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PROCEEDINGS OF 1958  
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
VOLUME 1

The American Political Science Association  
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036



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## INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOVIET POLITICS

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

Such terms as "industrialization" or "industrialism" represent a kind of shorthand designating the transformation which has been proceeding for several centuries in the world from a primarily agricultural, rural and largely non-monetary economy to the modern type of economy and its accompanying political system, in which most people make their living in activities connected with and shaped by large-scale machine industry. In the present state of the social and political sciences, it is extremely difficult to identify, let alone to precisely define, correlations between economic-technological developments and political institutions and processes. This is true even in countries in which a wealth of data is available and in which social scientists are free to pursue their activities relatively unhampered by political and ideological restrictions. The problem is considerably more difficult in the case of the Soviet Union, where official secrecy bars access to some of the most important sociological and political data, and concerning which foreigners have usually entertained an abundance of prejudices and illusions. However, the problem of the relationships between industrialization and Soviet politics is such an interesting one that it may be worth while to attempt here at least to identify some of them. It is certainly easier to approach this task today than it would have been a few years ago, before the publication of the excellent, objective studies of a number of sociologists, such as Barrington Moore, Jr.

Since the dynamic, never-ending and fabulously complex "industrial revolution" began, most of the ablest people in every society have favored and promoted industrialization. Many intellectuals, of course, were critical of the evils which they felt were associated with industrialism but usually radicals and reformers did not object to industrialization in general, but to particular results of this or that aspect of industrialization. The marxists furnish a conspicuous

illustration of the truth of such a generalization. No ideological movement has been more critical of the injustices and miseries associated with "exploitation" than the marxists and yet the marxists considered that the cure for the evils of industrialism was a more complete and vigorous industrialization. As G. D. H. Cole noted in 1932, "socialism, the child of industrialism, will not speedily take up arms against its parent."<sup>1</sup>

From the point of view of the political scientist, perhaps the most important consequence of industrialization has been its decisive role in the development of the modern form of the nation-state. The power of governments within nations has increased with industrialization, and the scope of the functions of government has grown. The power of industrialized societies in relation to non-industrialized societies has also obviously increased. A natural consequence of this process has been the effort made by the ruling elites of most countries, and the governments which they have controlled or influenced, to promote industrialization. While the major direct agents of industrialization in the "advanced" Western countries, at least in the nineteenth century, were private businessmen and corporations, governments mightily assisted the process by using various instruments of domestic and foreign policy, such as taxation, tariffs and the facilitation of foreign investment. In some very important respects, industrialization has had the same political effects in "socialist" Russia as in "capitalist" Britain, France, Germany or America. The most important and obvious general result of industrialization in Russia, major aspects of which we shall attempt to examine presently in some detail, has been the increase in both the domestic and the foreign power and influence of the Soviet Russian state. Perhaps as this process is extended to hitherto non-industrialized countries like China, Russia will lose some of the comparative advantage it has held among the "socialist" countries as a result of its superior industrialization. At the same time, however, unless the Western countries maintain the lead that they enjoy at present in terms of industrial development over the formerly underdeveloped countries, their power and influence in the world may tend to diminish. This may or may not be "good," but the record of the last two or three centuries, and in particular the history of Soviet Russia and Communist China indicates that it is likely to be true.

In view of the rather obvious points that have already been made, it seems surprising that there was ever any doubt in the West that Soviet Russia would play an increasing role in world affairs as the industrialization

of that country proceeded. Of course, we have today the advantages of hindsight, brilliantly illuminated by such recent developments as Soviet leadership in the launching of artificial earth satellites. There was a time, not so long ago, when some Western statesmen even doubted whether the Soviet system could long endure. Even today, popular magazines in Britain and America frequently predict the early dissolution of the Soviet Union. In one way or another, many of us, whether we be government officials, journalists, businessmen or scholars, have contributed to the myth of the instability of the Soviet political and economic system. It is outside the scope of this essay to attempt to explain why this myth has been so popular in the West. However, a few observations regarding its origins and persistence may be pertinent.

The Russian Communists themselves were partly to blame for Western misunderstanding of the Soviet economic and political pattern. Particularly in the early years of their power, the Bolsheviks made excessive use of utopian phraseology. Even Lenin, in his State and Revolution, written in 1917, talked as if in the new Russia there would be no need for law and order, government and authority, and in general for the orderly processes of administration without which, it has usually been felt in all countries, society would dissolve into chaos. The extravagances of "war communism," including the attempt to substitute a barter system for the use of money, and many other features of early Soviet policy, such as the aggressive attack on organized religion, made not only conservatives but also liberals and even many radicals in the West doubt the sagacity or perhaps even the sanity of the Soviet leadership, and, consequently, its ability to remain long in power.

Perhaps one important element in Western misconceptions of the Soviet situation was the implicit belief that industrialism was only a part of capitalism, and that there could be no industrialization without private ownership of industry and banks, and outside of the framework of stock exchanges, investment banking, and, in general, the institutional pattern which Western businessmen, government officials and economists and political scientists took for granted and associated with a "normal" socio-economic pattern. Perhaps partly because of these factors, the whole Soviet system seemed "unnatural," and therefore destined to disappear in a relatively short time. Wishful thinking, combined with



ignorance, led Westerners who took any interest at all in what was happening in Russia to predict, either early Soviet collapse or a "return to capitalism." While such illusions were perhaps most widespread in the early years of the famous "New Economic Policy," in the 1920's, they have been revived with almost every turn of Kremlin policy toward conservatism in politics or administration.

Westerners -- and dissident communists -- who interpreted many Soviet policies as retreats from "Marxism" were not entirely in error. They were, however, wrong in associating such practices as differential wage rates, the revival of a measure of "legality," and even the development of Soviet "patriotism" with a revival of capitalism of the Western type. What was actually developing in Russia was a monopolistic, statist industrialism, legitimized ideologically by Stalin's voluntaristic interpretation of Marxism.

The Soviets, after Stalin launched his first Five Year Plan in 1928, were engaged in a desperate and rigorous "struggle" -- to use their own apt term -- to build one of the most powerful industrial societies in the world. In some ways, perhaps, Soviet industrialism, like other features of the Soviet system, represents a logical, but exaggerated development of tendencies which, in the older industrialisms of the West, have been restrained and controlled by political democracy and other factors largely alien to Russian political tradition and completely absent from Stalinist ideology. Soviet industrialism is the purest monopolistic industrialism. The industrial leaders of the Soviet Union, who are at the same time the sole and undisputed political masters of society, possess, in exaggerated form, the characteristics of imperiousness, arrogance, suspicion and secrecy which have so often been displayed by economic and political monopolists elsewhere. The masters of the Soviet economy, being neither elected nor subjected to control, investigation or criticism by representatives of any electorate, whether it be a voting citizenry or even the stockholders of a corporation, naturally do not concern themselves very much with "public opinion." The political bosses, as the owners, in effect, of all industry in a fully "socialized" society also own the press and other agencies of communication -- a fact with enormous implications for Soviet artistic and cultural, as well as political life.



It is important to stress these differences between Soviet and, for example, Scandinavian, British or American industrial society for if they are not fully understood wishful thinking and confusion are inevitable. The character of an industrial society cannot, in other words, be understood without reference to the political and cultural context which helped to shape it. If at one time Westerners were prone to doubt that Soviet power could last very long, more recently they have tended to think that since the Soviet Union has become an industrialized society it must soon come into possession of all of the attributes of a modern Western industrial order, such as a relatively free press, political democracy, and a wide variety of pressure groups which can exert influence on official policy. We probably tend to underestimate the differences between the extremely hierarchical, statist industrialism of Russia and the much more pluralistic and less tightly organized system in which we live. By a kind of "democratic fallacy" we tend to assume that the laboring and consuming public will not long tolerate a situation in which they do not receive a reasonable distribution of the fruits of their labor. In the modern Western conception of the evolution of industrial societies, the rigorous early stage is automatically succeeded by one in which the general standard of living rises, and access to political participation becomes increasingly available to the population, through universal suffrage and the activity of competing political parties.

In the long run, this relatively optimistic prognosis may prove to be correct. Certainly it is difficult to doubt that if some such process were to take place in Russia and other communist countries, the results would be beneficial in terms of Western democratic values, not only to the peoples of those countries, but to the peoples of the whole world. In fact, the facilitation of such a "mellowing" of Soviet communism should be one of the major goals of American foreign policy. It is not necessarily wildly optimistic to share the hope expressed some years ago by The Economist, of London, that the Soviet rulers "may adjust themselves in the long run to a world which restricts their opportunities for expansion, yet permits them to enjoy unmolested the power and wealth which a new social order in a vast empire has bestowed on them."<sup>2</sup> In recent years, some leaders of Western thought have added to this formula the perspective of the growing influence in Soviet society of an increasingly influential class of

highly trained administrators, scientists and technical men.

However, it is only realistic to face the possibility that the Western situation in a world of growing Soviet industrialization, and the spread of the influence of Soviet industrialization to the underdeveloped countries, may grow considerably worse before it can grow better. The available evidence indicates that the physical power of Russia and other communist countries, relative to that of the West, will grow greater in the decades immediately ahead. While there will be some rise in the standard of living in the Soviet Union, and perhaps in other Soviet bloc countries, and this will benefit the populations of those countries, in the short run, at least, the results of this development will be to increase the world prestige of the Soviet Union and make its policies seem increasingly attractive to the peoples of the underdeveloped countries and even, perhaps, to those of some of the poorer Western industrial countries. While Soviet totalitarian industrialization, with its concomitants of regimentation of labor, political control of spiritual life, and general drabness, are not attractive to the peoples of countries which have long enjoyed high standards of living and the benefits of free political parties and free labor unions, it can be very attractive to impatient radicals and reformers in underdeveloped countries, who, quite justifiably, want to put an end in the shortest possible time to the conditions of medieval squalor and national humiliation from which their peoples and their countries are suffering. World history in our time may be decisively influenced by the decision made by the peoples of the underdeveloped countries, or rather by their leaders, as to which of the two available models of industrialization, the Soviet totalitarian or the Western democratic, they decide to choose. This, at any rate, seems to be the opinion of an impressive number of well-informed and thoughtful students of world affairs.<sup>3</sup>

The communist variety of industrialization leads to the enforced social, administrative and ideological homogeneity of society. Perhaps one of the major differences between Soviet industrialization and the early states, at least, of industrialization in Western countries with a more pluralistic sociopolitical heritage than

that of Russia -- and most of Asia and Africa also -- was that in a country like Soviet Russia the discontent which accompanied the early stages of industrialization could find no organized outlet and could exert little influence on official policy, except perhaps to make it, in retaliation, even more harsh and terroristic than it might otherwise have been. To the extent that it was represented in the upper echelons of the monopolistic Communist Party, opposition to the excesses of industrialization, based on a humanitarian interpretation of the Marxist ideology, resulted only in purges, exiling or execution of dissident communists such as Bukharin. Soviet Russia, unlike nineteenth century England, had no series of reform bills. As we have already hinted, the despotic Russian political tradition undoubtedly helps to explain this difference between Russian communist and English or American industrialization. However, there is another factor which must be taken into account. This is the factor of relative economic backwardness, which has had very important psychological repercussions in Russia and in other underdeveloped or formerly underdeveloped countries. The emotions generated by economic backwardness probably had a great deal to do with the fanaticism of Soviet communism. A full examination of this question would require a book. Here one can only recall that Russian economic backwardness generated, among Russian radical intellectuals, emotions of admiration and even idealization of the West, but at the same time led also to feelings of envy, animosity and fear. Fear of the impact of Western industrial power, which strongly influenced tsarist Russian foreign policy, has bulked particularly large, of course, in all Soviet domestic and foreign policy and has been a major motivating force of the rapid Soviet industrialization which is a disturbing factor in world politics today.

One could almost write the history of the Soviet Union in terms of the Soviet belief that unless Russia could "overtake and surpass" Western nations in terms of economic productivity and military technology, the "imperialists" would crush the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the best known and most often quoted Soviet expression of the connection between the fear of foreign powers and the drive for rapid Soviet industrialization was the often-quoted speech made by Stalin in February, 1931 "On the Tasks of Managers," in which Stalin demanded "Bolshevik tempo" in the liquidation of Soviet economic backwardness, and predicted that if Soviet backwardness



were not overcome within ten years Russia would be crushed.

As Lenin himself had once predicted, industrialization and the attempt to build "socialism," without political democracy, led in Russia to many "absurd and reactionary conclusions." 5 Certainly industrialization as it was carried out under Soviet auspices made it impossible to realize the professed aims of Soviet communism. Instead of building socialism in Russia on the firm foundations of civil liberties and political democracy, as Marx and Engels and most European socialists, including, although with perhaps fatally significant reservations, Lenin, had envisaged, the Soviet communists proceeded first to eliminate the rudiments of political democracy and civil liberties which had taken precarious root in Russia since the great reforms of 1861, and then proceeded with their program of totalitarian industrialization.

To say this does not mean to accept the view, fashionable in some Western circles, that from the beginning Soviet communism was an ideological cover for the cynical pursuit of power. There was, and probably is even today, at least among some rank and file Party members, an element of idealism in Soviet communism. In fact, without this element of idealism, too often converted into a combination of fanaticism and cynicism, Soviet communism could probably not have survived and it could certainly not have exerted such great influence as it has outside of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet communists have been so absorbed with means, chief among which has been that of rapid industrialization, that they have tended to lose interest in ultimate and ideal goals. Perhaps to a considerable degree this situation reflects a general characteristic of industrialization, whether carried out rapidly in a backward country or more gradually in a more advanced country. Certainly one does not have to be a doctrinaire critic of modern industrial society to have doubts about the value, in terms of humanistic criteria, of the frantic effort required by our own type of industrial society to stimulate the ever-increasing demand for goods and gadgets necessary, perhaps, to maintain demand and prevent recession and stagnation.

If industrialization in the Soviet Union has, thus far, brought to the Soviet people less, rather than more of the freedom and equality, Marx might have envisaged with the replacement of a primitive economy by a "socialist" one, and has brought prosperity only to the ruling few, it has produced many satisfactions for many Soviet citizens. Perhaps the most important, in terms of the political cohesiveness of the Soviet state, is the elevation of status which industrialization has brought to millions of Soviet citizens. Industrialization has elevated the status of all Soviet citizens, in a sense, by raising Russia from a second-rate power to the second-ranking power in the world. To what extent the all too powerless Soviet worker or peasant derives satisfaction from this kind of elevation of status is difficult to determine. We can be reasonably sure that many members of the political, administrative and professional elites take much pride in the new eminence of Russia among the powers of the world.

Also, millions of Soviet citizens have risen from the ranks of the peasantry to join those of the industrial working class which, according to the official Soviet mythology, is the "ruling class" of Soviet society. Other millions have received either a secondary or a higher education and have joined the new Soviet intelligentsia, officially described in Soviet political literature since about 1937 as "commanders of production" and as "the most cultured part of the Soviet people."<sup>6</sup> This combination of national and individual elevation of status has led to the development of a new Soviet elite which has a stake in the Soviet system.<sup>7</sup> At least part of the population has been gripped by a chauvinistic new Soviet nationalism, officially described as "Soviet patriotism," and it is the constant effort of the Kremlin to imbue the entire population with a fervent belief in the uniqueness and superiority of Soviet civilization.<sup>8</sup> There are, of course, differences of opinion among competent Western observers regarding the degree of success enjoyed by the Soviet authorities in the inculcation of "Soviet patriotism." On the whole, the available evidence suggests that while Soviet morale was very low in the years immediately following World War II, industrial and scientific progress and the victories achieved by the Kremlin in the "international arena" have stimulated Soviet national pride. One Western observer with a long background in the study of Soviet affairs reported after a visit to Russia in

1956: "Today there is almost no trace left of the former Russian deference for the science and culture of the West; it has given way to self-confidence, boasting and arrogance." 9 On the other hand, the continued fear of intimate contacts and spontaneous relationships between Soviet citizens and foreigners indicated by innumerable Kremlin actions, even since the death of Stalin, suggests that the new Soviet nationalism may still be only a veneer over the old Russian susceptibility to Western influences. Certainly such recent episodes as the expulsion from the U.S.S.R. of a young American diplomat for no other reason, apparently, than his normal, ordinary friendliness toward fellow students in the class he was auditing at Moscow University, do not bespeak Kremlin confidence in the success of Soviet industrialization, so far as its ability to inspire loyalty based on conviction is concerned. Some of the ablest of the Soviet refugees continue to report that there are dissident youths who desire a "democratic, social-minded and constitutional" state, even if some of them are still bewitched by the myth that Lenin was a "democrat." 10

As we have suggested, the most profound impact of Soviet industrialization lies in the area of international relations. Here the most obvious effect is that of military power resulting both from an increase in skills and productivity and from the exceptional capability of totalitarian industrialism to maintain a permanent war economy. Soviet military power enables the Kremlin to capitalize on worldwide fear of war. Whether or not Moscow is to blame for the acuteness of current international tensions, or whether they should be attributed mainly to factors over which neither Washington nor Moscow has much control, it is certain that Soviet Russia is in a good position, because of its centralized administrative system, to exploit them. This capability is, at least indirectly, one of the consequences of Soviet industrialization. A more alarming capability deriving from Russian military-industrial power is the pressure which the Kremlin can exert on the internal affairs of other countries, particularly weak and backward countries contiguous to or relatively near the Soviet Union.

There are also some other less obvious but very significant ways in which Soviet industrialization has affected world politics. Soviet industrial and scientific progress has tended to strengthen Soviet influence



and weaken Western influence in many parts of the world, particularly among peoples with a heritage of resentment against Western "colonialism." Although the present Soviet "trade and aid" policy probably originated, in large measure, as a defensive counter-strategy to American foreign economic policy, which, in the form of the Marshall Plan and "Point Four" achieved spectacular success in the early post-war years, it has recently achieved dramatic successes of its own. Obviously, this policy could not be pursued without a massive industrial base. Soviet foreign economic policy works hand in hand with an equally well-organized and aggressive "cultural relations" policy. Both of these instruments of Soviet policy depend upon industrial strength and both are designed to weaken Western influence, encourage neutralism and, eventually, to bring about the economic and cultural orientation of the peoples of Asia, Africa and even Latin America toward Moscow. In its employment of economic and cultural instruments abroad the Kremlin displays the same deadly seriousness, indefatigable energy and careful planning which have characterized Soviet economic-technological and cultural development at home.

Soviet foreign economic policy and the Soviet "cultural offensive" derive their strength from an increasingly impressive scientific and engineering-administrative technology. This home base is skillfully displayed to foreign visitors, particularly to those from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its vulnerabilities, which are those of totalitarianism, are carefully concealed. Every effort is made to persuade Asian and African "bourgeois nationalists" that the Soviet Union shares and sympathizes with their aspirations. The result has been that the Kremlin, which in reality desires the destruction of all non-communist political, economic and cultural systems, has won the friendship, or at least the friendly neutrality, of the heads of several anti-communist Asian and African governments. This amazing situation is the result of skillful Soviet exploitation of "contradictions" in the non-Soviet world, energetic utilization of technical, administrative and cultural resources created by Soviet industrialization and, at least to some degree, to mistakes made by the Western powers, particularly in their failure to study and try to understand the cultures and aspirations of the awakening peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is entirely possible that the Soviet

leaders may be able, eventually, to develop their already considerable success in penetrating the underdeveloped countries into complete, or at least decisive, political and administrative control over them.

The success of Soviet totalitarian industrialization may actually threaten the survival of the contemporary Western "welfare states," in which as A. A. Berle has pointed out, "governmental and private property are inextricably mingled." 11 It is, of course, impossible to predict whether or not the sentence of death which the Soviet communists have pronounced upon Western democracy will actually be carried out. It is clear, however, that the Soviet leaders believe they can defeat the United States in the race for economic supremacy. Nikita S. Khrushchev, in his speech on the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution asserted that within the next fifteen years the Soviet Union would be able to surpass the 1957 United States output of the "most important types of products." 12 More than a year before Khrushchev made this confident prediction, the President of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Professor Alexander N. Nesmeyanov, had stated that the tempo of scientific training and development in the Soviet Union had already surpassed that of England or the United States. There are indications that such statements are no longer regarded as idle boasts in some responsible circles in the West. The Economist, for example, for April 27, 1957, noted that "Four or five years ago the fashion was for British industry to send productivity teams to the U.S.; in the last two years technical teams have been going to Russia."

There are many indications of Soviet determination to convert industrial success into universal political power. For example, Mr. A. Sobolev, in an article published in the Central Committee magazine Kommunist, in 1956, predicted that with the gradual conquest of political power by communists in many countries, even the United States would eventually be "surrounded" by "a friendly socialist environment." It would then become easy to elect a "government of a new type." 13 For, as Khrushchev has put it more bluntly and less tactfully, the Soviets intend to "bury" us.

The ultimate objective of the Soviet effort is to produce "a single universal human culture," which,



however, cannot be established until after the realization of the "universal dictatorship of the proletariat" -- in other words after Moscow has established universal dominion.<sup>14</sup> Thus the political significance of Soviet industrialization seems to consist in a combination of the grandiose ambition, defensive but dangerous reactions to dogmatically postulated foreign threats and vast powers, possessed by the totalitarian rulers of a professedly revolutionary power in an age in which most of the peoples of the world are gripped by uncertainty, instability and vague but insistent aspirations for greater relative wealth and status vis a vis the "have" countries of the West.

If the free societies stop underestimating the ideological appeal and the power potential of totalitarian industrialism, they may be able to achieve the voluntary cooperation needed to prove to the peoples of the world, especially the "uncommitted" peoples that even in the contemporary era industrialization can be attained without totalitarianism. Achievement of this objective, which need not be one hundred per cent successful to be worth great efforts, requires a sustained, systematic and cooperative foreign economic policy and, perhaps even more important, hard and deep study of foreign thought systems, languages and cultures.

But even more important, or at least more urgent in terms of military security, than depriving the communists of further success in the underdeveloped countries is adequate performance in the "battle of production." The two efforts are interrelated, of course, and both are subordinate to the West's ultimate objective. This is to further develop and improve its own social system and to create conditions in which peoples now behind the Iron Curtain will have at least as much freedom of choice between the "open society," and totalitarianism, as modern political democracy makes available to its citizens. This does not imply demagogic slogans about "liberation" of other peoples. It does, however, demand that in the interests of its own survival, not to mention its ideals, the free society must fight stubbornly and relentlessly to deprive the totalitarian powers of their present unfair advantages in the field of communication. These considerations are not at all irrelevant to the problem of the politics of Soviet

industrialization. The menace of the false Utopia of Soviet collectivism consists very largely in the success it has already achieved and the even greater victories it threatens to achieve in converting men into instruments of technology -- while the virtue of Western democracy consists largely in the degree to which this fate has been averted. Deprived of the props of censorship and propaganda myths, the total state might crumble. The resulting end of the present "cold war" economy would require painful adjustments in the Western economies, of course, and there is no point in blinking this fact, but the cost would be small in comparison to the possibilities that would become available to all men for utilizing scientific knowledge for human welfare. The perspectives mentioned may seem grandiose, in view of the grim struggle for survival in which we are engaged. And yet, do free men deserve to prosper if they prove to be inferior in imagination and shrewdness to the rulers of regimental societies? Can we maintain the values of spontaneity and diversity against the pressures of Soviet monolithism and "purposiveness"? Will communist fanaticism soften and Soviet society become more humane over the next few generations? Will the cohesiveness of the "socialist camp" prove superior to, or inferior to the free consensus which furnishes the basis of NATO and other non-communist alliances? These, in many ways increasingly disturbing questions, are related to the almost protean problems we have sought to survey here.

It is not certain that the "mellowing" of Soviet ideology predicted by George Kennan in a famous article in 1947, and in subsequent essays, will actually occur, or as we have suggested, that its immediate effects, if it does, will be beneficial to the West. However, as Soviet industrialization proceeds, and matures, the material and cultural foundations for a more humane order are being established. And, as we suggested in connection with Soviet student unrest, some troublesome, even if as yet not very serious new problems are being created for the Soviet rulers. The social stratification, inequality of rewards, and often excessive pressures of the state upon the careers and even the most intimate private concerns of individuals also work steadily to undermine the moral authority of the official ideology. As the attractions of technology for technology's sake fade further, it is possible that Soviet youths may turn, not only to "true Marxism" -- in contrast to

official "Marxism-Leninism" -- but to a search for intellectual and spiritual values not contained in Marxism of any kind. Of course, even in this case, it is unlikely that Russians will cease to be patriots and even nationalists. The regime realizes the underlying force of nationalism in the Soviet mentality, of course, and has increasingly, both in domestic and foreign propaganda, claimed that in the modern era only communists have a right to call themselves patriots.

In fact, a chauvinistic, extremely provincial-minded nationalism is today the strongest sentiment in Russia, China and the other "socialist" countries. But just as totalitarian industrialism intensifies the nationalism of each "socialist" state, so it will, probably, render increasingly difficult the task of integrating the "socialist camp" as a whole. Moscow may come increasingly to regard Communist China as a Frankenstein of its own irresponsible creation. Perhaps Western diplomacy should, from time to time, do what it can to stimulate thought in Soviet elite circles regarding some of the perspectives for the future inherent in Chinese industrialization.

Although nuclear weapons and other marvels of our scientific age have greatly heightened international tension, they may have their compensations. The most obvious and direct seem to be in the area of energy production which can vastly elevate the standard of living of all peoples. Indirectly, the emphasis on scientific thinking to which they impel mankind in its efforts to survive may, in all countries, including Russia, lead gradually to strengthening the hand of social strata whose outlook in international affairs is less fanatical and ethnocentric than that of the present Kremlin rulers. For this and many other reasons, the West should, despite the frustrations which are inevitable, push steadily for the expansion of all kinds of cultural and intellectual contacts with Russia. We should, of course, insist to the greatest extent feasible, that "cultural exchanges" are really exchanges and not merely opportunities for the Soviets to disseminate propaganda abroad to buttress their propaganda at home by distorted interpretations of "on the spot" observations, as may have been the case with the recent visit to the United States by a rather mature and politically high-ranking Soviet youth delegation. And yet, even such a group may have seen things and enjoyed experiences not reflected in carefully "earned" Pravda reports.



While Soviet economic growth may long continue to be very rapid, economists note that Russia is beginning to face difficulties earlier encountered by other industrial countries after periods of tempestuous plant expansion. We may expect that economic-technological pressures for a slow-down will be reinforced by psychological influences. Maximum pressures cannot be maintained forever. Totalitarianism itself may perhaps prove one day to have been a crisis situation, rather than a system of government.

For want of space we have touched, only briefly, in this concluding section, on just a few considerations which might indicate that in the long run evolution -- or perhaps some combination of evolution and revolution -- will bring Russia back into the family of nations which share humane ideals. But the run is apt to be rather long for our comfort. We need hopeful perspectives, but they should not be allowed to become substitutes for policies urgently necessary to deal with present dangers. The dangers are actual. The hopes are only possible.

## NOTES

## Frederick C. Barghoorn Industrialization and Soviet Politics

<sup>1</sup> Article on "Industrialism" by G. D. H. Cole in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. VIII, (New York, 1932.) Cole, interestingly enough, noted that the Soviet Russians were "forcing on industrialization at a hitherto unprecedented pace." See pp. 18-26. Quotations on p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Editorial of January 22, 1949.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Edwin O. Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy, (New York, 1955.)

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the communique of the Plenary Session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of November, 1928, in which the most rapid possible industrialization and the fullest utilization of "the experience and knowledge of Western Europe and America," is urged, in view of "the international situation, the great technical progress of the capitalist states and the military threat." This communique is contained in VKP (b) V. Rezolyutsiyakh i Reshoniyyakh (Vol. II, Moscow, 1936), p. 295.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of this point see Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, (New York, 1948), pp. 293 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, the article in Bolshevik, No. 9, May 1944, "On the Marxist-Leninist Training of the Cadres of the Soviet Intelligentsia," or V. M. Molotov's speech on the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Great October Revolution, 1945.

<sup>7</sup> Many aspects of the relationship between social structure and the political cohesiveness of the Soviet system are discussed in Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956.)

<sup>8</sup> On Soviet nationalism see, for example, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, (New York, 1956.)

<sup>9</sup> Philip E. Mosely, "Russia Revisited," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, (October, 1956), pp. 70-83. Quotation on p. 81.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, David Burg, "New Trends among Soviet Students," The New Leader, August 18-25, 1958, pp. 15-16.

<sup>11</sup> A. A. Berlo, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution, (New York, 1954) Quotation on p. 109.

<sup>12</sup> Pravda, November 7, 1957, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> A. Sobolev, "O parlimentskoi forme perekhoda k sotsializmu," Kommunist, No. 14, (1956), pp. 14-32.

<sup>14</sup> On this point see, for example, G. G. Karpov, "O sovetskoi kulture i kulturnoi revolyutsii SSSR," (Moscow, 1954), pp. 76-77.

## The Concept "Leadership" in Community Research

by

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting  
of the American Political Science Association,  
St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958.

A layman might think that the concept "leadership" would be indispensable to political research. In fact, however, judging from current usage it might with advantage be dispensed with altogether as it is one of several words which are used to mean exactly the same thing. "The leaders of a group," say Lasswell and Kaplan in a book written expressly to clarify and systematize our concepts, "are its most active powerholders, effectively and in the perspectives of the group."<sup>1</sup> For Dahl leaders are "individuals with relatively great influence over decisions."<sup>2</sup> For Scoble "leader," "power-holder," "influential," and "decision-maker" are synonyms.<sup>3</sup> For Smuckler and Belknap leaders are those people identified by respondents to a questionnaire as "most important" in making decisions.<sup>4</sup> Hunter uses "power" and "leader" as one word, "power leader," and he strings together what for him are four synonyms in a short sentence which sums the situation up nicely: "In our society, men of authority are called power and influence leaders."<sup>5</sup>

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\* This paper arises out of an empirical study supported by the Institute of Public Administration and the Governmental Affairs Foundation with money from the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund. The writer wishes to thank Mr. Peter B. Clark for making available his interviews with lay civic leaders and for reading this paper.

- 1) Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, Yale University Press, 1950, p. 152.
- 2) Robert A. Dahl, "The New Haven Community Leadership Study," Working Paper #1, December 12, 1957, mimeographed, p. 2.
- 3) Harry M. Scoble, "Yankeetown: Leadership in Three Decision-making Processes," mimeographed, paper read before the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 6-8, 1956, footnote p. 1.
- 4) Ralph H. Smuckler and George H. Belknap, Leadership and Participation in Urban Political Affairs, Government Research Bureau, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1956, p. 9.
- 5) Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, University of North Carolina Press, 1953, p.2.



In ordinary usage these words have distinct meanings. ("A leader," Hunter was told by one of his power elite, "is a man who has the gumption to shake the lead out of his pants.")<sup>6</sup> Why have the distinctions been disregarded by social scientists? Conceivably because, although convenient for ordinary usage, they have been found to be without import for science. But no one really has shown them to be so (or indeed that there is really much difference between the requirements of science and of intelligent discourse) and in the absence of evidence the presumption surely ought to lie the other way. Instead of collapsing familiar distinctions, social scientists ought to try to sharpen them and fit them into an analytical system. To a large extent this is what theory is: the making of distinctions which are useful for analysis.

This paper is in four parts. The first explicates the concept "leadership."<sup>7</sup> The second employs some of the resulting distinctions to characterize in an illustrative way certain leadership roles in a Mid-western metropolis. The third discusses the connections between "leadership" on the one hand and "influence" on the other. The final section summarizes very briefly some crucial questions upon which research should focus.

# 1.

The Emperor of Japan is a leader. So is the President of the United States. An officer leads his men, a conductor leads his orchestra, and a businessman leads his company. What if anything do all these uses of the word have in common? Apparently this: in his own milieu each "leader" performs the same general function, that of giving relatedness or direction to activity. In the most general sense, a leader is one who performs the function of creating or maintaining organization.

To speak of one function is likely to lead to confusion, however... Because we happen to use one word -- "leadership" -- to refer to all of the activities by which an actor creates or maintains organization, we should not fall into the error of thinking that these activities are essentially alike. That they are alike in function does not imply that they are alike in any other significant respect.

In fact they are extremely unlike. They are unlike in the concrete operations

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6) Ibid, p. 35.

7) "Taking its departure from the customary meanings of the terms, explication aims at reducing the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of their ordinary usage by propounding a reinterpretation intended to enhance the clarity and precision of their meanings as well as their ability to function in hypotheses and theories with explanatory and predictive force." Carl Hempel, Methods of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, University of Chicago, v. 2, no. 7, p. 12.



they involve and in the personal qualities and organizational arrangements which give rise to them. Here is a list (not complete or systematic, of course, for no such listing could be either) of a dozen functions which are sometimes treated as the defining or essential characteristic of "leadership":

1. Innovation, invention, the initiation of new activity. The leader is defined as one who shows the way by going first with something new.
2. Clarification or redefinition of the ends of the group. The leader is defined as one who sharpens the purpose of the group.
3. Discovering and articulating the will of the group. The leader, according to this definition, is one who expresses the "sense of the meeting" or the "feeling of the country."
4. Giving purpose. The leader, in this sense, is one who makes his will the will of the group.
5. Anticipating the future and making provision for it. Here the leader is defined as the one without whose vision the people perish.
6. Laying out a course of action by which the group can attain its ends. In this sense the leader is a planner; he is the one who shows how.
7. Engendering morale. The leader is defined as one who creates a sense of dedication to common purposes and faith in the probability of success.
8. Galvanizing the group into action. The leadership function may be defined as that of creating a sense of urgency in the group and provoking it to act. The leader is a gad-fly.
9. Finding the terms on which the members of the group will act in relation to each other and to their common purposes. The leader is defined as one who can secure agreement.
10. Symbolizing the group. One who is the visible sign of an invisible entity -- the corporate being of the group -- is defined as its leader.
11. Serving as a medium for the exchange of communications. The leader, in this sense, is the central "switchboard" by means of which the activity of the group is coordinated.
12. Representing the group. The leader, in this sense, is one who carries on "foreign relations" for the group.

That these activities are different, in the sense of being different operations and therefore requiring different qualities and abilities, is evident. For example, leadership in the sense of laying out a course of action characteristically requires intellectual capacity. Leadership in the sense of anticipating the future and making provision for it requires the gift of making sound judgements under conditions of uncertainty. Leadership in the sense of galvanizing the group into action requires animal energy and the capacity to be absorbed completely in the task at hand. Leadership in the sense of symbolizing the group requires ascribed qualities such as age, family, or ethnicity. And so on.

Sometimes all these activities are combined in one role and occasionally the incumbent of such a role is able to do them all supremely well. (Sir Winston Churchill comes to mind.) There may be certain interrelations, logical or empirical, among them such that performing one strongly implies performing others: for example, one who symbolizes the group may ipso facto engender morale in it, give it purpose, galvanize it into action, represent it, and so on.

On the other hand, some leadership roles are highly specialized. The function most frequently and fully differentiated seems to be that of symbolizing; sometimes (as in the case of the Emperor of Japan, for instance,) this function is completely separated from others. Extreme differentiation is rare, but leadership roles frequently emphasize only one or two of these activities while subordinating others and excluding some. Normally there is even tension, if not actually incompatibility, among the leadership activities: the qualities that make one a leader in one sense of the word prevent one from being a leader in another sense of the word. Chester Wilmot remarked,

It seems fair to say that the very qualities which made Eisenhower a successful Supreme Commander prevented him at this time from becoming a successful commander in the field. His great talent lay in holding the Allied team together, and in reconciling the interests of different nations and services. In the situation which had now developed, however, Eisenhower's conscientious tolerance and inclination to compromise were liabilities. The occasion called for a man with a bold plan, a Commander-in-Chief who knew what was essential and had the will to impose his strategic ideas without regard for personalities or public opinion.<sup>8</sup>

If leadership activities are extremely varied, so are the group settings in which they occur. To engender morale in a small group assembled for laboratory experimentation is -- obviously -- not the same thing as to engender it among soldiers in combat or in a whole nation.

A crucial distinction is to be made between "intended" and "unintended" leadership. Almost all of the leadership functions listed above can be carried on unwittingly. A farmer, for example, may unintentionally lead a whole district to adopt a new practice by setting an example which others copy. Similarly a citizen may influence the attitude of his neighbors toward civic corruption without being aware that he is doing so. In these examples the activity of the neighbors is concerted, but without anyone's intending to concert it or thinking of himself as a leader or a follower.

There is, it will be seen, great danger in using the term "leadership" without specifying: a) the particular function (or combination of them) denoted, b) the kind of group or association with respect to which the function is performed, and c) whether the function (or functions) is performed intentionally or unintentionally. Where the context does not make the meaning perfectly clear, the term should be used with suitable qualifying expressions: e.g. "intended leadership in the sense of laying out a course of action for a large formal

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<sup>8</sup>) Struggle for Europe, p. 468.

organization," "unintended leadership in the sense of engendering morale in a primary group of children," or "intended leadership in the sense of initiating new activities in voluntary associations."<sup>9</sup>

## 2.

A complete account of leadership in a community must begin by identifying the various systems of activity which together constitute the community and must then describe with respect to each of these how the more or less distinct leadership functions are carried on. How, for example, does the city government -- presumably by far the most important single organization in the community -- choose courses of action? What are the forces which galvanize certain types of voluntary association into action? How is morale generated among voters?

Such an account would probably show both that unintended leadership is in some matters far more important than intended and that much leadership operates on a national or even international rather than a local basis. What is done about metropolitan organization in Toronto, for example, may influence directly what is done in Podunk, and this although no one in Toronto may think of himself as a leader of Podunk.

Even in a very small community there may be an elaborate specialization and division of labor among those who (intentionally or otherwise) perform leadership functions. Initiation of activity may be done by some. Definition of purpose by others. Planning by still others. And so on. It ought to be a matter of great interest to social scientists to observe the nature of this division of labor, to identify the social circumstances which produce various characteristic patternings of it, and to discover the principles by which certain personality types, or social types, are recruited into the appropriate roles.

One should not expect to find social roles corresponding to each specialized leadership function. There are many instances of an approximate correspondence (in England, for example, a group characteristically has a symbolic head who sits behind the mace; the symbolic head is a well defined social role); often leadership activity is the by-product, so to speak, of a social role which lies along another axis altogether.

Let us look, for illustrative purposes, at three unofficial roles which are familiar to the residents of a large Midwestern city. These are not the only such roles and may not even be the most important. However, they will serve as examples of the way in which the social setting gives rise to leadership activity and differentiates it by function.

9) This is consistent with the conclusion reached by Gibb in his review of the literature on leadership. "Perhaps," he says, "the concept of the leader will be of no further value to us when we have differentiated such roles as those of the initiator; energizer, harmonizer, expeditor, and the like. To shift the problem of definition from that of defining the leader to that of defining leader behavior or leadership acts has advantages for particular researches and for particular systemic psychologies, but it offers no solution to the definitional problem. Whether we couch our definitions in terms of the leader or the leadership act it is, of course, leader behavior with which the psychologist is concerned." Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Cambridge, 1954, Vol. II, p. 884.



1. The Promoter conceives a bright idea and tries to get it taken up and put on the civic agenda. He is likely to be an "individual" rather than a representative of an organization, to come from one of those occupations which exist on bright ideas (e.g. real estate, advertising, show business), to be an upward mobile representative of a minority group or to be in some sense "on the make" (he may be an amateur trying to break into politics), and to be seeking self aggrandizement rather than public service. He must take his idea to others to get it accepted, especially to the newspapers and the prestigious civic leaders. If they "buy" it, they will make it their own and drop him. He is not one of their club, and, besides, the qualities that are needed to carry the idea into effect are more or less incompatible with those that are needed to have it. To carry it into effect one must have official position in a strong organization (and therefore the kind of temperament that works well in organization), be (or at least appear) disinterested, and be "sound." The one who invents the new idea may not have any of these qualities.

2. The Negotiator gets those who have power to agree upon a course of action. He takes ideas which are current and fairly well accepted (e.g. that there should be consolidation of railroad terminals or metropolitan planning), formulates them into a workable "project," and gets it accepted. He is a big businessman who has reached the age of retirement (to deal with the heads of corporations he must be one himself, for vice-presidents can only talk to vice-presidents; but the active heads of corporations are too busy for his kind of civic activity; he is, therefore, retired or the chairman of the board, which means that he is at least 65). He has easy access to everyone of importance in the city and is on first-name terms with other corporation heads, the most important of whom he sees frequently at lunch in a private club or at golf. The project he works on is "practical" in the sense of attainable and therefore often very limited in scope, it has no ideological significance, and it seems to him to be clearly in the public interest. His contribution is to see that it is "soundly" conceived, that it is honest and out of politics, that it is carried forward energetically (he "rides herd on it"), and that it is agreed to by those who have power. He gets agreement by persuasion and patient give and take. The negotiator does not play an active part in local party politics (although he may be active nationally and may even have served on the Eisenhower "team") and he never engages in acrimonious exchanges in the press. He enjoys pulling strings from behind the scenes while letting professional politicians take credit with the public for his achievements. His personality, his background, and the requirements of his role as a negotiator all incline him to want to create harmony - to find the terms on which conflicting interests will work together. "I wouldn't say that the antagonistic method never accomplishes anything," a very successful negotiator recently told an interviewer. "It is just that I couldn't work that way. I'm psychologically unequipped for it. All the people that I've worked with are friends of mine. I made a comment like this to a Tribune editor. He said, 'That might be right for you.' He could use a meat-axe approach and also he could change his position. I have to maintain consistency."

3. The Adviser is called in by the mayor on an ad hoc basis to work out solutions to important problems. Characteristically his task is to sift a vast amount of factual evidence or to judge between the competing claims of technical specialists. This usually involves, at least implicitly, the making of value judgements on behalf of the community: e.g. should a certain facility

be located on the North Side where it will tend to break down racial segregation or on the East Side where it will be more popular and less expensive? The advisor is valuable to the mayor not only because his judgment is good, but also because it is respected by the press and by the public. He must therefore be able and disinterested. He is likely to be at the top of his business or profession (not to be would imply a question about his ability) and he is never identified with controversial interests or extreme positions (e.g. on race relations or tax reduction). Without being a politician himself, he is able to work with them on terms of mutual respect. (If there is a possibility of his running for office himself someday his usefulness to the mayor is less; one who is too old or too rich to want office is likely to be preferred as an advisor). Being a man of ability and weight who is not in politics, he will not allow himself to be used by the mayor for unworthy purposes. A mayor who wants to achieve a great deal must rely heavily upon advisors, as it is usually impossible for him to employ civil servants of sufficient talent. He must therefore conduct his office in a way that will attract them to it.

### 3.

We turn now to the connections between "leadership" on the one hand and "influence," "power," and "control" on the other. "Influence" means here ability to produce intended effects upon the behavior of others. "Power" is influence which exists when the ends of the influencer and those of the influencee are in conflict; if he is to have his way, A must offer rewards or threaten penalties or in some other way "force" B to obey him. "Control" is a different type of influence; it exists when ends are not in conflict: A's commands are in the nature of "signals," for B willingly accepts direction from him.

One who performs leadership functions is often the "head" of the group and in this capacity exercises influence on its behalf. Usually this influence (so far at least as it applies to members rather than to outsiders) is control rather than power. The leader can tell his followers how they must act in order to achieve their objectives, but he cannot "force" them to accept other objectives or to act in accordance with his will as such.

Moreover there is no necessary connection between performing leadership functions and being the "head" of the group, or between performing leadership functions and exercising influence (either power or control). The Emperor of Japan performs the leadership function of symbolizing his nation but he has no influence. One can in principle perform most leadership functions without having influence. For example, one can lay out a course of action without being able to carry it into effect. Or one can discover and articulate the will of the group without being able to change it.

If they have it at all, those who perform leadership functions may have "informal" rather than "formal" influence. By informal influence is meant that which is not explicitly ascribed to any official position or role.

Informal influence seems everywhere to rest very little upon power (i.e. upon the ability to use penalties and rewards or to "force" the other to do as one wills). Instead it rests largely upon control -- control arising from one or more of three conditions: 1. usefulness, 2. respect, and 3. benevolence.



1. By the usefulness of the leader is meant his ability to perform functions which the follower values. In so far as his control is of this nature, the leader's orders (advice, etc.) are accepted for no other reason than that they seem to offer the best solution to the problem. If he is better informed, wiser, or more skillful, the leader gets his way (as one put it) "by main force of being right." Being right is in fact the only "force" he can bring to bear.

2. The leader may exercise informal control by virtue of respect (i.e. mingled admiration, fear, and reverence) which is felt for him. He is respected because of qualities or attributes which pertain to him as a person and which exemplify or symbolize values that are respected; one displays regard for these values by deferring to him who represents them, by seeking his good opinion, and by modeling one's self upon him; feeling an obligation to act in accordance with the values, one feels an obligation also to act in accordance with his wishes or commands.

3. Leadership may rest upon benevolence -- the follower following because he is fond of the leader, because he wants to display affection for him, and because he wants to gratify him.

In much of the world virtually all leadership rests on informal influence. Even where formal influence is pervasive and highly organized, informal influence is of vast importance. In any social setting -- whether it be a Chinese village or an American metropolis -- the student of leadership will want to look closely at the role of informal influence and especially of influence arising out of respect.<sup>10</sup> He will want to know the characteristics which are the proximate grounds of respect, the values which are the ultimate grounds

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10) For example, in a Chinese village unofficial leaders respected for "personality or intelligence or general reliability" are sought out for advice by their neighbors and have such influence that official leaders must consult them and defer to them. M.C. Yang, A Chinese Village, Columbia University Press, 1945, p. 182. In an African tribe being able to talk gently and wisely and to make the people listen and return to reason when they want to quarrel or fight is usually cited as the most important condition of leadership. M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems, Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 232. In an Indian village one of the oldest methods of resolving disputes is by seeking the advice of some individual who is highly respected. These leaders "make no effort to interfere in the actions of others; but they are always available to give advice or act as mediators in quarrels, and their opinions and behavior are often copied by others." Their most important characteristic is "strict morality and discretion;" their behavior "approaches the ideal ethical code of the community." Henry Orenstein, "The Role of Leadership in the Changing Conditions of Caste in an Indian Village," mimeographed, Berkeley, 1957. In the Andaman Islands, "Besides the respect for seniority there is another important factor in the regulation of social life, namely the respect for certain personal qualities. These qualities are skill in hunting and in warfare, generosity and kindness, and freedom from bad temper. A man possessing them inevitably acquires a position of leadership in the community. His opinion on any subject carries more weight than that of another even older man. The younger men attach themselves to him, are anxious to please him..." A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, The Andaman Islanders, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1948, p.45.

of it,<sup>11</sup> and the range of demands which are likely to be met "out of respect."

In American cities lay persons who perform leadership functions in civic affairs are influential (in so far as they are influential) mainly by virtue of informal control. Witness, for example, the three roles that were described above. The promoter has no power; if he can make his idea appear advantageous it will be taken up but not otherwise. The negotiator is sometimes able to offer a quid pro quo of sorts (e.g. he will not press for this if the other fellow will not insist upon that) but in the main he relies upon patience, persuasiveness, and diplomatic skill. The adviser is in a similar position. He cannot "force" anybody to do anything.

If the civic leader is followed, it is not because he has penalties and rewards to distribute but because what he recommends "makes sense" and because he himself is respected. Here is an account of these matters given by a prominent citizen of the Midwestern city. In the course of an interview he had spoken with admiration of two men -- Mr. X and Mr. Y -- who if they lived in Regional City would certainly be called "top power leaders."

Q: Why do you admire X and Y?

A: Well, both are extremely intelligent and they have a real feeling of responsibility for the well-being of the community. They're level-headed in the sense that they're realistic about possible goals and ways of achieving them. They are not just visionary, well-meaning people. They also have independent personal fortunes and a position of authority in relation to other leaders in the community. In other words, they carry a clout. If either of them want to dragoon somebody onto a committee or get some money they can do it quite easily...

Q: Why do X and Y have this power of persuasion? Does Z have a clout?

A: The term 'clout' is misleading. I shouldn't have used it. I should have said, 'The power of persuasion.'

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11) The following quotations suggest how different may be the grounds, both proximate and ultimate, upon which respect is accorded:

1. "...leadership in prison is exercised by the criminally mature inmates who are serving long sentences for crimes of violence within the institution, by homosexuality, or by psychoneurotic or psychopathic behavior. Prison culture is organized around the values of its most persistent and least improvable members." C. Schrag, "Leadership Among Prison Inmates," American Sociological Review, XIX (Feb. 1954), p. 41..

2. "One of these teachers, however, was a very influential person because he possessed the attributes of a real Chinese gentleman. In addition to his specialized training he was able to paint landscapes, write poems, carve wood and stones, conduct conversations, and appreciate natural beauties. He could smoke like a gentleman and sip tea like an old scholar. He behaved very conventionally before women and old people, but was humorous when he talked with a group of young farmers." M.C. Yang, Op. cit., p. 188.

Q: Why do X and Y have this power of persuasion? What do they have that others lack?

A: I think the respect that the persuadee has for the persuader, and also the question of whether he likes him or dislikes him. I would make an effort to do things for X and Y that I would not make for John Jones. And that respect is a reflection of a long history in the case of each of them. There was real dedication to the community.

One can see in this reply (and in other similar interview material) some of the proximate grounds upon which respect is accorded by prominent people in the Midwestern city. A "civic leader" is respected by others if he: a) has worked or sacrificed from motives that are public-spirited; b) has good judgment, and c) has experience in handling large affairs and thus is used to exercising power and accepting responsibility.

It follows that in the Midwestern city one is not likely to have great informal influence among prominent people unless one is rich and powerful. Wealth and power are not however the bases upon which the influence rests directly; they are the sometimes necessary but never sufficient conditions of being respected, and it is respect, not the conditions which give rise to it, which the social scientist is likely to find the most interesting object for study.

It should be said again, however, that there is no necessary connection between having influence, formal or informal, and performing leadership functions. Whether the people who lead are the same people who have influence is an empirical question.

4.

Research along these lines will not focus on the questions which are now so popular: Who has high status? Who is considered "most important" in the making of decisions? Who gets his way? Whatever may be the importance of these questions, they lead in other directions. For the study of leadership in the community (or for that matter in any group at all) the crucial questions seem to be these: What are the roles (or complexes of roles) by which various functions (initiation of new activity, redefinition of ends, planning, and so on) requisite to the concerting of activity are carried on? What are the social circumstances which shape these roles and affect their working? What is the division of labor among them and how are people selected for them? Does the performance of one or another leadership function entail having influence (power or control, formal or informal)? If the leader is followed out of respect, what characteristics inspire it and what are the ultimate values these characteristics exemplify or symbolize?



## THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Prepared for Delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of  
the Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri,  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

To place the following contents in proper perspective it is necessary to explain briefly the background of this report to the members of the Association. So many distinguished members of the APSA have spoken on this subject in previous conventions that the unexplained appearance of the writer might be taken as evidence of a deep current of despair among Association leaders.

My credentials are simply explained. In August, 1957 at the request of a division of the Ford Foundation, the writer made a brief survey of introductory courses in political science and attempted to reach some conclusions concerning the potentialities of a project designed to improve the quality of these courses that had been proposed by a committee of the APSA.

Respondents were told that their comments and data would be kept confidential. The material that follows adheres to that promise. The names of responding institutions appear at the end of this paper. Any other identification has been avoided.

### Purpose of the Survey

The survey was undertaken with two objectives: First, to determine the current state of the teaching of introductory courses in political science and the extent to which such courses are viewed by the profession as satisfactory. Second, to determine whether there is need for a program designed to improve introductory courses and, also, to suggest promising lines of investigation and experimentation.

### Scope and Method

The necessity of producing a preliminary report by Sept. 2, 1957 meant that the survey would have to be restricted in both scope and method. It was decided to send a relatively brief questionnaire to selected private and public institutions, and to interview informed faculty members at 12-15 institutions, principally in the East. This report is based on information supplied by 51 institutions (26 public supported, 25 private). Information received from three other institutions has been discarded for purposes of this survey, either because incomplete, or unsuitable. In a substantial number of cases valuable statements were supplied by correspondents, supplementing the

ompleted questionnaire. What follows is based on questionnaire data, written statements and interviews. While the method used is admittedly less than rigorous, and the sample not scientifically derived, it is highly doubtful if a more complete study would change the data and conclusions in any appreciable way.

### What is the Introductory Course?

At most institutions the introductory course, as the title suggests, is viewed as an introduction to the materials and method of political science. It is commonly considered a basic course that is prerequisite to concentration by a student in the department, and at the same time serves as the one course in political science taken by a large number of students whose principal interests lie elsewhere and who elect the course primarily because of a social science distribution requirement. In some state universities it may perform a third function, namely, to fulfill a legislative mandate that certain classes of students (most commonly education majors) receive a certain amount of instruction in American government, including state and local government. Whether one course can with equal success meet the requirements of two or three different classes of students is a question that will be raised below.

### Objectives of the Introductory Course

Most comments on "objectives" stressed the necessity of giving student basic data and analytical skill to prepare him for additional and more advanced courses in political science. While it is argued that the typical introductory course is "good for the non-major," one has the clear impression that the introductory course is not viewed generally as a course in citizenship training, or as a survey course for the non-major, or as a means of arousing interest in politics in those who may enter the course without strong motivation.

There are exceptions. One respondent views his institution's two-term introductory course as serving all purposes reasonably well. This course, combining theory, comparative and U. S. government, is considered an adequate exhibition of the range of important political issues and their application, a good survey of the various topics with which more advanced courses will deal, as well as an introduction to the technique of political analysis useful to students in political science or in any other discipline involving values, competing interests, formal and informal social structures.

Another very commonly professed "objective" of the introductory course, especially where American government (usually at the national level only) is the subject, is the necessity of American college graduates "knowing" how their government works. Again, this is not aimed at increasing participation in politics, but is viewed as part of one's essential cultural stock. It is asserted that one can read newspapers, periodicals, and books with keener awareness of fundamental issues, behavior patterns, trends, etc. after having had such a course.

An additional word should be said about the student who is required at many institutions to take a specified number of class hours in the social sciences, defined typically to include political science, economics, sociology, with history and psychology occasionally added. This means that a number of students with little or no interest in political science will select the introductory course as the lesser of evils. Hence, the course must be designed, so the thought goes, to permit these "captives" to pass through successfully which means that the material that might be desirable for strongly motivated students must give way to that which is simpler and more easily digested.

In reality, one rarely finds only one professed objective, but rather a combination of objectives.

### Conception of the Introductory Course

Six of 25 private institutions and 9 of 26 public institutions indicated "inadequate course conception" as one of their leading problems, and it would appear that the problem is even more serious than these figures indicate. Fifteen of the private institutions and 10 of the public ones have made some substantial change in the conception or format of their introductory course since 1954. Half of those institutions that have made a basic change still term their course conception "inadequate." From statements volunteered by many institutions that did not specifically describe course conception as inadequate, it is apparent that relatively few departments are substantially satisfied. This may indicate a healthy modesty, but to this observer it denotes confusion of thought and purpose. Perhaps the best way to approach this problem is by looking at the institutions that profess greatest satisfaction, and indicate why.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Subject matter</u>	<u>Explanation of success</u>
A	Theory, Comp., US	"Core" materials. Senior profs. in charge greatly interested.
B	Theory, Comp., US	"Core" good reading, adequate lectures.
C	US	Senior lecturer outstanding, good staff.
D	US, Comp.	Small course, well taught.
E (2 courses)	Theory, Comp. Pol. Power in US	Excellent lectures, lively reading. Exciting lecturer, diversified reading.
F	Government and Citizenship in Action	Unorthodox, many "issues."

From this one can derive little that is instructive about the one best way to conceive the introductory course, unless it is that only one "straight" American government survey course is on this list, but it should be pointed out that in each instance there is some factor other than "conception" that helps to explain the success enjoyed.



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Course Format

Format is derived from conception obviously. Both are related to course length. But it is not always clear what that relationship is. Ten of 25 private institutions have a one semester course, 15 give two semesters. Fourteen of the public institutions have one semester or one quarter courses, with 12 giving two semesters or quarters. It is not at all apparent that the most dissatisfied institutions blame the lack of time for their principal difficulties, although the brevity of the course is frequently cited as an important factor where only one term or quarter is available. It is not clear whether course length in each instance results from an institutional pattern in introductory courses, or is primarily the result of conscious choice by the department concerned. The type of course combining theory, comparative and U.S. government could not be attempted in one semester, quite obviously.

The subject matter of the introductory political science course is prevalently U.S. national government, with some state and local materials added to most courses given at public institutions. Twenty-three of 26 public institutions devote all or a substantial part of their course to U.S. government. "Introduction to Politics" or some similar description characterizes all, or a substantial part, of the course in 6 institutions. One institution gives a semester of comparative government.

Private institutions are somewhat less partial to U.S. government, although 17 of 25 devote all or a substantial part of the course to this subject. Nine give theory and comparative, usually along with some U.S., and 2 have "Introduction to Politics" courses. (The totals exceed the number of institutions because of the split in the year's work at certain schools). There seems to be a predominant view in the private institution that the conventional American government survey course is unsatisfactory, but there is much less agreement as to what should replace it. One point on which there is agreement among those who have had experience in the matter, is that students seem to show greater interest when foreign governments were treated first and that much of this interest carries over to later phases of the course when they turn to a study of U.S. government. This is particularly true with students who have had a high school course that purported to cover American government, a course that is usually given in the third or fourth year of high school. Instructors teaching American government courses in colleges have serious difficulties in convincing such students that they are not retracing familiar paths when they encounter topical titles that sound familiar. Even for students who have had no work in government, it is asserted that studying foreign governments at the outset of a beginning course, is greater fascination and in a sense puts the student in a more receptive state of mind. There is a substantial body of opinion, especially at public institutions, that for American students a course in American government is the only defensible choice, particularly if the course must be given in one term or quarter. They argue that it is difficult enough to deal adequately with one government in a term, and that a student should at least be made aware of how his government is constituted and how it operates.

The greatest doubt, and in a sense the most serious debate (if it may be called such) surrounds the wisdom of including political theory in the introductory course. It is difficult to suggest accurately the range of the debate. Some support it in principle, but assert that it cannot be used in their institution, because of large classes, staff problems, low quality of students, and other reasons. Some feel that classical theory should be avoided but that theory showing the nature of communistic, socialist, and democratic governments is desirable. Another small group wants to stress the analytical tools and empirical basis of modern political science, with emphasis on what they conceive to be the distinctive aspects of the discipline. The behaviorists frequently take this position.

The one conclusion that can be made is that there is no consensus as to a "core" of political science that should provide the materials of the introductory course, or a body of theory or principles similar to the economic principles or theory that commonly serve as the introductory course in economics. Any attempt to determine just "why" this is so would lead into a lengthy discussion of the development of political science, but it may be suggested that "theory" in political science has traditionally been in the hands of the classicists, who have given descriptive theory courses that start with Plato and, typically, conclude with Locke. Recent decades have witnessed the rise of a new type of theorist in political science, one who designs research projects and evolves theoretical models for the purpose of discovering the "natural laws" of political life. Obviously, representatives of these two camps may have little in common, yet frequently are found in the same department. Each may oppose the other's theoretical "core," and thus far no effective combination of the two approaches has been found.

One question raised above concerns the desirability of devising separate introductory courses for two quite different publics: the potential political science, or social science major on the one hand, and the non-major, or "one course" student on the other. Respondents were asked directly whether, if resources permitted, they would give a second and different introductory course for the non-major. Eight of the 26 public institutions and 12 of the 25 private institutions would give such a course. A few already do so. It was suggested commonly that the non-majors should be given a course which is conceived more broadly, characterized by less emphasis on mastery of data about structure and processes, and perhaps frankly oriented toward the more exciting problems of the discipline.

Experimental courses are now being given at at least two institutions for the purpose of finding more suitable courses for the major and non-major respectively.

### The Teaching of the Introductory Course

There are three principal elements which combined determine the degree of success of an introductory course: lecture, reading, and class instruction. One might add "examination" as a fourth, but it is probable that the impact of this is normally not very decisive. Actually, there is no recognized technique for measuring the success of a course. Size of enrollment, a rough consensus of students who



have had, or are taking the course, usually suffices. What changes in attitude are produced or what incentives to political participation are aroused seem never to be measured. It is conceivable that a course pronounced "successful" by students may actually have caused harmful effects, if it presented a distorted picture of the subject, or avoided the difficult problems and topics in favor of popular ones. We simply don't know. We accept the beneficence of the whole process as a matter of faith. Few institutions conduct an intensive examination of student attitudes. Almost none invites inspection by colleagues from other institutions.

What can be discussed are the attitudes and knowledge of those who teach introductory courses. Whether their judgment may be fully trusted is doubtful. They may well err on the critical side. Certainly there is little evidence of excessive optimism.

### Lecture

There is some tendency to abandon the large lecture group, although little evidence that lecturing as a teaching technique is being abandoned. In some cases this change is the result of a move to decentralize the teaching of the introductory course so that each class instructor is wholly responsible for teaching and examining his group. Seven large and other smaller institutions give a decentralized course. The large class enrollments have made this step desirable. The private institutions tend to use a system of common lectures (1, 2 or 3 a week) although some do not have any straight lecture period.

At public or private institutions the success or failure of the lecture period is obviously determined principally by the skill of the lecturer. While seriously criticized by many modern educators as being the worst possible technique for teaching, in that it is essentially a one-way process which demands little from the student, it is so firmly established as an important and in many instances principal, element in teaching that it may be desirable to point out briefly why lecturing accounts for two-thirds or more of course time in the majority of institutions that responded. (It is difficult to be precise, because institutions using a decentralized system do not now how much lecturing is done by individual instructors).

Lecturing was adopted because it was and still is a dominant feature of German and continental systems, many features of which were copied by American universities in the 19th century, and has been retained because it has the advantages of simplicity and economy in teaching large numbers of students. An additional argument given by those who don't admire formal lecturing as an educational technique is that in a large survey course it is desirable to have at least one lecture weekly to ensure a common element in the course, and to facilitate a common examination procedure. A fully decentralized system, they argue, is successful only if all instructors are competent and experienced, and even where that condition is met, there is the problem of wide variations in the individual versions of the course. They recognize that common reading assignments, the use of a prepared syllabus, and fairly frequent staff conferences will go far to minimize differences, but in rebuttal point out that the latter



two devices are time consuming. One respondent that thinks the time is well spent is very happy with its decentralized course. Two defenders of the lecture system who wouldn't consider giving it up argue that all students get some insight into a really top-flight political scientist's approach to problems, that students are stimulated to greater efforts by good lecturing and that this is vital where graduate students or new instructors do a large part of the instruction.

Apart from these familiar arguments and rejoinders, there is unquestionably an appeal in lecturing that some academicians find irresistible. Most activities associated with academic life are performed by individuals or small groups. A class gives one a small audience, but a lecture is the one opportunity to hold a large audience captive while one's thoughts are sprayed at them. Without overstressing this factor it is helpful also to note that the lecturer is normally in charge of a course and this denotes a higher academic status. One understands then why the profession accepts lecturing as a principal teaching technique. Perhaps one other simple explanation is that teachers brought up under the lecture method simply accept the inevitability of teaching in the same way.

Even if we were to conclude that lecturing, except in rare cases, is not a desirable teaching method, it is argued that in most instances it could not be abandoned because of the increased costs of instruction that would follow. Thus far no cheaper way has been found to instruct 500 - 2,000 students than by one lecture. With closed circuit TV it may be possible to capture even larger audiences. Most university administrators, one is told, simply cannot accept any change in introductory courses in Political Science, or any other subject, if the change increases costs. They strongly favor improved techniques that either cut costs, or at least keep them the same. This reaction to increased costs is widespread. It is found in public universities as well as private, in small schools as well as large. This raises a serious and most depressing thought, namely, that the methods of higher education may be frozen, or severely restricted, primarily as the result of the economics of higher education. Whether the great upsurge of interest in higher education in late 1957 will extend beyond a program of vastly increased expenditures for science is not yet clear. Obviously, the economic problem, while discussed here with respect to lecturing is applicable to all introductory course reforms that require increased expenditures per student. This is a point frequently glossed over by those favoring small group experiments as many respondents noted. Most any institution can finance an experimental course or class, but if its adoption promises increased costs the experiment will be pronounced a failure. In some instances extremely small amounts of money would enable a department to try something different or to bring about an obvious improvement, but the money simply is not available. While it can be argued that academicians may not campaign effectively for these additional amounts, it should be added that they occupy a very weak bargaining position.

In conclusion, one gets the picture of a vast amount of lecturing in political science introductory courses, some of it brilliant, most of it competent, but hardly exciting, and a substantial and indeterminate amount of it probably close to sheer waste, educationally although admittedly not a highly effective educational technique, it promises to survive for a variety of reasons, the most important being its cheapness.

### Reading

There is considerable complaint about the reading materials available for the introductory course. In about half of the responding institutions, the students single out "dull reading" as a significant course weakness. The instructors are even more firmly agreed that they have great difficulty in selecting reading that will be both accurate and interesting and uniformly successful in covering all the topics they feel are essential in the course.

Obviously the conception and format of the course determine what reading materials are suitable. Clearly then, part of the difficulty lies here. In the course is to survey American national government in one semester, it is necessary to select reading that is broad rather than deep, that has some unity of focus, and yet treats the principal institutions, processes and problems of our national government. Actually, that is what most courses attempt to do, except that problems are dealt with only as incidental to the study of structure, institutions and processes. Two results follow from this decision to give a survey course completely covering American national government. It leads to heavy reliance on a single text, and the text writers, striving to reach the largest market possible cover all topics conceivably within the limits of such a course in great detail and frequently in a dogged plodding fashion. Recognizing that the introductory texts are not very exciting, most introductory course planners add a book of supplementary readings on the theory that the monotony of reading the text can be broken up by reading each week a few interesting items by authors whose viewpoints will be more vivid and somewhat more controversial than those of the text authors. This is the pattern in about 90% of the institutions contacted.

The consequences of this system quite commonly are as follows. Although I haven't any meaningful statistics to cite, where I interviewed course planners, invariably I was given this or a similar version). The average student, with two books to read, and examinations to face, wants to know at the outset what his responsibilities are. Either he will be told, or it will be suggested, or his early quizzes will inform him, that the heart of the course lies in his text. If the student is ill and absent from classes for a few weeks, the instructor will tell him to "concentrate on the text." From copies of previous final examinations he will note the heavy emphasis on text material. All this is quite understandable. The text contains the heart of the course since it stresses structure, institutions and processes. The supplementary readings are usually concerned with problems, controversial ideas, or political behavior and they are episodic and uneven, though more interesting when compared with the text. For the better and more interested students these supplementary readings prove quite exciting and stimulating and tend to make the text more meaningful. But the bulk of the students are apt to view political science as a body of rather dull material contained in the one text they studied.

Until a few years ago the leading text was a magnificently dull compendium of the most minute details about our system with a tremendous collection of footnotes built up over successive editions. In contrast, the leading texts today dealing with American government seem much more readable and stuffed with fewer unimportant facts.



Yet, they have not solved the problem completely. Many students and some instructors find one of the leading books too difficult: good students frequently find it dull. A livelier highly successful book is criticized by some instructors as somewhat superficial and excessively optimistic. These and less successful books deal with all aspects of American government.

Let us assume then that a course planner would prefer either to supplement his text readings with a variety of materials, or would minimize or reject the use of a text. What are his options? First, where course enrollment is large it is unrealistic to suggest that a wide variety of readings can be placed on reserve in a library. Purchasing 30 copies of a periodical to make one article available, or 30 copies of a book in which three or four chapters will be assigned does not appeal to financially oppressed library administrators, wholly apart from the increased expense of servicing a mass of introductory course students on a continuing basis. And rarely can the time or funds be found for reproducing materials of this sort.

In the course of my survey, the suggestion was frequently made by respondents that there is a pressing need for a service organized on a national basis, to select and reproduce articles and other material pertaining to American government and international affairs, in the form of sections of government reports, excerpts from legislative debate, court decisions and chapters from books, and make them available, preferably at cost, to teaching departments. Realistically, few departments can do what those at wealthy, small institutions can do: choose virtually anything and put it on reserve. This is primarily a problem arising from large numbers of students, and can be solved only by the ability to put into students' hands whatever the course planner feels should be there.

This is not to say that with unlimited choice of reading material all reading problems disappear. First, we have the situation alluded to earlier of the several publics found together in the introductory course. The bright young scientist completing a social science distribution requirement, an education major taking the course to qualify for certification, the girl who takes it because her mother is in the League of Women Voters, the pre-law student who may major in political science, the eager son of a government employee - these and other distinctive types are not likely to be equally satisfied by the same reading.

Anyone who after teaching an introductory course has questioned students about the course, has been struck by the contradictory responses to queries about the reading. One group liked the material on civil liberties and courts, another disliked this intensely. The sections on government and business appealed to many boys, the girls disliked it, and so it goes.

All this does not indicate that the student is irrational about his reading. The best, most strongly motivated student will work his way through almost anything that promises him additional insight into the nature of the political process. At the other extreme are students who will enjoy hardly anything more rigorous than a novel or a lively, anecdotal, biographical sketch of a working politician. Yet, in between these extremes are large numbers of students who might have their imaginations quickened by livelier material than they now must read in most introductory courses.



At the same time it seems unrealistic to assume that this mass of students with varying backgrounds and interests can be equally well served by one course. If this is true, it would follow that two quite different introductory courses might be devised - one for the pre-major, the pre-social scientist, the strongly motivated student, and a different one for the education major, the student fulfilling his social science requirements and others with a more casual interest. For the latter group, a more episodic, livelier, more readable set of materials with admittedly less depth would be provided in the hope of stimulating interest. In this large group are the citizens and voters of the future. If they can be aroused to an interest in reading newspapers and a few political periodicals, if they can learn to appreciate major political issues and their complexities, if they begin to use more rational standards in evaluating political personalities, the introductory course would be a greater success than it is now.

One recent (1957) development should be mentioned. The Inter-university Case Program now has a committee that is concerned with the selection, preparation and distribution of case studies for introductory courses in political science. If the ambitions of this committee are realized, some very teachable, low-cost materials will be made available. Presumably, a course planner would select only those cases from the list of those available which fit his course purposes. Each student would have a copy of those assigned. The first case to be written will deal with the "Little Rock" incidents.

In conclusion it can be said that there are tremendous opportunities for improvement of reading materials in the introductory course, and that relatively small expenditures for experiments and effort may yield large returns. While reading can never be a satisfactory substitute for teaching, it enhances a good teaching effort, and where teaching is mediocre, it can and must serve as the stimulus to the student of political science. It is the area most likely to yield to reform efforts within a reasonable time.

### Instruction and the Instructor

If the lecture is of little value and the reading dull, there will be a chance to redeem an introductory course through class instruction. However, if there is only one discussion period weekly the chances of accomplishing this are slighter than if two or more periods are available.

Four of the 25 private institutions use only permanent staff members in the introductory course, and these are the small institutions where 1-4 men can handle all instruction in the course. The role of the non-permanent staff member (commonly a graduate student) is shown by the following table.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Instruction in Introductory Course (1956-57)</u>	
	<u>Permanent Staff</u>	<u>Non-permanent</u>
A	7	7
B	1	4
C	7	1
D	2	2

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<u>Institution</u>	<u>Instruction in Introductory Course (1956-57)</u>	
	<u>Permanent Staff</u>	<u>Non-permanent</u>
E	2	3
F	2	4
G	8	0 (formerly half part-time)
H	1	4
I	10	3

In public institutions the role of the graduate student instructor is greater. Eight of 26 use none, but in large institutions the number may be significantly great as the following table shows.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Instruction in Introductory Course (1956-57)</u>	
	<u>Permanent Staff</u>	<u>Non-permanent</u>
A	4	4
B	5	12
C	9	4
D	3	4
E	4	6
F	3	8
G	8	8
H	13	6
I	7	7

Both private and public institutions, it is clear, tend to use graduate students in staffing their introductory courses. Although it is not suggested that as a group graduate students are less capable than full-time instructors, it does mean that the introductory course staff will frequently contain several men with little teaching experience, and staff turnover will be substantial. Beginning instructors, too, are frequently expected to teach in the introductory course, and in many instances they also will have had little teaching experience. There is, however, one desirable quality that these new teachers may have, and that is enthusiasm which may go far to make up for a lack of experience and depth of knowledge.

Beyond this there is little to be said about college teaching. It is to point out that no effort is made to teach the future teachers anything about teaching. One learns by being taught and by going forth to do likewise, albeit with a firm resolve to improve on the technique previously observed. Yet, there are many good teachers, it will be argued, and they learned by doing. Whenever the subject of teaching educational courses arises in academic gatherings, there will be much derisive comment. "Good teachers are born - not made," it will be asserted. To these observers teaching of high quality results from knowing a great deal combined with a "flare" for imparting that knowledge to others.

Since this view is dominant, there is no reason to expect any steps toward improving the instruction of the introductory course (or any others, for that matter) except to get better teachers or replace poorer ones at your own institution. Actually, since

major institutions may be more zealous in hunting out men who will publish than those who teach, such a result is unlikely. If the principal criterion for promotion is publication, why should we expect any great interest in teaching by senior or junior men?

No department, to the writer's knowledge, assumes any responsibility toward teaching its graduate students something about teaching. And even if one grants that there is no full substitute for experience, some of the experience of the elders might be imparted to the beginners, and so save some of the mistakes that inevitably occur under the present system. Observation by graduate students of class instruction by permanent staff members, observation of graduate student instruction by experienced instructors, meetings of graduate students with those teaching in various fields, and some minimum instruction in how to teach could hardly fail to improve the quality of college undergraduate instruction. At the very least, one could identify the teaching misfits. By this time we know or should have learned, that even short courses in teaching methods, if supplemented by observation and constructive criticism, can improve the natural teaching ability of almost any person. The World War II experiences of the services clearly demonstrated this. Such mundane matters as how to organize a class period, how to use blackboards and visual materials, how to ask questions, how to avoid "losing" a class, how to emphasize important material, how to use verbal and written testing procedures and many other simple but important points are not part of the lore with which man is endowed. There is no reason to assume that instruction in the techniques of teaching will destroy one's natural talent.

What are some of the common deficiencies of teachers? They are disposed to spend much of the time talking to or at students. So called "discussion" periods frequently furnish little more than another lecture for the student who yearns to discuss ideas and test his capacity to think in this new idiom, only to find that the instructor can and will supply all he needs to know. So long as learning is looked upon as the transfer of the teacher's knowledge to the student by a process of talking-listening and nothing more, there is little hope for the intellectual growth of the student. At the other extreme, students talking endlessly and aimlessly, back and forth, will yield little that is instructive. The creation of a real two-way communication, directed toward a series of learning objectives, is the essence of good classroom teaching. It is a rational process that can be taught, although admittedly the fruits will vary according to the talents of the performer. At present, it isn't taught at all.

This amateur approach to the teaching function is characteristic of all instruction in institutions of higher learning, and is not confined to political science departments or to the introductory course staff. The relevance of this situation to the instruction in the introductory course should be apparent, however. For by definition, it is in the introductory course that the most challenging tasks lie - to teach a large number of students, many of them only casually interested, the nature and excitement of political analysis and understanding. The teacher in more advanced courses can assume that the great majority of his students have a genuine interest in the subject matter, and that they will have had basic training in political science. They know what the advanced course will cover and have



chosen it for that purpose. The instructor, at home in his specialty, has confidence in his capacity to reveal new insights to his students. Commonly, he will have made some original contribution to the field of the course through his research. Finally, an instructor will not be given an advanced course to teach until he has had a few years of experience working with senior people, and has tried his wings in the introductory course.

Granted the continuance of the present system of "learning by doing," are there specific improvements in the system of instruction that might be achieved within a reasonable time? One obvious corrective would be to reduce the size of classes. On the whole, the private institutions have recognized this point, but some especially the city-community institutions still are unable to reduce to manageable size. In the public institutions, because of the tremendous enrollments in the introductory course, and the unwillingness to incur increased costs and to create a lop-sided permanent staff to meet the needs of one course, the following representative class sizes are found.

Average Class Size (1956-57)

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Number of students</u>
A	55-60
B	75
C	53
D	50
E	50 (ave. of two courses)
F	45
G	40-50
H	40
I	48
J	69

Of 26 public institutions only three have classes under 30. This suggests why representatives of the public institutions frequently commented that experiments in small class instruction, with individual or group projects, etc., were meaningless as correctives for their situation. They want experiments to devise techniques for handling large classes more effectively. Unless they can solve the financial problem that would arise from cutting class size, no alternative is open except to improve the existing system.

One obvious shortcoming in present class discussion is the dearth of effective visual materials. The use of films, film strips, colored or black and white charts is so slight that it would be hard to underestimate the extent of use of these materials. Crude, handmade charts, barely visible 15 feet away, or excessively detailed official government charts, designed for personal scrutiny are the most frequently encountered visual aids. Experiments are taking place with closed-circuit television at the University of Kansas, suggesting an effective technique for future use. It is hard to understand why so little material has been produced by commercial companies, but they claim that the market is insufficient. They correctly point to the rapidly changing political scene and

the tendency of charts dealing with government to need constant revision. The commercial film strips now available are not very good and are not widely used. Obviously, an instructor won't go to the trouble of writing to a company, begging money from a chairman, arrange for a projector and operator, unless the film or strips are worth showing. This is to say that there is almost no institutional or departmental effort to facilitate production, distribution and use of visual materials. Certainly experiments to improve quality and increase the distribution and use of visual aids would be extremely worthwhile. The potentialities of educational television have not yet been explored. The tremendous interest around the "labor rackets" investigation suggests numerous uses of TV for bringing to students legislative committee meetings and hearings, excerpts from floor debate, press and cabinet meetings of governors and the President, administrative staff meetings, quasi-judicial hearings, court proceedings, party meetings and conventions, etc. Foreign governments, the UN, the World Court could be covered in the same way. Put on film, they could receive wide circulation at little cost.

Another obvious step would be the establishment of a program designed to give the most gifted teachers a chance to make further experiments in new techniques, to share their information with the profession at large, to visit and evaluate the teaching efforts of others. Again, rather modest sums would enable one or two individuals at a number of institutions to obtain some release from other teaching requirements, to undertake a different course, modified version of an existing course, or simply try new devices to improve teaching results.

Perhaps the most useful of all projects would be a plan for effective exchange of information. Social scientists have long since abandoned their "ivory tower" with respect to the research function. They have more and more first hand knowledge about political processes as they serve as consultants or accept direct appointments in local, state or national government. But concerning the teaching of political science, and especially the teaching of the introductory course there has been little more than the face-saving gesture of a panel meeting or two at the annual conventions. That is hardly an appropriate time or place for systematic exchange of information. Yet, there is great interest, when one talks to individuals teaching the introductory course, in what is being done elsewhere. The only exchange of syllabi results when one of the service academies writes asking for the introductory course reading list. What is needed is a clearing house, directed by a person vitally interested in improving the introductory course, to serve as intermediary between all interested institutions. A section of the APSR could be used to spread information of general concern. Syllabi could be introduced and exchanged, detailed reports on experiments made available, exchange visits of instructors arranged.

### General Conclusions

One cannot be overly optimistic at the prospects for major improvements in the teaching of the introductory course in political science in the near future. On the other hand, there is widespread



interest within the profession in undertaking any feasible program, and general agreement that the resources of individual institutions or of the Association do not permit the substantial effort required.

Underlying many obvious reform proposals is the basic question of whether institutions can finance a more expensive introductory course, recognizing that a decrease in class size, a reduction in the reliance on lecturing as a major teaching device, will increase costs substantially. It would seem likely, however, that if it is demonstrated that an institution is below minimum standards found desirable by experimentation and collective data, strong pressures would arise to make it raise its standards.

Assuming that no changes involving major increases in cost are feasible, still much can be done to improve the introductory course. At the head of the list would be the exchange of information on a regular basis. Second, would be a program to improve the quality and variety of the reading materials available for the introductory course. A third would be a program of experimental courses by gifted and imaginative teachers, placing substantial emphasis on instruction of large groups. As part of this program attention should be given the increased use of visual aids, and other devices for making large group instruction more exciting and worthwhile. Fourthly, programs should be initiated at a number of universities designed to provide instruction in basic teaching methods for graduate students. Similarly, institutions might be encouraged to initiate improved staff procedures in introductory courses using the experience of those who have given considerable attention to this element. Their experiences should be shared.

There will be no difficulty eliciting support for a program or programs of the type suggested above. With rare exceptions the respondents strongly endorsed the proposal for a program of experimental courses. Most departments realize that they are not obtaining their share of majors. Where the introductory course is ineffective they do. The following table is instructive.

Department and Course Enrollments (1956-57)

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Enrollment in Introd. Course</u>	<u>Majors</u>
Effective Introd. Course		
A	325	145
B	330	120
C	243	250
"Trouble" with Introd. Course		
D	823	42
E	350	45
F	1,400	70

From a broader viewpoint, there is a great danger that a large part of our college graduates view political science, and the affairs of government in general, as essentially dull and beyond the ken of ordinary educated citizens. Clearly there is a tremendous challenge here, and one that will be more difficult to meet as time progresses. Whatever the extent of failure now, it will be multiplied in geometric proportion with the doubling of enrollments in the next ten years.



Responding Institutions

Private

American University  
 Boston College  
 Boston University  
 Brown  
 Clark  
 Cornell  
 Duke  
 George Washington  
 Hamilton  
 Harvard  
 Johns Hopkins  
 NYU  
 Northwestern  
 Pittsburgh  
 Pomona  
 Princeton  
 Rochester  
 Seton Hall  
 Southern California  
 Swarthmore  
 Syracuse  
 Temple  
 Union  
 Washington (St. Louis)  
 Yale

Public

Alabama  
 Arizona  
 Delaware  
 Illinois  
 Indiana  
 Iowa  
 Kansas  
 Maryland  
 Michigan  
 Minnesota  
 Michigan State  
 Mississippi  
 Missouri  
 North Carolina  
 Ohio State  
 Oregon State  
 Rhode Island  
 Rutgers  
 San Diego State  
 Tennessee  
 Texas  
 UCLA  
 Vanderbilt  
 Wayne  
 West Virginia  
 Wisconsin

POLITICAL GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA

by

George I. Blanksten

Northwestern University

Prepared for Delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri.  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

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I believe that I should begin by pointing out that some of my thinking with respect to the study of political groups in Latin America has been influenced by the recent work of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. No doubt, that influence colors much of what I have to say here today. Ordinarily, an acknowledgement of this sort could be relegated safely to a prefatory footnote. In this case, however, I think it proper to emphasize the role of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics. I say this for two reasons. First, I have recently worked fairly intensively with that committee, and in some writing I have done for the group I developed a portion of the material included in this paper. In the second place, the committee has made individual grants available for the study of political groups in Latin America and other areas. At least two participants in this panel have held such grants for the advancement of this research program. Professor Robert E. Scott, the distinguished chairman of our panel, has just returned from Peru, where he was engaged in the study of political groups; and one of our discussants, Dr. Frank R. Brandenburg, has spent the past year immersed in similar research in Mexico. It is my hope that we might be able, before we adjourn this session, to persuade them to share some of the benefit of that experience with us. Actual field research on political groups in Latin America is, after all, the proof of the pudding in which this panel

is involved.

## I

I have sometimes had occasion to reflect upon a curious observation made some time ago at an earlier meeting of this association. That observation ran to the effect that scholarly papers were produced by two types of fools -- those who began with definitions, and those who began without them. While I cannot say that I have lost much sleep pondering the question of which of these varieties is preferable, let me offer some evidence of where I come out on this issue. I feel it necessary at this point to attempt to define the term "political group" as used in this paper.

For the present purpose, we may regard a political group as a system of patterned or regular interaction among a number of individuals. This interaction is sufficiently patterned to permit the system to be viewed as a unit, and the action of the unit is directed toward some phase of the operation of government. Every political group has an interest. This is simply the central or continuing type of activity giving the group its property as a system or a unit. Interest, then, is consistent with the observed pattern of interaction, and not contrary to it. "The interest and the group are the same phenomenon observed from slightly different positions, and an 'interest group' is a tautological expression. The interest is not a thing that exists apart from the activity or that controls activity."<sup>1</sup>

Let me add a few points regarding the relationship between the political group and its member individuals. If the group be regarded as the pattern of interaction among its members, it would then follow that the group has an

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<sup>1</sup>Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in a Political Science," in Roland A. Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 38-51, particularly pp. 44-46.

existence apart from that of the individuals associated with it. Thus a political group may have a history or a career of its own, distinguishable from those of the individuals participating in the interaction. Further, at any given time a single individual may take part in more groups than one; a person with such "overlapping memberships" may pursue different and, in some cases, contradictory interests.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the question of the size of a group is not a problem for us. No issue is raised by such queries as how large or small a political group may be. It is defined by the pattern of interaction, and not by the number of individuals contributing to it. No aggregate of persons is too small to be considered as a political group; none is too large.

## II

Two propositions about political groups should be obvious. First, the number of such groups functioning in a given political system is likely to be quite large. Second, a wide variety of types of groups exists, suggesting the feasibility of some system of classification. Several such systems are, of course, possible, but permit me to advance one scheme here for the classification of political groups. They may be regarded as (1) institutional, (2) associational, and (3) non-associational. Let me now direct my attention to each of these categories.

(1) Institutional groups are formally constituted agencies, or sectors of them, with established roles in a political system. These roles are usually generally recognized and accepted. It is useful to distinguish between two broad types of such institutional groups. The first is the species which is

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<sup>2</sup>See David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), passim, especially Chapter 2.



formally and ostensibly assigned authoritative political functions --- such as rule-making, rule application, and rule-adjudication --- and which performs them. In other words, formally established government is itself composed of a number of groups whose role it is to carry out political functions. I take it that I need not waste your time in pointing out that some political groups can be studied in the examination of formal agencies of government. If nothing else, American political scientists have been conventionally trained to direct their attention to such structures. Let me therefore beat a hasty retreat from this subject, pausing only to remark that, while we are still with the old familiar subject-matter of conventional political science --- the formal structures of government --- the group emphasis does imply a difference in the manner in which these agencies are studied. I plan to return to this proposition at a later juncture in this paper.

I should like, however, to examine the second type of institutional political group more closely. This is the group which, while associated with a formal institution, performs a political function which differs markedly from the established or ostensible role of the institution. I deem the study of political groups of this type in Latin America of high importance, and would give considerable priority to political inquiries of this variety in the area. Let me mention a few such institutional groups of this type in Latin America. I hope it is understood that I am not attempting to present here an exhaustive list of such groups, but rather a relatively small sample of them as illustrative of one type of political organization to which the serious attention of research scholars is urgently invited.

The Roman Catholic Church is one of the major political groups of Latin America. Historically, Church and State were united in the Spanish tradition. This was true throughout the colonial period in Latin America; indeed, the

movement for separation of Church and State may, in a sense, be regarded as a relatively recent development in the area. In most of the countries, the Church pursues political objectives, and in some of them its functions resemble those of a political party. Some Latin-American political parties are essentially Church parties, as for example the Conservative parties of Colombia and Ecuador. Consider this statement by the Conservative Party of Ecuador of its political program: "Man is essentially a religious being and religion, consequently, is a natural phenomenon . . . . The end of man is God, whom he should serve and adore in order to enjoy after death the beatified possession of divinity. . . . The purpose of the state is to facilitate religious action so that its subjects will not lack the necessities of the spirit and will be able to obtain in the next life the happiness which can never be achieved in this."<sup>3</sup> The power of the Church as a political group varies, of course, from country to country. It is perhaps strongest in Ecuador and weakest in Mexico, but there is no Latin-American state in which the Church is not to be counted as a major political group.<sup>4</sup> The Church, of course, has been studied from several points of view, but published assessments of it in this capacity are rare.

Similarly, there are a few studies of the armed forces, particularly the armies, of Latin America as political groups. This is a curious indictment of political scientists interested in the area, as militarism has long been recognized as a fundamental characteristic of Latin-American politics. "The last step in a military career is the presidency of the republic"<sup>5</sup> is a well-

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<sup>3</sup>Wacinto Jijón y Caamaño, Política Conservadora (Riobamba: La Buena Prensa del Chimborazo, 1934), vol. 1, pp. 26, 32.

<sup>4</sup>See J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934).

<sup>5</sup>Quoted in George I. Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 36.

known and frequently-practiced precept in the area. Rather than the defense of the community, the basic functions of the Latin-American military lie in domestic politics. Everywhere high-ranking army officers are important politicians; everywhere the military provides a species of backdrop for politics. Generally this is more true of the armies than of the other armed services, although in a few of the countries--notably Argentina<sup>6</sup> and Paraguay--the navies also operate as significant political groups. Political studies of the Latin-American armed services are sorely needed. Questions especially requiring investigation include the process of political clique-formation among military and naval officers, and the relationship between militarism and the class system. Certain military ranks--e.g., major and lieutenant-colonel--appear to be of peculiarly critical political significance.

Few studies have been made of bureaucracy in Latin America, and, consequently, little can be said of the roles of public workers as political groups. In some of the countries government work, as other types of occupations, is organized on the basis of part-time jobs. Moreover, few of the republics have developed effective merit systems of civil service, and a spoils system is generally characteristic of the area. These considerations would suggest patterns of action differing from what is to be found in Western Europe or the United States. Latin-American government workers no doubt may be regarded as political groups. However, the current state of research on this problem does not permit evaluation at this time of their full significance.

(2) Let me now turn to the associational, or second major category, of political groups. These are formally or consciously organized associations which lie outside the formal structure of government and which include the

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<sup>6</sup>See Blanksten, Perón's Argentina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 314-316; and Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentino Upheaval (New York: Praeger, 1956), passim.



performance of political functions among their stated objectives. Generally speaking, the associational groups carry out less authoritative functions than do the institutional organizations. That is to say, this second category tends to concentrate its activity on such matters as political recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregations, and -- in some cases -- political communication rather than on more authoritative political functions such as rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication.

Two chief types of associational groups may be distinguished. This is roughly similar to the distinction, familiar to students of politics in the United States, between political parties and pressure groups. However, the division sought here is not quite the same as that. In the United States and in many of the countries of Western Europe, "political parties tend to be free of ideological rigidity, and are aggregative, that is, seek to form the largest possible interest group coalitions by offering acceptable choices of political personnel and public policy."<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, pressure groups in those same so-called "Western" systems "articulate political demands in the society, seek support for these demands among other groups by advocacy and bargaining, and attempt to transform these demands into authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of political personnel, and the various processes of public policy making and enforcement."<sup>8</sup> In many Latin-american countries, particularly in those with the more underdeveloped economies -- and, no doubt, in most of the so-called "non-Western" political systems -- the dividing line

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<sup>7</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process" (unpublished paper, Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, 1957), p. 20. See also Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

<sup>8</sup>Almond, op. cit., pp. 19-20

does not fall in quite the same place. In many of these systems, political parties tend to be more non-aggregative than aggregative, and some of the functions of the other associational groups include activities usually restricted to political parties in the United States and in some of the Western European systems.

Despite the fact that political parties have long been included among the accepted concerns of political scientists, it remains a curious circumstance that very little research has been done on these organizations in Latin America. Indeed, only one political party in the area has been the object of a full-blown monographic study.<sup>9</sup> "The field is one which needs a vast amount of spade work of a primary sort and on top of that additional synthesis in order to put the raw materials in proper arrangement and perspective," Russell H. Fitzgibbon has said. "I commend the field of Latin-American political parties to a whole generation of prospective graduate students in political science."<sup>10</sup>

Not only the party systems, but also the parties themselves, are of various types in Latin America. Let me once again, therefore, undertake the task of classification. Although the existing literature of political science contains a number of fairly elaborate attempts at categorization, it would seem that nothing more complicated is necessary for the present purpose than a simple dichotomy separating one-party systems from competitive party systems. Both types are to be found in Latin America.

The one-party system, of course, is the situation in which a single political party holds an effective monopoly of public power and controls access

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<sup>9</sup>Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).

<sup>10</sup>Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," The Western Political Quarterly, vol. X, no. 1 (March, 1957), pp. 21-22.

to government office. In some one-party systems, this may be provided for by law, in which other political parties are considered illegal or subversive; in another type of one-party system, other parties may exist legally but --- for reasons largely unrelated to legal questions or government coercion --- find themselves unable to challenge effectively the dominant party's hold on the system.

Thus conceived, two varieties of dominant parties hold power in the one-party systems of Latin America. The first of these may be dubbed the "dictatorial" party. This is found where two elements are present. First, an official attempt is made to obscure the distinction between the party in power and the government of the country, and to render opposition to the party virtually synonymous with treason against the state. Secondly, the party in power is the only legal party, any others existing in the country being considered subversive. The best current Latin-American illustration of this type of party is to be found in the Dominican Republic. Such a system has also operated in Venezuela. Paraguay's arrangement is a borderline case --- other parties than the Colorado are theoretically legal, but the price of participating in them is often imprisonment or exile anyway.

The second type of group holding power in a one-party system may be designated as the "dominant non-dictatorial" party. In this case, one party holds a monopoly of political power in the sense that it is victorious in virtually all elections, but other parties are legal and do exist. This is somewhat similar to the stereotype --- but I beg you not to hold me responsible for its validity --- of the "Solid South" in the United States. The leading Latin-American case is in Mexico, where the Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI<sup>11</sup>) is without a serious rival. Other Mexican parties exist legally, but

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<sup>11</sup>After the initial letters of Partido Revolucionario Institucional.



they exercise virtually no authority in government.<sup>12</sup> Uruguay's system may also be included here, if we agree with Fitzgibbon that it cannot be regarded as a two-party affair.<sup>13</sup> Further, it has been noted that the situation in Paraguay's case is borderline -- if one Paraguayan foot is in the "dictatorial" party camp, the other is with the "dominant non-dictatorial" party.

Competitive party systems exist where two or more parties, none of them a dominant or "official" organization, contend among themselves. In general, there are two classes of competitive systems, multi-party and two-party arrangements.

A multi-party system contains three or more major political parties, normally making it impossible for any one of them to command a majority of the seats in a representative assembly. Politics in these systems frequently operate through coalitions or blocks involving two or more parties, and these understandings are designed to produce working majorities. Latin America's best illustration of a multi-party system is to be found in Chile, where there are at least six major political parties, none of which controls a legislative majority.<sup>14</sup> The multi-party arrangement also exists in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru.

Two-party systems contain two major political parties sufficiently matched in strength to permit their alternation in power. "Third" or "minor" parties are legal in these systems, but are rarely serious rivals at the polls of the

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<sup>12</sup>See Frank R. Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One-Party Democracy" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1955); and Robert E. Scott, "Mexico: Government in Transition" (Urbana, unpublished manuscript), particularly pp. 16 pp. 161-214.

<sup>13</sup>See p. 11, below.

<sup>14</sup>See John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).

two major parties. Thus conceived, two-party systems are rare in Latin America; indeed, they are rare outside the English-speaking world. The best Latin-American illustration of a two-party system is to be found in Colombia, where the Conservative and Liberal Parties, roughly evenly matched, have historically alternated in power. Uruguay also has two major political parties -- the Colorados and the Blancos --but there is some question as to whether this is a clear case of a two-party system. Fitzgibbon, for example, believes that, since the Colorados have been victorious in all national elections since 1868, it cannot be said that Uruguay's is a true two-party arrangement.<sup>15</sup>

Most of the major parties in the competitive systems of Latin America are what might be called traditional political parties. In general, these have two major characteristics. First, the issues which concern them have historically troubled Latin Americans as long-range political problems of their respective countries. Primarily, these issues have been the questions of land tenure and the temporal role which should be exercised by the Roman Catholic Church. Second, the traditional parties draw their membership, in terms of the class systems of Latin America, primarily from the upper classes, with the other classes -- often involving majorities of national populations -- virtually excluded from direct participation in these parties. The traditional parties may be roughly branded as conservative or liberal. Conservative parties generally defend the interests of the large landowners and advocate an expanded temporal role of the Church, sometimes including union of Church and State. Conservative parties have been in power in most of the countries of Latin America during most of the years of their respective national histories. Representative Conservative parties include the Conservative Party of Argentina, the Conservatives of Colombia, the Conservative Party of Ecuador, the Blanco

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<sup>15</sup>Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 18. See also Fitzgibbon, Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 1954), especially pp. 137-152

Party of Uruguay, and COPEI of Venezuela. Liberal parties, on the other hand, have generally advocated some species of land reform, separation of Church and State, and a general reduction in the temporal influence of the Church. Representative liberal parties are the Radical Party of Argentina, the Radicals of Chile, the Liberals of Colombia, the Radical-Liberal Party of Ecuador, and the Colorados of Uruguay.

The parties which participate in the competitive systems of Latin America may be classed as pragmatic, ideological, and particularistic. Pragmatic parties are those which make no major ideological or philosophical demands upon their membership. Such parties are far more interested in commanding the votes than the minds of their followers, who may enter or leave the pragmatic groups without benefit of the trauma of ideological, philosophical, or religious conversion on such occasions.

Pragmatic parties may be broad- or narrow-based, depending on how large a sector of the politically articulate population is appealed to by the group. Perhaps Latin America's best illustrations of the broad-based pragmatic party are the Argentine Radical Party (UCR<sup>16</sup>) and the Chilean Radical Party. The UCR has endeavored, with some success, to appeal for the electoral support of organized labor, commercial and industrial interests, associations of university students, and professional and intellectual organizations. Indeed, under the leadership of Arturo Frondizi in the presidential election of 1958, the UCR, which had bitterly fought the Perón dictatorship (1946-1955), successfully campaigned for the votes of those who had formerly supported Perón. In Chile, the Radical Party has joined together university students, labor organizations, teachers' associations, and the smaller commercial and industrial interests.

Narrow-based pragmatic parties are more numerous in the area. In general,

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<sup>16</sup>After the initial letters of Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union).



these are of two types - personalistic and ad hoc parties. Personalistic parties are an outgrowth of personalismo, a long-standing ingredient of Latin-American politics. Personalismo may be defined as the tendency to follow or oppose a political leader on personality rather than ideological grounds, through personal, individual, and family motivations rather than because of an impersonal political idea or program. This historic attribute of the politics of the area has been noted by many students of Latin America. Pierson and Gil, for example, point to "the high value placed on the individual and personal leadership" promoting "a disposition to vote for the man rather than the party or the platform."<sup>17</sup> Another student has said: "From earliest days the Latin Americans . . . have always been more interested in their public men than in their public policies. They have tended to follow colorful leaders, to the subordination of issues. . . . A picturesque demagogue is virtually assured a large following."<sup>18</sup>

Latin Americans like to say--and this exaggerates the situation--that "Every 'ism' is a somebody-ism." Personalist parties are "Somebody--ist" groups organized in support of the political ambitions of strong personal leaders. Paraguay has its Franquista Party, composed of the followers of General Rafael Franco;<sup>19</sup> Brazil had a Querimista<sup>20</sup> party; Ecuador a Velasquista organization, made up of the followers of Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra; and Uruguay a Batllista "faction", founded by the nineteenth-century statesman, José Batlle y Ordóñez. There is some evidence that personalist parties are currently de-

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<sup>17</sup>William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957), p. 31.

<sup>18</sup>Austin F. Macdonald, Latin-American Politics and Government (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954, second edition), p. 2.

<sup>19</sup>Not connected with Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

<sup>20</sup>Literally, "we wantist," a popular abbreviation of "We want Vargas."

clining in number and influence in Latin America.

Finally, there are ad hoc parties. These are fluid organizations created for the purpose of achieving short-range political objectives and disappearing when these ends have been accomplished or defeated. These parties are particularly important in the politics of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. "In these times," a Bolivian wrote in 1942, "nothing is simpler than to found a political party. To form a political party only three people and one object are necessary: a president, a vice president, a secretary, and a rubber stamp. The party can get along even without the vice president and the secretary, . . . There have been cases in which the existence of only the rubber stamp has been sufficient."<sup>21</sup> Parties of this type are especially important in times of political instability and so-called revolution. These, it should be noted, are not infrequent in a number of the countries of Latin America.

Ideological parties are also to be counted among the actors in the competitive party systems of the area. Communist parties, for example, exist throughout the Americas. The most important Communist organizations are in Argentina; Bolivia, where the party has long been known as the Leftist Revolutionary Party (PIR<sup>22</sup>); Brazil; Chile; Cuba; Guatemala; and Mexico, where the group is called the Popular Party. Although the Mexican party system is not a competitive one, the Mexican Communists are nevertheless worth mentioning here. Despite indications that the party is small and weak from the standpoint of its influence upon domestic politics in Mexico, the communist organization in that country does perform a noteworthy international function in serving as a point of liaison, and as an informational clearing-house, between European Communists

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<sup>21</sup>Luis Torán Gómez, Los Partidos Politicos y su Accion Democrática (La Paz: Editorial La Paz, 1942), pp. 60-61.

<sup>22</sup>After the initial letters of Partido Izquierdista Revolucionario

and those of Central America and the Caribbean islands. Meetings of the Communist leaders of the smaller countries of Middle America are occasionally held in Mexico.<sup>23</sup>

Also, Socialist parties exist in virtually all of the countries of Latin America. The membership of these parties is generally dominated by middle-class intellectuals with a strong interest in Marxism. Despite their avowed interest in the problems of the working classes, the Socialists of Latin America have, in fact, developed little genuine influence with the masses. In country after country, the Socialists "have become increasingly doctrinaire, academic, and intellectualized."<sup>24</sup> Ray Josephs once remarked that "the Socialist weakness lies in addiction to theory and philosophy and what we might call their lack of practical, sound common sense."<sup>25</sup> It need hardly be added that Socialists have never been in power for any appreciable length of time in any country of Latin America.

A number of Church-oriented parties are to be found in the area, and these may also be regarded as largely ideological parties. The best current-illustrations of these are the Conservative parties of Colombia and Ecuador. Heavily Catholic in doctrinal orientation, Church parties have participated in most of the competitive systems of Latin America during the past century. Not since the regime of Gabriel Garcia Moreno in Ecuador (1859-1875) has a Church group been the dominant party in a one-party system. In that case, religious intolerance was revived, only practicing Catholics were permitted to be citizens of the country, then called the "Republic of the Sacred Heart" and government

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<sup>23</sup>See Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957).

<sup>24</sup>Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," p. 13

<sup>25</sup>Ray Josephs, Argentine Diary (New York: Random House, 1944), p. xxiii.



was heavily authoritarian in character.<sup>26</sup>

Nationalist groups also exist among the ideological parties of Latin America. It should be noted that the typical Latin-American nationalist party is narrow-based, addressing a concerted appeal to a small sector of the society in which it operates. Indeed, it is not unusual to find a given country in the area with two or more small nationalist parties functioning in rivalry relationships with each other. While anti-clerical nationalists are not unheard of -- one such group once effectively employed "We are Ecuadorans, not Romans!" as its slogan -- the nationalist parties more frequently embrace the Church, demand religious intolerance, oppose secularization, and attempt to eradicate foreign influence in the countries in which they operate. Often such parties are active centers of anti-Semitism. In recent times the most important nationalist parties of Latin America -- all of them narrow-based rather than comprehensive -- have operated in Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

The area also has its share of Fascist parties. With respect to many of these, "Fascist-like" or "quasi-Fascist" would probably be better designations, as these parties generally combine selected elements of Fascist ideology with enough indigenous Latin-American ingredients to render the organizations difficult to equate with European Fascist parties. During World War II, most of these organizations in Latin America pursued pro-Axis foreign policy objectives. Representative parties of this type are the Peronista Party of Argentina, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR<sup>27</sup>) of Bolivia, the Integralist Party of Brazil, the Nacista Party of Chile, and the National Sinarquist Union of Mexico.

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<sup>26</sup>See Richard Pattee, Gabriel García Moreno y el Ecuador de su Tiempo (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1944), passim.

<sup>27</sup>After the initial letters of Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario

Also occupying a significant place on the roster of the area's ideological parties are the agrarian-populistic group. In Latin America, these have come to be called Aprista parties. They have two distinguishing characteristics. First, they seek far-reaching social and economic change, usually including radical land reform and the integration of the lower classes into the political process. Indeed, there is a greater percentage of lower-class adherents in the membership of Aprista groups than is the case in any other type of Latin-American party. Second, Aprismo is indigenous to the area. Such international connections as the movement has--and they are not many--are entirely within Latin America. The chief prototype of this class of political party is the celebrated Aprista Party or APRA of Peru. Other Aprista parties include Acción Democrática of Venezuela, the Auténtico Party of Cuba, the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica, and, in a sense, Mexico's PRI.

Particularistic parties have on occasion appeared in the competitive systems of Latin America, although there is no clear illustration of a particularistic party operating in the area today. Such organizations, concerned in a separatist fashion with selected ethnic groups or regions and including some form of secession among statements of political objectives, have from time to time filled major roles in the Americas. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why what were once only eight Spanish colonies are now as many as eighteen independent states. In the historic past, particularist parties have been led by such personalities as General José Antonio Páez, who directed the succession of Venezuela from Gran Colombia; General Juan José Flores, who presided over the separation of Ecuador from the same entity; and Dr. Amador, prominent in the detachment of the isthmus of Panama from Colombia. Particularistic parties

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<sup>28</sup>See Kantor, *ibid.*; and Robert J. Alexander, "The Latin-American Aprista Parties," Political Quarterly, Vol. XX (1949), pp. 236-247.

were also active in the reduction of the former Central American Confederation to its present five separate heirs. So far as the contemporary scene is concerned, no major particularistic parties are functioning in the area, although there are significant instances of the presence of some of the ingredients of which such groups may be fashioned. In Brazil, for example, the two states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, which had stubbornly opposed the regimes of President Getulio Vargas (1930-1945; 1951-1954), have fallen into a political collaboration against other sections of the country which approximates particularism. Again, in the countries where regionalism is a major political force—such as Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia—there is a tendency for Political parties to become regionally based. It is therefore apparent that, whereas no clearly particularistic party is active in Latin America today, the record of the past and the current scene combine to suggest that it might not be unreasonable to expect the reappearance of such organizations in the area from time to time in the future.

You will remember that I had attempted to distinguish between two chief types of associational political groups, offering parties as the first of them.<sup>29</sup> I turn now to the second type, roughly resembling what are called pressure groups in the United States. This is not the exact equivalent of our pressure groups, as in Latin America these organizations perform some of the functions usually restricted in the "North American" system to political parties. Again, I shall not attempt to present an exhaustive list of Latin-American political groups of this type. Rather, I wish merely to mention a number of organizations illustrative of what I have in mind. My hope is that the following list includes enough such groups to contribute to a preliminary understanding of their functions in the political systems of Latin America.

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<sup>29</sup>See pp. 7-8, above.



Associations of landowners, in one form or another, exist in all countries of the area. In view of the significant role of the land in the economy of Latin America and the predominance of foudal-like systems of land tenure, these groups are of high importance. In Argentina, for example, fewer than two thousand families' landholdings constitute a combined area greater than England, Belgium, and the Netherlands put together; and statistics produced by some of the American republics indicate that approximately three-fourths of their respective land surfaces are owned by about two percent of their respective populations. Landowning groups wield considerable political as well as economic power in Latin America. The best-known landowners' association in the area is the Argentine Jockey Club; similar organizations operate in most of the other states of the Western Hemisphere.

Foreign companies function as political groups in some of the countries. In northern Latin America--particularly in the Caribbean area--United States corporations are prominent among these groups. Excellent illustrations can be found in the United Fruit Company as it operates in a number of the states of Central America, and in the influence of a number of "North American" oil companies in Venezuelan politics. In southern South America--Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile--British firms function in a similar fashion.

Labor organizations, though still small, are of growing importance as Latin-American groups. The role of these organizations is expanding as industrialization begins to take hold in the area. From the standpoint of their functions as political groups, the most important labor organizations in the area are Argentina's CGT,<sup>30</sup> Chile's CTCH,<sup>31</sup> Cuba's CTC,<sup>32</sup> and Mexico's

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<sup>30</sup>After the initial letters of Confederación General del Trabajo (General Confederation of Labor).

<sup>31</sup>Confederación de Trabajadores Chilenos (Confederation of Chilean Workers).

<sup>32</sup>Confederación del Trabajo Cubano (Confederation of Cuban Labor).

CTM.<sup>33</sup> Organized labor in Latin America is, in general, quite politically articulate, and its support has long been sought by Socialist parties.

Student associations are vigorously active groups in all of the countries involved. Indeed, university students in Latin America may be distinguished for playing a much larger role of this type than is common in the United States. Hear this account of student life in the area: "The . . . university, traditionally, is a miniature battleground of national politics. Students strike, riot, and stage political demonstrations on the slightest provocation." Politics "becomes a passion that invades and confuses everything. I myself remember many postponed examinations; many study hours disturbed; countless meetings, discussions, strikes--a whole year lost in them--elections that ended with gunfire. . . ." <sup>34</sup> As a general proposition, it can be stated that, as political groups, student associations are far more significant in Latin America than is the case in the United States.

Professional associations should also be counted among the active groups of the area. Lawyers' associations are perhaps the most long-standing of these. It should be noted that, with the growing economic development of Latin America, associations of engineers, still small, are of rising importance.

Business groups are also small in the area. However, these may be expected to grow in significance as industrialization and economic development continue.

Veterans' associations, important in the United States, are of little significance as Latin-American political groups. Exceptions to this generalization should be noted in the cases of Bolivia and Paraguay. In both countries, organizations of veterans of the Chaco War (1928-1953) have become major pressure

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<sup>33</sup>Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (Confederation of Mexican Workers).

<sup>34</sup>Isabel F. Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 212; and Luis Guillermo Piazza, "There'll Always Be a Córdoba," Americas (January, 1950), p. 27

groups. Indeed, in Bolivia, such a group served as the nucleus for the MNR party. In most of the region, however, veterans' organizations have done little to make themselves felt. In the absence of systematic studies of this circumstance, any explanatory statement can at this point be little more than conjecture. The guess--and it is only that--of this writer is that in most of Latin America such influence as veterans' groups might have had has been more than engulfed by the groups representing the armed services. International wars producing veterans are, after all, rare in contemporary Latin America; on the other hand, militarism and the military are ever-present.

(3) Finally, I owe you some discussion of the non-associational category of political groups. These are not formally or consciously organized as groups. Indeed, they may be regarded more as latent or potential than as currently functioning political groups. In short, the non-associational variety is far less structured than the institutional and associational types of political groups. In Latin America, non-associational interests tend to coalesce around such symbols of class, status, ethnic groups, kinship and lineage, and regionalism.

The class systems are fairly rigid in most of the countries of the area. Classes, of course, are not formally or consciously organized groups; yet significant political interests arise from them. Although the structure of the class systems varies somewhat from country to country in Latin America, the typical class system is composed of three levels. The highest class is usually referred to as the creoles or "whites"; the middle group is known as the mostizos or, in some countries, cholos; and, in the countries with large Indian populations, these have constituted the lowest class. The interests of the scholars who have examined these classes in Latin America have been such that they have devoted more attention to the creoles or "whites" and to the Indians than they



have to the mestizos or cholos. Consequently, fewer data are available concerning the middle group than is the case with respect to the highest and lowest classes.

The highest class -- creoles or "whites" -- are the most politically articulate of the three, and, in most of the countries of the area, the interests of the "whites" are the best-protected and espoused. Those interests involve such matters as the preservation of the systems of land tenure, the control of the Church and of the high military ranks, and the maintenance of a European rather than an indigenous cultural orientation. Where commercialization and industrialization have taken hold, these create new interests, primarily among the "whites." In some of the countries, this has a divisive effect upon "white" interests, which also include landownership, sometimes held to be threatened by commercialization and industrialization. Conscious of themselves as the ruling group in most of the countries of the area, the "whites" share an interest in the avoidance of true revolution and, in general, oppose political reforms believed to peril their dominant position.

As has been suggested, less is known about the mestizo or cholo than about any other major class in Latin America. A detribalized Indian but not yet a "white," the mestizo accounts for over 30% of the populations of some of the countries. He is not politically articulate, and rarely organizes. He is interested in working his way into the "white" group, and usually, in severing his ties with the Indians. The mestizo is frequently employed as an artisan or a tradesman. In some of the countries of the area, the mestizo is an important source of the labor supply. As a class, the mestizos no doubt have interests. But given the paucity of available data about them, little more can be said here regarding the non-associational interests of the mestizos without undertaking the hazards of a major excursion into the realm of speculation.

As for the Indian, entire libraries have been written about him. Indian communities and villages are tightly organized, and the Indians feel strong loyalties to them, but the Indian class as a whole is not organized in any of the Latin-American countries. In general, the Indians resist incursion upon their way of life by the "whites." The Indians desire, as they frequently put it, to be left alone. They seek decentralized, loosely organized, or inefficiently administered government, if by these terms is meant a system under which the number of "white" government officials entering the Indian communities bearing rules and regulations from the national capital is held to a minimum. Further, the Indians normally have a deep love for their villages and communities, and strongly resist resettlement programs involving relocation of the lower classes. Typically, the Indian does not own much, if any, land. Many writers have argued that in Latin America the Indian problem is basically a land problem, and have urged land reform programs which would deliver holdings to Indian ownership.<sup>35</sup> The Indians, however, have rarely expressed this sentiment themselves, and have been slow to respond to land redistribution programs. It should probably be added that the Indian is quite inarticulate politically, and rarely communicates his desires to the "white" officials of the governments which rule him.

In addition to the question of class, interests also arise from the concept of status. This is especially important within the "white" group. In colonial times, the upper class was acrimoniously divided within itself, with the creoles -- persons born in the colonies -- pitted against the peninsulares---

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<sup>35</sup>See, for example, José Carlos Mariátegui, Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana (Lima: Editorial Librería Peruana, 1934); W. Stanley Rycroft (ed.), Indians of the High Andes (New York: Committee on Cooperation in Latin America, 1946); Tyler N. Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937); Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el Indo Ecuatoriano (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933); Sáenz, The Peruvian Indian (Washington: Strategic Index of the Americas, 1944); and Sáenz, The Indian: Citizen of America (Washington: Pan American Union, 1946).

born in Europe -- who enjoyed higher status. Indeed, this intra-class struggle was one of the factors giving alignment to some of the fighting during the wars of independence. Since then, the peninsulares have dropped from the Latin-American class structure, but the concept of the "old families" or "good families" remains. Those -- when they can establish themselves as such -- enjoy considerable prestige within the ruling class. Although the "whites" are at least as racially mixed as any other group in Latin-American society, the "old families" are constantly engaged in heraldic research designed to demonstrate their unmixed Spanish descent. To be accepted as an "old" or "good" family is to be the aristocracy of the aristocracy. The families which have achieved this enviable position have a strong interest in preserving those elements of the system -- particularly the older patterns of land tenure -- lending security to the prestige system, and in making it difficult for "new" families to become "old" and share the higher status.

Again, in view of the paucity of research on the mostizo or cholo group, little can be said here of the prestige patterns within that class. In general, however, the mostizos strive to become "whites;" the latter, of course, enjoy higher status than do the members of the middle group.

Status is at least as important among the Indians as it is among the "whites." A significant difference, however, should be noted. Whereas those who acquire high prestige among the "whites" enjoy it on a national -- and, in some cases, international -- basis, status among the Indians has meaning only on a local village or community level. As in the case of the "whites", status among the Indians rests on ascriptive more than achievement considerations. Village elders, and their relatives, enjoy prestige, as do witch doctors and medicine men. To hold high status in the Indian community is to exercise some power -- frequently of government -- within it, and those who have this



prestige are interested in preserving it and preventing its adulteration through too-easy access of other Indians to the status positions.<sup>36</sup>

Non-associational interests also arise among some of the ethnic groups in Latin America. For example, Negroes — numerous in the Caribbean island republics, and in some parts of Brazil — have developed strong interests on an unorganized basis. So, too, have a number of the European immigrant groups, notably the Italians, Germans, Spaniards, and Jews. The European immigrant groups are normally more articulate than many of the indigenous groups, particularly the Indians and mostizos, and generally have developed interests, usually directed toward the preservation of their social and economic positions in society.

Patterns of kinship and lineage also produce systems of non-associational interest in Latin America. This is especially true among the "whites" and Indians, with the mostizos again, for the time being, at least, standing as an unknown quantity. Among the "whites," reference has already been made to the "old" or "good" families. High values are assigned to being members of them or, if that is impossible, to being somehow related or connected to them. The extensive use made of, and the exaggerated importance given to, the famous letters of introduction among the "whites" have frequently reached the proportions of a joke. A letter of introduction from a well-known member of an established "good family" is, in many of the countries, indispensable to the candidate seeking employment or some other favor from government. "The municipal department had become a perfect teeming house of raccomandados — persons for whom jobs had been found whether jobs were to be had or not," an observer has said of local politics among the "whites." "In the old days of the Deliberative Council, it used to be a standing joke that business offices could be wall-

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<sup>36</sup>See Aníbal Buitrón and John Collier, The Awakening Valley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).

papered with the letters of introduction given to job applicants."<sup>37</sup> Although this particular reference is to local government, the practice is general, regardless of level of government.

Three generalizations can be made regarding the role of kinship and lineage among the Indians of Latin America. First, it is even more basic in this class than among the "whites" as a determinant of interest. Next, in many Indian groups, kinship and lineage are more centrally and directly related to politics and government than is the case in the upper class. Finally, in contrast to the "whites" situation, this is important among the Indians on the local -- village and community -- level to the almost total exclusion of other levels of politics. Unfortunately, these are virtually the only generalizations that can be made safely about kinship and lineage among the Indians of Latin America. Practices in this field vary widely among the indigenous peoples of the area, for two major reasons. First, it is in many senses unrealistic to lump all of the Indian groups together and treat them as a unit. These people have differing cultures, languages, and social, economic, and political systems. Secondly, the extent to which "white" practices have penetrated Indian systems varies considerably, not only from country to country but also within many of the countries. Kinship and lineage functioned as a major determinant of political station and interest in the overwhelming majority of the indigenous Indian systems of Latin America. In some areas, where these systems have been relatively little interfered with by the "whites," this is still true. Indeed, instances exist in which Indian systems of village government continue to function with little outside intervention despite the fact that the "whites" have promulgated written constitutions providing for very different patterns of

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<sup>37</sup>Ray Josephs, ibid., p. 26

local government.<sup>38</sup> But there are cases --- often in other regions of the same countries --- where acculturation has taken the form of Indian responses to "white" influences which have fundamentally altered, or even obliterated, the indigenous practices. A number of monographic studies of this situation in specific Indian communities have been published. Short of reporting those detailed findings --- which of course, I cannot do here --- there is little alternative to stressing the point that kinship and lineage are, in general, even more crucial among the Indians than among the "whites" as determinants of interest. Also, it should be remembered that, as a rule, Indian groups are markedly less politically articulate than the upper class. Thus, this type of interest, while often more crucial in the lower classes, typically receives far less of a hearing when emanating from the Indians than when originating among the "whites."

Non-associational interests also arise on regional bases. Two major aspects of this should be stressed here. First, regionalism is characteristically a major feature of the pattern of Latin-American politics. This arises not only from the role of regional loyalties in Spanish culture, but also from the historic difficulty of transportation and communication across the mountains and through the jungles of Latin America. Living in a species of isolation from each other, the regions of Latin America have developed their own sets of interests. In Peru and Ecuador, for example, the regions known in each country as the "Coast" (located west of the Andes Mountains) are receptive to secularization and commercialization, fostering commercial and industrial interests;

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<sup>38</sup>See, for example, Manning Nash, "Relaciones Politicas en Guatemala," in Jorge Luis Arriola, (ed.), Integracion Social en Guatemala (Guatemala City: Seminario de Integracion Social, 1956), pp. 137-156; and K. H. Silvert, A Study in Government: Guatemala, Part I (New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1954), passim, especially pp. 62ff



whereas, in both countries, the "Sierra" (lying between the eastern and western cordilleras of the Andes), less secularized, cultivates the interests of the landowners and the Church. In both countries, the sometimes bitter conflict of interests between these regions is a major element of the national political patterns. In Argentina, to cite another illustration, the interests of the landowners and the Church in the "interior" have historically been pitted against those of the secularized and far more commercialized metropolitan region of Greater Buenos Aires. A second major aspect of the regional base of non-associational interests arises from the process of urbanization. A number of the Latin-American countries have had to cope with the problem of la cabeza de Goliath (Goliath's head), in which a giant metropolitan center (usually the capital city) rests on the dwarflike body of the rest of the country. In some of these instances, as much as half the national population lives in the one large city. Here again is an instance of the secular, commercial, and sometimes industrial interests of la cabeza de Goliath living in chronic conflict with those of the religious and quasi-feudal "interior." In Latin America, the major illustrations of this pattern are to be found in Argentina, Cuba, and Uruguay.

Let me repeat a point I have already made. The foregoing discussion, exhausting as it has no doubt been for you, is not exhaustive of Latin-American groups. Rather, my intention has been to mention some illustrations of the institutional, associational, and non-associational varieties in order that we might share a common notion of the range of entities involved in the study of political groups in Latin America.

## III

Obviously, I would not have subjected you to what I have thus far said here if I had not believed it to possess some merit and to stimulate some productive new departures for us as political scientists interested in the field of comparative politics. This leaves me the concluding task of attempting to spell out that merit and those departures, to which I now turn.

Let me at this juncture make two brief points regarding the novelty of focusing our attention on political groups. First, I do not claim that any approach would be a meritorious one simply and exclusively because it might be new. In the second place, as I am sure you are aware, an interest in political groups is not new among American political scientists. This has an established history of its own in our discipline, usually dated from the publication in 1908 of the late Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government<sup>38</sup>, through his Relativity in Man and Society, published twenty years later, to such more recent works as David B. Truman's The Governmental Process,<sup>39</sup> Earl Latham's The Group Basis of Politics,<sup>40</sup> and Richard W. Taylor's Life, Language, Law.<sup>41</sup> While it is true that these scholars offered varying formulations and analyses of political groups, that point need not concern us at the moment. What is important is the fact that the study of political groups has been a concern of some American political scientists for a half-century.

However, their pioneering work has, in general, not included two ingredients of crucial significance for our present purpose. One of these is the application

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<sup>38</sup>Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908.

<sup>39</sup>New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951.

<sup>40</sup>Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952.

<sup>41</sup>Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1957.

of group analysis to foreign political systems, and the other is its use in comparative studies. I am well aware of a tendency within our profession to regard "foreign governments," "comparative government," and "comparative politics" as synonymous terms. Let me enter as sharp a dissent as I can from that practice. The study of a given foreign system, on the one hand, and, on the other, the conduct of a comparative analysis of two or more systems are very different operations. I cannot stress this distinction too strongly, as I am convinced that the tendency to confuse them has been a major factor inhibiting the progress of the field of comparative politics. The study of a foreign system is precisely that; it is not comparative. I regret that many textbooks in political science containing parallel descriptions of the governments of various countries, without subjecting them to comparative analysis, are named with such titles as Comparative Government and Comparative Politics.

It is therefore important to treat the study of political groups in foreign systems and in comparative analysis as two separate and distinct matters. Let me, then, turn my attention to the first of them, the examination of groups in foreign political systems, holding the very different problem of comparative analysis for a later point. With respect to foreign politics, I see two justifications for restricting what I have to say here to Latin America -- this would make the problem more readily manageable for me, and I take it that you came here expecting to discuss that area anyway.

The bulk of the work -- particularly the earlier work -- done by "North American" political scientists in Latin America has generally involved, in one way or another, the descriptions of formal structures of governments. This has often taken the form of translating the written constitutions of the various countries and abstracting or summarizing these legal provisions. I do not wish to urge a cessation of this type of research. Some scholars primarily interested



in other aspects of politics have argued that some familiarity with constitutional forms if, if not necessary, at least helpful, in the analysis of other political problems. Certainly, I do not intend to stand here and tell you that as political scientists interested in Latin America there is any virtue in our being ignorant of the nature of the area's constitutional system.

But what I do mean to say is this. While there are always new Latin-American constitutions to be translated and summarized and I will even concede that there is room --- in the off years when no new constitutions are promulgated in the area --- for the improvement of the translations and summaries of the older texts, this type of activity reaches the point of diminishing returns. Indeed, I will argue that we long ago arrived there. Probably, it is not necessary for me to labor the matter of the limited utility of this sort of research.

It is, in short, necessary to work with more than the formal structures in Latin America. Again, I am under no delusions about this being a new point. For some years Latin Americanists have been looking to non-constitutional materials. Seduced by the anthropologists, many of us have experimented with cultural approaches. We have become enamored of political styles arising from alien cultures. We have examined the class systems and lionized the "whites" while we neglected the mestizos to carry the torch for the downtrodden Indians, until it took a Moises Saenz to tell us that "in order to be fair to the Indian, it is not necessary to stick feathers in our hair or wield a war club."<sup>42</sup>

There is considerable advantage in examining political groups in Latin America as alternative non-constitutional materials. If I were to spell this out inductively, beginning with the most unstructured considerations, I might start by pointing out that this is a major area of our ignorance in Latin-

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<sup>42</sup>Saenz, The Indian, Citizen of America, p. 1

American politics. We know virtually nothing about the area's political groups, and there is some virtue in our beginning to acquire that knowledge for its own sake.

On a little more structured level, it should be said in the second place that research on political groups would help us to understand problems which have long concerned us in Latin-American politics. Take the Argentine case as an example. I choose Argentina because it has long been regarded as one of the more important of the countries of the area, because much research has been done there, and because more articles and books have been published by "North American" scholars about that country than about most other Latin-American states. On June 4, 1943, the Argentine government was overthrown in one of the area's most significant so-called "revolutions" of recent times. Who or what was directly responsible for the revolution? A political group -- a clique of army officers known as GOU<sup>43</sup> or "colonels" clique." What was the GOU? Where did it come from? How did it operate? Nothing in all our research -- none of the product of our long-standing interest in Argentina, nothing in all our scholarly articles and books -- could suggest answers to such questions. So far as political science was concerned, the Perón revolution came from nowhere.

I may be foolhardy to put the following test to a group such as you, many of whom are distinguished Latin-American experts. The test is a simple challenge. If we agree that the Perón coup was one of the more significant political developments of our time in one of the most important countries in the area about which we claim some expertise, how did it happen that the GOU took us by surprise? How does it happen that militarism and the process of military clique-formation, one of the more basic characteristics of Latin-American

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<sup>43</sup>These initials conveniently and interchangeably stood for Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (United Officers' group), and Gobierno! Orden! Unidad! (Government! Order! Unity!), the group's slogan.

politics, remains unstudied by us? Why is our ignorance so broad-guaged that it covers not only the military but most of the other political groups in Latin America? You may argue that this is an unfair maneuver on my part, that as political scientists we have been trained to examine institutions rather than the strange entities embraced by the unfamiliar jargon -- associational and non-associational groups -- I have turned loose upon you today. To this I reply that the GOU was an institutional group, part and parcel of the formal structure of government. I have done nothing so unprincipled as to lead you from that hallowed familiar ground to exotic associational and non-associational territory.

How many more translations and summaries of Argentina's Constitution of 1853, as remarkable as that celebrated document may be, can we afford to make before we undertake the analysis of the political groups of that and other Latin-American countries? Or, to put the question in another way, which route to the mainsprings of the area's politics is preferable to the scholar -- to wait for GOU after mysterious GOU to ambush him, or to seize the initiative in seeking out these groups, tracking them even to associational and non-associational lairs? No doubt, this has policy implications as well, but they are not my concern at the moment. My point has been the relatively simple one that the study of political groups in Latin America would not only close considerable gaps in our knowledge of the area but also improve significantly our understanding of its politics.

I have said that this is among the less structured of the merits of the study of groups. To move to a more sophisticated level would be to enter the arena of comparative analysis. Before taking that step, let me remind you of the high importance I assign to the distinction between comparative politics and the study of foreign governments. In comparative analysis, as I understand



it, an attempt is made, through precise study of two or more objects, to isolate and identify the similarities and differences among those objects. The techniques of comparative study may be, of course, of varying degrees of complexity. I have heard it claimed for some of the more complex modes of comparative analysis that through them similarities and differences may be not only isolated and identified but also explained. I am not myself convinced that comparative method alone can do the explanatory job. Isolation, definition, and identification of properties can be handled in this way, but I believe that the task of explanation requires that comparative method, where used, be assisted or supplemented by additional modes of analysis.

One of the constantly recurring problems of comparative politics is the circumstance that in this field we generally deal with the so-called "macro" materials -- that is with large units or universes such as entire countries or political systems. In doing this, so far as precision is concerned, we are at a decided disadvantage as compared with the scholar engaged in a "micro" analysis of a small unit lending itself more readily to precise study. No doubt, this is one reason why much of what is called "comparative government" consists of roughly parallel descriptions of two or more "macro" systems, without benefit of comparative analysis. After all, it is not easy -- and some may regard it as an unreasonable demand -- to handle two or more national systems in a fashion permitting them to be compared precisely. Countries, cultures, even systems of government, appear in many ways to be unique as large universes; Argentines behave differently than Cubans; even the task of comparing the Mexican congress with the Chilean national legislature presents frightening pitfalls.

One solution to this "macro" problem might involve conceptualization permitting the abstracting of precisely defined components common to two or more

large universes. These components could then be subjected to comparative analysis with some promise of precision. Political groups are among the forms such components might take. Thus one advantage that might be claimed for the introduction of political groups into comparative analysis is the argument that this would furnish a method of abstraction rendering political systems more precisely comparable to each other. This would result in more manageable comparative analysis. Indeed, it could be argued that this method would create the possibility of comparative studies of large units which would be fundamentally incomparable in the absence of some such abstractive device.

A second potentially significant contribution of the group emphasis to comparative politics lies in the examination of structures in terms of their political functions. Structural-functional analysis holds some promise of advancing comparative studies. It may be possible to acquire some insight into what might be achieved through this approach by mentioning a relatively simple variation of it. If we were to attempt to devise a list of the functions performed in all political systems, and were to use some elementary list such as that including political recruitment, communication, interest-articulation, interest-aggregation, rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication, the group focus might serve to locate the structures performing each of these functions in the systems being compared. These structures, which are groups, might then be analyzed on the basis of their political functions.

Let us assume, for example, that we were engaged in a comparative analysis of the political systems of Chile, Mexico, and Paraguay. If we were tempted to compare the national legislatures of these three countries, it would be relevant to ask why this should be undertaken. These three bodies are given similar names -- "Congress" in Chile and Mexico, and "Chamber of Representatives" in Paraguay -- by the constitutions, which contain a few additional similar stipu-

lections about the legislatures. But this, after all, is a meager basis indeed for comparative analysis. If, on the other hand, we were to conduct our study by seeking the groups which perform the political functions common to the three systems, we might well be on more significant ground. If we were examining the rule-making function, I suspect that we might well find that much of it is indeed performed in the Congress in Chile, but in the PRI, the dominant non-dictatorial party in Mexico, and by a military clique within the Asuncion garrison in Paraguay. In such a case, I would submit that a comparative analysis of the Chilean Congress, the Mexican PRI, and the Paraguayan military would give us a far more significant result, and a deeper insight into the three political systems, than would a comparison of the three national legislatures. Thus, the second component of my case for the use of political groups in comparative analysis is the argument that it would not only give us greater precision but also permit us to direct that accuracy to more important propositions about the actual functioning of political systems.

Further, the group emphasis may be expected to make a major contribution in a field of rapidly growing concern in comparative politics. This involves the problems of underdeveloped areas, currently attracting the attention of growing numbers of political scientists. "Underdevelopment" or "underdevelopedness" is, of course, an economic concept related primarily to technology. The proposition central to this concept can be demonstrated in comparing two simple models of economic systems, one "advanced" or "developed," and the other underdeveloped. In the "advanced" model -- let us call this Economy A -- a given input into the productive process (capital, raw materials, man-hours of labor, etc.) is subjected to a given technology, from which a measurable result, or production, emerges. In the underdeveloped model -- Economy B -- the same input as in the case of Economy A goes into the productive process, but is subjected



to a less efficient technology, resulting in a measurably lower level of production characterized by low standards of living. Owing largely to technological problems affecting the state of their productive arts, the underdeveloped areas present us with a challenge of which we are becoming increasingly aware.

These underdeveloped areas, of course, include much of Latin America. It would appear that a major key to the problem lies in technological change. Thus if the technology in Economy B were altered so that it would approximate the productive arts of Economy A, a corresponding similarity in levels of production should result, raising the standards of living in the underdeveloped areas. A number of public programs based on this solution are currently in operation. A sector of the foreign aid programs of the United States -- variously known from administration to administration as technical assistance, "Point Four," and technical cooperation -- has as its objective the stimulation of technological change in the underdeveloped areas. Also, the technical assistance programs of the United Nations are similarly conceived. All of the Latin-American countries participate in the foreign aid programs of the United States; some of these countries are also involved in United Nations technical assistance. I do not wish to imply that this is entirely due to these programs, but technological change and economic development should be counted among the more significant movements afoot in contemporary Latin America. In some of the countries -- witness Brazil and Mexico -- the rapidity of this change is little short of spectacular.

Thus far the economist has done the work for us. But the political scientist interested in Latin America -- or any other underdeveloped area -- cannot much longer continue to avoid the major analytical task awaiting him there. It is widely assumed that there is some interplay between levels of economic development, on the one hand, and, on the other, political systems. It is

believed that the politics of, say, Bolivia, Haiti, and Paraguay are integrally tied to their underdeveloped economies, and that, as these change, so must their political systems. Again we have policy implications, as many of the foreign aid programs of both the United States and the United Nations are based on the assumption that political change goes hand in hand with economic development.

Yet all this is still in the realm of belief, of assumption, and even of faith; we have not acquired even the beginnings of a theory of the patterns of interplay between economic levels and political systems. When the political scientist undertakes, as he must, the search for this theory, he will, no doubt, have recourse to comparative analysis. I do not claim foreknowledge of the direction this theory will take, but I think it reasonable to expect that again we will be dealing with political groups. I say this because I see one road to the remarriage of economics and politics for this purpose through the theory of interest. Economic development, technological change, and trends toward industrialization imply changes in employment patterns; these alter the distribution of interests. Interest theory is closely allied to group theory; indeed, they may be the same. You may remember that I suggested early in this paper that every political group has an interest, which could be regarded as the central or continuing type of activity giving the group its property as a system or unit. "The interest and the group," it was pointed out, "are the same phenomenon observed from slightly different positions, and an 'interest group' is a tautological expression."<sup>44</sup> If such a formulation comes to undergird our understanding of the relationship between economic development and political change, the comparative analysis of groups might then unlock new doors not only to Latin America but also to other underdeveloped areas which, after all, embrace most of the people of the world.

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<sup>44</sup>See pp. 2 ff, above.

These other areas bring me to the fourth element in my case for the comparative analysis of political groups. This has to do with the problem of inter-area comparison. When we become specialists on an area like Latin America, there sometimes arises the danger that we may become the victims of inertia and other forces restricting us to that area alone. I see this as a danger because I regard it as a form of imprisonment. I will not deny the virtue of becoming sufficiently familiar with a single area to acquire proficiency and skill in the handling of its sources of data, but I would counsel against spending an entire professional lifetime there and there alone. We should not devote our careers to learning more about Latin America for the sole purpose of learning more about Latin America. Science seeks to generalize, and the more we can apply to other areas what we learn in Latin America, the greater the contribution we can make to comparative politics and to political science as a whole.

I realize that substantial obstacles render the practice of this preachment difficult. It is not easy to learn new languages or to develop, in working with the nuances of strange cultures the skills that we have cultivated, and at some sacrifice, in Latin America. Yet, sooner or later, we should be prepared to do this. As political scientists rotting in the prison of a single area, we do serious harm to ourselves as well as to our discipline. Actually, I am more optimistic about this than I might seem in putting the matter this way. I think that, in the last few years, we and our colleagues working in other foreign areas have developed reason for taking some pride in what I regard as noteworthy progress toward inter-area comparison. But its difficulties are hard and real. I think this is another point at which we might make substantial strides through the comparative analysis of political groups. The formula here might be similar to what I have suggested above with respect to the "macro" problem of comparing large universes. This involved the abstracting of precisely



defined components -- e.g., political groups -- of those "macro" units and the conduct of comparative analyses of those components. I see no serious methodological difference between doing this as between two or more countries in the same area, on the one hand, and, on the other, as between two or more systems in different areas. I have mentioned the feasibility of comparing the Chilean Congress, the Mexican PRI, and the Paraguayan military; the theoretical task is not substantially different in comparing, say, the Apristas with Mau-Mau or the GOU with the Young Turks. My point, be it noted, is not merely that this can be done, but rather that, sooner or later, it must be done.

Further, we should realize that in loosening our areal shackles to develop the ability to work in the underdeveloped areas at large, this wider field, while a bigger, better, more comfortable, and more significant jail, is still a prison. We will not be free until we can compare all political systems, inside and outside of the underdeveloped areas. It is in this light that we should view the recent work of the SSRC's Committee on Comparative Politics leading it to propose the curious dichotomy distinguishing "Western" from "non-Western" political systems. We can quarrel with this terminology -- for my own part, I am not happy with it, particularly as it applies to Latin America -- but to concentrate our attention on the terms is to miss the larger point. Some political systems are significantly more urbanized, secularized, commercialized, integrated, and receptive to technological change than others, and we should be able to compare these extremes, whether we call them "western" and "non-Western" or something else. Essentially, this would bring us back to the examination of political structures in terms of their functions. Where these political functions are performed in a "Western" (i.e., secularized, integrated, etc.) fashion in one system and in a "non-Western" (i.e. traditional unintegrated, etc.) manner in another, we can study these systems by examining

the structures (e.g., political groups) exercising the functions. Once again, then, we find ourselves with the comparative analysis of political groups.

A final problem remains. This is the question of the extent to which comparative analysis is necessary to the development of general theory. I am aware that there are those who argue that comparative method can be — some even say ought to be — bypassed in the development of general theory. But to the extent that comparative analysis has a role to play in the achievement of this objective, we have the final component of my case for the comparative study of political groups. There are two aspects of this. First, this would give added point to our re-examination of the work of Bentley, Truman, and Latham. That is, if comparative analysis of political groups is necessary to arrive at a general theory of groups, this is what has been missing from the existing literature on the study of groups and the basic justification for dusting off a book published in 1908 to say something new about it. In the second place, if comparative study is necessary to arrive at a general theory of politics, the comparative analysis of political groups carries still deeper significance. It has become increasingly clear in the current stage in the development of political science that the field of comparative government or comparative politics is not paying its own way in the discipline. If the field is to make this payment, it must contribute to political science as a whole; that is, comparative study must take part in the search for a general theory of politics. I believe this to be the fundamental element in the case — it may well be that, in the long run, this is the entire case — for the comparative analysis of political groups.

Perhaps you may feel that I have attempted too ambitious an argument for the study of political groups in Latin America. Let me say in conclusion, however, that basically I have made only three claims in defense of such research. The first is that it would close important gaps in our knowledge of Latin America

and thereby lead us to greater understanding of the mainsprings of its politics. In the second place, I believe that such study would, through giving sharper edge to comparative political analysis, contribute to an improvement of the quality of research in the field of comparative politics in encouraging more meaningful comparisons of the Latin-American systems with each other, and with "Western" and "non-Western" systems in other areas. Finally, I think the types of inquiry I have suggested here would stimulate a more significant contribution from the field of comparative politics to political science as a discipline. If this is indeed too ambitious a case, I hope to learn of a formula whereby the student of foreign politics might shrink from this ambition and, at the same time, enjoy a respectable role as a useful political scientist.



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## THE RELEVANCE OF NORMS TO POLITICAL DESCRIPTION \*

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(Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting  
of the American Political Science Association, St.  
Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958)

### I

The dangers that arise when norms and personal values intrude upon scientific work are familiar to every political scientist -- so familiar, that nowadays the dangers are likely to be shrugged off with undeserved contempt. "The 'cult of objectivity' has passed in social science," one writer has recently proclaimed (1); and Professor Easton declares, less dramatically, that even though he assumes that "factual and moral propositions are logically heterogeneous, this does not mean that in practice it is possible to discover a proposition which expressed only a sentiment or states only a factual relationship." (2). In context, such remarks may be perfectly innocent. They stir up embarrassing associations, however, and merge with certain streams of thought that would wash away the distinction between facts and values, in the belief that this is the way to make values respectable again, or as a consequence, perhaps, of a failure of nerve -- which may be only fatigue -- in the defense of "objectivity."

Since I wish to argue in this paper that there are ways in which normative considerations enlarge our understanding of politics, it is important that I should at the outset disavow any intention of condoning attempts to sabotage the distinction between facts and values. It is false sophistication to belittle the distinction. There are (and this is one of the chief points involved in the distinction) all kinds of descriptive statements in political science that imply neither favorable nor unfavorable value-judgments upon the phenomena described: for example, the statement,

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\* Robert A. Dahl, C. E. Lindblom, and Omar K. Moore did me the kindness of reading and criticizing a first draft of this paper, and I am indebted to them for many suggestions regarding both content and organization.

(1) Richard W. Taylor, in his introductory essay to the collection, Life, Language, Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley, 1957, p. 16.

(2) David Easton, The Political System, 1953, p. 224. It is doubtful that we would really want to say that a locution expressed a proposition if all that it did was "express a sentiment."

which I take from Professor Truman, that "Avoiding any commitment, especially an open or continuing commitment, to a particular party organization or faction is generally characteristic of interest group politics." (3) Such a statement may be accepted equally by those who favor this characteristic of interest group politics; by those who disfavor it; by those who are indifferent.

On the other hand (and this is another point involved in the distinction), there is a real and constant danger that political prejudices, from which no man can be sure that he is free, will lead political scientists to suppress or distort some of the facts which such descriptive statements might convey. One man may exaggerate the stabilizing effects of constitutional checks and judicial review, because they have obstructed attempts to modify privileges which he enjoys; another man may describe quite thoroughly the multitude of pressures that certain interest groups generate, but underplay the parallels in the case of organized labor, which he would persuade himself behaves more democratically and more responsibly.

This is a danger that can be coped with. We may grant that everyone perceives the political scene differently, but he is a unique person, with a history of experiences different from other people's histories. We may grant that since everyone is a participant in politics (or potential participant) as well as an observer, we may expect people to describe politics in ways distorted by differences in political values. It does not follow that the descriptions of a political phenomenon put forward by one man or another will be affected by these differences: they may be too subtle to show up in what will after all be a limited number of statements made upon a given topic.

But suppose they do show up. Do we have to put up with the bias on either side, and the attendant conflict of testimony? Of course not. We invoke the canons of scientific method; we demand consistency and clarification and repeated tests by different observers; we require that the evidence from all sides be pooled and new evidence gathered. This process of criticism is not infallible; but if the statements of fact that are accepted as such after methodical criticism are actually still biased in some degree, that does not mean that the distinction between fact and distortion finally fails; it means simply that the process of criticism has not been carried far enough. So we resume it, whenever we are confronted with a plausible charge of bias.

Omitting a fact does not imply any attitude toward it; nor does inflating or deflating it. Values are not the only things that lead men to make errors. But it is sometimes argued that in asserting any statement whatever, some value-judgments are implied; and in one sense of "imply", this is true. When Professor Truman made the statement which I have quoted, he did imply that he judged the fact which he was describing worth noticing. Furthermore, if he had asserted the statement as part of a rigorously

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(3) David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, 1951, p. 296.



systematized theory, I think that it would be fair to say that he would have implied that he valued the statement and the theory, taken together, favorably, according to the norms that are embodied in our concept of "a good scientific theory": namely: consistency, simplicity, scope, predictive reliability, fertility. But favoring the statement in this way is wholly different from favoring the existence of the phenomenon which it describes: no implication, of any sort, runs from the statement quoted to the latter kind of favoring. (4)

Having made my disavowals, I may perhaps permit myself to make a gesture of my own toward putting ethics in the respectable light that it deserves. It would be quite as gross a fallacy from the ethical point of view as from a scientific one to argue from a value-judgment to the existence of a state of affairs whose description might, in some sense, imply the judgment; and it is just as important for the moralist to have an accurate view of the facts as it is for the scientist. For every ethical principle needs to be applied to the facts before they are judged good or evil -- and if the facts are not correctly represented, how can the principle be correctly applied? Among those moral principles general enough to apply to, say, national policies, furthermore, the most

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(4) In Chapter VII of Scientific Explanation, 1955, Professor R. B. Braithwaite expounds a theory according to which the choice between statistical hypotheses depends upon "the gains or losses occasioned by choosing one or the other of these hypotheses when it is true or when it is false." Following Wald, Braithwaite holds that on the basis of these expected gains or losses we can develop "prudential strategies" for choosing between hypotheses; and, drawing, like Wald, upon the theory of games, he argues that these strategies when fully developed will be randomized ones. He concedes that "a strategy which is the prudential one for the assignment of values to the 'utilities' by one person will not be the prudential strategy for another such assignment by another person." This raises the possibility, which Braithwaite does not sufficiently investigate, that people may differ in the statistical hypotheses which they accept or reject without being able to have recourse to common standards of scientific acceptability. I can only point out here that it is a long and complicated road from Braithwaite's theory to contesting the position which I have adopted regarding the independence of facts and values. In the course of developing their strategies, people would, on Braithwaite's theory, have to consider not only the gains that they could expect from believing that a hypothesis was true when it was true, but also the losses that they would suffer from believing that it was true when it was false. Thus it is not a simple matter of believing something just because one very much wants it to be true. Furthermore, Braithwaite's theory is not the only one in the field; and whether it can be accepted will depend, I would say, on whether it can be reconciled with the position which I have defended in the text above. This is a problem which has hardly been ventilated, much less explored.

plausible and generally used require attention to the consequences of policies (5); and the more accurately and comprehensively these are known, the better-founded will be the resulting judgments upon policies.

There should, therefore, be no controversy between scientists and moralists regarding the necessity of getting the undistorted facts. I shall be so bold as to go on and claim that science -- in this case, political science -- can profit by cooperating with ethics. When we are alarmed about bias, we think first perhaps of the dangers of commission, of strong prejudice dictating a distorted statement; and this is so worrisome that we fail to note that there are dangers of bias in excluding moral considerations, too. Writers may fail to see important facts that they would have seen if they had allowed specific moral considerations to suggest certain questions.

As nice an example as anyone could want comes to hand in a very lucid and careful article by Gottfried Haberler in the Committee for Economic Development's recent volume on Problems of United States Economic Development (6). Haberler attacks the problem of "age-push inflation" and envisages self-restraint on the part of labor unions as the leading practical possibility of coping with the problem, supplemented as a last resort by controls on wages. "In the long run labor itself must lose if inflation, depression, or unwanted regimentation is forced on the economy by a policy of pushing up wages faster than general productivity rises" (7).

Now the thing that is wrong both with Haberler's recommendation and (what is more important for our present purposes) with his associated picture of the political and economic scene is that he has failed to consider any fundamental questions about the present distribution of income and property. I do not suggest that labor union leaders are all zealously propagandizing for a change in that distribution. But I ask, is it realistic to expect them to practice self-restraint if they (and their followers) do not feel bound to respect the present pattern of distribution in its entirety? The rule of keeping pace with increases in productivity is relevant only if we assume that the present pattern of distribution is satisfactory on all sides. Now, Professor Haberler may believe for his part that it is, or at least one that deserves approval, and thinking about it in this connection need not change his mind; but thinking about it would have led him to a more accurate picture of the factors involved in inflation.

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(5) Kant's categorical imperative belongs here, too, in spite of his protestations that attending to consequences was "heteronomous" and unworthy. See the fine article by Marcus G. Singer, "The Categorical Imperative," Philosophical Review Vol. LXIII, No. 4, (October 1954,) pp. 577-591.

(6) New York, 1958. See "Creeping Inflation Resulting from Wage Increases in Excess of Productivity," pp. 137-146.

(7) loc. cit. p. 146.

I turn now to elaborating the claim that political description is improved by attending to moral considerations. There is a complex of ideas, among which "function", "efficiency" and "success" are the most important, that are ubiquitous in the literature of political science. These ideas have important prescriptive features, which I shall exhibit in detail. I shall argue that political science would be impoverished if these prescriptive elements were expelled from it; and I shall try to show, both in method and content, that these elements can be treated with as much rigor and consistency as any other ideas.

## II

During the last war but one, there used to be a plaque hung up in the waiting room of the dental clinic at Camp Crowder, Missouri. The plaque announced that "The mission of the Army Dental Corps is to enable every soldier to chew the Army ration." (Perhaps the plaque is there still: I have not gone back to see.)

The word "mission", I take it, is the concept of "function" on military duty, meaning, as "function" primarily does, the task that is set for a man or a group to perform, a task set by the orders of those in authority; or perhaps by the performers themselves, in an attempt to formulate the needs and wishes of those under whose orders the task is to be carried out. (The Army Dental Corps may have had some doubts, I don't know why, about just what its contribution to the war effort was supposed to be.)

It is hardly necessary to argue that the word "function" is much used in political science; it is as familiar, and perhaps more prominent, than its running-mate and substitute, the word "role". My claim that the concepts of "efficiency" and "success" are also prominent may seem more doubtful; the words perhaps are not. But here we encounter, especially in the case of "success", whole families of evasive synonyms. I cite "efficient" and its cousin-concepts, "practical", "workable", "viable", "adequate", "responsive", "flexible", as a bridge to citing "success." To be efficient is to perform a function successfully (counting in "economy" as one of the standards of success).

There is more to "success" than "efficiency", however. To call an institution or a policy "successful", without qualification, is to imply a moral judgment; and since political scientists are (at least sporadically) shy about making moral judgments, they steer away from the word "success" and talk evasively about "equilibrium", "balance", "stability", "adjustment", "staying within safe limits", "accommodation", "integration", and the "health" and "strength" of "the system."

The use of "function" ranges over this whole complex of concepts. In a passage designed to champion "the function of the politician", Pendleton Herring identifies it with "the function of adjustment", which we know without further comment is something pretty worthwhile; Herring goes on to call it a "vital element in the politics of democracy" (8). Professor Schattschneider

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(8) The Politics of Democracy, 1940, p. 158.



declares, "Government by pressure groups is impossible. The function of planning, of integration, and over-all management of public affairs for the protection of the great interests of the nation can be handled only by a strong national party leadership supported by a well-mobilized majority" (9). To perform this function would indeed be to make a success of government.

Are there not, however, ways of using the concept of "function" that do not implicate us in the moral considerations which surround the notion of success? We speak (by extension) of "function" where the task has not been set by people, or even set for intelligent beings; and whatever philosophical difficulties there may be about such a statement as "The function of the heart is to pump blood through the body," it does seem that this can be asserted without moral implications. (The heart in question may be that of a saint; or, a crocodile's.) Analogously, it seems, we might consider that human groups have various tasks set for them by the environment, and seek to identify the social institutions whose function it is to accomplish these tasks; and we can do this without making even so elementary a moral judgement as that is a good thing for human groups to survive.

This is the "structuro-functional" approach, much discussed by sociologists. (10). It promises, and may give, light simultaneously on the variety of functions performed and on the structure of the institutions that perform them; and, ultimately, it may bring into view an exact and detailed conception of what points of comparison between different societies are most significant for a general theory of social systems.

The advantages and disadvantages of the structuro-functional approach have by now been pretty fully disclosed. (11) It has been generally recognized

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(9) E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government, 1942, p. 208.

(10) See R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1949; and Marion Levy, The Structure of Society, 1952; also various works of Talcott Parsons. Dorothy Emmet, in her recent book, Function, Purpose and Powers, 1958, gives a good extended discussion of the matters that I treat in this section; social scientists would find it, I think, both interesting and sensible.

(11) See Merton, op. cit.; and Levy, op. cit. I am also drawing upon a lecture on "Functional Analysis in Social Science" which was given at Yale May 9, 1958, by Carl G. Hempel. During the discussion following that lecture Professor Omar K. Moore maintained that the functional approach had been useful earlier, for example in the days of Malinowski's field work in anthropology; but that it was not helpful today, since the so-called "functionalists" are not trying to do anything so ambitious as formulate the concept of a social system from the ground up, and are, in fact, obstructing the growth of stricter theories and explanations. If the functional approach is something of an anachronism in sociology, however, it may not be in political science; and a number of points will emerge in this and the subsequent sections of this paper that could be interpreted as reasons for thinking that it is not an anachronism.

that to say a certain function, "F", is performed by an institution, I, is not to say that the given society could not exist without I existing. Even if we grant that the society could not continue without F being performed somehow, it is clear that all sorts of other devices might be found, besides I, to perform it: the state police, instead of possos or deputies. Once this is clear, attempts to assimilate functional identifications to causal explanations, in which the existence of one phenomenon can be inferred from the description of other phenomena, together with the statement of the relevant natural laws, are deprived of any color. The causal connection between the society surviving and F being performed does not explain why I should exist, rather than some alternative device.

Even in the case of biological functions, it is an error to equate statements of the form, "The function of (say, this organ) Q is F", with statements about necessary conditions of the form, "(The presence and activity of) Q is a necessary condition of F". (12) There might be another organ in the body, besides the heart, which also had the function of circulating blood, or which could take over the function if the heart failed. As it happens, this is not true; but it is not logically excluded by saying that the function of the heart is to pump blood through the body. It also happens that the body cannot dispense with the circulation of blood. But other functions can be dispensed with (e.g., vision) or assumed by different organs (e.g., voice-production, when the larynx has been removed). All that is involved in saying that "The function of Q is F", is, I think, (a) that Q normally does F and (b) that either nothing else normally does F or that nothing else does F in such a way as to make the contribution of Q superfluous. (13). To go on to speak of necessary or sufficient conditions is to formulate further information (and to make further assumptions specifying the case described).

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(12) Among the philosophers chargeable with this error are L. Jonathan Cohen, in "Teleological Explanation", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1950-51, pp. 255-293 (cited by Miss Emmet, op. cit. p. 48); and Ernest Nagel, in "Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems," reprinted in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 1953, pp. 537-558. In the passage which I have in mind from the latter article, p. 541 -- Nagel allows, as a secondary possibility, "Q is a necessary and sufficient condition of F"; this allowance does not go far enough, or even depart in the right direction.

(13) So for the general case, when "function" is used descriptively. In some particular cases (not biological ones), it is also implied (c) that human beings have planned that Q should do F. On the other hand, when "function" is used prescriptively, (a) may drop out, as we shall see below.

Though identifying functions may therefore not reach so far as stating full-fledged causal laws (which involve the notions of necessary sufficient conditions), it is nevertheless a useful step toward doing the latter, and at least approximately locates the causal relationships that need to be studied. There may even be psychological advantages in postponing direct attempts at causal laws and in trying instead for functional descriptions as a first step -- in asking, given an institution, "What does this contribute to the persistence of the whole system?", "What would be left undone if this were discarded?", or "If this entirely succeeded in doing what it now does in part, what other activities would it help or hinder?"; or, knowing that in one society there is a specialized institution for doing *F*, in asking what ~~institutions~~ there were for doing it in this one. Some of these questions are not, of course, peculiar to the structure-functional approach; but the series of questions, taken as a whole does suggest a natural and inviting way of going about the business of investigating society, a way which is bound to be profitable if it is pursued strenuously, and which is furthermore very familiar.

Ut is the approach which Herring, for example, seems to have taken when he was led to the view that national party conventions -- those irrational and overexuberant gatherings -- were of some use after all, since they dramatize the choice of candidates for an electorate that would otherwise be largely uninterested, and at the same time help generate unity and enthusiasm among the party workers. (14). This information is absent from Schattschneider's brief treatment of the topic (15), and it may be taken, I think, as an instance of the profit to be gained from seeking to discover unexpected functions even for institutions that at first sight seem nearly useless.

Political science deals, in the case of modern constitutional states, with institutions that have planned functions; and it can therefore in many instances use "function" descriptively in another way, besides the way taken in the structure-functional approach. The paradigm for this further descriptive use is, in fact, a more suitable illustration of the general concept of function than the biological paradigms which have interested sociologists. For we may take as the paradigm in this case such a statement as, "The function of the carburetor is to mix air and gasoline." There is no mystery about telology here; we are frankly talking about a device which is the product of human planning (and that is why it is a more suitable paradigm). It may not be our plan, or even one that we endorse; we merely describe its results. Similarly, it is an easy and straightforward matter to specify the functions of such organs of government as the police force the forest service, the customs bureau, and (I think) the Army Dental Corps. Their functions are the reasons, which everyone understands, why they were invented and why they are kept in being.

Yet, though this usage is authentically descriptive, and peculiarly appropriate in political descriptions, it is usage that puts political scientists in the way of temptations that do not visit biologists or sociologists so insistently; for it is usage that transforms quickly, and often without due notice, from description into proscription. It may not be impossible for political scientists to use "function" in a strictly descriptive sense only; but it is very unlikely that they will do so; and therefore it is very unlikely, on these grounds alone, that they can avoid entangling themselves in the moral considerations which surround the notion of success.

(14) Herring, op. cit., Ch. 16.

(15) Schattschneider, op. cit., pp. 157-158.



There are many political institutions for which either no generally accepted plans exist, or for which the plans, though accepted by those with the authority to fulfill them, and by society generally, are too vague to specify the actual activity of the institutions. When political scientists use the language of function to describe these institutions -- among which are the most important of all, parties, interest groups, the courts, the legislature, the executive -- they modulate between descriptive uses of "function" and uses in which endorsement and prescription are implied. In certain contexts to insist that the function of the independent regulatory bureaus is to protect consumers is at the same time to endorse the purpose for which the bureaus were allegedly set up and to condemn the practice of staffing the bureaus with people more easily influenced by the industries that they are supposed to regulate than by consumers' interests.

The use of "function" is often even more frankly prescriptive. Consider the statement, which Professor Key attributes to "our political lore", but also concurs in, that "the function of the party system (is) to create circumstances under which the electorate can act," specifically by providing the electorate with a genuine choice "at times of crisis" between candidates different in "policy orientation". (16) Key is not saying, "The party system can normally be counted upon to do this." It is clear from the context, and the rest of the book, that he is saying, "The party system sometimes does present the electorate with genuine choices at times of crisis; ideally, it always should: let's try to arrange that it always does." He is not merely describing a plan: he is offering one.

### III

The prescriptions conveyed in talk about "functions" do not come one by one, entirely independently. They are generally connected with one another, in what might be called normative models, which may be more or less elaborately developed in the case of different writers, and may also vary in explicitness. In such models, ideal functions will be designated for a number of actual or possible institutions, in a way coordinated by some more or less coherent set of value judgments. The models have the effect on associated descriptions of politics of encouraging stress upon the points on which observed phenomena depart from the prescribed standards: in other words, upon the ways in which the described institutions fall short of successfully performing what would ideally be their functions. This is the effect deliberately sought by Dahl, whose description of the American political system in A Preface to Democratic Theory is oriented by the carefully stated model of polyarchal democracy which he develops; and this is the way in which Schattschneider, in Party Government, works back and forth from his ideal of a system in which parties would be both disciplined and responsible to a description of parties as they are.

Making prescriptions of this sort involves raising major issues of policy and accepting liability to moral criticism. The policy of imposing a given function upon a certain institution will be successful or something less than successful. To call it a "success", without qualification, implies endorsing the policy and, if moral considerations are relevant, endorsing it morally.

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(16) V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, 1956, p. 12.

I say, "without qualification", because there are ways of evading the moral implications. One explains "When I said that the policy of redistributing income was a success, I did not mean that I favored it; all I meant was that the people who got it adopted succeeded in doing what they intended to do." This refuge is not open for people who are talking not about other people's intentions or desires, but expressing their own: and this is what writers who use "function" proscriptively are doing. They must expect to meet moral objections to the functions and designations that they champion, and expect to have the prospects of successful performance surveyed from a moral point of view.

"Function" and "success" have thus led us into the midst of moral controversy, and here many of the hard-headed and positive-minded, afraid for their honor as scientists and determined to save their procedures from further defilement, will perhaps be eager to have done. They will say, let us purge our descriptions. Let us retain the facts about function that can be stated without using the concept, and see how many of them we can promote to the status of causal laws. But let us banish the proscriptive elements in disgrace; and let us never hear a word about "functions" again, unless the usage is guaranteed to be descriptive.

I shall argue later that this is neither a practical nor a reasonable program for political science; and that if it were practical, it would still not be reasonable; though I shall not contest the utility of recognizing the descriptive and proscriptive aspects of "function" for what they are, or the necessity of keeping an alert watch against mixing them up. But first I want to show, schematically, just what moral considerations are involved in the notion of success. We shall see that they can be dealt with non-committally; we shall also see that there is sufficient agreement on what topics are relevant for us to be able to use a schematic notion of success as a standard guide for collecting the information needed to assess the performance of functions, whether or not we wish to prescribe anything ourselves about such functions.

Such a schematic notion may be constructed by anticipating the topics which moral criticism would cite against attempts to identify success with something as primitive as mere survival, or survival without domestic violence. Governments can survive, and even survive in domestic peace, without meeting the present needs of the population or providing for future needs; and no one, I should think, would want to call a government an unqualified success under whose auspices half the population was starving. It would not be the least bit more plausible to call a government successful which (though it has muddled through thus far) is now pursuing policies that will bring ruin, through war or economic disaster, upon the population which it claims to serve. Finally, I think that a government would be generally thought to be something less than successful if it was forfeiting opportunities to bring about improvements in the life and welfare of the population, even if this were already living under tolerable conditions.

Anticipating these topics, we must allow in our schematic notion of success for at least three chief considerations, which I shall denominate (K) justice (II) security (III) progress. Under each of these chief heads, there will be at least three sub-heads to consider, and in each case, these three may be denominated (A) inherited rights (B) consequences (C) procedures. I think that so far as this scheme goes, it is reasonably comprehensive:

that is to say, it anticipated all the major lines along which objections to calling political institutions or policies successful would be brought up. If it is not comprehensive, however, that does not greatly affect my present point, which is to illustrate how an adequate schema of success may be arrived at. We could stipulate anything we liked, and may find it useful to stipulate some features of the schema; but it would hardly be sensible to rely on stipulations entirely. We do not stipulate the ways in which people are interested in the success of political institutions, and the farther we depart from ordinary language conceptions of success, the less likely will it be that our schematic notion actually accommodates common moral concerns. So it is sensible to construct the notion by marshalling the various grounds on which people build up cases in ordinary language for defending or attacking claims of success. To claim that a political institution is an unqualified success is to claim that there is information to refute all adverse cases of this kind, so far as they are relevant.

The heads and sub-heads of our scheme need brief comments. By the heading "justice", I mean to indicate the consideration of how goods (in the very broadest sense, including leisure and honors) are now distributed in society (17) a consideration to which A) information about inherited rights is relevant -- that is to say, in this case, information about rights to income that are already enjoyed by members of the society and that have been accepted as results of past history; and also (B) information about the consequences of preserving or modifying these rights in the future, which will be based partly on information about the consequences of upholding them in the past; as well as (C) attention to the procedures by which any policy is adopted regarding these rights and consequences.

For example, people would disagree about the success of a government which had managed to stave off revolution only by severely curtailing traditional property rights in order to distribute land and goods to the poor, and did so by "packing" the courts, which would otherwise have voided the program. Some would say that the government had been a success, because the deprivations of the proletariat outweighed the claims of property, and that the procedures used were justifiable, because the courts as well as the other parts of government should be controlled by majority opinion. Others would say that a government which had so seriously undermined the rights of private property and so flagrantly disregarded the necessity of safeguarding an independent and disinterested judiciary was very far indeed from being a success. The schematic notion of success will not settle this dispute; my point is that it shows what information is relevant to arguments on either side. On both sides, people would be talking about the same topics; and these are the topics that they would be talking about.

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(17) This does not, of course, exhaust the ordinary meaning of "justice", a concept that would in fact be invoked in discussing rights and procedures under each of the three chief heads. Nevertheless, "justice" seems to be the most appropriate term for what I have in mind for the first chief head: the pattern of present sharing, considered as a moral topic.



The word "security" appears in the second chief heading, rather than the simpler and lovelier word "peace", because a critique of political success would have, in the case of countries dependent on foreign trade, to take up the possibility of ruin in foreign trade, as well as such topics as the risks of war involved in present policies, and the use of opportunities to promote peace. In this case, we may imagine that the sub-heading, "rights", would be filled out in part by considering treaty obligations inherited from the past.

The third chief head, "progress", indicates the relevance of considering how far present policies seize or forfeit opportunities to improve the condition of society, whether by increasing the output of goods, or by other means. Whether such opportunities will seem desirable depends, again, on whether the policies for seizing them invade rights, or have adverse consequences of other kinds outweighing the expected benefits, and on whether the policies can be brought to adoption without departing from fair procedures.

Now, in spite of all the confusion that there is about moral terms, and in spite of the many other sources of moral disagreement, I would claim that very general agreement is to be expected on the proposition that the schematic notion of success just illustrated is more adequate and begs fewer questions in political connections than primitive notions about survival or survival with domestic peace.

This does not mean that I underestimate the possibilities of moral controversy in politics. The agreement that I am claiming is not a very ambitious one. It does not, for one thing, imply agreement about the foundations of ethics: people who have a natural law theory about those foundations, with or without theological ramifications; people whose theories about foundations are naturalistic, metaphysical, intuitionist, or non-cognitive; and people who have no theory at all about the justification of moral principles can all agree that to consider fully the success of political institutions and policies involves considering the topics laid out in the schematic notion. One could even subscribe to a theory that since moral judgments stated nothing, but merely expressed emotions, therefore there was never any reason, outside of his personal inclination to do so, why a man should accept one moral judgment rather than another; one would thereby impeach his own moral judgments, and deprive all those whom he persuaded to adopt his theory of any means of discrediting the most outrageous judgments conceivable (18). One could still

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(18) The theory mentioned is what many people have in mind when they speak of the "emotive" theory of ethics, attributing it to A. J. Ayer (Language, Truth, and Logic, 1936; 2d ed., 1946), and C. L. Stevenson (Ethics and Language, 1945). It is not their theory, however; nor do I know of anyone who champions it. Both Ayer and Stevenson recognize that most of the judgments seriously considered in ethical discourse state facts as well as express emotions or commands; and they neither deny that there are reasons generally held to have precedence over personal inclinations as grounds for accepting or rejecting moral judgments, nor do they commit the absurdity of making such a denial as an incident of making moral judgments of their own. It is true that both of them grossly underrate the importance of these other reasons, and of such moves in ordinary ethical discourse as to discredit a moral judgment by showing that it does not conform to the received necessary conditions for valid moral judgments (such as consistency and disinterestedness), and merely expresses a personal emotion. Nor is their theory adequate to explaining our attachment to such criteria. For a more adequate explanation, see Stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics, 1950.

agree that the topics laid out in the schematic notion of success were those that people thought it important to consider.

On the other hand, the schematic notion is designed to abstract from agreements and disagreements about the success of any particular institutions or policies. Approaching the topics of the schema with one set of moral principles, people may condemn a government as unjust, reckless, and improvident; other people, invoking another set of moral principles, may find it none of these things, and count it a success. They would both be using the same schema. I have not specified that they must consider the survival of any institution, even their own sovereign government, essential; I have not even tried to indicate how the various topics laid out in the schema should be weighted. Finally, I am not claiming that the schematic notion illustrated is an entirely satisfactory representation of the meaning of "success." I am just claiming that there would be general agreement among thinking people that it is more adequate than the primitive notions mentioned.

If the agreement is so limited, however, what shall we have accomplished in getting it? I think several things. Limited as the agreement may be, it gives grounds for believing that the field of ethical discourse is not quite so wildly confused as sophisticated people tend to think -- that it is even to some degree "structured" (19). In the second place, the schematic notion shows what I meant when I spoke earlier of "systematic attention" to the moral considerations involved in the notion of success; and it shows how this systematic attention can be given without pronouncing moral judgments, if one wishes to refrain. For, in the course of describing a given political institution, a man may attempt to state the facts that fall under the schematic headings, and note their relevance to judging whether or not the institution is a success; and where he has no information to give on one of the schematic topics, he may give notice of the omission.

This does not involve him in making moral judgments of his own. It only requires him to provide certain points of information which his students are likely to find valuable, though in doing so, of course, he may have the effect of encouraging or discouraging them from making specific moral judgments about the institution described. Hence it is especially important that he should caution them about the topics which he has not canvassed, and thus forestall their making judgments prematurely.

If he himself wishes to arrive at a judgment of success, then he will want to give all the topics in the schema extended consideration. He will be impelled to increase his information in each of these directions, and to define a moral position regarding the facts that he has marshalled. Furthermore, he will want to consider alternative ways of performing the functions

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(19). It is easy to exaggerate the extent of disagreements relating to ethics. If one starts with certain questions -- questions about foundations, for example, or hard cases in which received principles notoriously conflict -- a disturbing picture of hopeless confusion emerges very promptly. Things are bad; but not so bad as that. The trick, both in theorizing about ethics and in doing it, is to raise questions in the order that will maximize agreement, and (I would guess) no philosopher has yet brought the trick off completely. I think David Hume came nearest.



that he discovers for the institution which he is evaluating, for it would substantially qualify his judgment that the present institution is a success to know that there were practical alternative devices which were likely to be even more successful. Thus he will be led to consider prescriptive suggestions about functions and normative models.

Again, he might consider them non-committally; whether he does so or not, the schematic notion of success is the relevant guide for marshalling information. All the principles that might be relevantly invoked under the headings of justice, security, and progress to assess the success of a going political system would also be relevant to criticizing the success of a normative model, the only difference being that in the one case a going thing is being judged, and in the other, a plan that may not yet be fully in effect.

We might imagine that there would be as many normative models as there are political scientists who care to go in for that sort of thing. (Or more: one or more for every member of society; and, perhaps, in addition, some that are championed by groups without being identical with those offered by any of the members of the groups). But to insist on such differences is just another way of exaggerating the prevalence of ethical disagreement. It is improbable, on sociological grounds, that the normative models offered by different participants in one political system will be wholly disparate; and even more improbable that there will be so great a variation in the models offered by the only set of people who in fact are likely to propose models, professional students of politics who have had the same sort of training and who are in constant intercourse with one another, that more than a handful of substantially different models would have to be distinguished.

When Professor Key introduces his remarks on the functions of the party system by referring to "our political lore", he is making a significant allusion to the way in which normative models characteristically originate. They are not invented suddenly out of nothing; they represent instead attempts to express what are acknowledged to be traditional conceptions, modifying them in part, no doubt, but still resting on a core of received values. If this is so, it is not surprising that we should find an identity between the framework for criticizing normative models and the schematic notion of success, which has been derived from the same tradition.

#### IV

Many political scientists will still, perhaps, prefer to have as little to do as possible with normative models, or with the prescriptive features of the complex of ideas associated with "function", "efficiency", and "success"; and it may be said that political scientists generally confront a choice between two possible programs: first, the program, already mentioned, of inhibiting themselves from any prescriptive uses of "function", and from any attempt to judge themselves the success of political institutions; and second, a program that would tolerate prescriptions regarding function, asking only that ultimately a clear distinction be drawn between ideals and facts. The second program does entail risks of confusion which the first does not; and the confusion, between value judgments and descriptive propositions, will have to be cleared up in detail as a preliminary to constructing exact descriptive theories. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that the second program is a reasonable and practical one; and that the first is not.



Even if political scientists wanted to dispense with the notions of "function" and "success", their audiences would force the ideas upon them. For the success which various political institutions enjoy in performing the functions that may be attributed to them is a matter of primary interest to non-professional students of politics, and to the political agents whom the scientists may seek to inform and advise. There will be a demand that advice, however disinterested, be couched in the language of "function" and "success." Furthermore, political scientists are themselves political agents, with hopes and fears about politics; and as agents, they will be under a constant temptation to use this convenient and persuasive language prescriptively.

These factors are reinforced by the circumstance that a large part of political activity consists in challenging the success of present institutions and in prescribing new functions, or in defending old prescriptions and championing the institutions affected by them. Indeed, one general way of describing what politics is, at least in democracy, is to describe it as the process by which the population prescribes the functions that the organs of government are to perform. It will be a rare man who describes this process without taking some part in it, especially when he is a concerned participant in other roles; and he is unlikely to have many imitators. I therefore conclude that the program of prescriptive self-denial is not practical.

But it is not reasonable, either, because it denies us information, as well as indulgence in ethics. Even if political science had (as it does not as yet) a systematic theoretical framework, with a place for proving every true causal law as a theorem of the system, not all of those places would be filled (20). Now suppose someone proposes that a certain institution have a given function. We may be able to read off the effects of conferring that function upon it from theorems already known; but there is no guarantee that we shall be able to do so. In very many cases, such prescriptions suggest causal antecedents that have not yet been tried out; and in these cases, we enlarge the system in the course of considering the proposed functions. In the present state of political science, the superabundance of causal hypotheses not yet formulated or investigated must be even more impressive; and hence the likelihood of obtaining new information from trying out the causal propositions implied by novel prescriptions, even more appreciable.

It is, furthermore, the very information that we are most interested in as supporters of political science. The chief thing that we want our observations of politics to do for us is to furnish us with guidance in our political activities. The new information which prescriptions provoke us to obtain enlarges our knowledge of unrealized political possibilities, and hence extends the scope of political choice in directions some of which may be more attractive than any we have known of or taken before. The importance of the schematic notion of success can now be made plain. We want to know not merely about

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(20) It could not, I think, be proved that all the logically distinct theorems that could be derived from the given axioms had in fact been derived and written down. Even a very simple logical system allows us to state infinitely many well-formed formulas, and which of these could be interpreted as causal laws could not be determined in advance. We would have to formulate them one by one and see.

possibilities -- about novel functions and new normative models; we want to know about the possibilities of success, and so not only will the investigation of these possibilities be prompted by moral considerations (namely, those from which prescriptions about functions and policies spring): we would not allow that the investigation was complete until it had given as much illumination as we could get on the moral topics laid out in the schematic notion of success.

There is, finally, yet another way in which political scientists help increase information by allowing themselves to make prescriptions. Recommendations like Key's and Schattschneider's regarding the party system indicate to the public that there are informed students of politics to whom just these recommended possibilities seem of crucial importance. Recommendations are not statements of fact; but it is a fact that these things are recommended, and by just these people. In a world in which we must rely on experts, information about the recommendations of political scientists is bound to count for something in the political picture. In this case, political scientists add to the picture of facts by creating new ones.

I conclude, therefore, that it is reasonable for political scientists to go on making prescriptions of function and ~~evaluations~~ of success. That does not mean that all political scientists must do this as an incident of all their work. Some may never do it; others may go no farther than a non-committal use of the schematic notion of success; and those who do go farther must expect a distinction to be drawn between the descriptive and prescriptive elements of their studies.

The distinction does not disgrace the prescriptive elements, or leave us with nothing more to do about them. There are even useful ways of making systems out of them, as precise and specific as any system that we construct out of the descriptive elements from which for some purposes we wish to separate them. I shall try, in closing, to say a few words about recent developments in deontic logic, which is symbolic logic especially designed to embody normative concepts; in doing so, I shall be relying upon the work of my colleague Alan R. Anderson (21).

A deontic logic is in the first place an instrument for studying the logical relationships between deontic notions, such as "permitted", "forbidden", and "obligatory". There are certain analogies between these notions and the notions of possibility and necessity, and one way of constructing a deontic logic is to exploit these analogies, first expanding the usual stock of logical operators (signs of negation, implication, etc.) to include an operator for possibility; then the notions of necessity and impossibility can be defined by this expanded stock, and the notions of permission, prohibition, and obligation by the expanded stock, taken together with a proposition describing the sanction or sanctions with which violations of the norms are penalized. With suitable definitions and axioms, one can go on to prove theorems that can be understood as showing the form of rigorously valid moral arguments.

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(21) Especially upon his monograph, The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems, 1956 (Yale Interaction Laboratory). See also A. R. Anderson and O. K. Moore, "The Formal Analysis of Normative Concepts," American Sociological Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 1957), pp. 9-17.

For example, one of the theorems of Anderson's system OM is " $C(KOCpqNMq)(Fp)$ " (22). Here "C" is the logical operator for implication; "K" signifies conjunction, "N" negation, and "M" possibility. "O" and "F" are deontic operators signifying obligation and prohibition respectively; and "p" and "q" are propositional variables, for which specific descriptions of actions or states of affairs may be substituted. The theorem may be rendered in English as meaning "If it is obligatory that we should do q if we do p, and it is impossible to do q, then it is forbidden to do p" -- that is to say, sanctions of some sort will be imposed if p is done. (23)

Such theorems are representative of are representative of a deontic logic in the "molecular" stage, in which a propositional calculus is provided as the basic framework for the logic as a whole. Work is in progress toward a theory of quantification, incorporating operators for "all" and "some", which will permit "atomic" analysis of normative systems, allowing one to distinguish, for example, between obligations imposed on every member of society and obligations imposed only on the members of specified groups, or on members holding specified offices. Anderson expects, for use at this stage, to adopt a certain concept of "responsibility" as primary. Possibly the concept of "function" could be used instead (24); in any case, it will be impossible to express prescriptions about political function.

There may be disagreement about whether a given system of deontic logic has actually succeeded in explicating the deontic notions which it incorporates. For example, another theorem of OM is " $C(KOpOCKpqr)(OCqr)$ ", which Professor von Wright, who demonstrated it in an earlier system, would render in English as "If doing two things, the first of which we ought to do, commits us to do a third thing, then doing the second thing alone commits us to do the third thing." In English, at any rate, this is a hard saying, and it may provoke criticism of the translation; or, as well, of the axioms and definitions from which the theorem is derived. Revision of these axioms and

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(22) This expression is given, following Anderson, in the so-called Polish notation. It could be rendered (again adding operators to the basic stock) equally well in the more familiar, but typographically more demanding, notation of Principia Mathematica.

(23) Anderson's illustration is that we should not borrow money when it is impossible for us to repay it.

(24) By coincidence, a quantified logical calculus is called a "functional calculus"; this usage springs from the mathematical concept of function, not the social and political one.



definitions would produce alternative systems of deontic logic, some of which might possibly express the basic normative concepts of a given language or a given social group more aptly than OM.

The main normative differences between political scientists, one suspects, are of a less subtle kind, which does not so much affect the system of deontic logic used, as the use to which any given system would be put. In making prescriptions about function, we may conceive of political scientists as differing, first, in regard to the sanctions that they wish employed; and, second, in respect to the particular actions and states of affairs that they wish to see permitted, forbidden, or made obligatory. The axiomatic systems produced by formulating these differences exactly will represent the different normative models with which the scientists are working, though in many cases, the models will not in fact have been at all developed systematically; and in some cases, there will be inconsistencies in a single man's thinking that will suggest he is trying to work simultaneously with more than one model. The relation of any such axiomatized model to the system of deontic logic in terms of which it has been formulated may be regarded as that of a separate system all of whose deductions are validated by theorems of deontic logic; in other words, the system of deontic logic certifies that the arguments of the axiomatized model are correct -- but not that their content is true.

If we agree to use a system of deontic logic to axiomatize normative models, we give ourselves a head start toward identifying exactly the normative differences between different schools of political theory; for we clear up at the beginning any possibilities of confusion about the logical relations of the deontic notions. This seems, in fact, to be taking up questions in an order likely to show the full extent of existing agreements about ethics, before it begins showing disagreements. It may appear further that most of the differences between the normative models actually influencing American political science are trivial ones. But whether they are or not, there is no way of seeing for sure what they are, together with their logical ramifications, short of constructing an exact systematic representation of each normative model.

This means a great deal of work. The labor involved, in fact, would be enormous; it could be accomplished only by subdividing it, and coordinating the efforts of a great number of workers. And this presents a political problem, to which, as a visitor from another discipline, I invite your scientific attention. The results to be expected if such work is done are of the highest value; yet there is a problem of organizing a coordinated effort without interfering with the freedom of scholars and scientists to choose their own tasks. This freedom extends, unfortunately, to being able to choose doing again some tired subjects from the received repertory. If political scientists can find an attractive way out of this dilemma, they will, I expect, have performed a very useful function for themselves; and they will have done a service for the world of learning which, I know, would be of special benefit to philosophers, too.

THIRD PARTY POSSIBILITIES

FOR 1960

by

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Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American  
Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton  
Jefferson Hotel, September 4 - 6, 1958.

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A veteran of many political campaigns once told a young man who was entering politics by running for a position in the state legislature, "Tomorrow's the day before the election; anything can happen." If this idea is considered almost an axiom by politicians, and, if the turn of political events is uncertain the day or the week before an election, they are likely to be even more unpredictable two years before the campaigns begins.

But even at this distance it is important to examine the developments that might take place during the next presidential campaign, and one of the most important of these is the possibility of a third political party that could capture two score or more electoral votes, particularly if the holding of these electoral votes threw the election of the president into the House of Representatives in Congress. There are other effects that a third party of major importance would have on the political system. Campaign issues would frequently be put in a different light and new ones perhaps brought before the voters, and certainly a number of lesser known politicians would receive national publicity. Some of these might have an opportunity to prove their ability as political leaders. Moreover, it is obvious that a third political party strong enough to take strength from one and perhaps both of the other two parties could be sufficient to bring about a realignment of the two major parties, especially with the amount of disunity that exists in them at the present time.

In order to make an estimate of the possibilities for a third party, it is necessary to find the sentiment that will support such a movement and to discover what conditions must exist in order to bring the third political party into existence or to increase the strength of a minor organization to the point where it will play a major role. There is no intention here to advocate or oppose the establishment or growth of a third party force; such developments occur because of the conditions, feelings, and ideas that exist within a society, and they are crystallized by the movement of current events.

Dissatisfaction with the activities and platforms of the major political groups gives rise to third party movements. There may be dissatisfaction with the economy or with the national political system that causes a group of people to organize another political faction. For example, Greenbacks and Populists were unhappy about the economic situation, and the Progressive Party of 1912 expressed dissatisfaction with the political conditions of the country. At times new political organizations have developed because of the feeling that the major parties have not given adequate attention to some particular issue or idea; the Prohibitionist Party is an example of such a development. At other times discontent with the stand that the two major parties had taken has resulted in the formation of a third party; the States Rights Party of 1948 grew out of this type of situation. The formation of third parties has traditionally developed in two ways, by splitting off from one of the major political organizations or by trying to create a new force. As V. O. Key has pointed out, those based on a doctrine have managed to exist for quite some time through the efforts of dedicated party workers, but those political organizations that have been based on economic protest have had a history of flash, flare, and flop.

There is no evidence that any of the minor political parties now in existence will develop into an organization strong enough to be a decisive influence in a presidential election. The Socialist and Socialist-Labor groups

have constantly decreased in the total number of popular votes that they have garnered since 1932, with the exception of the year 1948, and present estimates of their strength place their total popular vote between 35,000 and 40,000. The party workers may be capable and courageous, but there is no leader in their organization that appeals to the public. And there are no issues that can be used to secure new members and increase their voting strength. With liberals feeling that they can have more effective influence by operating within the two party system, there does not appear to be any possibility for a significant increase in the size of the socialist groups as a third major force in 1960.

The Prohibitionist Party is too limited in its appeals to become a major political organization, a fact that is readily seen in the gradual decline of its popular vote in national elections. In 1920, there were 188,000 votes cast for the Prohibition Party; in 1956, there were only 42,000 votes cast for that ticket. The constant decline has been checked only once since 1920, and that was, as might be expected, in 1948. Neither the temperament nor the taste of the country indicates an important increase in the size of the popular vote for the Prohibition ticket in 1960.

There is also a Woman's Party with headquarters in the old home of Lord Baltimore in Washington, but this organization is primarily interested in getting the federal constitution changed so as to provide for equal rights for women. Its workers are dedicated and capable, but their activities do not include such a range of issues that they could become a major political group. And the leaders of that movement are neither planning nor expecting to win control of the White House.

On the whole there seems to be little chance of a third party getting started or gaining any important amount of strength if that party is either liberal or leftist. There was a threat by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell this summer to create another political party in order to make the two major parties realize the importance of civil rights legislation, but his remarks were designed to have more effect on Democratic Party leaders in New York and on his campaign to keep his seat in Congress than it was to be carried into action. Ambitious politicians tend more to the conservative side of the road at the present, a position that was explained by an office holder who remarked after winning a very close election, "The liberals have stopped voting."

The greatest possibility for a third political party of any strength comes from the conservatives. Beginning with the campaign and election of 1940, most of the third party movements have come from the right-wing of the political scene. The extreme conservatives have often believed that the two major political organizations are leading the country to ruin, and they have hoped for an organization that would be strong enough to bring one or both of the major parties to what they consider as a more reasonable position. These groups have been unable to win a presidential election because they have not had a national or rather nation-wide organization, because they have had difficulty getting on the ballot, and because they have been too narrow in their views and very often limited to sectional interests. If they could be brought together into one organization, conservatives could possibly have more appeal and might prevent either of the major parties from securing a majority vote in the electoral college.



There have been all kinds of organizations advocating one or more of the conservative views. In 1940, a rash of committees, societies, leagues, unions, and councils sprang up all over the country, all opposed to what they considered to be the radical tendencies of the major parties. For example, The American Peaceway Society was pacifist and isolationist; the Taxpayers Association in Indiana was in favor of securing consideration for the taxpayers, and they opposed most of the welfare programs. The Civic Economic Committee in New York opposed the activities of most of the regulatory agencies, and it advocated that more of the regulation of the economy be left to the states. Many of these organizations lasted only a short while. Some of them became involved in isolationism; others became discouraged by international events that made their position difficult if it didn't appear to be unpatriotic. Some survived, however, and other groups have been formed since. Although there was little or no connection between these groups, during the latter part of 1945 and the early part of 1946 they united, in spirit and objectives, in their opposition to price controls and the Office of Price Administration. "Economic freedom," which meant freedom from government regulation, was at the heart of their thought, and, in order to achieve this, they called for a "return to the original meaning of the constitution." Specifically, they felt and still believe that taxes are too high, government regulations too severe, welfare activities of the government too numerous, and many government agencies unnecessary.

In 1948, many of these groups gave sub rosa support to the States' Rights Party. It was good politics. There was little hope of bringing any of the Southerners into the Republican camp, but there was a good possibility of encouraging revolt in Dixie which could and did take strength away from the Democrats. Conservatives in the North had probably never been so impressed with the possibilities of working with conservatives in the South. Perhaps this explains why the States' Rights Party was able to raise money with such ease that at least \$18,000 was declared a surplus and deposited in a bank in Hampton, South Carolina.

Between 1950 and 1956, Northern and Midwestern conservatives began to join with Southerners and vice versa. The Citizens Council has chapters and affiliated groups in a surprising number of states outside of the South, and support of the For America group exists in North and South alike. All of these activities, as insignificant as they seem to be, are evidence that there is a nation-wide conservative opinion that reflects dissatisfaction with the two major parties.

In 1952, conservatives hoped that Senator Robert Taft would receive the nomination for the presidency. Although General Dwight Eisenhower was looked on with considerably more favor than Governor Adlai Stevenson, General Douglas MacArthur was preferred to both. During this campaign, Colonel Robert Mc Cormick, editor of The Chicago Tribune, proposed that another political party be organized to support the more conservative views, and first of September of that year Mr. Upton Close announced in Philadelphia the creation of the Constitution Party. According to the plans of this group, a campaign was to have been made among the members of the electoral college with the view of persuading them to ignore their instructions and to vote for the candidates of the Constitution Party, General Douglas MacArthur and Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia. The organization faded out in the heat of the campaign, but in several states General MacArthur's name did appear on the ballot, a situation that caused some concern in the



Republican headquarters in October 1952.

In 1954, the For America group was organized. The purpose of the organization being to return to original principles of the constitution. Although their ideas of "sound constitutional" principles are not quite the same as those advocated by states' rights advocates, there is agreement on many points and people adhering to the principles of both doctrines can work together. In 1956, Northern and Southern states' rights groups formed a national organization known as the Federation for Constitutional Government, and a national convention was held in Memphis, Tennessee, of the same year. This "National States' Rights Conference" was attended by delegates from twenty-five states, and, although they voted down a proposal to organize a national party, they did adopt a "states' rights" platform and endorsed T. Coleman Andrews, a Virginia Democrat, for the presidency and Thomas Werdel, a California Republican, for the vice presidency.

The Andrews-Werdel ticket appeared on the ballot in only seventeen states, but votes were cast for the pair in eighteen states. The largest number of votes was cast in the Southern states where the names appeared. In Louisiana, the ticket received 44,520 votes, and in Virginia, the ticket received 42,964 votes or about six percent of the total vote. Considering the lack of planning, organization, and campaigning behind the Andrews-Werdel ticket, it is evident that with a more determined effort a conservative ticket could have secured a much larger vote throughout the country.

Another movement took place in Mississippi and South Carolina in 1956. In these states, an Independent organization was formed and secured a place on the ballot. The group supported Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia for the presidency and Congressman John Bell Williams of Mississippi for the vice presidency. This Independent ticket received 88,509 votes in South Carolina, about 29 percent of the total vote, and Mississippians cast 42,966 votes for the ticket, about 19 percent of the total vote. Had the two conservative movements of 1956 combined, organized in as many states as possible and conducted a vigorous campaign, it is possible they would have received as many electoral votes as the States Rights Party did in 1948. It should be remembered that only in Mississippi and South Carolina did any of the important political figures, and even then it was a definite minority, support the bolting tickets, and in most of the states votes were cast in spite of the lack of interest even hostility of the leading political personalities.

The question of whether there will be a third political party in 1960 appears to rest on the possibility of Northern and Midwestern conservatives joining with Southern conservatives. Recent developments point in that direction. There is a great deal of meeting and talking among conservatives from all parts of the country, and there is a genuine cordiality and friendliness between these people and the states' righters. In the middle of April of this year Mid-Western isolationists quietly met with Southern segregationists in Kansas City in a Congress of Freedom. Other such meeting are planned for 1959.

There is also a movement throughout the South to attain more unity of action in Democratic Party activities. Two "unity" meetings were held in Atlanta prior to the 1956 National Democratic Convention, at which some difficulties had to be overcome before the party leaders could arrive at any course of action. In August 1958, another meeting was held in Columbia, South Carolina, of Southern Democratic Party leaders, and it was attended by the chairman and other officials of this party in eight states. The purpose of the gathering was to provide an

opportunity for Southern Democratic Party workers to get to know each other and their problems. Mr. Tom Pope, Chairman of the South Carolina organization, advocated a plan to re-sell the Democratic Party to the South, but no course of strategy was adopted. However once these people become acquainted with each other and their problems, the South will be a stronger bloc within the Democratic Party councils, and officials of the national organization will find it difficult to ignore the interests of Southerners without losing six or eight states to a third party.

There is considerable sentiment for independent action in the South. There are a large number of people who believe that if the Southern states act together in an independent fashion and are not "in the bag" for any political party in a presidential election the two major parties will be forced to bargain with them hat in hand. These people point out that although the States' Rights Party did not succeed in 1948 they can quite close because a shift of only 41,000 votes in Illinois and Ohio would have thrown the election into the House of Representatives. There are others who can not agree with either of the two major parties. The question of segregation and civil rights generally has created an atmosphere that could easily bring about a political organization that would be created in time to get their candidates on the ballot and a campaign underway, and, with allies in other parts of the country joining in a strong anti-Communist platform, such a party could well be the balance of power in a close election.

A survey conducted by the Congressional Quarterly News Features in 1957 of thirteen Southern governors showed that seven of the governors asked would favor a third party movement, two indicated that they would favor a bolt, and four did not answer. It is interesting to notice that since that time two of the governors who did not favor a third party movement will soon be out of office. One of these is the present governor of Tennessee who will be succeeded by a man who won the gubernatorial primary in a campaign where the candidates seemed to try to outdo each other in favoring segregation and strong state action. There may be some doubt about the position of the governor-elect in the second instance, Alabama, but in this state a majority of the members of the state Democratic executive committee are known to be "independent minded." The four states where the governors did not answer the question were Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, where there is strong feeling for independent action.

The recent landslide election of Governor Orval Faubus to a third term, the first time Arkansans have elected a governor for a third term since the re-election of Jeff Davis in 1904, has had its repercussions throughout the South. The governor of Florida and North Carolina noted that the election results indicate the reaction to the use of troops at Little Rock, and the trend was summarized by Mr. Harry Ashmore, editor of the Arkansas Gazette, who said

"The moderate position formerly espoused by many Southern, political leaders, and by this newspaper as a matter of principles, has been rejected by the mass of voters in this upper Southern state and is now clearly untenable for any man in public life anywhere in the region.

Newsweek reported earlier this year that in spite of developments in the South to the contrary many news reporters were betting that there would be a bolt in 1960. In contacting news reporters this writer verified the statement. Their views are based on the idea that Northern Democrats believe that



they must take a strong pro-civil rights position and nominate a pro-civil rights candidate in order to carry their states in the next presidential election.

With the leadership already in important positions and with an alliance with conservatives in other parts of the country in the offing, the situation seems to need only a spark to start the organization for a third political party. Perhaps the spark was provided by Little Rock or maybe it will be provided by events as they develop in Virginia or some other Southern state involved in a battle over segregation. It is more likely that the inertia, if it really exists, will be broken at the National Democratic Convention. Should Governor Averell Harriman and others persist in a determination not to allow the nomination of anyone who would be acceptable to Southern Democrats or if the national convention of the Democratic Party adopted a platform or committed any other act that was knowingly offensive to the South, a third party would immediately be formed. And as events are taking place it would be better organized than it was in 1948. Such a situation can not be looked on too unfavorably by Republicans who feel that their greatest hope for victory at this distance seems to be the same that it was one hundred years ago, a division in the Democratic Party.

There are some good reasons, however, why such a third party will not develop. A number of people in the South have become tired of splinter parties and movements. These people feel that they supported the States' Rights Party in 1948 to no real gain, and they worked to attain the election of Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 only to have a president that has not made any great departure from the New and Fair Deals and who has capped all of this by his use of troops in Little Rock. Under these conditions they think that they can have more influence by being in the Democratic Party, especially if that party wins the next election. There are others who have a deep and abiding loyalty to the Democratic Party. A third attitude is the fear of abandoning the Democratic Party to a group of radicals and the feeling that the presence and participation of Southerners to promote a moderating effect. Most of the members of Congress are not anxious to lose their seniority because of splinter party activities. Their views were best stated by Ex-Governor Cameron Morrison of North Carolina when he said to his state's Democratic Party convention in 1948, "Let's get under the Democratic flag and help elect him [Truman]; then we'll let our Congressmen and Senators beat him down when he needs beating." Within the next two years the activities of the present administration and the Republican Party in general could drive a large number of Southerners back to the Democratic organization.

In spite of these deterrents, however, most of the elements exist to bring about a third party movement. There is a strong, definite dissatisfaction with the two major political parties, and there are sufficient issues growing out of the rulings of the U. S. Supreme Court as well as those that have arisen in Congress to create a political party based on an anti-communist, decentralization of government, segregation, lower taxes platform that could have a surprising amount of support, difficult as it is to imagine at this time. Such a movement might be strong enough to throw the election of the president into the House of Representatives and perhaps even bring about a re-alignment of the major parties. But only under the most advantageous circumstances could a third party become so effective. At this distance and in the light of present conditions, it is safer to conclude that there probably will be a third party in 1960 but that it will not significantly affect the course of American politics.



Toward More Responsible Parties:  
Some Notes on the Staff Organization  
of the  
Democratic National Committee

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of  
the American Political Science Association, St. Louis,  
Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

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The notion persists that one route to stronger, more responsible national political parties lies through expanded, more professional, more bureaucratic national party organs. Some may feel that strengthened party organs can evolve, unplanned, as the existing structures attempt to meet the demands of a more nationalized politics. Others feel that consciously planned and created party organs will themselves provide a powerful impetus toward nationalization of politics. In any case, Political Scientists will continue to be interested in the forms taken by the several organizations of the major political parties.

Professor Bone has recently completed thorough research of the forms and functions of the national party committees and has just published his findings.<sup>1</sup> The justification for this paper lies in the chance it affords to report some new developments in the structure of the staff organization of the Democratic National Committee; to report the thinking about these changes among the members of the staff organization; and to make a preliminary assessment of the significance of the changes and new trends.

The method underlying the preparation of the paper might be called unsophisticated. Like the old anthropologists who went to live among their subjects for a year and returned to describe what they had seen, I have spent some time among the members of the staff of the Democratic National Committee, have worked alongside them, shared many of their work and career problems and taken on some attitudes toward their function and its place in the party system. I do not represent the National Committee, however, and the views or attitudes expressed here are my own interpretations. They are not official or authorized reflections of the views of the National Committee or any of its staff officials.

The study is limited to the National Committee staff. References will be made to other party committees, to the state party organizations, and to the National Democratic Advisory Council, but these are not the foci. They affect and are affected by the National Committee staff operations. They are each major parts of that complex of power centers that gives national political parties such palpability as they may have. The National Committee cannot be fully understood apart from these other centers. This limited

1. Hugh A. Bone, Party Committees And National Politics, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1958.

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report on the developments in the organization of the Democratic National Committee, then, is offered as an aid toward the fuller understanding of the shape that is being taken by our national party system.

The Growth of the Staff

The permanent staff of the National Committee steadily grows larger. On December 31, 1957, there were seventy-one persons on the payroll of the National Committee.<sup>2</sup> This number includes the two people on the staff of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee whose salaries are paid by the National Committee but it does not include the eleven persons who are on the separate payroll of the Democratic Digest Corporation.<sup>3</sup> This compares with a total payroll of fifty-nine for the comparable non-campaign years of 1953 and 1955.

The staff has grown appreciably since the first of the year. This is due in part to the fact that this is a national election year, of course. Many of the additions are temporary and will be released when the campaign is over. People hired on this temporary basis are aware of and accept willingly the short duration of their employment. Washington abounds in people who move into and out of the agencies, of interest associations, party offices, etc., for short periods. They have their own reasons but they are a staple of the Washington scene.

But not all of the additions have been temporary. There have been three high-level, professional appointments of a permanent nature since January. In addition, one professional researcher who was on part-time salary has been taken on the full time payroll. I estimate that the payroll now includes over eighty persons and expect that it may reach one hundred by mid-campaign time.

In addition to the payroll, the headquarters staff enjoys the free labor of several volunteers. In 1957, 202 volunteers contributed a total of 18,873 hours, or an average of 363 hours per week. A few work steadily the year round at the headquarters office. They all perform functions that would have to be done by a paid worker, in some cases by a professional level worker. Their motives may be obscure but there can be no doubt of their devotion. For them there is no glory, no glamour, no participation in "policy" decisions. they do hard, often monotonous work in crowded quarters. They are an interesting phenomenon.

<sup>2</sup>. Paul H. Butler, Report To The National Committee, Feb. 21, 1958

<sup>3</sup>. The Democratic Digest Corporation is legally a separate entity. The Digest, however, is the official organ of the Democratic National Committee.



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The Committee's headquarters at 1001 Connecticut Avenue in Washington are overcrowded, though by former standards they are spacious. Especially in the rooms allocated to research duty do the workers suffer from the crowding and jostling of a too cramped work area. That research is so ill-favored is undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that only recently has it been accorded major status within the Committee.

Opposition to Growth

All this growth in the size of the National Committee staff is, of course, costly. And while it must be said that the growth has not been haphazard, but rather has been planned and nourished, it has been accompanied by a steady chorus of criticism from elements inside the National Committee itself.

The current Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Paul M. Butler of Indiana, is the driving force behind most of the recent growth of the Committee staff. He is seeking to build a permanent professional staff, large enough to provide such services to the various elements of the party that will win for the National Committee a position as a durable, vital, effective power-holding, cohesive factor in a strong national party.

It would be presumptuous to try to make here a complete and authoritative statement of Butler's organizational objectives and his program for achieving them. By piecing together elements of his public record to date, his speeches, short conversations with him and even some intra-office gossip, this much seems warranted: Butler, while undoubtedly not an "intellectual" in the popular sense, is a serious and reflective man. He reads widely in and is influenced by the scholarly literature about parties and politics. The APSA report of a decade ago<sup>4</sup> has been a special influence. He stands rather firmly in the "more responsible parties" school. Obviously he sees the National Committees as the principal uniting and coordinating bodies of the stronger parties he envisions.

It would be too much to say that Butler is a driving idealist who sacrifices all to achieve his goal. He is a practicing politician. This means that he is pragmatic, that he compromises, that he must often look no further ahead than the next election and that winning that election is really the most important thing in the world for him to do. He does, however, cleave to the long run objective of stronger parties. He has tried to expand

4. APSA Committee On Political Parties, Toward A More Responsible Two Party System, (1950)

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the National Committee staff in furtherance of that objective. He will try to enlarge the staff if he feels that only by doing so can he enable the staff to perform the services and functions he feels to be essential. He will resist those influences urging that the staff be cut back in size and the National Committee returned to a more traditional role.

There is still much sentiment for the traditional role. The motives for advocacy of the traditional role are too many and too complex for treatment here. In the main they stem from the decentralization of our politics. In the immediate sense, within the National Committee, money of course influences the urge for a diminished Committee staff. Some members of the National Committee, perhaps reflecting opinion in their states' organizations, feel that the money that goes to the national organization could be better spent electing mayors, state legislators, governors and senators from the home state. Some southern Democrats, on and off the National Committee, often claim that they can see no possible return for their money, that there is nothing that the Committee can do for them except to urge the northern liberals to stop talking about racial integration. It should be noted that this is not true of all southern Democrats. Relations between the National Committee and the state organizations of many of the southern states are cordial enough. Then there are pure traditionalists. These latter feel that the traditional system is just about right, that one ought not to tinker with it, that politics in America are primarily state politics except for a brief period every four years, that there is no reason for all this continuous activity by the Committee staff. "Jim Farley ran the best National Committee this country ever saw with Charley Michelson and some women to do the typing.", runs the typical comment. Many traditionalists concede that some expansion of staff and activity became necessary when the party lost control of the Executive branch but they feel that the Butler Committee staff has reached the point of diminishing returns. They are either skeptical or disdainful of the fact that the Republicans retain a large professional permanent staff. Localism and the enormous expense of maintaining year-round professional political activity, then, are the chief grounds of opposition to what might be called the new concept of the role of the National Committee.

A National Committee Chairman is not without his resources. The National Committee is not able to maintain continuous surveillance of the Chairman. Management of the headquarters and staff are left almost entirely in his hands. He alone can make decisions to employ new personnel or to fix the salaries of the staff. A Chairman must decide for himself whether or not any one particular expansion is worth the criticism he may receive for the new costs that will be involved. In increasing the scope of Committee staff activity Butler must always take care to justify new functions in terms of their value to the party organizations everywhere. In a way the announcement of an important new addition to the staff becomes an exercise in the political art. The timing of the announcement, the description of the new job, the appropriate prior consultations must all be just right. Although it is difficult to establish the fact certainly, members of the staff do feel that Butler has moved skillfully in his strengthening of the staff.

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The New Functions

It is almost impossible to draw a table of organization for the Democratic National Committee staff. The old habits die hard in party organizations. In the past each Chairman has cut the pattern of organization to reflect his own needs, hopes and political style. The size of the staff has undergone periodic expansion and contraction, personnel turnover has been high and thus there has been little interest in long-range organizational planning. Then, too, even in the expanded Butler organization, distinction between line and staff functions would be a luxury. Everybody from Butler down to the stenographers is almost ferociously busy at line work---there is really very little time for housekeeping. Though in the past there has been little need for formal rationalization of the staff, the new growth, that of the Butler era, cries out for greater systematization. There is now something slightly rueful about the staffers' observation that there is no table of organization. There exists among the staff some hope that Butler is ready to turn his talent and energy toward the internal organization of the headquarters. Earlier in the summer, a substantial general pay raise was granted---so far as I can ascertain, this was an unprecedented step in an election year---and many of the workers accept this as an earnest of the busy Butler's interest in internal matters.

In the Butler organization, staff conferences are held only at very rare intervals. Butler, naturally, confers with individual members of the staff from time to time. Equally obviously, professional members of the staff must consult one another occasionally. This is done on personal initiative, however, and is quite unformalized. Most members of the staff seem to accept the absence of conferences as normal enough. Still, one can hear complaints from staffers that they learn of a new member, a new office or a new function only by reading an announcement in the Washington Post or, more slowly, through the mill of informal office gossip.

Deputy Chairman for Public Affairs and Editor-in-Chief of the Democratic Digest, Samuel C. Brightman, once a month holds an assignment conference for all of the people who may do pieces for the Digest. These are largely unstructured affairs with irregular attendance. Brightman sketches out what he has in mind for the forthcoming issue, determines what the writers of the regular features (Women's activities, Young Democrat activities, etc.) may have worth reporting, and may call for suggestions for feature stories if he happens to be devoid of ideas at the moment. Obviously such a meeting touches what might be called "party policy" more than tangentially. Though Brightman holds the decision reins rather tightly, there is some argument made about whether or not to try a civil rights story, for instance, or whether to feature a foreign policy story or one on the domestic economy, or to stress such misfortunes of the Administration as the Adams-Goldfine affair. This is done in a casual manner, is played by ear, so to speak, with the current news largely dictating the flow of ideas and suggestions. Yet these Digest planning sessions are the closest thing to scheduled staff meetings that now go on at headquarters.



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A word is in order here about what might be called the essentially amateur spirit, or morale, that still pervades the headquarters staff. The staff is highly partisan and perpetually embattled, for the most part. It is important that there are exceptions but, still, a cause is being worked for. The tides of party fortune in Congress and in the states sweep across the faces and minds of the headquarters staff. The professional level workers do not watch the clock and even the sacred Washington week-end is not proof against the party fever that animates much of the staff. Naturally there are enormous advantages to this. Prodigious amounts of work can be done under that kind of high charge. It can melt away the barriers to output that low salaries, job insecurity and difficult working conditions may raise. At the present state of National Committee fortune it is probably an indispensable ingredient.

It is apparent that thus far the type of organization described resembles rather more the amateur, voluntary, non-professional and ad hoc association and rather less the permanent, professional, bureaucratized organization that it is the presumptive aim of Chairman Butler to create.

Yet there are signs that the permanent, professional bureaucratized staff organization may be emergent. It would be well here to emphasize that the whole Butler organization could collapse if he were to be removed from the Chairmanship and a "Little Democrat", pledged to economy of operation, were to replace him. Nor is it claimed here that these organizational transformations, of and in themselves, lead to or stem from the emergence of a more centralized, more programmatic and more cohesive national party. It is very important that Butler and the people associated with him believe that their changes are leading toward a different and new kind of party.

The signs of transformation are: (1) the kinds of functions now being performed in addition to those noted by Bone and others in the past; (2) the kind of people being employed to perform these functions; (3) the development of some professional and bureaucratic attitudes among the staff.

The new functions, those that have been undertaken primarily in the past year, are in the areas of (a) political organization, (b) finances, and (c) communications among levels of the party.

#### Political Organization

In 1955 Butler established an Advisory Committee on Political Organization, under the Chairmanship of Neil Staebler. Staebler, state chairman of the Michigan Democratic Party, may be an authentic genius at political organization. His Committee has functioned continuously since 1955. It has made a series of recommendations to the National Committee. Some that are significant have been adopted. The most important, those that point in

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the direction of professionalization of the headquarters staff are described below.

On July 15, 1957, Drexel A. Sprecher, an attorney with a background of broad experience in responsible governmental posts, was appointed Deputy Chairman for Political Organization. Working under the general direction of the Chairman, Sprecher assists in coordinating the activities and programs for women, Young Democrats, veterans, labor, farmers and other national and minority groups. But his primary duties have been in assisting and stimulating the state and local organizations in the recruiting and training of party workers, in coordinating the efforts of party workers at local and national levels and in developing and improving inner party communications.

The two most important, unprecedented and fascinating activities under Sprecher's general supervision are (1) the Field Service Program and (2) the Precinct Worker Training Program, which is a part of the Field Service Program.

The Field Service Program was inaugurated October 1, 1957, to aid state and local party groups to tighten and improve their organizations in every phase of political activity. The United States was divided into six regions: southern, southwestern, western, northwestern, central, and eastern. A Regional Representative was appointed for each region. The Regional Representatives are full-time, professional employees of the National Committee. Their salaries vary but they average at just under \$10,000 per year. The six men maintain their offices in their homes and in no case is there any allowance for secretarial help, although, of course, they are compensated for their travel expenses. One of the men does remain active in a family business but he does so during his spare time. The jobs are full-time in every sense and all of the men work far more than forty hours each week.

There is no detailed description of the duties of the Regional Representatives. In his report to the National Committee of February 21, 1958, Butler said only that they are "intended to be of service to state and local leaders in three general fields of political activity: organization, communications and finances."

In truth it is difficult to give a short job description for a regional representative. Sprecher feels that "counselling" is the best one-word description of their activities. In the course of their advising, assisting, counselling duties, the men do learn much about the intricacies of state and local party organization. Their periodic reports to Sprecher on their activities incidentally contain a wonderful mine of information about that protean subject even though political intelligence is not a primary function.

The men are under strict orders to stay wholly clear of local factional fights, to observe the most scrupulous punctilio in their relations with state and local party officers, to remain in the background, and, above all,

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to avoid giving the remotest appearance that it is their function to spy on, to dictate to, or to direct local and state party officers. Not all men attracted to political would find these orders congenial. Occasionally Sprecher finds that he must remind the men that too much publicity about themselves can hinder rather than promote their efforts.

The regional representatives essentially are available to local leaders for advice about political techniques (fund raising, publicity, campaign organization, relations with interest groups, interpretation of voting behavior studies, how to use the prolific flow of printed and filmed material out of the National Committee, etc.). Each man is either himself expert in these techniques or knows where to go get expert assistance. Overall, it might be put that the function of these men to keep steadily urging the state and local party officers to improve their organizations and to establish their own competence and willingness to help the state and local officers in the task.

The six regional representatives in themselves, their backgrounds and qualifications, reflect a blend between the traditional political "pro" and the newer organization man. Five of the six are under forty years of age and two are less than thirty. Three of the younger men have had formal training in political science at the graduate level to the M.A. Three are not college graduates at all. None of the men are without some background of political experience. In some cases the experience was in volunteer party work, in others the men had paying jobs in public life, in party work, or with an interest association.

The three who have had training in political science seem inclined to be analytical about politics and to be at ease with the language and skills of political science. On the other hand, one of these latter is frankly dubious about political "science" and insists that politics is more a matter of personality, of art, and of feel than it is a matter of science. The three who have not had academic training are not at all disdainful of the language and skills of political science but prefer to operate by intuition or feel. Sprecher feels both types of men are useful and that formal academic training in one's background is not a factor in the ability to win ready acceptance from the local party "pros" with whom the men must work.

One gets the impression from a reading of the reports of all of the field men that little by little all of them have developed a professional approach to and pride in their work. Sprechers constant reminder that they are not "politicians" or candidates but experts in political technique seems to have taken in one degree or another among the six. It is much too early to make firm generalizations about this major aspect of the Field Service Program. It could become a casualty of a cut-back in the size of the staff. As of the moment, however, Butler and Sprecher think of the program and of the regional representatives as fixtures. They are proud of the program and believe that it is helping party organization throughout the country. It is offered here as evidence that the National Committee staff is not only expanding but is also becoming professionalized.



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Among the duties of the Regional representatives in this past year has been promotion of the Precinct Worker Training Program. This program is another innovation designed by the Butler régime to assist the party organizations in the states. Despite its title, the program is not just another workshop for election day precinct canvassers. Fundamentally the program is a series of courses in local party organization given to persons chosen by local (county and state) party leaders for leadership work in precinct and ward organization.

The program, chief architect of which was Professor Morris W.R. Collins of the University of Georgia, is divided into two parts. The first part is a twelve hour course to train instructors who will be competent to conduct the course for precinct workers. The actual precinct worker's course, taught by the certified graduates of the instructor's course, is a six hour course that includes field work. Thus far twenty-two states have held instructor's courses. Several states have held two instructor's courses. It is not possible to know precisely how many subsequent precinct worker's courses have been held. One state, Florida, reports that over two hundred precinct worker courses have now been held on the heels of the two instructor's courses given in the early spring.

Party worker's schools or workshops are, as we know, familiar enough. What gives this program a possibly special character, in addition to its breadth, is the caliber or qualifications of the men who are teaching the instructor's courses. All of them form a cadre of most distinguished academic specialists in adult education. The courses and all of the manuals pertaining to them are drawn up in accordance with the most advanced theory and technique of adult education. The specialist-instructors serve on a volunteer basis---only expenses are paid by the National Committee---but the classes are held on a systematic, scheduled basis. Sprecher's office is the clearing house and the regional representatives are the principal intermediaries between state and county leaders who are interested in the courses and the instructor's cadre who will give the first instructor-training courses. Once the instructor's course has been given, all arrangements for the precinct workers courses are in the hands of and given at the discretion of state and county party leaders.

It is not now possible to make a final judgement about this program. It, too, could be eliminated by a general retrenchment. I believe that the program has elements of distinction. Certainly its professional credentials are noteworthy. The program is also offered as evidence that professionalism has accompanied the growth of the staff activities of the Democratic National Committee.

While still dealing with the functions of the office of the Deputy Chairman for Political Organization, it might be appropriate here to add a footnote to Bon's treatment of the relations between the Young Democrats and

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National Committee.<sup>5</sup>

The sporadic and tenuous relationship between the National Committee and the Federation of Young Democratic clubs of America has been formalized and strengthened. Richard Murphy, Executive Secretary of the Federation was hired by Butler in January of 1956 to serve as Director of the Young Democratic Division of the National Committee. He has served since and the position is now considered a permanent one. Murphy has a professional assistant at full-time salary. The work of the YD Division is primarily to coordinate activities among the over 2200 local clubs and to promote the development and growth of new ones.

Murphy, too, has had formal training in political science beyond the B.A. Though still in his twenties he is a seasoned party bureaucrat and Butler regards him as one of the most valuable members of his staff.

### Financing

Bone notes that Democratic National Committee financing is haphazard, loose and scattered compared to that of the Republican National Committee.<sup>6</sup> In general the Bone description is still accurate enough although some significant innovations have been made during the Butler regime.

The National Committee deficit at the end of the Stevenson-Kefauver campaign amounted to \$649,556.66. Very little of that amount has been retired. It costs around \$700,000.00 to run the Butler style National Committee operation. In the campaign year of 1958, Butler has hoped to give \$100,000.00 to each of the House and Senate Campaign Committees. In brief, the National Committee would require, in round figures, \$1,600,000.00 for the calendar year 1958 if the debt were to be retired, the headquarters operated in the fashion considered by Butler to be indispensable, and sizeable contributions made to the Congressional campaign committees. Total income received by the National Committee in 1957 amounted to \$824,535.89. Obviously fundraising is a major problem.

In the past fundraising has been perhaps the most time-consuming of the Chairman's activities. The various Chairmen have tried a variety of fundraising schemes. Fundraising still constitutes a major part of the total activity of the Chairman. In the past the Chairman was ordinarily assisted in his fundraising activities by the Treasurer of the National Committee and one or two of the Deputy Chairmen who took time out from other duties.

5. Bone, op. cit., pp. 54-57..

6. Ibid, pp. 97-103.



Stephen Mitchell in 1953 inaugurated a state quota system in a search for a stable mode of fundraising.<sup>7</sup> The quota system must be considered a success. It has been retained and in 1957 brought in a total of \$621,099.00. It is a step in the direction of systematization. Butler has tried to go further in his flight from the hit or miss methods of the past. In his report to the national Committee of February 21, 1958 he said, "There is absolute need for a detailed development of a program for fundraising. This will involve a full-time Finance Promotion Director, and assistant and secretarial help in the national office..."

A full-time Finance Promotion Director was appointed in the early spring of 1958 in the person of Kenneth Birkhead. Birkhead does not yet have the assistant and the secretarial help but he does have an office and is able to draw upon such secretarial help as is available at headquarters. Birkhead draws a professional level salary. He, too, has had considerable formal graduate training in political science and a record of successful employment in political and legislative activity before coming to the National Committee. Birkhead is keenly aware of the necessity for breaking new ground in fundraising, for getting out of the ruts that the "old pros" find so comfortable. He is currently working on two different fundraising programs that he and Butler hope will revolutionize the pattern of Democratic Party financing.

The first is a Butler regime innovation, the Sustaining Membership plan, inaugurated in July of 1957. This plan provides for a direct appeal to individuals to contribute to the party. In return, contributors are enrolled as charter sustaining members of the Democratic Party of the United States. In 1957, 12,616 Democrats became sustaining members and contributed or pledged a total of \$185,007.92 or an average of \$14.66 per member. This was achieved with but one solicitation. Members are required to contribute at least \$10.00.

The second fundraising plan is an outgrowth of a gift to both of the parties by the American Heritage Foundation and the Advertising Council. The two organizations are conducting a program that over the next two years will blanket all media of communication with \$10,000,000.00 worth of exhortation to average citizens, asking that they contribute some small sum to the party of their choice.

Butler considers this a revolutionary step, perhaps the most important political development of this decade. He may be vastly over sanguine but the Committee staff is banking heavily on the program and is girding itself to take advantage of it immediately. Birkhead is in charge of this program for the Committee. Naturally the Committee and staff have no troops to go out to collect the money. That job must be done by the state and local organizations. Birkhead and the National Committee provide

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7. Ibid.

reams of detailed instructions and suggestions for ways to get the job done. The regional representatives help on this as well. The National Committee will also sponsor radio and television programs of its own in connection with the drive which culminate this year with a "Dollars for Democrats" day in the early fall.

Birkhead hopes that a million dollars will be collected by all of the Democratic organizations all over the country. He hopes and expects that between \$250,000.00 and \$300,000.00 will find its way back to the National Committee; the remainder being divided by the state and local organizations that do the collecting. He concedes that large sums will be collected by fraud and will never be given to any party organization. Both Birkhead and Butler believe that the derivative value to the Democratic organizations that do the collecting may possibly mean more in the long run than the expected \$1,000,000.00.

Further comment on this interesting program is beyond the scope of this paper. Naturally it will excite the attention of political scientists and may, if it is successful, change the pattern of party financing in this country. It has already had organizational consequences for the staff of the Democratic National Committee.

### Communications

In a sense, communication is what the parties are all about. The national Committees of both major parties are in the communications industry just as deeply as the slickest ad agency on Madison Avenue. Nearly every professional level worker on the Butler staff is a writer of one sort or another. The principal media of communication for the Democratic National Committee are the Democratic Digest, The National Democratic Advisory Council, the multiple publications of the Research Division, publicity releases of the Division of Public Affairs, the activities of the Director of Television and Radio, the speeches of the Chairman and the activities of the Speaker's Bureau. The little noticed Records and Lists Division with its index of over 500,000 persons for a basic mailing list is also important.

The Democratic Digest is considered by Butler to be the most important medium of communication in the Democratic Party. It is safe to say that so long as Butler is Chairman the Digest will continue to publish despite criticism from within the party and scientific content analyses which may prick its pretensions. The magazine now has over 90,000 monthly subscriptions and this is considered to be just too valuable a stream of communication to be surrendered. Analysis of the Digest, its significance and its problems are outside the scope of this paper.

The National Democratic Advisory Council is still too new and as yet rather inaccessible to hard research. Though it has excited the attention of our profession, it too is essentially

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outside the subject matter of this paper.

The most significant change in National Committee staff communications activities since Bone completed his investigation is in the greatly enhanced position of research. The Research Division is now a permanent, major operating section of the Committee staff. It is unlikely that any general retrenchment would eliminate the Research Division. The Director of Research, William Welsh, reports through Deputy Chairman for Public Affairs, Samuel Brightman. Brightman's ultimate supervision is more than nominal. He approves all Research Division publications, often initiates others, and coordinates the work of the Research Division with the other activities of the Public Affairs Division.

Welsh is a political scientist with an MA in Public Administration. He served for three years on the staff of former Senator Herbert Lehman. Welsh is most knowledgeable about Congressional affairs and the work of the division reflects this interest and background. Welsh's interest and expertise in Congressional matters serves well the dominant aim of the Research Division. Most of the major publications of the Division are slanted toward, that is designed to help especially, the non-incumbent Democratic candidates for Congressional office.

Welsh has four full-time, presumably permanent assistants. One of these acts as personal secretary to Welsh but she also is able to and does do research when the occasion demands. The other three are professional researchers. Two of them, Miss Alice Robinson and Miss Leila McKnight, have had formal training in political science and prior research experience. The Research Division is the heaviest consumer of volunteer labor of any of the staff sections. A few of the regular volunteers do work that cannot be differentiated from that done by the regular researchers. Funds for salaries and space are all that keep Welsh from expanding the Research Division to two or three times its present size.

While much of the work of the Research Division is still occasional or emergency work--quick jobs done on demand for Democrats on the Hill, other "big name" Democrats, newsmen known to be sympathetic and other influential newsmen whose sympathy the staff would like to have--the bulk of the work is on regular, scheduled publications or on continuing, long-range projects.

The publications of the Research Division are sober and policy-oriented (Fact Sheets, The Democratic Fact Book, Facts to File, Voting Record Books). They deal with issues of public policy. Over the years a "style" has evolved for these publications. It is terse, free of adjectives, without pronouns. The style makes copious use of authentic quotes from important Republicans, always carefully cited, and even more copious use of figures, graphs, statistical columns, preferably from official, governmental sources.

Welsh, following the practice of his predecessor, runs continuous surveys of the normal recipients of Research Division



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material---candidates, Congressmen, local party officers---to help to determine their effectiveness and to make such additions and improvements as seem necessary. Welsh is ambitious and aggressive for the Research Division and drives his staff hard in his efforts to improve the extent and quality of the services. He would be willing to assume some of services to candidates now performed by the "Hill" campaign committees and is concerned about the possibility that research functions may pass into the hands of the Advisory Council or the Advisory Committee on Political Organization. It should be emphasized that this is not a matter of personal aggrandizement with Welsh but a strong drive for centralization, stabilization and coordination of research effort and to eliminate duplication and uncoordinated research effort.

In his great essay, Bureaucracy, Max Weber set it down that the characteristic loyalty of the bureaucratic worker was loyalty to the immediate function. The outlines of this bureaucratic loyalty may be making an appearance among the professional staff of the Research Division. Although the strong enthusiastic loyalty to the party and to Butler seem in no way attenuated, there does appear among the workers a keen sense of the discreteness of the research function and a close identification with and loyalty to Welsh. These are difficult things to establish without clear categories and more pointed research. My conclusion here is a tentative one, a sort of preliminary stab at a definition of operation loyalty for a portion of the professional staff.

It is also difficult to assess precisely, to place in a chart, the weight of the influence of the Research Division. When one considers the subject matter of the publications of the Research Division together with their distribution, and when one remembers that the work of the Research Division appears in the Digest and in the speeches of the National Chairman and other prominent Democrats, the conclusion seems warranted that the influence of the Research Division on the formation of policy is not negligible.

#### A Cautionary Note

Obviously most of the newer functions described here are service functions designed to help party organizations and candidates in the states and localities. In a sense the Butler improvements seem to have taken place so that the National Committee can help the state parties to grow. It is very difficult to point to any accretion of power to the National Committee itself, to the Chairman or to the headquarters staff. Yet it is clearly evident that large strides have been made toward the establishment of a permanent professional staff organized along bureaucratic lines.

One might wonder if a stronger national party can be built by strengthening the state parties. There seems to be some evidence that stronger state Democratic parties are developing, encouraged, in many cases actively assisted by the National Committee. This development warrants

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separate study, but it can be reported here that there are now nineteen states<sup>8</sup> wherein the Democratic Party has an active, permanent, full-time professional staff worker. Several states have more than one such person. These people have varying titles although in most cases they are called executive secretaries. It is important to note that these professional workers are not stenographers or clerks but directors of state organizations, organizers, fundraisers and the like. Sprechers office specifically and enthusiastically encourages and promotes this development.

Butler, Sprecher and Birkhead all believe that these stronger state party organizations are, in the main, friendly to the National Committee and more conscious of the idea of a national party than are the state parties with weaker organizations.

But this is not a wholly smooth or even development. Strong state parties, with a chance for electoral success within the state, develop expensive, even grandiose tastes in organizational style and campaigning. Party workers in such a state may balk at sending one-third of the funds collected in, say, a "Dollars For Democrats" drive to the National Committee. Party workers in well organized and successful states can tend to overlook the role the National Committee and national party issues have played in their success. A state party, scenting a chance to elect a Governor and Senator and to control the state legislature, may understandably feel that every cent raised by the local organizations should stay in the state and be used to cinch the anticipated victory. The leaders of such state parties generally are aware of the role that the National Committee plays. They are also aware that to varying extents the image of a national party rubs off on the state party and that, therefore, a "good" national party image is enormously beneficial to the state parties. The sentiment for balking on the state contribution to the National Committee more than likely comes from the ranks of the local organizations that do actual fundraising and that have developed deep attachments to specific local candidates.

The weapons Butler and the National Committee have to overcome that kind of local sentiment are not yet impressive. Reason and exhortation being undoubtedly the chief weapons. I have not meant to imply that such "rebellions" occur regularly or that they are not overcome by reason and persuasion. The sentiment of localism is accepted by the Committee. But

<sup>8</sup> Maine, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, Texas, Arizona, California. Washington pays its State Chairman a professional salary (\$12,000 per year) and he serves as a full-time director. The Democratic Party of Oregon may, by the time this appears, have employed an executive director. Note the extent to which this development has taken place in states where the "Populist" laws had forged a tradition of weak parties.

it exists as a sharp warning that even a vastly expanded, more professional national headquarters staff with all of its improved services to the local parties is not proof against the decentralized nature of American political organization.

But, though all of the problems have not been anticipated and thought through, though there is much improvisation, though a long-range building program has to be accomplished while facing the everyday requirements with the existing organization, there appears a clear conviction among the present Democratic regime that a bigger, professional and bureaucratic headquarters staff is a sine qua non of a stronger national party.



Academic Freedom, the American Association  
of University Professors, and the  
United States Supreme Court

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting  
of the American Political Science Association,  
St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958

R. K. Carr--Academic Freedom, the AAUP, and the Supreme Court

On July 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln put the following question to the Congress of the United States:

Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?

Lincoln's immediate concern, of course, was with the consequences of the national government's use of force to preserve the Union. But his question provides political scientists with a timeless formulation of the classic problem, which no democratic society ever long escapes, of the search for a satisfactory balance between authority and liberty.

My assignment at this panel session is to discuss certain recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court which have had an important bearing on authority--particularly on the investigatory power of legislative bodies--and on liberty--particularly with respect to what we college professors like to call academic freedom. I want to examine these decisions in terms of the continuing search for a satisfactory answer to the question posed by Lincoln. Clearly ours is a period in which a new threat to the nation's security properly gives cause for grave concern; but it is also a period in which many responsible persons have been disturbed about the state of individual freedom.

At the very outset I want to suggest in very brief and grossly oversimplified terms a guide for political scientists to follow in their efforts as scholars to analyze and evaluate national policy in the area under discussion, and as practitioners of politics to help shape the course of this policy. Just as Lincoln's somewhat rhetorical question to the Congress implied the wisdom of avoiding the ends of the spectrum along which the various degrees and interrelations of liberty and authority are distributed, I want to suggest that political scientists are well advised to pick a middle course between two extremes that are often defended as the correct or proper way of defining and protecting civil liberty in the United States. The extremes are those of principle and pragmatism, or, if you will, of absolutism and relativism.

Let us look first at adherence to absolute principle as an approach to the defense of individual freedom. Those who favor this approach argue that certain substantive rights--particularly those clustered together in the First Amendment--are, in one sense or another, absolute in meaning and absolute in indispensability, and thus entitled always to take precedence over the needs of authority. It is hard to attribute this position to any person or organization without doing some measure of injustice, but it is perhaps not utterly unreasonable to say that it is the stand taken by Alexander Meiklejohn in his stimulating little book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government; it is the position toward which the American Civil Liberties Union tends in certain of its policy statements; it is a point of view that finds expression in certain of the most eloquent opinions of Justices Black and Douglas. Note, for example, these passages from Justice Black's concurring opinion in Yates v. United States:

I believe that the First Amendment forbids Congress to punish people for talking about public affairs, whether or not such discussion incites to action, legal or illegal.

The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free government--one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.<sup>1</sup>

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It is not necessary to dwell long on the difficulties inherent in this position. Two may be mentioned:

1. The difficulty of definition. Is the sound-truck or the picket-line a form of speech or press and thus entitled to the sweeping protection of the First Amendment favored by Justice Black?

2. The difficulty of context. Is the conflict in a First Amendment case always one between liberty and authority, between the individual and the state? What happens when the quarrel is between individual and individual, and two freedoms are in conflict, such as freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial? Can absolutes provide a satisfactory solution to such a conflict? Does Justice Black mean to say that the right to a fair trial must always give way to freedom of expression--that a newspaper is entitled to be as irresponsible as it wishes in setting forth the details of a crime and in commenting about a person who is shortly to stand trial for this crime?

Turning to the relativist approach, again one must necessarily do its supporters a certain injustice by oversimplifying their position. Again it is perhaps not unreasonable to say that the pragmatists hold that a so-called civil liberty problem is little different from any other social problem. The interests of different people come into conflict, and, as a result, opposing forces contend for a preferred or dominant position in society--in particular, the opposing groups try to shape public policy and its enforcement so as to serve their interests. In these power struggles one side sometimes wins a total victory, but more often, in a democracy, some sort of compromise settlement is effected that reflects in part the pressure that each side has been able to muster, and in part a genuine attempt to recognize the merit that may be present in each of the opposing arguments. Those who take this position often express a strong distrust of principles or rules as satisfactory guides for the adjustment of human conflicts. This point of view has never been more sharply asserted than in Chief Justice Vinson's famous words in his opinion in Dennis v. United States:

Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only when associated with the considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature. To those who would paralyze our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic strait-jacket we must reply that all concepts are relative.<sup>2</sup>

If it is fair to identify Justices Black and Douglas as absolutists, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter can properly be called relativists. For example, in his last years on the Court Justice Jackson devoted much energy to arguing that the Supreme Court should be slow to upset convictions in criminal cases on the ground of lack of due process in the proceedings. He believed that police officers, prosecuting attorneys, and courts should be allowed great freedom to guard society against the depredations of lawbreakers. Again and again he denounced the tendency of the Supreme Court to let dangerous criminals escape punishment because of procedural shortcomings or technical errors in their trials.

In a similar vein, Justice Frankfurter has contended that the Supreme Court must defer to the practical, compromise solutions to human problems arranged by legislative and executive agencies, particularly at state and local levels, and be slow to upset these solutions on the ground of conflicts with principles said to be derived from the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment.



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I should like to suggest that both of these positions are in some degree unsatisfactory, either as bases for the protection of civil liberty by the Supreme Court, or the evaluation of Supreme Court decisions by political scientists. In my judgment the Supreme Court should view the freedoms of the First Amendment neither as absolutes, nor as mere pawns in the game of power politics. Instead, I think the Court can and should seek to formulate and follow impersonal rules of law, while simultaneously recognizing that the so-called civil liberty case almost always involves a conflict of interests, sometimes between society and the individual, sometimes between individuals, and that the resolution of these conflicts requires consideration of the interests on both sides.

Now I realize that this does not help very much, for I suppose I am saying no more than that the Court ought to show a proper regard for both principle and pragmatism in these cases. Moreover, I am aware that I, like my betters, have been guilty of a good deal of personal vacillation in these matters. A number of years ago I wrote a little book in which I was extremely critical of judicial review and suggested that legislatures had a better understanding of social needs than did courts.<sup>3</sup> More recently, in a book on the Un-American Activities Committee, I suggested that it was undesirable that the Supreme Court should police the congressional power of investigation, and that, in any event, the Court was not likely to make the attempt.<sup>4</sup> In self-defense I may add that I did point out that, in reviewing the prosecution of unfriendly witnesses for contempt of Congress, the Court might discover that it simply could not avoid evaluating the exercise of the investigating power in particular cases, since the alternative might be that men would go to jail for reasons or in a manner that would do violence to the Constitution of the United States.

Today I am as happy as anyone about the Supreme Court decisions of the last two years safeguarding civil liberty. Moreover, I have been dismayed and angered by the critical reaction these decisions have provoked in Congress, in the press, among members of the bar, and even, I regret to say, among distinguished political scientists.

At this point I find it necessary to indicate how hopelessly old-fashioned my position is by expressing my belief that the clear and present danger test still provides a pretty good working rule when the problem is one of striking a balance between social needs and First Amendment freedoms. I know that it has become fashionable for wise men, both on the Supreme Court and at the Harvard Law School, to make fun of the rule. I know that Justice Holmes may have meant far less when he spoke the famous words in his Schenck opinion than the rule has come to mean in later years to its more extreme advocates. I know that the rule undoubtedly needs elaboration and refinement in specific situations and cases.

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss five Supreme Court rulings of the last two years or so in which academic freedom, academic tenure, and academic due process were, in one degree or another, explicitly or implicitly recognized and protected. In no one of these cases was there any mention of the clear and present danger test. In each, however, the test, or something very much like it, was the inarticulate major premise upon which the majority based its judgments. In all five of these cases a prior position of the American Association of University Professors was in effect approved. This is not to suggest that in its reaction to the security-freedom issue of recent years the AAUP early revealed unusual courage or wisdom. It can hardly be said that the AAUP, any more than most other private organizations or public bodies, rushed to man the barricades during the "troubles" of the McCarthy period. It is certainly not to say that the AAUP aggressively seeks, or is entirely sure that it wants, to have the principles it promotes incorporated into American constitutional law by the Supreme Court. After all, what the Court gives, it can take away.

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Moreover, in the process it may persuade many people that only those principles of academic freedom that are finally recognized by the Courts as law need be observed. One of my most exasperating experiences as the Association's General Secretary involved negotiations with the president of a great eastern university who thought that, because the state courts had held that his institution's Faculty Regulations were not enforceable at law, it was unnecessary for the university to follow the generally recognized standard of the academic profession by giving one year's severance pay to a professor with tenure whom it had dismissed. And yet it is fair to say that the Association's statements of principle--if I may be permitted to use that word--were taken promptly and were sound. The Association's failure in the first half of this decade came in not applying and enforcing these principles in specific situations as promptly and as courageously as it might have.

Basically the problem that has confronted the Association in recent years has been to give meaning to, and win acceptance for, the idea of academic freedom. This stepchild among American civil liberties has never been adequately described or defined. Perhaps in the nature of things it never can be. If time allowed, it would be helpful to trace the development of the concept from the Association's so-called 1915 Declaration of Principles to the actions taken at the AAUP Annual Meeting in 1958. As is sometimes the case in these matters, there is more than a little reason to believe that the 1915 Declaration, formulated by a group of very distinguished academicians and adopted at the Association's second Annual Meeting, is still the best formulation of academic freedom ever made in this country. Be that as it may, following this initial statement, the AAUP, for reasons that seemed important to it, undertook to prepare, through joint conferences with the Association of American Colleges, a statement of academic freedom and tenure that college administrators and governing boards, as well as professors, could endorse and support. These joint efforts resulted first in the 1925 Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, and ultimately in the 1940 Statement of Principles.<sup>5</sup> The latter is the charter upon which all present efforts to define and defend academic freedom are based. In addition to AAC and AAUP, the Statement has been endorsed by a number of educational associations and learned societies, including the American Political Science Association. Indeed it is worth noting here that the formation of AAUP in 1915 and the adoption of the 1915 Declaration were the direct result of combined efforts, beginning in 1913, by the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Political Science Association to study and report on problems of academic freedom and tenure in teaching and research in the three disciplines represented.

Paraphrasing the 1940 Statement it may be said that the college professor plays two roles in which academic freedom is of great importance. The first is the role of the scholar. In this role the professor must be "free to follow the argument wherever it may lead" and to present his findings to his students, his professional colleagues, and the public through his teaching and his writings. The second is the role of the citizen. In this role the professor must enjoy the same rights of organizational affiliation and political activity possessed by other free men in a democratic society. In addition, he has the special right and obligation to make his knowledge available to the general public, without fear or favor.

Academic freedom is undoubtedly a personal right which the individual teacher may assert and defend. But in its deeper meaning and importance it is a social right that provides one of the cornerstones upon which progress in a democratic society rests.

Academic freedom is closely associated with academic tenure and academic due



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process. This is not the time to discuss the much misunderstood and often belittled concept of academic tenure. But a word needs to be said about academic due process. The professor who enjoys tenure can be dismissed from his position only for "cause." Academic due process means that those who seek his dismissal must carry the burden of the proof, they must define their charges with care, they must accord the professor a fair hearing on these charges, they must let issues of professional fitness be determined by the professor's peers, and they must see to it that the final decision is reached in the light of the professor's whole record.<sup>6</sup>

In the troubled years since 1940 the AAUP has undertaken to spell these concepts out in ever greater detail and to win ever wider acceptance of them in specific situations.<sup>7</sup> In the process several difficult problems have had to be faced. For example, what is the "cause" for which a professor may properly be dismissed? Two attempted answers by AAUP may be noted. The first is found in a resolution adopted at the Association's 1953 Annual Meeting. The answer is a terse one:

The tests of the fitness of a college teacher should be his integrity and his professional competence, as demonstrated in instruction and research.<sup>8</sup>

A somewhat fuller statement is found in the 1956 report of the Association's Special Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security:

Removal can be justified only on the ground, established by evidence, of unfitness to teach because of incompetence, lack of scholarly objectivity or integrity, serious misuse of the classroom or of academic prestige, gross personal misconduct, or conscious participation in conspiracy against the government.<sup>9</sup>

As early as 1953 the AAUP took a firm position on two very controversial questions--what should happen to the professor who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, or who is found to be a member of the Communist party? To the AAUP, firm adherence to the 1940 Statement of Principles seemed to lead to two conclusions:

1. Membership in the Communist party, past or present, does not in and of itself justify dismissal.
2. Invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination cannot in itself be a sufficient ground for dismissal.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time that the Association took these two stands, it recognized that either of these facts, when known about a professor, might justify an inquiry within the professor's institution to determine whether there were substantial grounds for questioning his fitness to continue in his position. The report of the 1956 Special Committee stated:

If a faculty member invokes the Fifth Amendment when questioned about Communism, or if there are other indications of past or present Communist associations or activities, his institution cannot ignore the possible significance for itself of these matters. There is then a possibility of his involvement in activities subversive of education itself, or otherwise indicative, to an important degree, of his unfitness to teach. As in other instances of possible unfitness, preliminary inquiry

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into this possibility is warranted and can become a duty.... If, after consideration of a faculty member's whole career, as well as the circumstances surrounding his invocation of the Fifth Amendment, probable cause to believe that he may be unfit is not disclosed, the matter should end at this stage; but if probable cause for belief in his unfitness is shown, charges leading to a formal hearing should be brought.<sup>11</sup>

It should be emphasized that even after preliminary inquiry and a formal hearing on charges, the facts of membership in the Communist party, or invocation of the Fifth Amendment, without more, are not regarded as sufficient grounds for dismissal.

What happens if, as has sometimes been the case, a professor persists in his refusal to answer certain questions at the inquiry conducted by his own institution? Admittedly this is an issue of great difficulty, one almost certain to provoke different reactions. One such reaction was forthcoming in 1953 in a joint statement by the presidents of some thirty-seven institutions affiliated with the Association of American Universities. This statement, The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and Their Faculties, asserted a duty of "complete candor" by the professor:

As in all acts of association, the professor accepts conventions which become morally binding. Above all, he owes his colleagues in the university complete candor and perfect integrity, precluding any kind of clandestine or conspiratorial activities. He owes equal candor to the public. If he is called upon to answer for his convictions it is his duty as a citizen to speak out. It is even more definitely his duty as a professor. Refusal to do so, on whatever legal grounds, cannot fail to reflect upon a profession that claims for itself the fullest freedom to speak and the maximum protection of that freedom available in our society.<sup>12</sup>

The AAUP took a little more time than did the AAU presidents to think about this issue of candor, particularly as it concerned the refusal of a professor to answer questions at a hearing within his own institution. The first AAUP attempt to work out a systematic statement on this problem was made in the 1956 Report of the Special Committee. This statement was revised and extended by the Association's Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure early in 1948.<sup>13</sup> The final position may be summarized as follows: In any proper inquiry by his institution it is the duty of a professor to disclose facts about himself that are of legitimate concern to the institution. The withholding of such information is relevant to the question of his continued fitness to teach, but not decisive. If the professor remains silent, his reason for his refusal to disclose information is significant. Moreover, he must accept the burden of explaining his refusal. If his purpose is to conceal derogatory information, his silence may reflect unfavorably upon him. However, this adverse factor should be judged in the context of all the other available evidence as to his professional fitness. If his refusal to answer questions is based on honest adherence to principle, his silence should not, in itself, be viewed as discreditable. The professor who persists in silence must also remember that he may well thereby leave unchallenged other evidence tending to show him unfit. The professor who elects to answer his institution's questions may run the risk of losing the protection of the Fifth Amendment, if he has previously invoked the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer similar questions put to him by a government agency. The institution's right to know the facts relevant to fitness to teach should prevail over this consideration. But under these circumstances the institution ought to be willing to accept an offer



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by the professor to answer privately and off the record, or to recognize that such an offer is in itself some evidence of candor and sincerity on the part of the teacher.

It is not surprising that the AAUP should have become the center of much controversy, both within and outside the academic profession, because of the stands outlined above. In particular, the action of the Association at its 1956 Annual Meeting in censuring the administrations of such institutions as Rutgers University, Temple University, the University of Oklahoma, The Ohio State University, and the University of California, because it thought that in one way or another they had violated these principles, brought down upon it a storm of criticism and even of abuse.

On the Monday following the Association's 1956 Annual Meeting at which it censured the administrations of three universities because of the dismissal, without hearings on proper charges, of professors who had invoked the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote in Slochower v. the Board of Higher Education, ruled that the automatic dismissal from a public college of a professor who had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination violated the Constitution.<sup>14</sup> Section 903 of the Charter of the City of New York provided that whenever an employee of the city invoked the privilege to avoid answering "a question relating to his official conduct" his employment should automatically cease.<sup>15</sup> Slochower, an associate professor, with tenure at Brooklyn College, and with 27 years' experience as a college teacher, invoked the privilege before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate in September, 1952, and was summarily dismissed from his post. "The investigation...related to subversive influences in the American educational system." Slochower offered to answer all questions concerning his associations or political beliefs subsequent to 1941. But he refused to answer questions concerning his alleged membership in the Communist party during 1940 and 1941. The Supreme Court majority found that § 903, as interpreted and applied in this case, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion was written, surprisingly enough, by Justice Clark. It is clear, particularly in retrospect, that the majority held no more than that automatic dismissal from his post in a state or municipal college of a professor invoking the Fifth Amendment before a congressional committee is unconstitutional.<sup>16</sup> However, the position taken by the majority as to the meaning and significance of the privilege against self-incrimination provided powerful support of the AAUP's position that invocation of the privilege by a professor should not in and of itself be ground for his dismissal. Particularly significant were these observations by Justice Clark:

At the outset we must condemn the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment.... The privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. ...[A] witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution yet be innocent of any wrongdoing.<sup>17</sup>

Schwartz v. Board of Bar Examiners of the State of New Mexico, and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California were decided by the Supreme Court on the same day in May, 1957. In both cases the petitioners had been refused admission to the state bar. The issue in both cases was essentially that of the effect of membership in the Communist party, past or present, on the right of an otherwise qualified candidate to be certified for the practice of the law, particularly as such membership was relevant to the determination of the candidate's "good moral character." Schwartz had acknowledged membership



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in the Communist party terminating in 1940. As a labor organizer during the 30's he had also used aliases. He had also been arrested several times but had never been brought to trial. His personal record subsequent to 1940 was seemingly without blemish. He testified freely at the hearing before the board of bar examiners concerning his activities in the 1930's. Numerous character witnesses testified on his behalf. Konigsberg was also supported by an impressive array of character witnesses and was seemingly a promising candidate for admission to the bar, except that he refused to answer any questions concerning past or present membership in the Communist party, on the ground that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent a state from inquiring into a person's political affiliations and beliefs. There was evidence, apart from his refusal to answer questions, that he had attended Communist meetings in 1941 and that he had criticized public officers and policies at the time of the Korean War in a series of newspaper editorials.

In the Schwartz case a unanimous Court held that the refusal of the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners to certify the petitioner for the practice of the law deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the opinion of the Court, Justice Black said,

Assuming that some members of the Communist Party during the period from 1932 to 1940 had illegal aims and engaged in illegal activities, it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shared their evil purposes or participated in their illegal conduct.

And he added,

...past membership in the Communist party does not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral character.... There is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Schwartz was morally unfit to practice law.<sup>18</sup>

Konigsberg's silence presented greater difficulties. However, by a five-to-three vote, the Supreme Court concluded that he, too, had been improperly denied admission to the bar under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, found that the California Bar examiners had not refused to certify Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to answer questions, but instead had regarded his silence as evidence from which some inference of doubtful moral character and loyalty could be drawn. Again the majority held that there was no evidence in the record of his application for admission to the bar that rationally justified a finding that Konigsberg had failed to establish his good moral character or to prove that he did not advocate the forceful overthrow of the government. On the issue of his alleged membership in the Communist party, Justice Black observed,

Even if it be assumed that Konigsberg was a member of the Communist Party in 1941, the mere fact of membership would not support an inference that he did not have good moral character. There was no evidence that he ever engaged in or abetted any unlawful or immoral activities--or even that he knew of or supported any actions of this nature. It may be, although there is no evidence in the record before us to that effect, that some members of that party were involved in illegal or disloyal activities, but petitioner cannot be swept into this group solely on the basis of his alleged membership in that party.<sup>19</sup>

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The majority also found that no inference of bad moral character could rationally have been drawn from the editorials.

On the issue of Konigsberg's refusal to answer certain of the bar examiners' questions, Justice Black stated,

Prior decisions by this Court indicate that his claim that the questions were improper was not frivolous and we find nothing in the record which indicates that his position was not taken in good faith. Obviously the State could not draw unfavorable inferences as to his truthfulness, candor or his moral character in general if his refusal to answer was based on a belief that the United States Constitution prohibited the type of inquiries which the Committee was making. On the record before us, it is our judgment that the inferences of bad moral character which the Committee attempted to draw from Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions about his political affiliations and opinions are unwarranted.<sup>20</sup>

The AAUP's stand on the issues of membership in the Communist party, and a professor's claim to the right of silence at an intramural hearing to determine his professional fitness had been substantially worked out a year and a half before the Schwartz and Konigsberg cases were decided. But the decisions were rendered at a moment when committees of the Association were investigating several cases involving the dismissal of professors, suspected of Communist party membership, who had invoked the Fifth Amendment before congressional committees and had subsequently refused to answer questions put to them at hearings within their own institutions. The two decisions undoubtedly strengthened the belief of the Association and its committees that administrative officers must carry the burden of the proof in demonstrating a professor's lack of fitness and that the mere facts of invocation of the Fifth Amendment or assertion of a right of silence concerning political affiliations and beliefs do not by themselves justify the professor's dismissal. The Schwartz and Konigsberg decisions seemed particularly significant, since a professor who is already a member of a college faculty obviously enjoys a stronger position than a person who is seeking to be certified for the practice of the law in the first instance. The Association was encouraged to hold that where a teacher explains a refusal to answer questions at an intramural hearing on the ground of honest adherence to principle and where there is no other derogatory evidence against him, a dismissal is unjustified.

One month after its rulings in the Schwartz and Konigsberg cases, the Supreme Court decided the cases of Watkins v. United States and Sweezy v. New Hampshire. Both of these decisions were of great importance and interest to the Association. Watkins, of course, did not bear directly upon academic freedom or tenure. Moreover, the Association has never challenged the right of Congress to conduct proper inquiries in the area of subversive activity. Nonetheless, its officers and committees welcomed the assertion by Chief Justice Warren that "the Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action."<sup>21</sup> Speaking for myself, I wish to express my unqualified approval of this much criticized opinion. In my judgment, the Chief Justice's opinion is a masterly one and deserves much more commendation, particularly from lawyers and political scientists, than it has yet received. Clearly the majority was reluctant to impose any further measure of judicial restraint upon congressional investigations than had been established by earlier decisions.

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Just as clearly it was appalled by the continuing failure of the House of Representatives to define with greater clarity the authority and responsibility of the Un-American Activities Committee and to subject the committee to an increased measure of supervision and control. The majority called attention to the extremely careless wording of the committee's charter and suggested that it made possible improper encroachment on First Amendment freedoms of political affiliation, expression, and belief, and on the Fifth Amendment right to notice in meeting one's obligations to obey the law and to supply the government with essential information. The Chief Justice's general observations are worth quoting at some length:

We start with several basic premises on which there is general agreement. The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.... But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of Congress.... Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency.... No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible.

It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.... This, of course, assumes that the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice. The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and association be abridged....

We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, the Court expressed a conviction that the purpose of an investigation or the way in which it is conducted cannot be left to the exclusive determination of Congress or its committees:

We cannot simply assume...that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.<sup>23</sup>

Why these general observations by Chief Justice Warren have not commanded the respect and approbation of the citizens of a free society, including, in particular, lawyers and political scientists, is hard to understand. This absence of universal



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praise of the Watkins ruling becomes all the more distressing when it is noted that the majority contented itself with a formal finding that, because the Un-American Activities Committee had failed to make clear to Watkins the pertinency of the questions he refused to answer to the subject under investigation, his conviction under 2 U.S.C. S 192 could not stand:

In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in other criminal cases. Among these is the right to have available, through a sufficiently precise statute, information revealing the standard of criminality before the commission of the alleged offense.... Part of the standard of criminality...is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the witness....

...The "vice of vagueness" must be avoided here as in all other crimes.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps the most incredible aspect of the adverse reaction produced by the majority opinion in Watkins is the angry, shrill dissenting opinion of Justice Clark. He begins by labeling it a "mischievous curbing of the informing function of the Congress" and proceeds, amazingly, to wonder how the Court dared equate a contempt prosecution under § 192 with "a criminal trial," particularly in the sense of "the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense."<sup>25</sup> Can Justice Clark possibly mean what he seems to be saying? After all, § 192 does define a crime against the United States for committing which men can be fined \$1,000 and sent to jail for a year. And it is no answer to point out that Congress may still exercise its own implied power to punish for contempt if it so chooses. It suited the purposes of Congress as far back as 1857 to define contempt of Congress as a statutory offense and to turn enforcement of the law over to the executive and judicial branches. Having done this, Congress must accept the fact that the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are necessarily available to any person charged with the statutory offense. In view of Justice Clark's intemperate attack on the majority opinion in the Watkins case, it is not surprising that a bill has been introduced in Congress providing that the factual issue of the pertinency of questions in congressional investigations shall be exclusively determined by the legislative branch. Fortunately, this particular anti-Court proposal has not thus far been enacted into law.

To AAUP and members of the academic profession, as such, Sweezy v. New Hampshire is quite possibly the most significant decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court. Here for the first time in history a majority of the Court extends the protection of the First Amendment to academic freedom. The case bristles with difficulties. It was hardly a case that one might have selected as providing an ideal basis for incorporation of academic freedom into the Constitution as a First Amendment right. There is no majority opinion in the case, only a judgment of the Court in which a majority of the justices concur. The majority justices were obviously troubled by the peculiar facts of the case, involving the questioning of a free-lance journalist and itinerant lecturer by the state attorney general as part of a sweeping investigation of "subversive organizations" and "subversive individuals" in New Hampshire under an incredibly broad delegation of power from the state legislature. The dilemmas posed by the case are well illustrated by the quandary in which Justice Frankfurter found himself. Believing, as he did, that the attorney general's questioning of Sweezy was a flagrant violation of basic

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rights in a free society, he was compelled to choose between two, to him, equally unpleasant alternatives. He could follow Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan in their conclusion that the Court could not permit constitutional liberties to be endangered in the absence of "any assurance that the questions petitioner refused to answer [fell] into a category of matters upon which the legislature wanted to be informed when it initiated this inquiry."<sup>26</sup> Or he could reach a constitutional issue of unusual difficulty--the status of academic freedom under the First Amendment. He bravely chose the latter alternative and even went so far as to extend "preferred position" status to both academic freedom and the individual's "political autonomy":

In the political realm, as in the academic, thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority.<sup>27</sup>

Because of the inability of the six justices in the majority to join in a single opinion, the academic profession enjoys the rare privilege of not one, but two formulations of academic freedom, one by the Chief Justice and one by Justice Frankfurter. Neither is a first-rate performance. Neither, for that matter, provides half so excellent a description of academic freedom as did the 1915 Declaration of Principles. Justice Frankfurter in evolving his definition of academic freedom is strangely reluctant to come closer, in time, to today's reality than the Annual Reports of President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard, or, in place, to a statement by the senior scholars of the Open Universities in South Africa.

The Chief Justice's description of academic freedom is good as far as it goes. He asserts:

The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.<sup>28</sup>

The Sweezy decision has posed quite a problem for the AAUP. At the time the case was being argued, it was suggested by interested persons that the Association consider the submission of an amicus brief to the Supreme Court. The Association declined to do so, thinking it likely that the case would be decided on grounds not directly related to the principles and activities of the Association, and also because it was not completely persuaded of the wisdom of seeking recognition of and protection for academic freedom under law. The Court's decision in Sweezy has made it necessary for the Association to reconsider its position. At the time this is being written, it appears likely that the Association will seek permission to submit an amicus brief in Barenblatt v. United States,<sup>29</sup> a contempt of Congress case which raises the issue of the extent to which congressional committees can carry their search for evidence of subversion among members of the academic profession and on university campuses.



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The Association would perhaps prefer to let the meaning and practice of academic freedom take shape, as it has in the past, on a private, voluntary basis through the collective efforts of teachers, institutions of higher learning, and educational associations. But faced with the possibility that the Court may choose to spell out the meaning of academic freedom under the First Amendment, the Association will probably find that it cannot evade the responsibility of offering advice to the Court in this difficult undertaking.

It was suggested earlier in this paper that one reason for the Association's reluctance to see academic freedom defined as a legal concept is its fear that what the courts give, they may take away, and that having thus given and taken away, academic freedom may be left in a weaker position than it was before it became a concern of the law. A decision rendered by the Supreme Court on June 30 of this year illustrates this danger. The case, Beilan v. Board of Education of Philadelphia, raised the issue, left dangling in Slochower, whether a state agency may properly dismiss a teacher, who has invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer a congressional committee's questions about his political affiliations and beliefs and who also refuses to answer similar questions put to him by his own employer. On two different occasions, Beilan, a teacher with twenty-two years of service in the Philadelphia school system, refused to tell the Superintendent of Schools whether he had been a functionary in the Communist Political Association in 1944. He indicated that he would refuse to answer similar questions, although no others were in fact asked. Six weeks after the second questioning, and one week after Beilan had invoked the Fifth Amendment in declining to answer questions put to him by the Un-American Activities Committee, the Board of Education instituted formal dismissal proceedings against him. The Board found that Beilan's refusal to answer the Superintendent's question constituted "incompetency" under the Pennsylvania Public School Code and it voted to dismiss him. By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court sustained the school board. Speaking for the majority, Justice Burton comes very close to accepting the generally discredited 1953 stand of the AAU presidents:

By engaging in teaching in the public schools, petitioner did not give up his right to freedom of belief, speech or association. He did, however, undertake obligations of frankness, candor and cooperation in answering inquiries made of him by his employing Board examining into his fitness to serve it as a public school teacher.<sup>30</sup>

Justice Burton proceeded to quote Adler v. Board of Education to the effect that "school authorities have the right and duty to screen...teachers...as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society"<sup>31</sup> and declared the question asked of Beilan was relevant to his fitness and suitability to serve as a teacher. Beilan was held not to be in a position to challenge the question because of the remoteness of time of the 1944 activities, since the Superintendent had made it clear that he had had other questions to ask which Beilan had indicated he would not answer. The majority was bothered not at all by the School Board's translation of Beilan's refusal to answer into insubordination, and the latter, in turn, into the incompetency specified by the Pennsylvania School Code as a proper ground for a teacher's removal:

We find no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness. Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of



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factors. The Pennsylvania tenure provision specifies several disqualifying grounds, including immorality, intemperance, cruelty, mental derangement and persistent and willful violation of the school laws, as well as "incompetency."<sup>32</sup>

The majority notes that the Pennsylvania courts have given "incompetency" a broad interpretation and quote with approval a Pennsylvania decision to the effect that a teacher who no longer commands "the respect and good will of the community" may properly be dismissed for "incompetency."<sup>33</sup>

The majority distinguished Slochower by pointing out that there the questioning was by an outside agency and was for a purpose "wholly unrelated to [the teacher's] college functions." Konigsberg is distinguished on the ground that the attempt to deny Konigsberg admission to the bar was not based on mere refusal to answer relevant questions, but on inferences impermissibly drawn from the refusal. Says Justice Burton:

In the instant case, no inferences at all were drawn from petitioner's refusal to answer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely equated refusal to answer the employing Board's relevant questions with statutory "incompetency."<sup>34</sup>

This distinction is hard to follow. An employer or licensing agency may properly arrive at an adverse judgment on the bare fact of refusal to answer relevant questions, but if it seeks to draw inferences from such a refusal to answer, it runs the risk of violating the Fourteenth Amendment!

The Chief Justice, and Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented in separate opinions, Justice Black joining the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas in their opinions. In the main, the dissenters treat the case as though Beilan had been dismissed because he was believed to be a Communist, rather than because of his mere refusal to answer a question. So viewed, they conclude that the record of the case did not reveal competent evidence justifying dismissal.<sup>35</sup>

The thought cannot be avoided that in Beilan, and its companion case, Lerner v. Casey, the Court, or perhaps more properly Justice Frankfurter, may have been "following the election returns." Its decisions in Nelson, Jencks, Yates, Watkins, Sweezy, and other recent cases have brought the Court under powerful attack from many directions. There has been precious little support for the Court and these decisions from sources that might well have been expected to come to their defense. Thus there may have been a temptation to regard a subway conductor and a public school teacher as expendable. For the majority, academic freedom seemingly does not extend beyond the edge of the university campus. The public school teacher must not only command "the respect and good will" of the community but apparently respond to all questions his "employer" may choose to put to him. Perhaps it is too much to ask that public school teachers enjoy the same academic freedom that the college professor does. But Beilan remains a disappointing and unsatisfactory ruling.

In my judgment the decisions discussed in this paper, with the exception of those in the Beilan and Lerner cases, show the Supreme Court performing its historic function of balancing the needs of authority and the interests of freedom in a highly satisfactory way. The Court has shown a proper respect for constitutional and legal principles; it has also revealed a wise understanding of contemporary problems and the social needs of our times. To be sure, such decisions as those in Watkins and Sweezy contain broad generalizations not wholly necessary to the disposition of the

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cases on the narrowest possible grounds. But the use of similar generalizations is at least as old as Marbury v. Madison. Historically these broad utterances have more often than not served a highly useful purpose by reminding the political branches of the government and the general public of the meaning of constitutional government in a free society. The decisions of the last two years constitute the most remarkable affirmation of individual freedom that has ever been forthcoming from the nation's Supreme Court in so short a period. At the same time, the Court has not interfered with the necessary and proper aspects of the current program to safeguard national security. Can anyone seriously argue that Slochower, Schwartz, Konigsberg, Watkins, or Sweezy posed serious threats to the welfare or security of the United States?

Neither has the Court hamstrung the investigatory power when used for proper purposes and in a proper manner. There is nothing in Watkins, for example, to prevent the House of Representatives from formulating a careful, precise directive to a committee charged with investigating the threat to the nation of subversive activity; there is nothing to prevent such a committee from employing all reasonable and necessary means to fulfil its assignment in a thorough and responsible way.

Through its decisions in the cases here under examination, as well as in Cole, Jencks, Yates, and other cases, the Supreme Court has afforded the American people and their public officers a much-needed chance to take a second look at certain of the more extreme aspects of the postwar program to safeguard national security. In particular, it has invited the legislative and executive branches of the national and state governments to seek a more satisfactory answer for this age, than has yet been found, to the question posed by Abraham Lincoln in 1861. It is incredible that the Court's rulings have in the main thus far been met with indifference by the public, carping criticism by many lawyers and political scientists, and vigorous, if not yet wholly successful, efforts by political leaders to override them. Not surprisingly, there are signs that the Court itself may be losing heart. There is a wide gulf between the eloquent language and challenging import of the rulings in Slochower, Schwartz, Konigsberg, Watkins, and Sweezy, and the pedestrian conservatism of Beilan. One hopes that the latter decision reflects no more than the majority's reaction to the particular facts of the case and its reluctance to concede much by way of academic freedom, tenure, and due process to public school teachers. One hopes that the majority of the justices still believe that there is a need to adjust the security-freedom balance a bit in freedom's favor. One hopes that Barenblatt may fare better than did Beilan. Probably the chance is still there. But who can say how much longer the Court can resist following "the election returns," if the critics of its work continue to make the most noise?

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FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>354 U.S. 298, 340, 341 (1957). Emphasis added.

<sup>2</sup>343 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).

<sup>3</sup>Democracy and the Supreme Court (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).

<sup>4</sup>The House Committee on Un-American Activities (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).

<sup>5</sup>The 1915 Declaration is reprinted in 40 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1954) 90. The 1925 Conference Statement and the 1940 Statement of Principles are reprinted in 44 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1958) 290.

<sup>6</sup>For a recent statement of academic due process, formulated by a joint AAC-AAUP committee, see "Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings," 44 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1958) 270.

<sup>7</sup>See the reports of nine investigating committees in 44 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1958).

<sup>8</sup>39 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1953) 91.

<sup>9</sup>42 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1956) 58.

<sup>10</sup>39 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1953) 92, 95.

<sup>11</sup>Op. cit., 58-59.

<sup>12</sup>4 College Public Relations Quarterly (July, 1953) 9, 12.

<sup>13</sup>44 AAUP Bulletin (Spring, 1958) 9.

<sup>14</sup>350 U. S. 551 (1956).

<sup>15</sup>"The Court of Appeals of New York...[had] authoritatively interpreted § 903 to mean that 'the assertion of the privilege against self incrimination is equivalent to a resignation.' Dismissal under this provision is therefore automatic and there is no right to charges, notice, hearing, or opportunity to explain." Id. at 554.

<sup>16</sup>"In practical effect the questions asked are taken as confessed and made the basis of the discharge. No consideration is given to such factors as the subject matter of the questions, remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or justification for exercise of the privilege." Id. at 558.

"This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an associate professor of German at Brooklyn College. The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. But there has been no such inquiry here. We hold that the summary dismissal of appellant violates due process of law." Id. at 559.

<sup>17</sup>Id. at 557. The majority also noted that "...the Board had possessed the pertinent information for 12 years, and the questions which Professor Slochower refused to answer were admittedly asked for a purpose wholly unrelated to his college functions.... [T]he Board seized upon his claim of privilege before the federal committee and converted it through the use of § 903 into a conclusive presumption of guilt." Id. at 558-559.



- <sup>18</sup> Schwabe v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 246, 246-247 (1957). Justice Frankfurter came even closer to the AAUF position. In his concurring opinion he said,

To hold, as the [New Mexico] court did, that Communist affiliation for six to seven years up to 1940, fifteen years prior to the court's assessment of it, in and of itself made the petitioner a "person of questionable character" is so dogmatic an inference as to be wholly unwarranted.... Facts of history that we would be arbitrary in rejecting bar the presumption, let alone an irrebutable presumption, that response to foolish, baseless hopes regarding the betterment of society made those who had entertained them but who later undoubtedly came to their senses and their sense of responsibility "questionable characters." Id. at 251.

- <sup>19</sup> Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 267-268 (1957).

<sup>20</sup> Id. at 270-271. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, and Harlan dissented. Justice Frankfurter based his dissent on jurisdictional grounds. Justice Harlan in a separate dissent agreed with Justice Frankfurter on the jurisdictional issue but also reached the merits. He emphasized that Konigsberg had to carry the burden of demonstrating his good moral character. Thus it did not seem significant that the record did not contain evidence demonstrating that Konigsberg's moral character was bad. He also quoted from the record at length to show that Konigsberg had been guilty of "constitutionally unprotected obstruction of a valid investigation into his qualifications." In particular, Konigsberg had persistently blocked the committee's efforts to test the veracity of his statement that he had not advocated the forcible overthrow of government. "...[T]he applicant is the moving party, and his failure to go forward is itself sufficient to support denial of admission." Id. at 282, 311.

- <sup>21</sup> Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).

<sup>22</sup> Id. at 187-188, 200.

<sup>23</sup> Id. at 198-199.

<sup>24</sup> Id. at 208-209.

<sup>25</sup> Id. at 217, 224.

- <sup>26</sup> Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957).

<sup>27</sup> Id. at 266. Justice Frankfurter was also led to make an unusually strong statement on behalf of the exercise of judicial power, if not judicial activism.

To be sure, this is a conclusion based on a judicial judgment in balancing two contending principles—the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection. And striking the balance implies the exercise of judgment. This is the inescapable judicial task in giving substantive content, legally enforced, to the Due Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed to this Court. It must not be an exercise of whim or will. It must be an overriding judgment founded on something much deeper and more justifiable than personal preference. As far as it lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal

judgment. It must rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed. Such a judgment must be arrived at in a spirit of humility when it counters the judgment of the State's highest court. But, in the end, judgment cannot be escaped--the judgment of this Court. Id. at 266-267.

<sup>28</sup>Id. at 250.

<sup>29</sup>240 F. 2d 875, 354 U.S. 178, 252 F. 2d. 129.

<sup>30</sup>Beilan v. Board of Education of Philadelphia, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_ (1958).

<sup>31</sup>342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).

<sup>32</sup>\_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_ (1958).

<sup>33</sup>Id. at \_\_\_\_\_. The teacher was alleged to have lost the respect and good will of the community "because of her afterhours activity in her husband's beer garden, serving as a bartender and waitress, occasionally drinking beer, shaking dice with the customers for drinks and playing the pinball machine." The case was Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant School District, 335 Pa. 369.

<sup>34</sup>Id. at \_\_\_\_.

<sup>35</sup>The Chief Justice equated the case with Slochower. He found that the School Board in fact dismissed Beilan because of his invocation of the Fifth Amendment before the congressional committee, since it had failed to take any action against him for 13 months following his first refusal to answer the Superintendent's question.

## FEDERAL ELECTRIC POWER POLICY

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Prepared as a basis for panel discussion  
at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American  
Political Science Association, St. Louis,  
Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958. 1/

Few, if any, areas of Federal domestic economic policy involve so much political tension and so sharp and deep a schism in political thought, interest, and action as Federal electric power policy. This continuing tension and schism are both cause and effect of the fact that Federal power policy, as it has evolved in Federal law (including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954), is made up of two groups of Federal policies and related institutions that are alternative to, and competitive with, each other in the supply of a "natural monopoly" service. One of these groups relates to public and rural-cooperative power generation, transmission and distribution. The other group relates, through regulation, to private investor-owned utility generation,

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1/ This paper is based largely upon research that the author is now undertaking as a Research Associate, Resources for the Future, Inc., in connection with a general study of the historical development of Federal Electric Power Policy. The views expressed, however, are those of the author and are not necessarily those of Resources for the Future, Inc. Moreover, many of the views of the author as to the accuracy of facts and their interpretation are still in a formative stage. He would welcome assistance through critical examination.

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transmission and distribution. 1/

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1/ "Policies" are taken in this paper to be "decisions about what to do or not to do in given situations." This is the "common meaning," according to Professor Friedrich (see Constitutional Government and Democracy, 1950, p. 362) and it is deemed to be a generally adequate definition for purposes of this paper. More particularly, with respect to public policies, it is deemed adequate because it can comprehend: executive and commission decisions (i.e., as indicated in policy statements, regulations, and in lines of administrative cases); legislative decisions (i.e., as indicated in laws of general applicability over a class of situations, as well as in legislative authorization and appropriation of funds for specific projects); and judicial decisions (i.e., as indicated in cases involving constitutional as well as other questions, where the effect of the decision is to condition future executive and legislative decisions). All such decisions are considered "policies" here because the center of interest is the full substance of the matter rather than the agency of the sovereign that is deciding and the different forms taken by its pronouncements. A further matter of definition should perhaps also be noted, namely, the distinction that is made in the text between "discretionary policies" and "policies embodied in law [including judicial decisions] of general applicability." The former refers to executive policies generally, and to legislative policies expressed in authorizations of, and appropriation for, specific projects that are within the confines of the latter and assume it to be fixed in the "short run." This is a rather gross distinction. But it is deemed to be adequate to indicate matters of policy with respect to which there is substantial freedom of action in contrast to matters that realistically are taken to be relatively fixed. As will be seen at a number of points in the text this is an essential distinction to understanding the current status and operation of Federal power policy.

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Relation to State and Local Public Policies

Each of the two groups of policies at the Federal level relate to more or less complementary groups of governmental policies at non-Federal levels. It is at the state level where policy ordinarily determines the existence, as well as the powers and geographic scope within a State, of the alternative institutions in the supply of electricity: the terms by which a municipality or public power district may take over upon its initiative, or relinquish, the function of electrical supply; the conditions governing cooperatives in supplying electricity to members and non-members if necessary group initiative is exercised and if electric cooperatives are permitted at all (Note: Apparently they are not permitted to function in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island); and the terms of charter and regulation of private investor-owned utility corporations for effecting electrical supply within a State or the terms of permission of a "foreign" corporation to do so under State regulation. In 48 States and the District of Columbia in 1955, there were in existence: 1,968 municipal systems, 950 cooperative systems, and 92 public utility and other public district and state projects--totalling 3,010 non-Federal public and cooperative enterprises. Private investor-owned electric utilities total-  
ed 581. 1/

Wide variations exist between the States in content of State and local policies in each policy group. Nebraska and Tennessee, through the combined effects of State and federal policies, have become almost complete public-cooperative power States and are the only two States to have become so. In

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1/ Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1957; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Table No. 661, p.531.

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Nebraska, however, this has come about more as a result of state policy than of Federal, while in Tennessee the opposite has been the case, due largely to the roles of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Rural Electrification Administration. On the other hand, there is an almost complete absence of municipal, other public, or rural-cooperative electrical service in West Virginia and Rhode Island. Essentially all power in these states is generated, transmitted, and distributed by private electrical utilities that are regulated by state commissions. In addition, these utilities are regulated by the Federal Power Commission (with respect to hydroelectric developments and interstate transmission and sales at wholesale, if any) and by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 (as it is applied to the operations of American Electric Company in West Virginia and to the New England Electric System and to Eastern Utility Associates in Rhode Island).

The remaining 44 states necessarily range in between these extremes of presence and absence of public and rural-cooperative power. Measured by the number of municipal and cooperative organizations involved today in the supply of electricity compared to the number of private operating utilities most of these 44 states take on the appearance of being heavily committed to local-public and rural-cooperative power. This appearance of commitment would also seem to have been true in 1923 when the total number of municipal public power enterprises for all states appears to have been at its peak (around 3,1000), when rural electrical cooperatives were few and very far between, and when the



aggressive consolidation movement among private utilities of the twenties still had some way to go. Measured by number of customers or kilowatt hours supplied, however, the opposite appearance has always been true; the predominant role of private power is clearly indicated. This has been true largely because municipal public power, with few exceptions (most notably Los Angeles and Seattle) is now, and always has been, a phenomenon of the town and small city. And, of course, the rural cooperatives have also been relatively small. Although neither measure is satisfactory for the purpose, the number of enterprises would seem to be much more indicative of the political significance of local public and rural cooperative power than the number of customers or kilowatt-hours supplied: it has had (beginning in the 1880's), and still has, widespread "grass roots" significance in American society. 1/

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1/ Of the some 3,100 municipal public power enterprises in existence in the United States in 1923, some 2,400 had originated as municipal enterprises. Only some 700 had originated as private undertakings and had been taken over and transformed into municipal enterprises (See, "The Changing Character and Extent of Municipal Ownership in the Electric Light and Power Industry," Herbert B. Dorau; Research Monograph No. 1, The Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities, Chicago, 1929, pp. 20-26.) It would thus seem clear that the typical municipal enterprise at that time did not have a public-private controversy in its heritage (as may be generally thought today), but in some sort of community action aimed at keeping the town or city up with the advances which 19th century technological development had brought about.

The Core Issue

At the Federal level, the core issue of Federal electric power policy would appear to be this: which group of policies and related institutions, public-cooperative power or regulated private power, is to advance relative to the other? Although this would appear to be the core issue, it is not, of course, the only issue today in Federal electric power policy. There is, for example, the issue of amending the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 to enable two or more private utilities operating in different states to own jointly through a subsidiary an optimum-sized generating unit without each utility subjecting itself for this reason to Federal regulation under the holding company act. This issue can be, and is, argued on independent grounds. Moreover, the same economic objective is being sought by four New England utilities, without a change in the holding company act and without political protest. But the issue of amending the holding company act would appear to be viewed by many of those most actively concerned, in part at least, in its relation to the core issue. Also, as an example, there is much that is said, on both sides of the argument that has been going on in recent years as to whether the Federal government should build, or subsidize the building of, further atomic power demonstration plants that is quite apart, logically, from the "public power" issue. But no one who is close to this policy struggle would doubt, I believe, that the public-private issue underlies much of the argument and is the factor which produces much of the force in the debates.

The core issue is not the only issue in another sense. Within the camp of each side on the core issue, there tend to be important differences. Within the rural electric cooperative movement, represented nationally by the

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National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, there are tendencies for policy splits between those who seek close alliance with public power, those who emphasize cooperative generation and transmission (including, in some instances, the sharing of special Federal benefits with private utilities) and those who go along relatively contentedly in the wholesale purchase of power from private sources. Within the public power sector, there are a substantial number of small municipal enterprises which, it may be presumed, feel secure and are indifferent to their kinship with other such enterprises and with Federal public power policy. Thus they do not join associations for their mutual protection and benefit. But within the group of such enterprises that is not indifferent, and represented nationally by the American Public Power Association, there are tendencies for policy splits at least along two general lines. First, as might be expected, there tends to be a split between those who wholeheartedly support Federal generation and transmission and those who are somewhat fearful of "Federal domination." At least as a first choice, they would prefer to rely on State and/or local public enterprise to fulfill their needs. Second, there tends to be a split between those who conceive of public power strictly from the consumer point of view as calling for the lowest possible price consistent with sound business principles and those who view municipal public power as one of several municipal services and the one best suited to provide substantial "general revenue" for the city over and above operating and capital costs (including an amount which might appropriately be considered as "in lieu of taxes"). The existence of the core issue, however, appears to be a strong force for closing ranks. And the impact of organized influence from



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the public and cooperative power side (which are joined together at the national level in the Electric Consumers' Information Committee) does not appear to be mitigated much, if any, by these and whatever other divisive tendencies there may be.

The regulated private power industry, the outside observer tends to assume, is rather completely unified on its side of the core issue. But in response to practical circumstances, it can be noted, particular private utilities have supported Federal power generation projects and even certain Federal transmission lines (e.g., in the Colorado River Storage Project and in the Pacific Northwest), where they expect to share in the benefits of such development. Marked variations also occur among private utilities, it is said, in their policies relative to wholesaling of power to local public and cooperative enterprises in their areas. Also, "power pools" and other forms of cooperation exist between the two sides, particularly in the Pacific Northwest, but also in a few other areas. Nevertheless, these intra-industry differences do not appear to affect the industry's rigid public posture of strong opposition to "socialism" in the electric power industry. This it generally cultivates with joint institutional advertising campaigns, high-level addresses at annual meetings of the Edison Electric Institute, and in other ways. When it comes to taking stands on proposed Federal policies, however, the industry (unlike its opposition) eschews acting in public with a common spokesman. Industry testimony before Congressional committees is by leaders speaking on their own behalf or on behalf of their company or the United States Chamber of Commerce. Nevertheless, substantial differences in testimony on matters of policy, if at all, would appear to be rare. The National Association of Electric Companies maintains a staff

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in Washington, but does not act as a public spokesman. This may be due, at least in part, to the fact that it is supported by only a minority of private investor-owned electric utilities.

To identify the core issue is not also to suggest that all groups and individuals supporting one side or the other have been chiefly concerned about the core issue. Many, who at various times supported various Federal policies with which public/<sup>and</sup>cooperative power policies are related, have been motivated largely by the prospect of different practical consequences. Nevertheless, their organized political support for things in which they were interested (e.g., navigation improvements, flood control, reclamation, comprehensive resource development of river basins, reform of city government, a non-tax source of city revenue, work relief, and betterment of farmers via cheap electrical service and cheap fertilizer) added, in effect, to support for public power and/or rural cooperatives. Authorization in 1927, for example, of some 200 comprehensive surveys of river basins looking towards possible multiple-purpose development, as detailed in House Document 308, 69th Congress, 1st Sess., probably did more to push the development of Federal public power policy in the years ahead than almost anything else. Yet much of the support which obtained passage of this act, it can be presumed, came from those who were concerned about other matters than public power, for example, the National Rivers and Harbors Congress. Also, a substantial part of the support for inclusion of power development in multiple purpose projects under Reclamation law has always come more from a desire to cut the reimbursable costs to be paid by the irrigators than to provide public and cooperative power per se. And, as a final example, organizations of taxpayers primarily interested in keeping Federal taxes down can be

found on the side of private power.

Tendency for "All Out" Struggle

Even though power policy issues can be identified that in some sense and degree are independent of the core issue, even though both sides are not exactly homogeneous in their policy views, and even though important supporters can be identified on both sides who have consequential interests that are independent of the core issue, that issue would still appear to be at the heart of the successive policy struggles. This would seem to be indicated clearly by the "all out" character they tend to assume. Why is this so?

First, each side has "vested interest," individual and group, to protect in their enterprises and government policies related to them. These interests, on the public and cooperative power side, run back longer and deeper than the New Deal. They run back into State and local history from which comprehensive knowledge is very difficult to come by and not well understood. The interests of private utilities and their historical setting, on the other hand, are much better understood.

Second, at both the propaganda and intellectual levels of discourse, the public-cooperative side (at least in part) and the private utility side deny the legitimacy of the very existence of the other. Public and cooperative power is labeled "socialism," as if it were a manifestation in this country of an imported ideology and did not have here a thoroughly American "grass roots" origin. Regulated private electric utilities are labeled "the power monopoly," as though there had been no Federal and State regulation (including the Holding Company Act) now for many years.



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On the intellectual level, the position and arguments of each side rest on opposite assumptions, largely implicit, regarding the present and potential efficiency of government regulation of admitted monopolies in specified areas. Private utilities came to accept the principle of public rate regulation around the turn of the century (under the leadership of Samuel Insull) as a way, among other objectives, of legitimizing such monopolies. Today, they and their supporters assume, as a basis for their general position, that the present scheme of regulation generally protects the public interest. On the other hand, in the rhetoric and arguments of the other side would appear to be the assumption: (a) that the present scheme of public regulation does not, in fact, protect the public interest; and/or (b) that substantial public-cooperative power is an essential competitive supplement. And, in some arguments, the view is explicitly expressed that public regulation cannot--for both theoretical and practical reasons--be made to achieve the public interest. No real dialogue is going on at this level among the protagonists. No general public investigations are underway. Current public opinion appears to be largely a carryover from the era of the last great electric utility investigations of some 30 years ago.

And third among the reasons for the "all out" character of the struggle is that there are no conceptual and/or operational limits beyond which each side can have confidence that the other will not extend its role. The "yardstick" concept of Federal public power, which held out to the liberal voter of the late twenties and early thirties the illusory hope of an "accounting" comparison of public and private operation as an aid in regulation of the latter, never materialized as a limitation upon further development after initial Federal

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installations.

A more realistic notion of the "yardstick;" was an experiment or demonstration to the private utilities that, as an economist would say, they possess a continually decreasing unit-cost-curve (within a wide range) and face a more elastic demand curve than they had customarily thought. But this form of the yardstick concept has proved to be no limitation either. The first such demonstration is now over 20 years old. But public power advocates have yet to say that there is no longer a need for further demonstration.

Also, the original confinement of Federal power to water power projects was broken in the TVA area. TVA now has more steam-electric power than hydro-electric power, and its steam capacity is destined to continue to expand. Moves in the direction of Federal steam power in the Pacific Northwest and, more generally, for the Western part of the United States were made prior to 1952, but they never materialized.

And in 1956, the original Gore bill would have established a beachhead federal in/atomic power production in such a way as to give public bodies and cooperatives a preference in its distribution under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In a subsequent version of this bill which did not pass, this beachhead feature was modified to preclude sale of the power until such time as the power would not be needed by the AEC in its activities. An authorization bill which has just passed the Congress contains provisions which could result in a beachhead, but this is not a necessary result.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Act of August 4, 1958, P.L. 950, 85th Congress, 2nd Session.

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The formal position of the public-cooperative side, and one which in present and foreseeable circumstances is realistic, provides a very wide latitude for struggle between the two sides but it is not "all out." In a recent speech, Alex Radin, General Manager of the American Public Power Association, reiterates this position in these words: "...we believe there is a rightful place in American democracy and economic life for both private and public power..." This would appear to mean, in effect, that competition between organizational types in the supply of electricity should be the highest public policy in this field. This position is not unlike Republican Senator Cullom's position in 1886 with respect to transportation policy. He and his committee, in recommending direct regulation of railroads via the Interstate Commerce Act, also endorsed continuation of indirect regulation of rates and services via competition from private water transport made feasible by public navigation improvements constructed by the Corps of Engineers.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> See Senate Report 46, 49th Congress, 1st Session (1886). The policy of indirect regulation of rates and services refers to the views of the Windom Committee of 1874. This committee, headed by Republican Senator Windom of Minnesota, had rejected a policy of direct regulation of railroads (largely on grounds that it wouldn't work) and had recommended a Federal policy of government-owned freight railroad lines and publicly improved waterways as the best means of regulating private railroads. See Senate Report 307, 43rd Congress, 1st session (1874). Ever since the Civil War, Federal navigation improvements have been supported to a very large extent on grounds of enabling competition with railroads and thus providing cheaper transportation.

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Limitation of the domain of regulated private electric utilities conceptually and operationally is, at least equally, lacking. On the general conceptual level, it need hardly be mentioned that private investor-owned utilities endeavor to associate themselves in the public mind with "free [competitive] enterprise" which widely proclaims that it alone has institutional legitimacy. Operationally, private utilities are now usually limited at a given time by regulation or franchise to particular geographic areas. Moreover, it would appear to be generally true that a private utility would have to buy out a local public power enterprise before it could give service to its area. This limitation, however, does not obtain in many states with regard to invasions of the "service area" of an electric cooperative. Thus, except for some not insurmountable hurdles and except for definite refusals of local public bodies to sell out or an electric cooperative to give up, there would appear to be no real limitations to further extension of the domain of private utilities.

The Current Political Result: Stalemate

The current political result of the existence, as noted above, of the two groups of Federal power policies - the core issue, the pullings and haulings on issues around the core issue, and the tendency for "all out" struggle between the protagonists - is largely a stalemate.<sup>1/</sup> That this is

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<sup>1/</sup> Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Vice Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in a speech of June 18, 1958, at the Fourth Annual Meeting, Nuclear Energy Writers Association, New York City, N.Y., characterized policy development in the atomic power field as in a stalemate (p.13). In this speech he also presented an atomic power program for ending the atomic power policy stalemate (pp. 10-13).

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the result would appear to be a reflection that neither national political party, nor a substantial and disciplined block from both, can now identify itself with either side in the struggle and prevail. Thus the political stalemate is not just the result of the running out by 1958 of what steam there was in 1953 in the Eisenhower Administration's somewhat equivocal "partnership" power policies. <sup>1/</sup> It is also due to the fact that the New Deal and Fair Deal Administrations, which never openly opposed the continued existence of regulated private power, spoke out strongly at one point, for many more "valley authorities" (being somewhat equivocal, publicly, as to the role of public power in them) but subsequently settled for lesser, ad hoc advances in public and cooperative power. These advances lost more and more luster (e.g., the Hells Canyon issue both before and after 1952) as domestic politics have become more and more conservative, and as fiscal and other policy considerations have intervened, since World War II.

Objectives in a New and Better Modus Vivendi

Stalemate in policy change is an acceptable modus vivendi, no doubt, if one endorses or just accepts the existing rugged competition between the present organizational types in the supply of electric power. Moreover, if one is a political scientist finding viability in the "pluralist society" or a political

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<sup>1/</sup> See page       , below.

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economist deriving faith from the not so "unseen hand" of "countervailing power," such acceptance is buttressed by very general considerations. The importance, however, of finding a new and better modus vivendi might be said to be indicated by one's desire to achieve the following substantial objectives:

(a) To remove the core issue as an obstacle to changes in Federal regulatory policy which would encourage private investment to be made, more generally, in large lowest-unit-cost generating units;

(b) To find a way of providing municipal and cooperative power distribution enterprises, which want to remain so, with a general and sure means of obtaining wholesale power at acceptable rates, thus obviating the usual necessity to generate their own power in much less than optimum-sized units when confronted with what they feel are excessive monopolistically-determined wholesale rates;

(c) To remove the core issue from the debate on whether the Federal government should, or should not, further subsidize directly or indirectly technological development of atomic power and on whether this should be done at home or abroad;

(d) To remove the power policy issue from consideration where it, in effect, is an obstacle to approval of otherwise approvable water resource development projects;

(e) To remove a possible element of over-emphasis on multiple-purpose water resources development (e.g., in proposed Potomac River development) in instances where recreational values of an undeveloped



river valley might be considered quite important;

(f) To remove as an issue possible under-emphasis upon inclusion of water power as a multiple purpose (e.g., in the public development of New England rivers) because of opposition to public power per se;

(g) To remove the core issue from having a bearing upon whether public hydroelectric power should or should not be used as peaking power rather than for base load;

(h) To minimize the impact of steam power generation upon the quality of water resources (via temperature increases from return condensing water) through location of relatively fewer large plants within a wider selection of water supplies; and

(i) To lighten the over-loaded agenda of national politics and administration of a narrow, but very time-consuming, issue.

To identify the substantial objectives that one might want to achieve through a new and better modus vivendi is a long way, of course, from specifying what policy scheme could conceivably bring it about. Hopefully this panel discussion of Federal electric power policy by political scientists could contribute significantly to the discovery of such a scheme which would commend itself to the public at large, to political practitioners, and to a decisive grouping of the interests involved.

#### Contemporary Federal Power Policy

To further set the stage for this panel discussion, beyond the foregoing introduction, the balance of this paper will endeavor to do three things: to set forth in Group A, below, the principal Federal public-cooperative policies; to outline the types of Federal regulatory policies in Group B, below, that

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relate to private investor-owned utilities; and to outline the basic elements of a proposed policy scheme, the Giant Power Scheme, recently resurrected from the past, which would appear to be worthy of reconsideration in any search for a new and better modus vivendi.

Before covering Group A and Group B, a few words should be said about what are to constitute contemporary Federal electric power policies. The present state of those policies, as revealed in law of general applicability, is identical with that which was extant in January 1953. The Eisenhower Administration's "partnership policy" was not a set of policies which required changes in law of general applicability. Rather, it was an executive policy which determined Administration stands on legislative authorizations and appropriations of funds for particular proposed Federal construction projects involving electric power. Also, it indicated the direction in which discretionary administrative power, was to be exercised within extant law. Thus the contemporary state of Federal electric power policy would appear to be best revealed by noting particular policies as they are embodied in law and then the principal differences between the Eisenhower Administration since 1952 and the Truman Administration in the exercise of discretionary power and in making recommendations on individual project proposals.

### Group A: Public and Rural Cooperative Power Policies

Federal policies relating to public and rural-cooperative power fall into three categories: (a) those dealing with Federal generation, transmission, and sale of electric power; (b) those dealing with Federal financing of non-Federal public and cooperative power; and (c) those dealing with Federal regulation in the form of licensing of non-Federal public and cooperative power.

Federal Generation, Transmission, and Sale

Federal generation, except with respect to TVA steam plants, has been confined to legislative authorization of hydroelectric installations within Federal water resource development projects. 1/ Thus Federal provision of power is dependent upon Federal water resources policy. But any implicit limitation in the provision of Federal power deriving from this dependency has been substantially reduced, so far, by the availability of hydroelectric potentials and by historically generous Federal action in making of investigations and plans for potential water resource projects, authorizing their construction, and providing the necessary funds. Provision for Federal generation in potential projects, however, depends upon the exercise of administrative discretion in planning and of Congressional concurrence when authorizing each project. The inclusion of complete generating facilities, with the implicit exception of TVA, is not required by any laws of general applicability. 2/ On the other hand, the authority in law has long existed in the Secretary of the Interior to lease a power privilege at a Reclamation dam (since 1906) and in the Federal Power Commission (since 1920) to issue a license "for the purpose of utilizing ... water power from any Government dam ..." It was this state of

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1/ There are minor exceptions to this statement. The Federal government is authorized to, and does, generate and sell diesel and other electric power in and around some military posts, national parks, etc. But this activity is considered irrelevant to this discussion of Federal electric power policy.

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2/ The only partial requirements (and that applicable only to projects of the Corps of Engineers) is that "penstocks or other similar facilities adapted to possible future use in the development of hydroelectric power shall be installed in any dam ... when approved by the Secretary of the Army upon recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and of the Federal Power Commission." (33 U.S.C. 701j). Note: This and subsequent references to the United States Code are to the 1952 edition.



policy in law, as of 1952, which enabled the Eisenhower Administration, without obtaining a change by the Congress in the general law, to propose "partnership" arrangements with non-Federal interests; assert that such proposals were consistent with long-run legislative policy; and, thus, reverse the direction in which discretionary policy had been exercised (with but few exceptions) since 1933. 1/

Even though TVA might be said to have been obligated to include Federal generation facilities (to the extent practicable) in whatever dams it built, Congress did not in 1933, nor after the private utilities in the area had been bought out as of 1939, clearly place responsibility in law upon itself and/or upon TVA for the exercise of "public utility responsibility" for power supply in the TVA service area. Power service contracts of TVA have always recognized this lack of unequivocal responsibility by providing that distributors are only bound to buy their power from TVA if TVA has it available. Thus the implicit "Dixon-Yates" power policy of the Eisenhower Administration (i.e., of removing the need for further expansion of steam generating capacity by TVA itself), as well as the culmination of the controversy in having the city of Memphis (rather than a private utility) augment the power supply of the TVA transmission system, was not inconsistent with extant policy as expressed in law. That the "Dixon-Yates" policy was a reversal of discretionary policy of the Truman Administration with regard to Federal expansion of supply, a blow to preconceptions about fixed TVA policy in "the valley," and an anomalous use of AEC authority,

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1/ See, Ralph A. Tudor, "Partnership' in Water Resources Development," 57 Public Utilities Fortnightly, 7, March 29, 1956, pp.443-440.

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can hardly be doubted. 1/

Federal Transmission, via Federally constructed or purchased transmission facilities of Federally generated or interchanged power has come about with a minimum of general policy determination in law and with a maximum of discretionary policy determination on specific transmission lines. In reclamation law there is no explicit general provision authorizing Federal transmission-line construction and operation, etc. Congressional authorization is obtained as a part of the authorization of each separate reclamation project.

As for general law applicable to projects constructed by the Corps of Engineers, the Secretary of the Interior (the power marketing agent of the Federal Government, except in the TVA area) "is authorized [but not directed] to construct or acquire, by purchase or agreement, only such transmission lines and related facilities as may be necessary in order to make power ... available in

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1/ The essence of the Dixon-Yates scheme was this: Memphis was the part of the TVA service area in which augmentation of power supply was particularly needed. Failing to obtain Administration support for additional capacity to meet service area loads, TVA was instead relieved of a portion of its commitment to supply the AEC at Paducah, Kentucky. The supply thus released was to be available for its regular loads. However, arrangements were initiated whereby TVA would continue to supply AEC at Paducah from its Shawnee plant, with Dixon-Yates supplying power equivalent to TVA's released commitment into the TVA grid in the area of the Memphis. Thus the Dixon-Yates proposal involved, in effect, that a private utility under a contract with AEC would assume TVA's incremental wholesale power need in the Memphis area. Plans for other large private steam plants bordering the TVA service area are said to have been on the sidelines. If the Dixon-Yates scheme had materialized without political upheaval, it would have been within the realm of executive discretionary possibilities to meet future wholesale power needs in the TVA service area by encouraging private generating plant construction and interconnection. Thus the need for expansion of TVA generating capacity would have been precluded.

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wholesale quantities for sale on fair and reasonable terms and conditions to facilities owned by the Federal government, public bodies, cooperatives, and privately owned companies." In adopting this particular language, which subsequently became law in Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, the Senate Committee on Commerce specifically rejected language authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Interior "to [acquire] construct, operate, and maintain such electric transmission lines [etc.] , including auxiliary steam or other types of plants, as he finds necessary, desirable, or appropriate for carrying out the purposes of this Act....," In so doing, and also while reaffirming support for "preference clause" policy, the Committee in its report stated:

"The committee desires ... [to provide] a convenient and practical method of disposing of power without setting up a public power trust which would be unduly competitive with established private power utilities." <sup>1/</sup>

The Tennessee Valley Act of 1933 and the Bonneville Act of 1938 include language regarding the provision of transmission facilities that is more in the spirit of the language rejected by the Senate Committee in 1944. In neither case, however, was it as broad and imperative. In both cases, however, it was sufficient, with support through Federal appropriations, to acquire or construct

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<sup>1/</sup> Senate Report No. 1030, 78th Congress, 2nd Session. (Underscoring added.)

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basic regional transmission systems. <sup>1/</sup>

The piecemeal purchase by TVA of private utility facilities culminated in the famous Wilkie-Lilienthal negotiations. The result was the purchase by TVA of practically all the private utility properties in an area of some 80,000 square miles by 1939. These events substantially determined the present TVA service area and thus its basic transmission system. The Bonneville system was much less decisively determined. Other Federal transmission lines, for the most part, have been constructed only after the most detailed consideration by policy officials of the Executive branch, the pertinent appropriations and other sub-committees in the Congress, and the Senators and Congressmen from the areas involved in each case. Thus discretionary power in the determination of policy has been decisive over the years in determining the development of Federal transmission lines.

The exercise of this discretionary power, except probably in the case of TVA and the early Bonneville lines, has generally occurred in the following context. Legislative policy, it is generally conceded, calls for provision of transmission facilities for Federal power by the Federal government from the point of generation to load centers within economical distances. Two alternatives are many times available, however, in making such provision: Federal

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<sup>1/</sup> Actually, the Tennessee Valley Act (16 U.S.C. 831 K), surprising as it may seem to many today, expressed a strong preference for non-Federal public or cooperative power transmission in place of Federal transmission. But this preference could only be operative if non-Federal public or cooperative organizations "shall construct or agree to construct and maintain" appropriate transmission lines, etc. Such non-Federal initiative apparently did not materialize. Thus TVA was not inhibited by this policy in developing the basic transmission system it now has.

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construction and operation of transmission facilities; and "wheeling agreements" (i.e. agreements with private utilities for transmission of Federal power over private lines for a fee). Prior to 1952, Administration policy, and the influence of preference customers, tended strongly to be on the side of Federal construction and operation. Wheeling agreements were generally avoided unless Congress insisted upon particular agreements by refusing to appropriate funds for Federal construction. 1/ Since 1952, Administration policy has been to construct and operate Federal lines "unless other public or private agencies have or will provide the necessary facilities upon reasonable terms" (i.e. "at costs not higher than would result from" Federal construction). 2/ This latter discretionary policy has slowed, but not stopped, Federal construction and operation of transmission lines. Between June 30, 1954, and June 30, 1957, some 3,417 miles of Federal transmission lines have been added to the 25,761 miles that were in place on June 30, 1954. 3/

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1/ The formal statement of policy, however, was as follows: "Transmission outlets to existing and potential wholesale markets shall be adequate to deliver power to every preferred customer within the region upon fair and reasonable terms. They must be owned and controlled by the [Federal] government unless privately owned facilities should be made available upon terms which assure full accomplishment of the basic objectives of the congressional power policy and which do not reward the private company simply because of its strategic location of monopolistic position." (Source: "Memorandum on Power Policy," Secretary of the Interior, January 3, 1946; reprinted in "Power Policy," Hearings before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1954, pp. 7-9.)

2/ "Power Policy," U.S. Department of the Interior, (mimeographed release), August 18, 1953. (Reprinted in "Power Policy," Hearings before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Congress, 1st Session; 1954, pp. 2-6.

3/ Source: Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior, and annual reports of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

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Federal sale of electric power, with few exceptions, is done at wholesale. This includes, in many instances, direct sales to large industrial customers as well as sale to non-Federal public, rural-cooperative, and private-utility organizations which operate retail distribution facilities. It is implicit, but nowhere explicit, in Federal policy as expressed in law that there is a limitation upon the Federal government to sell power only at wholesale. But such explicit limitation is really unnecessary. There appears to be clear recognition that maintenance of the whole structure of inter-organizational relationships on the public-cooperative power side depends upon Federal abstention from distribution. Thus explicit policies with respect to selling Federal power deal with the following: (1) wholesale rates, (2) preference in sales as between wholesale customers, and (3) Federal control of resale.

Wholesale rates (1) are determined on the basis of legislative and administrative policies that differ substantially depending upon whether the power is produced by facilities constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, TVA, etc. The details of these complex differences cannot be covered here. There is, however, one major difference among these policies, relating to the objective that is being sought, which should be noted.

In the sale of power from Reclamation projects, the Secretary of the Interior is to make sales:

"... at such rates as in his judgment will produce power revenues at least sufficient to cover an appropriate share of the annual operation and maintenance costs, interest on an appropriate share of the construction investment at not less than 3 per cent per annum, and such other fixed charges as the Secretary deems proper." 1/

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1/ 43 U.S.C. 485 h (c).



The underscorings which have been added clearly indicate that legislation provided a floor in the setting of rates. Nothing is stated indicating an explicit ceiling. If one reads this language in conjunction with an understanding of how irrigation water users benefit from anticipated proceeds from power sales, it is clear that the implicit general policy is to charge whatever is necessary to make the reimbursable segments of the total project financially feasible and still be able to sell the power. In the sale of power from projects of the Corps of Engineers, on the other hand, the Secretary of the Interior has been given by legislation both a ceiling and a floor within which to exercise his discretion. He is to:

"... dispose of power and energy in such manner as to encourage the most widespread use thereof at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business principles" (i.e., apparently, "recovery...of the cost of producing and transmitting..., including the amortization of the capital investment allocated to power over a reasonable period of years.") 1/

The Tennessee Valley Act, the Bonneville Power Act, and other acts relating to certain specific projects also provide similar, although not identical, ceilings as well as floors as legislated rate policy.

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1/ 15 U.S.C. 825s. Although payment of "interest" is not mentioned in terms, it has been deemed by the Executive Branch to be included as a cost that is to be met; discretionary policy now provides that this be 2.5 per cent.

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The difference in objective between these two general forms of legislated rate policy, both of which the Secretary of the Interior must implement, is clear. In reclamation policy, the primary objective is the furtherance of reclamation, through limitation of the amount of reimbursement by farm irrigators to what it is determined they can repay and <sup>making</sup> / up the difference primarily from power revenues. In non-reclamation policy, the primary objective is widespread use of power, at a low price, by urban residential and rural electric consumers.

That there is a very real conflict of objectives between these two types of rate policies came sharply into focus around 1944. Then, in effect, the rate was being determined at which the Bureau of Reclamation was to sell power from Grand Coulee Dam to the Bonneville Power Administration for resale under its power marketing act. If the Bonneville basic-wholesale rate of \$17.50 per kilowatt year had not previously been set, and if it had not been determined that the rate Reclamation wanted to charge Bonneville (inclusive of a substantial subsidy of irrigation costs of the Columbia Basin Project) could be met by Bonneville and still produce a modest surplus, then the two opposing objectives noted above would have been much more difficult to reconcile. <sup>1/</sup>

The current controversy over public versus private development of power in the Trinity River Division of the Central Valley Project is, in substance, largely a controversy between the same two opposing objectives: furtherance of

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<sup>1/</sup> See Daniel M. Ogden, The Development of Federal Power Policy in the Pacific Northwest, Chapter VIII. (A Ph.D. thesis dated June 1949, University of Chicago).

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reclamation and widespread domestic use of low-priced power. In this instance private power development appears to be supported by many on the irrigator's side. According to Secretary Seaton, such development would contribute more revenue to the accounts of the Central Valley Project, and thus a greater subsidy to irrigation, than public development and sale at established public power rates to preference (e.g. the Sacramento Municipal Utility District) and other customers. <sup>1/</sup> Private development is also favored, of course, by the Eisenhower Administration. During the Truman Administration, it is very doubtful indeed whether this issue would even have arisen: the possibility of private power development just would not have been brought to the surface for consideration.

Differences between the two Administrations as to the exercise of discretionary power with respect to the setting of power rates are not subject (at least, on the basis of my present knowledge) to accurate, simple and clear generalization. Most Federal basic wholesale power rates were set prior to 1952; thus there is not much to compare. It can be said, however, that the possibility of substantial differences arising in the establishment of any new basic rates has been greatly lessened in recent years by the fact that the official estimated cost of current and prospective hydro-electric power in multiple-purpose river basin projects (except, principally, in the Pacific Northwest) have become much closer to the price of alternative sources of electric

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<sup>1/</sup> That this irrigator interest in high power revenues can prevail over low consumer rates is indicated further by a recent application of Yuba County (which is in the Central Valley of California just north of Sacramento) for a preliminary FPC permit for construction of six multiple-purpose dams. The FPC news release (No. 9917; July 2, 1958) notes that: "The applicant said the power generated by the project would be sold to the highest bidder."

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power. Assessment of recent efforts to change certain established rates upward, within policies established in law, is a complex task that also cannot be attempted here.

With respect to preference (2) in the sale of Federal power as between different types of wholesale customers, Federal policy as expressed in law (including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) uniformly provides for preference in sales to public bodies and cooperatives over private utilities and industrial customers. Differences between various preference policy provisions in Federal law, to the extent they exist, relate to the amount of time available to prospective preference customers to perfect legal and financial arrangements to become customers as well as to limitations upon the contracting-away of power to non-preference customers that may be needed in the future by preference customers. It should also be emphasized that differences in law and in discretionary policy regarding Federal transmission of power have an important bearing upon the effectiveness of preference provisions. Even more fundamentally, differences in discretionary policy over whether there is to be Federal power generation in Federal water development projects determine whether preference policy provisions in law are to be short circuited or not.

The vital link between Federal public power and the non-Federal public and cooperative power, the link which basically puts each on the side of the other, is the preference clause. The Truman Administration not only fostered Federal generation and Federal transmission and honored the preference policy (as required by law), but also pursued an executive policy of actively assisting the organization of public agencies and cooperatives for the distribution of power. "The statutory objectives," as it viewed them, "were not attained by

merely waiting for a preferred customer to come forward and offer to purchase the power." 1/ The Eisenhower Administration, on the other hand, has not sought to change preference policy as provided in law. Nevertheless, it has tended in various ways not to make assistance to non-Federal public and cooperative enterprise the most important criterion in the exercise of its discretion in the sale of Federal power. 2/ In place of a frontal attack on the preference clause, it has tried strongly to short circuit preference policy under its "partnership policy"--the essence of which is encouragement of non-Federal development and operation of power within water resource projects.

With respect to control of the resale (3) of Federal power by public, cooperative, and private bodies, only the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration are authorized and directed by law to exercise such control. It is done as a matter of administrative policy in other power making activities of the Secretary of the Interior. Such control is accomplished through terms and conditions in sale contracts which may include resale rate schedules. The scope and degree of control exercised in these long-term contracts of sale were established prior to 1952. No fundamental change is known to have taken place since 1952 in discretionary policy applicable to control of resale.

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1/ "Memorandum on Power Policy," Secretary of the Interior, January 3, 1946, section on "operation and sales, item (a). (Reprinted in "Power Policy," Hearings before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1954, p.8.)

2/ For example, see "Power Policy," Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (83rd Congress, 1st Session), parts 1 and 2, December 1952, relating to the Eisenhower Administration's initial marketing criteria for Missouri Basin power.

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Federal Financing of Non-Federal Public and Cooperative Power

Federal loans and grants to non-Federal bodies for the construction of electric power facilities include the following: loans for public works--which can include loans for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution--by municipalities or other public bodies; loans and grants for "small" multiple-purpose river basin projects, having irrigation as their principal purpose, which may include power production; and loans for rural electrification.

Loans and grants for public works in the form of electric facilities were made in substantial amount in the thirties to municipal systems and public power districts by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), Public Works Administration (PWA), and the Works Projects Administration (WPA) including its predecessors. This financial aid made possible the development of substantial non-Federal public power agencies as, for example, in South Carolina, Nebraska, Texas, and Oklahoma. Also, many old municipal public-power systems were enabled to modernize themselves. Currently and since 1955, Federal policy embodied in law and administered by the Community Facilities Administration of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, authorizes interest-free loans for planning and authorizes loans to and the purchase of securities and obligations of any non-Federal public body "to finance specific public projects under State or municipal law," if the "financial assistance applied for is not otherwise available on reasonable terms," etc. Obligations outstanding at any one time are limited to \$100 million. <sup>1/</sup> A \$2 billion fund for similar purposes was being seriously considered by the Congress until very recently. The present revolving

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<sup>1/</sup> 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1492.

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fund has not been used for non-Federal public power projects to any important extent. 1/ Loans and grants not in excess of \$5 million in aid of "small" non-Federal public multiple-purpose river basin projects that will not have an overall cost of more than \$10 million, inclusive of local contribution, were authorized by the Congress in 1956. Irrigation must be the principal purpose, but other purposes including power production may be included. Costs allocated to power production are reimbursable in a period not to exceed 50 years with interest based upon the rate paid on certain long-term obligations of the United States. Commercial power, if sold at wholesale by the non-Federal public body, must be sold preferentially to public bodies and cooperatives. 2/

Of the three types of Federal financial aid, that undertaken by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) since the thirties has been, of course, the most substantial by far. Over \$3.5 billion in loans have been made through June 30, 1957. Some \$300 million were loaned in fiscal year 1957 alone: 58 per cent was for the construction of electric distribution facilities; 40 per cent was for generation and transmission facilities; and 2 per cent was for consumer facilities. 3/

Loans for rural electrification at 2 per cent per annum on the unpaid balance, and to be repaid in a period not exceeding 35 years, are authorized in law

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1/ But it has been used: The Washington Public Power Supply System was granted an interest free loan in July 1958 of \$205,000 to make advance plans for its proposed hydro-electric plant on Packwood Lake in eastern Lewis County, Washington.

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2/ Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, P.L. 984, 84th Congress.

3/ Report of the Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, 1957, pp. 1 and 2.

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to be made to individuals, corporations, public bodies, and cooperatives for the purpose of providing facilities "for the furnishing of electric energy to persons in rural areas who are not receiving central station service." <sup>1/</sup> However, no loan for the construction operation, or enlargement of any generating plant shall be made unless the applicant has first obtained the consent of the State authority, if any, having jurisdiction. Preference in the granting of loans is to be to "public bodies and cooperatives, non-profit, and limited dividend associations."<sup>2/</sup> Also, loans at 2 per cent are authorized for the "purpose of financing the wiring of the premises of persons in rural ears and the acquisition and installation of electrical and plumbing appliances and equipment." <sup>3/</sup> Both types of loans are subject to policies embodied in law regarding the proportionate allotment of funds annually available for loans among the States and territories.

Modern Republicanism, until recently, has not sought to change rural electrification policies embodied in law during the New Deal and Fair Deal. And no changes have been made in REA law since 1952. In the President's Budget Message for 1958, however, the Administration has propsoed legislation: "to assist both electric and telephone borrowers to obtain financing from private sources where the security is adequate and the loans can be repaid in a reasonable period

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<sup>1/</sup> 7 U.S.C. 904. See debate and Comptroller General's decision of July 21, 1958 with reference to a loan to the Central Iowa Power Cooperative in 104 Congressional Record 114384-114388 (July 31, 1958) for an appreciation of the background and current implications of the quoted phrase. See also 104 Congressional Record 15676-15680 (August 12, 1958) for reprint of letter of August 7, 1958, from Acting Secretary of Agriculture to Comptroller General requesting reconsideration of decision of July 21, 1958.

<sup>2/</sup> 7 U.S.C. 904. With very few exceptions, all of these loans have been made to public bodies and cooperatives, mostly the latter.

<sup>3/</sup> 7 U.S.C. 905.

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of time; and...to adjust interest rates on future loans for all loan programs to meet the Government's cost." It is presumed by REA borrowers and other supporters of the public-cooperative power side that adoption of these proposals would have the effect of raising interest rates charged then in the future. The reception accorded them so far would not encourage the belief that they will be translated into law in the foreseeable future.



Federal Regulation in the Form of Licensing

There are four elements of Federal regulatory electric power policy embodied in law that belong within the group of Federal public-cooperative policies. The first two of these provide an opportunity for the making of Federal decisions in favor of Federal generation of hydroelectric power over non-Federal generation and thereby enable extension of the realm of Federal power marketing law. "Whenever, in the judgment of the [Federal Power] Commission, the development of any water resources for public purposes should be undertaken by the United States itself, the Commission shall not approve any application for [license for] any project affecting such development, but shall ... submit its finding to Congress with such recommendations as it may find appropriate concerning such development." 1/ This is the first of the two opportunities. The FPC, so far as I now know, has never availed itself of this opportunity to initiate public development, but it has endorsed the initiative of other agencies.

The second opportunity relates to the period when an existing license is to expire. "Upon not less than two years' notice in writing from the [Federal Power] Commission the United States shall have the right upon or after the expiration of any license to take over and thereafter to maintain and operate any project ... upon the condition that before taking possession it shall pay the net investment of the licensee ..., not to exceed fair value of the property taken, plus" severance damages.2/ The policy of preserving this right by the Federal government, thus avoiding the less advantageous alternative, namely, recourse to condemnation proceedings,

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1/ 16 U.S.C. 800(b).

2/ 16 U.S.C. 807.

will have no application until the first FPC licenses expire in the 1970's. Under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, licenses shall be issued for a period not exceeding fifty years, but the right to take over can be frustrated by inaction or delay in bringing many existing projects under license, by re-dating existing licenses or issuing, under certain conditions, new licenses for already licensed projects. 1/ The Public Works and Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations is now looking into FPC discretionary policies along these lines that have developed in recent years.

The third element of Federal regulatory electric power policy embodied in law that belongs within the Federal public-cooperative policy group is that providing for certain preferences for public bodies or cooperatives in the granting of leases, permits and/or licenses relating to hydroelectric power. Three situations are distinguished in law to which this preference policy is applicable: (1) lease and/or license of the power privilege or "water power" from a Federal dam; (2) preliminary permit and license of new hydroelectric development; and (3) in certain circumstances, new license for taking over existing non-preference developments when the original license expires. Preference shall be given in these three situations by the FPC only if it is found that the plans of the preferred applicant are "equally well adapted [or shall be made so within a reasonable time] to conserve and utilize in the public interest the water resources of the region" in relation to the plans of another applicant and unless it is found that the development of a water resource for public purposes should be undertaken by the United itself.

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1/ 16 U.S.C. 799.

2/ 16 U.S.C. 800.

Preference is to be given (first situation) to "public bodies and cooperatives" in leasing the power privilege of a Reclamation dam and to "States and municipalities" in the licensing by FPC of "water power" at "any Government dam." 1/ So far as I now know and without intensive checking, the Federal government has never been faced with the problem of giving preference in this situation. 2/

Preference is to be given by FPC (second situation) in the granting of preliminary permits and licenses for new hydroelectric development to "States and municipalities" if and when they exercise the necessary initiative. 3/ This is no doubt the most important preference provision of these three. No measurement of its importance has been made so far as I now know, but presumably it has been of substantial importance since 1952 when a relatively large number of preliminary permits and licenses have been granted.

Lastly (third situation), preference is to be accorded "States and municipalities," if they exercise the required initiative, when new licenses

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1/ 43 U.S.C. 485h(c); 16 U.S.C. 800. The limitation of the preference to "States and municipalities" in section 800 derives from the fact that this was the form of preference in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. The notion of including "cooperatives" in preference clauses did not arise until 1927 when Senator Norris included them in a redraft of his "TVA bill." Since the enactment of the Tennessee Valley Act of 1933 all preference clauses have included cooperatives. Presumably, there is little, if any, difference in meaning between the phrases "States and municipalities" and "public bodies."

2/ In June 1958 Harrison County Rural Electric Membership Corporation No. 89, of Corydon, Indiana, applied to the FPC for a preliminary permit for a hydroelectric powerhouse (80,000 k.w. capacity) to be located on the Ohio River at the proposed U.S. Government Navigation Dam and Lock above Cannelton, Indiana. This application gives the cooperative the right of priority of application, but no preference right (see previous footnote). The application indicates however, that interest in obtaining licenses for the development and use of water power at a Government dam is not dead (see FPC release No.9905, June 24, 1958).

3/ 16 U.S.C. 800 (see previous footnote 1/).



are to be granted in place of expiring licenses of non-preference holders if the United States does not choose to "exercise its right to take over, maintain, and operate the projects..." or to grant renewals to existing licensees. Public bodies or others acquiring existing facilities in this way shall, "before taking possession, pay such amount, and assume such contracts as the United States" would be required to do if it were to take over the project. 1/ Whether this preference right will have substance in the 1970's, just as the right of the United States to take over, will depend upon whether the integrity of the 50 year limit on licenses is maintained by the FPC in the meantime.

The fourth element of Federal regulatory electric power policy embodied in law that belongs within the group of Federal public-cooperative policies relates to atomic power. In licensing atomic developments for the generation of commercial power, the Atomic Energy Commission shall give "preferred consideration to applications for such facilities which will be located in high cost power areas in the United States if there are conflicting applications for a limited opportunity for such license. Where such conflicting applications resulting from limited opportunity for such license include those submitted by public and cooperative bodies, such applications shall be given preferred consideration." 2/ Atomic electric power, however, is still deemed to be in the research as well as pilot and demonstration plant phase of development under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Thus application of the above preference policy with respect to "commercial power" is not technically involved in the current public-cooperative versus private power "who should do what" controversies. Nevertheless, in this phase a cooperative, a municipality,

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1/ 16 U.S.C. 800, 807, and 808.

2/ 42 U.S.C. Supp. IV, 2232(c).

and a public power district are now involved with AEC in the development of experimental atomic power plants at Elk River, Minnesota, Piqua, Ohio, and Omaha, Nebraska, respectively. When atomic power becomes economic for commercial production generally within the United States, it is now difficult to see why there will be "limited opportunity for ... license," calling preference policy into play. <sup>1/</sup> Some day, it can be presumed, there will not be a physical shortage of materials and equipment for commercial atomic power production. Thus the present efforts of cooperatives, municipalities and public power districts to get in on the ground floor of atomic power research and development is understandable and these efforts should be a more significant determinant of their future roles as generating suppliers of electric power than this form of preference policy.

Group B: Federal Regulatory Policies re Private Utilities

Governmental regulatory policies relating to private utilities are very substantially State policies. Municipalities still have a regulatory role, but this role in most States has been reduced very greatly since the advent in 1907 of the State regulatory commission into the field of electric power. Federal regulatory policies, as will be seen below, are limited to particular matters deemed to require regulation that are beyond the scope of State jurisdiction, and to particular matters that are subject to concurrent jurisdiction, but concerning which the Federal government has chosen to "occupy the field." These particular matters are: (1) hydroelectric power development and operation on waters subject to the commerce authority of the Congress, on Federal public

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<sup>1/</sup> This view depends upon certain lay interpretations of law and assumptions regarding future facts with which legal opinion may differ when confronted with the actual facts.

lands, and at Federal government dams; (2) atomic power development and operation; (3) transmission of power over Federal public lands; (4) transmission in interstate and foreign commerce as well as sales at wholesale in interstate commerce; and (5) the organizational and financial management of electric utility holding company systems.

The elements of the first type of activity--hydroelectric power development and operation on waters subject to the commerce authority of Congress, on Federal public lands, and at Government dams--are regulated by the Federal Power Commission in accordance with specific Federal policies embodied in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, as amended. The elements subject to Federal regulation are the following: the undertaking of a proposed development, involving the issue of whether it is "best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways," etc.; provision of certain navigation and fish facilities at licensees expense; the period of construction; charges to cover cost of license administration, for occupancy (if any) of Federal lands, and as an expropriation by the Federal government of "excessive profits" until the States make provision for preventing or expropriating them; payment to the United States or other licensees for headwater and storage benefits; power rates, quality of service, and issuance of securities unless or until the State shall provide for their regulation; as well as the period of the license (50 years), renewal rights, and terms of settlement if no renewal. In addition, the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 authorized the exercise by licensees of the right of eminent domain in Federal courts in the acquisition of required property. 1/ Less than 12 per cent of the total private investor-

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1/ 16 U.S.C. 791-823. The relevant provisions in this citation also relate to hydroelectric development and operation by non-Federal public and cooperative organizations. Only provisions which were considered to be distinctively "public power policy" were treated above, p. 34 to 38.



owned electric capacity of the country is hydroelectric and is thus subject (for the most part) to the above regulation.

The most noteworthy observation to make about these Federal hydroelectric policies is that since 1952 "the partnership policy" of the Eisenhower Administration, plus renewal of non-Federal interest (private and public) in hydroelectric development, has increasingly brought them into use. This was the implicit, though nonetheless clear, intention of that Administration policy. For roughly the previous 20 years, the Federal government had tended to assume as a general rule that non-Federal interests were economically or otherwise incapable of undertaking hydroelectric developments. 1/ The relatively few applications by private utilities for preliminary permits and licenses for generally small developments between 1933 and 1949 may well have been taken as confirmation of that assumption. When non-Federal interest in hydroelectric development tended to increase after 1948, Federal executive policy then tended strongly to oppose licensing of a large proportion of major non-Federal developments through interventions by the Secretary of the Interior in proceedings of the FPC on groups of conflict with Federal development plans and/or injury to fisheries. The position of the Interior Department, taken in its pursuit of the Roanoke Rapids case up through the Supreme Court in the last years of the Truman Administration, is also indicative of a general policy attitude in this regard. 2/ Moreover, the tireless opposition

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1/ See, for example, National Resources Committee's study of 1939: Energy Resources and National Policy.

2/ 345 U.S. 153. The Supreme Court (1952) did not accept the argument that a certain indication of Congressional interest in a river basin plan, short of a clear "authorization" in the usual form for a project, was sufficient to withdraw a dam site from the licensing authority of the FPC. Presumably, if it had, there would have been other sites around the country that could be said to be withdrawn for public development.

since 1950 to private development under FPC license in Hells Canyon is technically based upon the plausible view that 3-dam development is not "best adapted to a comprehensive plan..." etc. But few would deny, I should think, that opposition to private development, even if this were to be the "high dam," is at the heart of the long controversy.

The second type of activity, atomic power development and operation, is regulated by specific policies embodied in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized under this act to license private utilities and others to obtain and possess "utilization or production facilities [e.g., power reactors] involved in the conduct of research and development activities leading to the demonstration of [their] practical value ... for industrial or commercial purposes." In the issuance of these research and development licenses, "priority shall be given to those activities which will ... lead to major advances in the application of atomic energy for industrial and commercial purposes" (e.g., the production of electric power). All AEC licenses to date that relate to power production are of this research type. Special authorization and appropriation of Federal funds, moreover, has been required to promote this research and development. Thus, in the exercise of discretionary power in this phase, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has played an important policy role along with the Atomic Energy Commission. Due to the makeup of the committee (e.g., the inclusion of Chet Holifield, Democratic representative from a district in Los Angeles County) the viewpoint of public-cooperative power policy has not been overlooked.

"Whenever the Commission has made a finding in writing [which it has not done to date] that any type of [power reactor] has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value for industrial or commercial purposes, the Commission

may thereafter issue non-exclusive [commercial] licenses for such type..." Conditions relating to such commercial licenses will include: limitation of licenses to 40 years with possibility of renewal; adherence to health and safety regulations; as well as anti-trust and patent controls. 1/ Except for policies reflected in these conditions and others that are largely technical, and except for "preference policies" in selling output from any Federal plants (42 U.S.C. Supp. IV, 2064) and in licensing (see above, pages 29 and 37, respectively), Federal policies relating to electric power from commercial atomic energy are now to be the same as for electric power generally. "Nothing [in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954] shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale or transmission of electric power." 2/

Transmission of power over Federal public lands, the third type of activity, is Federally regulated primarily under the following provisions of law enacted in 1911: "The head of the department having jurisdiction over the lands is authorized and empowered, under general regulations, to be fixed by him, to grant [without charge] an easement for rights of way, for a period not exceeding 50 years, over, across, and upon public lands, national forests, and reservations of the United States ... for the transmission and distribution of electric power ..." Two conditions attached to this authority deal with lines over national parks and forests, etc., and forfeiture for non-use. 3/ Under

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1/ 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 2132, 2133, 2135, and 2181-2190. These provisions also apply to non-Federal public and cooperative power organizations.

2/ 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 2018 and 2019.

3/ 43 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 961. In addition, there are several special statutes dealing with the granting of rights of way generally, and in particular, parks and forests, etc., in the form of revocable permits. In 16 U.S.C. 797e the FPC is also authorized to grant licenses for transmission on public lands and reservations. Non-Federal public and cooperative organizations are also subject to the provisions relating to easements and permits.



general regulations fixed by him in 1948, the Secretary of the Interior required applicants for power-line rights of way to agree to allow the Federal government to use for a fee any excess capacity in those lines, or increase the capacity of those lines at its expense, to transmit Federal power. This was done to enable the Federal government, when it might so desire in the future, to transmit power to preference customers without itself constructing a duplicate transmission line when it could not negotiate an acceptable wheeling agreement. In 1954, this requirement was removed from "general regulations" by the Acting Secretary of the Interior. Subsequently, this removal was the subject of a Congressional investigation in which contemporary differences over power policy generally were clearly at the root of the controversy. <sup>1/</sup>

The fourth grouping of particular matters is regulated by the Federal Power Commission under law enacted in 1935 and involves, basically: the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy; the mandatory establishment of physical interstate connection of transmission facilities and sale or exchange of energy using these facilities (but only upon application of a State commission or an organization engaged in the business); transmission to and from foreign countries; rates and charges for transmission or sale of electric energy in interstate commerce; and the adequacy of any established interstate service (but only upon complaint of a State commission). Springing from Federal jurisdiction established in connection with the foregoing matters, Federal regulation extends to: the disposal, merger, consolidation, and purchase of

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<sup>1/</sup> See House Report No. 1975, 84th Congress, 2nd session (March 1956). This 13th Intermediate Report of the House Committee on Government Operations deals with "Certain Activities Regarding Power, Department of the Interior (Changes in Power Line Regulations)." Both majority and minority views are presented.

ownership of facilities for transmission and sale of power in interstate commerce; sale of securities and assumption of liabilities, unless such regulation is provided by State law; interlocking directorates and certain activities of officers and directors; and prescription and enforcement of a uniform system of financial accounting. The general policy intention in back of all this regulation is that it is "to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." <sup>1/</sup> No policy controversies appear to exist currently that pertain explicitly to these regulatory matters. The percentage of total private utility electric output in recent years that is involved in this regulation does not appear to be known, but it is believed to be small, certainly less than 20 per cent. Only some 192, out of over 500 private investor-owned utilities, come under this type of FPC jurisdiction, but most of the large utilities in the country are said to be included in the 192. <sup>2/</sup>

And finally, the fifth category of Federal regulation of private activities pertains to the organizational and financial management of electrical utility holding company systems. Federal regulatory policies in this category, as set forth in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, provide in essence for: (1) exemption from "regulation under the act [with or without reorganization] if a holding company system is predominantly intrastate in character," if a holding company is itself predominantly an electric utility operating company "whose operations as such do not extend beyond the State in which it is organized and States contiguous

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<sup>1/</sup> 16 U.S.C. 824-825r. These provisions are not applicable to public bodies (16 U.S.C. 824(f)), but presumably they are applicable, to the extent they are relevant, to cooperatives.

<sup>2/</sup> Source: Federal Power Commission.

thereto," or if other less significant criteria are met; (2) voluntary and involuntary reorganization of a holding company system to meet standards of functional integration (i.e., the supply of electricity or gas, but not both), geographic integration, and corporate simplification; and (3) intensive regulation of companies continuing to be subject to the Act with respect to a substantial number of different types of internal and external financial and other transactions. 1/

The most outstanding net result of the holding company act as of today, and stemming presumably from the existence of the above three policy elements in combination, has been the breaking up of the former corporate agglomerations made notorious by the utility investigations of the late twenties and early thirties. In 1938, when the maximum number of companies were subject to the act, the proportion of the industry subject to the act was very much greater than in recent years. As of June 30, 1957, only 14 electric holding company systems with aggregate net assets of only \$7.0 billion, as compared with \$33.3 billion for all private electric utilities as of December 31, 1956, remained subject to regulation under the act. 2/ In other words, the typical private electric utility system today is one which confines its activities functionally, organizationally, and geographically in such a way as to be exempt from regulation under the criteria of the act. This undoubtedly makes for smaller electric utility systems today than otherwise would be the case. 3/ It suggests, more-

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1/ 15 U.S.C. 79 to 79z-6.

2/ Based on data in 23rd Annual Report, Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, p. 102; and Electrical World, January 28, 1957, p. 129.

3/ Requirements in a number of States regarding domestic incorporation of utilities operating within the boundaries of a State presumably force holding company organization upon many utilities if they want to operate in more than one State. Thus many electric utilities cannot operate in more than one State and also stay out from under the Holding Company Act.



over, at least one important reason why only 7 out of 55 additions by private companies to steam-plant capacity (in units above 4,000 kw) were in units of more than 200,000 kw in 1957--a time when technological advance had brought us to the point where steam units with the least cost per kilowatthour were in excess of 200,000 kw and advances in electric transmission have kept pace.<sup>1/</sup> For "small systems," large least-unit-cost additions to their capacity (steam or hydro) are not economically feasible. This fact is at least one reason why the Idaho Power Company proposed to build in Hells Canyon three dams over a period of several years instead of one dam at once. <sup>2/</sup> This fact is also the underlying reason for the cooperative scheme for making larger unit additions (over 100,000 kw) to their combined steam-capacity by four electric utilities in Connecticut than any one of them acting alone would find economic. These four companies do not come under the holding company act. They appear to be cooperating in this fashion, rather than operating through a joint subsidiary, in order to make certain that they do not come under the act. <sup>3/</sup>

Together with an unwillingness to come under SEC jurisdiction with respect to the holding company act, a desire to make large hydroelectric projects in the Pacific Northwest feasible for private utility development is back of current efforts to add to the criteria of exemption in the act. The proposed vehicle

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<sup>1/</sup> Data derived from Edison Electric Institute, 22nd Semi-Annual Electric Power Survey, October 1957, Appendix II, pp. 28ff; and testimony of Dr. Maurice R. Scharff at hearings on S. 2643 by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, pp. 84-92.

<sup>2/</sup> See John V. Krutilla and Otto Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development (Published for Resources for the Future, Inc., by the Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958), pp. 152-159.

<sup>3/</sup> See statement of Austin D. Barney, Chairman of the board of directors, Hartford Electric Light Company included in hearings on S. 2643 by a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Congress, 2nd session (1956), pp. 471-474.

is the Pacific Northwest Power Company, a joint subsidiary for power generation of four operating public utilities not now under the holding company act which serve over 770,000 customers in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. <sup>1/</sup> In the current Federal power policy stalemate, the Pacific Northwest Power Corporation (via amendment to the never-amended Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935) and the Columbia River Development Corporation (via creation by Federal statute as currently proposed by the Pacific Northwest Public Power Association) are both looking forward to becoming the chosen instrument (in place of present diverse and complicated means) for carrying out future hydro-electric development in the Pacific Northwest and for bearing the burden of "public utility responsibility" for much, if not all, the region.

The most atypical electric utility, the American Electric Company (a holding company system with net assets of \$1.2 billion as of December 31, 1956 and operating in seven eastern and middle western states), does not appear to share the typical reluctance to be regulated under the holding company act in its present form. Moreover, it is very interesting to note, it is the private electric utility that, along with TVA, is doing the nation's most

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<sup>1/</sup> See statement of John E. Corrette, President, Montana Power Company on behalf of companies owning Pacific Northwest Power Company included in hearings on S. 2643 by the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 2nd session (1956), pp. 224-252. Aside, apparently, from a general unwillingness of private electric utilities generally to be regulated under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, specific reasons appear to relate to an unwillingness to give up present gas distribution subsidiaries and to meet certain standards of financial structure as the SEC would require. An unwillingness to be incorporated in the state of principal business on the part of some utilities also appears to hinder development of a multi-state systems with continued exemption from the Public Utility Holding Company Act (see testimony of SEC Chairman Armstrong, William Gilman, and other testimony generally in hearings on S. 2643).

outstanding job in making additions to steam capacity in very large "lease-unit-cost" plants (e.g., 450,000 kw).

Expansion of electric power capacity via additions within a system of plants, both hydro and non-hydro, at least-total-unit-cost is clearly desirable, at least on grounds of economic efficiency. Much is made publicly of the desirability of optimum development of hydroelectric potentials, for example, in debates on development of Hells Canyon. But little public cognizance is given to the apparent fact that current additions to non-hydro capacity are not optimal and that these additions in total are quantitatively much more important than hydro additions can be in the provision of power supply. Neither political party can really be said to be seized with this issue. To be so would involve consideration of changes in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and all other factors involved in the determination of the size of utility systems. And this, it would appear, neither party is anxious to do. 1/

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1/ In this connection, it is interesting to note the great current concern in the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs over the projected rate of hydroelectric and other water development in the Soviet Union and Red China in comparison to that in the United States. (See "Relationship of River and Related Water Resource Development Programs of the United States, Soviet Russia, and [Red] China," Memorandum of the Chairman to members of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, December 20, 1957; printed for use of the committee by the U.S. Government Printing Office.) If this great concern, as related to hydroelectric power, were focused upon optimum economic efficiency in non-hydro power development, it would be focused upon a problem, whose solution would presumably make a greater contribution to relative U.S. economic strength than maximizing development generally in the United States of remaining hydroelectric potentials.



A New and Better Modus Vivendi?

Given all these existing Federal policies, what policy schemes are there to propose which might provide a new and better modus vivendi than that of the present? What schemes are there which might be able to break the present stalemate and realize at least some of the substantial objectives, noted above, pages 16 and 17, which are frustrated by the existing situation?

If Albert Lepawsky is right (and I believe he is) that public power is here to stay, it can be said with at least equal certainty that so is private investor-owned utility power! <sup>1/</sup> Thus, the relevant policy problem is to discover a practical policy scheme that will provide this new and better modus vivendi. It is not to plot strategy and tactics on either side for the obliteration of the other.

There may well be several policy schemes that political scientists and others could formulate which, even if only vaguely and tentatively at first, might ultimately be considered technically feasible and within the "ball park" of political practicality. My intention here in the conclusion of this paper is briefly: to introduce historically, to outline, and to ask certain basic questions of one such scheme. This one, the fundamentals of which were thought out in the twenties and were apparently considered but rejected in the early New Deal period, has an all but forgotten history. Recently, it has been revived, put within the framework of his own thinking, and publicly promoted by Leland Olds, member and sometime chairman of the Federal Power Commission (1939-1949) and

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<sup>1/</sup> Albert Lepawsky, "Why Public Power is Here to Stay," The Reporter, October 6, 1955.

strong advocate of cheap All Electric Living.<sup>1/</sup> Because Mr. Olds is known favorably as "Mr. Public Power" in certain circles, this no doubt makes his views highly suspect in others. But this certainly should not stop all those seriously concerned with Federal Electric Power Policy from independent consideration of the fundamentals of this policy scheme which, as it came forth in 1926, would appear to have been an even-handed attempt at dealing with what has been called here the core issue.

During World War I (in marked contrast with World War II) there was a very serious problem of electrical supply. This manifested itself on a map in pockmarks of power shortages and gluts which could not then be readily eliminated through interconnection, long distance transmission, and provision of large-areal reserve supplies. After that war this problem came up for serious technical and public investigation and discussion. In 1921, "A Super-power System for the Region Between Boston and Washington" was published by the Geological Survey. Creation of private-utility "Super-power" systems became the public response of private industry to the public problem--a response which materialized in the great holding company empires having their greatest growth during the decade of the twenties. Also in public response, but probably even more in response to not unfounded fears of economic obsolescence, the municipal public power movement (spearheaded nationally by the Public Ownership League with headquarters in Chicago) held a "Public Super-Power Conference" in Washington in 1924. As a result of that conference, Senator Norris of Nebraska and Congressman Oscar K. Keller of Minnesota introduced bills into Congress providing for Federal involvement with municipal power enterprises, proposed State public power

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<sup>1/</sup> See, for example, "Giant Power for the American People", speech at Western States Water and Power Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, May 11, 1957.

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districts, and other public power projects in a national publicly-owned "super-power system.

At that time and subsequently "public power district" legislation was being vigorously pushed in many State legislatures, typically by statewide organizations known as the League of (Wisconsin) Municipalities. Ontario Hydro (Canada) a public system with its well publicized low rates, was a vivid inspiration, if not an exact model, for this movement which was propelled by increasing disenchantment with State regulatory commissions on the part of Progressive Republicans and Democrats who still drew upon the political heritage of Populism. Even Senator Robert LaFollette, who fathered the Wisconsin regulatory commission into being in 1907, switched to the fostering of public power in the early twenties. "Progressives" then and since have been split between those for public power, those for direct regulation of private power, and those-- in effect-- for both.

The Norris-Keller sponsored bills, giving national publicity to a public counter-proposal to private "super-power," was no doubt politically and otherwise premature as potential legislation. But there can be little doubt that there was substantial political support in the Congress during the twenties for municipal public power, for Federal public hydro-electric power, and for bringing electricity to the farm. In the usual crediting of the New Deal with bringing about TVA, it tends to be forgotten that Norris' TVA bills passed the Congress and failed to become law only because of Presidential vetoes in 1928 and again in 1931.



It was in this environment of emerging State and Federal action on the side of public power that Gifford Pinchot, then Progressive-Republican governor of Pennsylvania, and Morris Llewellyn Cooke came forth in 1926 with their Report of the Giant Power Survey Board. Their policy scheme, designed for Pennsylvania, was conceptually different from both private or public "super-power." It was a combination of both. This is what might have been expected from Pinchot--a man who at the national level had pushed strongly for regulation as embodied in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 under the banner of Conservation, who had studiously avoided becoming identified with public power (until the 1940's), and who had published a polemic in 1920 entitled: "The Power Monopoly."

The essence of the scheme was this: The function of power supply was to be broken up into its three components--generation, transmission, and distribution; any one private utility was to be licensed to engage in only one of these functions; and distribution was to be undertaken by municipalities, by "mutual companies," or by private investor-owned utilities--as local voters might see fit. Two key policies were to animate this structure and enable it to handle the technico-economic and political realities of the times. First, emphasis in licensing generation and transmission utilities was to

be placed upon "giant power," that is: large steam generating units of maximum efficiency located on top of coal mines; optimum development of hydro-electric potential; and systematic, basic, high-voltage transmission grids connecting generating plants with distribution facilities at appropriate load centers. Second, the wholesale rate to be charged distributors was to be publicly regulated and was to be nondiscriminatory as between the three different types of distributing organizations that were recognized to exist within the State.

Many of the elements of Pinchot's Giant Power scheme (but somewhat vaguely) found their way in a federalized form into the Report of the Mississippi Valley Committee of the Public Works Administration (1934).<sup>1/</sup> This is not surprising inasmuch as Morris Llewellyn Cooke was chairman of that committee. But here in this Cooke report the Giant Power approach to total power supply--private, public and cooperative--appears to stop. By 1935 the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the laws relating to Federal regulation of transmission and sale in interstate commerce had become Federal policy. And, as has been noted above (pp. 43 to 48), these tended to maximize the role of State regulation, minimize the role of Federal regulation, and be one important factor, at least, in the encouragement of "small" private utility systems. It would appear that the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, which is predominantly an association of State Commissioners, played a very important role in cutting down what attempts that

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<sup>1/</sup> Report of the Mississippi Valley Committee of the Public Works Administration, October 1934 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office), pp. 43-53.

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were made to enlarge the span of Federal power regulation over that which then became law. The Association apparently resolved in the early twenties not to let jurisdiction over electric power get out of State hands as had much of railroad regulation in the Transportation Act of 1920. It has maintained this position ever since.<sup>1/</sup>

After this effort to increase Federal regulating responsibility and other contemporary experiences (e.g., the public-private power fight in the TVA area), developments in New Deal and Fair Deal electric power policy pertained solely to public power and rural electrification largely through co-operatives, with a major emphasis upon an increasing role for Federal public power generation and transmission. The Eisenhower Administrations have attempted to reverse the direction of this Federal role by promoting partnership deals which short circuit preference policy. They have sought to replace the hopes and expectations of non-Federal public bodies and cooperatives of increasing Federal financial aid and supplies of cheap power, and thus decreasing this current substantial dependency upon private utilities for wholesale supplies at what many consider high rates, with the prospect of lessening Federal support and increasing dependence upon private utilities for wholesale supplies. This prospect, by and large, has not proved to be acceptable to many, including those most directly involved. Stalemate in policy development, as has been noted, is the order of the day.

The skeleton of a Federalized Giant Power scheme, for breaking this stalemate,

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<sup>1/</sup> Edward Walter Smykay, "The National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners as the Originators and Promoters of Public Policy for Utilities" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1955).

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- A. Separation of the functions of generation, transmission, and distribution into separate groups of enterprises. Usually, but not always, these functions are united at present in each private electric utility. This is not so to the same extent in non-Federal public and cooperative enterprise. This provision implies substantial breaking-up of the present vertical integrations and some recombination into horizontal integrations with respect to generation and transmission facilities - all to be accomplished by appropriate transition arrangements. That such public re-structuring of an industry, although clearly drastic, is not unprecedented in American experience is indicated by the following: the actions that have been taken under the Public Utility Holding Company Act since 1935; the public divorcement of certain functions from Transamerica Corporation and The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company; the public replacement of private monopoly in the aluminum industry by a private oligopoly; and other actions that have been taken under the anti-trust laws.
- B. Federal licensing of development and operation, as well as regulation of rates, etc., of virtually all private and any other power generation. Presumably there would be some low level of maximum generation that could be undertaken in certain circumstances that would not involve Federal license or regulation.
- C. Federal regulation, and/or Federal ownership and operation, of several regional inter-connected transmission systems. Whatever the number of such systems which would provide optimum efficiency in some appropriate sense, this number would no doubt be much smaller than the appropriate number of separate generating enterprises (each composed, presumably, of several generating plants) which would supply each transmission system.
- D. State jurisdiction over distribution systems. Presumably, such jurisdiction would involve a system for the making of public decisions of choice between public, cooperative, and private-utility distribution for areas within a state as well as rate and other regulation with respect to private utility distribution as is the general rule at present.
- E. Federal regulation of wholesale rates charged all distributors, without discrimination on the basis of organizational type (i.e., public, cooperative, or private). This is obviously a key provision. Without it, the substantial interests of non-Federal public bodies and cooperatives would not be adequately recognized and generally met.
- F. Development and operation of public and private hydro-electric power and, possibly, some public atomic power. A number of important considerations (e.g., the desirability of unified public hydraulic management of a river basin, Federal fiscal policy, and risk-taking in technological advance) could be taken into account in each specific decision in this regard. Such decisions, however, would be a matter of indifference to particular distributors in view of (E), above. Presumably this would make a sharp difference in the environment of decision-making regarding public versus private development over that which prevails at present.

Questions for Consideration

Would this basic scheme be acceptable to non-federal public and cooperative power interests? More specifically, would a non-discriminatory Federally regulated wholesale rate for power satisfy what these interests really want out of power policy?

Would it be acceptable (assuming appropriate transition arrangements) to private utilities, interested in making lowest unit-cost additions to capacity, but frustrated by the fact that such additions currently would provide increments to their capacity that for them are uneconomic?

Would it be acceptable to the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners?

Would it enable the substantial objectives (noted above, pages and ) to be realized?

Would it be desirable in the context of the general problem of Federalism today?

Would it be desirable public policy? <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> In bringing this scheme to the attention of the panel for discussion, the author is not thereby recommending it. Leaving aside questions of acceptability, he feels that one should have the benefit of more research on substantive matters having a bearing on the scheme before committing oneself to it. In particular, (1) a comprehensive and objective appraisal is needed of the experience of municipalities and cooperatives in buying power at wholesale from private investor-owned utilities before one should take a position recommending drastic policy change on the assumption that the experience has been very bad; (2) Federal policy in the form of the Public Utility Holding Company Act is no doubt only one reason why private utility systems stay "small" and generally add less than optimum sized units to their systems - thus all reasons need to be studied as a basis for considering a policy change; and (3) some sort of an estimate should be made indicating the annual real cost difference to the Nation between the present electrical supply set-up and an hypothetical optimum, efficient capacity so that one could judge whether the difference is worth the effort to bring about policy changes.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE:  
SOME CRITICAL DETERMINANTS OF PROPOSED  
METROPOLITAN SOLUTIONS

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

The purpose of this paper is to investigate some of the critical determinants of the structure of metropolitan government. There are two ways by which such an examination might proceed. The first approach is to classify metropolitan areas according to significant categories of social, economic, or governmental characteristics and then to determine whether pertinent differentia call for a particular type of governmental arrangement. This approach, of course, would assume from the beginning that there is a nexus between metropolitan government structure and "objective" characteristics. There have already been some generalizations of this type. For example, it is said that the county can easily be converted into a metropolitan government in those SMA's that cover only one county.

The second approach may be more profitable. I propose to consider what some of the more recent metropolitan surveys have actually taken to be the critical determinants of the governmental devices they have proposed. Upon what metropolitan characteristics have these researchers placed the most stress? What values seem to be implicit in their work? What images of the metropolitan area do these studies evoke - images of both the present metropolitan area and the metropolitan area structurally reorganized according to their proposals?

If this approach is valid, it may be illuminating for two reasons. First, we may gain insight about the nature of this increasingly common activity called "metropolitan study". Secondly, we may return to the assumption of a nexus between metropolitan characteristics and particular governmental devices with more chance of success in seeing what universals, if any, exist.

I.

There are a few preliminary observations and assumptions that should be made explicit. A rather important one is that there are at least four ways of analyzing the characteristics of a metropolitan area, or, to put it another way, that there are four models of the modern metropolis. We can view it as a system for the production of goods and services (an economic model), a system of neighborhoods, group relationships, and values (a sociological model), a system of urban land uses (a physical model), and a system of public services and political relationships (a governmental model). There are also important connections between these



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models. The social values that Americans apparently attach to space and privacy are reflected in both the distribution of land uses and the public policies of local governments. These same public policies also influence the way in which economic enterprise is distributed in the metropolitan area. Each of the four systems is affected by changes in any one system.

An important factor in the metropolitan complex is the existence of a great deal of conflict. While we may recognize the interdependence that creates the conditions favorable to the growth of large urban clusters, it would be unrealistic to deny that there are important conflicts in the goals held by a number of groups. In addition to the traditional division between central city and suburbs, groups whose economic interests depend upon the prosperity of different parts of the metropolitan area vie against one another. The increase in the nonwhite population of metropolitan centers, especially in the northeastern region, has added another element of social discord. And the probability that conflicting goals will be expressed has been increased in recent years by the development and invention of new public services and regulations. The choice of public housing sites can keep a big city in turmoil, as it has in Chicago and Philadelphia. Zoning can be used, and is being used, to segregate income groups, and to generate a neomercantilist competition among governmental jurisdictions.

The third observation I wish to make is one that will be investigated throughout the rest of this paper. It is the hypothesis that a difference in size is a difference in kind, insofar as devising governmental structures is concerned. John D. Corcoran, who has been involved in a number of metropolitan surveys, has recently distinguished two approaches to the problem of metropolitan government. One, which is exemplified by the Miami, Houston, Sacramento, and Nashville studies, is characterized by lower study costs, by proposals to change the structure of government, and by the involvement of public officials. The other approach, which is usually quite costly, places more emphasis upon the economic and social characteristics of the metropolitan area than upon local government reform. The studies are broader and deeper, and are usually citizen-oriented efforts. Mr. Corcoran mentions the St. Louis, Dayton, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Kansas City studies as examples of this second approach.<sup>1</sup>

The interesting thing about this analysis is that, with the single exception of Dayton, the metropolitan areas in which the second approach has been used are among the very largest in the United States, while the areas in which the study emphasis has been almost wholly upon new governmental structures are among the small and medium-sized Standard Metropolitan Areas. In short, the research in the smaller areas has been grounded on the assumption that the governmental model of the metropolis is the only model worth studying intensively. In the large areas, the other models receive much more attention. If we treat these contrasting approaches as phenomena, rather than pass judgment upon them, we may advance our understanding of both the unique requirements of the larger areas and the reasons why governmental reform is met with either massive indifference or suspicion.

James C. Coke

**METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE:  
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One final caveat is in order before we turn to the governmental metropolis of the metropolitan surveys. This is the problem of whether to take the emphases and methods of the written reports at face value. Undoubtedly in most surveys, which are cooperative ventures involving several groups, a great deal of negotiation has taken place before the formal report is written. However, in the absence of direct knowledge and experience, I am afraid that we can do no more than treat the written materials as the best available evidence.

**II.**

Let us look, first of all, at the attitude of the surveys toward the community, as distinct from the corporate area. The most common image of the metropolitan area that we receive from the surveys is that the area is a social and economic unity. Although it is divided into a number of governments, it is really one community. In some cases, the existence of communitas is simply posited, or it is assumed from the fact that the Census Bureau classifies the area as an SMA. In others, the area is proven to be a "unity" by adducing evidence of interaction, particularly between the central city and the suburbs. We are reminded that there is a great deal of commuting and of physical mobility for other purposes, such as recreation and cultural attractions. The surveys make much of population increase, particularly outside the central city. Sometimes the impression is given that the suburbs receive these new residents from the central city, or, to change the metaphor and use the descriptive British phrase, that the rapid suburban increase is an "overspill" from the core city.

But all that this type of analysis proves is that the modern metropolis exists and grows because of increasing specialization of labor. It establishes no necessary connection between the economic and social metropolis and the structure of local government. The mere existence of interaction does not inevitably call for a general political relationship; the method no more justifies a government than a statement that, since a number of businessmen ride the Broadway Limited, New York and Chicago should have some sort of common government. The usual methods of the surveys establish few connections between the various models of the metropolitan area.

If interaction is to be an argument for governmental change, so that the community and the corporate area more closely correspond, it would appear that the investigation should show that interaction of a certain type or in certain amounts establishes an interdependence for purposes of public policy decision-making. From what we can see so far, this is partially the reason why the studies in the larger areas draw upon social science research competence other than public administration and political science. Two aspects of the St. Louis survey, for example, are interesting from this point of view. One is the study of a manufacturing operation that showed to what extent employment and economic activity throughout the area depended upon this single operation. The other is the rather sophisticated method used to demonstrate a type of social unity throughout the metropolitan area. The techniques of social area analysis developed by Shevky and Bell were



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applied to both the central city and the suburbs, and the results showed that both parts contained an equally wide range of social characteristics. Instead of postulating similarity and minimizing conflict, which surveys in the smaller metropolitan areas tend to do, the St. Louis survey comes to grips with the contradictory type of unity-in-diversity that metropolitan areas seem to reveal.

Although the Philadelphia study is not yet underway, the prospectus envisions two types of research: "applied" research about governmental problems, and "basic" research about the economic and social characteristics of the area. The fact that the two are distinguished indicates once more an implicit concern that the various models of the metropolis be designed to illuminate each other.

### III.

The second aspect of the surveys that we should look at is the attitude toward political participation. This is closely related to the attitude toward the community. As one report states, the metropolitan area "has a common history, common social and economic interests, similar political characteristics, and a similar set of long-range goals". In many reports, we find that the individual is said to be only an important unit of political action. Living in an unreconstructed metropolitan area, the individual citizen is "frustrated" because there is no vehicle for "area-wide decision-making". However, he would be able to express an area-wide viewpoint if only the organization existed through which to speak.

This attitude indicates that the written reports proceed from holistic premises; they seem to assume that simple congruities can be established among all of the elements of the metropolitan complex. Lewis Mumford states that citizens must decide whether they want schools or cloverleaves, or, more basically, babies or automobiles. Some metropolitan surveys say that not only must citizens decide, but they can decide. There is a tendency to reify the metropolitan area: it can "speak with one voice".

Behind these exhortations lie certain assumptions: (1) there are matters which require area-wide control, (2) the residents of a metropolitan area are substantially and continually exercised about such matters, (3) the residents are aware of alternative courses of action, and (4) there are in fact no modes of action through which these matters are being agitated. However, there is evidence that casts some doubt upon the validity of these assumptions. We know, for example, that when people do perceive a problem, they quite often pose it in terms outside a metropolitan frame-of-reference. Quite often the problem is related to the dwelling, or to the small neighborhood. And this should not be surprising. Studies conducted in housing research at Cornell show that most people establish a pattern of living according to narrow paths between primary focal points of activity: home, work, shopping area, school, church, etc. Since they rarely stray from these paths, their attitudes are conditioned by the circumscribed nature of their contacts and experiences. Therefore, many people live in a metropolitan area, but they are not of it. The larger the metropolitan area, the more disparate individual attitudes and interests are likely to be.



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We may also question the assumption that there are no important methods by which problems that involve two or more coordinate local governments are agitated. Some of the formal reports do not deal with interjurisdictional problem-solving at all; others discuss only the special districts or authorities that have been created to meet special needs. After reading some reports, one feels that they have been victimized by their own assumption that local government is "Balkanized". One intuitively recognizes that in a metropolitan area common problems are met in several ways. There are a great many surrogates for metropolitan government.

In the Philadelphia area, for example, there are literally hundreds of interjurisdictional agreements, covering a wide variety of functional fields. The over-all pattern of these agreements may not be particularly neat, but it has prevented crisis. Sewage disposal agreements, fugitive search plans, and police radio networks serving several governments have pretty well taken care of those germs and criminals that recognize no municipal boundaries. State agencies like the department of health, the sanitary water board, and the department of highways sometimes prove more appreciative of "area-wide considerations" than the "frustrated" citizens of the area do. The political leaders in the area seem to be willing to erase municipal boundary lines for certain common purposes, although, it must be admitted, they sometimes do this at their peril.

Here, again, we can observe some difference between the study attitudes in the largest areas and in the smaller ones. In the former, there is much more hesitation about drawing up brave new schemes of metropolitan government without first investigating the reasons for the fact that things do get done and the metropolitan system keeps functioning, not only as a viable economic structure but also as a system of local government services. This, I think, is the significance of the approach that Geddes Rutherford took in his study of administrative problems in the Washington, D. C., area, and of the discrete, functional studies that the Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission is now conducting. Similarly, the Study Commission of the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area made its primary objective that of investigating through functional studies the extent to which local governments have the capacity to cooperate in meeting their common problems.

Holistic premises are reflected in the treatment of metropolitan area planning, as well as in the political motivations of the citizen. Almost every metropolitan survey concludes that there is a self-contained geographic unit for purposes of planning, and that planning for any smaller territory can be neither comprehensive nor effective. This concern goes quite beyond such simple matters as making sure that the centerlines of major streets strike a municipal boundary line at the same point; it is grounded, too, on the belief that an over-all plan of land uses can be formulated, and that reference to this over-all plan can remove the inconsistencies that arise from segmental planning of utility and transportation systems. Two surveys recommend that municipal zoning be required to conform with the metropolitan plan.

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This appears to be an extension of the older master plan concept to the metropolitan area. It flies in the face of the fact that this type of general planning does not seem to be prevalent in our largest cities, and is even less prevalent in our big metropolitan areas. No more than three or four large cities have master plans of land uses. It is interesting to speculate why reality is so far from the planners' article of faith. Does there exist a sufficient consensus on values in the largest areas in order to produce master plans? Or, though the consensus of values may exist, does the master plan try to accomplish too many purposes?

IV.

The third aspect of the metropolitan surveys to which I want to call attention is their attitude toward governmental services. This is particularly important for a reason quite significant for purposes of this paper; much of the criticism of metropolitan study approaches has been a criticism of functionalism. As Robert C. Wood has written about the main body of local government research, "the emphasis was not toward a consideration of the capacity to govern... Rather, it was oriented toward need, that is toward the way in which the capacity to act was exercised, the removing of deficiencies in all sorts of services, from police protection to planning."<sup>2</sup>

There has undoubtedly been a strong element of this kind of analysis in all metropolitan surveys. But, again, I think it is possible to ascertain certain significant differences in attitude that distinguish the very large from the smaller metropolitan areas. In the latter areas, studies have generally assumed that varying service levels and major gaps in services are, per se, problems. The criteria of adequacy tend to be a double standard for each discrete service: one uniform standard for all local governments with urban land uses, and another, lower standard for all local governments with rural populations. In the smaller areas, the surveys consider the level of services within the jurisdiction that provides them as the most important factor. In this sense, many surveys are really studies of urban government, not metropolitan government.

As the size of the metropolitan area increases, it becomes more and more difficult to view services in this way. The largest areas have governmental jurisdictions with wide variations in population density, and with equally varying demands and needs for governmental services. Therefore, there is a tendency in studies of these areas to accept variations in some services, but to judge the adequacy of others by considerations relating to the metropolitan area as a whole. Usually the criteria are more related to the economic and sociological models of the metropolis than to an administrative model. In his description of the St. Louis survey, Thomas Eliot made two perceptive comments: "Any measurement of adequacy must follow, not precede, the decision to render unto the metropolis those things that are metropolitan... The Survey put greatest weight on adequacy when failure to render services adequately would clearly and immediately harm the whole City-County area."<sup>3</sup>



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I shall return to the matter of governmental services later in the paper, but I think it is worthwhile to note here the very common assumption that, as the PAS study of Sacramento puts it, "local government was created to do a job".

V.

The last major aspect of the metropolitan surveys that I wish to develop here is the attitude toward the fiscal capacity of local government. On this point there is virtual unanimity that local finance is in a bad way. Central cities have a deteriorating physical plant; suburbs must stand the burden of financing costly new capital improvements. All of this must be accomplished principally through the property tax, which becomes increasingly inadequate. Studies of the Philadelphia area show that the intuitive resistance of suburban areas to population growth (or, more accurately, to the "wrong kind" of growth) is justified, for, on the average, a municipality can expect only a 9% increase in market value per capita to accompany a 10% increase in population density.

In fields of metropolitan research and action other than political science, fiscal considerations are becoming more prominent. The whole area of cost-revenue analysis has received great attention in recent years. Some of this work has been done in connection with annexation proposals. Some has been designed to assist municipalities in deciding what kind of industry is most acceptable, or in zoning for the proper type of residential development. It is a popular article of faith that a dwelling, the value of which is below a critical break-even point, does not pay its way for municipal services. There is an interesting parallel here between the efforts of political scientists to distinguish area-wide functions from local functions (or aspects of functions) and the dilemmas in cost-revenue studies of deciding what service costs to allocate to the individual house and what costs to allocate to the whole community.

All studies are agreed that local finance is a serious problem. What, then, is their conception of a "fair" tax system? The proposed governmental structures are all different in detail, but from a fiscal point of view, they can be roughly categorized by three major types. The first is a form of federation through creation of a new area-wide governmental unit, as in Toronto, St. Louis, and Miami. The second is city-county consolidation with the added feature of tax differentials for parts of the consolidated area that receive different levels of service. This is the hallmark of the Baton Rouge, Nashville, and Sacramento plans. The third is a division of functions between the city and the county, which was adopted by Atlanta.

The point worth noting is that all three of these alternatives mean about the same to the property taxpayer. In all, the underlying rationale combines the benefits-received and costs-incurred principles of taxation. The citizen pays for the services he receives at his residence. Insofar as possible, he subsidizes no one else. The proposals do not differ concerning the basic principle; they may only disagree in judging what services benefit the whole area and should be a charge against all residents.



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The curious thing about this benefit principle of financing local government is that it tends to belie the avowals that the metropolitan area is a unity - one community with shared common goals. If people really believed that they were partners in this kind of community, then they would not object to paying for services that they did not directly receive. The benefit to the one who pays would be no less real for being indirect.

VI.

If the attitude toward equity in taxation appears to contradict the attitudes toward the natural community and toward political participation, we may begin to understand what the proposals for local government reform purport to do. Therefore, let us pause for a moment and reconsider the nature of this activity called metropolitan study. The primary characteristic of the metropolitan area is conflict. Economic and social groups pursue a great number of ends, not all of which can be realized. If metropolitan study is to be productive of results in this kind of a contradictory complex of human activities, its methods must constitute a good strategy. The situation is analagous to the conditions of the theory of games, and the term "strategy" has the same meaning as in the theory of games. The methods of metropolitan study should be designed to maximize the minimum number of ends that can be attained, no matter what the effect of the uncontrollable factors.

I take it that any metropolitan study is an integral part of the ongoing political process of the metropolitan area in which it is being conducted. Those who are involved in the study are trying to create change in existing reality; they must view their work as a plan for a course of action. Their strategy, then, must consist of two parts. First, since the metropolitan area contains groups with conflicting ends, the proposals must provide a basis for the bargaining that is the necessary prelude to any action. But bargaining is not the whole process. We realize that in a metropolitan area the "stockpile of incentives" that can be traded to produce common action is not large. Indeed, the larger the area, the smaller this stockpile seems to be. Therefore, the second part of the strategy is to reduce the area subject to bargaining as much as possible. It is important to discover the shared ends upon which the actors can base their actions. In short, the methods and recommendations of metropolitan study accomplish two purposes: they increase communication in order to show that there are in fact shared, common goals, and they furnish the basis for bargaining.

This, then, is the basis for the values that are manifest in the written study reports. The attitudes toward the natural community and toward political participation are the efforts to adduce the existence of common goals and to increase communication. At the risk of oversimplification, I think we often get from the printed page the following picture of the smaller metropolitan area: it is one community that would be able to express a consistent set of common goals, were it not for the existence of artificial boundary lines of local government units. These goals are shared in common by individual residents of the area, but fractionated government keeps these goals submerged. If area-wide institutions can be created, the result will be a tremendous unleashing of civic interest and participation.

This may be an unrealistic picture for the small metropolitan areas; it is certainly unrealistic for the largest ones. In the latter, it is simply not a good strategy. This is why the surveys in the large areas are more tentative about the unity they find in the area, and why they use more

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sophisticated techniques for demonstrating the type of unity that does exist. The holistic overtones of the picture are, in my mind, the most objectionable, but there may be an element of calculation in them, as well. The folklore of rationality in public decision-making seems to be a strong element in American society.

The attitudes toward governmental services and toward fiscal capacity partake of both elements of the strategy. On the one hand, the measures of adequacy point to the fact that people who live in an urban setting all have a common interest in a certain quality of service. On the other hand, the proposals for governmental reform hold out the inducement that people who need services can have them, and have them more abundantly.

In the treatment of fiscal considerations, the surveys have used several methods to find a common basis upon which groups might base action. One of the more important ones is the result of the fact that suburban tax rates are rapidly approaching the central city's rates. Accordingly, several surveys, including the studies of St. Louis and Sacramento, have compared the property taxes or costs of services for a "standard house" located in several parts of the area. This tends to show that there are no tax advantages in suburban living. It is part of the you're-all-in-the-same-boat argument, and therefore attempts to show the existence of shared ends. The proposals for financing the new governmental devices make up the inducements for bargaining.

To sum up, the ostensible determinants of proposed governmental solutions appear to be grounded on some principles that are assumed to apply to all metropolitan areas, not just to the particular area being studied. These determinants are (1) geographical, in that the new device should coincide as closely as possible with the natural community, which is defined in terms of physical interaction, (2) political, in that the proposed change should give voice to the organismic public interest of the natural community, and (3) administrative, in that the new structure should extend adequate urban services with the advantages of scale, professionalism, and lower unit costs.

However, if the analysis of the nature of metropolitan study is valid, it should be clear that the real determinants must constitute a good strategy, and to constitute a good strategy, they must be realistic in terms of the political process of the metropolitan area. As Thomas Eliot maintains, there is only an apparent conflict between the ideal and the politically feasible.<sup>4</sup>

It was mentioned before that the ostensible determinants are not a good strategy for the large metropolitan area, for the picture does not accord with much of the evidence we have about conditions in such areas. There is another reason why metropolitan surveys in large areas have been hesitant about advancing thoroughgoing governmental reform, and have emphasized non-governmental analysis. This is the difficulty of calculating what effect a change in local government structure would have upon the economic and social structure of the area.



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VII.

How, then, can the problem of government in the largest areas be approached, if both the methods and recommendations of surveys of smaller areas seem inappropriate? I think we can gain some insight about the matter if we return to the problem of governmental services with a different perspective. Let us look at services, not from an administrative standpoint, but from the perspective of (1) economic development, and (2) the physical growth of the metropolis.

However, we should first establish some more definite dividing point between "large" and "small" metropolitan areas. Britton Harris states that "at some point around a population of 500,000, the city of today becomes a metropolis and has 'metropolitan' problems. Economically, these problems are associated with growth, in relation to the functions which sustain that growth... These underlying difficulties arise out of size and growth, and will always be present in a dynamic metropolitan area, regardless of its governmental organization".<sup>5</sup>

All metropolitan areas show concern with the prosperity of their economic base, and the methods of attracting new industry. The surveys seem acutely sensitive to the need for receiving a fair share of expected national economic growth. In fact, this is often used as an argument for changing the governmental structure.

The base-service method has been applied to the metropolitan economy in a number of areas. In its classic formulation this method assumes that the industries that sell goods and services outside the study area are basic, in that these transactions bring money into the area with which the residents purchase services. While there have been criticisms of this method on several points, Hans Blumenfeld has raised the most pertinent objection for our purposes. Blumenfeld points out that, the larger the area, the less important are the basic industries in explaining population growth, and the more the residents of the area prosper through "taking in each other's washing". In the large areas there is natural process of industrial growth.

The prerequisite for the operation of this natural process is the availability of business services of sufficiently high quality. Therefore, the business services, which include public services like highways, water supply, and education, become the truly "basic" activities in the large metropolitan areas. If they are attended to, industrial expansion will take care of itself.<sup>6</sup>

There is some corroboration of this argument in the Philadelphia area, for there has not been a noticeable suburbanization of industry. Between 1954 and 1957, the ratio of manufacturing employment in the central city to manufacturing employment in the four suburban counties of Pennsylvania has remained constant. One explanation for this state of affairs is that the suburban areas have not been competitive with city locations, insofar as the quality of services is concerned. The most serious deficiencies are in water supply, transportation, and sewage disposal.<sup>7</sup>



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To turn to the relationship of services to the physical growth of the metropolis, let us begin by assuming that we can distinguish urban from rural territory by using population density as our indicator. If we assume that the metropolitan territory consists of those urban areas that proceed outward from the core city unbroken by rural territory, and if we map the growth of this territory over time, we can see that growth consists of two distinct types of movement. In the Philadelphia area, the boundary line of the metropolitan territory has expanded spasmodically. The rate of growth seems to depend upon general economic conditions. The boundary moved outward very rapidly between 1920 and 1930, and between 1945 and the present time. Between 1930 and 1945 the outer boundary was virtually stationary.

The second type of population movement takes place within the broad envelope of the metropolitan territory, and, in contrast to the first type, is extraordinarily regular. According to another study of Blumenfeld's, "the crest of the wave of metropolitan expansion", which is defined as the locus of the most rapid growth, has moved outward in a concentric circle from the center of the core city at a rate of one mile per decade for the last fifty years. It is a secular trend.<sup>8</sup>

It is the first type of movement that is particularly significant with respect to urban services. For while the rate of growth seems dependent upon the prosperity of the economy, the direction of growth, and its quality, as well, are strongly affected by employment opportunities and by facilities like water supply, transportation, and sewage disposal. Developmental policies concerning these matters have contributed to the way in which the metropolis has grown.

Therefore, not only in economic development but also in the process of converting land to urban uses, it appears that the timing and quality of public services act as a powerful lever on the type of development that takes place. When the "bundle of services" is judged according to its influence on development, we can begin to evolve a new set of criteria for devising metropolitan governmental institutions.

I think that this approach may constitute an acceptable strategy for metropolitan study in our largest areas. Basically, the method would consist of identifying the services and facilities that are critical in the physical and economic development of the metropolitan area, and of deciding what kind of public control, if any, would be appropriate. In adopting this approach, one would be under no compulsion to postulate a unity of the area that goes beyond the specialization of labor that produces economic interdependence. Furthermore, the method would furnish incentives for important groups in the area to bargain.

We should not underestimate the difficulties of this approach in providing a basis for bargaining. Economic development is a subject that both divides and unites the central city and the suburbs. It divides them in the sense that the central city may lose certain types of economic activity to the suburbs if the provision of services makes suburban industrial sites competitive with the denser areas. It unites them in the sense that the central city

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will be strengthened, if the suburbs attract industry that will inevitably use the type of business services which the CBD seems destined to centralize.

In spite of these contradictory aspects, many groups are vitally concerned with the economic prosperity of the metropolitan area. So, too, is there much concern with the consequences of the physical growth of the area. During the last half century, the primary factor that has caught our attention in the largest areas seems to be the physical plant of the metropolis. Throughout this period we have believed that negative consequences have ensued from the methods by which urban land is used. Therefore, many efforts have been directed toward reducing the costs of growth.

Let it be emphasized that these costs have not been expressed in purely economic terms. We have a long tradition of appreciation of the social costs of metropolitan phenomena like slums and commuting. Perhaps today the package suburban housing development shares some of the opprobrium of the slum. It is blamed for inconvenient living, for monotony and conformity, and for the ugliness of sprawl.

I raise this point because it is sometimes said that metropolitan studies have been too closely tied to considerations of administrative efficiency. However, this oversimplifies the case in the larger areas. In looking back at the 1920's, which was the first period of both rapid metropolitan growth and intensive interest in metropolitan problems, one can find a number of study efforts (as in Philadelphia and New York) in which the sponsors carefully avoided the subject of local government reform and used instead an area-wide approach to land use planning in order to achieve a more rational physical structure for the metropolis. Present-day metropolitan researchers perhaps pay more attention to government structure, but one of the reasons is because government is the only institution in urban society that has the power to make moderately rapid changes in the physical pattern through capital investment, zoning, and other regulatory devices.

If this approach were adopted, it would call for the establishment of the type of relationship that exists among the four models of the metropolitan area. Therefore, the side-effects of proposed governmental changes might be more easily calculated. The approach would also discriminate among services and facilities with regard to their effect upon development; it would prevent raising a particular service to the stature of a metropolitan problem just because a number of governments provide it or just because it is provided unevenly. The approach would require an analysis of the way in which decisions about the important facilities are in fact made. Finally, this approach would furnish a basis for bringing participants together in a political relationship, for its focus would be upon developmental policy-making at the strategic points of the metropolitan complex.

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FOOTNOTES

1. John D. Corcoran, "Seeking Better Government for Metropolitan Areas", 40 Public Management 82 (April, 1958)
2. Robert C. Wood, "A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas", paper prepared for meeting sponsored jointly by American Political Science Association and Regional Science Association, September 6, 1956, p. 4
3. Thomas H. Eliot, "Dilemmas in Metropolitan Research", 2 Midwest Journal of Political Science 26 (February, 1958), pp. 29, 32
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5. Britton Harris, "The Economic Aspects of the Metropolitan Region", 105 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 464 (February, 1957), pp. 469-470
6. Hans Blumenfeld, "The Economic Base of the Metropolis", 21 Journal of the American Institute of Planners 114 (Summer, 1955)
7. Institute for Urban Studies, University of Pennsylvania, Four-County Industrial Land and Facilities Requirements (June, 1957)
8. Hans Blumenfeld, "The Tidal Wave of Metropolitan Expansion", 20 Journal of the American Institute of Planners 3 (Winter, 1954)

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In writing this paper I have used most frequently the reports of the surveys in St. Louis, Nashville, Miami, Sacramento, Birmingham, Washington, D. C., and Houston. I have also drawn extensively on the concepts developed in Meyerson and Banfield's Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest, and in Dahl and Lindblom's Politics, Economics and Welfare.



### THREE "STYLES" IN THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

James S. Coleman

Paper to be delivered at meetings of American Political Science Association  
Sept. 4-6, 1958, St. Louis, Missouri

Social science keeps searching for a miracle drug to solve its ills, to free it from charges of being idle speculation and academic jousting at windmills. Mathematics is probably as frequent a remedy sought as any other. Attempts to apply such a remedy began long ago, at least as early as the geometrician Descartes. But recent attempts at the use of mathematics have been particularly frequent, and it is worthwhile asking just what good, if any, they might do for political science.

Before discussing how mathematics can be, and in a few ways is now, used fruitfully in the service of political science, there are a few unfruitful directions which should be noted. Mathematical facility and the use of mathematics tends to confer prestige, or at least a certain respect or awe, in some circles of social scientists. Like any attribute which confers prestige, there are certain symbols which can substitute for the attribute itself: a high school football sweater, for example, is such a substitute symbol. Prestige is given for being a good football player--but by wearing a football sweater, a non-football player can get a little illegitimate prestige among those who can only tell the football players by their sweaters.

Something like the same thing goes on in social science. Prestige is legitimately conferred when mathematics is systematically and carefully used in the service of political science. But certain terms serve the same function as the football sweater. "Information theory," "entropy," "homeostasis," "game theory," "boundary-maintaining systems," and a few other terms are the ones to watch for. If a paper is liberally sprinkled with such terms, then be careful. This is very likely not a use of mathematics in the service of political science, but only the use of its external symbols in the service of its user's prestige.

Such "scientific namedropping" does exist in political science, but in some cases it is hard to distinguish from the real thing. In such cases, it is probably better to err on the side of naivete--to risk being fooled by emptiness--than to risk rejecting what may be fresh and powerful ideas.

The styles or strategies to be discussed here are not the kind of namedropping mentioned above. Whether they will make positive contributions to political science, however, is another question which cannot now be definitively answered. Yet this is precisely the question to which I want to direct this paper. What can be the possible values for political science of particular styles or strategies in the use of mathematics?

The three strategies examined below have in common one feature: they are all concerned with the political system. And it is in large part for this reason that they were selected here. The study of a system of complex interrelated parts is one for which mathematics has been

particularly suited in other sciences. It is with this general experience in mind that I hold a working assumption that the use of mathematics to characterize systems of behavior may turn out to be particularly fruitful.

Beyond this similarity, the three styles diverge greatly. They go at the study of political systems in different ways, and very different things can be expected from them. Just what can be expected from each will be examined shortly. First it is necessary to give a short sketch of what each is like.

1. The Semi-normative Style: Downes' Economic Theory of Democracy.

The theory of games will illustrate what I mean by a semi-normative theory. It is not a theory about how games should be played to maximize the social welfare. Thus it is not strictly normative. Yet it is not a theory about how games are in fact played, so it is not strictly descriptive. It is a theory about how the game would proceed if the players played completely rationally.

Such theories may have quite important values in social science of a sort to be discussed below. In political science there is one excellent recent example of a semi-normative mathematical theory. The theory has been recently published as a book, An Economic Theory of Democracy, by Anthony Downes.

How does Downes use mathematics? There are few formulae and symbols in his book, and no numbers at all. The first thing to note, then, is that this first approach does not use mathematics as a way of handling data, as a model to which quantitative data may be applied. The model is as far from quantitative data as the most non-empirical theory to be found in political science. It starts not with the intention of fitting data which will be gathered on political systems, but with a fundamental conception of the functioning of a democratic political system.

The elements in this conception are simple. The structure is this: there is a governing body which is elected at intervals; there are elites (or political parties) competing to gain control of the government; and there is a citizenry whose votes put one or the other elite into control of the government. These are the two complementary groups in this theory: the political elites who compete with one another to gain the favor of the electorate, and the members of the electorate who support one party or another. But how do the elites compete, and what motivates the electorate in their support of one group or another? The elites compete via their policies and platforms, while the members of the electorate vote on the basis of the benefit they expect to derive from the policies of the party they support. Thus each group acts completely on the basis of rational self-interest: the elites in formulating policies which will put them into office or keep them there, and each member of the electorate in voting for that party whose policies will benefit him most. The theory is semi-normative in setting up a "purely rational" system, one in which every element acts on the basis of rational self-interest.



There is nothing radically new in these assumptions. They have been applied to the capitalist economic system at least since the time of Adam Smith, who noted that the complementary self-interests of firms and consumers acted as a "guiding hand" to keep the economic system in operation. In application to political systems, these assumptions are implicit as a kind of base line in the work of many, if not most, political theorists. They are built into the American constitution, which attempts to defend each segment of the populace or government against the selfish interests of the others.

If, then, these assumptions are not new, what is? The procedure of verbal theories which begin from these self-interest assumptions is roughly this: to note the assumptions, and then, after a short line of reasoning, show what kind of consequences these assumptions imply for politics. It is obvious that such a procedure breaks down if the assumptions become too complex, or if the chain of reasoning which goes from assumptions to consequences is too long. It is at this point that the mathematics becomes of value. The essence of a mathematical system is the explicit linking together of assumptions, the formal chains of reasoning by which consequences are deduced. Such formalization is not important when the system is very simple; it is imperative when the system is complex. And political systems, even when highly abstracted, are quite complex.

What I am saying, in effect, is this: verbal reasoning about the behavior of a system is fine as long as the system is simple. But when it gets complex, so that many elements are interdependent, then the formality of mathematics is necessary to extricate oneself from the theoretical maze. It is in this way, then, that Downes' theory differs from those of other theorists who have used these same rational self-interest assumptions. Note that such linking together of assumptions and consequences requires no empirical data. It is characteristic of the semi-normative approach of Downes' theory that its value accrues largely without any use of quantitative data.

In short, then, the Downes model is an attempt to describe mathematically the functioning of a political system from an extremely parsimonious set of assumptions, particularly parsimonious because they assume only a self-interest motivation on the part of each person. It is the more surprising, then, that a model of a functioning political system results, one which does not fly apart in the manner of Hobbes' "war of all against all." (It should be added that Downes finds it necessary to introduce a few assumptions which help keep the system from flying apart, and which have some of the same arbitrariness that Hobbes' social contract had. However, it seems clear from the nature of the model that these assumptions could be eliminated by adding a little complexity to the system.) The model makes no attempt to mirror all the aspects of concrete political systems, but instead says, in effect, "Let's see just how many aspects of concrete political systems are derivable from this very simple set of postulates."



## 2. Descriptive Theory: A Mathematization of Bentley's Ideas.

The second style of mathematics in political science comes a step closer to empirical data, and a step closer to being a descriptive theory. It is like the first in that it works deductively from a set of postulates; but it is unlike the first in that it keeps a much more attentive ear to empirical data, and to the way political systems in fact operate. It is nearer than the semi-normative approach to what one ordinarily thinks of as theory in social science.

The example I will use is some work of my own, not as yet published. The work consists of a mathematical restatement of the basic ideas found in Bentley's Process of Government. Bentley had a conception of the functioning of a political system, one which differed somewhat from the conception of economic theory in the Downes model. His conception starts more nearly at the beginning, prior even to the existence of a formal body of government. His theory is in essence a general theory of social control--a theory of the way societies regulate themselves. His fundamental conceptions are as follows:

(a) Everyone in society is engaged in a set of activities which are interrelated with those of other members of society.

(b) It is at the point that these activities interrelate (that is, coincide, conflict, compete, complement, etc.) that there is need for some sort of social decision. The interrelation of these activities sets up points of tension, points at which not all activities can benefit simultaneously, or at least equally.

(c) These activities, and their resulting points of tension, generate subjective interests in particular policies--desired gains which can be realized by some policies, and feared deprivations from others. These interests interrelate (coincide, conflict, compete, complement, etc.) just as the activities which generated them do.

(d) These subjective interests in particular policies which derive from the activities affected by those policies translate themselves through individual political participation into objective pressures to bring about or inhibit the policy.

(e) The policy which finally results, then, is that policy which is nearest the balance point or equilibrium of these pressures.

Bentley proposed this theory not just as one to account for the electorate's response to a policy offered by a party; he proposed it as a theory to account for the introduction and formulation of policies as well. He proposed it even for the formation of the very structure of government. (For example, the rural bias which has been built into most state legislatures since their conception derives, in Bentley's formulation, from the great importance of the farming activity, not just to farmers themselves, but to the economy of the state as a whole, at the time the legislatures were set up.)

Bentley's basic conceptions are thus both very simple and very fundamental. It is much less elaborate than the system of competing elites and supporting electorate involved in the first example; yet it purports to be more fundamental in that it traces subjective motivations or "interests" or "utilities" back to the activities which generate them, and it traces the origin of policies, as well as the structure of government, back to the balance of interests which generated them.

One consequence of Bentley's ideas is particularly interesting: the basic elements of his political system are not people, and the policy is not determined by the number of people aligned on either side. Activities are his basic elements, and policies are determined by the amount of activity aligned on one side or the other. This solves in a very simple fashion the problem that individuals are often not aligned fully on the side of one policy, but are often divided; and it solves just as neatly the problem of differing intensities of support given by different people. According to the theory, an activity generates high intensity when it happens to be concentrated heavily in particular individuals rather than dispersed over many. By not beginning with the a priori assumption that every person counts equally, the intensity problem never arises: people are merely the agents through which activities exert their pressure on policies. Some activities exert their pressure upon and through many people, while others exert just as much pressure upon and through only a few.

So much for Bentley's conceptions. What does this second strategy in mathematical political science attempt to do with them? Just this: it takes them as a basis, or a starting point from which to work, and builds from there. Bentley's conceptions give the fundamental postulates for the functioning of a political system, and it would be possible to take the same tack as Downes by building a mathematical system based on these alone. This second strategy, however, asks the question: In what way are there systematic empirical deviations from what would be predicted by these postulates? Then it tries to build explicitly into the system whatever modifications are needed to make the model more adequately descriptive of concrete systems. For example, one major bias is this: there seems to be a "threshold of attention" below which an activity will not engage the interests of its participants, and thus generate pressures in its behalf. As a consequence, a tiny "special interest" minority can often put over a measure without opposition, although this bill goes directly against a weak interest of the rest of the population. Such bills do not generate the opposition pressures which Bentley's theory would predict, possibly because the activity is not of great enough importance to any single member of the general public to incite him to opposition. Because of this problem, then, it becomes important to incorporate in the theory, as Bentley did not, the distribution of concentration of the activity over the populace, as well as its total amount. As another example, although Bentley discussed interest groups at length, his theory provides no mechanism for the way in which actual groups and organizations develop, so that a potential group becomes a real one, with the political strength which derives from organization.



These examples of possible modifications of the theory illustrates the general strategy: to start out with a set of postulates such as Bentley's, but to continually modify and add to the postulates in such a way that the theory becomes more and more descriptive of concrete systems. While the first approach remains austere and "clean," deriving as much as possible from extreme parsimony, this one allows itself to be cluttered up with additions and modifications which make it more and more nearly descriptive of concrete systems. This does not mean that either approach is "better." These two approaches serve quite different purposes, as will become evident shortly.

### 3. Empirical Synthesis: Simulation of the Electoral System.

The third approach is illustrated by work currently being carried out at Columbia by a sociologist who has studied voting behavior, William McPhee. It constitutes a radical departure from the first two styles; perhaps some would not label it a "mathematical" approach to political science at all. The strategy is this: first of all, it is concerned with only a sub-part of the total political system, the electoral process. Secondly, it is "contentless," unconcerned with issues of a particular campaign, and concerned only with the social processes through which people come to vote, together with the effects of their past voting history. Specifically, the strategy is this: to start purely inductively, using social-psychological propositions which have been generated by empirical studies of voting behavior (e.g., one's first vote upon coming of age has a certain probability of being the same as his father's present one). It sets up a prediction model by means of these propositions. Then, using an automatic computer, it carries a hypothetical electorate through a whole series of elections. For example, programmed on the computer are processes through which the members of this hypothetical electorate influence each other as the campaign progresses. Programmed also is a modification of one's future probabilities as a function of his vote in the present election. Then it becomes possible to feed into the computer hypothetical populations to which different things are happening--different birth rates, varying social-class differentials in birth rate, varying rates of occupational mobility, etc.

What this strategy does, then, is to use all available empirical knowledge about factors affecting voting behavior to program these propositions into a computer, and then to feed into the computer different kinds of hypothetical populations. The result is the voting pattern of this population as it undergoes the general processes which populations undergo: aging, new births, occupational and geographic mobility, and so on. The model (or program, for the model consists of precisely that--a computer program) will be subject to many modifications, or "doctoring up," with the express intent of making it come as close as possible to a simulation of the voting processes which characterize American society. This approach stands at the opposite extreme of the theoretical austerity and parsimony of the Downes theory. It is a synthesis of pieces drawn from everywhere, explicitly designed to fit. The second strategy lies in the middle in this respect: starting from a conception about the functioning of a political system and letting a mathematical model of this form the basis of the theory, it goes on from there--it modifies the postulates to provide a system more in accord with reality, and when necessary adds further postulates for the same purpose.



These, then, are three "styles" or strategies which can be presently found in the application of mathematics to political science. The first is very nearly the strategy of mathematical economics, the second a strategy more often found in verbal theories in other parts of social science, and the third a strategy made possible for the first time with the advent of electronic computers. This strategy of simulating behavior with computers has been used in several areas, such as human problem-solving and psychological discrimination, and is rapidly coming of age.

#### 4. Potential Results of Each Style.

What can the first approach do--the semi-normative theory of competing political elites and electors acting on the basis of purely selfish interest? Surely this is not adequately descriptive of politics. Politicians are often motivated by altruistic concerns, and by a deep identification with their country and the part of it they represent. Voters have ideologies, often quite at variance with their selfish interests; they are subject to influence from other persons; they often vote out of identification with some group to which they are affiliated; and above all they are creatures of habit, voting much the same way as they did in the last election, quite independently of the policies proposed by the parties.

What answer does the first style give to this? One answer is that these are asking for the wrong thing--that the intent of such a theory is not to describe matters precisely as they are, but to show the political consequences of certain parsimonious assumptions. The usefulness of this becomes apparent when we ask what are the things for which one wants a political theory? Not only for pure description of the way things are; also for answering such questions as: What are the conditions under which a democratic system can survive? For this, the theory based upon rational self-interest is of particular value. To be sure, some politicians are altruistically motivated, and act out of a deep sense of personal duty. But the democratic systems which depend on such altruism for adequate functioning do not survive long. The graveyards of democracy are full of Latin American republics and trade unions which long ago lost their democratic processes. There is good reason, then, for developing a system of political theory which lets its members be motivated by purely selfish interests and states the conditions under which a system can maintain itself even then. The authors of the American constitution were theorists of this sort, as the Federalist papers will attest. They attempted to design a political structure which would survive the most selfish intents of individuals, of minority groups, and of the majority.

But this last observation leads to a second question: If men in the eighteenth century without the aid of mathematics were able to do this, why is a highly formal mathematical theory necessary? The answer was given earlier: mathematics is a chain-of-reasoning device which allows us to go beyond the simple if-then statements of verbal theories. Thus, for example, Downes' theory can introduce the condition of a multi-party (rather than a two-party) system into his theory and from this, together with his basic assumptions, explicitly derive certain consequences about the kinds of policies which will result, and the different way these

parties will behave than will the parties of a two-party system. Conjectures about such differences, and actual observations of existing differences, have been made by many political theorists. But it is quite another thing again to derive such differences from certain other aspects of the system. Mathematics is the tool which allows such derivations to be explicitly made.

These are the kinds of things one might expect from the austere strategy of a pure theory such as Downes' self-interest theory. First, in almost a normative sense, the model can tell what conditions are necessary for a political system to be viable if we depend on nothing more than self-interest--without attempting to answer the descriptive question of whether political elites will be self-interested or fully altruistic and self-sacrificing in their policy formulation. Secondly, the model stands as a "reasoning device" to link structural changes in politics to their political consequences. Without pretending to be fully descriptive of all the consequences, the model can show just what consequences flow from the specific narrow set of postulates which comprise the model.

The second strategy, illustrated here by the model which begins with Bentley and goes on from there, is more fully descriptive, and aims more to be a theory in the usual sense of the term. It is more ambitious than the first in that it tries to be more accurately descriptive of the way political systems function. It is less ambitious because it allows itself to employ a wider range of social and psychological theory in doing so.

But to go back to some of the objections raised to the first strategy, such as altruism of leaders, ideologies and group-identification of voters, and the like: What does the present strategy say? It says, look here, much of this behavior is itself deducible from the theory--or if it is presently not, the theory will be modified to make it so. Although it will never deduce that this or that man will be self-sacrificing, it would aim to deduce that certain social and political conditions produce a higher rate of self-sacrifice than do others.

But for other aspects of concrete political systems, this strategy is no more adequately descriptive. In its focus upon the activities in society in which people engage, it neglects ideologies along with many other things. As is inherent in the nature of theory, it abstracts from the totality of political life only a few elements, but attempts to make these elements "work overtime" by telling not only about themselves but also about other things which the theory allows it to deduce from these few.

Probably the major aim of such a strategy as this has again to do with the use of a mathematical theory as a special chain-of-reasoning device to draw deductions from initial conditions. It will aim to deduce changes in the content of government policies from changes in the activities in which members of the society are engaged. In other words, since the theory itself links up the fundamental activities of society with government policies, its ultimate aim should be to state how the latter might change as the former changed. For example, the theory when full-blown should be able to predict the political consequences of automation (assuming we had good estimates of



the direct effects of automation upon the economic structure). It should predict the political effect of the move to suburbia, based only upon a knowledge of how the activities of suburban life (the psychological and economic investments) differ from those of city life. In some ways, the aim of this strategy would be like that of a branch of economic theory known as input-output analysis--a branch of economic theory, incidentally, which is much less highly "theoretical," less austere and postulational than most mathematical economics. Input-output economics consists of merely a matrix of the functional interrelations of the various segments of the economy--the material and money flows between each industry and its suppliers and consumers. This matrix then allows examination of the indirect effects of changes in one segment of the economy upon the remainder. It would tell, for example, the ultimate impact (or at least the impact at two or three steps removed) of a slump in the auto industry. Something similar to this in the realm of politics would be the major aim of the second strategy described here.

But one objection which is often made to this kind of "deterministic" political theory can be legitimately raised, both to the second strategy and to the first one. Both these strategies treat policies and political behavior as strictly determined by the constraints of the system, when in fact this is far from the case. Anyone who knows the workings of politics knows that decisions often hang almost on the toss of a coin; and they know also that personality differences between different office-holders create important differences in the policies that are formulated. What do such theories as these make of facts like this? Unfortunately, not much. Any theory in which the primary constraints are internal to the system itself must neglect such variations. This means the theory is less good in prediction than it might be. But there is one saving grace--in either of these two strategies, the theory can tell the degree to which an office-holder is free to exercise personal variability (altruism, statesmanship, corruption, power aggrandizement, etc.) unconstrained by the pressures of the electorate. In some systems and for some offices such freedom is great; in others, it is nearly absent. The theories just described cannot say what the office-holder will do when he has this freedom; but they can say just how much he can exercise without being taken to task at the polls.

Finally, then, to the results of the third strategy, the empirical synthesis of machine-simulated election processes. What does it aim to do? What are its results? They are basically two. First of all, we must go back to the way the model was constructed. At every point in the construction of the simulation procedure, actual empirical results were used. There was no attempt at unity or parsimony, no attempt to derive the simulation from a grand conception of the electoral process. "Small" theories--mostly social-psychological ones at that--were introduced at various points, but only because they worked--they gave results which simulated those in actual elections. This criterion was used at every point, resulting in a simulation process which best fit actual election statistics.



The obvious thing one can do now--and it is just the opposite procedure from that of the other two strategies--is examine this synthetic system to see what makes it work. Since its psuedo-election statistics can be made to mirror accurately what actually happens, and since it "works" over the span of a generation or so, then as a synthesis of processes it must also accurately mirror the synthesis of processes which constitutes an actual electoral system. It becomes important, then, to look back at the theory to discover just what this "successful" synthesis is. Note how this inductive process is completely backwards from the first strategy, which makes a definite commitment to a certain theoretical position--that is, its postulates or assumptions--and then examines the consequences of this position, seeing their points of similarity and divergence from actual political behavior.

The second use of this strategy is similar to the other two strategies. One can make numerous variations in the initial conditions and examine the political consequences. For example, this strategy would attempt to answer what would be the effect on election statistics of certain changes in the occupational structure; what would be the effect of changes in birth rate differentials, the effect of a "strong candidate" on the rest of the ticket, the effect of a "high temperature" campaign with intensified political discussions, and so on. In some of these, the model would sometimes predict the same as the first or second strategy; but even in such cases the grounds on which the predictions are made would differ radically.

None of these three strategies or styles in the use of mathematics for political science has yet proved itself. It is hard to say just what the prognosis is for each. If I were predicting, I would predict the following:

(a) Semi-normative theories will be few in number. Almost by definition they are limited, for all such theories have a single behavioral or psychological postulate: rational self-interest. They differ in the structural arrangements under which they operate. For example, Downes' theory and classical economic theory are alike in their behavioral postulate; their difference lies in the structure of the system within which rational behavior operates.

Thus, I suspect that there will come to be a single mathematical theory of rational political behavior, but one greatly enlarged in scope--much as mathematical economics is today.

The second point concerning such a theory will be the surprisingly large amount of political behavior that it will account for. Already there are surprises in Downes' work--surprises that certain aspects of the political system can be derived from a theory that is so bare of postulates about behavior.

(b) The use of mathematics for descriptive theory and empirical synthesis, the second and third styles discussed above, will meet with difficulties of a sort that the first style never encounters: to add further behavioral assumptions requires mathematics at the level of psychology, which is largely missing at present.

### THREE STYLES IN THE USE OF MATHEMATICS -- Coleman

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However, with provisional solution of such difficulties, there is one avenue which seems extremely appealing, a kind of combination of the second and third strategies. It combines the more "theoretical" approach of the second style with the electronic computer of the third. It would proceed something like this: first, to develop mathematically a theory along the lines of the second strategy, but then to arrange the storage cells of a computer to represent as complex a political and social structure as one likes; and finally to program the theory upon the computer and insert hypothetical situations to let the theory act in conjunction with the political structure mapped out there. This possibility, of which there have already been beginnings, can allow a mathematical theory to deal with the complexity of actual political systems--something which has always been one of the stumbling-blocks with mathematical theories.

**BEST COPY AVAILABLE FOR PHOTOGRAPHING**



ORGANIZATION FOR DECISIONS IN NEW HAVEN

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

NOT FOR QUOTATION OR PUBLICATION

New Haven is a striking case of an organization -- in this case, a political system -- that has passed from one "state" or "order" into something radically different. Since I am going to need labels for these different political orders, I shall call the first a "multi-centered" order and the second an "executive-centered" order; but I beg of you not to read anything into the labels, which I have chosen mostly for convenience.

Both orders have displayed a good deal of stability. The origins of the first are lost to us, but certainly it endured for a decade, probably longer, possibly very much longer. It is safe to say that the present executive-centered order will last seven years at a minimum, probably longer, possibly much longer.

My colleagues and I who have been examining political leadership in New Haven for the past year know a good deal more about the executive-centered order, which we have been able to observe in action, so to speak, than we do about the multi-centered order that preceded it. But we are certain that the existence of the two is no illusion. Because I cannot set out all the evidence in this short paper, let me present a very general summary of the condition of the evidence for what I am going to say. The amount of information we have been able to assemble is

very great. Most of it, however, has not yet been systematically analyzed. What I am about to present is the most plausible explanation we can find for much of our data. We have a very high degree of confidence in the proposition that the multi-centered order has been succeeded by an executive-centered order; and therefore (since, as I warned you, the labels are mere words of convenience) in propositions about the general characteristics of the two orders. On the other hand, I have much less confidence in some of our statements about details and in our attempt to explain the causes for the change from the one order to the other. And lest anyone be misled by labels, in spite of my warnings so far, let me add one final word on that subject. I have the impression that the word "pluralistic" is popular among us these days -- and that we regard the quality of pluralism, whatever it may be, as a good one. I do not want any one to suppose that the multi-centered order in New Haven was "pluralistic" and the executive-centered order is not, for both are special cases of what I, at any rate, would consider a "pluralistic" political system.

Let me now describe the two orders, each in turn, and then seek for an explanation of causes.

#### I. The multi-centered order.

The multi-centered order in New Haven can be regarded as having ended not long after the municipal election of 1953, when Richard Lee, a Democrat, displaced William Celentano, a Republican. Celentano, who owned and operated a well-known undertaking establishment, was the son of a moderately prosperous storekeeper and the first person of Italian background to become mayor of New Haven, a city in which persons of Italian extraction comprise almost half the population. In 1945 he had

soundly defeated an old guard Irish politician, a Democrat, who had provided leadership that was, from a middle class point of view, unenlightened, somewhat corrupt and hopelessly inefficient. Celentano, who came in as a reform candidate, was supported with enthusiasm by school teachers and the League of Women Voters, by the middle class wards, by the "Italians" in the 10th and 11th wards, and, it was charged, only feebly by the Republican organization which was, until then, largely the domain of the Yankees, the business community, and, surprisingly, a shrewd Irish leader.

As a system for making decisions, the political order that Celentano bequeathed to Lee was probably not markedly different from the one he himself inherited, although of this we cannot be altogether sure. In any case, its salient characteristics were these: First, with respect to the locus of decisions, the order was highly decentralized. Second, with respect to the distribution of influence over decisions, individuals in the community were highly unequal -- although probably not more so than in most American communities. Third, with respect to the means for coordinating diverse decisions, the order depended very heavily, although not exclusively, on bargaining among interested parties.

1. The locus of decisions.

Let me now examine these general characteristics in more detail. The political order of New Haven consisted of more or less separate "centers" for making decisions -- and it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Mayor Celentano was only one of these centers. Let me make quite clear what I mean by a "center." Suppose that at some period in time we take decisions of a certain scope: decisions on matters of



public schools, for example, or on zoning, or on political nominations, or on parking. And suppose we take all the individuals who are actively trying to influence the outcomes of decisions on one of these topics, and from among these we choose those who are in fact relatively influential, or, concretely, those who succeed in initiating proposals over the opposition of others, who veto proposals initiated by others, or who secure the compliance of others for proposals to which no opposition is offered. Suppose, further, that we combine into one class any of these categories of decisions -- or "scopes," as I have been calling them -- for which the sets of individuals involved are quite extensively over-lapping.

We think it is empirically true that in New Haven during Mayor Celentano's administration, and probably before, we would have rather quickly exhausted the overlapping sets of individuals and ended up with a rather larger number of non-overlapping sets. I do not know precisely how many; but the set of people who were influential on public schools -- curriculum, appointments, organization, new construction, and to a considerable extent on budgets -- was very different from the set of people who were influential on zoning and parking, and these in turn overlapped only in small part with those who were influential on political nominations. I do not wish to push the point too far, both because our evidence for statements about this period in New Haven's history is, as I have indicated, far from complete, and because as we shall see there were some coordinating forces at work even then. But we believe it is roughly correct to say that a number of such

centers existed where decisions were made; that the number of influential individuals comprising each of these centers was very small when compared with those affected by the decisions or with the New Haven electorate; that the individuals were different in the sense that the same person rarely participated in two centers, almost never in as many as three, and so far as we know never in all of the most salient ones; that they were also socially different, in the sense that if you located the individuals according to gross indicators like occupation, status, income, or education, they would, on the average, be different; that the individuals in one center tended to maximize policy goals different from those of another center; and that there was not much communication among members of different sets.

The public school system will serve as an illustration. The public school system of New Haven, which is a city of 165,000 people, is made up of 35 elementary schools, 4 junior high schools, and 2 high schools. (Outside the public system there are also 16 parochial schools, most of them Roman Catholic.) Under the old Democratic administration the schools had fallen into an appalling state and, as I have said, Mayor Celentano came into office in 1945 as a reform candidate committed to improving the schools. There had evidently been considerable interplay between politicians and the school system on matters of appointments. That was now largely ended; the school administration was substantially insulated from venality; expenditures were increased.

Still, it would hardly be correct to say that the insulation of

the school administration from political pressures significantly enhanced the influence of some hitherto powerless publics. For now the schools were firmly run by the school administration; and in fact this generally meant the superintendent of schools. Although he was ostensibly an employee of the school board, the board was little more than his rubber stamp. No agenda was circulated in advance of Board meetings, to which the members therefore came singularly unprepared; and action consisted mostly of agreeing to the proposals of the superintendent. He was, then, the towering figure in school decisions. He had allies on the school board and within the school system; yet the alliance seemed to be based primarily on personal friendships and sympathies. The alliance may have been predominantly Irish Catholic in composition; but in a city where two-thirds of the population and 4 out of 7 members of the Board of Education are Roman Catholic, where the Irish moved into both politics and the lower middle class generations ahead of the Italians, and where until quite recently the biggest supply of aspiring school teachers was to be found in girls from Irish Catholic families -- in such a city, the composition of the dominant school alliance is not the least surprising. There are rumors but little evidence that the Roman Catholic Church actively intervened in the public school system, the need, in fact, was not likely to arise. The alliance, so far as we can tell, was not in any significant way connected with other centers of influence: with the parties, for example, or businessmen, or even with the Mayor's faction within the Republican Party.



There was, then, a nearly autonomous center of influence over school decisions. Political recruitment was decided in several different centers: There were two in the Republican Party, partly coordinated in an uneasy alliance; for the man who was generally acknowledged to be the party-leader prior to Mayor Celentano's victory, Mr. Frank Lynch, still retained a large share of his influence -- and he was covertly hostile to the rise of the Celentano faction. Because his ties with the State organization were older and stronger than the Mayor's, and because municipal court appointments rested with the state legislature (under a provision of the State constitution dating from 1818), Lynch had at his disposal some of the best patronage positions. In the Democratic Party, nominations were firmly in the hands of an experienced party-leader, Mr. John Golden, an Irish-Catholic insurance broker who ran the party in the style of the classical boss. And there was, finally, the probate court, a remarkable institution with a fabulous income and extensive patronage, an empire of its own,

What was true of schools and political recruitment was true of other areas as well. Thus when urban redevelopment and renewal began to engage the attention of the city fathers around 1950, a year after the Housing Act of 1949 offered what appeared to be tempting opportunities for "saving" downtown New Haven, that set of decisions came to rest in a more or less separate center. There were others: police, welfare, and zoning, to name three important ones.

## 2. The distribution of influence.

Now why was influence over community decisions decentralized in this way to various centers? The answer is to be found in two places: first,

in the characteristics of the bases of influence in New Haven, and second, in the means and techniques of the Mayor.

By a base for actor A, I simply mean a resource that, with the aid of some means or technique, can be employed by A to influence B. Thus with respect to political nominations (scope), wealth is a base of influence by the wealthy insofar as campaign contributions, bribes, or other means dependent on wealth as a resource, would enable the wealthy to affect the outcome of political nominations.

It appears to be the case in New Haven that:

1. There are a considerable number of different bases of influence over political decisions. These include: legitimacy, legality, popular following, disciplined organization, patronage, disposition of contracts and other rewards, wealth and income, status, friendships, information and knowledge, available time, and probably many others.

2. None of the bases I have listed is completely monopolized by one individual or by a collection of individuals employing a coordinated strategy.

3. To discover a base monopolized in this way, we would have to resort to a quite narrow classification of resources: e. g., certain kinds of probate court patronage.

4. There is no collection of individuals who stand in a uniformly favorable relation to all bases: who, for example, are wealthy, have high social status, popular following, and patronage.

5. Individuals who stand in a favorable relation to one base are not uniformly more influential over decisions than individuals who stand in favorable relation to some other base.

6. But the number of individuals who exploit any of these bases is relatively small in proportion to the number of adult citizens.

What I have said so far does not exclude the possibility that there might be some coalition of individuals with various bases who would pretty thoroughly control the policies of the various centers. But I am going to argue that no such coalition existed in the period of the multi-centered order we are presently concerned with and furthermore that no such coalition could have existed unless it were led and, indeed, substantially dominated by a mayor capable of employing a very wide range of legal powers and political techniques with a high degree of skill. Or to look at the matter another way: it is difficult to imagine how the sheer play of "pressure politics" could ever have produced anything other than a multi-centered order.

I do not, unfortunately, have the space to elaborate the evidence for this key hypothesis, but I can suggest the sorts of evidence we find persuasive. Any social scientist only moderately familiar with New Haven could construct a list of some of the possible elements in a coalition that might conceivably dominate the governmental policies of New Haven. The list would doubtless include the old Yankee families with their base of influence resting essentially on social status; businessmen and bankers with bases in wealth, control over incomes, and organization; people of upper socio-economic status in general, with bases in status, friendships, knowledge, and wealth; the Yale community, with bases in status, expertness, information, expenditures and landholdings; the Roman Catholic Church, with bases in



organization, loyalties and religious commitments; the party organizations with bases in nominations, patronage, and contracts; the public bureaucracies, with bases in information, expertness, "neutrality," and legality; and, of course, the elected officials, with their bases in popular following, legality, legitimacy, patronage, contracts, organization loyalties, and so on. For any of these groups, with the possible exception of the last, it is possible to show that the way in which they exploited and their bases gave them only a limited influence, that, in fact, their bases quite probably could not have been exploited to any great extent; and that in any case they were not, for the most part, unified in their political goals and strategies.

Take the old Yankee families, for example. They possess the highest social status, in the usual sense. But there are not many of them left in New Haven itself; for they have emigrated from New England, or the family has come to an end, or the descendants have fled to the suburbs; and the old mansions are left for doctors' offices, Catholic schools, apartments, and later arrivals: Irish, Italians, Jews, Poles, and Yale professors. More than that: their social status is a commodity of curiously limited negotiability. Only those on the immediate fringe can be much tempted by the prospects of admission to the charmed circle; the men most likely to be in public office in New Haven are least likely to be anywhere near that fringe; marriage is not exactly a matter for negotiation, like royal matrimony; the clubs are not so very exclusive; and to all except a very tiny proportion of the population, the whole business is as remote as Zanzibar. There are

dozens of status hierarchies in New Haven according to which individuals locate themselves, and the old families are irrelevant to most of these. Nor are the old families much interested in politics; it is intriguing to suppose that when their leadership was destroyed a half century ago they were permanently traumatized. Today only a handful can be found anywhere in public life, (either behind the scenes or in the spotlight) and of these all except two or three are ex-officio members of the Park Board where by virtue of certain legal anachronisms they possess what amounts to an hereditary tenure.

Or take the businessmen and bankers. New Haven is not a great financial center. There are 7 commercial banks servicing the New Haven area; nearly half the financial resources of all seven are concentrated in one bank, the First New Haven National, and 85% are concentrated in the three largest banks. (The smallest bank was established by Jews, who were, and are, systematically excluded from directorships in the other banks, and who felt they had excessive difficulties in securing credit.) There are 3 savings banks and 3 savings and loan associations. Business is diversified. There are only 7 firms in New Haven (and 3 more in the immediate suburbs) employing over 1000 employees; none employs more than 5000. There are over one hundred firms employing between 50 and 1000 people. Now I do not want to seem to imply that businessmen and bankers are not, on the average, more influential than ordinary citizens. But as a group they have some very serious limitations. Many of them live in the suburbs and are unwilling to devote much time to the affairs of New Haven. Executives in the large national corporations are often

transients with little interest in New Haven except for assessments. For example, of all the executives in the New Haven branch of Olin-Mathieson Chemical, which now owns the old New Haven firearms firm, the Winchester Repeating Arms Co., so far as we know only one participates at all actively in public affairs. (He is a chemist, an ex-college teacher, and a Westerner, who is devoted to the cause of public education.) If the business community dominates anything, it is the Community Chest -- hardly a center of great power. Even when the more articulate members can unite around a program requiring political action, they need political leadership at least as much as political leadership needs them. The Chamber of Commerce takes great pride in having set out a ten point program some years ago that that they see as having grown into New Haven's extensive redevelopment program. But most bankers and businessmen in New Haven, as in other Northern cities, are Republicans. When Mayor Colentano, a Republican, moved at a snail's pace on urban redevelopment, the business community was helpless and unconcerned. They continued to contribute to Republican mayoralty campaigns through his defeat in 1953 and that of another Republican candidate two years later. It was not until 1957, when spectacular progress on urban redevelopment under Mayor Lee had persuaded them that salvation of New Haven's downtown area rested with the kind of leadership Lee provided, that they switched their contributions from the Republican candidate to Lee.

Or let us take that much larger group, the 5000 individuals who comprise Hollingshead's "Class I."<sup>1</sup> The men in this class are mainly

Based on a three-factor Index of Social Position (residential area, occupation, and education.) Hollingshead estimates that 3.4% of the population fall into Class I. A.B. Hollingshead and F.C. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness; A Community Study (New York, 1958), p. 69.



business executives and professionals. They are a heterogeneous lot, ranging from Republican bankers to Democratic Yale professors; about 60 per cent are Protestants, a quarter are Roman Catholic, and about 13% are Jewish. The Protestants are predominantly of old Yankee stock; but about 11% of the whole class are of Irish descent and 9% are of Italian background. It would take a political leader with a very strong and loyal following drawn from the other classes to withstand a united front of the men (and women) of this class; they have money to finance campaigns, prestige, access to officials, knowledge of affairs, the capacity to articulate their views. But they are not united and probably cannot be except for certain limited purposes like urban redevelopment, and only for some aspects of that. Furthermore, most of them are not sufficiently motivated to participate in political or "civic" activities. Many are too timid or unenterprising for any extensive personal involvement; and many are just not interested in public affairs.

In general, then, the "influentials" are comparatively few in number. But they are dispersed, divided, apathetic, and incapable of acting in unity. A political leader who is capable of uniting them is almost certain to be very powerful in his own right.

### 3. Coordination.

The distribution of influence supplied to the political system a set of strongly charged centrifugal forces. Yet it would be overstressing the point to conclude that there were no limits on these forces.

First of all, in the background, dominating the entire political

order and all the issues raised within the order, there existed (and still exists) such an overwhelming agreement among citizens of the community on goals that vast numbers of alternatives are excluded from consideration. One could fill a book the size of the New Haven telephone directory with a list of alternatives that are (in some ill-defined technical sense) "open" but which have never been considered in the period under review. I could cite some bizarre examples to make the point -- legalized houses of prostitution might be one -- but let me use something more mundane. Water is supplied to the New Haven area by a privately owned water company. This seemingly anachronistic institution goes about its business quietly and, I suppose, no more inefficiently than most private bureaucracies; however that may be, its fortunes are never a matter of public issue and the alternative of municipal ownership is simply not considered. The point I am making is a familiar one but worth stressing: the "issues" of politics in most communities are a tiny squall in the midst of a vast and silent sea of indifference, agreement, and latent responses.

Nonetheless, there are conflicts. There are, for one thing, conflicts over scarce resources. A highly decentralized system of decision-making of the kind I have been ascribing to New Haven would quickly outstrip available resources without some minimal coordination. For the over-all values, being not only ambiguous but positively favorable to a variety of competing ends, would not serve as an adequate check on completely autonomous centers. The legal powers

of the Mayor and the Board of Finance provide authority for some coordination; and fear of the political consequences of raising taxes supplies the impulse. Thus the second main limit on the centrifugal forces of New Haven was set by the efforts of the Mayor and the Board of Finance to limit the resources available to the various departments. These efforts were encouraged by the owner of both local newspapers, who was quick to attack any proposal involving increased expenditures and maintained a steady editorial complaint against the high cost of government. For more than thirty years this man exercised a considerable -- although largely negative -- influence over municipal affairs.

Other conflicts were handled mainly by means of the Mayor's control over appointments, and his capacity for exercising a certain veto over the decisions of subordinates.

Since the differences between the multi-centered order and the executive-centered order I am about to discuss are qualitative, it may be that I have either understressed or overstressed the Mayor's role, but the general nature of the order is perhaps now clear enough. Decisions were, by and large, decentralized to centers that approached autonomy; there was no collection of individuals who exerted a strong influence over the decisions of all the centers; except possibly for the mayor, no collection could have done so; and there was some minimal coordination imposed by the Mayor or the Board of Finance through their controls over financial resources, or appointments, or by vetoing actions proposed at a



particular center of decision-making.

Throughout this period the League of Women Voters was agitating against New Haven's "weak-mayor charter." No doubt the order had many of the characteristics associated in the literature with the "weak-mayor" form of government. The charter certainly permitted a high degree of decentralization; it may even have prescribed it; but, as we shall see, it did not require it.

## II. The Executive-Centered Order.

The executive-centered order, as I have said, can be dated approximately from the election of 1953 in which Richard Lee came to office; but of course the transformation was not instantaneous. In that election Lee, after twice being defeated by Celentano (once by 712 votes, once by 2 votes), won by a margin of less than 2%. Two years later, against a weak candidate (Celentano had wisely decided to bide his time) Lee polled 65% of the vote; and in 1957, again 65%. There has literally never been anything like this in New Haven's history. In the past century, no candidate for Mayor has ever won the proportion of the total vote Lee has earned twice; on only two occasions has a mayor's proportion gone over 60% in the past century -- once with a Republican in 1879 and once with a Democrat in 1937. (Even Roosevelt in 1936 got only 63% and Wilbur Cross, the Democratic candidate for governor that year, and a legendary figure in Connecticut politics, got just over 64%.)

Lee, who was 37 when he was first elected, had already had long

experience in New Haven politics. He came from an Irish-Catholic working class family (his mother, however, was of Yankee stock, a fact he rarely mentions in public), went to New Haven public schools, worked as a reporter on the Journal-Courier, served as an officer of the Junior Chamber of Commerce, had a brief spell in the army, and from 1943 until his election was in charge of Yale's public relations. He had been a member of the Board of Aldermen, where he quickly became majority leader, and was the fair-haired boy of John Golden, who in 1953 was the acknowledged boss of the Democratic Party.

Let me now describe very briefly the executive-centered order he has instituted.

1. The distribution of influence.

Except for changes in the position of the mayoralty team and coalition, no substantial changes have taken place in the distribution of influence. It is still true that a major share of influence over key decisions is distributed to a relatively small number of individuals. There have been no important changes either in bases of influence or in the techniques of exploiting the bases.

But the change in the position of the mayoralty team and coalition is extraordinary. For now the distribution of influence over key decisions is essentially pyramidal, with the mayor at the summit of the pyramid. This will be disappointing, and even puzzling, to all those who look for a hidden hand behind public officials, but it is almost certainly the case. The mayor, to be sure, is part of a team and a coalition; but he very much runs both team and coalition.

There are three ways in which the distribution of influence differs under Lee from the multi-centered order: First, there has been a very great increase in the number of scopes over which the influence of the mayoralty coalition is significant; hardly a center of public policy exists in which the mayoralty coalition does not possess influence. Zoning and zoning appeal, to take only an example, are now rather tightly controlled by the Mayor's office. Second, there has been a significant increase in the amount of influence exercised by the mayoralty team within each of these scopes. In the schools the mayor's coalition consists of 3 people besides himself, a Yale professor of English, the president of the Connecticut CIO-AFL, and an ex-school teacher who is a friend from Army days and still a professional educator. Two others, including the Board chairman, are friendly; and no one on the present board is hostile to the Mayor. The Board has slowly increased its influence over school decisions so that it is, today, the dominant force in the major decisions, although it sometimes loses on subordinate ones. In urban redevelopment, which is the major policy on the mayor's agenda, the mayor's team initiates all important policies and most minor ones, sidetracks alternatives it considers undesirable, and, if necessary, overcomes the scanty and disorganized opposition that sometimes appears.

In the third place, the mayoralty team and coalition employs a much wider range of techniques for exploiting its bases, employs them more skillfully, and has actually created some new bases. I will return to this point in a moment.



## 2. The locus of decisions.

It follows that the locus of decisions has to a substantial extent shifted to the Mayor's office, or more properly to his team and coalition. Roughly, it is now true that for all key decisions over matters of highest salience to the mayoralty team (redevelopment and renewal, schools, nominations, patronage, parking, traffic, taxes, race relations) the successful alternatives are initiated by the mayor's team; all alternatives under consideration are tested for consistency with the major objectives of the team (which of course includes re-election, or election to the governorship or the U. S. Senate, as salient goals); and alternatives initiated elsewhere are generally vetoed unless they happen to be consistent with the major objectives of the team.

Decisions of a second order of salience -- salience being partly a matter of "content" and partly a matter of urgency -- are made by a coalition of the mayor's team and leaders in the old "centers" of decision-making. Examples would be questions of police administration, some school appointments of intermediate importance, and probate court patronage (which still rests largely with the judge of probate.)

Other decisions --- minor school appointments, for example-- are made more or less autonomously at the various centers; but there is direct intervention by the mayoralty team if a threat to major objectives appears.

Finally, there has been a noticeable tendency for decisions to move from the last category to the second and from the second to the first.

It may be, however, that the limits of centralization have now been reached; and that there exists a kind of equilibrium between the old centrifugal forces and the newer centripetal ones. But whether the equilibrium is a stable one is a question on which we shall have to speculate.

### 3. Coordination.

It follows from what I have already set out that there exists a high degree of coordination on all questions of policy salient to the mayor and his team, and a fairly high degree of coordination on all other matters. There has been, incidentally, no change in the charter. Having said so much it is perhaps time to try to explain the change.

### III. Causes.

Of the possible explanations for the change in the character of the political order, we can rule out all those that imply a change in some basic feature of the New Haven community. For example, the legal and constitutional foundation of the system, the charter, remained the same. The population has been stable in size and composition; in 1940, the population was 160.4 thousand, in 1950, 164.5 thousand, and in 1958 according to estimates by the Connecticut Department of Health, 166.9 thousand. There were no significant demographic changes. Whatever changes there were in the overt political behavior of voters (the mayoralty elections to one side) these offer no clues. It is true that for the first time since 1924 the city went Republican in the Presidential election of

1956 by a proportion of just under 55%; but in 1954 it had gone Democratic in the gubernatorial election by almost exactly the same percentage; it would be difficult to establish a "trend" in either direction, and even more difficult to interpret its meaning if there were one. Turnout fluctuated from one election to another within moderate bounds.

There had been, however, a drastic decline from 1945 in retail sales in the city of New Haven and a dramatic rise in retail sales in certain suburbs. A new shopping center in Hamden, a suburb of 38,000 on the city's edge, had obviously drained off a large number of consumers from down town New Haven. The decline of down town New Haven had been going on for years. As early as 1938 James W. Hook, the president of the United Illuminating Company, had called for action to stop the decay. (16 years later he became an important and vigorous advocate of the redevelopment program under Mayor Lee; by the time he died in 1957 he was able to look out on 42 acres of redevelopment going on under his office windows.)

There are, I believe, three plausible causes to which one may look in order to account for the change: the decline in down town New Haven, the political techniques of the mayoralty team, and the unifying character of the issues exploited by the mayor. In addition, however, there are some necessary conditions located in the characteristics of the community. One may put the general hypothesis this way: There exists a class of communities in which the organization for decision-making may partake of the characteristics either



of a multi-centered order or of an executive-centered order. Given such a community, whether it is a multi-centered order or an executive-centered order is determined by one or more of three factors: the existence or non-existence of a "substantial" threat of deprivation removable by governmental action; the nature of the political techniques employed by elected leaders; and the extent to which the means proposed by elected leaders to remove the threat of deprivation produce convergence or divergence in the goals of the politically active minority.

What we wish to know, then, is this: What are the essential characteristics of the class of communities (of which New Haven is one member -- and possibly the only member) capable of changing from a multi-centered order to an executive-centered order? What are the relative weights of the three causal factors we have enumerated?

It is perfectly obvious that these questions cannot be answered by examining New Haven alone. However, it may be useful to draw on the evidence from New Haven to derive some plausible answers.

As to the characteristics of New Haven that seem to be most closely related to the change I have been discussing, I am inclined to think that the most essential element is the underlying pattern in the distribution of influence. The bases of influence, I have tried to show, are highly fragmented; they are numerous and independent. The most comprehensive set of bases that can be exploited are available to the elected leaders. Thus if there is to be a "dominant" center of coordination anywhere in the system it will have to occur in the

electd political leadership; as we have seen, it may not exist even there; but if it does not exist there, it does not exist at all. It seems to me reasonable to expect that the system would and will quickly relapse into a multi-centered order if the combination of Mayor Lee, urban redevelopment, and concern over the decay of the city disappears from the scene.

Now what of the relative weight of these three factors? It is very difficult to appraise the extent to which there existed a sense of threat resulting from the decay of down town New Haven. Some of our informants contend it was widespread among businessmen. The Chamber of Commerce had talked about the need for action for some years. We do know that the redevelopment program met virtually no opposition until the past year, when a group of small merchants became concerned over the possibility of being redeveloped out of existence. Redevelopment did generate a very considerable amount of enthusiasm. It is most unlikely that this response could have been produced in a community where the threat was less self-evident -- in a middle class city, for example, where decay was not far advanced. At the same time, however, political leadership can, within limits, accentuate the sense of threat, and there is no doubt that Lee deepened the awareness and concern among the active minority in New Haven. This decline of the central business district and growth of the suburbs is common to a great many American cities.

We would be inclined to give a very heavy weight to the differences in political strategies and techniques employed by the two mayors.

Mayor Lee and his team have exploited a considerable variety of bases that were available to previous mayors of New Haven but were either unused or used with less finesse and drive. Among these are techniques (such as the carefully selected Citizens Action Commission on urban redevelopment and its host of subcommittees, numbering over 500 persons in all) that confer legitimacy, facilitate the spread of information, and stimulate involvement in programs of this administration -- with no very notable diffusion of actual influence over decisions. There is also the enormous technical superiority of the members of the Mayor's immediate team, and of his broader coalition; their experience, intelligence, level of information, and dedication are without exception above that of most of their critics and supporters in the community. Other techniques include the recruitment of sympathetic and like-minded members of the coalition into decision centers and, correspondingly, the elimination of hostile members; close control over budgetary allocations and expenditures; an extensive and skillful program of information and propaganda; meticulous employment of the rewards and threats available to the mayor's team by virtue of control over patronage (600 positions), contracts, public services, and coercive agencies; an extraordinary intelligence and information-gathering network; infiltration of local newspapers owned by a hostile publisher; a full-time, energetic commitment to the job; and the exploitation of unifying issues that cut across traditional political divisions and unify, at least temporarily, a curious variety of old antagonists.



**HOUSE DIVIDED: URBAN-RURAL RELATIONSHIPS IN  
ILLINOIS AND MISSOURI**

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**Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American  
Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton Jef-  
ferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958**

HOUSE DIVIDED: URBAN-RURAL RELATIONSHIPS IN  
ILLINOIS AND MISSOURI<sup>1</sup>

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Few aspects of state and local government have received more attention from political scientists than urban representation in state legislatures, and the political implications of urban underrepresentation. Murray Stedman states that "Rural minorities control many state legislatures and thereby penalize urban majorities. The virtual serfdom of the urbanite to the rurally controlled state legislatures in many areas is a recurrent plaint in the writings of political scientists."<sup>2</sup> Commenting on the tendency of state legislators to form blocs reflecting individual localities, local and regional interests, Alfred DeGrazia concludes that "every American state with any considerable urban population has undergone protracted conflict between rural and urban blocs, often regardless of party lines."<sup>3</sup> Text-books on municipal government, and state and local government, universally condemn urban underrepresentation in state legislatures and state, or imply, that the result is consistent defeat or frustration of urban interests in the legislative arena.<sup>4</sup>

In general, the argument might be stated as follows: 1) there exist urban and rural interests which are incompatible; 2) urban legislators will forward urban interests, rural legislators rural interests; 3) since rural population is overrepresented, rural interests will prevail over urban interests; 4) a redress of numerical representation to favor the urban areas will reverse the outcome of this conflict and urban interests will prevail.

It is the thesis of this paper that genuine urban-rural conflict in the Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies is rare, and that most of the conflict surrounding legislative consideration of urban problems arises from intra-urban party disputes, central city-suburban antagonisms, or factionalism within the urban majority party. Further, collision of urban and rural interests, as forwarded by legislators from these two areas, is seldom found, while conflict of interests within the urban areas frequently appears in the legislature. Finally, the success or failure of urban delegations in the legislative process is usually dependent on the level of agreement between urban parties or factions, or between central city and suburban legislators, or both, and is not usually dependent on the intrinsic attitudes of rural legislators toward urban problems.

## I

This study examines the behavior of the urban delegations in the Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies and responses to this behavior by rural legislators in order to determine the frequency and intensity of conflict between these two groups. The five legislative sessions chosen for the analysis, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1957, cover a ten-year legislative period.

The recorded roll-call vote is used in this analysis to determine position-taking by legislators, and to uncover group conflict. The organization and conventions of these legislatures operate to produce a large number of roll-calls each session, and to guarantee that a small minority of the membership can force floor action, and a roll-call vote, on most measures. Observation of the Assemblies, and interviews with members, have led the writer to conclude that most substantial legislative conflict, such



as that between urban and rural legislators, will be permanently recorded in the form of a roll-call at some stage of legislative action. Based on their studies of the Illinois and Missouri Assemblies, W. J. Keefe and G. D. Young comment that the roll-call is a proper criterion for measuring party attitudes on legislation and that most of the legislation deemed important to one of the parties will receive some sort of floor action.<sup>5</sup> Numerous other studies of legislative behavior in both national and state governments have relied heavily on roll-call analysis.<sup>6</sup>

Roll-calls which occurred during the ten year period totalled 14,052 in the Illinois House and Senate and 4,989 in the Missouri House.<sup>7</sup> Each of these 19,041 roll-calls was examined for the presence of urban-rural conflict. Most roll-calls were unanimous or nearly unanimous, so for purposes of analysis a group of "contested roll-calls" was selected. To qualify as "contested" a roll-call must contain 10% of the membership on the losing side of the vote. This reduced to 3,652 the number of roll-calls to be subjected to the more elaborate analyses in which voting cohesions of party and geographical groups were determined for each roll-call. The use of high speed data processing equipment facilitated the analysis of the more than 500,000 individual legislator votes.

In this study tests of cohesion are based on the percentage of the elected membership of the delegation representing the majority position of the delegation on any given roll-call. Except for comparative data this test of "absolute cohesion" is used throughout. For example, if 100 seats are held by Democrats and if 67 Democrats vote "yes", the Democratic cohesion on that vote would be 67% regardless of the number of Democrats who vote "no" or the number who were absent. This test retains the simplicity

of a single, easily understood expression useful in identifying groups in conflict without adding the bi-dimensionality of intra-group cohesion which is not the main concern in most of the analyses and which is handled by certain manipulations of the absolute cohesion test when necessary.<sup>8</sup>

Illinois, an example of what V. O. Key terms a "unimetroplitan" state,<sup>9</sup> is frequently selected to demonstrate the frustration of urban interests in a rural-dominated legislature.<sup>10</sup> Cook County comprises most of the Chicago Urbanized Area and accounts for 52% of the Illinois population, but in the 1949 through 1955 sessions of the Assembly held only 37% of the House and Senate seats. Legislative reapportionment in 1955 gave Cook County 51% of the House seats and continued control of the Senate in areas outside of Cook County. Until 1957, 54 of the 57 Cook County House seats and 18 of the 19 Senate seats were held by legislators whose districts were wholly or substantially within the city of Chicago. Consequently the whole Cook County delegation is treated as the "urban" delegation in the analyses of the 1949 through 1955 sessions. The 1955 reapportionment produced districts either wholly within or wholly without Chicago, and this is reflected in the 1957 analyses by the use of the Chicago delegation as the "urban" delegation and by the exclusion of the greatly enlarged suburban Cook County delegation. The area wholly outside of Cook County, often referred to as "downstate", is treated as the "rural" delegation although it includes both substantial urban populations such as Peoria (pop. 110,000) and legislative districts in which 80% or more of the population resides in places of less than 5,000 population. Statements about urban-rural conflict are usually couched in terms of the big city vs. the rest of the state, a

dichotomy which obtains in popular beliefs about urban-rural conflict in both Illinois and Missouri.

Missouri is a "bimetroplitan" state with two geographically polar but politically similar cities, St. Louis and Kansas City, containing 36% of Missouri's population. The suburban St. Louis County contains another 10% of the population.<sup>11</sup> St. Louis City hold 11% of the House seats and Jackson County (most of which is in Kansas City) holds 8% of the House seats.<sup>12</sup> In this study the three Missouri "urban delegations are the St. Louis City delegation, the Jackson County delegation, and the St. Louis City and Jackson County delegations together. All areas outside of St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and Jackson County are treated as "rural".

## II

1. The urban delegation seldom votes with high cohesion. Tables I and 1.1 contain data on the voting cohesion of urban delegations in Illinois and Missouri. (Tabular material appears in the Appendix). In Illinois during the ten year period studied, the urban delegation voted with a cohesion of more than 90% on 32 contested roll-calls (2%), more than 80% on 163 roll-calls (10%), and more than 66% on 482 roll-calls (30%).<sup>13</sup> On 70% of all contested roll-calls the urban delegation voted with a cohesion of less than 67%.

In Missouri the same pattern is evident. The urban delegations voted with a cohesion of 91% or more on 3% or less of the contested roll-calls, and with a cohesion of less than 67% on more than 70% of the roll-calls. It is notable that the two metropolitan delegations, St. Louis City and



Kansas City, voted with a combined cohesion of 91% or more on only 4 of the 2,047 contested roll-calls.

The conclusion is that urban delegations were not in the habit of voting solidly on issues which caused conflict in the legislature. Such occurrences on contested roll-calls were the exception rather than the rule.

2. The urban delegation almost always wins when it votes with a high cohesion. In determining what would be considered an urban victory or defeat it was necessary to decide what degree of voting cohesion would be necessary to indicate "support" or "opposition" by the urban delegation. In this study if the voting cohesion of the delegation was 67% or more on a given roll-call, the delegation is considered to have "supported" or "opposed" the measure involved. Although such a definition is necessarily arbitrary, certain considerations are apparent in the determination of delegation support or opposition. A vote on which less than half of the delegation was in agreement would be eliminated on the basis that a minority expression does not represent a position imputable to the majority. On the other hand, to demand a cohesion of 100% would eliminate all contested roll-calls from the analysis. Interviews with observers of the Assemblies indicated that, if anything, this 67% level of significance tends to be too low.

Tables 2 and 3 contain data showing the five session wins and losses of the Illinois urban delegations when they voted with a cohesion of 67% or more. Out of 482 roll-calls on which the urban delegation voted with high cohesion, there were 384 wins (80%) and 98 losses (20%). Three-fourths of these losses were in the Senate where the party division within the urban delegation confused high urban cohesion with high Democratic cohesion.

Because of the unique system of cumulative voting in the election of each Illinois House district's three-member delegation, House districts are certain to elect two members of the majority party in the district and one member of the minority party.<sup>14</sup> Thus, although Chicago is a Democratic stronghold, the House urban delegation contained a substantial percentage of Republicans during each of the five sessions. In no session did the Republicans have fewer than 36% of the House urban delegation seats. A roll-call reflecting a cohesion of 67% or more in the urban delegation necessarily included both Democrats and Republicans. This situation provides us with an opportunity to examine the success of the urban delegation when it not only voted with a high cohesion (67% or more) but also with substantial support from both parties within the delegation (at least 51% of each party group). Table 4 contains these data for the House sessions.

On 168 of the 974 contested roll-calls the House urban delegation voted with high cohesion and with intra-delegation bipartisan support. The delegation was on the winning side of 153 of these roll-calls (91%) and on the losing side of 15 (3%). On 10 of the 15 losing roll-calls the urban delegation lost by one vote at a time when 17 members of the delegation were voting against the delegation majority position.

The urban delegation in the Senate included enough Republicans in 1949, 1951, and 1953 to make feasible an analysis of roll-calls on which the test of cohesion (67% or more) also included the requirement that at least 51% of each party group voted with the delegation position. The wins under this redefinition were 89 (95%) as compared to 71 (76%) when the requirement was simply a cohesion of 67% or more.

The total losses under the two definitions of high urban cohesion must be viewed in relationship to the total of 14,052 roll-calls of this ten year period. The Illinois House and Senate urban delegations lost on 98 (seven tenths of one percent) when the test of cohesion was 67% or more of the delegation, and on 71 (five-tenths of one percent) when the test of cohesion was 67% or more of the delegation including at least 51% of each party group.

It is notable that the Illinois urban delegations lost on only three out of 14,052 roll-calls when they voted with a cohesion of more than 90%, indicating as in the case of Missouri that as urban delegation solidarity approaches 100% it is virtually certain that the delegation will be on the winning side of the vote.

Table 2.1 contains data on the wins and losses of the Missouri urban delegations in the 1955 and 1957 sessions. All of the urban delegations were on the winning side of more than 85% of the roll-calls on which they voted with a cohesion of 67% or more. As the cohesion of the delegation increased, the number of losses decreased until at the 90% level of cohesion St. Louis City was on the losing side of five out of a total of 938 contested roll-calls, Jackson County was on the losing side of four, and the combined St. Louis City-Jackson County group was on the losing side of only one. Put in another way, the Missouri urban delegations were practically never on the losing side of a roll-call vote when they were highly united. The relatively greater success of the Missouri urban delegations was partly due to the fact that they were primarily Democratic and were operating in a Democratic-controlled chamber, while the Illinois urban delegations were



primarily Democratic but were operating in Republican-controlled chambers. The partisan composition of the Illinois urban delegations also influences the win-loss pattern. As demonstrated above, by controlling the party variable it was possible to bring the Illinois urban win-loss patterns more into line with what was found in Missouri.

3. The rural delegations seldom vote with high cohesion against the urban delegations. Assumptions about urban-rural conflict imply that the two groups clash in the legislative arena and that the urban delegation loses. The preceding section suggests that the urban delegation voting with high cohesion seldom loses. The assumptions about urban-rural conflict further imply that high urban cohesion is met by heavy rural opposition.

Tables 5 and 6 contain data showing the degree of rural opposition to the Illinois urban delegations when the latter voted with a cohesion of 67% or more. It is striking that over the five session period (including 7,186 roll-calls) there was no instance of a House urban-rural clash involving over 90% of the urban delegation in opposition to over 90% of the rural delegation in opposition is found. In the Senate two instances of conflict at the over 90% level are found. Fifteen cases of conflict at the over 80% level occurred in the Senate, but twelve of these took place in the 1955 session when 89% of the urban delegation was Democratic and 94% of the rural delegation was Republican. If the 1955 Senate session is excluded, the other four Senate sessions and the five House sessions produced only six instances of urban-rural conflict at the 80% level of significance. If the test for urban-rural conflict is lowered to the 67% level of conflict between delegations, seven such cases are found in the House and 28 in the

Senate. But 24 of these Senate roll-calls occurred in the 1955 and 1957 Senate sessions when over 80% of the Democrats were urban and over 80% of the Republicans were rural.

It is notable that during the five House sessions which produced more than 7,000 roll-call votes, there were only three instances of urban-rural conflict in which a combination of more than 67% of both urban Democrats and urban Republicans were opposed by more than 67% of the rural delegation.

When there is opposition to the Illinois urban delegation, from what quarter does it come? Using roll-call votes on which the urban delegation voted with a cohesion of 67% or more, a support-opposition score was obtained for each legislator by subtracting the number of times he voted against the delegation from the number of times he voted with it. In the quartile of the highest opposition to the urban delegation practically all legislators are rural Republicans, with rural Democrats clustering in the two quartiles of lowest opposition. Support-opposition scores were obtained for the three-member House districts by summing the scores of the three members. Results of the analyses of House and Senate districts using the Spearman rank order correlation significant at the .01 level indicate a positive correlation between: 1) degree of opposition of Senators and of House members of the same party from the same area; 2) opposition to the urban delegation and degree of "Republicanism" of the district as measured by proclivity of the district to elect Republican legislators. Each down-state district sent at least one Democrat to the House, and in each case the Democrat had a score showing higher support of the urban delegation than did his Republican colleagues from the same district. Some of the implications

of these findings are discussed in later parts of this paper. The support-opposition scores of legislators from Illinois downstate urbanized areas throw interesting light on the hypothesis that the common problems faced by cities throughout the state may lead legislators from these different cities to work together. Although there are wide variations in voting behavior of legislators from non-Chicago urbanized areas, those legislators are distinguished neither for support of, nor opposition to, the Chicago delegation. Finally, it should be noted that there are some Republican legislators from Chicago and Cook County in the quartile of highest opposition to the Chicago delegation.

Table 5.1 contains data showing the rural opposition to Missouri urban delegations voting with high cohesion in the 1955 and 1957 sessions. The most striking finding is that the urban delegations were never opposed by as much as 90% of the rural delegation, and that only St. Louis City was met with as much as 67% opposition from the rural delegation. This occurred twice in the 1955 session. Data not included in Table 5.1 show that during the 1949, 1951 and 1953 sessions of the Missouri House there was no roll-call on which 67% or more of an urban delegation was opposed by 67% or more of the rural delegation.

This absence of urban-rural conflict on Missouri roll-calls is not explained by lack of roll-calls with high urban cohesion. Rather, the rural delegation is practically never united on contested roll-calls. During the five session period in Missouri, the rural delegation voted with a cohesion of 67% or more on 89 (4%) of the 2,047 contested roll-calls, and with a cohesion of more than 80% on only three roll-calls. At no time did rural solidarity reach the 90% level of cohesion. This is explained largely



by the fact that the Missouri rural delegations were politically divided. In contrast, the rural Illinois delegations are more politically homogeneous. In the Senate, where most rural members are Republicans, the rural delegations voted with a cohesion of 67% or more on 34% of all contested roll-calls in the five session period. The margin of Republican control of the rural delegation in the House is less marked, and House rural delegations voted with a cohesion of 67% or more on 10% of all contested roll-calls.

An illustration of the refusal of Missouri rural Democrats to vote against their urban colleagues is provided by analysis of their behavior on the 166 roll-calls which elicited high cohesion in the combined St. Louis City-Jackson County group in 1957. A majority of the rural Democrats voted with the urban Democrats on 90% of these roll-calls, and against the urban Democrats on only one roll-call. A majority of rural Democrats voted against St. Louis City Democrats on only three roll-calls and against Jackson County Democrats on only one roll-call. Thus, when Democrats hold a substantial number of rural seats and refuse to vote against their urban colleagues, urban-rural conflict is avoided.

In summary, these findings show that urban and rural delegations in the Illinois and Missouri Assemblies seldom vote solidly against each other, and that urban-rural conflict in this sense seldom occurs.

4. Party conflict is more prevalent than urban-rural conflict. Party loyalty exerts a much greater influence on the legislator's behavior than does his geographical base. Tables 7, 7.1 and 8 present comparative data on frequency of party conflict and urban-rural conflict. The findings of Keefe

and Young presented to indicate that tests of relative cohesion produce the same conclusions as tests of absolute cohesion.<sup>15</sup> In Illinois, with the exception of the 1955 and 1957 Senate sessions, party votes occurred in one to six percent of all roll-calls, while urban-rural votes occurred in less than 0.3% of all roll-calls. In the data on the 1955 and 1957 Sessions, the party divisions again cloud analysis of urban-rural conflict, a fact that is partially illustrated by the footnotes to Table 8 listing the urban-rural votes meeting the test of party conflict votes. In the other cases party divisions within the Illinois urban delegations control the party variable to some degree.

In Missouri party votes occurred or from 3% to 12% of all roll-calls, and conflict between the rural delegation and one of the urban delegations never exceeded 0.7% of all roll-calls. No urban-rural conflict was in evidence during the 1949, 1951, and 1953 roll-calls.

These data support the conclusion that in Missouri and Illinois Democrat vs. Republican was much more the significant type of conflict. Clear-cut urban-rural conflict was a rare occurrence.

5. Intra-urban political disputes often surround legislation relating to the city. To conform with assumptions about urban-rural conflict, urban legislators must act together to support or oppose legislation, and rural legislators must oppose these efforts. This overlooks the probability that in large urban areas there will be political power struggles and that legislators emerging from these struggles will behave in the legislature just as they behave in urban politics.

Because Republicans constituted a substantial part of the Cook County and Chicago House delegations we are able to examine the impact of intra-urban party conflict on the legislative behavior of an urban delegation. Table 9 contains data on the frequency of votes showing high bipartisan cohesion and partisan conflict within the Illinois House urban delegations

of 1955 and 1957. Two significant findings are obvious. First, urban Democrats and Republicans were in conflict slightly more often than all Democrats and all Republicans in the chamber. Second, urban Democrats and Republicans were more often in disagreement with each other than in agreement. It should be noted that on 42 of the 61 roll-calls showing such agreement less than 25% of the total membership of the chamber was on the losing side, a clear indication that bipartisan urban agreement usually does not occur on highly contested matters.

The behavior of the 1957 House Chicago Democrats and Republicans on 32 bills applicable only, or primarily, to the Chicago metropolitan area reveals that the urban delegation seldom acts with unity on municipal problems which give rise to conflict in the state legislature. Table 10 contains a summary of the agreement and disagreement pattern of 47 roll-calls taken during consideration of the 32 bills. On 85% of these roll-calls Chicago Democrats and Republicans were in disagreement. While they were in agreement at a high level on two (5%) of the roll-calls they were in disagreement at a high level on 28 (60%) of the roll-calls.

The past five sessions of the Illinois Assembly have produced numerous bills introduced by Chicago and Cook County Republicans to embarrass or damage the Democratic-controlled Chicago administration. Conversely, Chicago Democrats introduced bills to consolidate their political advantages against Republican incursions. The downstate response to such measures tended to be partisan, producing chamber party votes rather than urban-rural votes. It should be noted, however, that in a number of cases the downstate legislators adopted a wait-and-see policy, refusing to take sides



in an intra-city fight. Several downstate legislators have said in interviews that they are willing to support Chicago legislation on which both urban parties agree, but are themselves unwilling to settle intra-urban political disputes. It is a rare occasion when legislation supported solidly by both urban parties fails to pass.

S. B. 310 in the 1957 session provides a good illustration of intra-urban conflict in the state legislature. This bill, introduced by three Chicago Republican Senators and one Cook County Republican Senator, simply restored a tax rate limit for the City of Chicago after the 1955 session had failed to place limits on how much money the city administration could take from the taxpayers. To place such a tax limit would not only impose an important financial restraint on the Democratic city administration, but would also carry the implication that this administration could not be trusted to act in accordance with interests of the people of Chicago.

This bill passed the Senate on a straight chamber party vote, the Chicago and Cook County Republicans lining up with downstate Republicans against Chicago Democrats. The House Municipalities Committee reported the bill with a "do not pass" recommendation and Chicago House Republicans attempted to revive it by moving to overrule the Committee recommendation. In the ensuing debate on this motion Rep. Pollack (R-Chicago), the House Majority Whip, accused Chicago Democratic legislators of political treachery in failing to keep 1955 promises to continue the tax peg limit under which Chicago had been operating until that time. Two bills were introduced in 1955 by Chicago Democrats to continue this limit, but both bills were allowed by their sponsors to die on the calendar. In moving to overrule

the Municipalities Committee recommendation, Pollack charged that without the tax limit "the taxpayers will be at the whim and caprice of the City of Chicago, and the taxpayers of Chicago deserve the protection of a limit." He further argued that "the people will be at the mercy of a city council controlled by the city administration" and that "the 'home rule' argument that Chicago should not be limited by the legislature is an attempt to take the lid off property tax, contrary to the historical practice in the state of Illinois."

Rep. De La Cour (D-Chicago), House Minority Leader, countered that "we (sic) of Chicago have treated our taxpayers fairly" and accused the Chicago Republicans of unfair and dilatory action. The debate on the House floor was entirely between Chicago Democrats and Republicans. The vote which defeated Pollack's motion to overrule the "do not pass" recommendation illustrates both the internecine urban party behavior and the tendency of downstaters to line up along party lines or to ignore intra-urban disputes. Chicago Democrats and Republicans voted solidly against each other, the downstate Democrats voted with Chicago Democrats and the downstate Republicans with Chicago Republicans, and a small but decisive number of both downstate Democrats and Republicans abstained from voting. The silence of 21 downstaters killed Chicago Republican chances to restore the tax limit when the motion went down 71-69, 18 votes short of the required constitutional majority of elected members.

Other 1957 measures sponsored by Chicago Republicans to damage or discredit Chicago Democrats included the abolition of the Chicago Department of Public Welfare and removal of its functions to an agency more amenable

to Republican control, the alteration of Chicago aldermanic structures and election procedures to enable increased Republican political opportunities, and a change in the method of filling vacancies in the Cook County Board of Commissioners to protect Republican representation on the Board.

Although the scarcity of Republicans in the Democratic St. Louis and Jackson County County delegations precludes statistical analyses to indicate intra-urban party conflict, evidences of other conflict may be adduced. It is a commonplace in the Missouri Assembly that the bitter opposition to St. Louis City bills comes from the St. Louis County delegation, a majority of which is Republican. It was largely through the efforts of A. Clifford Jones (R-St. Louis County), the Republican Minority Leader, that St. Louis bills were disputed in the 1957 session. While this action was probably an attempt to discomfort the St. Louis City Democratic administration, it was also tied to the existence of the St. Louis earnings tax which causes St. Louis Countians employed in the city to contribute to the city treasury. Any legislation which would cause added expense to the city was met with opposition from St. Louis County and whatever rural Republicans the County legislators could persuade.<sup>16</sup>

A series of pay raise bills for St. Louis City employees was brought into the 1955 and 1957 sessions of the Assembly by the St. Louis Democrats. Jones stated during debate on one of the 1957 bills:

Who pays for these salary increases? St. Louis County taxpayers who work in St. Louis City pay. The Board of Estimates and Apportionment is not a trustworthy watchdog of city finances. The necessity for legislative acts enabling St. Louis pay raises is blamed on the legislature and the lack of home rule. These acts should be blamed on the Aldermen, the Board of Estimates and Apportionment, and the St. Louis Democrats. I will not be blamed for increased taxes on the people of St. Louis County.



And in an attack on what he termed "a pay raise for Jug Ears Hagen, the license collector," Jones charged that "the St. Louis delegation is constantly trying to increase the costs of St. Louis government through salary raises while they let Mayor Tucker's bills be killed in committee." 17

The penchant of St. Louis County legislators for opposing St. Louis City in the legislature is illustrated by their behavior on the 31 contested roll-calls involving 1957 legislation relating to St. Louis City. Table 10.1 contains data on the level of agreement and disagreement between the two groups. There was a high level of disagreement on 81% of the votes, and a lower level of disagreement on 10% more. St. Louis City and St. Louis County legislators were able to reach some level of agreement on 3 of the 31 roll-calls involving St. Louis City bills.

The reaction of rural legislators to controversial city legislation in Missouri is much like the reaction found in Illinois: they either vote along party lines, or are not attentive to the conflict. This reaction is described by Dr. George D. Young, a rural Democrat in the 1955 and 1957 House sessions.

The great majority of party votes fall into the category of 'desire to help a fellow party member.' St. Louis City salary bills, and the Jackson County salary and local government bills fall into this category. They are not items of statewide concern or of state party concern. They are not discussed in caucus or asked for by state party leaders. They could not effect the re-election chances of representatives outside of these areas, but they still cause party voting. Outstate Democrat members grumble about so many city bills and many are not actually in favor of all of the bills, but they vote for them. The attitude seems to be that if the St. Louis or Kansas City representatives want them they should not interfere. The opposition from Republicans from the two metropolitan areas seems to strengthen Democratic resolve to vote for them.<sup>18</sup>

Young reports that "emergency" legislation put before the 1958 Special Session by the Governor at the request of the St. Louis and Kansas City administrations failed because of opposition from urban legislators. The St. Louis administration proposal for an increase in the earnings tax levy was opposed by virtually all of the St. Louis County delegation and many of the St. Louis City legislators. Young concludes that:

In the House the difficulty in passing city legislation does not come from rural members but from members of the city's own delegation...Members of a city delegation opposed to a certain proposal urged by the city administration can exert strong influence against it when it comes up for action in the House or Senate; this has resulted in the failure of many bills. On the other hand, it is almost invariably true that if the city's delegation is united upon a measure it will be accepted by the entire General Assembly.<sup>19</sup>

The power relationship between City Hall and the city's legislative delegation has much to do with the delegation's behavior. The Democratic Mayor of Chicago exercises firm control over the Chicago Democrats in the Illinois Assembly. As one Chicago House Democrat put it to the writer in 1957: "A telephone call from Mayor Daley can control 40 of the 42 Chicago Democratic votes in the House."

While the Chicago Mayor enjoys such control over Democratic city legislators, Kansas City's administration has little, if any, control over the Jackson County delegation. The political cataclysms of the late 1930's and early 1940's which smashed the Pendergast organization and ushered in "nonpartisan" municipal government, resulted in a crazy quilt factional struggle in the Jackson County Democratic party. Forced out of open competition for control of the city administration by the reformers, organization Democrats concentrated on the Jackson County Court, a non-judicial county executive board with patronage resources. This factionalism

has operated against cooperation among Kansas City legislators, One Jackson County House Democrat told the writer that "we have wasted ourselves because of being split. There is a lack of leadership -- everyone is a chief, nobody's an Indian."

Outside of the two gerrymandered Republican districts in Jackson County, competition for legislative seats occurs among half a dozen fairly stable factions. The leaders of the city administration, a mayor and a city manager, have nothing to do with the nomination and election of the city's legislative delegation, and exercise no control over the delegation's behavior in Jefferson City. Because of the animosity between the city administration and the Jackson County Court, most members of the legislative delegation are not kindly disposed toward the city. A Jackson County House Democrat explained to the writer that "the Jackson delegation doesn't trust city hall. They got in on a reform movement, but they have been playing politics ever since. Cookingham (the city manager) has made a whipping boy out of the County Court. We can't get anything from the city government, so factional leaders fight over the county patronage."

Both the city administration and the County Court maintain lobbyists in Jefferson City during the Assembly session, and at times the Jackson County delegation is in opposition to city-sponsored legislation. An example of this is the perennial fight over city representation on the Jackson County Board of Equalization. While Kansas City is almost 90% of Jackson County, there are no city representatives on this Board which exercises important power over assessment and taxation. In 1957 one of the two Jackson County Republicans sponsored H.B. 272 which provided for two city representatives on the Board. This legislation was supported by City



Manager Cookingham and the influential Kansas City Star but was vigorously opposed by the Jackson County Court and the Jackson Democratic legislators who had it killed in committee. A Jackson Democrat, who had refused a city request to sponsor the bill, explained to the writer that "the bill never had a chance. There are city 'favorites' and county 'favorites' on tax fixes. It's simply a matter of who gets favors, not of the benefit to Kansas City as a municipal corporation." Of ten bills identified by a city administration official as eliciting active opposition from the city in 1957, eight were sponsored by Jackson County Democrats. Four of these bills constituted what the official termed "political attacks" on the Kansas City municipal courts. They provided for rules of evidence and venue changes which might embarrass the municipal courts, prohibited municipal judges from practicing law in any Missouri court, and gave Jackson County magistrate courts appellate jurisdiction over Kansas City municipal courts.

On a continuum of city administration control over the city's Democratic legislators, Chicago would be placed on the extreme of strong control, Kansas City on the extreme of weak control, and St. Louis somewhere between these polar opposites. Observation of the behavior of these urban delegations suggests that as city hall control of the legislative delegation becomes stronger, the climate for treatment of city bills in the legislature becomes more favorable. Since both the Illinois and Missouri Assemblies include a substantial number of rural Democrats, and since these rural Democrats have demonstrated their willingness to "go along" with city

delegations, a city administration with no control over city legislators is in a weak position. In the case of Kansas City, "nonpartisanship" in city government may nurture a condition in the selection and control of the legislative delegation which operates against city interests in the state capital. If the relationship between the Jackson County delegation and the Kansas City administration were analogous to that between the Chicago delegation and the Chicago administration, Kansas City's position in the Missouri Assembly might be more secure. As a Kansas City official told the writer: "Kansas City would do all right if the Jackson delegation were unanimous in support of our bills. Too many are anti-administration."

6. Reapportionment may not guarantee a more favored position to big cities. The previous sections of this paper have suggested that Chicago and Cook County, even though in the minority, were quite successful in being on the winning side of votes, particularly when high cohesion tended toward bi-partisan unity. Downstate opposition to high urban cohesion seldom reached a significant level of conflict. It was also found that urban intra-delegation partisan conflicts exceeded bipartisan agreements.

With these points in mind the possible effects of the 1955 Reapportionment Act may be examined. Table 11 indicates that the net gain in House seats of the Chicago and Cook County Democrats in 1957 was 5.3% while the net Republican gain was 8.7%. The party division within the Chicago delegation remained about the same as in 1955. Heaviest gains in seats were made by the suburban Cook County area, a Republican stronghold. The Chicago and Cook County Republican gains in the Senate are more

spectacular. While Chicago Democrats suffered a 7% loss in seats in 1957, Chicago and Cook County Republicans enjoyed a 17% gain. Much of this is accounted for by the addition of five new Senate seats in Republican suburbia. Because reapportionment of the Senate requires a constitutional amendment, it is unlikely that Republican gains will be offset in the near future. Political habits of suburbia and the pattern of urban growth point toward a continued Republican domination of Cook County outside of Chicago, the area most likely to gain in seats as the House is reapportioned decennially. If it is true that the strongest opposition to Chicago comes from Chicago and Cook County Republicans rather than from rural legislators, then in the 1957 Assembly Chicago was actually in a weaker position than before the reapportionment. Recross through fundamental changes in political loyalty in Republican suburban Cook County and downstate areas would seem remote.

It is interesting to speculate whether increased representation of the suburban Cook County area in the legislature may encourage enemies of the Chicago city administration to transfer much of the intra-city and county power struggles to the legislative arena. The Cook County and Chicago Republican gain in 1957 House seats was 8.7% as opposed to a downstate Republican loss of 6%, and the Senate gain was 17% compared to the downstate Republican loss of 9%. If Cook County and Chicago Republicans have enjoyed a corresponding increase in power within the Republican legislative parties, it is reasonable to conclude that they will be in an even better position than before reapportionment to line up downstate Republican colleagues in the harassment of Cook County and Chicago Democrats who speak for City Hall. This role of Chicago Democratic legislators is illustrated by a statement in debate by Rep. De La Cour (D-Chicago), the 1957 House Minority Leader. De La Cour described the Democratic Mayor



of Chicago as "Director of the Board, a captain of the ship, a commanding general."

It is not with shame that I say to you 'the Mayor of Chicago is the Democratic Central Committeeman and he is expressing what the people of Chicago want.' Orders have to be given, and I am happy as Minority Leader to get those orders, because it is in the interest of the wishes of the people of Chicago and of Illinois.

Needless to say, Chicago and Cook County Republicans do not perceive the Democratic Mayor of Chicago as De La Cour describes him, either in city politics or in the state legislature.<sup>20</sup>

Political scientists propose "home RULE" as one solution to the "stepchild lot" of the big cities in the state legislatures, although many of them feel that without "fair representation" the solution could never be forced. Paradoxically, in Illinois at least, the reapportionment which many counted on to make grants of power to Chicago more possible may indeed have created a political situation making such grants even more remote. The Republicans of Chicago, and their allies across the city limits in suburban Cook County, may develop into the strongest opponents of giving their political enemies more autonomy in the operation of Chicago city government. The more independent a Democratic-controlled Chicago administration becomes, the less secure will be Chicago Republicans and Republican suburbs fearful of big city intrusions. With their increased legislative power resulting from reapportionment, they may effectively veto ambitions for home rule powers.<sup>21</sup>

### III

This analysis suggests that the traditional belief in bitter urban-rural conflict in state legislatures must be rejected for Illinois and Missouri, at least at the roll-call stage. Such conflict is rare, perhaps because issues calling up such conflict are rare. When unified urban delegations come to the state capital they usually get what they want. Urban legislators are not trampled on by rural legislators, even when the latter are in a numerical majority.

Rather, a different type of conflict emerges in which political factors within the urban area determine the fate of city legislation. The city's bitterest opponents in the state legislature are political enemies from within its own walls, and those camped in the adjoining suburban areas. The city's rural friends are members of the majority party of the urban delegation, and the balance of power is held by rural members of the urban minority party. Rural legislatures have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate in the solution of urban problems provided urban legislators can reach agreement on the solutions. They have demonstrated equally well that when the urban political groups bring their squabbles to the state legislature, rural legislators will usually divide along party lines if they are attentive to the dispute at all. This situation places grave responsibilities on urban political groups to resolve differences on policy before putting their case before the legislature.

Intra-urban political conflict may be in the finest tradition of the doctrine of party responsibility, according to which party conflict is a healthy phenomenon and the majority party must be under the constant scrutiny and criticism of the minority party. If urban areas are to have party systems, and if this doctrine is to be pursued in the governing of large cities, it is only reasonable that urban parties should behave in this manner in the state legislature where many urban problems seek their solutions.

As long as partisanship has a role in governing the metropolis, and only a few political scientists now believe that it does not, it is likely that the city's success in the state legislature will be determined by partisan considerations. To ask for more than this is to avoid the hard facts of political reality.

## FOOTNOTES

1. The writer wishes to express appreciation to the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid which made possible observation and interviewing in the 1957 sessions of the Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies, and the collection of much of the data analyzed in this paper. The Council is not responsible for the findings or conclusions of this paper.
2. Murray S. Stedman, Jr., "American Political Parties as a Conservative Force" 10 Western Political Quarterly 395 (1957).
3. Alfred DeGrazia, "General Theory of Apportionment" 17 Law and Contemporary Problems 261 (1952).
4. For example, see: C. M. Kneier, City Government in the United States, Revised Edition, (New York, 1947), Chapter VI; S. A. MacCorkle, American Municipal Government and Administration (Boston, 1949), pp. 52-54; C. F. Snider, American State and Local Government (New York, 1950), pp. 169-172.
5. W. J. Keefe, A Study of the Role of Political Parties in the Legislative Process, Illinois General Assembly (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1951), pp. 73-74. See also Keefe's "Parties, Partisanship, and Public Policy in the Pennsylvania Legislature" 48 American Political Science Review 450 (1954), in which roll-call analyses are used. G. D. Young, The Role of Political Parties in The Missouri House of Representatives (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Missouri, 1958), pp. 86-92. Dr. Young (D-Howard County) was a member of the Missouri House in the 1955 and 1957 sessions.
6. M. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," 49 American Political Science Review 773 (1955); W. Lockard, "Legislative Politics in Connecticut," 48 American Political Science Review 166 (1954); A. L. Lowell, "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, Vol. 1, 1901; D. MacRae, "Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," 46 American Political Science Review 1046 (1952); Julius Turner, Party and Constituency, (Baltimore, 1951)
7. While thousands of roll-calls occurred in the Missouri Senate over the five session period, it was felt that too few caused enough dispute to be subjected to the analyses made of other roll-calls in this study. The conventions of the Missouri Senate apparently operate to reduce recorded conflict. Committees function more meaningfully in the Missouri Senate than they do in the House, and since roll-calls are more difficult to take than in the House much more of the Senate business is



conducted by viva voce or show of hands votes. Undoubtedly the size of the group (34) facilitates pre-voting compromise and consensus. An examination of the contested roll-calls which did occur in the Senate suggests that there was no more, and possibly less, urban-rural conflict than data included here indicate for the House. However, further investigation of the Missouri Senate is necessary before concluding urban-rural conflict does not occur there. At this time the writer feels that such further investigation would not alter the conclusions of this paper. This is substantiated by George D. Young in "The 1958 Special Session of the Missouri General Assembly" Missouri Political Science Association Newsletter, No. 3 (May, 1958), p. 3.

8. A number of quantitative tests of voting cohesion are available. Stuart A. Rice developed an index of cohesion which is useful when a single expression of unity within the delegation is needed, and intra-delegation conflict must be expressed. See Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York, 1928). Other writers have used a "relative cohesion" test which is based on the percentage of a delegation voting on a particular roll-call. The expression of cohesion is obtained in the same manner as in "absolute cohesion" tests, but is not related to the total membership of the group being studied. The "relative cohesion" test exposes the analysis to the danger of imputing the position of a minority of the delegation to the majority. For example, if Democrats divided 40 yes, 3 no, and 57 absent, the relative cohesion of the Democrats would be 93%. If the Republicans divided 2 yes, 30 no, and 40 absent, Republican cohesion would be 94%. Under the relative cohesion test this roll-call would qualify as a party vote at the 90% level of conflict, although less than half of the Republicans and Democrats even participated in the roll-call.

The chi square test has been used to determine whether the distribution of votes cast by two or more groups on one roll-call can be attributed to random chance. See Murray C. Havens, City versus Farm (University, Alabama, 1957). This test yields a statement of statistical risk involved in rejecting hypotheses that distributions of elements are random. Havens established the level of significance at  $P=.05$ , the usual choice of social scientists using the  $X^2$  statistic. At this level he accepts a relationship between variables involved in the roll-calls, in this case urban and rural groups. Thus, on those roll-calls where distribution of urban and rural votes yields  $P=.05$  or less, Havens accepts the hypothesis that urban-rural conflict was present. There are several criticisms of this method. Assuming a hypothetical legislature in which urban and rural groups each hold 100 seats, a division of 57 urban "yes", 43 urban "no", and 43 rural "yes", 57 rural "no" would produce a  $X^2$  value of 3.92, which is significant at the .05 level, and would lead to a conclusion of urban-rural conflict. This is substantially below the levels of significance used in this study and in roll-call analyses of party behavior cited in footnote 6.

Further, no good comparison can be made between roll-call votes if no more than the  $X^2$  and P values are available; that is, the  $X^2$  test does not by itself provide a measure of the strength of correlation between variables, (urban or rural constituency and position-taking on roll-calls), but only a statement of probability that randomness can account for distribution of votes. Unless this test is further refined by a coefficient of contingency, or similar statistic, no comparison can be made of association of variables on different roll-calls.

One merit of a fixed absolute percentage of delegation membership as a test for level of significant cohesion lies in being able to state that a delegation did vote with a given high cohesion, and that it was or was not opposed by another delegation voting with a given high cohesion. On the contrary, the  $X^2$  test opens the door to conclusions of urban-rural conflict which may hardly be justified if "conflict" is to be endowed with its usual meaning. For example, Havens obtains a  $P=.01$  for a roll-call on which the urban group divided 18 "yes", 15 "no", and the rural group 32 "yes", 0 "no". This meets his requirements for "urban vs. rural" although the urban delegation is almost evenly divided, and a majority of both urban and rural groups voted on the same side. (p. 54 op. cit.) Testing the distribution of votes within the urban delegation with a 50-50 hypothesis, one concludes that in this case the distribution must be attributed to random chance ( $P=.30$ ). Thus, one might conclude that this roll-call, and several others meeting Havens' test of "urban vs. rural" show a difference in behavior of urban and rural groups, but not a conflict between these groups.

Finally, Havens' application of the  $X^2$  test to that portion of the total membership of a delegation which voted on a given roll-call resulted in the labelling of several roll-calls as "urban vs. rural" when less than half of either or both groups represented the majority position of the group on the roll-call.

9. V. O. Key, Jr. American State Politics (New York, 1956), p. 234.
10. See Kneier, op. cit., Snider, op. cit., Benjamin Baker, Urban Government (Princeton, 1957), pp. 325-328. Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power (Garden City, 1955), pp. 15-19.
11. It should be noted that while Chicago is part of Cook County, St. Louis County and St. Louis City are independent local governments. The latter exercises both municipal and county powers.
12. In the Missouri House each county has at least one seat, but a multiplier effect in the apportionment formula gives increased representation to heavily populated counties. This increased representation is not in direct proportion to the population of the county. Thus, St. Louis City has 22% of the population and 11% of the seats, Jackson County 14% of the population and 8% of the seats. The Missouri Senate is reapportioned decennially on the basis of population. At present



St. Louis City and Jackson County contain 36% of the population and hold 32% of the Senate seats.

13. The relatively higher incidence of voting cohesion from 67-91% in the 1955 and 1957 sessions of the Senate may be accounted for by the fact that Democrats comprised 83% of the Chicago delegation in 1957, and 89% in 1955. In all other House and Senate sessions, some Republican votes were needed to push delegation cohesion above 67%. The 1955 and 1957 Senate data reflect party conflict.
14. For analyses of the cumulative voting system and its political implications see George S. Blair, "Cumulative Voting," 52 American Political Science Review 123 (1958) and Charles S. Hyneman and J. D. Morgan, "Cumulative Voting in Illinois," 32 Illinois Law Review 12 (1937)
15. Keefe, op.cit. pp. 232-233 contains analyses of 1949 and 1951 Illinois votes on tests of relative cohesion, and Young, op. cit. pp. 100 and 176 contains similar analyses for the 1955 and 1957 Missouri House sessions.
16. An example of the opposition of St. Louis County to the St. Louis City earnings tax is provided by a series of 18 House votes on H.B. 50 (1951) which authorized extension of the tax. St. Louis City and St. Louis County delegations were in high opposition on 12 roll-calls, in opposition at a lower level on 3 roll-calls, and in agreement on 3 roll-calls. Ten of the roll-calls were chamber party votes under the definition of 67% of the elected party groups in opposition to each other, and fifteen of the roll-calls were chamber party voted under the definition of 80% of the voting members of the party groups in opposition to each other.
17. This may have referred to the fate of the proposal for increased power of eminent domain to acquire off-street parking locations in St. Louis (H.B. 444). This bill was reported "do not pass" by the Governmental Organization Committee of the House. Two members of the Committee told the writer that a majority of the St. Louis City delegation was opposed to the bill and that this influenced the Committee.
18. Young, op. cit., p. 203.
19. George D. Young, "The 1958 Special Session of the Missouri General Assembly," Missouri Political Science Association Newsletter, No. 3 (1958). My emphasis.
20. It is interesting that in the 1957 House, after reapportionment had placed all Cook County districts either completely inside or completely outside the city of Chicago, there were only four of the 322 contested roll-calls displaying a cohesion of more than 67% for the combined



Chicago-Cook County group which had a numerical majority in the House. This should ease the fears of those downstaters who predicted that reapportionment would mean "control of the state by one county."

21. Edward C. Banfield has pointed out the inherent political difficulties of metropolitan area organization stemming from control of the central city and the suburbs by two different political parties. "The Politics of Metropolitan Area Organization", 1 Midwest Journal of Political Science 77 (1957). He states that "it seems likely that the central cities will become more and more Democratic" and that "the Republican suburban vote has in general suffered little from the increase in population." As a result "these facts suggest that for many years to come it will be difficult or impossible to integrate local governments where the two party system operates" because "in effect, advocates of consolidation schemes are asking the Democrats to give up their control of the central cities or, at least, to place it in jeopardy." It may be that Banfield's argument can be broadened to say that the same forces which bring the central city Republicans and the suburbs into collision with the Democrat central city administration in metropolitan area organization can be expected to appear in legislative consideration of expanded "home rule" powers for the central city.

# APPENDIX

## TABLE 1

VOTING COHESION OF COOK COUNTY DELEGATION ON CONTESTED  
ROLL-CALLS: SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Voting co- hesion of Cook County delegation	Number of roll-calls											
	1949		1951		1953		1955		1957*		House	Senate
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate		
91-100	0	2	1	3	0	0	7	13	4	2		
81-90	14	11	5	6	1	2	18	31	9	34		
67-80	26	35	21	24	27	11	57	32	56	30		
less than 67	74	102	135	108	107	42	169	47	253	91		
Total	104	145	162	141	135	65	251	123	322	157		

\*Chicago

TABLE 1.1

VOTING COHESION OF ST. LOUIS CITY, JACKSON COUNTY (KANSAS CITY), AND ST. LOUIS CITY+  
JACKSON COUNTY DELEGATIONS ON CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS: HOUSE SESSION OF 1949  
THROUGH 1957

Voting co- hesion of urban groups	Number of roll-calls											
	1949			1951			1953			1955		
	S.L.	K.C.	S.L.+ K.C.	S.L.	K.C.	S.L.+ K.C.	S.L.	K.C.	S.L.+ K.C.	S.L.	K.C.	S.L.+ K.C.
91-100	3	1	0	2	1	0	13	2	0	7	8	2
81-90	27	23	13	21	8	2	11	9	4	50	14	15
67-80	61	121	82	44	77	43	19	33	25	64	89	79
less than 67	242	188	238	327	308	349	339	338	353	429	439	454
Total	333			394			382			550		388



TABLE 2.1\*

NUMBER OF CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS ON WHICH ST. LOUIS CITY, JACKSON COUNTY (KANSAS CITY),  
AND ST. LOUIS CITY + JACKSON COUNTY DELEGATIONS WON AND LOST WHEN THEY VOTED WITH  
A COHESION OF 67% OR MORE: HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1955 AND 1957

Voting co- hesion of urban groups	Number of Roll-Calls									
	1957					1955				
	S.L.		K.C.		S.L.+K.C.		S.L.		K.C.	
	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost
91-100	28	5	6	4	1	1	7	0	8	0
81-90	54	4	42	0	37	6	49	1	13	1
67-80	60	15	98	18	94	18	48	16	78	4
Total	142	24	146	22	132	25	104	17	99	5
									88	2

\* Losses in this table have been adjusted to account for later action of the Assembly which reversed urban losses. For example, in 1957 the St. Louis City delegation had 24 roll-call losses which were not reversed by subsequent action, and 23 which were reversed. Because of problems of absenteeism in the Missouri Assembly, it is common for several attempts to be made to pass a bill. This pattern of behavior is not found in the Illinois Assembly.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS ON WHICH THE COOK COUNTY  
DELEGATION WON AND LOST WHEN IT VOTED WITH A COHESION OF  
67% OR MORE: HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Voting co- hesion of Cook County delegation	Number of roll-calls									
	1949		1951		1953		1955		1957*	
	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost
91-100	0	0	1	0	0	0	6	1	4	0
81-90	13	1	5	0	2	0	18	0	9	0
67-80	25	1	20	1	25	1	42	15	52	4
Total *Chicago	38	2	26	1	27	1	66	16	65	4

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS ON WHICH THE COOK COUNTY  
DELEGATION WON AND LOST WHEN IT VOTED WITH A COHESION OF  
67% OR MORE: SENATE SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Voting co- hesion of Cook County delegation	Number of roll-calls									
	1949		1951		1953		1955		1957*	
	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost
91-100	0	2	3	0	0	0	13	0	2	0
81-90	11	0	5	1	2	0	14	17	29	5
67-80	22	13	20	4	8	3	12	20	21	9
Total *Chicago	33	15	28	5	10	3	39	37	52	14

NUMBER OF CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS ON WHICH THE COOK COUNTY  
DELEGATION WON AND LOST WHEN IT VOTED WITH A COHESION OF  
67% OR MORE, INCLUDING AT LEAST 51% OF BOTH COOK COUNTY  
DEMOCRATS AND COOK COUNTY REPUBLICANS:  
HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Number of roll-calls										
Voting co- hesion of Cook County delegation	1949		1951		1953		1955		1957*	
	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost
91-100	0	0	1	0	0	0	6	1	0	0
81-90	13	1	5	0	2	0	18	0	8	0
67-80	10	1	18	0	20	1	29	10 <sup>#</sup>	23	1
Total	23	2	24	0	22	1	53	11	31	1
*Chicago #Cook County lost on these ten roll-calls by one vote.										



TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE OF DOWNSTATE DELEGATION OPPOSING COOK COUNTY DELEGATION ON  
ROLL-CALLS ON WHICH THE COOK COUNTY DELEGATION VOTED WITH A COHESION  
OF 67% OR MORE: HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Percentage of downstate dele- gation opposing Cook County delegation	Number of roll-calls														
	1949			1951			1953			1955			1957		
	Cook County Cohesion(%)			Cook County Cohesion(%)			Cook County Cohesion(%)			Cook County Cohesion(%)			Chicago Cohesion(%)		
	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100
91-100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
81-90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
67-80	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	0
51-66	1	2	0	5	2	0	1	1	0	7	0	4	3	0	0
0-50	25	11	0	15	3	1	25	1	0	48	18	2	52	8	4
Total	26	14	0	21	5	1	26	2	0	57	18	7	56	9	4

PERCENTAGE OF OUTSTATE DELEGATION OPPOSING ST. LOUIS CITY, JACKSON COUNTY (KANSAS CITY) AND ST. LOUIS CITY + KANSAS CITY DELEGATIONS WHEN THEY VOTED WITH A COHESION OF 67% OR MORE: HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1955 AND 1957

Percent of outstate op- posing urban groups	Number of roll-calls																	
	1957												1955					
	S.L. Cohesion			K.C. Cohesion			S.L.+K.C. Cohesion			S.L. Cohesion			K.C. Cohesion			S.L.+K.C. Cohesion		
	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100	67- 80	81- 90	91- 100
91-100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
81-90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
67-80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
51-66	7	3	3	2	1	1	8	0	0	5	2	0	1	0	0	9	2	0
0-50	78	66	32	117	144	10	129	13	2	57	48	7	88	14	8	70	15	2
Total	85	69	35	119	145	11	137	13	2	64	50	7	89	14	8	79	15	2





TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ROLL-CALLS OF PARTY VOTES AND URBAN-RURAL VOTES ACCORDING TO DERGE<sup>1</sup> AND  
KEEFE<sup>2</sup> DEFINITIONS: HOUSE SESSION S OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Type of Roll-call	1949		1951		1953		1955		1957	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
All roll-calls	1082	100.0	1117	100.0	1158	100.0	1669	100.0	1860	100.0
Party votes (Derge df.)	33	3.0	24	1.7	19	1.6	30	1.8	90	4.8
Party votes (Keefe df.)	38	3.5	27	1.9	20	1.7	58	3.5	108	5.8
Urban-rural votes (Derge df.)	1	0.09	1	0.07	0	0.	3	0.18	2	0.11
Urban-rural votes (Keefe df.) =	1	0.09	1	0.07	0	0.	2	0.12	3	0.16

1. Derge definition: 67% or more of elected membership of one group opposed to 67% or more of elected membership of other group.

2. Keefe definition: 80% or more of the voting members of one group opposed to 80% or more of voting members of other group.

TABLE 7.1

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ROLL-CALLS OF PARTY VOTES AND URBAN-RURAL VOTES ACCORDING TO DERGE<sup>1</sup> AND  
YOUNG<sup>2</sup> DEFINITIONS: HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Type of Roll-call	1957		1955		1953		1951		1949	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
All roll-calls	928	100.0	1098	100.0	987	100.0	1012	100.0	964	100.0
Party votes (Derge df.)	36	3.9	57	5.2	27	2.7	77	7.6	47	4.9
Party votes (Young df.)	69	7.4	134	12.2	87	8.8	106	10.5	97	10.1
St. Louis vs. outstate (Derge df.)	1	.1	2	.18	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.
St. Louis vs. outstate (Young df.)	3	.32	8	.73	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.
Kansas City vs. outstate (Derge df.)	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.
Kansas City vs. outstate (Keefe df.)	0	0.	3	.27	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.
St. Louis + Kansas City vs. outstate (Derge df.)	0	0.	1	.10	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.
St. Louis + Kansas City vs. outstate (Young df.)	2	.22	1	.10	0	0.	0	0.	0	0.

1. Derge definition: 67% or more of elected membership of one group opposed to 67% or more of elected membership of other group.

2. Young definition: 80% or more of the voting members of one group opposed to 80% or more of the voting members of other group.

TABLE 8

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ROLL-CALLS OF PARTY VOTES AND URBAN-RURAL VOTES ACCORDING TO DERGE<sup>1</sup> AND KEEFE<sup>2</sup> DEFINITION S: SENATE SESSIONS OF 1949 THROUGH 1957

Type of Roll-call	1949		1951		1953		1955		1957	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
All roll-calls	1242	100.0	1376	100.0	1201	100.0	1483	100.0	1564	100.0
Party votes (Derge df.)	60	4.8	34	2.5	13	1.1	20	1.3	26	1.7
Party votes (Keefe df.)	54	4.4	43	3.1	16	1.3	35	2.4	55	3.5
Urban-rural votes (Derge df.)	2	0.16	1	0.07	1	0.08	16 <sup>3</sup>	1.1	8 <sup>5</sup>	0.51
Urban-rural votes (Keefe df.)	3	0.23	2	0.14	5	0.41	29 <sup>4</sup>	2.	15 <sup>6</sup>	1.

1. Derge definition: 67% or more of elected membership of one group opposed to 67% or more of elected membership of other group.

2. Keefe definition: 80% or more of the voting members of one group opposed to 80% or more of voting members of other group.

3. All of these votes met Derge definition of party vote.

4. Eighteen of these votes met Keefe definition of party vote.

5. Seven of these votes met Derge definition of party vote.

6. Fourteen of these votes met Keefe definition of party vote.



TABLE 9

NUMBER OF CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS ON WHICH PARTY GROUPS VOTED WITH A  
COHESION OF 67% OR MORE, AND WERE IN AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT:  
HOUSE SESSIONS OF 1955 AND 1957

	1955		1957	
	N	% all contested roll-calls	N	% all contested roll-calls
Urban Democrats and Repub- licans in agreement	27	10.8	34	10.6
Urban Democrats and Repub- licans in disagreement	31	12.4	95	29.5
All Democrats and Republi- cans in disagreement	30	12.	90	27.9

TABLE 10

LEVEL OF AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT OF THE CHICAGO DEMOCRATS AND  
REPUBLICANS ON 47 ROLL-CALLS INVOLVING URBAN LEGISLATION IN THE  
1957 ILLINOIS HOUSE

	N	%
67% or more Democrats opposed 67% or more Republicans	28	59.5
Democrats and Republicans in disagreement below 67% level	12	25.5
Democrats and Republicans in agreement above 67% level	2	4.5
Democrats and Republicans in agreement below 67% level	5	10.5
Total	47	100.0

TABLE 10.1

LEVEL OF AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT OF ST. LOUIS CITY DELEGATION AND  
ST. LOUIS COUNTY DELEGATION ON 31 ROLL-CALLS ON LEGISLATION RELATING  
TO ST. LOUIS CITY: HOUSE SESSION OF 1957.

	N	%
67% or more of St. Louis City delegation opposed by 67% or more of St. Louis County delegation*	25	81.
St. Louis City and St. Louis County delegations in disagreement below 67% level	3	10.
St. Louis City and St. Louis County in agreement above the 67% level	1	3.
St. Louis City and St. Louis County delegations in agreement below 67% level	2	6.
Total	31	100.

\*Includes passage votes on which St. Louis County delegation withheld support by voting "present" or absenting themselves. This behavior is tantamount to a "no" vote because a constitutional majority of elected members was required for passage.

TABLE 11

SEATS HELD IN 1955 SESSION (OLD APPORTIONMENT) AND 1957 (NEW APPORTIONMENT) BY PARTY GROUPS FROM CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY OUTSIDE OF CHICAGO

HOUSE	1955		1957		% gain or loss in 1957
	N	% all seats	N	% all seats	
Chicago Democrats	34	22.	42	24.	+ 2
Cook County Democrats	1	0.7	7	4.	+ 3.3
Total	35	22.7	49	28.	+ 5.3
Chicago Republicans	20	13.	27	15	+ 2.
Cook County Republicans	2	1.3	14	8.	+ 6.7
Total	22	14.3	41	23	+ 8.7
SENATE	1955		1957		% gain or loss in 1957
	N	% all seats	N	% all seats	
Chicago Democrats	17	33.	15	26.	- 7.
Cook County Democrats	0	0.	0	0.	0.
Total	17	33.	15	26.	- 7.
Chicago Republicans	1	2.	3	5.	+ 3.
Cook County Republicans	1	2.	6	16.	+14.
Total	2	4.	9	21.	+17.



## PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

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### I

Unlike most earlier centuries, one of the fundamental phenomena of our age is the relative frequency with which political systems have collapsed to be displaced by new types of regimes. The increase in the quantity and rate of political change has been especially visible in western Europe where at least the obvious facts of economic distress, war, and conquest help, although in part only, to explain the emergence of new types of political orders. But for the first time the growth of new types of orders has achieved equal prominence in the so-called underdeveloped areas of the world. Although we are all aware of the economic and cultural transformations in these areas and are quite sensitive to their implications for international relations, we cannot neglect the fact that these countries are also experiencing internal political changes of the most profound and often unexpected kind. Aside from any purely theoretical considerations, the fact of the many new political types coming into existence calls for increased attention to ways of studying those forces that contribute to the destruction of existing political regimes and the stability of both old and new ones.

Political change is thus the context within which this essay is to be interpreted. It is an attempt to study one aspect of the dynamics underlying the change of a political system from one basic type to another.

The study of political change has been approached from a number of directions. Among them the main emphasis has been placed upon the role of such factors as the economy, conquest, war, and the religious or general cultural ethos. Little attention in modern research has been paid to the conditions under which a political system can achieve and maintain itself across generations as an integrated unit, thereby stabilizing the given political system. For the most part speculation has tended to look outside the political system, to its environment in the form of the economy or conflict situations, rather than to the actual way in which the system operates, internally, as it were, to perpetuate itself. Although fluctuations in the economy, contacts with new cultures, and the occurrence of military defeats may impose apparently intolerable stresses upon the system, the fact is that many political systems have been able to cope with some of these successfully and emerge, if not unscathed, at least basically unchanged. Witness Britain, the United States and Switzerland in the twentieth century. Others, however, such as the Weimar Republic, the Italian monarchy, Russia and most recently, perhaps France have succumbed.

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This suggests that there may be certain internal factors, involving the political structure and processes, that have made it possible for some of the systems to cope with these external strains where others have failed.

As a means of understanding the nature of these internal political factors, it is helpful to focus on the fact that every system seeks to maintain itself by taking steps to weld its members into a cohesive or integrated political unit. A major task of political processes is to settle differences among individuals that cannot be resolved or regulated through private means. Conflict or dispute lies at the heart of every political system. Since conflict over goals tends to divide and antagonize people, a system could not begin to cope even with the normal stresses of everyday life, let alone the extraordinary demands of war or economic distress, unless it provided a variety of integrative processes. This is especially true for a highly pluralistic society such as our own.

From this point of view, we can shed some new light on why a political system changes its regime or is able to achieve stability over a span of time if for research purposes we pose the following question: What minimal kinds of structures or processes must a system have if it is to maintain itself as an integrated whole from generation to generation? Or alternately, what are the minimal conditions for the continued existence of an integrated political system?

There are of course many factors that contribute to the maintenance of a political system. Here I wish to deal with one only, namely, the one implied in the hypothesis that no system can attain or remain in a condition of integration unless it succeeds in developing among its members a set of shared political values and attitudes as well as a body of shared knowledge about political matters. As they develop toward maturity, the members of the system must develop common expectations with regard to the standards that are to be used in making political evaluations, the way they ought to feel toward political institutions and personalities, and the way they perceive and interpret political phenomena. These three elements I shall call the basic political orientations.

Consensus with regard to these is a necessary although not a sufficient condition for maintenance of a system through time. My assumption is that if in the development from child to adult, convergence of expectations with regard to these basic orientations fails to materialize, then the members of the system will find it difficult if not impossible to cooperate to the degree necessary for making political decisions that are acceptable as legitimate. The Hobbesian war of all against all becomes a real possibility, even though in actual life this outcome is normally avoidable either through the intensification of the other integrative practices or through the use of force, generally thought to be the least successful means over the long run. In any event, if the system does not collapse and disappear, it at least changes its basic form.

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From Plato onwards, the great political theorists have of course recognized that what happens to the child has vital significance for the destinies of a given political system. Modern totalitarian systems, as well as others, have consciously used formal education and special youth organizations to bolster their regimes. Thus although in practice we recognize that the political evolution of the child is critical for the maintenance of a system, there has been little actual research to indicate just what happens in the process of political maturation and how critical this process is. We do not have reliable knowledge about how a child acquires the political outlook that fails or succeeds in integrating him into a given political system and what alternative processes are more or less likely to do so.

## II

Before we can intelligently enter upon a discussion of political socialization of young people, we need to get our conceptual bearings if only because there has been very little in the way of a theoretical structure for research in this area. As I have suggested, it is useful to look at the socialization of consensus as involving the acquisition of three types of basic political orientations. A few simple illustrations will demonstrate what is implied in the case of each of these orientations and will enable us to see their connection with political consensus.

With regard to the way a person orients himself to political knowledge and information, the assumption is that most members of the system must share, in some presently unspecifiable but nonetheless determinate minimal degree, an image of the nature of the political processes, events, institutions, and persons with respect to which they may interact in their political behavior. For example, if for the moment we hold values and attitudes constant and we let one half of the members of the American political system perceive government as consisting of the people and institutions at Washington and the other half view it as a ruling class acting in a concealed and conspiratorial way through puppets at Washington, we could expect this condition to generate far-reaching divisions in party alignments and policy positions. The capacity to work together in the solution of differences depends in some measure upon having a relatively congruent image of political persons and institutions. Although the point is only too apparent when thought about, it is consistently overlooked in discussions of political consensus.

In the case of values, if for the moment we view them as the most general goals toward which members hold that a system should strive, there can be little doubt of their importance for holding a system together. We need only cite the example of Ghana today. There survival of the system is threatened by the great chasm that separates the traditional values of tribal life, as represented in the Ashanti Confederacy, from the modern rationalistic values of Nkrumah embodied as they are in the image of a free representative system stabilized by improvement of the standard of living and objective administration through a technical bureaucracy.



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With regard to attitudes, the assumption is that if differences among major segments of the system with regard to the nature of the affect they display toward perceived political objects passes beyond a certain minimum there will be difficulty in holding the system together. If in important matters relatively equal numbers of members trust and distrust political persons, institutions or processes, stand in awe of them and are disrespectful, feel efficacious and powerless, display interest and indifference, or stand consistently sympathetic and hostile, the possibilities of harmonious political relationships will clearly be reduced if not destroyed.

To say that minimal consensus is necessary for the maintenance of a political system is quite commonplace. By itself it says little that is new or interesting. The intriguing question has always concerned the development of indices to identify such a state and the specification of the conditions under which it might prevail. Nevertheless, what the conceptualization here adds to this statement is a means of breaking down the idea of consensus into its component variables, namely, knowledge, values and attitudes. As it stands, consensus is too vague and undifferentiated a term to be useful. It takes on meaning for research when it is reduced to more easily managed elements. By examining the agreement or disagreement in a system with respect to each of these elements, it would be possible to begin to develop some measure of the degree of overall consensus that could be said to exist. That is, consensus is here defined in terms of congruence of basic orientations.

My problem, however, is not one of studying the conditions under which consensus can be achieved. If it were it would lead us down a rather different conceptual path. We would want to know something about the minimal range of variation in basic orientations that is compatible with the maintenance of a given system, the number of persons who would have to be in agreement at any time, the effect of their concentration or dispersion over the territory covered by a system, and the intensity of the orientations they share. Nevertheless the path we do want to follow in understanding something about the way a system achieves continuity over time, requires us to be able to sort out those orientations that are significant for the maintenance of a system. And the very ones that are significant are those that are involved in the consensual aspects of a system. This is why they are important for us. Therefore in order the better to investigate the way in which socialization contributes to continuity of significant orientations in a system we must pursue the question of consensus a little further.

Not all disagreement or cleavage in the basic orientations of the members in a system need necessarily constitute a threat to its survival. Whether or not it does will depend upon the subject matter or object with respect to which the disagreement prevails. For example, it is obvious that democratic systems manage to survive even in the face of deep cleavages with respect to all these orientations. Party alignments, candidate preferences and issue choices may well reflect the fact that members of the system have adopted widely divergent images of their political opponents, use sharply different criteria for evaluating persons and issues, and feel strongly but

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differently toward the same political figures and parties. Whether or not the mere existence of cleavage in all or some of the basic orientations will constitute a threat to the system depends upon the subject matter in which the differences center.

Although subject matters may show infinite variety and it would be possible to classify them in many ways, from the point of view of the maintenance of a system there are three major objects with respect to which the extent of consensus is vital. I shall call these the government or authorities, the regime, and the political community. These objects or subject matters toward which the basic orientations may be directed represent three different levels of the system.

The utility of analytically dividing the system into these three levels derives from the different relevance and meaning of each for the maintenance of a system. When we speak of changes in a system we may mean one of three things: that the government or day to day authorities have been changed, that the regime or basic form and norms of the system have been altered, or that the community in which the government and regime operate has been broken up into two or more separate systems or fused with another system. It is possible for a system to change at one level alone or at all levels simultaneously and typically in the history of political systems, the rate of change has been greater at the governmental, regime, and community levels in that order.

Just as consensus becomes a manageable term when broken down into its elements, so the idea of maintenance of a system can be useful for research only if we differentiate it into its components. We can now see that the impact of agreement or disagreement in a political system will in part be a function of the object toward which the disagreement is directed. Lack of consensus in basic orientations at the governmental level will usually not have the same consequences as if this condition occurred at one of the other levels. It is for this reason that we can say that the components of the system represent different levels; they are so structured that we can say that one is prior to the other in importance for purposes of understanding how the system is maintained.

Let us look more closely at each of the three possible levels of consensus in a democratic system. The government or authorities consist of all those roles through which the day to day formulation and administration of binding decisions for a society are undertaken. In relating to this object in the political system, members typically display wide and often deep cleavages of attitudes and values. Normally it is not consensus but cleavage that is expected with respect to the political authorities. Members are expected to take opposing views on who is to govern and the policies they are to pursue. This level tends to become one of high tension, if only because the differences that are intrinsic to the situation periodically become magnified through the conflict between parties and interest groups as they seek to settle their disputes.

We would expect therefore that the political orientations applying to government would display the lowest measure of accord. Although there is no comparative material, studies on voting behavior do bear out the fact that there is a considerable measure of disagreement. They reveal not only stable cleavages in the American system along party lines but also substantial diversity of orientations with regard to perceptions of political figures and parties, evaluation of the performance of leaders and parties, stands on issues, and attitudes toward candidates. (1)\*

Not even at the governmental level, however, can cleavages alone prevail. Some minimal degree of consensus is probably required, in order to dull the edges of conflict and division that are periodically sharpened through electoral campaigns. Consensus with regard to the regime will be seen to have this consequence in part. But some ties probably have to be strung between members of the system at the very level with regard to which conflict is taking place if the partisans are not to be flung by the centrifugal force of policy dispute into permanent and irreconcilably hostile camps.

A recent study points to some of the elements of consensus that prevents the partisan members from drifting too far apart, even in the heat of campaigns. Most members of the sample examined in this study tended to agree at least on the agenda of issues that they thought ought to be discussed so that they were not talking past each other. Most also agreed on the criteria to be used in judging the worth of candidates, on a number of specific issues which were thereby removed from the area of contention, and on the meaning and significance of the outcome of the election. (2) But it is of the nature of this level of political interaction that the areas of difference should overshadow those of accord.

Although we have little by way of reliable data on which to rest an analysis, in the case of consensus at the level of the regime the reverse is probably true. A system would not be able to survive if agreement in this case did not overshadow differences.

Basic orientations at the level of the regime may be analyzed in two parts. There are, first, the orientations that relate to the given organization or form of government for which a constitution, written or unwritten, spells out the formal prescriptions both as to structure and allocation of rights and privileges. Although we often assume that there must be agreement with regard to our knowledge or perceptions of the formal structure, limited testing does indicate that if there is considerable consensus, it probably lies in the area of large scale ignorance. This might lead one to suspect that it does not matter much, from the point of view of mere survival, whether the members of the system understand the nature of the formal and informal constitutional provisions. What might prove to be of greater importance is their attitude toward the general form of the political structure. As long as the members are favorably disposed toward the constitutional forms, even if they are vaguely conceived, this will serve to perpetuate them. Knowledge may of course become vital at moments when changes of a far-reaching

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\* Notes appear at end of paper.



character are suggested.

The second part of a regime consists of those customary rules that may be so universally accepted as to become part of the political culture, supported largely by social rather than special legal sanctions. These are, for example, the norms that approve of the existence of a competitive party system, that establish a politics of compromise rather than intransigence, that spell out the so-called rules of the game legitimating a government's actions, that place a premium upon tolerance of opposing points of view rather than upon monolithic conformity, and that impose upon a member the civic duty to adopt a partisan position while showing a deep concern for the common good. Substantial consensus of orientations with regard to this aspect of the regime are probably the necessary conditions for the tolerance of wide and pervasive cleavages at the governmental level. That is, alternations in governments or ruling authorities are feasible only because there is sufficient consensus with regard to orientations toward the regime to provide a stable understructure.

If the maintenance of consensus with regard to the regime is logically prior to the shifting character of government, this is equally the case in the relationship between the regime and the political community. The political community for this purpose consists of an aggregate of persons who seek to solve their problems in common through a shared political structure. The assumption is that the maintenance of a system requires that its members share their orientations with regard to the community itself as an object of perception, evaluation and attitudinal expression. The breakdown of consensus at this level becomes apparent not when governments have changed or regimes have been displaced, but when a large separatist movement forms or civil war threatens. At these moments, if the community is seriously dismembered, the old political regime and governments frequently fall with them.

The utility of analyzing a political system in terms of levels is now apparent. The notion of levels derives its justification from the fact that the absence of consensus at each level, in an ascending order from government to regime to community is usually consistent with the maintenance of other aspects of the political system as long as consensus with regard to basic orientations prevails at the next higher levels. For example, as long as no powerful group challenges the form of the regime or the unity of the given political community, severe conflict at the governmental level with regard to which party is to hold power in any period offers very little threat to the rest of the political system. If no powerful group questions the nature of the regime, the consensus with regard to basic orientations at this level leaves the way free for even deep and protracted pluralistic struggles over control of public policy. To be sure if these governmental or policy conflicts persisted over a long period, the cleavage at this level would filter through to other levels. Typically under these conditions, as the present events in France amply show, dissatisfied groups begin to question the fundamental arrangements themselves. At this point, cleavage at the lower, that is, the governmental level begins to act upon and erode

consensus at the higher level.

And what applies to the relationship between government and regime, is equally true, other things constant, of the relationship between regime and community. Just as governments typically change their character without seriously disturbing the nature of the regime, so regimes may and do change without involving a destruction of the political community. From the seventeenth to the twentieth century the English constitutional order has experienced a variety of profound modifications without at any point bringing into question the existence of the nucleus of the English political community, except to expand or contract the territory under its authority. But as in the case of the possible impact of cleavages at the governmental level upon the regime, similarly if the differences concerning the desirability of a regime become sufficiently great and protracted among powerful groups, both the regime and the community may fall together. This almost occurred in the United States at the time of the Civil War when the community was divided against itself and could well have taken the path toward the establishment of two separate systems.

It is typically the case also when subgroups within a system find that the constitutional order fails to provide sufficient outlet for or recognition of their demands. They may be then driven to seek satisfaction of their needs through the organization of separatist movements, not for the modification of the regime, but for the destruction of the unity of the community. The experience of the split in the political community of India along cultural-religious lines and the organization of two separate political systems rather than the construction of a regime satisfactory to both groups illustrates this point well. No amount of research with regard to the orientations of the Indians toward their regime could by itself satisfactorily account for the breakdown of the community, aside, of course, from the role of the imperial power. We would have to determine not only the effect of the struggle over the regime upon the outlook of the Indians toward a unified community, but also the other factors that helped to weaken and then destroy their image of a unified India as a desirable one, their values that had led them to put a store upon a single community in the past, and their general attitudes toward such a community.

The identification of these three levels of a system, together with the three types of political orientations, provides us with an initial way of conceptualizing the study of political socialization. It means that we need not turn at random to the vast variety of political ideas and attitudes to which young people in a democratic society are exposed. Our structure of concepts, when presented in tabular form, gives us a set of nine cells. Each of these cells represents a kind of orientation is is acquired by each new generation in a political system. In the light of the discussion to this point, I am suggesting that it is worth looking at the socialization of orientations classified in this way if only because the problem of the nature of consensus in relation to them is vital to the overall maintenance of a system.

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## TYPES OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Levels of a Political System	Basic Political Orientations		
	Knowledge	Values	Attitudes
Community			
Regime			
Government			

## III

To appreciate the implications of the conceptual structure proposed here, it is useful to look at the alternative structure implicit in the existing literature that deals with political socialization. This reveals three things: that concern with socialization has been largely peripheral to other interests and therefore there are few reliable data upon which to base any analysis; that the small amount of research that does exist has been geared to the needs and perspectives of disciplines other than political science; and that because of this ancestry, these studies have quite unwittingly been led to confine themselves largely to orientations in that part of the system I have called the government. The last two points call for some extended comments.

Since the research dealing directly with political socialization is so scanty, we must take our cue of the direction in which it is moving from the main body of data out of which odd bits and pieces about the nature of political socialization can be gleaned.(3) These fragments of research have been embodied in general studies of voting behavior, political attitudes, and the relationship of personality to political behavior broadly conceived. The significant point for us is that this research has drawn its inspiration from the needs and objectives of disciplines other than political science, such as social psychology, sociology, and education. It is not strange, therefore, that the research should reflect, not the perspectives of political science, but the needs and objectives of these other disciplines. This fact has had certain important consequences for the nature of the research, as one might expect.



In the first place, the theoretical criteria that dictate the priorities with regard to this research are not necessarily those that would have been attractive to someone immersed in the perspectives of political science. It is well known, for example, that the motivations underlying the Columbia voting studies were closely associated with the needs of social psychology for its study of the way in which people make decisions in various areas of life. Some work had already been done in areas other than politics, but in order to refine techniques for unravelling the determinants of choice, it was useful to construct interviewing methods applicable to large aggregates of persons in the process of making well-defined decisions. Voting provided a natural setting for the development of technical inventions in this area, particularly because the unit of study, that is, the vote, could be so easily identified and isolated.

But it would be naive to imagine that these technical criteria alone account for the selection of voting as an area for intensive investigation. The fact that at the present time politics has begun to emerge as a vital field of activity in the United States has not been irrelevant.(4) Although the methods could equally well have been developed in relation to economic decisions of various sorts, it is clear that in turning to the study of voting social psychology was given the opportunity to apply its methods and theories to an area of transparent social significance and probably of compelling interest to the research workers themselves.

Although the relative ease with which a well-defined unit such as voting could be studied gave some plausibility to the selection of this area for an understanding of the way people arrive at decisions, theoretical justification becomes less tenable when we look at other interests of social psychology. For example, psychologists and sociologists interested in the acquisition, development, diffusion, and assimilation of attitudes could and do refine their theoretical tools in a wide range of substantive fields. The increasing interest shown in politics derives not from any special theoretical problems that are found there but rather from the fact that the substantive conclusions themselves have an obvious and quite practical social significance. Even those dedicated to the study of personality structure have been enticed into pursuing their interests in political situations. Although research into the authoritarian personality might just as easily, and in some ways even more easily, have been pursued in other contexts, as for example within the family where considerable work had been done or within small religious organizations, the unmistakable substantive appeal and policy relevance of a political setting can hardly be overlooked as an active motivation.

I am not of course arguing that just because pressing political matters were selected as areas of research, other disciplines weakened in any way the outcome of their efforts. How useful this research has been from the point of view of any of the given disciplines is not a matter that I am called upon or qualified to discuss. My only point is that although the theoretical relevance of this research to each of the given disciplines may be quite apparent to the members of these disciplines from the point of view of political science there is much that is wanting. The fact that there are shortcomings in this respect is the responsibility not of these disciplines but of political science itself.

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From the point of view of the theoretical needs and perspectives of political science, the contributions of the other disciplines have been of a twofold character. At the level of technical skill and invention, they have been at the least suggestive and at the most, of crucial significance in providing tools for research hitherto inaccessible to political science if only because there was not a sharp awareness of the way in which these tools could be applied directly to politically relevant problems. At the theoretical level, however, where priorities of substantive interest and criteria of relevance are paramount, uncritical acceptance of the problems identified as important for research would result in political scientists abdicating their responsibilities as specialists in their chosen field.

As the result either of accident or the manifest practical relevance of certain areas, the other disciplines have insisted on entering political research largely, although not exclusively, through one door, namely, the one that leads to an understanding of partisanship or political cleavage. The voting studies and their associated or derivative research, have focused on the factors that induce members of a political system to vote the way they do, and to act on behalf of, become involved with, or prefer a given party, candidate, or issue. Voting research has concentrated on understanding why members of a system participate along the existing lines of partisanship. The attitude studies have typically sought to illuminate the sources and characteristics of various kinds of partisan ideological commitments, usually along some kind of right-left or conservative-liberal dimension. And many of the personality inquiries have been intent upon sorting out the determinants of latent or manifest predispositions toward authoritarian as contrasted with democratic political positions which of course have partisan political implications.

The result has been that quite unwittingly, data have piled up with regard to the factors that influence the adoption of partisan positions in a political system. The emphasis has been placed upon the source of political cleavages in a system through alignments in partisan relationships, the acquisition of broadly differentiating political ideologies or response patterns, and the development of a partisan spirit of involvement and concern.

To the limited extent that this research has pushed back into childhood and adolescence for additional information about the influences at work, we have obtained some understanding of the way in which partisanship is socialized in the United States. But once we cast these results within a broader analytic framework, we can see the direction in which current research has been moving. This research has helped us to understand some of the processes at work in socialization but largely at the governmental level where, as we have already seen, partisan cleavages are probably most pronounced. This is not at all an unexpected outcome if we take into consideration that the investigators here were social scientists interested in politics primarily as a secondary area for the application of their techniques and concepts. Such cleavages are the most visible and dramatic upon first inspection and certainly need understanding. But because they are the most

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prominent, they are apt to distract attention from deeper processes also at work.

What has been almost entirely neglected, with a few notable exceptions (5), is that broad substratum of consensus at the regime and community levels within which, we have assumed, the deep-seated cleavages at the governmental level alone becomes possible. And if a system is to perpetuate itself over the generations, then not only would we expect to find that the patterns of political partisanship might display some continuity, but what is of equal importance, we would anticipate that the orientations at the lower levels of the system would have to be transmitted as well. Socialization must occur at all levels of the system. If we confine research to the most obvious level we would be at a loss to explain the way a system does or does not manage to maintain itself through time.

#### IV

With these broad conceptual matters behind us, we can now turn to some of the specific problems that would have to be explored if we wish to understand the way socialization takes place with respect to basic orientations at all levels of a system. Socialization is essentially a learning process through which as a member matures physiologically in a society he acquires a certain range of political orientations. Since it is a learning process we might be justified in assuming, aside from any evidence to the contrary, that if the conclusions of contemporary psychology in areas other than politics such as aggression, sexuality, achievement and dependence, are correct, what is learned early in the process of maturation tends to endure and spills over into the later periods.(6) Not that adults stop learning but their learning takes place within a rather well-defined and therefore limiting matrix of earlier patterns of behavior. All that this means is that in the usual case the rate of change for behavior already learned declines with the increase in age.

With respect to political orientations we need not adopt this conclusion as an untested assumption. The research conducted in the socialization of political participation and partisanship offers certain initial hypotheses that have the advantage of being quite consistent with the conclusions of psychology already mentioned. These political hypotheses indicate, in the first place, that in the United States by the time a person has reached the age of 16, and certainly by the time he has reached his normal legal majority of 21, he has acquired a set of attitudes that it is difficult to distinguish from those of mature adults coming from similar backgrounds.(7) Development of attitudes toward participation, voting and ideology tends to be complete at a relatively early age.

In the second place, not only are these attitudes complete but they have become by this age relatively fixed or stabilized. That is, after the period of adolescence or youth is past, these political orientations may change or develop, but if they do, it is normally at so slow a rate that we



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can say they are stable.(8) For a small part of an adequate sample, of course, significant changes may occur. For most of such a sample partisan orientations would be relatively stable, although changes with regard to party alignment, that is, partisanship as expressed in party identification, would be even less likely than attitude expressed as political ideology.

Partisanship refers to the governmental level of orientations, as has already been pointed out, and we have little evidence as to whether orientations toward regime and community follow the same pattern. Some data seem to show that at least with regard to attitudes toward those rules of the game embodied in certain traditional civil liberties such as tolerance or non-conformity, attitudes and values are relatively fixed and complete by the end of adolescence.(9) We might well surmise on the basis of common sense observations, that other orientations toward community and regime should be even less likely to change than those toward party and ideology.

The reason for this is that in the normal life of a democratic political system it is not only usual but also expected and preferred that members question and scrutinize their ideologies and party preferences. Democratic norms hold that one ought not to vote in a spirit of blind and uncritical loyalty. Change of party affiliation is morally acceptable if not desirable from time to time. But with regard to the regime and community, not only are members normally reluctant to tolerate novel alternatives, but the whole weight of the practical democratic ethic is to put even discussion of the desirability of a radical change beyond the pale of respectability. Even in otherwise tolerant systems, severe social sanctions threaten those who would question the fundamental premises of the regime or community; they may be branded immoral, deviant, subversive, or crackpot. We consider it ethically natural that a system should use whatever means deemed necessary to perpetuate the fundamental character of its political order and the existing unity of its community. For these reasons we might certainly be justified in expecting that research would reveal that orientations at the community and regime levels are much more deeply seated and therefore less easily displaced than those at the governmental level.

If it is true that the stability of governmental orientations can be accounted for as a product of early attachments during the pre-adult stages of life, and if it is also correct to surmise that community and regime orientations would turn out to be at least as tenacious, we would be justified in assuming that something must be happening before adulthood is reached that serves to create these relatively unyielding attachments to community and regime. On the basis of our initial evidence of the significance of a person's early years, therefore, the study of political socialization will make sense only if it pushes back before the adult period and seeks to reveal the way in which a hard core of orientations is transmitted to and inculcated in the young person. We shall for this reason find it is useful to confine the discussion of socialization to this pre-adult period of life. We leave as a separate task an inquiry into

the way in which and the extent to which adult learning and experiences alter and reshape the hard core of patterns acquired at an earlier period.(10)

Our assumption then is that as in other areas of behavior, the pre-adult stages are the vital formative years in political life. We can now ask: What would be a useful way of undertaking research with regard to this formative period?

The approach typically adopted in cleavage research has been a static one. We have snapshots of the kinds of political orientations toward government young people hold at a given time and place or as they change in the historically brief intervals between elections. But for a fuller understanding of how young people come to hold these views, where they come from and where they are going during this early malleable period, it is essential to direct our attention to the developmental aspect of socialization. How do young people acquire the orientations that they come to adopt at each in a number of stages of their social and chronological maturation?

What we have here is a conception of the new-born child as the raw material upon which the society has to work and which will ultimately be processed into an adult with rather stable political orientations. A full understanding of why the outcome is what it is requires us to explore what happens to the child as he advances from infancy through childhood and adolescence or youth to adulthood and as he is subjected to the variety of influences of family, peer groups, schools, and the broader social aggregates of class and status, regional location, ethnic groups and the like.(11)

Several major questions are relevant to such a developmental study. First, it has been suggested that from the perspective of the needs of the individual himself to make an adjustment to American society, if he is to achieve "a satisfying membership in a social group" (12) adolescence is the period when he must begin to behave like an adult. At that period he can be expected to accept many of the social responsibilities of increased maturity, presumably including political responsibilities. Therefore in terms of optimal social development for a child, that is, from a subjective point of view, it might well be better to leave his overall political education to adolescence or at least to late childhood. At that age he would have a mental and emotional apparatus better adapted to dealing with such matters.

Although we have no reliable evidence as to when political socialization actually does begin, we do know that as in the case of other critical areas of social behavior, the child is inevitably exposed to political phenomena at a very tender age. Even if parents and siblings could themselves avoid transmitting to him many of their own orientations, they would find it difficult if not impossible to shelter him from influences outside the home to which he might react. There is no reasonable way in which we could conceive of the postponement to adolescence of all political socialization.

Furthermore, even if this were desirable from the point of view of the child's own progressive development, from the standpoint of the needs of the political system for continuity and integration, it would probably be, if not disastrous, at least dangerous. The danger would arise if only because in terms of contemporary knowledge of childhood, it is axiomatic that many of the most enduring, although not absolutely unchangeable, orientations are acquired by the age of five or six. If it were to push out of this very malleable age period a matter of such vital importance as the continuity of its political system, a society might well unnecessarily imperil its future.

Whatever evidence we have bears witness to the fact that a system does not permit the advantages of early inculcation of political orientations to be overlooked. For example, it is common knowledge that once a child has become sensitive to other persons outside the family situation, he has the opportunity to pose questions charged with considerable political content. And since some answer is normally forthcoming from the adults in his environment, they will find it impossible to avoid transmitting political orientations.

The child typically queries his parents or siblings about the role of policemen, firemen, postmen, soldiers or the flag. These he can scarcely avoid seeing on the streets or in his readily available picture books. Such simple questions as who pays the postman or policeman as compared to who pays daddy, or why do we have to do what the policeman says, immediately create a context in which the parent can circumvent the political elements only with extreme difficulty. Any catalogue of pre-school age children's toys reveals an amazing number with political connotations and it would be interesting to discover how the political meanings are communicated and interpreted at this early age. Symbols such as the flag, related as it is to orientations toward the political community, traditionally draw the interest and pique the curiosity of many children. Furthermore, in societies in which persons are exposed to the stimuli of mass media, whole new ranges of experiences become possible. These are especially significant today when pictorially through television the minor crises of intense political campaigns and their associated rhetoric and symbolisms may pass across the child's horizon.

Coupled to the problem of when political socialization has its start, is a second major question: Are there any well-defined stages, possibly correlated with age, in the further development of the socializing process? Traditionally in the study of pre-adults, the classification of the maturing process is drawn along age lines. The life cycle is broken into infancy, childhood, adolescence or youth, and adulthood. It is true that there is considerable difficulty in distinguishing these stages in our society with any real sharpness; aside from adolescence, they are vague social rather than precise physiological categories.(13) And our society provides few rites or rituals to help us decide when a person has passed over the boundary



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from one category to another. The line between a late adolescent and young adult, for example, is particularly troublesome to define.

Without pausing to debate the utility of this classification for political socialization, we do have data to dispel the older conviction that critical changes in political orientations occur at the time a youth enters the labor market, selects a mate, sets up a household and begins to adopt the normal responsibilities of early adulthood.(14) As has already been mentioned, by the physically mature age of 16, sometime before the average adolescent crosses the threshold into the responsibilities of social maturity today, he has acquired a full bundle of political orientations that differs little from that of adults in the same social groups.

Not only that, but there is some evidence to suggest that the stabilization of development may well take place at an even earlier age, that is, not at the end but by the beginning of adolescence. This would be an important point to establish firmly. A review of the literature and some preliminary scrutiny of raw data presently being gathered from a working and a middle class high school in the Midwest suggest that for those who go on to high school, there is little evidence of substantial development during the whole of the high school period, at least in the area of governmental orientations. The period of adolescence, from about fourteen to sixteen, appears to constitute a plateau in which there may be a certain reinforcement of orientations but few if any significant changes for most persons. And if my suspicion is correct that community and regime orientations are learned even earlier and are more deeply imbedded than governmental ones, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that they too reach a plateau at least at about the same time. The conclusion is apparent. Among the various stages of political development, it would be worth investigating initially whether the period of childhood, both pre-school and elementary school, is not most decisive in the acquisition of political orientations.

This second major question, dealing with the course of political socialization after its inception in early childhood, suggests a third one along similar but more general lines. To what extent is the path along which political socialization moves, continuous or discontinuous?

A number of alternative developmental patterns are theoretically possible.(15) In the discussion to this point the implication has been that political development is probably smooth and continuous. The image is one of the very young person gradually absorbing orientations at the various political levels, each succeeding set of orientations being consistent with the earlier ones and enriching or reinforcing them. The product by adulthood is a full set of more or less compatible orientations in all political levels. The smoothness of the curve would suggest that if we had tested an adult at some point in childhood, later development would not be too different from what we might have expected from a projection of his early orientations. There are data hinting that this is the typical

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developmental pattern at least with respect to partisan and ideological orientations. (16)

There is further implicit in my remarks the notion that age growth does not display a parallel development with political orientations, at least after childhood is past. The process is continuous but tends to stop at a given age. The image here is one in which basic orientations are gradually absorbed up to a young age and then remain constant right through to adulthood, early tutoring having resulted in effectively fixating them so that the individual is encapsulated politically for the rest of his life. When phrased in these explicit terms, this is a course of development that one might find difficult to accept. But if we connect it with our knowledge about the relatively indifferent place politics has in the life of the average adolescent and adult in the United States, the interpretation takes on a somewhat more realistic air and would be worth investigating.

An entirely different course of development is possible however, especially if it should turn out upon actual research that development is not basically complete either by the end of childhood or of adolescence. It is conceivable that the acquisition of orientations is discontinuous at a given point or at various points in the whole of the course of development, with the curve resembling a step-function. There is no reason, as Breslaw (17) suggests, why there could not be periods of latency, during which certain political orientations lie dormant, only to be triggered into a positive and visible response by some social or emotional crisis. The direction in which the orientation might go would not be entirely predictable even if the nature of the latent state was known. This would represent a traumatic course of development as against a continuous one.

Of course no one of these paths of development may emerge but rather some combination of them. It is also entirely likely that different sub-groups in a political system might display substantially different patterns.

A fourth major question concerns the presence of any special order of transmission to young people of the different kinds of orientations linked to each level of a political system. Is a young person more likely to acquire his orientations toward the regime and community before those toward government? A greater measure of consensus is probably necessary at the regime and community level, if a system is to maintain itself, than at the governmental level. At the latter level, as we saw, the cleavages of partisanship are not only present but are themselves a condition of existence for democratic systems. One might therefore suspect that regime and community orientations would be instilled very early.

Although few comparative data are available, we do know that the adult governmental orientation most firmly fixed in the child at an early age is party affiliation as against political ideology. Once acquired, party identification is less likely to change than ideology. No studies have been made

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to attempt to explain why this should be the case although Hyman proposes a number of possible alternative explanations.(18) Party might be socialized early and most readily because of the simplicity of the symbols of party loyalty, the greater degree of direct indoctrination by parent to child, or because of the lesser range of alternatives available.

The fact that party identification is absorbed at an early stage in the child's development does not of course mean that other orientations are necessarily postponed to a later period. It is quite consistent with the data to speculate that orientations to community and regime might arise if not at an earlier period at least simultaneously. If the assumption is made that the child tends to progress in its social learning from the concrete to the general, then parties are not the only concrete political things immediately visible. After all, parties are not themselves visible entities to the young person. What he sees are the symbols and candidates of parties and what he feels are the emotional overtones of his parents about their party preferences.

But if my reasoning about the pre-school age child is correct, the community and regime both have their concrete symbols to which a child is exposed at least as early as he is to party symbols, if not much earlier. The policeman on the corner or in the squadrol and the flag on a public building probably cross the child's horizon much earlier and far more frequently than party symbols. At best, the symbols of parties are episodically visible whereas the symbols of authority constantly present themselves in a variety of forms. A good case can therefore be made for the high visibility in concrete forms at an early stage of a person's development of the symbols of the regime and community and therefore for the likelihood that the child will acquire orientations to these levels, if not before his governmental orientations, at least no later.

Past research may have neglected other orientations in favor of party orientations for two reasons. In the first place, as has already been mentioned, the perspectives of those undertaking research in this area left them prone to probe into the socialization of governmental orientations and therefore it was natural to unearth little information about the comparative time appearance of other orientations. In the second place, research instruments at the present time are better equipped to elicit data about such relatively tangible phenomena as party identification or political ideology. These are areas in our political system about which people either are or can be made to be quite explicit. They are normally a matter for articulation in ordinary interaction between members of a system. Orientations toward community and regime, however, tend to be more subtle and are communicated less explicitly and consciously. They may be less accessible to research with the instruments presently available, at least on the scale of a social survey. Hence on the basis of the information available about the early acquisition of party orientations, it would be premature to conclude that community and regime orientations necessarily come late or last in the ordering of the acquisition of all political orientations.



Indeed, although we lack adequate data and consequently can deal with this matter only speculatively, certain evidence does hint at the hypothesis that community and regime orientations precede the more particular governmental ones, and then perhaps proceed contemporaneously throughout the pre-adult period. It is reasonable to attribute the relative permanence of party identifications to the early stage at which they are acquired. If it is true that what is learned earlier in life, especially by the age of 5 or 6, has a tendency to be least easily dislodged, then we have a clue about the possible period of acquisition of community and regime orientations. All impressionistic evidence points to the fact that these orientations are even more difficult to change than those of partisanship. In part this might be due to the greater sanctions that a system imposes against non-conformity with regard to these as compared to partisan orientations. It would nevertheless be well worth exploring the hypothesis first, that community and regime orientations endure longer and are more intransigent to change and second, that this is due to the fact that they are instilled at a tender and formative age and receive continuous reinforcement through social sanctions.

We have not been able to discuss the order in which political orientations are socialized without touching on the matter of the intensity with which a set of orientations is acquired. From a number of directions we have arrived at the conclusion that community and regime orientations are probably not only acquired at a somewhat earlier stage than governmental orientations, but they are also probably more deeply entrenched. That is, they are less subject to change as the person grows older.

This hypothesis suggests a fifth major question that needs to be asked for a fuller understanding of the processes of political socialization. To what extent are political orientations successfully instilled in young people, in comparison at least with certain other social orientations to be mentioned shortly?

It would be impossible to answer this question adequately without undertaking a full comparative study of the various areas of socialization and devising some techniques for measuring the tenacity of their hold on young people. However, even though precise measurement is not available, there are data that can at least offer us some crude impressions of how effective or enduring socialization may be over the whole range of political orientations at all levels. These data will suggest the hypothesis that, during the period of youth at least, political orientations cling more tenaciously in the minds of young people than certain other values and attitudes adults would like to see securely transmitted to them.

The period of youth plays a special role in American society and it has been the object of extensive research. In fact of all phases of the life cycle, behavior in the period of youth is so markedly different that it has been given the special label, youth culture. The most pronounced feature of this youth culture is its repudiation of a whole range of adult values and

the effort to escape adult expectations and discipline. Where adults measure success and prestige in terms of vocational specialization, youths put a premium on rounded good fellowship; the exemplary individual is the one possessed of a well-developed non-specialized range of interests in the humanistic pattern. Where adults see their destinies in terms of their social responsibilities to family and job, youth seeks to assert itself by deliberately shaking off worldly or adult cares. The youth who merits prestige from his peers is the one who excels in personal attractiveness, popularity, skill in the pleasures of romantic love as confirmed by success in rating and dating, and a keen knowledge of and taste for special types of leisure pursuits such as sports, ultra-modern music, and lively uninhibited types of social dancing.

This phenomenon in which large segments of youth devote their time, energies, and resources to what appear to be trivial pursuits from the point of view of their later responsibilities as adults is peculiar to only a few societies of which America is one and perhaps the foremost. The values of youth are so much a part of our culture as a whole that although from time to time adults may wonder at the meaning and consequences of this behavior and deplore it, nevertheless they have come to accept it. Some have in fact gone even further; they have come to expect that one ought to sow his wild oats while he is young. If irresponsibility is not encouraged it is at least permitted. And older age groups themselves have not proved unwilling to idealize youth and from time to time, out of a romantic nostalgia for this all too fleeting state of irresponsibility and abandonment to the pursuit of pure fun, they even seek to refresh memories and experiences of their own bygone days through imitating youthful behavior.

The reasons why youths turn against adult values in our society have been thoroughly documented.<sup>(19)</sup> We know that adolescence and youth constitute a period of stress and storm for American youth, not for any physiological reasons, as was once supposed, but because of the special position they hold in the social structure. Youth in all societies is a period when young people are confronted with two of their most critical decisions: the choice of a vocation and of a mate. In other societies and in the past of our own, a youth would plunge directly into the tasks of earning a living and raising a family and he would have little doubt as to the paths he ought to take. A son would normally be expected to follow in the vocational footsteps of his father and his mate would be partly if not entirely selected for him by his parents.

Today the path toward job and marriage is strewn with a variety of disconcerting hurdles. Although by the end of adolescence a young person is physically prepared for marriage and well able to undertake a job, the complexities of a technological, changing society prevent him from stepping directly into his father's vocation. In many cases he requires prolonged training for types of jobs unknown in his father's day that will carry him well into adulthood and thereby require a lengthy postponement of marriage. Thus, while physiologically he is at the peak of his sexual and physical powers and is fully capable of having children and holding down a job, he

must relate to the opposite sex with trustworthy virtue and continue to be dependent upon his parents for income and support, a constant cause of irritation and conflict. And, added to this, youth's position on the labor market is marginal; he is the last to be hired and the first to be fired.

These sources of dissatisfaction and internal tension are compounded by the indeterminacy of the choices he must make both with respect to job and mate. Although in the expectations of the community he is supposed to be reaching the point of maturity where he can make these decisions himself, he is not entirely free from supervision by his parents. His position in the family structure in this respect is peculiarly ambiguous. The authoritarian structure of the family in the past gave the parents complete control over the child, even to the point of life or death in some societies. Today, the authoritarian family in the United States has been destroyed as a norm. But even though the youth now stands in a more permissive relationship to his parents, the boundary line between the power of parent and child in day to day choices is not clearly defined, providing another serious source for frustration and friction on both sides.

Youth's ambiguous place in the economic and family structure has led to the description of his overall social position as one of "tolerated parasitism," (20) a phrase invented by adults that in itself carries a strong overtone of disparagement. Confronted at one and the same time with the need to make vital decisions with regard to the future in the way of marriage and vocation and with the incapacities deriving from their position in the social structure, youths have responded with classical withdrawal behavior. In the outcome they have attempted to carve out for themselves an area of life as independent of and alien to that of adults as possible. They have sought to retreat into a world of their own values anchored in the pursuit of pleasures and at the extreme, in social irresponsibility.

In the area of politics, too, we might well anticipate that youth would seek to reject adult modes of behavior and in fact the typical interpretation of youth culture does suggest that this has occurred. But the picture is not entirely clear. Before we can accept this judgment, we must inquire into the kinds of expectations and patterns of behavior adults might consciously or quite unwittingly transmit to young people and then determine the extent to which they have been repudiated.

On the one hand, adults are prone to accept the world that youths have carved out for themselves and to advocate that youths ought to enjoy themselves while they can. Politics is too serious a matter for young people to meddle with. On the other hand, under the impulse from their own democratic values, adults know that youth should be a period in which young citizens prepare themselves for accepting their future civic responsibilities, a period when they might learn that they have obligations to a broader community. This is summed up in the commencement rhetoric that youths are the future leaders of the world. And the curricula of our schools are apt to reflect this ambivalence by attempting to instill in students a consciousness of the need to think in terms of the common good and their future responsibilities as dedicated citizens while at the same time suppressing



everything but the most anaemic and unprovocative discussion of political ideas.

In insisting upon preparation for citizenship at this period, education in a democracy is of course based upon sound principles. The period of youth would seem, on any independent estimate, to be well adapted to inspiring not only an interest in but a positive and serious concern for the welfare of society. Among adults, the demands of vocational specialization with its accompanying narrowness of perspectives is known to inhibit a broad concern for the common good. The demands of a specialized vocation absorb a large part of the emotional energies and interests of adults and tend to separate members of a political system rather than to bring them together. Youths, however, are still humanistically oriented. When we link this with the fact that they are at the peak of their physical and emotional energies and are typically motivated by idealistic principles, the ground seems to be well prepared for the seeding and growth of a strong and thriving drive toward political interest, concern and even participation.

The ambivalence that adults display between the feeling that youths ought not to be burdened down with serious matters and that they ought to be prepared for the grave tasks of citizenship, is further brought to light by the frequency with which adults are prone to deplore the indifference of youth to politics. It seems to suggest that adults believe that youth are repudiating adult orientations to politics.

For example, invidious comparisons are often drawn with the youth of other countries. It is pointed out that in Russia prior to the Revolution, the teenage was the time when young people became sufficiently fired by a purpose and ideology to do more than merely explore political problems intellectually. And in Germany a recent volume has recounted the way youths banded together in the Roamer movement at the turn of the century to rebel against the school system, family and in part the political order, motivated strongly by the feeling that something was wrong with the world and that they could do something now to prepare themselves for doing much more when they grew up.(21)

Other countries have also experienced the spontaneous growth of youth movements with a political motivation.(22) Among them the United States is an exception. Not only have self-generated youth movements of any significant proportions failed to emerge here, but even tutelary organizations with social purposes, that is, youth organizations formed, shaped and supervised by adults, have never embraced more than a tiny fraction of the population.(23) This would certainly seem to bear out the impression that if there has not been a direct and open rejection of adult political orientations, at least there has been little acceptance of them, in itself a form of repudiation.

In the empirical research with regard to the degree of youthful interest and participation in politics we find a similar overtone of dissatisfaction with the political role of youth, as though youths were rejecting adult standards.(24) Numerous investigations have shown incontestably that politics is an area of very low salience for youth in the United States.(25)

Although as young people grow to manhood, they do become better informed politically and more interested, (26) this has been interpreted not as the growth of a genuine concern for political life, but as the outgrowth of a special personality type that inspires American youth to conform to what his peers expect of him. (27) One ought to be informed and interested, not in order to do anything of a serious nature about it, but only to have the inside dope, to be in the know. It does not constitute a basis for possible action, either as a young person, or even later as an adult. Youthful involvement in the form of interest and party alignment is normally paired with well entrenched apathy or indifference. And large segments of youth are neither well informed nor interested. It is true that there are youthful forays of an isolated and limited nature into politics, but these involve only a tiny fragment of the youthful population. Furthermore they are either in the form of a lark as part of the youth culture's permissive way of expressing itself, or they are the slight stirrings of response to deep social crises, as during the great depression of the thirties.

In the face of the rich potentialities for serious political concerns at this period and in the face of the actual political involvement of youth in other countries, this presumed repudiation of adult political expectations is accounted for and in part explained away on a number of grounds. It is said that in the United States the absence of youthful participation is a sign of health in the body politic, that all is going well. It is interpreted as an indication of a basic consensus that gives little cause for getting excited about politics. Although conflicts of interest may exist between social classes or farm and city, they are not deep or intractable. (28) Unlike the case of underdeveloped areas or such countries as Japan, social changes in the United States are neither too rapid nor too sharp to disturb the mind of young people or fire their imagination with a deep sense of wrong. And unlike Germany in the pre-Hitler period, the United States is a land still rich in opportunity so that the youth have no incentive to try to create a world better than the one they know. These factors, it is argued, have made it feasible for the unique American youth culture to grow to proportions so gigantic that although this culture helps to relieve the subjective tensions created by a complex and slowly changing society, it also serves to distract the minds of the young from more serious political matters. By absorbing so much of their energies it leaves little for other pursuits.

There can be no doubt about the validity of these explanations for helping us to understand why young people in the United States have failed to develop a true political consciousness. And yet as persuasive as they are, these explanations do not go to the heart of the matter or tell the whole story. They are based upon the premise that American youth have in fact repudiated adult values with regard to politics in the same way as they have in other areas of behavior. On this premise we are quite correctly called upon to explain how it is that as in the case of social responsibility, sexual behavior, prominence given to leisure and pleasure, personal popularity and the like, youths have also been led to abandon adult patterns in politics.

Close scrutiny forces us to abandon this premise, however. We find that quite unlike other areas of behavior, in the case of politics there has in fact been no repudiation at all. What we have is a peculiar instance in which youths have not only failed to rebel against adult, but have instead followed a pattern of utter conformity, an amazing degree of submissive acceptance of the pattern of behavior of the older generation. What we are called upon to explain is not a failure in the area of socialization in politics, but its very success.

We have been able to accept the implication that as in the case of other areas, socialization has failed with regard to politics as well because, with other critics we have for the moment continued to look, not at the actual patterns of political behavior that are transmitted across the generations, but at the verbal expectations expressed in democratic theory about the civic responsibilities of young people. It is true these democratic values find an outlet in courses on civics in the schools and in democratic rhetoric on the proper occasions. But we know that young people are apt to be sensitive not to the verbal expressions of what is considered right and adequate, but to the actual model that adults present for them to emulate. And if we look at the actual patterns of adult behavior in politics, we find that youthful behavior presents a faithful if pale reflection.

With regard to governmental orientations, where alone considerable empirical data exist, the picture of adult behavior is the very one that adults have been inclined to deplore when they see it mirrored among young people. Although adults as an aggregate do display an interest in and knowledge of politics, it is well known that only a small fraction of the adult population is actively engaged in purposeful political activity, such as participation in political meetings, working for candidates, or contributing money. In spite of the exhortations implicit in democratic philosophy, for adults politics rates far lower than the pursuit of success in terms of wealth and sociability.

But this is precisely the condition in which we find American youth except that as we might expect, the small percentage that actively involves itself in politics is undoubtedly considerably smaller than in the case of adults. Far from repudiating the actual orientations of adults toward politics, observation suggests that youth have faithfully mirrored their adults, that is, that socialization has been only too successful, at least at the governmental level. And my assumption all along has been that what is true for the governmental level is probably equally true at the regime and community levels as well. Youthful orientations, in other words, tend to be traditional with respect to politics, however innovating and variant they may be in other areas of social life.

We can conclude therefore that if this reasoning is correct, we should find in research that in comparison with the other areas of behavior already mentioned, political orientations tend to be transmitted from generation



to generation with a considerably higher degree of success. They represent today highly stable, traditional social patterns across the generations. If anywhere it is here that one can properly apply the aphorism from Pope's Moral Essays, often misquoted in the literature, that "just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined."

We have now touched upon a number of the major problems that would have to be explored if we are to begin to understand the processes underlying political socialization. As in the case of the study of other large aggregates, we would of course expect that the processes might work differently for different subgroups of youths classified not only by age but by ethnic, class, status, regional and other criteria. We would also need to explore the roles played by various agencies, such as the family, schools, peers, and mass media, in the actual transmission of important political orientations. But my major point is that sufficient initial research has been done to make it profitable at the present time to begin to put some real effort into developing an analytic structure for the study of political socialization. Alternately, continued empirical research without the benefit of such conceptualization would only by accident make an important contribution to our understanding of such central puzzles as the way in which a political system manages to maintain and perpetuate itself or the extent to which the processes of socialization contribute to the emergence of changes in a political system.

NOTES

1. A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, The Voter Decides (New York, 1954) and B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago, 1954).
2. B. R. Berelson et al., op. cit., p. 187.
3. An excellent inventory and analysis has recently been completed by H. H. Hyman, in Political Socialization (Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1957).
4. To confirm this, one only needs to look at the last chapter of B. R. Berelson et al., op. cit.
5. An insightful beginning in research at the regime level has been made by David Riesman in Faces in the Crowd (New Haven, 1952). There he discusses partisanship but not in order to discover the determinants of party or ideological alignment. He is interested in discovering the roots of the will and capacity to commit oneself, regardless of the direction of the commitment. That is, he seeks to understand the determinants of the capacity for commitment in a partisan direction rather than the influences at work upon the direction itself. No democratic system could endure long without the existence of such a capacity.
6. For a review of research on socialization in areas other than the political see I. L. Child, "Socialization" in G. Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1954).
7. H. H. Hyman, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. S. A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York, 1955) at p. 105.
10. A beginning has been made in this direction with regard to political socialization by A. Inkeles, "Social Change and Social Character: The Role of Parental Mediation," 11 Journal of Social Issues (1955) 12-23.
11. For development of the child in the social structure see the following classic articles by K. Davis: "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," 5 American Sociological Review (1940) 523-35; "The Child and the Social Structure," 14 Journal of Educational Sociology (1940-41) 217-29; "Adolescence and the Social Structure," 236 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science (1944) 8-16; also T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, 1949) c.XI; and E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York, 1950).

12. S. M. Corey and V. E. Herrick, "The Developmental Tasks of Children and Young People" in F. Henne et. al., Youth, Communication and Libraries (Chicago, 1949).
13. For an overall picture of the adolescent in our society see R. G. Kuhlen, Psychology of Adolescent Development (New York, ) and P. H. Landis, Adolescence and Youth (New York, 1952) 2nd ed.
14. S. De Grazia, The Political Community (1948).
15. Here I lean on an article by B. J. Breslaw, "Development of a Socio-Economic Attitude," 32 Archives of Psychology (1938) Doc. 226.
16. See H. H. Hyman, op. cit.
17. Op. cit.
18. Op. cit.
19. In addition to items already cited, see: J. H. S. Bossard, Sociology of Child Development (New York, 1948); D. Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, 1950); F. T. Spaulding, High School and Life (New York, 1938); H. E. Wilson, Education for Citizenship (New York, 1938).
20. E. B. Reuter, "Sociology of Adolescence," 43 American Journal of Sociology (1937-38) 414-27.
21. H. Becker, German Youth (1946).
22. For Japan, see J. Stoetzel, Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1955).
23. See T. F. Neblett, "Youth Movements in the U. S.," 194 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science (1937) 141-51 and the full bibliography in Youth Movements in U.S. and Foreign Countries (1936) published by Library of Congress, Division of Bibliography.
24. See D. Riesman, op. cit. and P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Motion Pictures, Radio Programs and Youth" in F. Henne, op. cit.
25. See H. H. Hyman, op. cit. and H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, The American Teenager (New York, 1957).
26. H. H. Hyman, op. cit.
27. D. Riesman, op. cit.
28. S. M. Lipset et.al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Voting Behavior" in G. Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1954).



## THE ROLE CONCEPT IN THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE

### LEGISLATURES

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

1. Legislative research and the goals of political analysis
  - a. "End variables" in political inquiry
  - b. Legislative output and "end variables"
2. The problem of a model political actor
  - a. Perception and behavior
  - b. The concept of role
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3. The legislature as a role system
  - a. Roles of the legislator as lawmaker
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  - c. Clientele-oriented roles: the foci of input
    - (1) Party-related role orientations
    - (2) District-related role orientations
    - (3) Pressure group-related role orientations
  - d. Specialization of roles within the legislature
  - e. Systems of roles: some hypotheses
4. The explanation of legislative institutions and processes
  - a. The consequences of legislative role-taking
  - b. The determinants of legislative role-taking
5. Conclusion and road map for the study of legislatures

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The research on state legislative behavior was made possible by grants from the Social Science Research Council. Mr. Wahlke also acknowledges assistance from the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Vanderbilt University, and Mr. Ferguson from the Governmental Research Bureau and the All-University Research Fund of Michigan State University. Mr. Eulau's work was facilitated by a fellowship at The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Neither the Council nor the researchers' institutions are responsible for this study.

# 1. Legislative research and the goals of political analysis.

The term "legislature" is denotatively unambiguous. It directs attention unerringly to the empirical phenomena comprising certain bodies of men, organized in some fashion, doing certain things which are commonly described in studies of legislatures.

## a. End variables in political inquiry.

But knowledge about legislatures requires that what is described be related to something. The various "characteristics" used to describe legislatures, even in the most purely descriptive studies, are conceived of at least inferentially as variables upon which, presumably, other variables depend. Any political scientist has (or will agree others ought to have) some conception of the ultimate questions it is his job as a political scientist to answer. So, schematically, we can diagram the logical structure of the task of legislative analysis as follows:




Figure 1 = The Goal of Legislative Research

The "end-variables," V, W, X, ..., here represent the ultimate dependent variables it is the task of political science to explain, and a,b,c, ..., the characteristics or properties of legislatures which function remotely or proximately as independent variables controlling variations in V,W,X, ... . Explanation involves linking a,b,c, ... to V,W,X, ... with demonstrable and logically related hypotheses.

We can sketch out what seem to be a few developing concepts in the end-variable area - - - the V's, W's, and X's of Figure 1. One such variable is "equilibrium," the stability over time of established and observable relationships among the individuals and groups making up society. Another is "conflict" or "tension," the motivational posture of individuals and groups in society toward one another and toward their relationships one with another. A third is the "power distribution" among individuals and groups in society. It is worth noting that many familiar value-oriented concepts can be treated, at least in part, as synonyms for "good" or "bad" affixed to certain states of these variables according to the preferences of some judger. "Liberal" and "conservative" for example, refer to (among other things) different preferred or unpreferred distributions of power: "responsibility" likewise can connote a preferred relationship of accountability among individuals or groups in society, as it can also connote the capacity of a political system to keep conflict or tension in society below some preferred threshold.

But our goal in current legislative research is not to contribute directly and immediately to construction of this general theory by conceptualizing and explaining the end-variables of political inquiry. We hope legislative research

will contribute eventually to a general theory of politics, but we certainly do not undertake now to investigate directly the key hypotheses of such a theory.

b. Legislative output and end-variables.

We assume that the legislature constitutes a sub-system occupying some definable place in the political system and, therefore, in the social system. Such an assumption inclines one toward curiosity about how the activities of legislatures contribute to the maintenance of equilibrium, the reduction of social tensions, etc. This means we are interested in the "output" of legislative activity, conceived of as a series of "decisions." (The term decision must be conceived broadly enough to include, for example, the total absence of action in the face of demands or expectations for it by individuals or groups in society). We assume that the sum-total of legislative decisions at any given point in time has consequences which can be characterized by three variables.

1. Articulation with other authoritative decisions in the political system. This describes for us a variable explored through comparison of the number and type of legislative decisions (in a given time and place) with those made by other governmental bodies, with the expectations and demands for decisions on the part of individuals and groups in society, as well as with the expectations and demands of members of the legislature themselves.

2. The state of tensions and conflict in the sub-system called the legislature. We assume these are not irrelevant to the tensions and conflicts in society, although we recognize that the linkages between them are a crucial area for political research.

3. The equilibrium of the legislature as a sub-system. Although closely related to it, this is not the same thing as tension and conflict. We assume that in order to function as a decision-making mechanism, the legislature is required to manifest tension, to possess the capacity for constantly focussing and resolving tensions and conflicts. Equilibrium refers to the capacity of the system to perform its tension-focussing, tension-resolving function without significant alteration in the relationships which constitute the legislature as a system.

In terms of the original schematic representation of theoretical goals (see Fig. 1), we have now conceived of "the legislature" as a decision-making system and process, and inserted between it and the original "end-variables" a set of constructed variables directly linked to legislative decisions as shown schematically in Figure 2.






Figure 2: An Approach toward End Variables

This schema represents the rationale of our research; it does not describe the variables directly subjected to research. We have sketched out the conceptual relationships between legislature, output, consequences of output, and end-variables only to keep clear the ultimate objectives of research. Our immediate research interests lie at the extreme left of the diagram. The function of this schema, so far as our research is concerned, is to guide us in constructing a typology of legislative decisions appropriate to later exploration in the direction of the end-variables.

## 2. The Problem of a model political actor.

All conceptions of a legislature picture it to begin with<sup>as</sup> a collection of individuals engaging in various actions. No theory or explanation of why a legislature does what it does, therefore, can altogether dispense with a conception of why individuals do what they do. Some theory or model of individual behavior must underlie every model or theory of legislative behavior.

### a. Perception and behavior.

The most useful as well as most realistic model appears to us to be one emphasizing what might be called the perceptual aspects of human behavior.<sup>1</sup> The guiding ideas of such an approach are essentially those suggested

1. An alternative model, which appears far less realistic, is the rational-man model implicit in a great many political works, particularly those of the popular variety. According to it, the political actor is a man who somehow or other (writers disagree on how) is apprised of an end and engages in actions which he conceives of as means to that end.

A psychoanalytical model, which seeks to explain an individual's behavior or significant proportions of it, by subconscious motivations, particularly mechanisms of sublimation, displacement and projection, has sometimes been used in specialized studies, such as Harold Lasswell's notable works. See Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

In our view, each of these views may afford significant insights into the behavior of persons under certain conditions, but neither is adequate as a

by George Herbert Mead and utilized for political analysis first and most notably by Walter Lippmann.<sup>2</sup> We picture any actor acting politically only in a certain situation, which, from the actor's standpoint, is an objective set of things and persons influenced by his actions and acting with effects on him. We postulate that the actor's view of this situation is a construct and not an exact picture or replica of the "real" situation.

Perception thus becomes (at least for purposes of political analysis) an intervening variable between motivation in the general sense (instinct, drive, purpose) and action. The significant feature of such a concept (again for purposes of political analysis) is that it spans all the alternative models of the individual actor. Whether he is motivated by rational pursuit of an end, subconscious, sublimated, displaced, or projected drives and instincts, or otherwise, insofar as his actions impinge on other persons or objects in a situation, these actions will be in some discoverable relationship to the actor's perception of the objects, persons, and events making up the situation for him. By fastening upon the intervening variable of perception, the political scientist is able to avoid needless commitment to a particular psychological school. Such generality and freedom of choice is justified by the fact that the aim of legislative research is not to explain the idiosyncratic behavior of any individual legislator, not to contribute directly to general theories of individual behavior, but is rather to explain the constellations of individual actions which constitute legislative behavior and to explain their relation to the political system. Our legislative researcher is assumed to be a political scientist, not a psychologist or sociologist, however much he can profit by intellectual collaboration with sociologists and psychologists.

b. The concept of role.

A corollary of the perceptual outlook which leads to the notion serving better than any other as an organizing concept, asserts that an important part of the perceptual apparatus of any actor is his perception of himself, his self-concept. To a large degree, the person sees himself not as a mere isolated and unique "thing" in a universe of unique things, but as standing in certain relationships to other things and persons. The word which refers to his perceptions of his relationships to the things and persons in the universe around him is "role." A person in any situation perceives not merely himself and an "objective" situation; he perceives himself in a series of roles, which he defines to himself in terms of actions and attitudes toward other persons and things. To put it another way, the situation "is," to any actor, largely the roles he thinks himself and others do or should play.<sup>3</sup>

general model of individual behavior. Furthermore, they are both focussed more upon the problem of motivation of individuals than upon the problem of patterns and uniformities of behavior among individuals.

2. See especially Anselm Strauss (ed.) The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956) Parts 4-6 and Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922).

3. An excellent theoretical summary of the concept of role and its relation to other basic concepts in modern sociology is that of S. F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957). Good short statements of the meaning of role and related terms are to be found in Ralph Linton, The

Briefly and oversimply stated, role theory says that all patterned or uniform relationships among persons are described and defined by the expectations of each person in the relationship concerning his own and the others' actions. A businessman behaves one way toward a customer, another to a salesman, and still another to his lawyer. His behavior in each case is largely guided by his conceptions of the actions he thinks appropriate toward the other person as occupant of a role. Moreover, he has expectations of the behavior he thinks appropriate for customers, salesmen and attorneys to take toward him. Still further, his expectations are not of the "whole person" with whom he is dealing but with that person - as-something. His expectations concerning one and the same individual, with respect to both his own and the other's behavior, will vary depending upon the role that person is thought to be playing. Finally, to return to the social character of the term role, it is the fact that persons do entertain stable expectations concerning their own and others' roles that social behavior is distinguishable from mere aggregated or symbiotic behavior of individuals. Society "is" a network of roles. Without such a network, any given number of people is only a collection of persons.

It is for this reason that role-theory is particularly appropriate for investigation of the political system or a sub-system of it like the legislature. In the first place, investigation of the precise character of the roles which make up the system to be studied is useful in any functional analysis of the system. For, knowing the various behaviors thought proper for certain persons in certain circumstances, and knowing the probabilities of their actually engaging in such behavior, we can estimate the chances of the system's functioning to achieve the goals supposedly set for it. We can, in other words, investigate the functionality and dysfunctionality of the various roles constituting the system.

We have referred to the "probabilities" of persons actually playing roles which are expected of them for good reason. For we often find two or more persons in a role-situation entertaining quite incongruent concepts of the roles each is supposedly playing. By definition, of course, a system can support only a certain minimum of such role-incongruence (disagreement about the behaviors appropriate to given roles) and still remain a system. Investigation of the extent and the character of role-incongruence, therefore, can tell us much about the stability or instability of a system, as well as about the character of tensions and conflicts within it.

There remains but one more comment concerning the general role-concept. We have so far talked as if role-relationships exist only between particular individuals, as if they were particularized for innumerable face-to-face sets of persons. This restriction is by no means necessary. It is, in fact, undesirable. Social psychologists have long talked about the "generalized other," just as political scientists have long talked about "the public." There is good grounds for assuming that an individual will see certain actions as appropriate for himself in the light of what he perceives as "public"

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Cultural Background of Personality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947) pp. 76-77; R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, rev. ed. 1957), Chapters 8 and 9; Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).



expectations. So long as we can specify the cues which lead a person to think it proper for him to undertake certain actions, even if there is no particular person toward whom he sees himself acting, we can define his role-concept exactly as if we were dealing with a two-person relationship. No new theoretical problems are raised.

c. Role theory and political theory.

The character of the role-relationship demonstrates the connection between that behavioral approach which concentrates exclusively on uniformities of observed, concrete behavior (actions) and that which incorporates a perceptual focus. For one thing, if roles are the normative sort of thing we have suggested, we can elicit (by questionnaire, e.g.) from any actor his perceptions of the actions he considers appropriate toward any given person in any given situation. We thus elicit action (verbal responses) of the kind the strict behaviorist demands. For another thing, we now have a logical (theoretical) framework which enables us to establish theoretical relationships, working through perceptions, among two or more observed uniformities. We have also a concept so defined that we can always establish empirically, for any desired case, the correspondence between a role-relationship defined by the perceptions of the role-takers and the same relationship defined by an outside observer. In other words, we can dispense with one troublesome theoretical and methodological problem which has at times plagued behavioral researchers. We can be "loose constructionists" with respect to the types of admissible data for empirical research without sacrificing the empirical rigor demanded by strict behaviorists.

In taking "role" for a guide we are doing no more than accepting a model of individual behavior in terms of which we can describe and classify the political behavior of legislators. We acquire, by assuming role theory as a basis, a primitive organizing concept and a limited number of categories for organizing data, but we acquire no hypotheses about relationships among the data. The theoretical power of the concept of role for political analysis stems from the fact that it entails no commitment to or rejection of any existing body of political theory but enables us to incorporate significant contributions from all of them, by interpreting these theories themselves (class, group, etc.) in role terms and thereby relating them to each other.

For example, the concept of role is compatible with the basic premise of group-based theories: that institutionalized governmental groups (e.g. Congress, the Supreme Court, the Democratic National Committee, etc.) are generically comparable and commensurate with all other groups of persons. It goes beyond this, however, to suggest that what significantly differentiates one from the other type of group is the role-concepts of the various group-members and the role-concepts of others in their relationships with group-members. A given citizen plays a role as Chamber-of-Commerce member; he plays a role too as member-of-the-political-community. For him, legislative decisions constitute a significant class of cue-giving actions; for him, the legislature is a "generalized other" toward whom he must play roles. Comparison of his role-concepts respecting legislatures with his role-concepts respecting the Chamber of Commerce and of his with others' role-concepts will go far toward explaining for us the character and functions of the political system in society.

An important concept in the literature of groups and institutions is that of "organization." It should by now be fairly obvious how organization-theory can be translated into role-theory terms. Indeed, the very concept of role began with the attempt to describe and explain something called social "structure." Briefly, organization approached in this way becomes an abstracted system of roles which can be described independently of the particular persons playing those roles at any particular time. An organization can be described in terms of the roles which any person occupying certain statuses (offices) empirically found to constitute the organization will play if they assume those statuses. This brings us back to the conception of institutional groups as sets of offices which specify roles for all incumbents of those offices.

In short, we can conceive any sub-system of the social system as a system of roles. We can describe the principal roles (or statuses, if they are fully abstracted) which make up the sub-system. We can do the same thing for more than one sub-system. We can therefore explore the linkages (through relevant role-relationships) between sub-systems. The concept of role is therefore strategically located whether we wish to move from legislative decisions forward towards explaining "end-variables" of political inquiry or move backward towards explaining why a given system of roles exists in some political sub-system or why individuals occupying certain statuses in that system hold the kinds of role-concepts which produce the role-system we find.

Finally, use of the role concept helps to eliminate some spurious argumentation between "institutionalists" and "behaviorists." The concept of institutions is meaningless if divorced from the behavior of people. The usual way of defining institutions is to call them regularized ways of doing things, which immediately says that institutions are visible only as uniform classes of activity by people. Whatever else they are, institutions are uniformities of behavior. This alone, even without the notion of roles, suggests the futility of dichotomizing behavioral and institutional study into mutually exclusive approaches. This implication is frequently overlooked because many "institutional" studies concentrate upon the functional or what-is-accomplished aspect of the behavioral uniformities called institutions. Use of the role-concept to conceptualize behavior does not require abandoning all concern with functional questions of this sort; on the contrary, we arrived at this organizing concept because we started with just such a concern.

### 3. The legislature as a role-system.

The term "legislator" is more than just a pointer to enable us to distinguish legislators from other human beings; it is the name of a role. It signifies that the person named "legislator" occupies a certain status in a certain group and thereby acquires to obligations to undertake certain actions toward certain people and to forego others. The existence of "rules of the game" in the legislative group or club, often pointed out, attests to the recognition by legislators that they ought to respond to certain cues by other members with appropriate responses of their own. "The role" of legislator is, however, not a simple role played vis-a-vis persons in some other simple role. It is a complex of roles, made up of role-relationships between legislator and legislator, legislator and outsiders, legislator and party leaders, legislator and governor, and so on.

Analysis of legislators' role concepts can best begin with their conceptions of the norms and behaviors entailed in their mutual inter-relations inside the legislature by their general acceptance of "lawmaking" as the generic description of the sum total of their activities. Not every member of a legislature will always accept even this basic premise in building his own role-concepts. The term Opportunist neatly describes the legislator who approaches every colleague in every situation with the thought of utilizing his legislative office and the relationships it makes possible for purposes of his own quite extraneous to the supposed business of the "organization." In our terms, such a legislator is really rejecting all legislative roles. Although physically a member of the legislative body, he accepts none of the expectations of others concerning his legislative behavior as legitimate or binding upon him.

A legislature peopled predominantly (perhaps even noticeably) by Opportunists could not long remain a legislature, if we mean by legislature an institutionalized system, since by such a term we mean that it is a collectivity of actors whose behavior involves a patterned and permanent sequence of acts - a structure of action. What prevents the behavior of legislators from being random and occasions a behavioral pattern continuous through time is the set of role relationships among legislators. And these relationships could not be carried on if the participants did not expect some stability, both in the form and in the content of each other's behavior.

Roles taken in the institutional setting of a legislature, then, may be thought of as the premises which guide legislators with regard to the form and content of their decision-making behavior.<sup>4</sup> There may, of course, exist disagreement with regard to the most desirable form and content of legislative decision-making. If such disagreement were to reach a point where each legislator had a different notion of what form and content the legislative process should have, the legislature as an institution would disintegrate, for an undue multiplicity of orientations would make it impossible to take appropriate roles. The relationship among the legislative actors, if one can speak of a relationship at all, would be symbiotic rather than social. This does not mean, however, that only one conception of what is a proper legislative or representational role is a prerequisite for institutionalized behavior. Because the legislature is an institutionalized group, a range of role orientations is more likely than a single legislator-role concept. The functional requirements of a legislature are varied and permit choice among roles which are germane to the maintenance of the legislative system.

The distinction between the content and the form of role behavior suggests the importance of distinguishing between the legislator's legislative role proper, which is focused on the substantive goals of legislation - the what for of the legislative process - and his representational role, which has as its focus of attention the process of legislation - the how of the decision-making process.

a. The roles of the legislator as lawmaker (The legislative role proper).

Legislation may have at least four major types of content. First, the creation of policies necessary to adjust the political system to the ever changing needs of the larger social system and to maintain the polity as an

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4. For the conception that roles constitute the premises of decision-making behavior, see Herbert A. Simon's introduction to the revised edition of Administrative Behavior (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957).



authoritative decision-making mechanism for the social system. Second, the coordination and integration of possibly conflicting interests and demands in terms of a minimum conception of the public weal. Third, the articulation and achievement of popular needs, wants or preferences. And fourth, the passage of legislation necessary for the performance of those services which the polity is expected to render as a matter of course.

Each of these major types of legislative objective requires that legislators take roles appropriate to their achievement. Theoretically, each legislator could take at least four legislative roles, then, which are geared to the four objectives of legislation. In practice, of course, there will be a division of labor, with some legislators taking only one role, while other legislators may take two or more roles simultaneously. Insofar as it is possible to identify the roles which legislators take, it is possible to say what premises guide them in their decision-making behavior as this pertains to the content of legislation.

Four major role orientations appropriate to the content of legislation have been identified. The Inventor as a role-type stresses the policy-creating aspects of legislation. The Broker emphasizes the coordinating and integrating function of legislation. The Tribune articulates the democratic focus of legislative action and works for the realization of popular aims. The Ritualist is concerned with the passage of routine legislation. What each of these roles has in common is their focus on the content of legislation, the what of legislative activity. Legislators relate themselves to each other in terms of these roles. Their taking these legislative roles patterns their behavior in reference to the content of legislative action and makes it more or less predictable - subject, of course, to the fact that they also may take other, possibly conflicting, roles in other political sub-systems which may also guide their decisions.

b. Representational roles.

As a sub-system of the political system,<sup>5</sup> the legislature is a legitimate and authoritative decision-making institution. What makes the legislature legitimate and authoritative is its representational character.<sup>6</sup> It is through the process of representation that the legislature is linked to other political sub-systems. How this linkage is perceived by legislators in their formal position as representatives is particularly relevant to their decision-making behavior. Different orientations towards the bond between

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5. Other political sub-systems pertinent to legislation are: the legislative district system, the party system, the lobby system, and the administrative system.

6. It is through representation - whatever the unit represented may be - that the legislature, though a relatively small group of persons, is empowered to act for the whole body politic, or legitimized. And it is because, by virtue of representation, they participate in the legislative process that the represented accept legislative decisions as authoritative.

legislators and their clienteles give rise to different representational roles. These roles constitute the premises of how decisions ought to be made in the legislative process.

Two major orientations have been traditionally postulated as to how legislators as representatives ought to make up their minds as they approach the task of legislation. First, the legislator as representative should act on the basis of his own conscience, convictions, principles, best judgment, appraisal of the issues and understanding of the facts involved in an issue. Second, the legislator as representative should decide on the basis of instructions, preferences or demands which reach him from his clientele.<sup>7</sup> A third orientation may be suggested: the legislator should make his decisions as circumstances require, sometimes relying on his own convictions or judgment, sometimes following a mandate, possibly even harmonizing both approaches - for precisely because the clientele may be heterogeneous, instructions may be conflicting, so that judgment is called for to reconcile divergent demands.

Three major representational roles have been identified, corresponding to these three conceptions of the how of legislative behavior. The Trustee is expected to act as a free agent, unhampered by instructions from clienteles. The Delegate is expected to follow an imperative mandate from the represented to which he must subordinate his own principles or best judgment. The Politician is expected to follow one line of action or the other, or to harmonize both, depending on conditions and circumstances. These representational roles, then, provide the premises of how legislators as representatives are likely to proceed in the course of law-making.

c. Clientele roles: the foci of input.

We have already said that representation is the link between the legislature and the public, emphasizing that this link takes place not only through the legislator's role-relations with his district but through role-relations with various clienteles.<sup>8</sup> Observation as well as the literature of

7. Following the classic arguments of Edmund Burke, political scientists have traditionally treated the problem of representation as if the legislator's choice was solely that between "his own conscience" and instructions from his district, or constituency. In view of the many "publics" we now think significant for legislators, we can now see that Burke's argument was aimed at only a special case, that the legislator faces similar choice not only vis-a-vis his district in the legal, electoral sense, but in respect to many other clienteles - of which party, administration, and significant pressure groups constitute the most outstanding examples. The distinctions among role-types which follow are generic distinctions which do not tell us which of these clienteles is more salient for a legislator. Problems of this kind are treated in section 3c below.

8. The concept of "overlapping memberships" of legislators, as discussed by David Truman (The Governmental Process, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, pp. 332-343), comes close to the notion we are here setting forth. In the language of role-theory, role-relationships of group-members (in this case legislators) with non-group-members (in this case, lobbyists, powerful constituents, party leaders, etc.) define the boundaries of groups and, more important, are the

legislative analysis suggests that at least four clienteles - their formal constituencies (districts), political parties, pressure groups, and the administration - are of major significance in the eyes of Western legislators generally, though individual legislators may disagree upon the exact order of significance among them. With each of these clienteles (or persons representing them), the legislator is required by the facts of interaction to maintain some role-relationship as legislator. With each or all of them he may also be related in other, non-legislative roles (e.g. as Chairman of a party committee, as Executive Secretary of a manufacturers' association, or as brother-in-law of the Comptroller of the Treasury. If such is the case, we should want to know how these extra-legislative role-relations affected his role orientations as legislator toward the person or group in question. But this is a special case. Ordinarily we can expect to deal primarily with relationships which come about only because the legislator is a legislator.

Just as we found not a single role-orientation but alternative and sequential role-orientations in discussing representational and internal legislative roles, so we can expect not one but various orientations in legislators' roles in relation to each of the major foci of attention which constitute an element of "input" into the legislative system from the respective sub-systems. Since we are dealing with sub-systems outside the legislative system, a major dimension of a person's role orientation toward any one of them will concern the saliency of that sub-system for him. Saliency, in this case, will reflect both his cognition or awareness of the sub-system in question and his affective inclinations toward it--i.e., like or dislike of it.

(1) Party-related role-orientations.

Although the language of role has not been utilized directly, discussions of party influence in legislatures have often hinted at the possible varieties of role orientation among which legislators choose. The name party man signifies one such type, the legislator who listens willingly, if not eagerly, to cues and clues from party leaders, voting as party leaders suggest, helping out in campaigns for party candidates, serving in party offices, and so on. Equally familiar is the independent, who refuses to look upon cues from party-leaders as exceptionally authoritative or important in his own decision-making, even though he may perform

mechanisms by which groups are related to groups. The language of role seems more appropriate than the language of groups for analyzing such phenomena, since we have to deal here with legislators' relationships with, say, the C.I.O., the League of Women Voters, the local Taxpayers Association, the local Republican Committee, the governor's Budget Office, and many other groups, in very few of which does he hold any sort of "membership." "Overlapping membership," it seems probable, describes a very special situation which we might expect to affect significantly a particular legislator's relations with a particular clientele. But it is hardly the generic relationship linking the legislature to the world outside. For a study of the effects on a legislator's role-concepts of such a special situation, see John H. Millett, "The Role of an Interest Group Leader in the House of Commons," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1956), pp. 915-926.



minor chores for party officials and agencies in political campaigns. Almost as well known is the maverick, who refuses to value at all the cues of party agents and may, in extreme cases, delight in confusing and confounding them by his actions both in voting and in campaigns.

(2) District-related role-orientations.

In the same way, some legislators will put a high value on their district and cues from people in it, interpreting proposed legislation in the light of its effect on the district, thinking up legislation for the principal benefit of the district, and so on. Such a district-oriented legislator has a quite different conception of his role in relation to district than does the state-oriented legislator<sup>9</sup>, who conceives his job to necessitate transcending local and particular concerns, thinking broadly of "the interests of the whole state" rather than parochially of "the narrow local interest." Moreover, those who are district-oriented may entertain different conceptions of the kinds of action involved in "serving the district." A mentor will think it one of his principal duties to educate and enlighten the people of his district, informing them, through letters, speeches, etc., of important issues of the day and thereby keeping them in touch with the large issues transcending the locality. The servant will conceive his duty, however, to be simply that of listening to constituents, conveying their wishes to the legislature, and seeking through his votes and otherwise to enact those wishes into law.<sup>10</sup> Also familiar to students of modern government is the errand boy, who thinks in terms of petty and time-consuming non-legislative services to people from his district - introductions to administration officials, guidance through the capitol, assistance in job-seeking, and so on.

(3) Pressure group-related role orientations.

Political scientists have long sought to persuade the general public that pressure groups, far from being the evil anti-public-interest beings popular opinion supposedly considers them to be, are useful instruments of government. A similar difference in judgment among legislators gives rise to different role-orientations toward pressure groups. Some legislators, persuaded of the legitimacy and utility of interest group organizations as expressive of public aspiration, will play the role of facilitators, listening willingly to the pleas and arguments of group agents, turning to them for advice and information, and generally easing the way for legislative consideration of group demands. Other legislators, convinced of the pernicious influence of such organizations, will play the role of resisters, turning aside from all group representatives, refusing to admit the legitimacy of framing public policy with a view to its effects on any "special interest." Some, knowing little and not caring much one way or the other about organizations of interests, will play non-group-oriented roles, governing their behavior toward each group as they

9. This is Burke's "trustee."

10. This is Burke's "delegate."

are faced with it in the light of other role-orientations and other considerations than a strong and continuing general conception of how legislators should deal with pressure groups.

Since legislators deal with a multitude of pressure groups, whereas they deal usually with only two parties and one district, they may be expected to play particular roles toward one or another group which, while ordinarily consistent with their generalized role-orientation, go beyond it in shaping their legislative actions. For example, the advocate will, in almost precisely the lawyer's sense of the word, look after the interest of one particular group (or at most a few), representing it in much the same fashion that "delegate theories" of representation would have a legislator represent his district. Closely related to him is the Nemesis, who plays a role toward a particular group or a few groups not of representing their interests, but of seeking to block and frustrate them at every turn. Less easy to detect, but no doubt also significant, are the legislators who play the role of hostage, who for one reason or another, unwillingly but consciously advance the cause of the group in the legislative arena. Still more difficult to detect are those who play the role of pawn to one or another interest group, consciously responding to cues from certain groups, but in such a way as to produce effects they never expect but the cue-givers do.

d. Specialization and particularization of roles within the legislature.

Some individual legislators assume specialized roles by virtue of the formal structure and organization of the legislature - the roles of the Speaker, the Committee Chairman, the Rules Committee member, and so on are obvious and important examples. It is important to bear in mind that the character of these roles is not found wholly set forth in the rules and statutes, but is subject to modification and to varying interpretation just as was the character of other major role components sketched out above. The role of the presiding officer, for example, involves not only the legal prescription of his duties but his own conception of his job and the expectations of the members concerning that role. We need not here go into the various alternative role-orientations possible, since these are more familiar to students of the legislative process than those in the areas discussed above.<sup>11</sup> The same holds true of the less formalized offices in the legislative authority-structure - the roles of party leaders in particular.

One role not frequently mentioned, however, assumed by some individual members, is that of expert on one or another subject matter field.<sup>12</sup> In so far

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11. For an excellent study of some alternative conceptions of the roles of "committee member", see Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," American Political Science Review, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 340-365.

12. Such a role is explicitly recognized and described by Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government (New York: Henry Holt, rev. ed., 1949), p. 362.

as certain legislators consider themselves experts in a particular field, and are so perceived by their colleagues, they play an important role in linking the legislative system to the social system in general as well as to other parts of the political system. Moreover, experts may be conceived of as "functional authorities" who may or may not overlap with "formal authorities" in the legislative system. The degree to which expert roles are taken depends, probably, on the social and economic complexity of a given social system and the need to come to terms with this complexity in legislative decisions.

e. The system of roles.

We can summarize the general relationships among the various component role-orientations just described by means of the diagram in Figure 2. What we have so far said, briefly, is that most legislators, can be expected to choose




Figure 3: The Legislative System



one or more roles in each of the five major areas shown in Figure 2. The legislature as a system is the network of relationships among legislators described by the particular roles they play.

Since the legislature is a system, we should expect to find not random distributions and combinations among the various roles but a meaningful pattern or system of roles. Not all possible roles are compatible in the role-concepts of any given legislator. In particular, it is probably the interpenetration of legislative and representational roles which most nearly characterizes the role system of any given legislature, for the legislature is, in Western society, an institutionalized group supposedly functioning to make legitimate and authoritative decisions and is endowed with its legitimacy through the processes of representation. It is therefore worth spelling out in some detail the relationships among roles in these two areas, leaving the relations between others to be sketched less fully.

The most general hypothesis about the legislature as a role system advanced here is that legislators whose roles are oriented towards the substance of legislation will take those representational roles which are most conducive to the performance of their legislative or content-oriented roles. Implicit in this hypothesis is, of course, the assumption that representational roles, being geared to the how of legislative behavior, are clearly secondary - that they would make little sense without being related to goal-oriented roles. In other words, it is hypothesized that there are significant differences between legislative role types, with their focus on the what of legislation, in respect to their taking representational roles whose focus is the how of legislation. In order to test this general hypothesis of the association of legislative and representational roles, we shall suggest a series of more detailed hypotheses concerning particular relationships between the various role types.

Hypothesis #1: Inventors rather than Brokers or Tribunes are more likely to be Trustees.

Hypothesis #1a: There is a closer association between the Inventor role and the Trustee role than between the Inventor role and the Politician or Delegate roles.

Inventors, unlike Brokers or Tribunes, are oriented primarily towards the formulation and implementation of the general welfare or of particular new policies thought to be in the public interest. Inventors are likely to be ahead of Brokers or Tribunes in creative imagination and endeavour. They cannot afford to be dependent on instructions, nor can they afford to make many compromises, without losing their raison d'etre. Rather, they must be legislators who are guided in their decision-making behavior by their convictions or their judgment of what public policy ought to be. Hence, they should differ from both Brokers and Tribunes in the proportion of Trustees they include. And their role type should be more closely associated with that of Trustee in contrast to Politician or Delegate.

Hypothesis #2: Brokers rather than Inventors or Tribunes are more likely to be Politicians.

Hypothesis #2a: There is a closer association between the Broker role and the Trustee role than between the Broker role and the Politician and Delegate roles.

At a first glance, these two hypotheses seem to be in conflict. But they are not. It is the Broker's role to reconcile, weigh and balance conflicting demands through legislation which is widely acceptable. In doing so, he may have to pay attention, like the Delegate, to instructions that may reach him. But unlike the Delegate, he will not automatically follow these instructions. On the contrary, precisely because these instructions are likely to be in conflict, he must act like the Trustee and use his own judgment. Hence the role of Broker is likely to be more closely associated with that of Trustee than of Politician or Delegate. But the Broker should differ from the Inventor and Tribune in that he is more likely to take both the Trustee and Delegate roles, i.e. the role of Politician. One should, therefore, find a greater proportion of Politicians among the Brokers than among the Inventors or Tribunes.

Hypothesis #3: Tribunes rather than Inventors or Brokers are more likely to be Delegates.

Hypothesis #3a: The Tribune role need not be associated any more with the Delegate role than the Trustee role.

The legislative objective of the Tribune is to satisfy popular needs and wishes, either by promotion of certain laws or by opposition to programs which he thinks are detrimental to people's interests. Because his outward focus of attention is "the people," he is more likely than either the Inventor or the Broker to accept instructions from clienteles, and Delegates should appear more frequently among Tribunes than among the other two legislative role types. On the other hand, the Tribune need not follow instructions as he makes decisions in the interest of people. He may feel that he must rely on his own principles or judgment as he promotes the popular cause. In other words, the Tribune has available more alternatives than either the Inventor or the Broker of how to make his decisions. Hence the degree of association between the Inventor role and the representational roles can be expected to be zero or very low.

No hypothesis could be entertained concerning the relationship between the legislative role of Ritualist and representational roles. While the Ritualist's focus is on law-making as the central core of the legislative role as such, his orientation is essentially neutral with respect to the content of legislation. Hence the Ritualist's role does not lend itself to hypothesizing about the interpenetration of legislative and representational roles.

In addition to the "pure" legislative roles, these roles may be segmentalized in terms of the different orientations possible with respect to the content of legislation. In other words, a legislator can take two or more legislative roles simultaneously. As none of these roles are mutually exclusive, no conflict of role orientations as such can be postulated, though it may be assumed that legislative roles in combination may either strengthen or weaken the effect of their orientational components. Hence analysis of the relationship

between segmentalized legislative roles and representational roles may serve as a secondary test in appraising the consistency of the relationships suggested in hypotheses one through three. Where the orientational components of segmentalized roles are similarly geared to representational roles, one should expect a similar distributive pattern as in the case of the singular legislative roles.

The ways in which the legislative and representational roles which are internal to the legislature are most likely to combine with various clientele-oriented roles can be suggested very briefly. District-oriented legislators, for example, may be either Trustees or Delegates; but Servants among them are likely to be more often Delegates. State-oriented legislators however, can be expected to be more often Trustees than Delegates. With respect to legislative roles proper, we should expect State-oriented legislators to be more often Inventors or Brokers than Tribunes, while District-oriented legislators may equally well be either Inventors or Tribunes and almost as easily be Brokers.

We should expect more Party Men than Independents or Mavericks to be Delegates, just as we should expect more Party Men than either Independents or Mavericks to be Inventors. Independents and Mavericks, accordingly, are more likely than Party Men to be Tribunes.

Facilitators in group-oriented roles will more often be Inventors or Brokers than will Resisters, who, in turn will tend more than Facilitators to be Tribunes. Similarly, Facilitators are more likely than Resisters to be Politicians, whereas Resisters are more likely to be Delegates. Resisters may be Trustees, however, as readily as may Facilitators.

With respect to relationships among the role-orientations toward different clienteles we likewise should expect certain patterns of role-combination. It is unlikely that a legislator will be simultaneously a District-oriented, a Party Man, and a Facilitator, since each of these roles involves, to a certain extent, an inclination to see one particular clientele as particularly salient among all the input foci. A State-oriented legislator, however, may well be both a Party Man and a Resister, or a Resister and an Independent.

Limitations of time and space prevent our saying more about the mutual inter-relationships which make up the system of roles. But enough has been said to illustrate sufficiently the process by which hypotheses concerning the role system are derived from a theory conceiving the legislature as a role-system.

#### 4. The explanation of legislative institutions and processes.

The conceptual apparatus describing legislatures as role-systems is now a more genuine model in that it incorporates several working hypotheses and tells us what variables have to be measured and how they can initially be related to each other. But to attain genuine knowledge about government and politics we must relate the system of roles both to consequences and to causes (explanations).



a. The consequences of legislative role-playing.

We can relate the role-conceptions of an individual legislator to his actions and behavior as a legislator, thus extending our model in the direction of the end-variables (toward further dependent variables). We can, that is, explain certain features of the behavior of individual legislators which have been the concern of political scientists since the study of legislatures began. Some of the more important individual-action variables to be investigated are:

- (1) The legislator's voting and related actions: speeches, sponsorship of bills, attendance at sessions, work in committees, etc.
- (2) The character of his participation: leadership roles assumed, active/passive participation, etc.
- (3) His issue- (policy-) orientation on specific issues or classes of issues.
- (4) His affiliation or participation with blocs and informal groups, especially voting blocs.

Such individual-action variables are of interest because they are the theoretical links between legislative roles and the institutional-action variables which, in turn, link the study of legislatures to more general problems of political science. One set of institutional-action variables relates to the set of decisions, or character of output, of the legislative sub-system. Here we are interested in investigating variations in output of at least the following sorts:

- (1) Activity/passivity: the proportion of demands and expectations (by persons and groups in society) on which action is taken.
- (2) Subject matter: the kinds of questions for which decisions are and are not made (e.g., supervision/investigation of administration, selection of governmental personnel, socio-economic and other issue-decisions).
- (3) Finality (authoritativeness): the probability that any given legislative action will be the last one of its kind for some specified time under specified conditions.

Closely connected to the individual- and institutional-action variables just described are certain other characteristics of the legislature as a system which may be called structural variables.

- (1) Attention patterns
  - (a) Time-allocation to different procedures and practices.
  - (b) Communication nets.
  - (c) "Issue tolerance," or probability of action on different types of issues.

(2) Leadership - and power-structure

- (a) Internal to legislature (officers, party leaders, committee chairmen, etc.)
- (b) External to legislature (governor, administrative heads, party-organization leaders, "bosses," etc.)

(3) Inter-personal groupings (extra-functional, i.e., extraneous to legislative roles per se)

- (a) Friendship groups
- (b) Voting blocs
- (c) Hostilities and cleavages

These structural variables are in one sense the product of, i.e., constituted by, the role-concepts of the legislative members, yet they appear, in another sense, to be "objects" perceivable by the legislators. It is important here to avoid the trap of reification and to recognize that the "structure" we as analysts see through variables like these is wholly a construct of our own. As such, we can logically deduce its character in any particular case from the role-concepts of legislative actors, or we can infer its character from observing the manifest actions of those same actors.

A set of variables closely related to the structural variables just mentioned is that relating the functionality of different role orientations and systems of role to the legislative system. For example, we can examine the extent to which each role and the constellation of roles contributes to the following functions:

- (1) Promoting cohesion or harmony within the group.
- (2) Expediting the business of the legislature.
- (3) Stabilizing and maintaining the system itself.
- (4) Crystallizing and channeling conflict: i.e., focussing issues and thus facilitating choice by the members.

All these sorts of investigation - in regard to individual action, institutional action, and structural variables - lead us in the direction of our "end-variables" of political inquiry and facilitate the explanation of variations in legislative output which, in turn, relate to the variables of ultimate concern to political science. The relation of these various branches of legislative study to the legislative as a role system is schematically represented in Figure 4.




Figure 4: The Consequences of legislative roles

b. The determinants of legislative role-playing

A theory of legislatures which explains legislative output in terms of the role-system of the legislature should go on to explain that role-system itself - to account for one legislature's exhibiting one kind of role-system and another legislature a different one. It must suggest what determines the kind of role-system a legislature displays.

The vast bulk of legal and formal studies of legislatures suggests a likely starting-point. It is not at all unreasonable to hypothesize that many role actions of legislators will be seen by them as prescribed by constitutions, statutes, by-laws, rules of procedure, and other formal enactments. Such enactments create at least the skeletons of roles for all legislators to play and, in fact, "create" roles for many of them by setting up offices and prescribed relationships. Among enacted role requirements we may list:



- (1) (Certain) procedures and practices: debate, hearings, etc.: formal steps, such as bill-introduction, bill-reading, bill-passage.
- (2) Spheres of competency: prescribed and proscribed objects of legislative actions in general and of individual legislators' actions.
- (3) Official roles: Speaker, committee chairmen, other formally prescribed agents.

Observation as well as theory suggests that this source of legislative role-behavior has been greatly undervalued in the reactions of some "new political scientists" to the more traditional ones, and that the formal or legal approach to the study of political institutions generally may have contained more truth than it has lately been given credit for. This can be illustrated by considering the problem of explaining judicial behavior in the judicial process. In spite of the great interest of some political scientists in psychoanalyzing judges or in historical research to discover "what the judges had for breakfast," the most reliable predictor of a judge's decision is still an understanding of the legal doctrines every judge considers it his role to apply. Over-valuation of this factor by traditional constitutional-law studies is far less serious than its omission in some less traditional attempts to explain judicial behavior.

Closely related to the legal-constitutional and other enacted role requirements imposed on a man when he becomes a legislator are certain features of organization and structure so permanent and fixed as to constitute major landmarks in the legislative situation. These situational landmarks include such features of the internal situation in the legislature as:

- (1) Number of chambers.
- (2) Size of legislative body.
- (3) Length and type of session.
- (4) Staffing, services, facilities for legislative work.

Also included here would be many regularized (but not "enacted") characteristics of the legislative-executive and the legislative-judicial relationship and of relationships with other governmental bodies (e.g. federal government agencies, local governments, and special-purpose governments). It is sufficient for our purposes here to mention these without attempting to categorize and classify the significant types of relationship which constitute landmarks for legislators.

Such landmarks in the legislative situation serve to mark out the area in which a legislator acts, to suggest to him whole classes of behavior which are appropriate or inappropriate. While they may not always directly prescribe behavior for him, as do the enacted role-requirements, they do greatly limit and point up the choices he might face in acting as a legislator. Like the enacted role requirements, situational landmarks are universally present for every person as soon as he becomes a legislator. They might be called, as might enacted role requirements, situational variables, since they in some sense surround every legislative action.

While each legislator in shaping his role concepts is subjected equally to these situational influences, the fact that not all legislators entertain identical role concepts makes it clear that other influences govern the way legislators respond to situational variables, determine the way in which the imperatives of situational determinants are incorporated into the composite role-concepts of each legislator. What are the significant clusters of variables to consider here?

To begin with, a critical question about any role system concerns the manner in which role-players are recruited to their respective roles. Whether we use the terminology which distinguishes "achievement roles" from "recruitment roles" or that which distinguishes between ascribed and achieved status, it is plain that in dealing with legislatures we have to deal with a system in which there is a definable process of recruitment. The role of legislator is not one to be assumed voluntarily on the initiative of any individual in society but one for which persons are chosen - whether willingly or not is at this point an irrelevant question. It is reasonable to assume, as a working hypothesis, that the system of recruitment will operate selectively to eliminate persons who might entertain certain kinds of role-concepts from ever holding legislative office. How an elective recruitment process does this for legislators constitutes a fertile field for a whole new body of theory of the sort being elaborated here. For our purposes, though, it is enough to recognize its existence and its general place in the theoretical scheme.

If our aim were to explain the recruitment process, we could readily compare those who survive it with those who are screened out by it (and with those who may not even know there is such a screen at all). That is, we could compare the three classes of persons - general population (persons A,E,H), the "casualties" (C,G); persons selected for office (B,D,F,) - represented schematically as follows:




Figure 5: The Recruitment Process.

Our aim, however, is not to explain the recruitment process. What we want to know is what role-concepts are excluded from the legislature and what are put into the legislature as a product of the recruitment process. What we know of human personality, moreover, suggests we can safely assume that for all practical purposes in legislative study, B is B, D is D, and F is F, and so on, whether we look at him before or after recruitment - in other words, nothing significant is put into legislator's role concepts as a product of recruitment.

What we must do, therefore, is determine what characteristics of the person as a person exhibited before as well as after he becomes a legislator, might affect his construction of his role concepts when he does become a legislator. We need not go into detailed questions concerning the mechanism which links the desired variables to the "personal character" of an individual in order to suggest the principal categories of variables we should consider. In suggesting these categories, it will be helpful to think of the object of investigation here not as "personal character" but as the individual's "role potential."

Certain permanent and (largely) involuntary characteristics of the person may be suspected of having some effect on his role potential. These are such characteristics as his age, sex, ethnicity, education, religion and socio-economic status. While there are complex inter-relationships among several of these which are the subject of psychological and sociological research and theory, they are still sufficiently similar for us to distinguish them as a class from other personal characteristics such as "personality-type" (psycho-analytical type, skills and abilities, sociability, etc.), party-affiliation, or previous political experience. Within this second class again, as well as between characteristics of each class, there are complex inter-relationships not accounted for in our model. This generality or lack of detail in the model is justified, however, since our aim is not to explain individual behavior but to explain the behavior of legislative institutions and groups. If we can relate legislative behavior to any significant number of variables at the level of "personal characteristic" we will have moved a considerable distance toward our main goal even if we cannot fully explain the relationships among the personal-character variables.

In addition to the two classes of "personal characteristics" just described there is one further category of variable which relates directly to individual members of the legislature. This category comprises the various ecological and demographic characteristics of his state and district and of the environments in which he grew up and lives. The most important of these are shown in Figure 6.

Remembering then that we need not concern ourselves in any direct way with the process of recruitment nor with the precise horizontal relationships among personal and ecological variables, we can represent what has been said so far in this way:






Figure 6: The Determinants of Legislator's Role Concepts

With this conception we arrive at the end of our conceptual effort. Appended is an analytical chart showing how the various parts of all the preceding discussion fit together. It is perhaps wise to avow here that the master-diagram (like its component parts) is not intended to constitute a model in itself. Its chief purpose is to serve as an analytical table of contents to the discussion. The model is to be found in the definition of concepts and in the working hypotheses which relate them to each other.

## 5. Conclusions and road map for the study of legislatures.

While nothing more can be added to the picture, several comments offered or implied heretofore are worth setting down here.

First, the conceptual apparatus we have devised is not yet a genuine theory, inasmuch as it does not state the exact causal relationships or establish parameters for the influence of any component variables. But it is more a true model than a loose conceptual scheme since it does incorporate working hypotheses which tell us what to look for as significant parts of the legislative object under investigation and how the parts can be expected to fit together. It not only suggests particular research hypotheses by which the model may be made more exact, but it suggests ways in which hitherto unrelated hypotheses may be related to each other, as well as ways in which purely descriptive and existential generalizations, which we have in abundance, may be utilized. At the very least it provides an accounting scheme for organizing bits and pieces of knowledge and information we already possess. It provides a "road map" for legislative study.

Second, although the model is a basis for a theory of legislatures and not for any other aspect of the political system, it is designed to connect up with other theory about other sub-systems and to point the way toward extension of more general theory. It is, so to speak, equipped with "sockets" into which other theories can be plugged. One example of such a socket is found in the discussion concerning the place of the recruitment process in legislative study. Suggestions concerning the possible extension of legislative study in the direction of more general theories of political systems were offered at the outset in discussing the relation of legislative study to the end-variables of political inquiry. Extension in the direction of more general theory about political behavior of human beings at large can similarly take place through more detailed investigation of the determinants of legislators' role behavior and comparison of them with the determinants of the behavior of other political actors (voters, candidates, judges, obedient citizens, rebels, etc.)

Third, also in connection with the subject of general theory, our model is essentially a functional one. It therefore relates to dynamic processes. But it takes an essentially short-run view of those processes; it offers a snap-shot which stops political action for the moment of investigation. It takes little imagination, however, to see how it can be broadened into a theoretical model which could guide trend-studies as well as structural-studies. The "decisions" of a legislature and their consequences for the social system react back, in the long run, on some of the basic determinants of legislative behavior. They change the enacted role requirements, the situational landmarks, and the ecological variables, to mention only the most obvious cases. Omitting all such feed-back relationships from our model does not mean we are blind to their significance for general political theory.

Fourth, we do not think of this model as now or potentially a competing theory among alternative theories. It is broader than most familiar "theories" - group, class, individual will, etc. - in that it permits incorporation of specific theoretical propositions and even whole segments of those theories.

Finally, we recognize that the model is designed for "institutional" study. We reject the assertion of "political behaviorism" as it is occasionally very narrowly defined, namely, that the supreme object of political research is to discover laws of behavior uniformly operating on all human individuals. We think

political knowledge must include knowledge about the political function in society, first and foremost. Since we assume this function is institutionalized to some degree in every human society we are likely to see or know anything about, we are in one sense of the word "institutionalists." But we reject the assertion of "institutionalism" narrowly defined which says that only knowledge of the consequences of institutional organization and action is of concern to political science. We think the supreme object of general political theory is to link up generalizations about human behavior and generalizations about the functioning of institutions. Instead of putting a plague on them we cheerfully accept invitations from both houses.

Whether or not our model is valid or useful must be determined, of course, by the results it yields when used to guide research. The principal theoretical next step, therefore, is the elaboration of more specific working hypotheses about the exact relationships among the variables we have conceptualized, followed by their translation into operational research hypotheses. But a useful check on its utility or validity is to ask, even before these steps, what major problems of legislative analysis, what questions about legislative behavior are not readily translatable into the concepts and working-hypotheses relationships we have set forth?




Figure 7; continued on next page






Figure 7: Road Map for the Study of Legislature.

INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN LEGISLATORS'  
ROLE ORIENTATIONS

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Prepared for Delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting  
of the American Political Science Association,  
St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958

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I

1. Core Legislative Roles
2. Representational Roles
3. Areal Roles (District and State as Clienteles)
4. Party Roles (Party as Clientele)
5. Pressure Group Roles (Pressure Groups as Clienteles)

II

6. The Interpenetration of Legislative and Representational Roles
7. The Interpenetration of Areal and Representational Roles
8. The Interpenetration of Party Roles with Legislative and Representational Roles.
9. The interpenetration of Lobby Roles with Legislative and Representational Roles

III

10. Conclusions

Appendices:

- A: Diagram of Role Relationships
- B: Method of Constructing Roles

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The research on state legislative behavior was made possible by grants from the Social Science Research Council. Mr. Wahlke acknowledges assistance from the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Vanderbilt University, and Mr. Ferguson from the Governmental Research Bureau and the All-University Research Fund of Michigan State University. Mr. Eulau's work was facilitated by a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Neither the Council nor the researchers' institutions are responsible for this study.

This is a preliminary and summary report of some of the findings of the State Legislative Research Project concerning role orientations of legislators in four states.<sup>1</sup> The first part describes the definitions and the distribution of the various role orientations in the four states and presents and tests some hypotheses about interstate differences in this respect. Definitions of role orientations were derived by a process involving both logical deduction from theoretical propositions about the functions of roles in the political system, and inductive construction from the empirical data gathered in interviews with the legislators.<sup>2</sup>

It is our belief, however, that the various roles are meaningful only in that they constitute a role-system, i.e., that they are related to each other in meaningful and not random ways. The second part of the paper, therefore, discusses some of the combinations of roles in the four state systems and their interpenetration.

The objective of the project is comparative analysis of the legislative systems of American states. We hope ultimately to suggest what different consequences follow from different patterns of role-configuration, as well as what might occasion such differences. In this paper we can only suggest some possible explanations and consequences; our main purpose here is to describe some of the different role complexes, making clear the meaning of the terms we are using and pointing out what appear to be significant differences among the four states studied.

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1. The data reported in the study come from interviews with 474 state legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee, conducted by the authors and research assistants during the 1957 sessions of the four legislatures. The samples for the four legislatures are 91% in Tennessee, 94% in California and Ohio, and 100% in New Jersey. The four states composing the sample represent different geographical regions of the country, different ratios of urban and rural population, and different degrees of party competition. The interviews, utilizing fixed schedules, uniform in all four states and including both open-ended, focussed-type questions as well as closed, or fixed-answer-type questions, averaged about two hours.

2. For fuller discussion of the theoretical aspects, see Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson, "The Role Concept in the Comparative Study of State Legislatures," a paper prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958 (cited hereafter as "The Role Concept..."). Appendix A presents a schematic view of the inter-relation of the various roles in our theoretical model. Appendix B summarizes the operational construction of the roles described here.



I

1. Core Legislative Roles.<sup>3</sup>

Of first concern in any examination of legislators' role conceptions are their notions of how they think it proper to go about their principal business of law-making. While one need not take it for granted that "law-making" is at the core of such conceptions, it yields, at least, a minimum definition. It refers to the behavior expected of the legislator by virtue of his holding a legislative office. But it is unlikely that the formal definition exhausts the meaning of the legislative role. Law-making is probably a necessary, but not a sufficient, component of the legislative role.

Our study of legislative role orientation proper suggested four major types--Tribune, Inventor, Broker and Ritualist.

Tribune--In approaching his law-making function, the legislator may primarily perceive himself as the spokesman of popular needs and wants. It is not relevant, in this connection, whether he sees himself as being guided in his decisions by a mandate from the people or by his own principles or his judgment of what the legislative situation requires him to do. As Tribune he may see himself in at least one of three ways, or a combination of such ways. He may perceive himself as the discoverer or connoisseur of popular needs, as the defender of popular interests, or as the advocate of popular demands. But, different as these attitudes undoubtedly are, their focus of attention is invariably the popular environment within which the legislator orients himself to his law-making task.

Inventor--In an era in which the formulation of public policy tends to be either a function of the executive, with its corps of expert civil servants, or in which policy suggestions come from well-informed, interested groups outside the formal governmental apparatus, the individual legislator tends to become less the creator and more the register of public policy. Nevertheless, contemporary legislators continue to perceive themselves as initiators of policy. The legislator may still see as his primary task the formulation of the general welfare or of particular policies. His orientation of Inventor directs his attention to what he considers the creative policy-making aspects of his job.

Broker--The idea that the legislature referees the struggle of interest groups, constituencies and executive departments, and that in this struggle the legislator plays the role of broker, is probably the most dominant theme in studies of the legislative process. But because a legislature is more than the sum of its members,

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3. This section is abstracted from a longer working paper on "Internal Legislative Role Orientations and the Power Position of the Legislature in the Political System." See also, "The Role Concept...", pp. 8-9.

because it develops an identity of its own, its function in the context of group pressures and group conflicts involves more than the simple notion of brokerage might suggest. It is because of this feeling of identity that the Broker's function is not only one of compromise or arbitration, but also of coordination and integration.

In his orientation as Broker the legislator can define his job in a variety of ways. He may, perhaps naively, interpret his role as involving a rather automatic operation which requires him to maintain, within the context of opposing pressures, an "overall picture" that can be best gained by "looking at all sides of a question." In this conception the fiction is perpetuated that not only all sides must be heard, but the assumption is made that all sides are of equal importance and must be given equal weight. The public interest is assumed to emerge from the judicious weighing of all sides. This elaboration of the orientation of Broker reflects a rather undifferentiated view of the structure of the group struggle in politics.

On the other hand, the more sophisticated legislator does not see the public as an undifferentiated whole, but is sensitive to the fact that he is exposed to the conflict of group interests whose reconciliation requires not simply impartiality, but an appraisal of opposed claims and demands in terms of their moral worth, the power potential of the groups in combat, and the political consequences.

Ritualist--So numerous and complex are the formal rules and procedures of the legislative process that their mastery may appear as the essence of the legislative role. Moreover, while the rules and procedures of the legislative process are designed to facilitate, or obstruct, legislative action, so overwhelming may be the routine of the process, so consuming in its daily impact, that preoccupation with and involvement in legislative manoeuvring can become an end in itself rather than be a means to an end. The legislator may come to relate himself to the task of law-making in terms of the parliamentary mechanics alone, and he may fail to rationalize his actions by any purpose or goal other than performance of the legislative routine. He may be content to list for himself the various tasks which he feels expected to have to carry out as a result of perceiving himself simply as a cog in the legislative wheel. In the role orientation of Ritualist, therefore, the legislator is particularly sensitive to the flow of legislation, the intricacies of the legislative maze and the bureaucratic organization of the legislature. This orientation appears, of course, quite frequently linked with some other orientation--that of Tribune, Inventor, or Broker. But it may also appear alone.

Distribution of internal role orientations--Table I presents the distribution of internal role orientations in the four states, regardless of whether these orientations occur in combination or not. The most obvious aspect of the distribution is that in all four states the role orientation of Ritualist occurs more frequently than any other. This is not surprising. It represents an orientation which is "Built-in," so to speak, into the role of the legislator. Moreover, with the exception of the difference between California and Tennessee,<sup>4</sup> there are no significant

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4.  $\chi^2 = 4.82$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ .

differences among the states in regard to the orientation of Ritualist. At least two-thirds or more of New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee legislators indicated that they held an orientation relevant to the task of law-making as such, and California legislators came close to the two-thirds mark.

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNAL LEGISLATIVE ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Role Orientation	Cal. N=113	N.J. N=79	Ohio N=162	Tenn. N=120
Tribune	55%*	63%*	40%*	58%*
Inventor	36	49	33	30
Broker	37	33	48	15
Parliamentarian	58	70	67	72
Opportunist	1	1	1	4

\*Percentages total more than 100% since some respondents could give more than one orientation.

The orientation of Tribune is probably the oldest in the American setting, dating back to colonial days, and as Table I indicates, it seems still to find strong expression in state legislatures which, perhaps more than either federal or municipal legislative bodies, are sensitive to their grassroots relations. In three states--California, New Jersey and Tennessee--the orientation of Tribune appears more frequently than any other except that of Ritualist, and the differences in occurrence among these states are slight. But there are statistically significant differences in the distribution of the Tribune orientation between each of these states and Ohio.<sup>5</sup> Just why Ohio legislators were less inclined to mention this orientation is difficult to say. One hypothesis worthy of exploration is that the disciplined Republican majority in the Ohio legislature has less need to orient itself as strongly towards "the people" than legislators elsewhere and is, therefore, less prone to emphasize the orientation of Tribune.

Of the various role orientations, that of Inventor, as has already been suggested, is probably less realistic than any other. For reasons difficult to explain at this point, this role orientation occurs in New Jersey considerably more frequently than in the other three states, though the difference between New Jersey and California is

5. California-Ohio:  $\chi^2 = 6.46$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .02$ . New Jersey-Ohio:  $\chi^2 = 9.11$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .01$ . Tennessee-Ohio:  $\chi^2 = 8.42$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .01$ .



not statistically significant.<sup>6</sup> This is especially astounding because the New Jersey Governor plays an active role in state policy-making.

Perhaps the most surprising finding revealed in Table I is the relative scarcity with which, except for Ohio, the role orientation of Broker was mentioned. There are significant differences, in this respect, between Ohio and the three other states,<sup>7</sup> between California and Tennessee as well as between New Jersey and Tennessee.<sup>8</sup> In other words, while Ohio legislators were considerably more prone to hold the Broker orientation than California and New Jersey legislators, the latter were more prone to do so than Tennessee legislators. An interpretation of these differences is difficult. We shall make some explanatory suggestions below.<sup>9</sup>

Structure of internal role segmentalization--Insofar as the internal role set is segmentalized, each role orientation has as its referent some factor in the legislator's environment which would seem to be particularly salient in the way in which he defines his legislative role. Presumably, each possible combination of role orientations gives the legislative role a unique organization which structures the content of the role, and which calls for appropriate behavior in the execution of the role, and which calls for appropriate behavior in the execution of the role. Two questions may be asked: (a) Do certain combinations of role orientations, or certain forms of segmentalization, occur more frequently than other combinations, and (b) are there differences among the four states in the distribution of segmentalized role sets?

Because the role orientation of Ritualist is so pervasive in all four states, its importance can be appreciated best if it is treated in isolation from the other orientations. Indeed, its omission from the array when it occurs in combination with other orientations, may yield a more meaningful picture of significant role sets. Table II presents the combination of role orientations with the orientations of Ritualist omitted from the segmentalized role sets.

6. New Jersey-Ohio:  $\chi^2 = 6.46$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .02$ . New Jersey-Tennessee:  $\chi^2 = 7.23$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .01$ . New Jersey-California:  $\chi^2 = 3.19$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p > .05$ . California-Tennessee:  $\chi^2 = 5.03$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ . The differences between Ohio and California, and between Ohio and Tennessee are not significant at the .05 level.

7. Ohio-California:  $\chi^2 = 12.38$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .001$ . Ohio-New Jersey:  $\chi^2 = 4.92$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ . Ohio Tennessee:  $\chi^2 = 31.45$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .001$ .

8. California-Tennessee:  $\chi^2 = 5.21$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ . New Jersey-Tennessee:  $\chi^2 = 9.93$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .01$ . There is no statistically significant difference between California and New Jersey in the distribution of the Broker orientation.

9. See pp. 30, 32-34.

TABLE II. INTERNAL ROLE SETS--ABBREVIATED

Role Sets	Cal. N=112	N.J. N=78	Ohio N=160	Tenn. N=115
Tribune-Inventor-Broker	5%	12%	2%	3%
Tribune-Inventor	13	17	11	15
Tribune-Broker	9	9	7	5
Inventor-Broker	4	6	12	4
Tribune	29	27	20	37
Inventor	14	15	9	10
Broker	8	6	27	3
Ritualist	18	8	12	23
	100%	100%	100%	100%

As Table II indicates, the triple role set of Tribune-Inventor-Broker is, with the exception of New Jersey, relatively scarce. On the other hand, the dual role set of Tribune-Inventor appears quite frequently in all four states and inter-state differences are insignificant. Moreover, it seems that the Tribune orientation is more likely to be associated with that of Inventor than with that of Broker or the latter with that of Inventor, except in Ohio where the Inventor-Broker role set appears significantly more frequently than in the other states.<sup>10</sup>

Among the singular roles, that of Tribune outranks that of Ritualist, followed by the Inventor and Broker roles, in that order, except in Ohio where the Broker role is held more frequently than elsewhere. Moreover, it now appears that California has more Ritualists who have no other role orientation than the total distribution of role orientations reported in Table I may have led one to believe. In fact, California exceeds the proportion of the Ritualists found in Ohio and New Jersey, though it lags behind Tennessee.

In general, then, the pattern of role orientations revealed in Table I is maintained when orientations are combined in role sets. While there is almost no difference between California and New Jersey, except that the triple set of Tribune-Inventor-Broker predominates in New Jersey and the role of Ritualist in California, both states differ in the distribution of role sets from Ohio and Tennessee. In Ohio, the dominance of the Broker orientation is reflected not only in the strength of the pure Broker role, but the latter also dominates in combination with the Inventor orientation. In Tennessee, on the other hand, both the Tribune and Ritualist roles appear as being more frequently taken than elsewhere.

10. Ohio-California:  $\chi^2 = 4.686$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ . Ohio-New Jersey:  $\chi^2 = 12.135$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .001$ . Ohio-Tennessee:  $\chi^2 = 4.690$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ .

What do these data tell us about the character of the legislative systems in the four states, and particularly about the position of the legislature in the larger political system? Any answer to this question can, of course, only be speculative. In the first place, it would seem that the legislative system in

TABLE III. NUMBER OF INTERNAL ROLE SETS

Number of Role Sets	Cal. N=112	N.J. N=78	Ohio N=160	Tenn. N=115	Total N=465
Multiple Sets	31%	44%	32%	27%	33%
Singular Roles	<u>69</u> 100%	<u>56</u> 100%	<u>68</u> 100%	<u>73</u> 100%	<u>67</u> 100%

New Jersey and its position in the political system as a whole is somewhat more complex than in the other states. New Jersey legislators apparently feel impelled by the nature of the system and its relations with other sub-systems of the political system to hold more legislative role orientations and take more segmented roles than legislators elsewhere. In Tennessee, on the other hand, legislators apparently face an institutional setting which makes fewer demands on them and allows as many as 73 percent to take singular roles, though the difference from California and Ohio is rather small (Table III).

Secondly, it would seem that the political system of Ohio does not require legislators to be as inventive in the policy field or as responsive to popular demands as the political systems of the other states. Ohio, as Table II indicated, has fewer legislators than any other state who took the singular roles of Inventor or Tribune, and Ohio lags behind the other states as well in the frequency with which the Tribune-Inventor role set appears. This relative freedom from responsibility to be creative policywise, or to be sensitive to people's wishes, at least as perceived by the legislators themselves, may account for the fact that the Broker role is so dominant in the Ohio legislature, though it may later be shown that because conflicting interests are more prevalent in Ohio than elsewhere legislators must, for functional reasons, take this role in greater numbers than in the other three states.

## 2. Representational Roles<sup>11</sup>

Premises underlying decisions such as those made by legislatures, may be of two kinds: (1) they may be premises relevant to the content or objective of decisions; and (2) they may be relevant to the form or style of decision-making behavior. For instance, a legislator may be guided in his decisions by premises such as that legislation should benefit the district from which he is elected, that it should be "liberal," that it should not favor special interests, that it

<sup>11</sup> This section is abstracted from a longer working paper on "The Function of Representation and the Relevance of Representational Roles in Legislative Decision-Making." See also "The Role Concept...", pp. 9-10.



should be in performance of his party's campaign platform, and so on. In these instances, the premises implicit in a given decision relate to the content or objective of legislation.

On the other hand, a legislator may be guided in his decisions by the premise that he is free to decide as he pleases, that he should consider the facts involved in an issue and arrive at a personal judgment, that he should do what is right and what his conscience tells him; or he may be guided by the premise that he must follow the instructions of the people who elected him, that he must follow the leadership of his party wherever they may lead him, that he should go along with the majority of his colleagues, or that he should be sensitive to and bend towards the strongest group pressures. In all of these cases, the premises involved in his decision-making behavior refer not to the content of legislation, but rather to the style of his conduct in the decision-making situation.

The premises implicit in a legislator's conception of how he should behave in deciding legislative issues are, by these operational criteria, his representational role. The representational role--whatever the legislator's definition, whether he sees himself as a free agent, as bound by mandate, or both--does not provide premises for the content of his decisions, but for the form of his decision-making behavior.

The analysis of representational role orientations will be undertaken in terms of three major types: the role orientation of Trustee, the role orientation of Delegate, and the role orientation of Politician.

Trustee--The role orientation of Trustee seems to find expression in two major conceptions of how decisions ought to be made which may occur severally and jointly. There is, first, a moralistic interpretation of the Trustee orientation. The Trustee sees himself as a free agent in that, as a premise of his decision-making behavior, he claims to follow what he considers right or just, his convictions and principles, the dictates of his conscience.

There is, secondly, a judgmental conception of the role orientation of Trustee. The Trustee is not bounded by a mandate because his decisions are his own considered judgments based on an assessment of the facts in each case, his understanding of all the problems and angles involved, his thoughtful appraisal of the sides at issue. Again, as in the moralistic definition of the Trustee role, the representative evaluates his relationship with significant others as they affect the way in which he makes his decisions.

It would seem that the orientation of Trustee derives not only from a purely normative definition of the role of the representative, but that it is often grounded in conditions which make it functionally inevitable. The fact that the represented do not have the information necessary to give intelligent instructions, that the representative is unable to discover what his clientele wants, that preferences may remain unexpressed, that there is no need seen for instructions because of a presumed harmony of interests between representative and

represented--all of these circumstances may be acknowledged as sources of the role orientation of Trustee, at times even forced on the representative against his own predilection for a mandate if that were possible.

Delegate--Just as the representational role orientation of Trustee is empirically by no means a pure type, the orientation of Delegate would seem to allow for a number of different conceptions of representation. Of course, all Delegates are agreed that they should not use their independent judgment or principled convictions as criteria of their decision-making. But this does not mean that they feel equally committed to follow instructions, from whatever clientele. Some might merely say that they try to inform themselves before making decisions by consulting their constituents or others, though the implication is that such consultation will have a mandatory effect on their behavior.

Others who hold the orientation of Delegate frankly acknowledge their direct dependence on instructions and accept them as a necessary or desirable premise in terms of which to make decisions.

Finally, there is the representative as Delegate who not only feels that he should follow instructions, but who feels that he should do so even if these instructions are counter to his own judgment or principles. In other words, the possibility of conflict between role orientations is clearly envisaged and resolved in favor of subordinating one's independence to the requests of what is considered a superior authority.

Politician--The classical dichotomization of the concept of representation in terms of independent judgment and mandate was unlikely to exhaust the possibilities of representational behavior. In particular, it would seem possible for a representative to behave in line with both criteria of decision-making behavior. Reformulation of the dichotomized conceptions of representation into role orientations facilitates the empirical analysis of representational behavior. For roles and role orientations need not be mutually exclusive. Depending on circumstances, a representative may hold the role orientation of Trustee at one time, and the role orientation of Delegate at another time. Or he might even seek to reconcile both orientations in terms of a third. In other words, one can think of representation as a continuum, with the Trustee and Delegate roles as poles of the continuum, and a midpoint where the roles tend to overlap and, within a range, may give rise to a third role. Within this range the roles may be taken simultaneously, possibly making for conflict, or they may be taken seriatim, one after another as circumstances dictate.

Because our data do not permit us to discriminate too sharply between these two possibilities, we shall speak of legislators who express both orientations, either simultaneously or serially, as Politicians.<sup>12</sup>

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12. Provision for such discrimination was made in the coding of responses, but differences among the coders seemed to introduce a good deal of unreliability in this connection. Hence it seemed preferable to combine these responses in a single category--Politician.

In general, then, the Politician as a representational role type differs from both the Trustee and the Delegate in that he is more sensitive to conflicting alternatives, more flexible in the way he resolves the conflict of alternatives, and less dogmatic in his orientation towards legislative behavior as it is related to his role as a representative.

Distribution of representational role orientations--It may be assumed that the way a representative relates himself to the task of law-making--how he comes to make his decisions--is, in part at least, influenced by the nature of politics at a given time and the demands which politics makes on him as a decision-maker. It is the purpose of this section to explore this general hypothesis by inference from the distributions of representational role orientations in the four states.

The hypothesis may be restated as follows: The problems of modern government, even on the relatively low level of state government, are exceedingly complex. Matters such as taxation and finance, education and public welfare, legal reform, licensing and regulatory procedure, transportation, and so on, are, more often than not, beyond the comprehension of the average citizen. Unable to understand these problems and helpless to cope with them, people in an age of mass democracy are likely to entrust the affairs of government to the elected representatives who, presumably, are better informed than those whom they represent. It is likely, therefore, that the representative has become less and less a Delegate and more and more a Trustee as the business of government has become more and more complex. One should expect that the role orientation of Trustee is more commonly held among state representatives than that of Politician, and the latter more frequently than that of Delegate.

As Table IV indicates, the hypothesis is confirmed. In all states it appears

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Representational Role Orientation	Cal. N= 49	N.J. N=54	Ohio N=114	Tenn. N=78
Trustee	55%	61%	56%	81%
Politician	25	22	29	13
Delegate	20	17	15	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

more frequently, and significantly more frequently, than the other two role orientations. Moreover, Table IV also shows that the role orientation of Politician appears somewhat more frequently in all states than that of Delegate. If it may be assumed that representatives take a representational role in their decision-making behavior which derives from their perception of the expectations of the represented, it would seem that the publics in the four states are agreed to grant their legislators that discretion which is necessary for them to cope with the complexity of governmental affairs.



However, it may also be noted in Table IV that the orientation of Trustee appears significantly more frequently in Tennessee than in the other three states, at the expense of the Politician and Delegate orientations.<sup>13</sup> It is not our purpose here to seek to account for this difference. As this orientation includes responses stressing traditional moral values, such as following one's conscience, convictions or what one feels to be "right," it could be assumed that these virtues are more valued in rural Tennessee than in the three other, more urbanized states. But inspection of the frequency with which this attitude appears in Tennessee as against the other three states does not reveal significantly different distributions.<sup>14</sup> An answer must be reserved to further analysis of the genesis of representational role orientations. It may only be noted here that the more frequent appearance of the Trustee orientation in Tennessee suggests treatment of that state as a "deviant case" in a further analysis of the interpenetration of representational and other legislative role orientations.

### 3. Areal Roles (District and State as Clienteles)<sup>15</sup>

In political systems where the enabling source of an office-holder's power is the electorate of a geographical district, it is a widely held expectation--shared by many voters and some politicians alike--that the incumbent of a governmental position must be guided in his decisions by considerations which take account of the presumed "interests" of the area he comes from.

The assumption that geographical areas have particular characteristics--such as population attributes and industrial, agricultural or commercial properties--and, hence, unique interests which are, or ought to be, factors influencing the direction of public decisions continues to be shared not only by voters, politicians and others involved in policy-making, but also by scientific students of the political process. It underlies many studies which seek to relate legislative roll-call votes to the socio-economic characteristics of electoral districts, as well as those studies which analyze the socio-economic composition of legislatures. But this assumption is a most tenuous one under modern conditions. Electoral districts tend to be so heterogeneous in population attributes, so pluralistic in the

13. Tennessee-New Jersey:  $\chi^2 = 8.273$ ; d.f. = 2;  $p < .02$ . Tennessee-California:  $\chi^2 = 10.58$ ; d.f. = 2;  $p < .01$ . Tennessee-Ohio:  $\chi^2 = 13.84$ ; d.f. = 2;  $p < .001$ .

14. Percent of Trustees in the four states stating that they follow in their decision-making behavior the dictates of their conscience, their convictions, their sense of what's right (as against their judgment or appraisal of the facts involved in issues): California: 18%; New Jersey: 8%; Ohio: 28%; and Tennessee: 23%.

15. This section has been abstracted from a longer working paper on "The Areal Focus of Legislative Role Orientations." See "The Role Concept"..., p.12.

character of group life, so diverse in the kind of values and beliefs held, that whatever measures of central tendency are used to classify a district are more likely to disguise than to reveal its real character. The notion that elections are methods to discover persons whose attributes and attitudes mirror the attributes and attitudes most widely shared by people in their district appears to be of dubious validity.

This does not mean, of course, that a legislator's point of reference in making decisions cannot be his district. It may or may not be, and whether it is or not is a matter of empirical inquiry. It is merely doubted that what orients a legislator towards his district rather than some other focus of attention (such as state or nation) is the alleged identity or similarity between his district's characteristics and his own. In fact, the "deviant" may be more concerned with his district and seek to discover the district's "interests," if they are discoverable. And if a district interest, so-called, can be specifically singled out, it is more likely to be the interest of a politically salient grouping in the district than of the district as an undifferentiated entity.

Insofar as the district rather than some other unit, such as the state as a whole, enters the legislator's focus of attention in his decision-making, it may constitute a significant segment of his role as a representative which, presumably, stands in meaningful relationship to other segments of his total role. It needs emphasis here that areal role orientations refer to the focus which gives direction to a legislator's decisions, not to the form or manner of his decision-making behavior. The way in which he relates himself to the how of decision-making, the decisional process, constitutes his representational role. But this procedural dimension must be distinguished from the source dimensions of his legislative role, i.e., the clienteles at his focus of attention which are relevant to the content of his law-making. In the case of areal orientations, regardless of whether a legislator is a Trustee, Delegate or Politician, he may or may not focus on his district in selecting alternatives in the legislative choices he makes.

If the district is the legislator's focus, we speak of a district orientation or, for short, a district role. It means that the legislator, in deciding an issue, will pay attention to his district rather than some other focus, such as, for instance, the state. If he does not select the district as a focus, but the state, or if he gives no indication of any areal focus, it means that he does not take a district role. In the latter case, he may take his cues regarding the content of his decisions from participation in other political sub-systems, such as the party or pressure-group sub-systems. Of course, different role orientations are not mutually exclusive. They may be held simultaneously, and appropriate roles may be taken simultaneously.

District-orientation--District-oriented. Legislators had essentially two alternatives in their responses: either they could just mention their district or county as being relevant in their conception of the legislative job, or they could explicitly place their district as being above the state in their considerations. Among the former, the most frequent responses suggested that it is the legislator's job to take care of his district's needs and pass legislation which will benefit his district or county. Others would emphasize the policy problems involved in legislation and the necessity to protect what they considered district

interests from the policy point of view. Or the emphasis might be on the services which these legislators think they are expected to render for their district. Another group of district-oriented legislators specifically pointed to the importance of placing the interests of their district above those of the state, though they usually admitted that state concerns should also be given consideration.

State-orientation--As in the case of the district-oriented legislators, state-oriented legislators may either mention the state alone as the salient focus of their job, or they may also mention the district, but clearly tending to place state above district. Some of the state-oriented legislators emphasize the need of state policy or state program as an overriding consideration. A second group of state-oriented legislators point to both state and district as relevant foci of their job, but tend to give the benefit of doubt to the state. Finally, some of the state-oriented legislators may explicitly emphasize the desirability of overcoming parochial considerations in favor of the state.

District-and-state orientation--A third major group of legislators who spontaneously concerned themselves with the areal focus of their legislative role mentioned both district and state as relevant to their legislative or service activities, but, apparently, did not see a possibility of conflict and thought that they could attend to both foci without undue difficulty. Yet, the generality of the responses which were given in this connection may be deceptive, and coding them as district-and-state orientation may have been somewhat arbitrary in a number of cases. Though the actual language used tended in the direction of the state as a focus of this orientation, the tone often appeared to be more suggestive of a latent district orientation. One should expect, therefore, that on tests of role consistency these hyphenated legislators may more resemble district-oriented than state-oriented representatives.

Data concerning areal role orientations--If, as was suggested, a legislator's district orientation does not automatically derive from ascertainable district interests or from personal characteristics he may share with his electors, the question arises where district or state orientations come from, and why they are likely to intrude on the legislator's conception of his role.

The hypothesis may be advanced that areal role orientations--whether district, state, both or neither are foci of reference in legislative role-taking--are a function of the dynamics of the democratic political system with its emphasis on the responsibility of the elected to the electors. Political responsibility--a set of relationships in which the elected are sensitive to the power of the electors over them and in which the elected are aware of the sanctions which make responsibility a reality--is predicated on the existence of a competitive party system where the electors have genuine choice and where the elected are periodically confronted with the possibility of removal from office. It may be suggested, therefore, that it is the sanction of removal inherent in a competitive system which serves to focus legislators' attention on their district rather than the state as the crucial reference point. It is hypothesized, then, that legislators from competitive areas are more likely to be district-oriented than legislators from one-party areas, while legislators from one-party areas are more likely to be state-oriented than those from competitive areas.



An initial, but crude test of the hypothesis is possible by an examination of the distribution of areal role orientations in the four states. One should expect that Tennessee legislators will be less district-oriented than legislators in California, New Jersey and Ohio in view of the predominant one-party character of that state. As Table V indicates, the data seem to support the hypothesis in a general way. Though the percentage differences are small and statistically not significant at the five percent level of probability,<sup>16</sup> only 21% of the Tennessee legislators were district-oriented as against 35% of California legislators, 27% of New Jersey legislators, and 28% of Ohio legislators. But the most noticeable aspect of Table V is that Tennessee legislators in

TABLE V. DISTRIBUTION OF AREAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Role Orientation	Cal. N=113	N.J. N=79	Ohio N=162	Tenn. N=120
District	35%	27%	28%	21%
District-and-State	14	28	25	8
State	20	14	16	9
No Mention	31	32	30	62
	100%	100%	100%	100%

significantly greater proportion failed to express themselves spontaneously in this connection. Why this is so can, at this point, be only a matter of speculation, requiring more detailed analysis. Tennessee legislators may take the district, state, or both for granted as foci of their role and not feel a need to mention it, or they may be simply less articulate in this respect than legislators elsewhere. Finally, while there is somewhat more dichotomization of district and state role orientations in California than in New Jersey and Ohio, where the district-and-state orientation figures more prominently, only relatively few legislators in all states mention the state alone as the focus of their areal orientation.

#### 4. Party Roles (Party as Clientele)<sup>17</sup>

The party system is a sub-system in the political system which is meaningfully related to the legislative sub-system. This implies that the individual legislator's party roles are related to his legislative roles.

16. The difference is, of course, significant between Tennessee and California where  $\chi^2 = 4.91$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .05$ .

17. This section is abstracted from a longer working paper entitled Party Role and Legislative Behavior. See also "The Role Concept...", pp. 10-12.

Although the influence of party in American state legislatures is often vitiated by such factors as malapportionment, separation of powers, staggered elections and one-partyism, it still appears that party is an important factor in the legislative process.

In the first place, all of the legislators in the four states identified themselves as either Democrats or Republicans. There were no nonpartisans or minority party members in the population studied.

From information gathered in the interviews it was possible to assign most of the legislators to a party role type according to the strength of partisanship that they exhibited. It should be made explicit here that the party roles have reference to degree of partisanship rather than direction or policy orientation of the legislators. That is to say, that party role refers to the legislator's expectations as to the extent to which political parties should play a part in the legislative process rather than to his identification as a Democrat or Republican.

The four party role types which it was possible to specify were Mavericks, Independents, Weak Partisans and Strong Partisans. Mavericks were those who took the extreme anti-partisan position that it would be better if legislators were elected without party labels. Independents would retain party labels, but they feel that it is better for an individual citizen to deal with the government directly, rather than through a political party. Weak Partisans feel that it is better to work through one of the parties, but they differ from the Strong Partisans in that they would not vote in support of the party if it cost them support in their districts. The Strong Partisans would place party above district, and in addition to this about one-third of them take the extremely partisan position that the two parties should take more clear-cut opposing stands on state issues in order to encourage party responsibility.<sup>18</sup> The distribution of these role types in the individual states is shown in Table VI.

TABLE VI. DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY ROLES

Role Distribution	Cal. N=108	N.J. N=79	Ohio N=159	Tenn. N=111
Strong Partisan	28%	52%	62%	26%
Weak Partisan	27	35	19	27
Independent	11	8	13	29
Maverick	34	5	6	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%

18. These role types were based on a five point Guttman-type scale constructed from four party attitude items in the interview schedule. For a description of how the scale and the role types were constructed see Appendix B, p.37.

This table demonstrates quite effectively the differences between California and Tennessee on the one hand, and New Jersey and Ohio on the other with regard to party roles. In New Jersey and Ohio, which both have a strong tradition of competitive two-party politics on the state level, more than 80% of the legislators are classified as partisans. Ohio has the largest percentage in the Strong Partisan category while New Jersey has relatively more Weak Partisans. It is of some help in understanding the party role distributions in these two states to note that in both New Jersey and Ohio the Republicans are more likely to be Strong Partisans while the Democrats are more likely to be Weak Partisans, Independents or Mavericks. This may be explained in part by the fact that in both of these states the legislatures have traditionally been dominated by a strong Republican party organization. Such a situation might be expected to reinforce the expectations of majority party members that party should play an important part in the legislative process.

As is indicated in the table, almost half of the legislators in California and Tennessee are either Independents or Mavericks. The California case is particularly interesting because of the tendency toward bi-polarization of party roles in this state. The extent of this bi-polarization is not completely shown in the table, for of the 28% of the Californians classified as Strong Partisans, over two-thirds took the extreme partisan position of advocating that the two parties should take more clear-cut opposing stands on state issues. In other words, the Strong Partisans in California actually include a greater proportion of extremists than those in other states.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, however, California has by far the highest percentage of Mavericks of any state in the study. This bi-polar tendency may be a reflection of the somewhat confused and transitional nature of the party system in California, where a strong tradition of bi-partisanship associated with the device of cross-filing in the primary elections, is gradually being modified in the direction of making political parties more important in state elections.

The lack of partisanship exhibited in Tennessee is presumably associated with the tradition of one-partyism in that state, and it is interesting to note that here, as in New Jersey and Ohio, members of the traditionally dominant party (in this case Democratic) are somewhat more likely to be Strong Partisans, while the minority Republicans are more likely to be Weak Partisans or Independents. Democrats were also more likely to be Strong Partisans in California, and it is also important to note that Californians who had successfully cross-filed in the primary were considerably less likely to be Strong Partisans than those who had received the nomination of only one party.

A test of consistency of the party roles is possible by relating them to legislator's perceptions of party in the legislative process. Legislators were asked quite simply to describe the part played by parties in their legislatures. Replies to this question were coded in terms of whether the legislators perceived parties as having an impact on legislative decision-making, and the relation of these perceptions to party roles are shown in Table VII.

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19. See Appendix B, p. 37, for a detailed account of the attitudinal base of the Strong Partisan role types.



TABLE VII. RELATION OF PARTY ROLE TO PERCEPTION  
OF PARTY IMPACT ON LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS

Party Impact	Strong Partisans N=198	Weak Partisans N=116	Independents N=70	Mavericks N=69
One or both parties, or parties generally have impact.	50%	47%	29%	26%
One party has impact, other party little or no impact.	9	5	11	4
One or both parties, or parties generally have little or no impact.	27	41	50	57
No mention of impact in reply to question.	$\frac{14}{100\%}$	$\frac{7}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{13}{100\%}$

The table indicates clearly that Partisans are likely to perceive parties as having an impact on legislative decisions, while Independents and Mavericks are likely to perceive parties as having little or no impact on the legislature.

#### 5. Pressure Group Roles (Pressure Groups as Clienteles)<sup>20</sup>

The literature of legislative study suggests that pressure groups constitute another class of "significant others" towards whom most legislators will entertain significant role concepts. Whereas most studies of pressure group influence have been concerned with legislators' relations with particular groups, our concern initially is with their generic conceptions concerning their roles in relation to groups in general.<sup>21</sup>

20. This section is abstracted from a longer working paper on "The Role Orientations of Legislators Toward Pressure Groups." See also, "The Role Concept...", pp. 12-13.

21. Analysis of particularistic role concepts governing legislators' relations with specific groups will be dealt with in subsequent stages of analysis.

We have found three principal orientations--those of Facilitator, Resister, and Non-Group-Oriented--which reflect the legislators' different evaluations of group life and their differing degrees of knowledge or awareness of it. These role orientations are directly relevant to the legislature's functioning to accommodate or to frustrate group demands in the formulation of authoritative policy decisions.

Facilitators are those legislators who look favorably upon the activity of groups in general, are relatively highly aware of such activity, recognize demands they assert as legitimate data for legislative consideration, and cooperate willingly, both in accommodating them and in calling upon them for help, with group spokesmen and representatives. They, therefore, facilitate the integration of group demands into the legislative process. Resisters, on the other hand, although comparatively well aware of groups and their activity, do not recognize such activity as properly part of the legislative process or admit the legitimacy of group demands as proper data for legislative consideration. They, therefore, serve as obstacles to the integration of group demands into the legislative process. Between these two role types and ordinarily playing a lesser part in shaping the fate of groups and group demands before the legislature, are persons who are either relatively ignorant of group activity, whatever their tolerance or intolerance of it as a general principle, or, if they are not ignorant of it, have no strong feelings for or against their existence and activity. This middle group we may call non-group oriented.

One evidence that Facilitators, more than Resisters or others, do indeed help broaden the legislative process to include consideration of the views and desires of a number of interest groups is found in legislators' responses to a question asking them to name groups whose advice they thought ought to be considered, whether they happened to be powerful or not (See Table VIII).<sup>21a</sup>

TABLE VIII. NUMBER OF GROUPS NAMED AS PARTICULARLY WORTH LISTENING TO BY LEGISLATORS OF DIFFERENT ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Number of Groups Named	<u>Facilitators</u> N=132	<u>Non-Group-Oriented</u> N=165	<u>Resisters</u> N=101
0-2	27%	39%	39%
3 or more	40	39	39
"All are worth listening to"*	33	22	22
	100%	100%	100%

\*Counted here only if no more precise answer given (i.e., no group named).

21a. Facilitators-Resisters:  $\chi^2 = 4.36$ ; d.f. = 2; .10 > p > .05.

Variations in role-perception are related not only to readiness to listen to groups but to the clarity with which groups are perceived. Facilitators, as Table IX shows, tend to think far more than do either Resisters or Non-Group-Oriented legislators, in terms of specific and concrete persons and organizations, whereas the latter two types tend to think in terms of generalized aggregates of people and interests.<sup>21b</sup> From this too, we can infer that Facilitators will be more likely than other types of legislator to gear legislative consideration to the expressed demands and wishes of actual groups.

TABLE IX. SPECIFICITY OF PERCEPTION OF GROUPS  
BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF LEGISLATORS<sup>21c</sup>

Type of Reference to Powerful Groups	Facilitators N=154	Non-Group-Oriented N=188	Resisters N=101
Names broad interest-aggrega- tions only	12%	22%	13%
Names mostly broad-interest aggregations	25	28	42
Names broad aggregations and specific organizations (or lobbyists) in equal numbers	7	10	7
Names most specific organizations (or lobbyists)	35	26	24
Names specific organizations (or lobbyists) only	$\frac{21}{100\%}$	$\frac{14}{100\%}$	$\frac{14}{100\%}$

In short, the capacity of any legislature for accommodating the demands and interests of organized groups will depend upon the presence in it of legislators whose role concepts lead them to behavior serving such a function. Table X shows that the relevant role-orientations are distributed differently in the four legislatures.<sup>21d</sup>

<sup>21b</sup>. Ignoring middle category,  $\chi^2 = 11.91$ ; d. . = 2;  $p < .01$ .

<sup>21c</sup>. In answer to the question, "What would you say are the most powerful /interest groups or lobbyists/ here in /your state/?"



TABLE X. DISTRIBUTION OF ROLE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD PRESSURE GROUPS

Role Orientation	Cal. N=104	N.J. N=79	Ohio N=158	Tenn. N=117
Facilitator	37%	40%	40%	22%
Non-Group-Oriented	44	37	43	43
Resister	19	23	17	35
	100%	100%	100%	100%

It is perhaps sufficient to comment at this point, that the relatively low proportion of Facilitators and high proportion of Resisters in Tennessee as compared with the other three states, does suggest that group conflict in the Tennessee legislature is likely to be more acrimonious and characterized by more unresolved tensions resulting from group demands than group conflict in the other three state legislatures. What some observers have interpreted as a greater intensity of "crude" pressure politics in Tennessee, as compared with the supposedly more "hidden" and "subtle" pressure politics in some other states, may well be a reflection of the greater difficulty faced by organized interests in Tennessee in getting their demands considered by legislators. In other words, it may be that the Tennessee legislature is less well equipped to accommodate group demands than the other three legislatures.<sup>22</sup>

## II

Analytical distinctions of legislative roles in terms of orientations toward the what, how, and wherefrom of legislation are helpful in dissecting legislative behavior. But that behavior is not likely to be a function of discrete roles, but of a system of roles. It is the role system which gives pattern and coherence to the whole law-making process. It is essential, therefore, to relate the various role dimensions to each other in terms of significant hypotheses about their co-variation in the legislative role system.

22. The relatively low percentage of Brokers and Politicians in Tennessee as compared with the other states (see above, Tables I and II) lends support to this view. The inter-relation of these roles is discussed below, pp. 32-35.

## 6. The Interpenetration of Legislative and Representational Roles<sup>23</sup>

The most general hypothesis about the legislature as a role system advanced here is that legislators whose roles are oriented towards the substance of legislation will take those representational roles which are most conducive to the performance of their legislative or content-oriented roles. Implicit in this hypothesis is, of course, the assumption that representational roles, being geared to the how of legislative behavior, are clearly secondary--that they would make little sense without being related to goal-oriented roles. In other words, it is hypothesized that there are significant differences between legislative role types, with their focus on the what of legislation, in respect to their taking representational roles whose focus is the how of legislation. In order to test this general hypothesis of the association of legislative and representational roles, we shall suggest a series of more detailed hypotheses concerning particular relationships between the various role types.

Hypothesis No. 1: Inventors rather than Brokers or Tribunes are more likely to be Trustees.

Hypothesis No. 1a: There is a closer association between the Inventor role and the Trustee role than between the Inventor role and the Politician or Delegate roles.

Inventors, unlike Brokers or Tribunes, are oriented primarily towards the formulation and implementation of the general welfare or of particular new policies thought to be in the public interest. Inventors are likely to be ahead of Brokers or Tribunes in creative imagination and endeavor. They cannot afford to be dependent on instructions, nor can they afford to make many compromises, without losing their raison d'être. Rather, they must be legislators who are guided in their decision-making behavior by their convictions or their judgment of what public policy ought to be. Hence, they should differ from both Brokers and Tribunes in the proportion of Trustees they include. And their role type should be more closely associated with that of Trustee in contrast to Politician or Delegate.

Hypothesis No. 2: Brokers rather than Inventors or Tribunes are more likely to be Politicians.

Hypothesis No. 2a: There is a closer association between the Broker role and the Trustee role than between the Broker role and the Politician and Delegate roles.

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23. This section is abstracted from a longer working paper on "The Legislature as a Role System: A Comparative Analysis." See also "The Role Concept....," pp. 14-17.

At first glance, these two hypotheses seem to be in conflict. But they are not. It is the Broker's role to reconcile, weigh and balance conflicting demands through legislation which is widely acceptable. In doing so, he may have to pay attention, like the Delegate, to instructions that may reach him. But unlike the Delegate, he will not automatically follow these instructions. On the contrary, precisely because these instructions are likely to be in conflict, he must act like the Trustee and use his own judgment. Hence the role of Broker is likely to be more closely associated with that of Trustee than of Politician or Delegate. But the Broker should differ from the Inventor and Tribune in that he is more likely to take both the Trustee and Delegate roles, i.e. the role of Politician. One should, therefore, find a greater proportion of Politicians among the Brokers than among the Inventors or Tribunes.

Hypothesis No. 3: Tribunes rather than Inventors or Brokers are more likely to be Delegates.

Hypothesis No. 3a: The Tribune role need not be associated any more with the Delegate role than with the Trustee role.

The legislative objective of the Tribune is to satisfy popular needs and wishes, either by promotion of certain laws or by opposition to programs which he thinks are detrimental to the people's interests. Because his outward focus of attention is "the people," he is more likely than either the Inventor or the Broker to accept instructions from clienteles, and Delegates should appear more frequently among Tribunes than among the other two legislative role types. On the other hand, the Tribune need not follow instructions as he makes decisions in the interest of people. He may feel that he must rely on his own principles or judgment as he promotes the popular cause. In other words, the Tribune has available more alternatives than either the Inventor or the Broker of how to make his decisions. Hence the degree of association between the Inventor role and the representational roles can be expected to be zero or very low.

In addition to the "pure" legislative roles, these roles may be segmentalized in terms of the different orientations possible with respect to the content of legislation. In other words, a legislator can take two or more legislative roles simultaneously. As none of these roles are mutually exclusive, no conflict of role orientations as such can be postulated, though it may be assumed that legislative roles in combination may either strengthen or weaken the effect of their orientational components. Hence analysis of the relationship between segmentalized legislative roles and representational roles may serve as a secondary test in appraising the consistency of the relationships suggested in hypotheses No. 1 through No. 3. Where the orientational components of segmentalized roles are similarly geared to representational roles, one should expect a similar distributive pattern as in the case of the singular legislative roles.

For reasons of space limitation we shall not present here the particular hypotheses about relationships between segmentalized legislative roles and representational roles. However, we might say that, with some exceptions, the expected patterns did occur and confirmed the hypotheses about the individual role combinations.



Data Concerning Inter-relation of Legislative and Representational Roles--  
Table XI presents the cross-tabulation of pure legislative roles and representational roles for the four states. A glance at the table indicates some clear-cut patterns which seem, in general, to support the various hypotheses. Inventors

TABLE XI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PURE LEGISLATIVE AND REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES

Representational Roles	<u>Inventors</u> N=25	<u>Brokers</u> N=50	<u>Tribunes</u> N=85
Trustee	84%	68%	46%
Politician	12	28	23
Delegate	4	4	31
	100%	100%	100%

differ from both Brokers and Tribunes in the proportion of Trustees they include; Brokers differ from Inventors and Tribunes in the proportion of Politicians; and Tribunes differ from Inventors and Brokers in having the largest proportion of Delegates. Moreover, the Brokers, though including a larger proportion of Politicians than either the Inventors or Tribunes, also include, as anticipated, a sizeable proportion of Trustees. On the other hand, the table indicates one disturbing aspect. The Tribunes include a greater proportion of Trustees than Delegates, whereas a more equal distribution had been expected. This somewhat negative result seems to be due to the fact that Tennessee legislators included, by comparison with the other states, an undue proportion of Trustees, with the result of not allowing enough leeway for the operation of the other representational roles. Nevertheless, the results obtained in the cross-tabulation of Table I seem to confirm the general hypothesis of a meaningful interpenetration of legislative and representational roles, so that one can legitimately speak of a role system.<sup>24</sup>

Hypothesis No. 1 predicted that there should be significant differences between Inventors, on the one hand, and Brokers and Tribunes, on the other, with respect to their assumption of the Trustee role. The data support the hypothesis. While 84% of the Inventors are also Trustees, only 68% of the Brokers and 46% of the Tribunes are Trustees.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, as predicted in Hypothesis No. 1a, there

24. The differences obtained for the tabulation are statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 23.568$ ; d.f. = 4:  $p < .001$ ), and the association of the role variables is positive though moderate. More detailed tests of the various hypotheses seem to be justified.

25.  $\chi^2 = 14.83$ ; d.f. = 2;  $p < .001$ .

is a positive, if only moderate, association between the Inventor and the Trustee roles.

Hypothesis No. 2 predicted that Brokers should differ from both Inventors and Tribunes in their taking of the role of Politician. As Table XI indicates, Brokers do, in fact, include a somewhat greater proportion of Politicians, but the difference is not statistically significant.<sup>26</sup> However, this statistical result is not surprising. Hypothesis No. 2a predicted that the Broker role should show a positive association with the Trustee role because Brokers must rely on their convictions or judgment in order to coordinate and balance possibly conflicting demands. The degree of association between the Broker role and Trustee role is positive, though low.

Hypothesis No.3 predicted that Tribunes should differ from Inventors and Brokers in taking the role of Delegate. As Table XI shows, 31% of the Tribunes as against only 4% of the Inventors and 4% of the Brokers took the delegate role. These differences are statistically significant.<sup>27</sup> However, a larger proportion of Tribunes turned out to be Trustees than Delegates, whereas Hypothesis No. 3a predicted at least similar proportions. This negative result is likely to be due to the fact that Tennessee has significantly more Trustees than the other states (81% as against 55% in California, 61% in New Jersey, and 56% in Ohio), thus upsetting the expected operation of the representational role variables in the cross-state tabulation. It seemed desirable, therefore, to control Table XI by separating out Tennessee. Table XII presents the results.

TABLE XII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PURE LEGISLATIVE AND REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES IN THREE STATES AND TENNESSEE

Representational Roles	California, New Jersey, Ohio			Tennessee		
	Inventors	Brokers	Tribunes	Inventors	Brokers	Tribunes
	N=19	N=46	N=51	N=6	N=4	N=34
Trustee	79%	67%	33%	100%	75%	64%
Politician	16	29	24	0	25	24
Delegate	5	4	43	0	0	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

26.  $\chi^2 = 2.48$ ; d.f. = 2,  $p > .05$ .

27.  $\chi^2 = 20.48$ ; d.f. = 2;  $p < .001$ .

If Tennessee is treated separately, it now appears that in the three states (California, New Jersey and Ohio), a larger proportion of Tribunes take the role of Delegate than of Trustee, whereas in Tennessee an even smaller proportion take the Delegate role than in the cross-state tabulation of Table XI. Table XII demonstrates that the poor result obtained in the cross-state tabulation can be accounted for by the deviant pattern of role-taking of the Tennessee Tribunes. While the over-all three-state pattern of Table XII is similar to the four-state pattern of Table XI in the Inventor and Broker categories, the Tribune role, with Tennessee omitted, is now more strongly associated with the Delegate than the Trustee role. However, a third of the Tribunes remain Trustees.

More detailed interstate analysis, not reported here, supports the notion of the legislature as a role system, and indicates that, in general, state legislatures are more similar than different in the nature of the relationships obtaining between those roles which are particularly pertinent to legislative decision-making behavior. With one exception, Tennessee, legislative roles oriented towards the content or what of legislation are likely to engender representational roles oriented towards the process or how of legislation. Interstate differences seem to be due less to absence of the specified relationships between legislative and representational roles, and more to the fact that legislative roles or representational roles appear in different proportions in different states.

#### 7. The Interpenetration of Areal and Representational Roles.<sup>28</sup>

The two dimensions which we have called "representational roles" and "areal roles" have often been confused, as a result of an uncritical acceptance of Edmund Burke's assumption that a district-oriented representative is invariably bound by instructions from his clientele, while a commonweal-oriented representative is a free agent. But today, when a legislator has many clienteles other than his district, Burke's identification of district-oriented behavior and mandatory behavior appears merely as a special case. In fact, it does not follow at all that because a legislator focusses on a given clientele--be it his district, his party or an interest group--he cannot be either a Trustee, following his own convictions or judgment in the decisional process, or a Delegate, following instructions, or a Politician who may take one role or the other as circumstances require,

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28. Sections 7, 8 and 9 treat the inter-relation of areal, party, and group-related roles, respectively, with legislative and representational roles. We have omitted all discussion of inter-relations among these three clientele-focussed role orientations not only for reasons of economy but also because we should theoretically expect less association among these components than between any of them and the legislative and representational components. The three clientele-focussed components are, in a sense, three independent foci of legislators' attention. Which focus of the three is more salient for any given legislator should depend almost as much upon typical situations and circumstances (party competition in district, party character of legislature, size and character of district population, and so on) as upon the logic of role-compatibility.



or who may even try to harmonize the two roles in a single situation or in general. This is simply a counter-postulate to Burke's postulate that a district-orientation invariably implies delegate rather than trustee behavior. Which postulate is more adequate depends, of course, on the empirical data.

We shall, in the following, present some hypotheses about the relationship between representational and areal role orientations, as well as some theoretical reasoning behind the formulation of the hypotheses.

Hypothesis No. 4: District-oriented legislators are more likely to be Delegates and less likely to be Trustees than State-oriented legislators,

but:

Hypothesis No. 4a: District-oriented legislators are not likely to take the Delegate role in a significantly greater proportion than the Trustee role.

The two hypotheses represent a combination of the two postulates, Burke's and our own. On the one hand, we assume with Burke that district-oriented legislators are less likely to be Trustees than State-oriented legislators, but we add our own assumption that because a legislator is district-oriented, he need not be a Delegate any more than a Trustee. The reasoning behind hypothesis No. 4a is not any more arbitrary than that behind hypothesis No. 4. It simply implies that though a legislator may have his district at his focus of attention, he may act for the district, in his own conception, as a free agent. Empirically, such a legislator will say that he knows and understands what the district needs or wants, and he rejects the notion that anybody in the district can tell him what to do as a legislator. This district-oriented Trustee is likely to be what we may call a Mentor, a type who sees it as his job to act in behalf of the district as he sees fit, and who sees it as his further task to persuade and convince his constituents in the district that he acted in their best interest.

On the other hand, hypothesis No. 4a cannot be arbitrarily reworked to fit the case of State-oriented legislators. These legislators are, indeed, more likely to take the role of Trustee than that of Delegate. Hence:

Hypothesis No. 5: State-oriented legislators are more likely to take the Trustee role than any other representational role.

This hypothesis derives from the differential circumstances in which State-oriented legislators of necessity find themselves. Although he has the State as his focus of attention as a law-maker, he is not politically responsible to any state-wide electorate, and he cannot point to any purely state-wide clientele from which he could possibly receive instructions. Hence the State-oriented

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29. The State-oriented legislator could, of course, receive instructions from a state-wide clientele group such as a pressure group or party, but these constitute other dimensions of his attention foci.

legislator, as hypothesis No. 4 implied, is more likely to be a Trustee than the district-oriented legislator, but, in line with hypothesis No. 5, he is unlikely to be a Delegate or Politician.

Finally, if the legislator's areal focus is both his district and the State, we should expect that he will take the role of Politician more often than either the pure district-oriented or the pure State-oriented legislator will. For precisely because he has both areal foci, this legislator will have to compromise between his own convictions or judgment, on the one hand, and whatever instructions he may receive, on the other. The segmentalization of his areal role also involves a segmentalization of his representational role. Hence:

Hypothesis No. 6: District-and-state-oriented legislators are more likely to take the role of Politician than do either the district- or the State-oriented legislators.

Data concerning inter-relation of areal and representational roles--The data for our sample of legislators in the four states who could be classified in both the areal and representational role dimensions support these hypotheses.<sup>30</sup>

As Table XIII indicates, while 84% of the State-oriented legislators also took the role of Trustee, only 37% of the district-oriented took this role, with the district-and-state-oriented legislators in a middle position (Hypothesis No. 4).<sup>31</sup> Secondly, among the district-oriented legislators, almost the same proportions, 37% and 36% respectively, took either the Trustee or the Delegate roles (Hypothesis No. 4a). Third, among the State-oriented legislators, none took the role of Delegate and only a few that of Politician (Hypothesis No. 5). Finally, while 37% of the district-and-state-oriented group took the role of Politician, only 16% of the State-oriented<sup>32</sup> and 27% of the district-oriented legislators<sup>33</sup> did likewise (Hypothesis No. 6).<sup>34</sup>

30. The differences in the entire Table XIII produce a  $\chi^2 = 37.759$ , which with four degrees of freedom, makes for a confidence level or  $p < .001$ .

31.  $\chi^2 = 18.15$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .001$ .

32. The 21% difference between the district-and-state-oriented and the State-oriented in the Politician category yields a  $\chi^2 = 6.72$ ; d.f. = 1;  $p < .01$ .

33. The difference between the district-and-state-oriented and the State-oriented, though 10%, is not significant at the .05 level of confidence.

34. Relationships similar to those found in Table XIII were found, with some exceptions, in the individual states. In all four states, State-oriented legislators took the Trustee role more often than the Delegate role, and the district-and-state-oriented were more likely to be Politicians. But in California and New Jersey the district-oriented included more Delegates, and in Tennessee more Trustees than Hypothesis No. 4a postulated, though in Ohio they split as expected. However, these deviations from the hypothesis may be due to the small number of cases available for individual state analysis.

TABLE XIII. AREAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN FOUR STATES

Representational Role	District- Oriented N=89	State-District- Oriented N=64	State- Oriented N=44
Trustee	37%	55%	84%
Delegate	36	8	0
Politician	27	37	16
	100%	100%	100%

#### 8. The Interpenetration of Party Legislative and Representational Roles

As a sub-system of the democratic political system, the party system--notably the two-party system--performs a series of functions necessary for, or at least contributive to, the maintenance of the political system. Parties supply the political system with candidates for public office and mobilize the electorate in support of these candidates. They serve as agencies which take over governmental power and manage the operations of government. Parties sensitize the political system to the needs and requirements for authoritative decisions and services on the part of the larger social system. They adjust, coordinate and integrate a multiplicity of divergent demands made on government by individuals, groups and larger collectivities. Finally, parties articulate and project issues into the political system and define the boundaries of political conflict, and seek to translate issue positions into governmental policies.

The linkage between party system and legislative system is made possible by the fact that, in democratic political systems, legislators not only take roles in the legislative system, but also in the party system. They are, invariably, "members," "adherents," "identifiers," or "sympathizers" of political parties. Whatever nomenclature of party role relationships is selected, it is well known that the relationship between "partisan" and "party" (i.e. the "significant others" in the relationship) is one of varying degrees of intensity. As roles may be thought of as providing the premises of political behavior, it may be postulated that insofar as legislators take party roles of varying intensity, they allow themselves to be "influenced" in varying degree by party in their consideration of political matters and in their legislative decision-making-behavior.

If we are speaking of the functions of party in the political system, we are also speaking, of course, of the functions of those who take roles in the party system. As simultaneous role-takers in the party and legislative systems, different types of legislative role takers should be expected to take party roles which are geared not only to the functioning of the legislature, but also of parties in the political system. In other words, the type of party role he takes, should harmonize, more or less, with the legislative role he takes.



It may now be noted, therefore, that legislative role orientations seem to be relevant to the functions which parties were seen to perform in the political system. The Tribune is particularly sensitive to demands reaching the political system. The Broker coordinates and balances demands in the legislative setting. The Inventor is concerned with the shaping of public policies. And the Ritualist is predominantly involved in the legislative enactment of policies. As each of these roles presumably involves behavior which is, apparently, also identical with action in the performance of party functions, the problem arises of whether, and how, legislative roles and different party roles interpenetrate to satisfy the maintenance requirements of both the legislative and party sub-systems of the political system.

The assumed interpenetration of party roles and legislative roles is functional, not causal. That is, it is not assumed that one role is antecedent to the other, but that they are mutually engendered. One must think, therefore, of a "legislator-partyman" to recognize the interpenetration of legislative and party roles. Given the fact that in the four legislatures all members identified themselves as either Republicans or Democrats, it is impossible, in this connection, to think of a legislator who does not also take a party role, or of a partisan (or independent) who does not also take a legislative role. It is precisely this interpenetration of roles which allows us to speak of a relationship between the party system and the legislative system.

Of course, the roles taken in either system must stand in a theoretically meaningful relationship. The following hypotheses may be advanced:

Hypothesis No. 7: Brokers are more likely to be Strong Partisans than are Inventors or Tribunes.

One of the major functions of political parties in the political system is to adjust and integrate group demands and conflicts. If this is so, one may assume that Strong Partisans, in particular, are sensitive to conflicting group pressures. They are likely to see party success at the polls if their party succeeds in bringing about effective coalitions of competing and diverse groups in the social system. One should expect, therefore, that those who take the Broker role in the legislature are more likely to be Strong Partisans than either Inventors or Tribunes who are not particularly concerned with the coordination and integration of diverse group interests.

Hypothesis No. 8: Inventors are more likely to be Strong Partisans than are Tribunes,

But:

Hypothesis No. 8a: Partisanship is not important in taking the role of Inventor.

The Inventor, stressing the policy-creating aspects of his job, is likely to be a "split" role-taker in the party system. On the one hand, he probably wants to get his ideas translated into legislative measures, and he is, therefore, likely to appreciate the importance of party organization and discipline as instruments for the clarification and realization of policies--something which tends to make him a Strong Partisan. On the other hand, he may be so ahead of the policy views of his party's leadership and out of tune with current party policy--which he would like to see changed--that he may also be an Independent. We should expect, therefore, that Inventors will be more partisan than Tribunes, but will also resemble Tribunes more than Brokers in including a sizeable proportion of Independents.

Hypothesis No. 9: Tribunes are more likely to be Independents than are Brokers.

The Tribune articulates the democratic focus of legislative action and works for the realization of popular aims. He may be an advocate or defender of popular demands. He is more likely to be an Independent than a Partisan because he is likely to seek to effect a change in public policy in terms of the grass-roots demands whose spokesman he considers himself to be. It should be remembered, of course, that "independent" does not have here a literal meaning. The Independent, like the Partisan, has identified himself as a party "member," at least for electoral purposes, and he usually votes the "party line" in the organization of the legislature. In other words, he is not altogether outside of the party framework, and, in cooperation with other Independents, may have some influence on the party under whose label he has been elected. Being a Tribune-Independent, therefore, does not make him a political Don Quixote.

Data concerning inter-relation of party roles and legislative roles--Table XIV presents the relevant findings. As the table shows, the expected patterns occur and the differences between Brokers, Inventor and Tribunes are statistically significant.<sup>35</sup> While 59% of the Brokers are Strong Partisans, only 33% of the Tribunes are likewise, with the Inventors in a middle position (Hypothesis No. 7).

TABLE XIV. LEGISLATIVE AND PARTY ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Party Roles	Brokers N=61	Inventors N=50	Tribunes N=121
Strong Partisan	59%	40%	33%
Weak Partisan	20	24	29
Independent and Maverick	21	36	38
	100%	100%	100%

35.  $\chi^2 = 12.636$ ; d.f. = 4;  $p < .02$ .

Secondly, Inventors, as anticipated, do include a larger proportion of Strong Partisans than the Tribunes, but they also resemble the Tribunes in the proportion of Independents (Hypothesis No. 8). Finally, whereas 38% of the Tribunes are Independents, only 21% of the Brokers are Independents. The fact that Tribunes do not include more Independents was to be expected, for, as pointed out in connection with Hypothesis No. 9, independence here does not mean complete freedom from party commitments by any means. Evidently, a sizeable proportion of Tribunes find in their party an effective vehicle for the performance of their popular spokesman function.

Interpenetration of party and representational roles--In considering possible relationships between party roles and representational roles it would seem reasonable to assume that the role of Trustee is no more likely to be associated with any one of the partisanship categories than another. Hence:

Hypothesis No. 10: Partisanship is not significant in taking the role of Trustee.

As the Trustee makes decisions based on his own principles or judgment, we might think of him as an Independent or a Weak Partisan. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that the legislator finds no conflict between his own judgment or conscience and his strong loyalty to his party. He perceives himself as following his own judgment or conscience, but he also has the strong expectation that "truth" and "principle" will be associated with party.

Hypothesis No. 11: Strong Partisans and Independents are more likely than Weak Partisans to be Delegates.

As the Delegate is one who "follows instructions," we can assume that his party role will depend on whose instructions he expects to follow. If he is inclined to follow instructions of party, then we might expect him to be a Strong Partisan, but if he has a strong district orientation it would be likely that he would be an Independent. It is also quite possible that for some legislators the district is identified with the local party organization. Such a situation, where the same instructions come from both party and district, would tend to reinforce the tendency to take the Delegate role. It would appear that the role of Delegate would be least consistent with the role of Weak Partisan and most consistent with that of Independent or Strong Partisan.

TABLE XV. RELATION OF PARTY ROLES AND REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES

Party Roles	Strong Partisans N=141	Weak Partisans N=66	Independents & Mavericks N=79
Trustee	60%	65%	67%
Delegate	14	8	20
Politician	26	27	13
	100%	100%	100%



The Politician is more flexible than the Delegate or Trustee in his representational behavior. Since he is likely to be more flexible in the way he makes decisions, we might expect that he would be more aware of the coordinating and integrating function of political parties in the decision-making process. Hence:

Hypothesis No. 12: Partisans are more likely than Independents to be Politicians.

The relation of party roles and representational roles are shown in Table XV. The table shows that Trustees make up about the same proportions of each of the party role types, thus supporting Hypothesis No. 10. Though the differences are small, Weak Partisans are less likely to be Delegates than are Independents or Strong Partisans (Hypothesis No. 11), and Independents are less likely to assume the role of Politician than are those in the two Partisan categories (Hypothesis No. 12).

#### 9. The Interpenetration of Lobby Roles with Legislative and Representational Roles.

The most striking single feature of the way pressure-group-related role orientations combine with other role orientations is that, in each state and for every other major role-component, Facilitators, Resisters, and non-group-oriented legislators all tend, though in varying degrees, to adopt that role-orientation which is dominant in their own state.<sup>36</sup> For example, Tennessee legislators of all three types tend to be Tribunes in their legislative role-orientation, whereas Ohio legislators tend more to be Brokers. From this we can infer (as a hypothesis for future analysis) that pressure-group-related roles are less salient for legislators generally than are any other components of their individual role-orientations. This is also what we should theoretically hypothesize, since legislatures are universally viewed as authoritative decision-making bodies (hence the greater saliency of legislative and representational roles); they are universally selected by voters in districts voting under a system historically developed as a method of reflecting political views of residents of specified areas (hence the greater saliency of areal roles), on the basis of their campaigns waged under party banners and labels (hence the greater saliency of party-related roles).

Nevertheless, we should hypothesize that certain group-related role orientations would more readily combine with some legislative and representational roles than with others. If Facilitators recognize the often-conflicting demands from many groups as legitimate data for legislative consideration, they are already one long step on the road to accepting the legitimacy of serving as Brokers among the conflicting group demands. If they see such "external" demands as legitimate

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36. Tables omitted here.

determinants of public policy, they may well find it difficult to think of policy issues in abstract, intellectual terms as would Inventors. If they see clearly a multiplicity of organized groups as vehicles for expressing public demands before the legislature, they are unlikely to take the generalized view of the "populace" essential to the role of Tribune. Hence:

Hypothesis No. 13: Facilitators tend more than other types to be Brokers.

Hypothesis No. 13a: Facilitators tend less than other types to be either Tribunes or Inventors.

TABLE XVI. ASSOCIATION OF PRESSURE GROUP ROLE ORIENTATIONS WITH LEGISLATIVE ROLES

Legislative Role	Facilitators N=137	Non-Group-Oriented N=165	Resisters N=90
Inventor	7%	17%	14%
Inventor-Broker	11)	7)	8)
Broker	19)	14)	12)
Broker-Tribune	7)	8)	10)
Inventor-Broker-Tribune	7	4	6
Tribune	27	35	32
Ritualist	22	15	18
	100%	100%	100%

The data shown in Table XVI tend to support these hypotheses. Facilitators not only tend more than other types to assume the pure Broker role, but also to assume segmentalized roles involving that role in combination with one of the others (Hypothesis No. 13).<sup>37</sup> Likewise, Facilitators assume Inventor and Tribune roles less frequently than either of the other types (Hypothesis No. 13a).<sup>38</sup>

37. Facilitators-others:  $\chi^2 = 3.118$ ; d.f. = 1;  $.10 > p > .05$ .

38. Facilitators-others:  $\chi^2 = 3.455$ ; d.f. = 1;  $.10 > p > .05$ . One rather surprising feature of Table XVI is that non-group-oriented legislators seem less often (15%) than either Facilitators (22%) or Resisters (18%) to play the role of Ritualist. The difference, while slight suggests the need for further analysis.

In general these relations hold the same in all four states. However, New Jersey Facilitators show a greater tendency than the other two types to be Tribunes (62% as against 44% and 30%, respectively), and even show a slightly lesser tendency than do Resisters to be pure Brokers (13% as against 20%). Why these deviations should occur we cannot yet say.

Recognizing numerous legitimate demands from groups "outside," Facilitators can less easily see their job as involving primarily a trusteeship for promoting group interests, as they see them, than can legislators less sensible of or less favorably disposed to such demands. Recognizing a multiplicity of frequently divergent and conflicting legitimate demands, they can hardly see their job as directly enacting any one set of them, as would a Delegate. Hence:

Hypothesis No. 14: Facilitators should tend more than other types to be Politicians.

Hypothesis No. 14a: Facilitators should tend less to be Delegates than to be either Trustees or Politicians.

The data, as Table XVII shows, seem to support these hypotheses. Some 32% of the Facilitators are Politicians, whereas only 13% of the Non-group-oriented and 24% of the Resisters assume that role (Hypothesis No. 14).<sup>39</sup> And only 10% of the Facilitators are Delegates, whereas 32% of them are Politicians and 58% of them are Trustees (Hypothesis No. 14a). But there are several important departures from this pattern in particular states. Tennessee Resisters tend more than either Facilitators or Non-group-oriented to be Politicians, while California

TABLE XVII. ASSOCIATION OF PRESSURE-GROUP ROLE WITH REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES

Representational Roles	Facilitators N=100	Non-group-oriented N=119	Resisters N=70
Trustee	58%	70%	62%
Delegate	10	17	14
Politician	32	13	24
	100%	100%	100%

Non-group-oriented legislators tend slightly more than either Facilitators or Resisters to play this role. The number of cases involved here is so small, however, that we are not warranted in considering these deviations too significant.<sup>40</sup>

39. Facilitators-others:  $\chi^2 = 9.310$ ; d.f. = 1;  $.01 > p > .001$ .

40. Only 12 Tennessee Facilitators were also classified according to representational role--1 being a Politician and 11 being Trustees--while only 18 California Facilitators could be so classified--4 as Politicians, 12 as Trustees, and 2 as Delegates.



III


10. Conclusions.

The generally satisfactory results achieved in the tests of hypotheses concerning the interpenetration of legislative and representational roles seem to support the notion that a legislature as an institutionalized system of behavior gains its coherence by legislators' taking of roles which are related in a system of roles. It is the system of roles which, presumably, makes the operation of the system predictable because it makes the behavior of the incumbents of legislative positions predictable. In other words, the behavior of legislators is not chaotic. Legislators cannot be assumed to bend automatically to the force of the strongest pressures which impinge on them in random fashion as circumstances might occasion. This assumption prevails in those studies of legislative behavior which focus on the struggle of interests in the legislative process. These studies assume that the legislative product invariably reflects the contemporary strength of the pressures which are exerted on legislators. Legislative behavior becomes random, or is orderly only insofar as the balance of pressures is more or less stable through time. Our study, on the contrary, assumes that what pressures are brought to bear on legislators are absorbed by them in a meaningful manner by the taking of roles which themselves serve as premises in decision-making. And if these roles compose a system, the influences brought to bear on legislators from the outside can be expected to be modified in such a way that the legislature continues to be a system rather than an unpredictable battle ground of pressures in combat.

Appendix A

THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM  
A Diagram of Role Relationships

THE FOCI OF INPUT: CLIENTELE ROLES



Appendix B

METHOD OF CONSTRUCTING ROLES

1. Core Legislative, Representational and Areal Roles:

These roles were derived mainly from orientations expressed by the legislators themselves, primarily in response to the following unstructured, open-ended question:

"Now, a couple of questions about the job of being a legislator:

- (a) First of all, how would you describe the job of being a legislator--what are the most important things you should do here? (b) Are there any important differences between what you think this job is and the way your constituents see it? What are they?

Responses to this question yielded three different orientational dimensions and were coded as follows:

1. Characterization of job
2. Objectives of job
3. Criteria of Decision

Each total answer was broken up into individual statements and coded in the appropriate punches of these three major categories. Coding was undertaken in terms of manifest statements rather than latent meanings, though meanings were taken into consideration in locating manifest statements.

Role orientation types were constructed by combining relevant punches which, on the basis of their manifest content, seemed to represent a major orientational dimension. In general, data concerning characterization of job yielded the core legislative roles; data concerning the objectives of the job yielded the areal roles; and data concerning criteria of decision yielded the representational roles.

Of course, because of the open-endedness of the question, not all respondents could be located in all orientational dimensions, and only effective responses could be used in the construction of the role types as they emerged from legislators' own definitions, and in the analysis.

2. Party Roles

The party role types were constructed from a Guttman-type scale based on replies to four statements (calling for an agree-disagree response) included in a list of twenty-five statements dealing with various other legislative and political matters which was presented to the legislators after they had answered most of the other items in the questionnaire:



1. The best interests of the people would be better served if legislators were elected without party labels.
2. Under our form of government, every legislator should take an interest in government directly, not through a political party.
3. If a bill is important for his party's record, a member should vote with his party even if it costs him some support in his district.
4. The two parties should take clear-cut, opposing stands on more of the important state issues in order to encourage party responsibility.

In this analysis "disagree" responses to items 1 and 2 and "agree" responses to items 3 and 4 were considered "positive" partisan responses. The Guttman technique produced a five point scale with an over-all coefficient of reproducibility of 90.8%, and the following distribution of scale scores:

PARTISANSHIP SCALE SCORES BY INDIVIDUAL STATE

	<u>Cal.</u> N=108	<u>N.J.</u> N=79	<u>Ohio</u> N=159	<u>Tenn.</u> N=111	<u>Total</u> N=457
1 Lowest Partisanship	34%	5%	6%	18%	15%
2	11	8	13	29	15
3	27	35	19	27	26
4	8	41	43	21	29
5 Highest Partisanship	20	11	19	5	15
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

In this table, scale score 1 represents those who took the extreme position of rejecting party labels. Within the 10% margin of error permitted by the Guttman technique each increment in scale score represents a positive response to a more strongly partisan item, and those in scale score 5 made a positive partisan response to all four items in the scale.

Scale scores 4 and 5 were combined to form the Strong Partisan role type and those with scale score three were termed Weak Partisans. Legislators with scale score 2 became the Independents and those with scale score 1 were given the label Mavericks. In some cases it was necessary to combine the Independent and Maverick roles in order to carry out an analysis without winding up with too few cells in our table.

### 3. Pressure Group Roles

Legislators were classified on the basis of (a) their tolerance of pressure politics (acceptance of pluralism), and (b) their awareness of organized group activity. Those ranking high in tolerance and in awareness were classified as Facilitators. Those ranking low in tolerance but high in awareness were classified as Resisters. Those ranking low in awareness (whatever their ranking in tolerance) and those ranking neutral in tolerance were classified as Non-group-oriented.

Tolerance of pressure politics was measured by a Likert scale based on the following four items:

- a. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work better or worse if there were no interest groups and lobbies trying to influence legislation?
- b. (Agree or disagree) The job of the legislator is to work out compromises among conflicting interests.
- c. (Agree or disagree) Lobbyists and special interests have entirely too much influence in American state legislatures.
- d. (Agree or disagree) Under our form of government, every individual should take an interest in government directly, not through interest-group organizations.

The ability of these items to discriminate between those with high and those with low tolerance more than meets the standards usually considered appropriate; a discriminatory power of at least 1.0 for any given item (if the item has been scored from 0 to 4) when comparing average scores of the upper and lower quartiles is the customary requirement, whereas the discriminatory power of the above items when comparing upper and lower thirds (a more stringent test) was, a = 1.3, b = 1.5, c = 2.0, d = 1.9.

Awareness was measured by a lobbyist-recognition score, based upon the legislator's ability to identify nine lobbyists on a list presented to each legislator interviewed. In a few marginal cases, ability to name a given number of groups when discussing the subject of powerful groups in the state was introduced as a supplementary measure.

# THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT UPON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel. September 4-6, 1958.

## I

That the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have had a profound impact upon the administration of criminal justice in the country all will agree. It is, on the one hand, the final court of review for the lower federal courts. On the other hand, as the custodian of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment it exercises increasingly extensive powers of review over the state courts. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that all branches of the federal government, legislative and executive as well as judicial, are involved in the administration of justice in one way or another. For, taken as a whole, notwithstanding the nature of the federal division of labor, under which most crimes are within the responsibility of the states, the national government has very broad commitments in the criminal law field. The amount of legislation enacted by Congress in this area has grown steadily over the years, since the second session of the First Congress adopted in 1790 "An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States," a modest statute of 33 sections.<sup>1</sup> Of course, the federal government has implied as well as specifically enumerated constitutional powers, and in the McCulloch case,<sup>2</sup> which nailed down the principle of implied powers, John Marshall cited the United States penal code as an unchallengeable illustration of the principle, declaring that "the good sense of the public has pronounced, without hesitation, that the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers." Thus, thrice-blessed, by Congress, John Marshall and the good sense of the public, the federal criminal jurisdiction has steadily expanded from humble beginnings into the vast complex of power it is today. Since it was decided, at an early date, that there are no federal common law crimes,<sup>3</sup> this expansion has been accomplished by means of legislation. By the time Congress adopted the Revised Statutes of 1877, the title dealing with federal crimes<sup>4</sup> ran to 225 sections. The Penal Code of 1909,<sup>5</sup> which added new sections on offenses against the postal service and against foreign and interstate commerce, included 345 sections. The 1948 revision of Part I of Title 18 of the U. S. Code,<sup>6</sup> which defines federal crimes, contained 502 sections, and many sections have been added since then.

Federal facilities have had to expand to cope with this growing body of federal legislation. Many additional federal judgeships have been created, and the burdens of judges and of the host of officials whose activities are geared in with those of the courts-- commissioners, prosecutors, marshalls, clerks, parole officers, and the like-- have grown heavier. During the fiscal year 1957, 28,120 criminal cases were commenced in the federal district courts (as compared with 62,380 civil cases).<sup>7</sup> The number of federal probation officers has increased from 63 in 1932 to 481 in 1957.<sup>8</sup> There has been a steady increase in the number of federal prisoners, the average daily population of federal penal institutions moving from 301 in 1896 to 18,282 in 1941 to 21,220 in 1957.<sup>9</sup> This enlarged criminal jurisdiction has also resulted in the creation of more and ever larger federal administrative agencies of an essentially police character, of which the most important are the Federal Bureau of Investigation,<sup>10</sup> the Secret Service, the Post Office Inspection Service, the Bureau of Narcotics, the Enforcement Division of the Alcohol Tax Unit, the Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Coast Guard and the Immigration Border Patrol. In addition to these police



services, many agencies are scattered throughout the federal administrative system whose routine activities touch upon the enforcement of criminal laws, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior, the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions of the Department of Labor, and the Public Health Service in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Some measure of the scope of the criminal law jurisdiction of the federal government is reflected in the range of activities of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The creation in it of a new Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in 1954 is symptomatic of the present drift of the federal government in an area customarily left to the states. Vigorous enforcement in recent years of the Hobbs Act<sup>11</sup> and Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act<sup>12</sup> as part of the government's drive against racketeering in the labor field is merely an additional illustration of the persistent enlargement of the federal interest in criminal law. Even in the field of gambling, a vice traditionally consigned to the vagaries of state administration, the commitments of the federal government have been mounting up, now that it is trying to enforce the Slot Machine Act,<sup>13</sup> and the Wagering Tax Act,<sup>14</sup> on top of the old lottery statutes<sup>15</sup> and the Gambling Ship Act.<sup>16</sup>

## II

Clearly the practices and principles of the various branches of the federal government in the criminal law field exert a profound influence upon the states, who still carry the major burden of criminal law administration. To be sure, a great deal of this impact has been by way of Supreme Court decisions, but not even the influence of the Court is limited to its role in litigation. For the present federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are in effect by virtue of orders of the Supreme Court entered on the basis of rule-making power vested in it by Congress in the Criminal Appeals Rules Act of 1933<sup>17</sup> and the Criminal Pleading and Trial Rules Act of 1940.<sup>18</sup> In the words of Rule 1, "These rules govern the procedure in the courts of the United States and before U.S. commissioners in all criminal proceedings," with certain exceptions spelled out in Rule 54, for example, petty offenses on federal reservations and certain offenses against navigation and fishery laws. Though these rules do not apply to state courts, they tend to serve as guideposts for state legislatures and state appellate courts when they formulate rules of criminal procedure of their own. The federal example is widely studied and necessarily exerts a powerful exemplary influence upon the states. The late Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, who was an ardent champion of procedural reform, has documented in detail the weighty impact of both the federal civil and criminal procedure rules upon the states.<sup>19</sup>

As Rule 2 declares, "these rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." On many subjects- such as bail, the right to counsel, search and seizure, and criminal contempt- the federal rules are important because they represent an enlightened point of view on highly debatable issues.<sup>20</sup>

It is not without interest to note that when the present rules of criminal procedure were adopted, Justice Frankfurter, without expressing any opinion on their merits, refused to join in the action because he did not believe that the Court was an appropriate agency for formulating such rules for the district courts.<sup>21</sup> First of all, he noted that prior to the Evarts Act of 1891<sup>22</sup> the Justices rode circuit and "thus had intimate, first-hand experience with the duties and demands of trial courts." But during the past half-century, he pointed out, the Justices have become removed from direct, day-to-day contact with the district courts. "To that extent," he wrote, "they are largely denied the first-hand opportunities for

realizing vividly what rules of procedure are best calculated to promote the largest measure of justice." And he added: "These considerations are especially relevant to the formulation of rules for the conduct of criminal trials. These closely concern the public security as well as the liberties of citizens."

Of course this same objection can be made, and has often been made, of the Court's disposition of criminal appeals. If the Justices are too far removed from first-hand contact with the realities of criminal justice to frame rules of procedure, maybe they are also unsuited to the task of deciding cases which involve the same problems. As a matter of fact, there have always been plenty of critics who make just this charge. Thus Wigmore said, in castigating in his own inimitable way those responsible for the rule that a confession secured during a period of illegal detention is ipso facto inadmissible: "Let the judges who sit in judgment on crime look a little into the facts. Let them not sit up aloft and dictate a rule which ignores the well-known facts of criminal life and hampers the needful methods of justice."<sup>23</sup> Much harsher comments have been made in the past few years regarding the Justices' knowledge of the facts of life about subversion and the requirements of national security.<sup>24</sup>

Justice Frankfurter gave two additional reasons for his refusal to concur in the adoption of the new rules of criminal procedure. For one thing, he argued, there are bound to be provisions in the code which will raise questions for future adjudication by the Court. He therefore thought it was unwise to prejudge questions that may come before the Court in due course of litigation, by laying down "rules in the abstract rather than deciding issues coming here with the impact of actuality and duly contested." Furthermore, he thought the Court was too busy to be saddled with the additional task of fashioning and periodically revising codes of procedure for trial courts.

While Congress has in recent years delegated extensive rule-making powers to the Supreme Court, it is still true that many federal statutes have also contributed ideas and practices to American criminal law procedure. A familiar example is the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907,<sup>25</sup> which gave the government a direct appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the defendant had not been put in jeopardy. Of considerable importance is the statute which provides that the repeal of a criminal statute does not extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability already incurred unless the repealing statute shall so expressly stipulate.<sup>26</sup> Congress was one of the first legislative bodies in the United States to establish by legislation, in 1878, that a defendant in a criminal case is competent to appear as a witness, if he so desires, in his own behalf.<sup>27</sup> Congressional statutes dealing with the admissibility of evidence, such as writings or records made in the regular course of any business,<sup>28</sup> have been especially noteworthy. Attention has been drawn in recent years to federal statutes involving sentencing, parole, probation, youth correction, trial of mental defectives, and juvenile delinquency.<sup>29</sup>

In still other ways the activities of the national government have contributed to the development of an improved administration of justice embodying the fruits of modern knowledge and moral taste. The federal agencies have done much to put police work on an efficient, professional basis. Sheldon Glueck remarked in 1934 that "the Attorney General's office is becoming the symbol of efficiency in the apprehension and prosecution of criminals."<sup>30</sup> The national law-enforcement agencies have emphasized the importance of recruiting investigative personnel who possess certain desirable qualifications, and of proper in-service training.<sup>31</sup> Significant aspects of progress in police work, such as criminal identification, the use of modern means of transport and communication, and crime reporting, have been immensely stimulated by federal examples. Many key men in local police forces have gone through the excellent training program which the FBI provides for in its famous



Police Academy. Established in 1935, it had graduated 3,452 law officers by the end of 1957.<sup>32</sup> It is also important to note that the federal police give a great deal of attention to promotional, informational, hortatory and research work. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, a professional journal which is designed to help local police keep in touch with the most recent trends in law enforcement, and the Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin, are good examples. Finally, it is especially noteworthy that every police agency of the national government cooperates with local officials in some degree, great or small, formally or informally, with or without statutory authorization. It follows that interpenetration of ideas goes on all the time.

### III

The Supreme Court spends a great deal of its time disposing of criminal appeals. During the 1956 Term, for example, when the Court decided 130 cases on the merits with full opinion, there were in all 24 federal criminal cases, of which seven involved constitutional issues (censorship, contempt of Congress, procedure), and 17 were disposed of on statutory grounds (evidence, procedure and construction of statutes.) There were also eight federal habeas corpus cases, four involving alien deportation, three military jurisdiction, and one a state prisoner presenting a constitutional point. In addition, nine state criminal cases were disposed of with full opinion during this Term, all involving of necessity constitutional issues: censorship, legislative contempt, supremacy of federal law and several procedural questions. During the 1955 Term, when there were 94 dispositions with full opinion, the Court disposed of eleven federal criminal cases, of which five presented constitutional issues (self-incrimination, indictments, jurisdiction and procedure, construction of federal statutes.) There were in addition seven federal habeas corpus cases, of which two were brought by state prisoners; the other cases involved alien deportation, military jurisdiction and a procedural question. There were six state criminal cases in this Term's output, all but one of which involved procedural issues.

These figures for the 1955 and 1956 Terms are probably not typical of the Court's business, if it is surveyed over a long period of time, for its interest in criminal appeals has been unusually great during the past few years. Nevertheless, Frankfurter and Landis, in their well-known book, The Business of the Supreme Court, published in 1927, reported that between 1908 and 1924 the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 alone brought to the Court each Term on the average ten additional cases.<sup>33</sup> It is also noteworthy that the general trend of modern federal legislation has been in the direction of restricting rather than expanding the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The exception to this tendency in favor of criminal appeals is an interesting example of the contemporary concern with criminal justice.

It is elementary, of course, that the Supreme Court stands in a different relationship to the lower federal courts as compared with its relationship to the state courts. It is the head of the federal court system, and as such exercises general powers of supervision over the administration of criminal justice in that system. That is to say, in disposing of federal criminal appeals the Supreme Court has the same authority to decide all legal issues, whether constitutional or not, that a state supreme court has in reviewing the lower state courts. Thus, from the beginning of its history, the Supreme Court has formulated rules of evidence for federal criminal prosecutions.<sup>34</sup> A very good recent illustration was the Court's decision in 1957 in the Jencks case,<sup>35</sup> which held that defendants were entitled to see the confidential reports of informers used by the government as witnesses. Similarly, in the Roviaro case,<sup>36</sup> also decided in 1957, the Court ruled that fundamental fairness requires disclosure to the defendant of an informer's



identity where such disclosure would be helpful to the defense. These decisions did not even purport to be constructions of the Constitution, but were merely expositions of rules of evidence fashioned by Court as the supervisor of the federal courts and of federal justice.

The Court's role in reviewing state criminal proceedings is quite different, however, and much more limited. For in reviewing the local tribunals the Supreme Court's authority is restricted to the vindication of federal constitutional limitations applicable to the states. Furthermore, since every state has at least one appellate court, and many have two, fully-adjudicated state cases come to the Supreme Court in a posture which usually commands a great deal of respect. Finally, a great many criminal appeals turn on questions of fact, and the Supreme Court quite properly takes into account that the state judges were much closer to the facts in contrast with its review of a cold printed record.

Federal intervention in the state administration of criminal justice is very recent, and is based largely on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The privileges and immunities clause got off to a bad start in the Slaughterhouse case,<sup>37</sup> and has never amounted to very much. Except for the jury cases, the equal protection clause has not been very important in this area until the decision in Griffin v. Illinois (1956),<sup>38</sup> which held, though by a 5-4 vote, that a state denies equal protection if it refuses to provide for a transcript without cost to an indigent defendant where the transcript is necessary to secure an adequate review of alleged trial errors.

The power of the Supreme Court to review state criminal cases dates, of course, from the adoption of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.<sup>39</sup> But it did not have much on which to operate until the enactment by Congress of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,<sup>40</sup> which was designed to help enforce the Reconstruction Acts. This statute made federal habeas corpus available to state as well as federal prisoners, and provided that federal judges, "in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." The statute also provided that "the petitioner may deny any of the material facts set forth in the return, or may allege any fact," to show that his detention was illegal, and the court to which the petition was addressed was required to determine the facts by hearing testimony and argument. This gave the prisoner a right to have the court consider the truth and substance of the causes of his detention. Clearly this was a broader review than the bare review which common law practice then permitted, for it opened the door to a more searching inquiry by the judge into the actual facts. This was a far cry from John Marshall's holding in Ex parte Watkins (1830),<sup>41</sup> that "the judgment of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would be." That is to say, the object of habeas corpus is the liberation of persons imprisoned without sufficient cause, and the judgment of a court of record having final jurisdiction is sufficient cause. In Ex parte Lange (1873)<sup>42</sup> the first case under the Act of 1867 in which certiorari was used to bring up the record of a trial court, the Supreme Court declared the sentence void and ordered the petitioner's release, thus making it clear that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is not necessarily conclusive. It was also established that in deciding the matter the appellate court considers the record as well as the petition and return. The Supreme Court has never had any doubt of the power of Congress thus to liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus.<sup>43</sup>

The federal courts having been authorized, since 1867, to provide relief wherever a prisoner is held "in violation of the constitution," the history of their use of the writ of habeas corpus has been one of steady expansion. The

earliest cases dealt with the indictment and conviction of Negroes by juries from which Negroes had been systematically and arbitrarily excluded, beginning with three leading decisions reported in Volume 100 of the U.S. Reports.<sup>44</sup> Other early cases dealt with a variety of technical problems dealing with indictments,<sup>45</sup> variations in the number of peremptory challenges in capital cases,<sup>46</sup> general fairness of trial procedures,<sup>47</sup> waiver of jury trial in capital cases,<sup>48</sup> and selection of jurors.<sup>49</sup> The Supreme Court also made it clear that it had no jurisdiction to decide legal questions which fell entirely within the scope of the exercise of the powers of the state,<sup>50</sup> and that it would not consider a Fourteenth Amendment due process question where it was first raised after the case had been decided by the state's highest court.<sup>51</sup>

#### IV

Federal judicial intervention with the administration of criminal justice at the state level is, for the most part, a product of very recent decisions. The rule that a state trial is improper on federal constitutional grounds if held under the influence of mob domination dates from the Frank<sup>52</sup> and Moore<sup>53</sup> cases, decided in 1915 and 1923 respectively. The first case to hold that due process includes the right to counsel, at least under certain circumstances, was decided in 1932.<sup>54</sup> The first decision to establish the proposition that a state violates due process if the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony came in 1935.<sup>55</sup> It was not until 1936 that the Supreme Court set aside a state conviction on the ground that it has been based upon a coerced confession.<sup>56</sup> Other decisions extending the scope of federal review were those which held that due process included the right to be heard by an impartial judge (1927),<sup>57</sup> and that due process forbade the use of unreasonable presumptions in state criminal statutes (1929).<sup>58</sup> The principal grounds upon which the Supreme Court has set aside state convictions in the last 25 years have been in connection with the right to counsel, the exclusion of Negroes from jury service, the use of coerced confessions, and the use of tainted testimony.<sup>59</sup> That the scope of none of these subjects is well-settled today is amply suggested by the Court's handling of the coerced confession problem in Stein v. New York,<sup>60</sup> decided in 1953.

Though the scope of due process as a federally-enforceable limitation upon the states in the criminal law field is still in a state of flux, one proposition may now be regarded as settled, that federal process is not the measure of due process. That is to say, the procedures which federal courts are bound to follow because of the explicit commands of the first eight amendments are not necessarily the measure of Fourteenth Amendment due process so far as the state courts are concerned. A minority of Justices have for some years taken the position that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to nationalize the Bill of Rights, but this doctrine of total incorporation has never found favor with a majority of the Court. The last full-dress debate on this subject was in the Adams on case,<sup>61</sup> decided in 1947, where the Court, by a 5-4 vote, stood by the traditional position that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against the states only those provisions of the Bill of Rights which are essential to justice.

The reluctance of the Supreme Court to impose upon the states the rules of procedure which prevail in federal courts is a well-known feature of contemporary constitutional law. A familiar example is that dealing with the right to counsel, for the Court has refused, ever since Betts v. Brady,<sup>62</sup> to apply the sweeping command of the Sixth Amendment to the states. Under the rule of this case, a mere denial of counsel by a state trial judge, even if requested by the accused, does not in and of itself deny due process; the defendant must establish that some sort of injustice resulted from his lack of a lawyer. Similarly, while the Supreme Court has ruled that confessions secured during a period of illegal detention are



inadmissible in federal courts, wholly apart from any question of voluntariness,<sup>63</sup> it has refused to make this a requirement of due process, binding upon the states.<sup>64</sup> The rule which excludes such confessions in the federal courts was not announced as one required by the Constitution, but merely as a rule of evidence adopted in the course of the Supreme Court's supervision of the administration of federal justice. But it takes the position that it has no power of general supervision over the trial of criminal cases in the state courts, and that voluntariness is the only test of due process so far as confessions are concerned. Still another familiar example of the proposition that federal process is not the measure of due process is the rule that whereas evidence secured illegally, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is excludable on motion in federal courts,<sup>65</sup> the Court has refused to apply this exclusionary rule to the state courts.<sup>66</sup> Its position is that the rule was never a constitutional requirement, but merely "a matter of judicial implication," and that it was not essential to justice in any fundamental, due process sense.

What, then, has been the impact of Supreme Court decisions upon the administration of criminal justice in the states? Where the Court has squarely announced a particular rule to be a requirement of due process, the impact has been considerable. The right-to-counsel cases have unquestionably stimulated substantial policy changes in the states, whether accomplished by legislation or court rule. This is illustrated by the long tussle between the Supreme Court and the State of Illinois,<sup>67</sup> which resulted in the adoption by the state Supreme Court of a liberalized rule on representation by counsel,<sup>68</sup> and in the enactment by the legislature of a statute spelling out the defendant's post-conviction remedies more clearly and adequately.<sup>69</sup> While it is impossible in the present state of empirical knowledge to know just what the effect of the jury cases has been, it is a fair guess that more Negroes serve on state juries today as a result of the Supreme Court's decisions. It is also a fair guess that the confession cases have had some effect upon the conduct of state trials, though here again adequate empirical knowledge is lacking.

Even where the Supreme Court has fashioned rules for the federal courts alone, and has specifically held them inapplicable to the states, the example of the nation's greatest court is not without weight, and of course states are perfectly free to follow the federal lead if they wish to do so. In this regard the record, so far as it has been studied, is a mixed one. Take, for example, the federal exclusionary rule, which was first adopted by the Supreme Court in 1914. Writing in 1949,<sup>70</sup> Justice Frankfurter's research showed that before the Weeks decision 27 states had passed on the admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, and that of these, 26 states had opposed the Weeks doctrine, and only one had anticipated it. Since the Weeks decision, 47 states had passed on the doctrine, 20 for the first time, of which six followed it and 14 rejected it. He found that 26 states had reviewed prior decisions contrary to the Weeks doctrine, and ten of them decided to follow Weeks, the other 16 adhering to their earlier position. Thus, as of 1949, he concluded that 30 states rejected the Weeks doctrine, and 17 states agreed with it. Clearly this represents a considerable drift away from what had been, not so long ago, an almost unanimous state position contrary to the Weeks doctrine.

I do not believe that I have a full count of decisions since 1949, but I do know that since the Wolf case, the highest courts of California and Delaware have adopted the federal exclusionary rule,<sup>71</sup> and North Carolina, Texas and Maryland have followed suit by statute.<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, the Michigan Constitution, which had a customary clause on unreasonable searches and seizures,<sup>73</sup> was amended in 1936 and 1952 so that it now includes this proviso: "Provided, however, That the provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any



court of criminal jurisdiction, or in any criminal proceeding held before any magistrate or justice of the peace, any narcotic drug or drugs, any firearm, rifle, pistol, revolver, automatic pistol, machine gun, bomb, bomb shell, explosive, blackjack, slungshot, billy, metallic knuckles, gas-ejecting device, or any other dangerous weapon or thing, seized by any peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state."<sup>74</sup>

Powerful arguments against the exclusionary rule have always been advanced by state courts<sup>75</sup> and legal scholars.<sup>76</sup> Thus Professor John B. Waite of the law faculty of the University of Michigan wrote not very long ago of the exclusionary rule:

"Like so distressing much of judicial law-making, it seems to be predicated not upon research, not even upon careful evaluation of known data, but wholly upon the predilections of the particular judges who have assumed that power to choose between competing notions. It is not the choice of a scientist, not even of a social scientist; it is at best the empirical reaction of individuals whose knowledge of realities varies greatly. By no other, less condemnatory, theory can the disparity of belief and divergence of judicial opinion be explained.

"No one would question the intelligence of a Holmes. But what knowledge of realities, of the practical necessities of social protection through law enforcement, does even a Holmes possess after four decades in the ivory towered cloisters of an appellate bench. Had so radical a rule of evidence been promulgated by Congress or a state legislature, without even pretence of committee study of facts or a request for information, its method of production would have been cursed by the police, castigated by the press and condemned by the general public."<sup>77</sup>

Professor Waite went on to assert that "not one shred of evidence has been discovered to indicate that the police of Ohio and New York, where use of evidence is permitted, are worse behaved than the police of Michigan and Illinois, where it is excluded." On the contrary, he thought that there was "ample and persuasive evidence" that the exclusionary rule has actually encouraged serious police misbehavior, through such devices as the "tip-over raid" and other forms of harassment. He complained that the rule frustrated the police in going after criminals, and he insisted that not a "few criminals," as Holmes thought, but many thousands, have in fact been able to escape justice.

While a good many states have been impressed with the logic and reason behind the federal exclusionary rule, the McNabb rule, which bars the use of confessions secured during a period of illegal confinement, whether they were given voluntarily or not, has not impressed them. It will be recalled again that the McNabb decision did not rest upon any interpretation of the Constitution. In fact, Justice Frankfurter said that the civilized standards of procedure and evidence which the Court seeks to maintain as the supervisor of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts are not satisfied "merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as 'due process of law,'"<sup>78</sup> At the same time he pointed out that "review by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction." The Court has ruled that state courts are not required to follow the McNabb rule as a matter of due process,<sup>79</sup> and most state courts take a dim view of it. "There is a respectable body of opinion," the Connecticut court

recently said, "which holds that the rule....goes too far in favoring criminals."<sup>80</sup> And it pointed out: "Society, as well as this defendant, is entitled to equal protection of the law and to due process of law." The Oregon court observed a few years ago that "it must be remembered that at least one of the purposes of a criminal trial is to bring murderers to justice."<sup>81</sup> Most state courts insist that the only test of the admissibility of a confession is whether it was given voluntarily.<sup>82</sup> "It seems regrettable," the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals said in 1951, "that this rule has come about during a time that our country has become overrun with foreign agents, spies and saboteurs, and with enemies of our way of life, as well as in a period of development of organized crime and subsidized organizations whose sole purpose is to create discord. The peace officers are at a distinct disadvantage to say the least, and cannot be expected to accomplish their mission under the handicaps imposed, and such failure may cause desperation among the people and lead to grave evils."<sup>83</sup>

The McNabb rule has been strongly criticized by legal writers as an unwise effort of judges to supervise police activities. The rule, says Professor Waite, "propounds once again the wisdom of a judicial policy which turns known criminals loose upon society as a means of punishing the police."<sup>84</sup> He argues that the rule does not penalize the offending officer at all, but merely invites ineffective law enforcement. He quotes Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as saying that the rule "would handicap law enforcement, would be contrary to public interest, and would serve only the criminal whose advantages seem to be paramount to the public welfare."<sup>85</sup> Mr. Hoover also maintains that since modern criminals usually work in groups, the prompt arraignment of the first man arrested would tip the government's hand and jeopardize the entire investigation. This point was an important part of Wigmore's objection to the McNabb rule; the only people who do not seem to understand that professional criminals usually work in groups, he said, are some Supreme Court judges. In addition, he argued that lengthy interrogation right after arrest has great advantages, even for the innocent person who is always helped by an early opportunity to tell his whole story. But it is especially important as a way of getting at the truth because "the nervous pressure of guilt is enormous," and confession relieves the mind. So far as police abuses are concerned, Wigmore thought that the remedy lay in the improvement of police personnel and in greater use, as in England, of an "authorized skilled magistrate" to elicit the confession. In addition, Professor Inbau, of the Law School of Northwestern University, has argued that the judges have no constitutional authority to discipline and supervise the police. "Some judges," he complained, "conceive their role to be that of part-time commissioners of police, an obviously non-judicial function," and he cited the McNabb case as "the foremost example."<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, he denied that the courts can effectively discipline the police; unlike prosecutors and trial judges, he maintained that the police "are generally insensitive to a court's rejection of evidence merely because of the impropriety of the methods used to obtain it," and this is especially true of the ignorant, untrained policeman whose improper practices are most likely to be brought to the judge's attention. Police misconduct, he argued, depends upon such factors as the qualifications and training of policemen and the non-political control of police personnel.

# V

The expanding scope of federal review of the complaints of state prisoners, whether by direct appeal or collaterally through habeas corpus, has always stirred up considerable opposition. In a larger sense, of course, this is a wholly familiar characteristic of federal-state relations in all their aspects. The states have always resisted answerability to outside power. Nor can the true scope of federal supervision be measured merely in terms of the number of cases in which



federal courts have actually found in favor of appellants or petitioners. For the mere availability of federal review- which I do not know how to quantify- exercises a certain influence on state policy. Thus it is a familiar fact that only a tiny number of state prisoners receive their freedom annually by means of federal habeas corpus. In his separate opinion in Brown v. Allen,<sup>88</sup> published in 1953, Justice Frankfurter summarized a special study of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts which showed that during the previous seven years there were 3,702 federal question applications for habeas corpus, of which only 67 were granted. A more detailed study of the past four years showed that of 29 petitions granted, only five petitioners were released from state penitentiaries. Surely the expansion of the range of federal habeas corpus has not resulted in any general delivery of state jails. Whether the smallness of the number of successful state petitioners in the federal courts is due to the observance of high standards of justice by the state courts, and whether this in turn owes something to the ever-present possibility of federal review, one can only surmise. A distinguished state jurist, Judge Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court, recently asserted: "To the extent that the small number of meritorious petitions shows that the standards of due process are being honored in criminal trials we should be gratified; but the continuing availability of the federal remedy is in large part responsible for that result."<sup>89</sup>

Whether it is proper for federal courts to grant habeas corpus to state prisoners has long been a bone of sharp contention. The Conference of (State) Chief Justices protested in 1952 that when a federal district court frees a state prisoner it is in fact sitting in judgment of the highest state court, that the federal remedy was contrary to the basic principles of our federal system, and that its possibility inevitably results in legal uncertainty and undesirable conflicts between state and federal courts.<sup>90</sup> A subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings in June, 1955, on one of many bills which have been introduced into Congress in recent years to limit the availability of habeas corpus to persons in custody pursuant to the judgments of state courts.<sup>91</sup> At these hearings, John J. Parker, then chief judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, argued that "one of the greatest evils" has been the friction engendered between state and federal courts.<sup>92</sup> He declared: "....as a Federal judge I want to say I think the State courts are entitled to great respect. I think by and large the State courts are just as able as the Federal courts and just as conscientious."<sup>93</sup> Judge Parker called attention to the fact that proposals to restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners beyond the lines already drawn in the 1948 revision of the federal statute had the support of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the Association of (State) Attorneys General, the section on judicial administration of the American Bar Association, and the conferences of several federal circuits.<sup>94</sup>

It was in response to such criticism that Justice Frankfurter went to such great pains in Brown v. Allen<sup>95</sup> to spell out the standards which federal district courts should be careful to observe when entertaining petitions for the writ presented by state prisoners, although he cautioned that fool-proof standards which could be applied automatically by the 225 federal district judges could not be devised. And after he outlined in some detail six principal standards which should guide the hand of the federal district judge, he concluded with these words, with which this paper may well be concluded:



"I yield to no member of this Court in awareness of the enormity of the difficulties of dealing with crime that is the concomitant of our industrialized society. And I am deeply mindful of the fact that the responsibility for this task largely rests with the States. I would not for a moment hamper them in the effective discharge of this responsibility. Equally am I aware that misuse of legal procedures, whereby the administration of criminal justice is too often rendered leaden-footed, is one of the disturbing features about American criminal justice. On the other hand, it must not be lost sight of that there are also abuses by the law-enforcing agencies. It does not lessen the mischief that it is due more often to lack of professional competence and want of an austere employment of the awful processes of criminal justice than to wilful misconduct.....Unfortunately, instances are not wanting in which even the highest State courts have failed to recognize violations of these precepts that offend the limitations which the Constitution of the United States places upon enforcement by the States of their criminal law."

FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
- <sup>2</sup> *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316, 418 (1819).
- <sup>3</sup> *United States v. Hudson*, 7 Cranch 32 (1812); *United States v. Coolidge*, 1 Wheat. 415 (1816). This rule does not apply to the District of Columbia, *Tyner v. United States*, 23 D.C. App. 324, 358 (1904).
- <sup>4</sup> Title LXX, Secs. 5323-5550.
- <sup>5</sup> Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1088.
- <sup>6</sup> Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 683.
- <sup>7</sup> Annual Report, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1957, pp. 85, 102.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 135.
- <sup>9</sup> Federal Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prisons, 1957, p. 7.
- <sup>10</sup> The annual appropriations for the FBI now run slightly over \$100,000,000 a year, and it has some 14,000 permanent positions, including about 6,000 special agents.
- <sup>11</sup> 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951.
- <sup>12</sup> 29 U.S.C. Sec. 186.
- <sup>13</sup> 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1171-1177.
- <sup>14</sup> 26 U.S.C. Secs. 4401-5, 4411-13, 4421-23, 6419, 7262.
- <sup>15</sup> 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1301-5.
- <sup>16</sup> 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1081-3.
- <sup>17</sup> Act of February 24, 1933, c. 119, 47 Stat. 904.
- <sup>18</sup> Act of June 29, 1940, c. 445, 54 Stat. 688.

19

The Challenge of Law Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), Chap. 3; Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration (New York: National Conference of Judicial Conferences, 1949), pp. 92, 102, 104, 106, 118, 125, 127; "The Need for Procedural Reform and Simplification of the Judicial Structure," Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, pp. 1-26 (January, 1955).

20

"Many of the Criminal Rules involved difficult constitutional questions as well as careful balancing of the public interest and private rights." Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform, p. 67.

21

For the text of his memorandum see 18 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, pp. XVIII-XIX (1951).

22

Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826.

23

Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), Vol. 3, p. 319.

24

See Charles A. Horsky, "Law Day: Some Reflections on Current Proposals to Curtail the Supreme Court," Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 42, pp. 1105-11 (May, 1958).

25

Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.

26

Act of February 25, 1871, c. 71, 16 Stat. 431, Sec. 4; 1 U.S.C. Sec. 29.

27

Act of March 16, 1878, c. 37, 20 Stat. 30, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 632.

28

Act of June 20, 1936, c. 640, 49 Stat. 1561.

29

See Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Federal Sentencing Procedures, February 15, 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print.

30

Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Crime, 1934, p. 63.

31

Testifying on January 16, 1958, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover said: "No administrative function of the modern-day law enforcement agency is of greater importance to its overall efficiency than the effective training of personnel. Through exacting entrance requirements, close supervision, careful training and a stringent code of personal as well as official conduct, we endeavor to instill in our investigative staff the type of teamwork performance which has enabled it to retain its reputation for efficient public service.

"All newly appointed special agents must complete an intensive 14 weeks' course of instruction. This initial training is supplemented by on-the-job instruction. The courses embrace a wide variety of subjects ranging from firearms and defensive tactics to constitutional law and the Federal rules of



criminal procedure. We continually stress the importance of upholding the individual rights of all citizens. We have not, and will not, tolerate strong-arm tactics." Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 85th Congr., 2nd Sess., Department of Justice Appropriations for 1959, p. 164.

32

Of the graduates of the Police Academy now active in law enforcement, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover reported in 1958, 28 per cent are executive heads of the departments they serve, including 542 chiefs of police, 80 sheriffs, 17 heads of state police agencies, and 27 others who are either wardens of penitentiaries or hold other responsible civil positions. Hearings, supra, Note 31, p. 165.

33

Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 119.

34

See Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75, 130-1 (1807); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 643-4 (1818); United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184, 199 (1820); United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 468-70 (1827); United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430 (1840); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.), Vol. 1, pp. 170-97.

35

Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).

36

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).

37

16 Wall. 36 (1873).

38

351 U.S. 12. See Betram F. Willcox and Edward J. Bloustein, "The Griffin Case—Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment," Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 43, pp. 1-26 (Fall, 1957).

39

Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, Sec. 25, 1 Stat. 85.

40

Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, Sec. 1, 14 Stat. 385, now 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c) (3) (1952).

41

3 Pet. 193, 203. See also Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (1822).

42

18 Wall. 163.

43

Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).

44

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). There have been many cases on this question in recent years. See: Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).

- 45  
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 (1897).
- 46  
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
- 47  
Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462 (1891); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
- 48  
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
- 49  
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 173 (1899).
- 50  
Davis v. Texas, 139 U.S. 651 (1891)
- 51  
Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 (1900).
- 52  
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
- 53  
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
- 54  
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
- 55  
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
- 56  
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
- 57  
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
- 58  
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
- 59  
See Bennett Boskey and John H. Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 13, pp. 266-299 (April, 1946).
- 60  
346 U.S. 156 (1953). See John A. Gorfinkel, "The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings- 'Ordered Liberty' or 'Just Deserts,'" California Law Review, Vol. 41, pp. 672-691 (Winter, 1953-1954).
- 61  
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- 62  
316 U.S. 455 (1942).

- 63  
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
- 64  
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
- 65  
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
- 66  
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
- 67  
See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947), and particularly the castigation of the state by Justice Rutledge for its "procedural labyrinth....made up entirely of blind alleys," constituting for defendants a veritable "merry-go-round." See also Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
- 68  
Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois, Rule 27A, May term, 1948.
- 69  
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, Secs. 826-832 (1951).
- 70  
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
- 71  
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Rickards v. State, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 77 A2d 199 (1950).
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N. C. Stats. 1951, c. 644, Sec. 1, Gen. Stat. Secs. 15-27 (1953); Tex. Acts 1953, 53d Leg., p. 669, c. 251, Sec. 1, Vern. Ann. Code Crim. Proc. Sec. 727a; Md. Stat. 1947, c. 752, Stat. 1951, cc. 145, 704, 710, Stat. 1952, c. 59, Ann. Code, Art. 35, Secs. 5, 5A.
- 73  
Art. II, Sec. 10.
- 74  
For the background of this provision see John B. Waite, "Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 749-767 (April, 1933).
- 75  
See the famous opinion of Judge Cardozo in the leading case of People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926): "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." For fully reasoned opinions taking this view see also: State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923); Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
- 76  
See Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), Sec. 2184; Albert J. Harno, "Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure," Illinois Law Review, Vol. 19, pp. 303-314 (January, 1925).



- 77 "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 42, pp. 679-693, 684-5 (February, 1944).
- 78 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
- 79 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). But it was held in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), that a federal officer who had made an illegal search and seizure with a defective warrant could be enjoined by a federal court from testifying in a state court.
- 80 State v. Zukauskas, 132 Conn. 450, 45 A. 2d 289 (1945). See also State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 75 A.2d 429 (1950).
- 81 State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568, 150 P.2d 17, 25 (1944).
- 82 Fry v. State, 78 Okla. Cr. 299, 147 P.2d 803 (1944); State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S.W.2d 77 (1944); People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934); Rogers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 46 Cal.2d 3, 291 Pac.2d 929 (1955); Grear v. State, 194 Md. 335, 71 A.2d 24 (1950); State v. Bunk, 4 N. J. 461, 73 A.2d 249 (1950); State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947); Com. v. Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A.2d 61 (1948); State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 Pac.2d 559 (1951). For further citations see: Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (3rd ed., Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1953), pp. 209-210; Wharton's Criminal Evidence (12th ed., 1955), Vol. 2, Sec. 366. English courts have held that a confession is not to be excluded merely because the police violated the rules, the sole test being that of trustworthiness. The King v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531: "It is desirable in the interests of the community that investigations into crime should not be cramped," A.T. Lawrence, J., at 538. For Canadian cases see: Regina v. Fitton [1956] Can. Sup. Ct. 958; Boudreau v. The King, [1949] Can. Sup. Ct. 262, 270, 3 D.L.R. 81, 88 (1949): "It would be a serious error to place the ordinary modes of investigation of crime in a strait-jacket of artificial rules." Rand, J.
- 83 Hendrickson v. State, 93 Okla. Cr. 379, 229 Pac.2d 196, 200 (1951).
- 84 John B. Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 42, pp. 679-693 (February, 1944).
- 85 Ibid., p. 689.
- 86 Evidence (3d ed.), Vol. 3, Sec. 851, p. 319.
- 87 Fred E. Inbau, "Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 77-85 (March-April, 1957). For a rebuttal see Judge Samuel S. Leibowitz, "Safeguards in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions," ibid., pp. 86-89.

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344 U.S. 443, 498.

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"Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 70, pp. 1-26, 25 (November, 1956).

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Report of the Conference of Chief Justices of the States, State Government, Vol. 25, pp. 249-250 (October, 1952).

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Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 5649, June 7 and 24, 1955. See also: Melvin E. Beverly, "Federal-State Conflicts in the Field of Habeas Corpus," California Law Review, Vol. 41, pp. 483-498 (Fall, 1953); Louis H. Pollak, "Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 66, pp. 50-66 (November, 1956).

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Ibid., p. 5.

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Ibid., p. 6.

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Ibid., p. 7.

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344 U.S. 443, 499-509 (1953).

## THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE: NEEDS, PROPOSALS, PROSPECTS

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association, St. Louis,  
Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

Three years and nine months ago an official body of the federal government brought forth a new idea--an idea, moreover, that was positive, not negative. Improbable, some skeptics may say; but it happened. A bipartisan joint commission, chaired by that sturdy young man, Herbert Hoover, prepared a four-part program to improve top management in the federal government. One of the four parts was the recommendation to establish a "Senior Civil Service," a new category within the competitive service. The proposal had the effect of focusing attention on problems of an adequate higher civil service for the first time since the Reed Committee report of 1941.<sup>1</sup> This is the background for our discussion today of needs, proposals, and prospects touching the higher civil service.

I use the term, "higher civil service," deliberately as a comprehensive generic term not identified with specific proposals for either a senior civil service or a career executive program. It refers to the upper ranks of the federal civil service in which there are important administrative responsibilities.

Since the senior civil service proposal of the Hoover Commission precipitated the discussion, I propose to begin with it and to move on to needs and prospects. Also, since a good bit of the discussion of the senior civil service has proceeded without much reference to the documents, and sometimes in complete disregard of them, it is proper to review briefly the Hoover Commission proposals on personnel and civil service. In doing so I shall rely largely on the full and detailed task force reports, the major proposals of which the Commission adopted and incorporated by reference.

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<sup>1</sup>The first Hoover Commission made important recommendations which led to significant action in strengthening departmental authority; but its personnel proposals were directed to the then urgent matters of decentralization and problems related to the government's position as a large-scale employer.



The Top Management Context

The Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service addressed itself particularly to the needs and problems of the higher civil service. It noted that

1. Higher civil servants of demonstrated competence and integrity are not identified individually or as a group.

2. Regardless of long and successful performance they have only job security, not career status.

3. Higher civil servants do not have a generally recognized standing in American society appropriate to their responsibilities, and they are at times subject to widespread charges of incompetence and partisanship. These charges are more frequent and extreme when a President of one party succeeds the administration of a President of another party, but they are not limited to such times.

4. The civil service system, originally intended for the control of gross patronage in lower ranks, and adapted to problems of mass employment in relatively standardized positions, is not well designed for civil servants at high levels of administrative responsibility where the qualities of the man more largely determine the job. It gives less flexibility in assignment of higher civil servants than is desirable, and also less certain status in a governmental career.

In the Task Force view a personnel system, particularly for dealing with men at high levels of responsibility, is only a part of the broader management process. Management questions and personnel questions must be dealt with together. This point of view is not surprising in the light of the extensive executive experience of members of the Task Force both in the government and in private life. This was a working committee, both wise and distinguished, and they brought their rich experience to bear in thinking constructively about the government's management problems.

5. They called attention to the heavy demands upon top management in the national government where the complexities of congressional politics and the avid interest in details of administration of the many committees and subcommittees, not to mention the myriad organized pressures, generate great centrifugal force and make for a large volume of work.

6. They recognized the President's pivotal role as responsible chief executive in maintaining the strength and unity of the government, and they noted the trend of public policy in recent years to strengthen departmental management under the Chief Executive as an essential link in the chain of responsibility and authority.

7. The Task Force found that a combination of circumstances had made for a confusion of functions within top management in which frequently there tended to be an inadequate distinction between the obligations and activities of responsible political executives and those of administrators who were presumed to be or who wished to be permanent civil servants. This confusion resulted in publicly involving these professional administrators in politics to such an extent that color was given to the charge that the higher civil service generally was partisan in its official behavior, the careers of individual civil servants were jeopardized, and political executives lacked the stable administrative support which they needed from experienced higher civil servants. In some instances the participation of civil servants with competitive status in political functions, doubtless, was voluntary and deliberate, but more often it was the result of failure of political leadership to meet its responsibilities and the shifting of its proper functions by default to subordinates. The net result of this situation was to weaken top management in the government, to blur responsibility, and to place both political leadership and higher civil servants in a disadvantageous position.

#### Major Proposals of the Hoover Commission

To deal with problems of the higher civil service in the broad context of top management, the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service first proposed a clearer division of functions between political executives and career administrators, in which political executives would carry the burden of active advocacy and defense of the decisions and actions of the administration, a burden which goes with political responsibility. In line with the recommendations of the first Hoover Commission, the reforms of both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, and the opinion of many students of administration, it strongly recommended that the responsibilities and functions of political leadership be concentrated at the departmental level, and that management at the subordinate bureau level take a supporting role. It saw very clearly that if both departmental executives and bureau administrators are politically active, real authority reverts to the bureaus, departmental direction and control are enfeebled, and with them the Chief Executive's strength, which is essential to our system of government. It also saw that if the distinction between the political executive and the professional administrator is not made between the department and the bureaus in the line of command, bureau management tends to lack the experience and skill which are required to deal with its subtle combination of pressures and technics, and that the ceiling for the career service inevitably is depressed below the bureau level. With such a low ceiling, it would be impossible to attract and hold in the government civil servants of the high capacities which now are needed.

It should be noted that the Task Force did not say that policy and administration can be separated. On the contrary it noted that administrators are necessarily vested with discretion at many levels, and there are many levels of policy. Nor did the Task Force attempt to exclude professional civil servants from the departmental management. It made specific provision for them in auxiliary staff positions up to and including the administrative assistant secretary and the deputy chief of staffs concerned with substantive policies. It was the view of the Task Force that departmental management needs both political executives and professional administrators to be fully effective; but the former should have the responsibility for and the function of command.

The second recommendation, of the four major proposals, was to strengthen top management by taking steps to increase the supply of qualified political executives. The problems are more difficult, the burdens are heavier, and the necessary skills are greater than generally has been realized. The political executive's job is one of the most difficult and important in our society. Yet we lack a system to find and develop talent. There are plenty of executives and plenty of politicians. But how to get the two strains crossed is the question. The Task Force did not pretend to know the answer to this problem; but it did suggest some first steps and urge action.

It is not until we reach the third recommendation that we come to the Task Force proposal for a senior civil service--"a group of professional administrators carefully selected from all parts of the civil service and from all departments and agencies solely on the basis of demonstrated competence."<sup>1</sup> It recommended that they "have status, rank, and salary as individuals" and be "employed flexibly in a number of authorized positions calling for high administrative talents." "The primary objective," it said, "is to have always at hand in the Government a designated group of highly qualified administrators whose competence, integrity, and faithfulness cannot reasonably be questioned; who will make it easier for political executives to discharge their responsibilities, and who will add to the smoothness, the effectiveness, and the economy of governmental operations. A secondary but related purpose is to make the civil service more attractive as a career to able men and women." To this latter end the Task Force also recommended substantial increases in pay and retirement benefits.

The senior civil service proposal was developed in some detail so that the idea would be understood and not brushed aside. But the Task Force stated explicitly that it did "not emphasize details of the proposal" and that it was aware that "the plan may be improved in operation." However, it was "strongly convinced that action of the general nature outlined should

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<sup>1</sup>Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 50-51.



be taken promptly and carried through until it is firmly established in the institutional framework of the Government."<sup>1</sup>

This brings us to the last but not the least of the four major recommendations--on training and executive development. The Task Force said rather emphatically "What is needed is a straightforward and vigorous effort to develop the capabilities of civil servants generally in their technical, vocational, professional, and managerial knowledge and skills. But particular emphasis is needed on building up the executive capacities of the civil service in a systematic executive development program which will directly improve the quality of first-line supervision and junior executives, and which also will increase the supply of experienced and competent career administrators for top management posts."<sup>2</sup> This program also was outlined in some detail so that it would not be passed over as vague or incomplete. It was regarded as essential to the success of the four-part program.

#### Criticisms of the Senior Civil Service

As a critic of the critics of the Hoover Commission proposals, I would suggest two general points. One is that frequently they have not considered as a whole the four major proposals which were designed to go together. The second point is that some critics have not shown great care in reading the documents; or they have not remembered what they read, and have let their imaginations fill in what they did not read or remember. Possibly, they should be excused on the grounds that the Commission's report is too short to present the recommendations clearly and the Task Force report is too long.

Criticisms of the senior civil service may be summarized under four headings: (1) It is intrinsically a bad idea. (2) It might be dangerous. (3) It is not necessary. (4) It cannot be done.

The senior civil service is intrinsically a bad idea, say some, because it would require too much neutrality of career administrators. This argument is advanced chiefly by academicians who served a happily exciting tour of duty in the federal government once upon a time. It should be noted at this point that the Task Force did not say that politics and administration can be separated or should be in top management decisions. It did say that political responsibilities and corresponding activities of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-79. Chapter IV, "Training and Executive Development," is entirely devoted to this theme, and outlines the essentials of an adequate program.

superiors can be separated from administrative responsibilities of a subordinate in top management. The professional administrator, subordinate to a political executive, may be more sophisticated politically than his superior, and he can share his wisdom; but he should not take over the political executive's responsibilities or duties.

Some critics have argued that a senior civil servant would have to be without feeling or emotion. This was not the position of the Task Force. It spelled out in detail public activities to be avoided by senior civil servants; but on the subject of feelings it said simply that "Senior civil servants as a group should be fully prepared to serve faithfully each administration that takes office. This means that they must avoid such emotional attachment to the policies of any administration that they cannot accept change." Could anyone ask a career administrator for less neutrality?

One or two critics go much further and seem to argue there should be no distinction between the activities of political executives and career administrators at any level--that all civil servants at all levels are obliged to support their programs by all means. If accepted, these views would either prevent change of policy by democratic processes, or they would destroy a career civil service entirely. One would have to choose between democratic change and an expert service.

The charge that the senior civil service would be a closed corps, and therefore bad, has been made. On the contrary, it would be open "to all parts of the civil service . . . all departments and agencies." The only restriction is "demonstrated competence" and the low requirement of five years of service. It is not "closed" if civil servants can get into it on their merits after normal advancement to positions of important responsibility.

In a similar vein some have called the senior civil service undemocratic, an "elite," hence bad. Is it undemocratic to recognize merit and achievement demonstrated in the public service? Is it undemocratic to reward outstanding achievement with an adequate salary and reasonable security? If so, American democracy has been operating on a mistaken understanding of the term for a very long time.

There is one final argument that the senior civil service is a bad idea. This is that it would leave out some people. It would not include specialists; it would not include the lower ranks; and hence the people left out would be unhappy. The amount of unhappiness perhaps would be minimized by the fact that specialists would not expect to enter a category not designed for them. Without expectation there need be no disappointment. People with administrative responsibilities in lower ranks could qualify in due course as they advance and therefore need not be unhappy about the existence of a senior civil service which they have not yet entered.

But it may be argued, some will not qualify who hope to. This is undoubtedly correct. But is it significant? There are plenty of classifications and categories in the civil service now, and not everyone gets as high as he would like to. But this has not yet been advanced as a reason for repealing the classification act or abolishing the Civil Service Commission.

The second type of criticism of the senior civil service is that although the idea is not inherently bad, the powers might be abused, and therefore the senior civil service is too dangerous to attempt. Some fear that a President, never the incumbent, might at some future time in some way abuse his powers with reference to the senior civil service. This is difficult to follow since the President would have no more power over higher civil servants than he has today. Others profess to fear that the senior civil service will in some fashion control admission to its own ranks, and will in some improper way become exclusive. This argument also is difficult to follow; for the proposed administrative arrangements provide for departmental nominations which brings the political executive into the process (a potentially useful lay element), a board in charge with a majority of the members from outside the government, and designation by the President. These arrangements would tend to restrain such bureaucratic tendencies as may exist within the higher civil service.

Some have argued that the senior civil service would endanger its own membership by calling attention to their existence. I believe that this argument fails to take into account the nature of political storms in the American scene. When civil servants draw down the lightning it is because of the high positions they occupy, the functions they perform, and sometimes their personal behavior. The thunderbolts, moreover, are thrown by interested parties who dislike decisions or actions which have been taken, even though the bolts emerge from clouds of talk about party loyalty. Actually the Hoover Commission recommendations should deflect many of these blows by shifting the function of political decision and political debate more clearly to the shoulders of political executives. It is reasonable to expect that the distinction of the men first appointed to the senior civil service will bring credit not discredit upon it, and that this high standing will be safeguarded by due care in subsequent appointments as the service grows to its natural limits. Association with other men of demonstrated capacity and integrity never distracts from one's own standing.

The third general criticism of the senior civil service is that it isn't necessary. All is well on the Potomac. The standing of civil servants generally is high enough. The business community's mistrust of civil servants has been replaced by full confidence. The next transition from the administration of one party to that of another will be smooth and easy; and higher civil servants will have no problems. This



is an opinion to which those who hold it are fully entitled. But it is based upon faith which I do not share and presumes facts for which I see no evidence.

The declarations of high esteem for public servants which many eminent businessmen made when leaving the government after World War II had no effect upon the businessmen who came in to take up the reins of government seven years later. Nor will the endorsements of the Randalls and the Worthys be remembered in the next transition. Schedule C has pushed political appointments well down into bureau management in many departments; and the belief that exists (whether or not it is true) that the present administration has sought to put Republicans in high places even within the classified service will not make the next transition easier. The difficulties of transition will be no less the next time, and they may even be greater than in '53, if steps are not taken in the meantime of a constructive character.<sup>1</sup>

A fourth general criticism of the senior civil service accepts or passes over the merits of the proposal and simply argues "It can't be done." It is said that Congress will not permit the senior civil service to be set up. It is said that higher civil servants will not give up political functions. It is said that political executives at the departmental level will not pick up the burdens of political leadership.

In considering the assertion that it can't be done we should remember that this argument is always advanced when something new is proposed. If the statement were revised to say "It can't be done easily," or "It can't be done without leadership," or "It can't be done without a fight," I would be inclined to agree. But with leadership and intelligent hard work, I believe that the senior civil service can be established--if it has the merit of meeting a real need. In my opinion the argument reverts to the merits of the proposal.

#### Counterproposals

Three alternatives to establishing the senior civil service have been proposed. One is to stand pat and do nothing. The second is the

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<sup>1</sup>The argument that there is no need for a senior civil service began with the Hoover Commission itself. Commissioner, Representative Clarence J. Brown, in his dissent took the position that the "super grades" are all that is needed. (This argument was echoed later by incumbents of GS-18 and 17 positions. "What do we have to gain?") Commissioner, Representative Chet Holifield also dissented, seeing "no compelling reason" for a senior civil service. Possible dangers and difficulties also loomed large in the view of these dissenters.

so-called program-staffing idea. The third is the Career Executive Program developed by the Eisenhower administration.

A do-nothing policy implies either perfection in the present system or lack of interest in progress. Since no one seriously argues that the present system as it affects higher civil servants is yet near perfection, the proposal seems to me to lack appeal; and I do not see why it should be accepted by thoughtful men.

The program-staffing idea is, I believe, a by-product of successful emergency measures during the New Deal and World War II when many men and women went into the government temporarily, carried important responsibilities, and after the crisis returned to private life. The proposal as I understand it is to bring in regularly from outside the government executives to man the key positions immediately under the department heads. These would include a considerable stratum at the bureau level and below. By definition they would not be career civil servants, but would be outsiders chosen for their supposed ability to contribute to their respective "programs."

Several observations may be made. The first is that this would put a low ceiling on a civil service career, and as such it would be a severe, perhaps mortal, blow to a career service. Second, it would require a very large number of outsiders to keep these posts filled. The turnover is high in such appointments, and it is particularly hard to keep the most capable men. There is no evidence that it would be possible to secure people who would be an asset to the government in these large numbers. Political executive talent of this sort is in very short supply. Third, by definition their loyalties would be to their programs (and their patrons)--not to the administration or the government as a whole. Would they not tend to aggravate the problem of excessive centrifugal forces in our national administration? They would certainly not increase the unity of the government. A fourth probability is that they would not be very effective. Those of us who served in the national government in one of the past emergencies take some satisfaction in having done so and fondly remember our successful moments. It is easy to forget the break-in period and the mistakes we made. Or we compare our performance with that of the civil service of the '30's, not with the improved civil service of the '50's. What was necessary for past emergencies is not good enough to meet the normal loads and problems of the present and the future. As David and Pollock have pointed out, it is not feasible to make a workable system out of the program-staffing idea.

The semantic confusion here, also, should be noted. The advocates of program staffing in their hoped for "buffer zone" say that because the appointees might not have had an active party affiliation, these executives would not be "political." In the thinking and terminology of the Hoover Commission, however, they would be political executives if their function is political. Function, rather than past personal affiliation, is controlling in their use of the term, political executive.

Finally, it is in order to recall that the Hoover Commission did not oppose lateral entry into the classified civil service, or recommend its curtailment. Some lateral entry is always useful and at times essential; but if it is more than a supplementary device, there is something wrong with the personnel system.

The Career Executive Program is the Eisenhower administration's first step toward a senior civil service. The presumption is that eventually it will go farther in that direction; but it is not committed to doing so unless experience justifies the move.

The Hoover Commission proposed the senior civil service in January 1955. One year later, after mature reflection upon the recommendation within the administration, the President by letter directed his principal personnel adviser to propose a program to implement the senior civil service recommendation which in his judgment, it is reported, is "one of the most far-reaching and imaginative proposals made by the Commission."<sup>1</sup> Then began the long process of consultation for which the administration has become famous.<sup>2</sup> Its low pressure efforts to secure unanimous support within the executive branch put a premium on recalcitrance, so that the genius of the experts was directed not to devising ways of overcoming difficulties or weaknesses, but to surveying obstacles and imagining hazards. Mole hills became mountains which had to be climbed one by one. I would not say there was foot dragging on this expedition. It seems to me rather that as the conferees toiled up the slopes of these Andean heights the ascent was so steep that even proceeding on hands and knees they had to pause frequently for breath. The rivers of perspiration that flowed from this expedition seem to have washed away much of the White House enthusiasm for the project. But it persevered.

A pilot program formulated by the Civil Service Commission was torpedoed by the departmental experts in February 1956 and sank without a trace. In May of 1956 the President's principal personnel adviser reported that an executive order was in preparation to implement phases of the proposal which did not require legislation. Seven months later agreement was reached, not to take action, but to constitute a committee

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<sup>1</sup>Philip Young, "A Forward Look in Personnel Administration," Address at the 1956 Annual Conference of the Society for Personnel Administration. U. S. Civil Service Commission, pamphlet, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Note may be taken of the consultant's law attributed to the celebrated English philosopher and authority on management, General Sir Ian Lyndal Peoples. Sir Ian's discovery, roughly stated, is that if you consult a sufficiently large number of people for a long enough time, you can develop insurmountable opposition for the most innocuous idea.



to recommend what action to take. Again moving without precipitate haste, an executive order was formulated and presented to the White House in April of 1957. In due course, that is, four months later, the order was signed creating what afterwards came to be called the Career Executive Committee. The committee presented its proposals and draft executive order to the White House in late December or early January 1958, and on March 4 the order was signed to establish the Career Executive Board, which in turn is to carry out the Career Executive Program.

Only then did it become apparent that in more than three years of consultation no one had got around officially to telling the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and Civil Service what the administration was up to. A full opportunity to do so, however, was shortly provided in hearings arranged by the House Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization. The general effect of the questions then asked was to create the impression that members of the committee felt that this oversight was most unkind.

Executive Order 10758, of March 4, 1958, creates a career executive service and a Career Executive Board to launch it. In the words of the order

"'Career executive service' means those line or staff positions in the competitive civil service having significant administrative or managerial characteristics which are designated by the heads of the executive agencies concerned with the approval of the Career Executive Board hereinafter established from among (1) positions in grades GS-16 and above (and their equivalents) and (2) positions in such grades below GS-16 (and their equivalents) as are hereafter designated, under the authority of this subsection, as additional career executive-program grades by the United States Civil Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) upon the recommendation of the said Board."<sup>1</sup>

At the outset the career executive service will cover super-grade positions within the classified service which are administrative in character. Persons to be designated by the President as career executives will be recommended by the departments and agencies and screened by the Board. The Board also will maintain a roster of such talent with appropriate "service and experience records"; it will develop methods for the regular appraisal of performance; it will assist the agencies in devising training programs to increase the supply of executive talent; and it will recommend to the Civil Service Commission "changes in position classification practices to permit

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<sup>1</sup>"Executive Order No. 10758 of March 4, 1958, Establishing a Career Executive Program Within the Civil Service System," Sec. 1(a), Manpower Utilization in the Federal Government (Career Executive Program), Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 85 Cong. 2 sess. (1958), p. 6.

greater flexibility in the assignment of career executives." It may be noted that the Board is to operate in cooperation with the Civil Service Commission, and will depend heavily on assistance from the Commission's staff. The Board's recommendations for changes in civil service rules and for legislation will go to the President through the Commission.

The Board as first constituted consisted of five members, three from private life and two from within the government. Members Flemming, Stauffacher, and Taylor were from private life and Lawton and Mitchell were from the government. When Mr. Flemming became Secretary Flemming, the 3-2 nongovernmental majority was reversed. On August 6 the board was enlarged by the addition of two nongovernmental memberships to restore the lay predominance; the positions have not yet been filled (August 15, 1958).

The administration has taken the position that this is a first step toward the senior civil service proposed by the Hoover Commission. There would be no rank-in-person, no enhanced procedural protection for security, no added obligations, and no superior pay or fringe benefits. It is argued the appointment procedure and presidential designation would bring increased prestige and security, that the proposed revision of classification practices would make for greater flexibility in assignment, and that the Board's roster of talent would increase opportunity for and availability of career executives. These seem to be reasonable expectations for this modest first step. The administration proposes to go on from there in the light of experience, a conservative and prudent procedure.

How far will it go? This is not an easy question. Members of the House Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization in interrogating administration witnesses on the career program took two quite different positions. One was that it was dangerous, would create a privileged "elite," might be exploited by a future President, and could become a vehicle for bureaucratic independence. It also looked hard for evidence that the discretion of department heads might be impaired (a new worry for congressmen). The second position was that the Career Executive Board would not do anything that the Civil Service Commission itself could not do without an executive order, and that the Board and the program are unnecessary. The chairman of the subcommittee, after the hearings, but in advance of the subcommittee's report, issued a press release (July 27, 1958) announcing a subcommittee resolution "that no activity to further the creation or administration of the career executive program be taken until the subcommittee has had a chance for further study in the 86th Congress." Copies were sent to the Civil Service Commission and the White House.

It may be that the administration will acquiesce in this demand, and that the Career Executive Program will never get off the ground. This is possible, but I think not probable. The Constitution gives the President both rights and duties, and Congress by law (including the Civil Service Act and related personnel statutes) has vested him with a considerable discretion

to fulfill his responsibilities as chief executive for the vitality and the success of the government. A more deliberate executive action than the issuance of Executive Order 10758 can hardly be imagined. If the President should now bow to the personal veto of a single subcommittee chairman, three years and nine months of preparatory work would culminate in a fiasco that administrative historians would rank above the 1957 budget. I do not believe that the man who led the successful invasion of two continents will knuckle under to one subcommittee chairman, or that his advisers will ask him to.

If Article II of the Constitution has any meaning, the President and his administration are committed to act, and within the area of the President's executive discretion as defined by the most conservative interpretation of the fundamental law. What they will achieve, however, is another question. There are those who believe that if the administration had moved promptly and vigorously in 1957 after the President's second election triumph, he could have obtained legislation to establish the senior civil service fully and without serious opposition. But there are other equally informed men who are doubtful and fear that opposition in Congress would have been too strong. I lean to the former view since congressional interest in administrative reforms within the executive branch is never very deep or widespread. The precedents also seem to indicate that second-term Presidents can push through reforms in the personnel system if they are determined to do so.

Whatever might have been the prospects for relatively easy success in 1957, the prospects now are for opposition. If the administration is halfhearted in developing the Career Executive Program, opposition doubtless will feed on its weakness. If the administration pushes the program strongly and skillfully, the opposition, which has no logical basis for its hostility, I believe, will yield to the President's strength. But what once probably could have been done more easily will now take hard work. The administration will have to fight.

A President in his second term, regardless of his personal age, finds himself in the position of an aging gamecock. Although when younger he was unchallenged, he now has to fight for his position. He has no choice between ruling the roost and finding himself at the far end of the barnyard pecking order. He has the spurs and the experience to win; but his fate depends upon his willingness to use them.

#### Needs

How shall we measure the proposals and the efforts to strengthen the higher civil service? First of all, personnel reform must be part of the broader process of making top management in the government stronger and more responsible under the Chief Executive. This I believe is the lesson of our administrative experience and in keeping with our constitutional tradition.



In the second place we must think of what qualities are needed today by higher civil servants within top management and what conditions must exist for effective work. For your consideration I should like to suggest three categories. The first is capacity:

- Capacity to operate, to keep things running.
- Creative capacity--to innovate; to devise methods, programs, policies. We need shipwrights as well as shipmasters.
- Integrative capacity--to fit together varied and diverse programs into a rational whole. (In this respect American public administrators are perhaps least advanced.)
- Leadership--capacity to secure teamwork and cooperative effort, to stimulate the best in public employees.
- Counseling capacity--to give wise counsel to the political powers that be on all matters of both policy and operations on which the civil servants have experience and insight.

The second category of qualities is integrity--something very difficult to describe but also very real. Here are some of the things it means:

- Putting the organization's interest above one's own personal interest (when they come in conflict).
- Putting the government's interest above the interest of one's organization.
- Putting the public interest at the top consistently. Although the guide lines of public policies leave much to the higher civil servant's discretion in determining the public interest, it is nevertheless a compelling ideal, and the very foundation of successful administration if that discretion is exercised in good faith.

These qualities may be called faithfulness to the hierarchy of responsibilities. In addition integrity means:

- Candor and veracity--in contrast to deceit--even at the risk of irritation or even anger. A higher civil servant who is afraid to be unpopular with his superiors where the truth is concerned can not serve them, or the public, faithfully. Of course he must be able to distinguish opinions from facts in his own thinking, and the way he says it may be as important as what he says in giving advice.

- Faithfulness to decisions made. His only choice is to accept or to withdraw.

The third category comes under the heading of confidence. Capacity and integrity are not enough. There must be confidence in the higher civil servant if he is to fulfill his critical mission. His political executive superior must have confidence in him, or he cannot begin to be effective. Congress must have confidence in him if he is not to lack the stability essential to do his job. The public must have confidence in the higher civil service or it will not attract its fair share of the nation's talent--which it very much needs. Most of all, higher civil servants must have confidence in themselves--in their own capacity and integrity. It is obvious that three fourths of the problem of confidence is out of the hands of civil servants themselves. Men can not do their best work if they are mistrusted by their superiors and misunderstood by those whom, ultimately, they serve. The capacity and integrity must be there, to be sure, but also they must be known to be there, not only to the few, but to the many. They must be a matter not only of expert knowledge, but of common knowledge.

Does such confidence exist today? I do not think so. This is no more than an opinion. You may differ. We lack any recent, valid, and comprehensive measurement. Until one is made we must guess. But from my reading of the signs, the higher civil service falls short in the essential of confidence.

The higher civil service as a whole, I believe, has made great advances in capacity and integrity over the past generation. But really there is no whole. There are just individuals. There are many highly qualified individuals, but not enough. Such influence, status, and power-for-good as they have are highly personal; they have not been institutionalized. No higher civil servant can pass on his prestige, nor does he share the prestige of others. There is not the strength of union, the warmth of fellowship, nor the discipline of common bonds. Except for informal vocational associations, each one stands alone in the ranks of the vast and varied body of public employees.

Is it possible to raise this vast body in capacity, in integrity, in dignity, and in status to the place which it deserves, and which the public interest demands, in American life? Yes. But it could take generations for such a glacial change. We need to concentrate our efforts on the critically important higher civil service which so largely determines the effectiveness--and the standing--of all the rest.

Is the top management of the government prepared--as a system--to deal with the problems which face it today? I do not think so. We are still unconsciously counting on the time to experiment--which is gone--and on the surplus resources--human as well as material--which have been used up. We cannot afford the mistakes, the delays, and the extravagance

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## THE CHALLENGE OF REGIONALISM

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### I

The massive balkanization of the world's ninety-odd states into various systems of competing and overlapping regional associations has now been a fact of international relations for over ten years. It cannot be said that as a fact it has gone unnoticed. On the contrary, regionalism has given rise to a floodtide of literature bitterly critical over the development or determined to justify it as a necessity for world security and a support for a sagging United Nations structure.<sup>1</sup>

Among the voices critical of the advent of regional organizations and regional programs of action for economic development, military security, trade liberalization and the protection of human rights a number of sub-strains can be isolated. The committed universalist tends to argue that economic welfare, like collective security, is indivisible and he adds that economic unions and common markets distort the logic of a universal division of labor and therefore do not in the long run conduce to production and trade increases. Advocates of global peace and order maintain that emphasis on extra-United Nations regional political and military organizations downgrades the role of the United Nations, evades its obligations and potentialities and recommitts the world to the very balance of power-cum alliances system which collective security was to obviate. Still other critics maintain that regional military planning is made both impossible and obsolete because it involves the participating states in conflicting and irreconcilable policy commitments and because the advent of ICBM's renders such measures pointless.<sup>2</sup>

Arguments derived from a monistic theme of international law and morality dominate among the critics of regionalism: they deplore the fact that departures from the universal focus of organization are almost uniformly justified by virtue of Article 51 of the Charter, the massive escape clause in the global scheme of obligations. The defenders of the pattern, however, derive most of their support from the day-to-day pre-occupations of national policy. Directly and indirectly they invoke the necessities of the Cold War -- either in the role of participants or as would-be abstainers -- as justifying economic and military arrangements removed from United Nations control, while maintaining simultaneously that such steps actually tend to strengthen a global structure otherwise condemned to impotence.

I have argued elsewhere that the coexistence of regional with universal organizations, though certainly derogating from the legal and moral superiority of the United Nations, does not in fact undermine the

United Nations as long as the politico-economic game implied is played within the limits of Cold War thinking: states as units in the global policy-making process are eliminated in favor of voting blocs representing regional associations of varying cohesion.<sup>3</sup> Collective security, while no longer obtainable through the assumptions and techniques of the United Nations, can only be attained through an unworkable balancing process operating within the institutional limits imposed by the rules of the General Assembly. To explain regionalism, however, is not to justify it as a desirable instrument of order. Regional pacts may be a useful temporary anti-Soviet device, even though this proposition is more than doubtful in terms of the revolution in weapons technology, but they do not therefore contribute in principle to the strength of global institutions and procedures to maintain stability and provide for peaceful change.<sup>4</sup>

In any event, it may be suggested that the utility of the policy-oriented defense of and the universal morality-oriented attack on regionalism has now been exhausted. The positions have been clearly stated and given the general texture of international relations in our era it may be doubted whether much of interest to political scientists can still be added. Of what service can the study of regionalism be to us in that case?

It is my contention that the most interesting challenge inherent in the study of regionalism lies in the potentialities of the field for insights into the process of community formation at the international level. Regional relations, meetings, decisions, administrative devices, bureaucracies, inter-ministerial, inter-expert and inter-parliamentary institutions provide a mass of data on the process of "denationalization" of normal government functions with their delegation to regional decision-making units. While it is true that universal institutions can be used for precisely the same kind of study, it is likely that the data will prove more instructive at the regional level, if only because of the greater bulk of activity. I propose to take advantage of the recently published pioneering work of the Princeton Center for the Study of World Political Institutions by stating its conclusions and the context to which they apply.<sup>5</sup> While the authors derived their information from a study of closed historical cases in the Atlantic area, they also seek to project them in an assessment of NATO. I shall then proceed to discuss the possibility of generalizing these propositions by applying them to the study of supranational economic integration in contemporary Europe and to state the lessons to be derived from this regional experience.<sup>6</sup> Our examination will close with proposals for applying this type of analysis to other regional settings.

## II

On the basis of an examination of ten closed cases of successful and unsuccessful unions of states in Europe and North America the Princeton study advances a series of general and specific findings on how "security-communities" are attained. A "security-community" is a "group of people which has become integrated" and "integration" is defined as the "attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."<sup>8</sup> For practical purposes, however, the study proceeds in terms of two sub-types of security-community permitting of greater institutional specificity. Integration may be achieved through an "amalgamated" security community, which implies the creation of a governmental structure, whether that of a unitary, federal or personal union type of state is immaterial. Roughly, the concept of the amalgamated security community corresponds to the kind of regional arrangement which provides for a heavy dose of central decision-making, whether "federal" in the more restricted legal sense or not. On the other hand, integration may also be achieved through a "pluralistic" security community, any arrangement in which no true central decision-making unit is created and in which the constituent states retain their independence but which nevertheless provides for the kind of social interaction thought conducive to integration. Confederations and conventional international organizations at the regional level would fall into this category.

With commendable caution, the authors eschew a rigorous statement of which factors or conditions must be considered "necessary and sufficient" to bring about integration. They doubt that the successful isolation of a number of recurrent historical themes amounts to a truly "scientific" statement of a process. "When we call certain conditions 'essential'", they note, "we mean that success seems to us extremely improbable in their absence. Though essential, they also seem to us insufficient: even if all of them were present, we do not know whether any other conditions might be required which we may well have overlooked. A similar consideration applies to those conditions that we called helpful but not essential: we found that integration occurred in their absence, and might well recur in this way in future cases."<sup>9</sup>

Within this methodological context, the general findings are as follows. Pluralistic security-communities are easier to attain and maintain than more formal unions, provided that the central aim is merely the preservation of peace among the participants. This conclusion is not true if socio-political aims other than peace predominate. However, the actual attainment of either type of security-community cannot be judged readily by the passage of some "threshold" of integration. Successful integration is attained when the subjective criterion of certain elite expectations is met: if the expectations of key elites



in the region converge toward demands for peaceful change and other benefits thought to be obtainable only through the union, integration is underway. Objectively speaking, integration can be considered achieved when the states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another, a condition which can be easily verified from military statistics and plans. It could be said that the "integration threshold" is passed when both criteria can be positively met, but since the subjective index is not considered easily verifiable, not much practical value is expected of the concept.

A range of conclusions were derived from the concept of social communication. First of all, successful integration is held to depend on the prevalence of mutually compatible self-images and images of the other actors participating in the process of unification. This involves first and foremost successful predictions on the part of one nationally identified élite of the behavior pattern of other élites active in the region. It is this type of sympathy feeling among the crucial actors which is held of importance, not verbal commitment to common symbols and propositions, such as "freedom," "peace" or "welfare." Further, successful integration tends to take place around a "core area", a region possessing superior administrative skills, military power, economic resources and techniques, as well as capacity for receiving and assimilating the demands of other regions so as to satisfy them. Actors in the weaker areas look to the core area for leadership and help in the satisfaction of their demands; sympathetic response on the part of the élites active in the core area then begets progressive integration without in the least implying any "balance of power" among participating units. A great deal of stress is placed on the "capacity" of the administrative system and the attitudes prevailing in the core area actively to respond to the needs expressed by others. In Karl Deutsch's terms, successful integration equals the balance of load and capability in the network of social communication.

The Princeton authors note that successful integration for both types of security-community is more likely if improvement of the communications network takes place before the actual burdens are spelled out in terms of political demands. They note also that war among the participating actors should cease to be a respectable mode of policy before the achievement of political union. Further, the nature of the élite structure is singled out as being of crucial importance. It is desirable for successful integration that a broadening of élites vertically in each political unit take place before the act of union, that rigid social stratification be weakened, that mass participation in public life increase. But it is equally desirable that horizontal contacts among élites of similar status and outlook in all the political units be made to flourish. Hence internal democratization was a prerequisite for the successful integration of Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Canada or the United States; but close "international" ties among political parties, trade associations, labor unions, religious organizations and the like are essential for

larger regional integration. Put another way, the conditions and consequences associated with democracy and pluralism in modern western society emerge as crucial elements in the process of international integration.

"Take-off", a concept adapted from the theoretical literature on economic development, is a central point in this explanation of growing regional unity. Whenever a given doctrine associated with integration has been adopted by a politically crucial élite as its own and thus lifted from advocacy initially confined to literary and philosophical circles, integration has acquired a momentum of its own; it "has taken off". Under what conditions does this happen historically? The Princeton authors argue that it happened in the cases they studied whenever a young generation developed aims implying a "new way of life" (e. g. the attainment of individual freedom and civil liberties) whose realization was thought to depend on a revolutionary change in established governmental institutions and on similar action by like-minded groups in neighboring states. Often such visions include claims for new governmental services which cannot, for administrative and ideological reasons, be satisfied by the established structure. Naturally such developments imply the prevalence of mutually compatible images among the internationally allied élites, the complementarity of values, a skill for compromise and for de-emphasizing issues which might strain the alliance. The use of force is more often an obstacle than an aid and the movement profits if its leaders de-emphasize integration for its own sake and present it merely as a means to other, more immediately desired, ends.

Such are the general findings applicable to regional integration, irrespective of institutional refinements. For "amalgamated" security-communities, the authors also argue that certain additional "essential" requirements could be isolated. Some of the initial expectations of élites -- though by no means all -- have to be satisfied to anchor the union. Some concrete "bonuses" may have to be paid to "persuade" hesitant élites to identify themselves with the union, usually specific financial or economic rewards. Administrative and economic growth in the core area must continue in order not to disappoint initial expectations. Leadership groups must continue to practice skill in de-emphasizing divisive values and in stressing common aspirations, in advancing successful mutual prediction of behavior patterns among élites and to facilitate easy interchange in group and personal roles in common tasks. And a generous range of all kinds of inter-personal, inter-group and international transactions (mail, trade, meetings, etc.) must continue to multiply non-national contacts, eventually implying a larger measure of institutional standardization.

As for essential requirements for successful "pluralistic" security-communities the authors stress merely the need for compatibility among the major value systems involved, the attendant capacity to receive,

understand and sympathetically deal with demands of allied governments and élites -- mutual responsiveness -- and the need for successful mutual predictions of behavior patterns. Diplomacy by fait accompli, shifts in policy without consultation, unilateral threats and warnings are all incompatible with this requirement for successful regional growth among states retaining their independence.

These conclusions were drawn from historical cases outside the basic social context in which we live. The revolution in weapons technology making possible total war with a minimum of manpower had not occurred. Involvement in all corners of the globe for most of the participating units was less pronounced. The world was not divided into warring camps in disagreement on almost every aspect of life and thought. The industrial revolution had not yet affected equally all the states in question. Mass democracy and mass participation in politics was only a factor at the very end of the historical period under study and the concern with the welfare state was still to come. The "mass man" had not yet been discovered as an important political figure and the refinements of manipulation associated with totalitarian government were confined to the literature of political philosophers. In view of the difference in variables governing the Princeton cases and our own period, can we assume the validity of the conclusions for the study of regionalism in our time? For instance the Princeton authors note inter alia that unions based on initially non-political aims do not necessarily lead to political security-communities, thus throwing some doubt on the Mitrany thesis of functional international organization leading to peace and order; elsewhere they affirm that the existence of an external military threat may be a helpful condition to aid in regional integration, but that it is certainly not essential. If these conclusions apply to our own era, much of the logic underlying contemporary regional organizations and efforts seems misapplied if not fallacious. Without arguing dogmatically that the presence of the variables just listed must beget different conclusions, I suggest that the difference in context is sufficiently striking to make checking of these conclusions a necessity in the contemporary setting.

### III

In our effort to check these historically derived findings in the context of contemporary efforts at regional integration it is first essential to raise a number of methodological points. One of these refers to the problem of time. When must mutual responsiveness among the interacting élites and actors come into existence? Before, during or after the onset of integrating relations? When must core area capability be well developed, before or during the "take off" period? Is an increasing flow of mail, trade, migration and personal contacts the cause or the result of integration? I submit that the question of when these conditions are



thought to come about is vital when we seek to set up a rigorous conceptual scheme to explain the causes of integration. Especially in relation to indicators hinging on social communication we must know whether the transactions measured prevail among the élites to be integrated before the process starts or whether they come about as a result of events which characterize the region after the process has gone on for some years. If the latter is the case, we have merely defined an already functioning political community in terms of communications theory but we have not explained the steps through which it had to proceed before getting there.

Another fundamental question refers to the hierarchical level at which social action relating to integration is thought to take place. Does successful mutual responsiveness, communication, and the de-emphasis of divisive issues rest on mass participation in politics or on its minimization? Are numerically small groups of economic, industrial, administrative and military élites the crucial actors, or must the analytical focus be put on political parties and their constituencies? What is the role of doctrine, ideology, and mere issue-oriented pragmatic rationality in the inter-group contacts relating to integration?

Neither the issue of time nor of level is clearly isolated in the causative scheme implicit in the Princeton study. "Process" must be clearly differentiated from "background conditions" on the one hand, and from "consequent conditions" on the other. Unless this is done -- and the task of differentiation would clearly imply some arbitrariness in view of the dynamic nature of the social data -- we may forego the opportunity to use the study of regionalism as a device to learn something about the formation of larger political communities.

In one sense these problems of analytical method are mirrored in the dichotomy patent in the field of international organization between the existence of ambitious institutional structures and the relative absence of any obvious integrative consequences flowing from them. Are such structures the cause or a result of integration, or perhaps even unrelated to the process? Do they represent consensus at some elusive élite level or do they correspond to mass aspirations? Are they one of the background conditions from which community may develop, do they channel the process or are they irrelevant to this whole range of inquiry? NATO, singled out by the Princeton authors for a contemporary application on their historical findings, illustrates the difficulty.

There can be no doubt that the physical existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization coincides in time with the prevalence of a de facto pluralistic security community among the major member states: since 1948 these countries have been more closely united in the pursuit of the totality of policy aims than any other recent regional conglomeration and there has been no use of force in the settlement of disputes among them. However, when tested against the findings summarized above, the NATO score is poor.

Thus, while there is an adequate compatibility of major national values (with the exception of Portugal), the pattern of mutual responsiveness is pockmarked with complaints of inadequate attention by the United States, France, Britain, West Germany and Turkey to each other's and their allies' objectives. If the Marshall Plan was the highpoint of American responsiveness, a fairly consistent deterioration has set in since. Nor is there unambiguous evidence that the demand for a new way of life uniformly characterizes the younger generation in most of the member countries. Such a way of life may be made up of concurrent demands and expectations relating to growing welfare services, rationality and constitutionalism in government, applying the lessons of the sciences to social relations and technology, forswearing war among the members as a practical means to settle disputes and admitting that military defense solely by the national state is impossible and too costly in terms of competing welfare commitments; but if it is, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain would probably have to be omitted from the membership list. The core area requirement is met in part by the Canadian-American complex; but its responsiveness is open to doubt. Among other background conditions held out as helpful for pluralistic security communities, but essential for the amalgamated variety, the authors note a very great range of mutual transactions at all levels of inter-group relations, with the exception of personal mobility. Elite structures are constantly being broadened vertically and interchanges take place on an increasing scale horizontally, though the Princeton study is uncertain whether actual horizontal communication links among like-minded groups in separate national settings are adequate for continuing community development.

The inferences to be drawn from this picture are thus uncertain. The institutional structure of the North Atlantic area and the overall context of international relations within it satisfy the formal requirements of a pluralistic security community. The social processes isolated as being historically of significance in the development of such a community, however, are only imperfectly represented in it. Further, if effective decision-making is introduced as a criterion of community, it could be argued that in the military realm at least, and perhaps also in the relations of the NATO countries with the Soviet Union in Europe, the members of the alliance adhere to centrally made decisions with remarkable fidelity. But according to the social processes thought productive of community relations, this should not have been expected. A final incongruity of NATO as a regional community is that the scope of total inter-personal and inter-group relations and responsiveness is probably greater in it than in several of the other historical situations studied, situations which led eventually to political amalgamation. But who would predict such an outcome for NATO after the decline in inter-allied consensus since 1956?

What, then, is cause and what is effect? Was it mutual responsiveness or something else which led to the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, to the establishment of SHAPE, to the common infrastructure program, the annual

review and all the other institutional evidences of community? I submit that it was indeed mutual responsiveness, but a responsiveness limited to one factor: a common perception of an outside threat. This made possible extensive common planning and standardization of national habits and institutions as long as the participating actors were essentially members of the military elite.<sup>10</sup> It could go on as long as the conflicts between NATO military planning and welfare commitments were explained with reference to the external threat. It could remain non-controversial and removed from the main-stream of national politics because the issues in question were treated as being severely technical. It required few of the major social communications variables isolated in other contexts. But it is condemned to failure if the common perception of the external threat gives way to dissident assessments.<sup>11</sup>

This methodological digression into the NATO experience, as seen in the focus of the Princeton findings, illustrates that lessons of the past should not be automatically applied to contemporary situations. It suggests that the "background" and "process" factors be identified, separated and sorted according to a time sequence and that the social groups thought to be carriers of the movement toward integration be specified. To my mind, the true challenge of regional studies lies in the establishment of causative relations between these aspects of the political process and the institutions through which they are channelled. The results, far from invalidating the findings of the Princeton group, will nevertheless enable us to restate these in the context of modern social conditions. I shall attempt to do this by analyzing supranational economic integration among the "six" continental European countries, seeking to combine institutional and behavioral indicators.

#### IV

In identifying the background factors found to be directly related to continental European economic integration, emphasis will be focused on those ideologies, attitudes and expectations of articulate organized groups which prevailed between the end of World War II and 1950, the date of the first official federative proposal, Schuman's call for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Expectations will include "identical" aims, implying identical demands based on identical reasoning patterns regardless of the nationality of the group. These will be contrasted with "converging" expectations, i. e. aims based on a reasoning pattern peculiar to a given national group but sufficiently similar in aim to result in support for integrative proposals. Converging expectations make for regional unity instrumental in nature rather than being based on principle. Identical and converging expectations must finally be contrasted with aims of groups opposed to integration.

Thus we find that certain voices in all countries concerned advocated closer unity or federation because division of Europe was held responsible for military, cultural and political weakness, dependence on the United



States, inferiority to the Soviet Union, and therefore inability to deal with internal aspects of the Communist threat to established and generally held European values. The same voices tended to defend a "third force" doctrine for a future United Europe and to preach economic revival through a regeneration of competition in a larger continental market, including the abolition of trade barriers and the destruction of cartels. Still others, sometimes identical with the groups just summarized and sometimes not, equated a United Europe with a general economic, social and cultural regeneration, achieving a new synthesis beyond the old issues of national hatreds, wars and class conflict.

These expectations were identical throughout the Continent. They were defended by the dedicated Federalists, for the most part intellectuals and professional people not overlapping with practical politics, industry, labor, agriculture or other entrenched elite groups. Among the political parties, only certain Christian-Democrats and a few Socialists subscribed to these ideas, including some Christian-Democrats but no Socialists in leading positions. It is fair to say that identical expectations united only certain politically peripheral persons. While they included the organized Federalists of all religious and secular persuasions it cannot be demonstrated that these people influenced the actual course of integration unless -- as in the case of Adenauer, Schuman, Monnet, De Gasperi, Beyen and Pella -- they also were active as politicians and negotiators.

Background conditions were otherwise when we focus on converging expectations. Here we find that German trade associations, trade unions and political parties -- except the SPD -- were one in favoring economic unification if this were the means for regaining German economic equality, i.e. if remaining allied occupation controls were removed simultaneously, including the ban on cartels. But we also find certain French trade associations, trade unions and the political parties of the Center and Moderate Right embracing economic federalism as a means for controlling an economically resurgent Germany, maintain in force allied decartellisation and deconcentration measures under "European" auspices, and assure for French industry non-discriminatory access to German coke and the southern German export market. All non-Marxist Italian parties and trade unions favored closer European unity because they saw in it the possibility for capital imports, unhampered exports of goods which could find a ready foreign market and above all the right for Italian workers to migrate. The general argument of freer trade appealed to organized business in Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, but a very specific economic "bonus" was necessary to create a pro-integration bias among certain Belgian and Italian industrialists who feared extinction in a free larger market.

Opposition to economic federalism characterized trade associations convinced that without the protection of national tariffs and subsidies they would decline. It also applied to right-wing political parties (the RPF in France) whose attachment to the militarily independent national state is an important ideological tenet and to left-wing parties (the SPD and many of the Belgian Socialists) who saw in economic federalism merely a regionally cartellised but otherwise unreformed capitalism, whose impact

on the national working class and national welfare was thought to be harmful. Opposition also characterized all major groups in industry, agriculture and politics in Great Britain for reasons too well known to require recapitulation.

The major conclusion on background expectations is one which the Princeton authors also discovered: a marked fragmentation in national attitudes prior to the initiation of the process of integration. Great Britain showed little disunity and hence non-participation in ECSC negotiations was not very controversial.

Fragmentation into opposing group opinions in each nation facilitated the eventual establishment of close links on a regional basis of communication among ideologically allied political and economic elites. In contrast to the Princeton findings, however, it must be stated that with the exception of the close ties among a few important Christian-Democratic politicians, the growth of this now striking communications network was the result of the establishment of federal institutions and not its cause. Contacts among trade unionists, industrialists, administrators and parliamentarians certainly existed before 1930; but they were lacking in intensity, in concrete programs, in consensus and in results. The background requirement of inter-élite responsiveness, of mutuality of values and willingness to de-emphasize clashing aspirations was in evidence only among a very narrow group of administrators and certain key politicians; it was not then a general phenomenon of regional inter-group relations.

My findings support the argument that the existence of a "core area" can be a vital consideration in regional unification. However, in the European context this meant a desire to unify in order to control such an area -- the Ruhr -- not to rely on it. On the other hand, many supporters of unification regarded Great Britain as a sympathetic core area around which unity should develop; their disappointment in the British refusal to accept this role was important in defeating EDC, but not in stopping regional integration in the economic field.

If the "new way of life" demanded by the younger generation is specified as a dedication to regional welfare economics, cultural regeneration and political mediation between Moscow and Washington, such a strand of thought can indeed be isolated among the background conditions surrounding European economic federation. However, it is typical of the "identical" demand patterns discussed above and therefore not consistently applicable to the policy-making elites. On the contrary, these seem often to have embraced unity as a device to protect an "old" way of life. If the "new" way be identified merely as a dissatisfaction with European international relations of the inter-war variety, however, then it becomes an important background factor, typical, however, of the old as well as the new generation.

These conditions and attitudes prevailing before 1950 clearly explain why Schuman's proposal for a federal approach to economic unity was eventually adopted: in view of the dominant national fragmentation of aspirations the scheme was a direct way to realize a new dispensation for a few, and instrumental toward achieving some very concrete and immediate economic benefits to many others. A definite change, or a "take off" did not take place until after the actual institutions of ECSC had been established. I stress, therefore, that new modes of conduct and new channels of communication among élites did not develop until after the institutional constitutive act. It was then that a closer rapport among trade unions, trade associations, political parties and senior civil servants began to develop, a process which eventually "spilled over" from the realm of coal and steel to the field of general economic unification -- or the Common Market (EEC) -- and acquired an independent momentum perhaps in 1955.<sup>12</sup>

The new institutions were called upon to realize the benefits expected of a common market restricted to coal and steel while being fully cognizant of the economic impossibility of acting meaningfully unless such related areas as foreign trade, taxes, wages, monetary policy and country-cyclical measures were also subject to regional regulation. In this setting each nationally organized group began to search for regional allies to aid in the implementation of a program for coal and steel considered beneficial to it. Interest groups coalesced in their efforts to influence the policy of the ECSC High Authority, as did the parliamentarians selected by national legislatures to control the High Authority in the ECSC Common Assembly. More important perhaps in the context of a "pluralistic" security community, a special set of relations and a new code of conduct came to characterize the Council of Ministers and the associated national administrators, the organ to which the High Authority often deferred and which came to exercise the fundamental decision-making role in the expansive aspects of ECSC. Unlike the pattern in OEEC and other intergovernmental organizations, a presumption developed toward reaching consensus at a higher level of central action than that favored by the least federally minded member government. This resulted in progressive intergovernmental compromise toward more and more central economic planning, entrusted often to the High Authority. Eventually the process produced the Messina Conference of June 1955 and the Brussels Conference of Experts appointed to draft the EEC and Euratom agreements.

It could be argued, then, that a "take off" mentality did develop when significant decision-makers and élites realized that more economic benefits than sacrifices would develop as a result of further federal unity, and when they sought to influence the central institutions accordingly. The "take off" became an operational reality when groups previously indifferent or hostile toward integration turned to the advocacy of further unity by way of EEC, on the basis of their experience in ECSC institutions and with the effects of ECSC economic policy.

Successful "take off" is a manifestation of a previously successful "spill over": demands and expectations for further integrating measures are voiced as a result of performance in previously federated spheres of govern-



mental activity. Performance is held inadequate because of an insufficient grant of powers or timid policy on the part of central authorities; hence the claim for new federal powers to achieve better performance is a direct outgrowth of the earlier institutional system and the realignment of group expectations produced through it. It becomes of the essence for the accurate statement of a regional process of political integration to state these realignments.

National trade associations affected by the initially created federal institutions may in principle persist in the positions analyzed in our discussion of the pre-federal background, but experience with European groups indicates that they adapt to new rules by changing policies, if not aims. Thus the initially anti-ECSC Belgian collieries became firm supporters of the federal authorities merely because they expected a more sympathetic treatment from them than from their national government. Other trade associations initially hostile become conditional supporters of the new system as they realize that the supranational authorities may be instrumental in achieving certain of their aims. This is illustrated by the eagerness of the French steel and coal industries to use ECSC for purposes of sustaining cheaper access to German coke and for increasing German production costs by "equalizing" social security and wage payments. Still others subscribed to the free market implications of the ECSC Treaty but opposed any granting of manipulative or planning powers to the supranational organs. Five years later such groups -- for instance the German, Belgian and Dutch steel industries -- still favor the same principles but exert themselves politically to minimize public regulation of the free market, especially in opposing anti-trust and anti-cartel measures. Their commitment to this political action compels them to work through the federal authorities. As for a "spill over", these groups favored EEC if it created a general free market but opposed strong central institutions to assert political control over it. Trade associations opposed to the continuation of economic integration, i.e. the adding of EEC to ECSC, were easily identified as the industries dependent on national protection, just as in 1950; in France and Italy this included the bulk of medium and small-sized manufacturing establishments and the major national trade associations.

National trade associations experience the necessity to combine supranationally in order to achieve common political goals once the new institutions are installed. While such combinations have occurred on a massive scale in Europe since 1950, there is little evidence that the allied industrialists are consistently receptive to each other's needs, expectations and values. Compromise occurs rarely; divisive aspirations are not usually de-emphasized successfully by leaders who emerge with a tacit mediating role; subordination of nationally-defined economic interests to common regional positions is not observable among industrialists after five years of experience in ECSC. The supranational alliances, then, remain ad hoc groupings for immediate tactical advantage. However, as EEC illustrates, integration is proceeding rapidly just the same.

But the picture is quite the reverse in the ranks of trade unions. All non-communist unions were in favor of economic integration in 1950, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm and by no means unconditionally. One of the conditions was the dedication of the federal institutions to direct measures for raising living and working standards. As ECSC in practice devoted little effort to this aim the unions were compelled to fashion themselves into a more potent political force in order to lobby more effectively; and in the process they had to achieve agreement on their aims. They successfully de-emphasized divisive aspirations on price policy, cartels, and migration by stressing the aims which unite them: regional collective bargaining for the standardization first of fringe benefits and eventually of wages and hours. Labor's radical supranational realignment and unity was obtained partly as a result of national economic demands pressing for a supranational equalization of cost factors and partly through the astute mediating role of certain key officials. Unlike the industrialists, the trade unionists display great mutual responsiveness and a good deal of role interchangeability in successfully combining alternating national leadership with consistent supranational compromise on common interests. What is more striking still, it can be easily demonstrated that these features developed rapidly over time and received a further decisive stimulus with the inauguration of EEC.

The process of integration since the debut of ECSC seems to have affected key political parties quite unevenly. The Christian-Democrats did not change in their unswerving support for integration. But about half of the Radicals in France abandoned their former instrumental and conditional support for economic federalism as their fear of Germany grew and their insistence on a French "national solution" hardened. On the other hand, many of the Moderates in France saw even more instrumental benefits in continuing integration than had been apparent in 1950; they supported EEC and even the expansion of ECSC powers -- always on the assumption that certain French interests would thereby be favored. The German Liberals, similarly, concluded that growing unity among the Six is an obstacle to German reunification and therefore voted against EEC after having favored ECSC -- for anti-allied reasons. The striking changes, however, occurred in Socialist ranks. The SPD maintained its opposition to ECSC until 1954 and switched thereafter to become one of the most consistent and forceful advocates of a regional planned economy functioning through democratic federal institutions. The SFIO, after overcoming its division on the EDC issue, now takes the same position, as does the Belgian Socialist Party which was split on ECSC and EDC. Finally the Nenni Socialists in Italy, who had opposed all European unity efforts, in 1956 aligned themselves with the, by then, general continental socialist position.

Doctrinal consensus on a trans-national basis has developed significantly as a result of activities in the ECSC Common Assembly (since 1958 the European Parliamentary Assembly, with control functions over ECSC, EEC and

Euratom). Largely as a result of the increased opportunities to criticize meaningfully and continuously the activities of a true administrative agency, the Socialist deputies of six nationalities began to function as a supranational political party, showing a consistent record of successful internal compromise, deference to each other's wishes, alternating leadership and willingness to deemphasize issues on which a unanimously endorsed doctrine proved unobtainable. Agreement reached by way of supranational activity proved highly significant in begetting the changed socialist positions in the home legislatures. Within the limits of the technical issues so far raised in the context of economic unification, the supranational group of Christian-Democratic deputies shows less doctrinal unity but functions smoothly as a general support for any "European" policy, exercising a role analogous to a national "government" party whereas the Socialists tend to act as the "loyal opposition". The Liberal Group shows no such unity and is rarely cohesive on concrete policy issues. Nevertheless, all three groups have developed into a permanent parliamentary elite conversant with the problems of integration and respected as such in their home legislatures. Again, however, this increase in trans-national communication and national prestige occurred as a result of the institutionalization of democratic parliamentary control functions at the regional level.

Realignments among governments are less patent. In essence, the positions of the three Benelux governments and of Italy are unchanged as compared to 1950: they still favor a maximum of economic unification and the creation of a sufficiently powerful federal political structure to administer the rules of the common market and implement its welfare objectives. Many statesmen in these four countries are frank to admit that they see in economic federalism the precursor to a full political union. These positions were expressed uniformly in the negotiations which resulted in the EEC and Euratom Treaties.

Things are otherwise in Germany and France. In 1950 these two governments agreed in favoring a maximum of political federalism for ECSC and in a minimization of intergovernmental features. During the EEC negotiations, there was a tendency for the German negotiators to minimize institutions for the common market and to oppose the insertion of provisions facilitating economic planning. The French by contrast were concerned mostly with minimizing the federal aspect of EEC so as to permit them to continue unilateral policies inconsistent with the EEC rules. However, the fact that an agreement was reached which subordinates national demands for the relaxation of the rules to the consent of EEC organs indicates that the degree of mutual responsiveness in these intergovernmental dealings was extraordinarily high. But it also illustrates the general finding on the process of integration that once governments have committed themselves - for whatever reasons - to certain common measures of fundamental importance to the daily lives of their entire citizenry they can resolve future problems of implementing the agreement only by means of further delegation of power to the center. This "administrative spill over" is an essential consequence of initial acts of



integration in a crucial policy sector. Withdrawal from its implications is not possible - as in the case of NATO - when the external stimulant changes. Since the range of issues which gave rise to the initial step is woven completely into the contemporary preoccupation with welfare, withdrawal would imply a sacrifice of economic advantage--a step not taken lightly by elected politicians.

Given the background conditions we specified, given the initial act of institutional unification based on identical and converging aims and expectations, a realignment of political forces calculated by the actors on the basis of normal political expediency takes place. This realignment will result in the intensification of growth toward a regional political community if the task of the center is expanded. But the story of why the supranational task was expanded significantly in Europe since 1950 again confirms the earlier finding, stressed equally by the Princeton study, that demand for increased regional activity is based essentially on instrumental motives and only rarely on principle. If enough task expansion occurs the eventual condition characterizing the region will be a federal or unitary state, or a "pluralistic" institutional setting in which central decisions of ministerial organs are always implemented because there is no meaningful alternative to them. The lessons derived from the analysis of the process leading toward task expansion can now be summarized:

1. Groups subject to a process of integration are not uniformly responsive to each other's claims even though the institutional pressures are such as to make concerted supranational action politically reasonable and practically desired by most.
2. In the modern European setting, groups in the past exposed to active international value sharing find it easier to achieve this responsiveness. In practice, this has meant Socialist and Catholic labor and political groups.
3. Government negotiators and high civil servants working in isolation from political pressures and democratic accountability achieve mutual responsiveness more readily than groups resting on mass support.
4. Despite initial acts of integration, continuing rewards must be held out to participating groups in order not to alienate them. For labor this has meant the promise of an active welfare policy under EEC; for the French conservatives it has meant the "Europeanization" of investment programs in French Africa and the temporary waiving of some common market rules under EEC as applied in France; for Italy it called for the creation of the "European Bank"; for French and Belgian industrialists it resulted in the promise of some measures for the

equalization" of costs of production through higher social security contributions in Holland and Germany.

5. The contemporary process of integration need not include dedication to and inter-elite agreement on a "new way of life." On the contrary, it is my conclusion that integration is advocated as a means to defend some cherished aspect of an established way of life, even though this "way" may be transformed willy-nilly by the consequences of the integration process. Under modern socio-economic conditions, three types of attitude development can be identified, each of which implies merely the buttressing of previously advocated values in a new setting:
  - a. High-cost industries move from initial opposition to integration to strong support of federal institutions with the aim of inducing the new authorities to adopt a protectionist and subsidizing policy for the industries in question. The same is true for trade unions in these industries. The political consequence is a tendency toward regional protectionism resting on firm supranational constituency pressure.
  - b. Groups who consider themselves marginal in the nations undergoing integration will, after initial indifference or mild favor for unity proposals, rally to the new central authorities and seek to induce them to adopt a comprehensive welfare and planning policy designed to protect the interests of the groups in question. They will also seek to penetrate the new institutions as a means for gaining equality and respectability at the supranational level, which was denied them in the national context.
  - c. Low-cost industries initially favor measures of economic integration, provided no ambitious federal regulatory powers are created and industrialists are left free to compete or conclude "agreements" as they see fit. As soon as the federal authorities seek to control cartels and regulate the market, opposition to the method, but not necessarily the principle, of integration is voiced, hinging around the argument that standardization of economic rules and practices is not required in a common market. However, in the process of opposing the federal authorities, the dissident low-cost industries are involuntarily committing themselves to

channelling their political aims through the new centers of power.

Whether because of growing positive expectations of the new central institutions or because of the negative aim seeking to block institutional action at the center, the net result of the group realignment is an enhanced role for the center. The tendencies here outlined imply that all important groups are influenced in this fashion, that some opposition to integration is reconciled by its benefits while groups who continue to question central policy do so in the spirit of loyal opposition. This is the pattern uncovered in the five-year experience of ECSC. Whether it will prevail also under EEC is open to some doubt. Political parties consistently identified with the authoritarian Right and the pro-Soviet Left in all member countries did not change their attitudes since 1950, continue to oppose integration and use their influence in connection with integrative tasks so as to sabotage them. However, these parties have little following among the groups who have been directly concerned with the work of ECSC and no evidence of unrepentant opposition to integration has been found among the industrialists, trade unionists and merchants associated with ECSC. We must remember, however, that so far peasants, small retail businesses, artisans and family-size manufacturing establishments have remained unaffected by the progress of economic unification. It is these groups which furnish the bulk of the authoritarian and fascist constituency in Western Europe, utilizing appeals to exclusive national symbols and often rejecting supranational sharing of values on principle. Whether transitional economic protection and subsidies will suffice to woo these members of Europe's flourishing middle-class movements into the realignment pattern is by no means certain.

## V

Our discussion shows that significant differences in background conditions, in the constituents of the process, in the kind and manner of elite participation can be discovered in the analysis of community formation at the regional level, depending on the historical setting and the functional preoccupation of the decision-makers. Lessons derived from pre-contemporary social contexts do not automatically apply to regional organizations now functioning and findings derived from NATO, for instance, cannot be automatically carried over into organizations dedicated to a different kind of task even when they function in the same cultural and time setting. In addition to the cultural and functional differentials between regional organizations, we must bear in mind marked structural variations. Does the integrative impact produced by inter-governmental organizations compare favorably with the role of various kinds of supranational, federal or confederate arrangements? To shed further light on these problems, the study of regionalism must be so generalized as to take account of the cultural, the functional and the structural variants in the contexts to be examined.



One approach to the study of regional integration in non-western settings is to focus on the relation of existing regional institutions and legal rules to the underlying social structure. Past and present findings in the European context agree in stressing the importance of fluid social relations, fragmentation of opinion and groups, widening of elites horizontally and vertically as important background conditions for integration. Do similar conditions exist in the Western Hemisphere setting, in the Arab world, in Southeast Asia, in the Caribbean? In all these regions international institutions of a consultative nature exist; but do they reflect merely the momentary aims of governments or are they tied to some basic social process whose nature could be studied by using the analogy of the European and Atlantic setting, at least as a point of departure?<sup>13</sup>

Existing institutions could serve a further research purpose. Our European lesson drives home the potential role of institutional forces in rechannelling and realigning previous group loyalties and expectations. Have OAS bodies, SEATO meetings, Arab League conferences and the like had similar consequences; or, since the answer is probably negative, why have no such consequences come about? The answer could reveal more information about the nature of background conditions in non-western settings as well as lead to insights on the relation between functional orientation and integrating results in regions other than the industrial-democratic setting analyzed thus far.

For that matter, the differences in integrating results observable from the work of economic organizations with slightly different functional missions but operating in the same region are not yet satisfactorily explained. Why did ECSC lead to EEC and Euratom, and therefore to greatly accelerated integration and why did OEEC and EPU, operating in the same context but with different powers and larger memberships, fail to expand? Why is it possible to argue that integration advances more rapidly as a result of decisions made in private by senior civil servants in the ECSC/EEC framework but that in OEEC the same technique yields no parallel consequences?<sup>14</sup> It might be suggested that all members of ECSC/EEC are marked by internal fragmentation and political movements looking for new solutions to old problems, whereas Britain and Scandinavia among the OEEC members are less plagued by this internal situation; but it would require more rigorous research into OEEC decision-making to substantiate this hypothesis.

The social background of the Arab effort at regional unity holds out fascinating questions for studies of this kind. It is here that the demand for a new way of life on the part of the younger generation might be demonstrated to be a background condition and a causative factor in the process of advancing and retarding regional political unity. Did the Arab League fail to produce unity because it was based on the negative consensus of groups identified with the status quo? Is Nasserism a more potent stimulus to unification because it self-consciously identifies itself with a new way of life castigating the foreigner and promising domestic abundance? Further, the Arab cultural heritage might offer insights into patterns of achieving

mutual responsiveness among elites which have no exact counterpart in the western setting.<sup>15</sup> But systematic research into regional decision-making would be required before adequate answers become available.

In the work of the Organization of American States and its predecessor bodies the notion of the core area might be subjected to a rigorous non-European test. To what extent did inter-American cooperation receive encouragement from the help and sympathy which the Colossus of the North might mobilize? But it might also be asked to what extent the OAS has its Latin *raison d'être* in a desire to achieve security against the United States by enmeshing the Colossus in a firm network of Latin-inspired legal obligations and institutional safeguards. In short, systematic research into the expectations entertained by Latin American elites with respect to the OAS might reveal an anti-American mutual responsiveness pattern which at the same time would imply a number of non-integrative consequences for the work of the OAS. But if this can be substantiated in the legal, social and economic aspects of the OAS program, would it explain the singular success of OAS efforts at maintaining collective security in the Western Hemisphere? In all likelihood a different range of factors would explain this strikingly integrative aspect of regional activity.

Mutual responsiveness and the compatibility of elite aims could also be submitted to rigorous analysis in the study of SEATO and of the Baghdad Pact. Is fear of the communist enemy the unifying factor in these alliances? Is it the hope for rewards unilaterally proffered by the United States in the realm of military and economic aid? Or is it some local issue, say Kashmir, which bears no intrinsic relation to the basic function of the alliance? A study of the processes of compromising these aims in a setting of culturally heterogeneous members might prove instructive.

Generally shared expectations of economic gain are constituents of the process of integration found to recur with monotonous regularity. However, the degree of regional cohesion obtained through this expectation seems to vary sharply. True, in the EEC/ECSC setting it proved dominant and successful. The Princeton authors note that the disappointment of such expectations in the NATO framework may be partly responsible for the slow-down in Atlantic integration. But why did such expectations fail to yield a regional economic planning structure in the setting of the Colombo Plan? Why is their presence in the OAS the subject of many words but of little action? Why have essentially military pacts like SEATO stressed economic aid and development more than armaments? The uniformity of economic expectations and policies to meet them varies with the regional setting and the functional preoccupation of the members, factors which themselves may be traced back to underlying conditions of social organization and communication.

Whatever the answers may be, they compel renewed attention to the phenomenon of regionalism as a fixed feature of our time. And to obtain them, there is no alternative to the systematic study of regional integration,

combining institutional analysis with the study of political process. In doing so we may hit a rich lode of materials which might explain how nations cease to be nations, how they lose the self-consciousness which comes from having lived within the confines of a fixed set of frontiers, or how they develop loyalties extending over a broader geographic area, but which still display the earmarks of nationalism.



### FOOTNOTES

- 1 See Norman J. Padelford, "A Selected Bibliography on Regionalism and Regional Arrangements", International Organization, Vol. X, No. 4, (Nov. 1956)
- 2 For a comprehensive critique of the assumptions underlying regionalism see Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "A Re-examination of Regional Arrangements", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1955). Economic regionalism is sharply challenged by Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956). Extra-UN regional military arrangements are treated critically by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations, Eighth Report (June 1953).
- 3 Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal Organization", World Politics, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Jan. 1956); "Regional Integration and National Policy", International Conciliation (May 1957).
- 4 For thoughtful recommendations strengthening universal over regional procedures and ties see Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Strengthening the United Nations, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957).
- 5 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichtermann, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). The conceptual and methodological principles applied in this study are treated in Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: Wiley, 1953); and Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954). The first-mentioned work provides the substance of the discussion of Part II of this paper.
- 6 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950-1957, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958). This study provides the substance of Part IV of this paper.
- 7 The study abstracts its findings from the examination of these cases: United States, 1789-1877; England-Scotland, middle ages to 1707; England-Ireland, until 1921; German unification, early 19th century until 1871; Italian unification, early 19th century until 1860; Hapsburg Monarchy, middle ages until 1918; Norway-Sweden, 1814-1907; Switzerland, 13th century until 1848; England-Wales, late middle ages; English unification, middle ages. The cases were selected to include both pluralistic and amalgamated security-communities, successful and unsuccessful attempts at unity. The authors assumed all their cases to be "closed" historically.
- 8 Ibid., Page 5.

9 Ibid., Pp. 12-13.

- 10 It should be noted that the NATO military élite comes very close to meeting the characteristics listed by Morris Janowitz for professional military men "selling" their plans to civilian leaders in a democratic institutional setting. This process implies decreasing differentiation between formerly typical civilian and military tasks, as well as a shift in the basis of military authority away from command and toward discussion, negotiation and ideological persuasion. See his "Military Elites and the Study of War", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 1957), pp. 9-18.
- 11 On the basis of a series of different behavioral propositions, Harold Guetzkow comes to the same conclusion. See his "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations", Ibid., pp. 64-67. The motivational hypotheses presented by Guetzkow in his Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955) are strikingly borne out by my findings.
- 12 The briefest, and yet accurate, descriptions of the ECSC and EEC Treaty rules are to be found in John Goormaghtigh, "European Coal and Steel Community", International Conciliation (May 1955) and Serge Hurtig, "The European Common Market", ibid. (March 1958). The economic issues of the common market are analyzed in Raymond Bertrand, "The European Common Market Proposal", International Organization, Vol. X, No. 4 (Nov. 1956) and the political process of negotiation by Miriam Camps, The European Common Market and Free Trade Area (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1957). See also the Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., Britain and Europe (London, 1957).
- 13 Research hypotheses on differences and similarities in political behavior among western and non-western systems are developed by G. McT. Kahin, G. Pauker and L. W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non Western Countries", American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 4 (December 1955). I consider many of the variables discussed there as applicable to work on international organizations. The same is true of hypotheses and research designs put forward by comparative politics specialists concerned with western systems. See G. A. Almond, T. Cole and Roy Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," ibid. Also Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (1956).
- 14 With very few exceptions, all discussions of OEEC are either institutional or economic in scope and intent. Some indications of political process may be gleaned from Robert Marjolin, Europe and the United States in the World Economy, (Yale University Press, 1954); Lincoln Gordon, "The Organization for European Economic Cooperation", International Organization, Vol. X, No. 1 (February 1956); René Sergent, "Schritt für Schritt zum Gemeinsamen Markt", Europa (Oct. 1955).

- 15 To my knowledge, no discussions of political processes in the Arab regional organizations have appeared in English. Much information, however, can be gained from the diplomatic record alone. See T. R. Little, "The Arab League: A Reassessment", Middle East Journal (Spring 1956); Paul Seabury, "The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement", International Organization, (November 1949); E. Y. Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League", International Conciliation, (May 1954).
- 16 Very little discussion of political processes in the OAS, as distinguished from institutional analyses and descriptions of actions in specific crises, is available. See, however, A. P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954) and Martin B. Travis, Jr., "The Organization of American States: A Guide to the Future", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 2 (September 1957).



**TRANSFERRING THE PRESIDENCY**

by

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**Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting  
of the American Political Science Association,  
St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958**

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### TRANSFERRING THE PRESIDENCY

That hypothetical character the Average American usually finds alien and incomprehensible what he reads or hears about the crises brought on in European countries by the fall of premiers and their cabinets and the partial paralysis that afflicts those states until new and viable governments are formed. Even we political scientists sometimes allow our scholarly detachment to be ruffled by irritation or amusement at these events, and often show a trace of incredulity that supposedly sensible people cannot somehow handle their affairs a little better. I would not press the analogy too far, but it may serve as a gambit for a suggestion that the United States too has its characteristic form of crisis associated with the turnover of governments, and that our domestic type can be just as interesting--and sometimes just as expensive--as the more highly advertised French and Italian varieties.

I refer primarily, of course, to the periods of crisis and rapid change in our national government institutions brought on by a change of Presidents of the United States, and incidentally to the more or less comparable crises that presumably occur with the turnover of chief executives in state and local government. The American scheme of chief executives elected on schedule and serving fixed terms independent of legislative support gives us a regularity in terms of the calendar that our European friends do not share, and probably in the long run more genuine governmental stability. Nevertheless the Presidency--to speak only of the national government--does change hands periodically, probably more frequently in the long sweep of our history than most of us realize. For the benefit of the statistics-minded, I note that our national government has experienced 33 changes of Presidents since 1789, excluding George Washington who started not exactly from scratch but at least without a predecessor. Of these 33 presidential transitions, 15 have represented changes in party control of the Presidency. There have been 11 instances of succession by a regularly elected man from the same party as his predecessor, and 7 intra-party successions following presidential deaths. Since 1900, a period occupying roughly a third of our history under the Constitution and presumably including the experience most relevant to the future, the rate of presidential turnover has slowed down a little. Nevertheless, in that time we have had four party overturns, three cases of succession by death, and two cases of intra-party succession by regular election. And by the Twenty-Second Amendment we are guaranteed another transfer of the Presidency no later than January 20, 1961.

Since the Presidency is central to our governmental system and increasingly important in the world at large, a change of men in that still highly personal office is an event of major importance. Whatever the implications of the change in terms of ultimate public policy, the federal government considered as a functioning system is significantly affected. The change of Presidents may be either cause or effect (or both) of a major crisis in national political leadership. However it may be perceived from outside, a presidential transition is a period of crisis inside the government. The capacity to respond to challenge, or even to perform ordinary governmental tasks, may be severely impaired.

The change at the White House touches off a wave of readjustments in relationships in and between the Executive Branch, Congress, the political parties, and other organizations closely associated with the government. The change is likely to be greatest when the new President is leading a party overturn such as occurred in November 1952, and for that reason the remainder of this paper will be primarily concerned with such situations. However, presidential successions within the same party, either by regular election or presidential death, could be considered in similar terms; they create problems and require adjustments that may on occasion rival those associated with party overturns.

Let me hasten to say, I hope unnecessarily, that I am not opposed to all changes in the Presidency. I admit a lack of appreciation for the alleged blessings of the Twenty-Second Amendment, and I accept with reluctance the probability that every decade or two a President is going to die in office. But I embrace the democratic faith that the people should be able to vote themselves a new President every four years if they want one, and that when they do, in the long run and all things considered, the change is probably for the better. I only say that as political scientists we ought to know more about how these electoral decisions and strokes of God are executed. How is a change of Presidents actually carried out, and what are likely to be the effects of the change upon the functioning governmental system and its principal parts? Furthermore, in our capacities as potential political decision makers or just plain citizens, each of us is entitled to weigh on his own value scale the costs and benefits of change, to inquire whether the system is truly responsive and neither unduly resistant to nor unduly damaged by changes in top leadership, and to advocate any alterations in procedures or institutions that may permit improvement of the system's performance of this inevitable and highly critical function.

Despite the significance of the party overturns and presidential transitions of 1860-61 and 1932-33 in the history of those eventful years, no one seems to have made any systematic study of presidential transition as a recurring political phenomenon or a practical problem of government. The Republican restoration following the election of 1952 caught almost everyone unprepared. At least one of the principals seemed to regard his problem as almost unique. Most of the members of the supporting cast were uncertain about their roles. The advisers to policy makers had to rely on fragments of historical lore and forward analysis of the sketchiest sort. The political community in general knew not what to expect. And unlike the astronomers, who make meticulous preparations long in advance to observe an event like a total eclipse or an appearance of Halley's comet, the stargazers of government awoke too late to the opportunities of 1952-53 and hardly had their instruments unpacked before the transition was over.

Better late than never, in the past two years I have been trying to collect additional information about the Truman-Eisenhower transition and compare that with what can be learned about the three previous party overturns in the Presidency since 1900 (Taft to Wilson, 1912-13, Wilson to Harding,



1920-21, Hoover to FDR, 1932-33). In the limited time available, perhaps the best way for me to exploit this historical material, which at this point is incomplete and only partially digested, is to re-examine just a few aspects of the 1952-53 experience in the light of the past. Then perhaps we can join in some speculation about the course of events, the problems that might arise, and the opportunities that might be seized by political scientists in the next party overturn in the Presidency.

From Election to Inauguration:  
The Quest for Continuity

First let us examine these transitions from the relatively narrow viewpoint of the need to protect the national welfare and maintain effective and responsible government while changing administrations. In recognizing the problem and devising formal and informal means to maintain continuity we have come a long way in the past half-century. However, many difficulties yet remain, and in view of the increasing complexity and ever-higher stakes of governmental action the situation may be only slightly more satisfactory than it was fifty years ago.

Higher and Higher Stakes

Looking at the four transfers of the Presidency between men of different parties since 1900, one is immediately struck by the greater delicacy of the operation each time it is performed. One constant factor is the advanced erosion of the political and moral authority of the outgoing administration. The differences are in the government itself and in historical circumstances. From the perspective of 1958, the transition of 1912-13 was under conditions of simplicity and bliss. The federal government had less than 400,000 employees and was spending annually about 3/4 billion dollars. The country was prosperous. There were few clouds on the international horizon, until a revolution broke out in Mexico just before inauguration day. By 1921 the situation was considerably more complicated. Washington was strewn with the hulks of World War I agencies, government employment stood at about 600,000, and federal expenditures at about \$5 billion. At home there was postwar economic recession and abroad there was trouble in a hundred places. But still, to a war-weary nation, none of these conditions seemed of extreme urgency; it was still possible to hope that if one ignored them they would go away.

In 1933 the federal government itself was not much different from 1921; employment and expenditures were again at about 600,000 and \$5 billion after dropping lower in the Coolidge era. The outside world posed no threat, in a military sense at least. The crisis was internal, social and economic. Between election and inauguration the economic slide became an avalanche; bank failures and mass unemployment touched the entire land, and physical deprivation touched many homes. The situation required instant decisions. President

Eisenhower moved into a government that had grown vastly larger and more complicated since 1933, and into a situation that was extremely grave but perhaps lacked the desperate urgency of 1933. The complexity of the government itself is suggested by a civil service of 2 1/2 million (a fourfold increase since 1933), a military establishment slightly larger, and an annual budget swollen by the Korean mobilization to \$74 billion. The economy was operating under forced-draft. The cold war was five years old, American troops were pinned down in Korea, and total war, while unlikely at any given moment, was an ever-present possibility.

Thus the stakes are getting higher and higher. A civilian bureaucracy of 3 million and a \$100 billion federal budget may not be far off, and these figures convey only a hint of the complexity of the organization and the subjects it raises for presidential attention. Government shapes the economy with ever-decreasing political and economic tolerances. The ICBM's are close ahead, with life and death for millions a matter of almost split-second decision. And the timing of the Suez affair in 1956 suggests that if a crisis is not already at hand at the time of the next presidential election and possible party turnover, someone hoping the United States will be distracted with internal affairs is likely to create one. The nation's survival may well depend upon prompt, informed, responsible decisions just before or just after inauguration day.

#### The Constitutional and Legal Timetable

The constitutional and statutory provisions governing the turnover of the Presidency are few and on the whole unrestrictive. Even so, General Eisenhower and President Truman faced a different and more exacting schedule than any of their predecessors in similar positions. Under the old schedule, there was a four-month interval between election and inauguration day. The interval was seldom productive. Congress convened early in December--not the Congress just elected, but the one elected two years previously--for the infamous lame duck session. To the lame ducks was delivered a swan song in the form of the outgoing President's State of the Union message. After 1921, the President also was required by law to submit in December a budget for the fiscal year beginning the following July. While the President-elect prepared himself to assume office and the outgoing President tidied up the establishment, Congress passed the appropriation acts and engaged in miscellaneous mischief until the end of its legal life at noon on inauguration day. The new Congress was not required by law to meet until the following December. However, the outgoing President, as an accommodation to his successor, always issued an advance call to the Senate for a special session to begin immediately after inauguration for the purpose of confirming cabinet and other nominations. And every new President after Benjamin Harrison called the whole Congress for a special session, usually in April. The President's message opening the special session translated campaign promises and the usual generalities of the inaugural address into specific proposals for legislation.



The new factor in 1952 was the Twentieth Amendment, passed in 1933 mostly to eliminate lame duck Congresses but having other effects that remained latent until a presidential succession by regular election. The most obvious change was a shortening of the election-to-inauguration interval from 4 to 2 1/2 months, clearly a net gain for the public interest despite the additional pressure it put upon the President-elect to get himself ready. In 1952 the new timing of presidential and congressional terms--Congress coming in on January 3 and the President on January 20--also raised some doubts whether the outgoing President should deliver a State of the Union message, and assume responsibility for the budget and the economic report. All are customary and the budget was required by law before January 20. President Truman decided, I think wisely, to submit these messages. His State of the Union message was followed by his successor's equivalent a month later. His budget and economic report were allowed to stand as documents and modified piecemeal as the new administration clarified its position--a flexible procedure that gave Eisenhower freedom to exert his influence without having to assume responsibility for these complex documents immediately after entering the White House.

As the distinguished chairman of this panel pointed out at the time, the new phasing of the presidential and congressional terms raised problems of executive-legislative relations considerably more important than the question of who was to submit what messages. As compared to his predecessors, General Eisenhower not only had less time to get ready, but he had to get "readier." By the old timing the President and his cabinet had several weeks after inauguration in which to settle down, familiarize themselves with the business, and fill the second-level political offices before facing Congress. Even then, because it was a special session, appropriations and the usual grist of legislative business could be minimized. The President was in a good position to focus attention upon his priority legislative items and push them through. But President Eisenhower found Congress already organized, ready for business, and anxious to hear his specific proposals. He and his administration were called upon to start dealing immediately with Congress across the whole wide front of government business, including the pending appropriation bills. President Eisenhower managed to produce a policy message to Congress only two weeks after inauguration, which was quite a feat as compared to the six weeks his predecessors had taken to do the same thing. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that his administration never quite caught up with Congress during that first session. The President and his associates seemed to have undue difficulty in deciding what they wanted and remained largely on the defensive.



## Presidents-Elect and Their Preparations

A President-elect has no legal duties and theoretically he might take a long vacation or go into retirement until inauguration day. As a practical matter, his presidential job begins on the morning after election--or sooner. Circumstances force him into action. Under extreme pressure, he must absorb information, choose the principal officers of his administration, establish new relations with the legislators and other leaders of his party, and make other commitments of great importance to his presidential success. Because the requirements are seldom seen sufficiently clearly in advance, the period from election to inauguration is usually one of confusion, filled with decisions made without adequate consideration, opportunities missed, and actions postponed that ought to have been taken. Nevertheless, successive Presidents-elect have learned from the experiences of their predecessors and responded to changes in circumstances; over the years, pre-inaugural preparations have become increasingly systematic and faster paced. While in many respects Presidents-elect have all done the same things, there have been important differences in the emphasis given various aspects of the role.

In his day, President-elect Wilson seemed to proceed energetically and systematically, but his pace seems leisurely by present-day standards. Although he had given little thought in advance to his post-election task, he began by taking a month's vacation in Bermuda cut off from visitors and telephones. He was still governor of New Jersey, and to spite the local bosses of his party and push some final reforms through the legislature he clung to the job until March 1. Preferring to handle as much as possible himself, Wilson's staff facilities were modest. He had only Joe Tumulty and a few clerical assistants in his own office, and his friend Colonel House for confidential errands and advice; other friends from the fields of scholarship and journalism (but rarely from politics as such) were used on an ad hoc basis. Ostensibly to seek ideas about his cabinet and his program, but actually mostly to look over a group he didn't know very well, he summoned major and minor Democratic leaders to Trenton for interviews. Only with a few congressmen who would be in key spots to carry through the legislation he had in mind did he get at all specific about his intentions. Most suggestions that he involve himself with the activities of the outgoing administration, the lame duck Congress, or the organizational affairs of his party he brushed aside. He did not have his tentative cabinet slate until about the first of February, and it took until almost the end of the month to negotiate the appointments; one dark horse was added at the last minute on the basis of a half-hour interview and almost no investigation. The cabinet was announced, and at least one of the members met Wilson for the first time, on inauguration day.

President-elect Harding tried to move faster than Wilson but in the end he probably accomplished less. He too started with a month's vacation in which few affairs of state were allowed to intrude. He was still a member of the Senate, but he attended only the opening day of the lame duck session and resigned shortly thereafter. At his headquarters at Marion, Ohio, the

staff assembled for the campaign was intact; Harding had the services of at least a half-dozen assistants of some significance, headed by his personal manager Harry Daugherty. There was a parade of party leaders, referred to in the headlines of the day as "the best minds of the Republican Party," to confer with Harding; apparently the President-elect seriously intended this as a policy-making exercise and was chagrined when the best minds did not concur on what he should do. Intending to name at least some of his cabinet members early, to give them time for study and consultation with their predecessors, Harding had most of his men lined up by the end of December, but an attempt to clear them in advance with all the leading party factions led to a party row that held up the final decisions until mid-February. Meanwhile, Harding took a two-week cruise in Florida waters. Throughout his preparatory period, Harding engaged his party leaders in much more specific discussion of the future than Wilson had. Unfortunately, these conferences did not seem to establish Harding's authority, clarify his mind, or achieve party agreement on policy; they only restricted his freedom of action.

FDR, like Wilson, had gubernatorial duties, which took a fair amount of his time until January 1. While he spent two weeks at Warm Springs in November and December, and another week in January, these periods were partly filled with conferences with his staff and Democratic leaders; not until a two-week Florida cruise in February did Roosevelt get away for any considerable time. He was staffed in far greater depth and variety than either Wilson or Harding. He had at his disposal a personal staff of at least a half-dozen people and a policy group of similar size (the Brains Trust), not to mention the resources of Jim Farley and the national committee. Unlike Wilson and Harding, Roosevelt was not permitted the luxury of detachment from current governmental problems. Attention to the economic emergency and dealing with the Hoover administration delayed decisions on the Roosevelt cabinet until February; his team arrived in Washington haphazardly organized. There was little time for party caucusing; staff work going all the way back to the campaign for the nomination, supplemented by hasty talks with legislative leaders, formed the basis for the legislative measures of the Hundred Days after inauguration.

Twenty years after Roosevelt, President-elect Eisenhower had much less time in which to prepare for a vastly more complicated government and a touchy world situation. Having resigned from the Army to seek the nomination, he had no competing duties. In manpower and variety of talent, Eisenhower was certainly as well staffed as Roosevelt. Sherman Adams, Hagerty, Hughes, Stevens, and others of the campaign organization at the Hotel Commodore were ready as the nucleus of a White House staff. Available for policy study and advice were such men as Brownell, Clay, Dulles, and Dr. Milton Eisenhower. Advice and services poured into the Commodore from pipelines tapping the resources of Time-Life-Fortune, the Dewey organization in New York, the Rockefeller private brain trust, various independent research organizations, and many of the country's top-drawer corporations, law firms, and advertising agencies. One



suspects a glut of volunteers too eminent to be ignored. Perhaps the most obvious weakness of the group was its limited experience with the special politics of Congress and the Presidency.

Eisenhower moved with unprecedented speed. He slipped away promptly after election for two weeks in Georgia, where golf and conferences with his leading advisers were in about equal proportions. Only a few days after election, at the invitation of President Truman, he designated a budget observer and a defense and foreign affairs observer for liaison with the outgoing administration. Returning from Georgia on November 18, Eisenhower conferred with President Truman at the White House. After two more weeks of conferences with staff, advisers, and visiting politicians at the humming headquarters at the Hotel Commodore, Eisenhower left secretly for Korea.

By the first of December, decisions not only on the cabinet but on several of the second-echelon appointments had been made and announced. New Yorker stories about Sidney Weinberg's sudden inspirations notwithstanding, the appointment on such short notice of such hardly obvious choices as Dodge, Humphrey, Wilson, McKay, and Ezra Taft Benson implies a good deal of pre-election staff work. Designating these men early made it possible for them to wind up their personal affairs, inform themselves about their new jobs, confer with their predecessors, and appear on inauguration day in an unprecedented state of readiness for business. For this practical step Eisenhower received much public applause. There was another less obvious effect. By moving rapidly, he stole a march on the politicians of the congressional and more conservative wing of his party. While Eisenhower's appointees were, by and large, not men to whom the Taftites could openly object, they were certainly not the man Taft, Knowland, or Bridges would have chosen. But by the time Eisenhower got well exposed to the senatorial viewpoint the commitments were already made.

On the Helena returning from Korea, Eisenhower and several of the future cabinet members conferred with General Bradley, Admiral Radford, and other leading military men and began their first serious conversations about defense, foreign affairs, and--according to Mr. Donovan 1/--economic controls. Back in New York, from mid-December to mid-January the President-elect's pace was a little easier. Aides were already working on the inaugural and State of the Union addresses. Eisenhower had much-publicized meetings with MacArthur and Churchill and conferred with numerous congressmen and national leaders. The early appointees slipped into Washington for meetings with their predecessors and briefings at the Pentagon, the State Department, and the Budget Bureau. The mimeographs at the Commodore ground out announcements of second and third echelon appointments. Arrangements were made with congressional leaders to hold hearings on the prospective cabinet nominations before inauguration day so that they could be confirmed as soon as Eisenhower sent them up; despite a warning flag raised by Senator Byrd over the conflict of interest problem, it was generally assumed that the inquiry would be perfunctory.



On January 12 and 13, Eisenhower, Nixon, the future department heads, leading White House staff members, and other appointees assembled at the Commodore for unofficial cabinet meetings. These sessions were widely hailed as an important and constructive innovation, which undoubtedly they were, although one wonders if their importance was not overestimated, or at least misinterpreted. Our information is limited, depending mainly upon press accounts and the Donovan more-or-less-authorized book, but it appears that various individuals reported their impressions from visits to Washington and conferences with their predecessors, there was a great deal of talk about inauguration day procedures and the mechanics of taking over offices, and the group was given a preview of the inaugural address. Many things were discussed, but it is hard to identify anything of importance that got decided. The main importance of these sessions, I suspect, was in helping to develop the unusual cabinet solidarity that was to characterize the first year or two of the new administration. The Commodore meetings--the entire preparation, in fact--reflected Eisenhower's characteristic view that the first step in doing anything is to get properly staffed and organized.

To summarize, over the years from Wilson to Eisenhower the preparation of the President-elect has evolved from a leisurely, highly personal activity to a fast-paced, highly organized operation that begins well before election day. The emphasis has changed from party consultations to staff work. In the most recent transition, cabinet members were designated within a few days after election, establishing a precedent that seems likely to endure. The increased speed and bureaucratization of the process tends to diminish the influence of congressmen and other leaders of the President's party in the initial appointments and other matters.

#### Presidents and Presidents-Elect

Now we come to one of the most interesting aspects of the business, the relations between incoming and outgoing regimes. In the early years of this century, there seems to have been a feeling that it was undignified for the President and President-elect to display any interest in each other until the formal call at the White House traditionally made by the President-elect on inauguration eve. We have no knowledge of what his real intentions were, but President Taft secretly wrote to Wilson in November 1912, inviting him to spend a few days with him at the White House. Wilson declined on the ground that he was too busy, and there were no further efforts by Taft or his cabinet members to open serious discussions. Taft and Wilson corresponded about domestic matters at the executive mansion, and a few unauthorized runners from various departments succeeded in penetrating Wilson's defenses briefly, but most of his information was received from Democratic congressmen and other third parties. This lack of communication seemed fairly normal and no one thought much about it until ten days before inauguration when a violent revolution broke out in Mexico City, endangering the lives of the sizable foreign colony. Jingoists demanded that United States troops be put into

Mexico to rescue our citizens and eliminate some of the nuisances to foreign-owned business. Taft said that the situation was serious and mobilized troops at the border. Henry L. Stimson, who was Secretary of War, issued a public statement suggesting as strongly as possible without making a direct request that Wilson send the future Secretary of War to talk to him about the situation. He of course did not know that at that moment Wilson was still looking for a Secretary of War. From all accounts, Wilson was preoccupied with other matters and not inclined to take the Mexican situation seriously, so it is doubtful that he would have sent a representative had one been available. Wilson had tea at the White House on March 3, and most of his cabinet members got the benefit of an hour or two of conversation with their predecessors when they appeared to be sworn in, but that seems to have been the extent of the liaison. The Wilsonians showed no interest in advance consultations, and the Taft administration, despite its impulses, was too inhibited to suggest them openly and directly.

Before the election of 1916, when the nation was delicately balanced between neutrality and war, Wilson prepared a plan of action in case he should lose to Hughes. He intended to appoint Hughes Secretary of State and then he and the Vice President would both resign, making Hughes President immediately under the Succession Act. But when it came to turning over the Presidency to Harding in 1921, Wilson was sick and bitter and the 1916 plan was not revived. Wilson told his associates to be helpful to Harding and ordered some steps taken to clear up unfinished business and clarify the record, but he took no initiative. When Harding visited Washington in December after his election the newspapers tried to stir up a summit meeting, but it was obvious that neither side wanted one. Wilson said he would be happy to receive the President-elect if he should call at the White House, and Harding said he would respond to any invitations but of course could not present himself uninvited, and there the matter rested. The Harding cabinet members were not announced until late February, but most of them arranged for at least a day or two of pre-inaugural conferences with their predecessors. In a few departments there was notably successful use of holdover officers at the sub-cabinet level. Just as in 1913, there was a dust-up in Latin America just before inauguration day, although this one was of smaller proportions--a small border war between Panama and Costa Rica. The outgoing Secretary of State deferred action but gave full information to the incoming secretary, Charles Evans Hughes, who moved in sternly on March 5 and quieted the disturbance.

The unsuccessful relations between Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the election-inauguration interval are well known. Shortly after the election, Hoover invited Roosevelt to a meeting at the White House to discuss the problem of impending default by Britain and France on war debt payments. At a painful conference on November 22, Roosevelt declined to join Hoover in proposing a joint legislative-executive War Debt Commission. In mid-December Hoover asked Roosevelt to join him in naming the delegates to the World Economic Conference that was to meet after inauguration day. Roosevelt declined,



and Hoover immediately made a second appeal, insisting that he was not trying to bind Roosevelt to anything but simply to establish machinery to identify areas of agreement. Roosevelt's response was that ". . . For me to accept any joint responsibility in the work of exploration might well be construed . . . as a commitment--moral even though not legal, as to policies and courses of action." 2/ Early in January, primarily upon the intervention of Norman H. Davis, a prominent Democrat in the service of the Hoover administration, Roosevelt had a long consultation with Secretary of State Stimson. As a result, Roosevelt made two public statements backing up various aspects of Hoover-Stimson foreign policy and agreed to have a second face-to-face conference with Hoover on the war debt question. At this meeting, on January 20, Roosevelt again disagreed with the course Hoover proposed but agreed to join with Stimson in drafting a reply to an urgent British note on the subject if his position were safeguarded on certain points. The reply was sent only after a stormy session between Stimson and Roosevelt's advisers, Moley and Tugwell, who thought Stimson was trying to slip into the note things that Roosevelt had not agreed to. On February 17, Hoover sent Roosevelt a secret letter telling him of the impending banking crisis and suggesting that to maintain the confidence of the country he make a statement promising a balanced budget and no tampering with the gold standard. Roosevelt's negative reply was delayed for ten days--a secretary's oversight, it was explained. On March 2 and 3, Hoover tried desperately to get Roosevelt to back him publicly in a course of action, principally the proclamation of a banking holiday, but Roosevelt insisted it was all Hoover's responsibility until March 4 and Hoover took no action. On March 5, Roosevelt did issue such a proclamation on his own authority. Despite the failure of cooperation at the presidential level, the incoming and outgoing Treasury officials worked closely together for several weeks. Whether Roosevelt was justified, wise, or highly irresponsible in declining to take joint action with Hoover has been debated ever since, but the experience was an impressive exhibit of the difficulties of getting a President-elect to assume any responsibility whatever before his term legally begins.

The situation in 1952 seemed to call for as much cooperation as possible, especially in foreign policy. We did not know it at the time, but Mr. Truman has revealed in his memoirs that during the campaign he offered General Eisenhower weekly CIA briefings and invited him to come to the White House for a briefing on the foreign situation and a meeting with the cabinet. 3/ Governor Stevenson had recently had the same privilege. Eisenhower accepted the CIA briefings with the stipulation that they should in no way limit his freedom to discuss foreign policy issues. However, he declined the invitation to the White House, on the ground that it would "result in confusion in the public mind," and that as the Republican standard bearer ". . . it is my duty to remain free to analyze publicly the policies and acts of the present administration. . . ." This stiff reply brought a "Dear Ike" letter in the great Truman tradition, with the President in effect suggesting that the General get down off his high horse and join in supporting the foreign policy he had recently helped make. But the General remained aloof, indicating that



in an emergency he would change his decision but under the circumstances preferred not to become involved.

The day after election, November 5, Truman sent Eisenhower a curt telegram of congratulations, with the request that he immediately send a representative to meet with the Director of the Budget on the presentation that would have to be made by January 15. Later the same day, when Eisenhower's response was affirmative, Truman sent a second and more cordial telegram inviting the President-elect to the White House at his earliest convenience, " . . . to discuss the problem of this transition period, so that it may be clear to all the world that this nation is united in its struggle for freedom and peace." Then, before Eisenhower could reply, he issued a public statement pledging his cooperation with the incoming administration and announcing that he had invited Eisenhower to the White House. Apparently he did not expect the General to say no. The following day Eisenhower accepted the invitation and proposed the date.

All this was by telegram. Also on November 6, Truman had sent by courier a letter asking General Eisenhower to designate a person in addition to the budget representative who would be able to discuss "authoritatively" several matters in the defense and foreign affairs area on which action would soon be required. Said Mr. Truman, "All these things are vital policy matters which can only be decided by the President of the United States, but I would prefer not to make firm decisions without your concurrence, although the decisions will have to be made."

Until that point, only the objects of consultation, discussion of problems, and presentation of a united front to the world had been raised, but Truman's use of the words "decisions" and "concurrence" implied something the Eisenhower camp was not slow to catch. Truman had asked Eisenhower to send someone "to act authoritatively for you." Eisenhower accepted his invitation "to send someone to sit in on discussions." He noted: "In your letter you use the word 'authoritative' by which I take it you mean that my representative be able accurately to reflect my views. This he will be able to do, but quite naturally this will likewise be the limit of his authority since I myself can have none under current conditions." Truman's next message did not mention the point, and presumably the President accepted the restriction. Mr. Dodge in Budget and Senator Lodge in defense-foreign affairs took up their observation posts within a few days. From what we know of the activities of these representatives, their functions turned out to be even more limited than was implied by Eisenhower's last letter. Not only did they refrain from concurring, but there was relatively little reflecting of the President-elect's views; mostly they just observed.

On November 18, General Eisenhower appeared at the White House. He had a private conference with the President, and later they were joined by Dodge and Lodge and several members of the Truman cabinet. At the end of the meeting, there was a Truman-Eisenhower joint statement that said in part:

"We have discussed some of the most important problems affecting our country in the sphere of international relations. Information with respect to these problems has been made available to General Eisenhower.

"Under our Constitution, the President must exercise his functions until he leaves office, and his successor cannot be asked to share or assume the responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes office.

"We have worked out a framework for liaison and exchange of information . . . but we have made no arrangements which are inconsistent with the full spirit of our Constitution.

. . . . .

"We are confident that this meeting and the arrangements we have made . . . furnish additional proof of the ability of the people of this country to manage their affairs with a sense of continuity and with responsibility."

The reasonableness of these arrangements, with the President-elect being given information but not asked to assume any responsibility, was widely applauded.

The story has obviously not been fully told, but we now have evidence both from the Truman memoirs and the Donovan Inside Story that there was some inside maneuvering about what action, if any, Eisenhower should take as a result of the meeting. Mr. Truman records that he advised Eisenhower at the outset that there were several pending issues where success might depend upon assurance that the new administration would continue the Truman policy. "We will tell you about these issues and would welcome concurrence if you want to give it," said Truman. "But we will not press for it. This is a matter on which you will have to make up your own mind." <sup>4/</sup> Apparently he thought concurrence was not the same thing as asking Eisenhower to assume responsibility.

The test arose when Secretary of State Acheson, after reviewing the status of the Korean armistice talks, produced a draft statement Eisenhower might make to back up the administration on the forcible repatriation of prisoners issue. Eisenhower pocketed the draft and said that he would give it careful study. <sup>5/</sup> Then it appeared that the White House draft of the proposed joint press statement also contained the sentence: "We both agree that it is of utmost importance to preserve the principle that prisoners of war shall not be forcibly repatriated." According to Donovan, this was stricken at the suggestion of Senator Lodge, who did not want Eisenhower committed to a statement drafted by the Truman administration. <sup>6/</sup> The joint communique had nothing to say about substantive matters. The next day in New York, however, Senator Alexander Wiley emerged from a conference with Eisenhower and told reporters that the President-elect stood firmly against forcible repatriation. Thus Eisenhower supported the administration but avoided a direct, personal endorsement of a Truman policy.



From the White House meeting, Eisenhower went to the Pentagon for a more detailed briefing on the military situation. Two days later, he received a three-volume National Security Council briefing book which, according to the New York Times, reviewed country by country the essential aspects of United States foreign policy, gave the latest intelligence estimates on the danger spots, and summarized the tentative plans to be followed in various contingencies. 7/ Within a few days, the Eisenhower cabinet designates began appearing in Washington for consultations with their predecessors and briefings by the Budget Bureau; departmental briefing books were under way if not already assembled. At Mr. Truman's directive, his entire administration stood ready to facilitate the transition; representatives of the new administration were supplied--probably overwhelmed--with information whenever they exhibited curiosity. With the Truman cabinet members preparing to disappear on inauguration day and sub-cabinet officers resigning in droves, arrangements were made in each agency for at least one sub-cabinet officer to remain on board, empowered to act as Secretary until the new one would be sworn in and available for consultation with the new group for a reasonable period of time. Truman saw even to such details as ordering General Eisenhower's son home from Korea to attend the inauguration and having the White House offices freshly painted. Some of the sweetness and light was dissipated when Truman snorted "demagoguery" at the Eisenhower trip to Korea and his subsequent conference with MacArthur, but never before had there been such an effort to make the transition orderly and put the new administration in position to act promptly if it chose to do so. The Eisenhower group accepted the information but was very cautious about public statements that could be construed as supporting Truman policies.

Reviewing these attempts at inter-administration liaison, it seems that the outgoing group usually supplies the ardor while the incoming administration tends to be reluctant and shy. (The only possible exception was Wilson and Harding, where the disinterest was mutual.) Wilson dodged his predecessor almost completely, and Roosevelt and Eisenhower got no closer to theirs than seemed absolutely necessary under the circumstances. The reluctance of the President-elect is natural. Beside the distaste he may have for dealing with a recent campaign opponent, he feels that he has plenty to do without involving himself before his legal responsibility begins; he is also uncertain of where talks with his predecessor might lead, acutely aware of his lack of detailed knowledge, afraid of being lured into an unwise commitment or being asked to spend some of the good will with Congress that he is hoarding to be risked after inauguration. The outgoing President has a greater appreciation for the responsibilities of the office and the problems he can see ahead. Already at the center of the intricate web of policy and administrative action, he hates the thought of any strands being broken unnecessarily. Therefore he pursues his successor with information, cherishing the hope that the new man will see the problems as he sees them and then do the obviously right thing.



Under circumstances like the ones surrounding the Hoover-Roosevelt and the Truman-Eisenhower transitions, the President-elect and his associates can hardly risk the public disapproval they would undoubtedly receive for declining to confer with their predecessors. Arrangements like the Dodge-Lodge observerships and the Truman-Eisenhower conference can be useful and successful if the goals are merely to get information in the hands of the incoming group and display unity before the outside world. But why cannot the transfer of information lead to something more, such as joint statements of agreed-upon policy, or actions by the outgoing President with the specific approval of his successor? Aren't facts facts?

While substantive collaboration between incoming and outgoing administrations might occur--might be downright imperative under some circumstances--there are several persistent difficulties that ought to be understood. One of the most obvious is the limited capacity of a President-elect or a prospective cabinet member to absorb and reach conclusions from the enormous amount of information the President and the executive branch pour upon him. Unless he is steeped in a subject in advance and has far greater staff resources than any President-elect so far, he just cannot take it all in. A State Department official who stood just offstage during the Hoover-Roosevelt conferences on the war debts in 1932 commented: "What apparently struck Hoover and Mills was his [Roosevelt's] ignorance of the general problems facing the Administration, particularly in the foreign field. What apparently struck him was that Hoover and Mills, who had been working and struggling with these problems for years, should expect him to have well-defined ideas and policies on them before he and his advisers had a chance to make a careful study based on official information." 8/ One suspects that no matter how hard they may have tried to be short and selective, the authors of the numerous briefing books of 1952 gave many of their readers the feeling of futility that goes with being lost in a snowstorm.

An outgoing President who sincerely wants to cooperate with his successor must also go out of his way to avoid any trace of a Dutch Uncle attitude. Mr. Truman's overtures to Eisenhower in 1952 were undoubtedly sincerely motivated by a desire to do what was best for the country and by recollections of his own predicament in 1945, but one suspects that as he laid his problems before Eisenhower in all their complexity he was getting a certain grim satisfaction out of at last making that so-and-so confront reality. And to the extent that this satisfaction was obvious, it may have contributed to Eisenhower's "frozen grimness" when they met, and the "something about his attitude" that Mr. Truman says he did not quite understand. 9/

Another reason why discussion of factual information does not necessarily lead to joint action is that to different people the facts may mean different things, or have different orders of significance. The facts about the Mexican revolution just before Wilson took office were clear enough, but they had significance only if one assumed that the United States might want to do something about them. To President Taft, sending the Marines was an unpleasant but

possible alternative. To Wilson, the whole Mexican business was dollar diplomacy and he was having none of it. Therefore, the facts that made Stimson think a conference with his successor was so urgent made no impression at all on Wilson.

The case of Hoover, FDR, and the war debts is another classic example. To Hoover, the war debts were linked up with international credit, the gold standard, and world trade, and in these relationships lay the cause and the possible cure of the American depression. Thus action was extremely urgent. But the Roosevelt-Moley-Tugwell economics rejected the internationalist viewpoint and insisted that the depression began at home and must be attacked there. International credit was, if not irrelevant, at least peripheral and certainly not important enough to risk the diversion of attention and possible compromises that Hoover's proposal would have involved. Hoover was enraged because these irresponsible fellows wouldn't even discuss the establishment of machinery to search for agreement, but to the other fellows even the establishment of machinery implied acceptance of doctrines they had been campaigning against.

Setting aside instances in which the approaches are so different that the facts mean different things, there remain many cases in which the facts are plain and the premises of both sides similar enough that overt and specific commitments on the part of the President-elect ought to be possible. The wariness of Roosevelt on the banking holiday proclamation and of Eisenhower on the Korean prisoners issue seems to have resulted from a fear of "getting involved" that is difficult to explain rationally or defend. Nevertheless, in view of past history, Eisenhower's indirect support of Truman on the Korean prisoners issue represents a considerable achievement. Perhaps in some future transition a President-elect can be induced to take the risk of openly supporting his predecessor on a critical point.

#### Post-Inauguration: Stability and Responsiveness

Now we turn from the pre-inaugural period and its crisis of national leadership to deal even more briefly with the post-inaugural phase of transition. Simultaneous crises in the bureaucracy and in the ascendant majority party are characteristic. At such times the national interest presumably calls for maximizing the two objectives of responsiveness to whatever changes in national political sentiment can be divined from the recent election returns, and of stability in the machinery and day-to-day processes of government. These two goals are sometimes considered antithetical, requiring choice or compromise between them. In some situations this may be so, although my own view is that the two goals are as likely to be complementary as to be competing.



## Presidents, Parties, and Policy

President Eisenhower, just as Wilson, Harding, and FDR, was swept into office with a huge electoral majority and enjoyed great public esteem and apparent political power as he occupied the White House. As compared to his predecessors, what were his problems and how did he fare in converting these assets into policy achievements?

It soon became apparent, in the spring of 1953, that the exercises at the Commadore, the briefings, the consultations, and the holdover officers provided by the Truman administration were useful for some purposes but their effects were limited. There had been a considerable display of American unity before the world. The President's staff and the inner circle of his administration was organized in a rudimentary fashion, the key individuals had at least nodding acquaintances with their jobs; the circuits of executive power did not go completely dead on inauguration day. But the pre-inaugural momentum could not be maintained and converted into significant, rapid, and orderly change of policy. The most notable exceptions, perhaps, were in the financial field. The incoming officials of the Treasury, who knew Washington, each other, what they wanted to do, and how to go about doing it well in advance, and whose consultations with their predecessors were as between brothers in the mysteries of the bond market, were able to put into effect shortly after inauguration day a significant change in public debt policy. It also seems probable that without the knowledge of issues, men, and procedures Mr. Dodge acquired before inauguration at the Budget Bureau, the major revision of the Truman budget that was carried through in the spring of 1953 would have been an extremely arbitrary and essentially irresponsible job. But in most areas of the government there was something approaching a policy vacuum that stopped all but the routine operations; great changes were presumed to be coming, but no one knew just what they would be and meanwhile nothing could be decided. It took weeks and in some areas months of caucusing among the new officials and threshing about with survey teams, study groups, and special commissions before the policy wheels began to turn in anything like normal fashion.

Eventually the first Eisenhower year saw the Korean armistice, the ending of wage and price controls, the beginning of the military "new look," and the first steps in the development of a position in such fields as public power and agriculture. Most of these accomplishments were primarily in terms of developing policy in the executive branch. Eisenhower's proposals for new legislation were late and limited, and except for the St. Lawrence seaway authorization and one or two other matters, there was relatively little accomplishment. Not until the following January did the administration go to Congress with a comprehensive legislative program. Meanwhile it had had difficulty merely holding the line on taxes, reciprocal trade, and foreign aid, and defending itself from irresponsible investigations and such right-wing excrescences as the Bricker amendment. There is, to be sure, some



danger of underestimating the accomplishments of an administration that, by party ideology and platform, was dedicated to liquidation as much as legislation, but we have Donovan's testimony as to Mr. Eisenhower's own disappointment. 10/

What happened? Briefly, Eisenhower encountered the same characteristics of the American constitutional and party system that had frustrated, in varying degrees, all his predecessors. He found that a party platform is not easily convertible into a legislative program. He found that an American political party, when used as a recruiting device, produces such a heterogeneous group of political appointees in terms of experience, executive skill, policy viewpoint, and political allegiance that it is painfully difficult to develop, support, and administer a presidential program. He found that the constitutional powers of Congress, the weakness of its internal leadership, and the independent local bases of its members give those members great freedom to ignore and harass even an essentially moderate President with tremendous public popularity. These perennial centrifugal tendencies become even more dominant in a party overturn situation. The President is psychologically and, for a time, functionally detached from his normal allies in the bureaucracy. The leading members of the President's party who are already established in Washington and ostensibly well informed are the congressmen. Their policy advice and individual whims receive great deference. As the out-party's candidate, the President has generalized his appeal and blurred over differences in his party; now he is reluctant to force those differences to a resolution.

What did Wilson, Harding, and FDR do under these conditions? Driven by theory and psychological compulsion to personal leadership, Wilson forced the factional issue early. Even before his inauguration he stressed that he would have an administration of progressive Democrats. He kept a close watch on appointments at the sub-cabinet and sometimes even the bureau level but kept peace within the party by giving way to politics as usual on the lesser, local, patronage. Supremely confident of his own judgment, he made several important changes in foreign policy by simple fiat, hardly even consulting the State Department. For legislative action he picked two issues, the tariff and the currency. These he dramatized by such gestures as his unprecedented personal appearance on the Hill and supported with great vigor both publicly and privately. While these were pending, he avoided involvement with Congress on other issues as much as possible. When resistance appeared he cracked the party whips and appealed to the country. He achieved his major legislative objectives that first year and planted the seeds of resentment that led to his undoing after the war.

Harding tried to do it the other way, pleasing all factions, never forcing anyone, hoping to attract support by sweet reasonableness. He wore down the legislative leaders and got his way on several cabinet appointments, but jobs below that level were thrown to the shifting winds of patronage. His program was what his department heads, some of them unusually able men, suggested. Once he had made his proposals to Congress, he largely stood aside.

There was a good deal of legislative activity in his first year--a tariff act, a large tax cut, an immigration act, and the original budget and accounting act. But it was the congressional leaders who set the priorities and determined the content. While on a few occasions, now largely forgotten, Harding rose to the defense of the executive power, he amply fulfilled his pledge to redress the legislative-executive balance from where Wilson had shifted it. Harding retained his personal popularity but the administration gradually bogged down and accomplished little.

The Roosevelt leadership that resulted in the remarkable legislative record of the Hundred Days was of course enhanced by the crisis conditions of the time. However, FDR played a far more subtle and complex game than any of his recent predecessors and probably would have been successful regardless of the crisis. At the beginning he made gestures toward all wings of the party. The staffing of the administration, even close to the Presidency, had many incongruities. His legislative proposals were derived from many sources, but the previous year of Brain Trust activity had given FDR and his closest advisers just enough unity of view to permit them to pick and choose and splice together proposals that were roughly acceptable to all; in the emergency no one demanded perfection. By personal charm, much political maneuvering, and skillful use of his great popularity in the country, Roosevelt managed to keep the progressive Democrats in line without losing too many of the conservatives. On the latter, a deliberate dangling of carefully stored patronage carrots often proved effective. The Roosevelt technique seems in retrospect to have been based upon a shrewd knowledge of the sources of power in the American system and a determination to lead without the inflexibility that had eventually defeated Wilson.

Thus each President responds to the leadership problem in terms of his own abilities, concepts of the Presidency, and party doctrine. Mr. Eisenhower clearly followed closer to the Harding route than to the path of Wilson or of FDR. His temperament and the prevailing attitude in his party toward presidential leadership--especially apparent in 1952 after twenty years of chafing--inclined him that way. In his first year he moved cautiously, waited to hear the counsel of all, was slow to demand loyalty in his administration, seemed embarrassed by any signs that he was using the machinery of the party to strengthen himself against incipient factional rivals, and rarely brought his enormous national and world prestige to bear on those who resisted his gentle suggestions. Yet there were at least two important differences from the Harding approach. Eisenhower wanted no helter-skelter administration; he took care to get organized according to his liking and insisted that policy proposals be put through the processes of clearance and staff work to which he was accustomed. It took a great deal of time, but his proposals were safe and reasonable when made. While Eisenhower would not force his views on Congress, he was far more conscientious than Harding in resisting the efforts of some of the legislative leaders of his party to turn the clock backward. Eisenhower did manage to stave off huge tax cuts, to keep foreign aid and reciprocal trade going, to keep us in the UN and NATO, and dodge the Bricker amendment. No small accomplishments themselves, in the conditions of 1953.



## A Crisis for the Bureaucracy

Until now I have commented only in passing upon another major factor in transition situations--the personnel, organization, and procedures comprising the continuing apparatus of the executive branch. The bureaucracy. What happens to the civil service in a party overturn? Is the bureaucracy a force for continuity and unity to counteract the unstabilizing political influences we have been talking about? Does it constitute an obstacle to legitimately ordered change? I have left this subject for last partly because what happens to the bureaucracy in a transition becomes intelligible only in terms of the broader political problems discussed above. Also I have feared I could not cover the subject adequately in a brief time and have hesitated to start. Fortunately we have Professor Somers' paper, written during the 1953 transition but still entirely relevant. 11

Most of us recall the ordeal of the civil servants and their new leaders in 1953: the initial suspicion, hostility, and lack of communication; the frustration of the new officers at finding almost all their staffs under at least some shadow of merit system protection; the establishment of Schedule C outside the merit system; the disposal of unwanted bodies through reorganization, reclassification, and reductions in force; the security checks and the "numbers game"; political clearance; and the gradual return of stability and confidence.

From the limited viewpoint of the ancient contest between merit and spoils, much of what happened was squarely in the tradition. The sequence of events, the arguments used, and the institutional positions are all familiar. The party platform and the President himself announce dedication to merit principles, but the organization men and Congressmen need jobs. The Civil Service Commission is directed by a congressional committee to compile a list of positions outside the merit system. Early in the administration the President discovers that the preceding administration has rigged the system, and to restore true merit a revision of the regulations--which will have the incidental effect of opening up a good many jobs--is required. Wilson and Harding, for example, changed the regulations on postmasters; the Eisenhower equivalent, mild by comparison, was Schedule C. While the President looks the other way, the obvious patronage is expanded by transparent technical devices such as reorganization and reclassification of positions. Congress meanwhile takes care that any organizations, agencies, or divisions authorized by new legislation are exempt from the civil service rules for a suitable period of time. After a few months, it becomes clear that the available jobs won't go around, or that the jobs and the candidates just cannot be matched. There is pressure from the Hill and renewed efforts at "cooperation" from the executive branch. Eventually, with public criticism mounting, the President calls a halt, and other events come along to relieve the pressure. As peace is restored, the last loud voices heard are those of unreconstructed congressmen explaining mid-term election losses in terms of public disappointment that the administration had not really cleaned house.



The differences mainly have been in how fast the cycle has run. Wilson, a personally dedicated civil service reformer, put his foot down after he had been in office ten months, when he publicly served notice he would veto a postal appropriation bill if a rider taking 2,400 assistant postmasters out of the merit system was not removed. In Harding's time the patronage surge reached its peak in early 1922, when Elmer Dover, a hatchet man from Ohio, freshly appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, announced that his mission was to "Hardingize" that agency. He succeeded with the Customs Service but stirred up a hornets' nest when he "reclassified" practically the entire technical staff of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving and was forced to resign shortly thereafter. Franklin Roosevelt was spared the unpleasant necessity of disciplining his party's spoilsmen; the exempt positions in the new welfare, agricultural, and other programs took care of almost everyone. Although Donovan chronicles Eisenhower's increasing exasperation in late 1953, some parts of his administration were still trying to enlarge patronage opportunities through most of 1954. The climax came in the fall of 1954, with Charles Willis' elaborate plan for "broadening the personnel procurement base," complete with "Forms PM-2, PM-2X, PM-5, V-54 and PM NC-1(Rev)." After the exposure of this startling new application of O and M, the President issued some cautioning orders, and the excitement subsided rapidly during 1955 and 1956.

Thus 1953 saw the repetition of a familiar pattern. Between each party overturn, of course, the merit system continues to creep "upward, outward, and downward," as the phrase goes. Because of government expansion, the absolute number of positions subject to appointment on some sort of a political basis probably has not shrunk much since Wilson's time, but within any given agency there is much less room for maneuver.

But discussing this aspect of the Eisenhower transition merely in terms of the past has limited usefulness. Since the 1933 overturn there had been such important changes in the character of the federal government, and of the bureaucracy itself, that nature of the problem had changed. It was no longer merely a matter of merit or spoils. The argument was in terms of control.

As late as 1933, the representative civil servant was the government clerk. By 1953 he had become an administrator, perhaps even an executive. The new upper civil servants were intelligent, university trained, a little on the intellectual side, sophisticated and proud of the responsibilities they were carrying. The more articulate of them were developing a theory of their role: they provided not only the indispensable skills for the operation of big government, but also the ideas and alternatives among which they and their political colleagues jointly chose courses of action. While sometimes cross-pressured by government-wide and program loyalties, they usually thought of themselves as the allies of the President in a perpetual battle for rationality, unity, and progress against the disruptive activities of Congress and the lesser politicians. Their party neutrality, they assumed, was beyond question.

But of course the new administration in 1953 did question it. Assuming that the civil servants of the New Deal must be devoted Democrats, many of the new department heads and deputies ignored, or avoided even receiving, the advice of the upper civil servants and sought opportunities to bring into the government men whose advice could be trusted. They also filled the record with plaintive statements about how alone and powerless they were. The bureaucrats were bewildered. "If they want help, why don't they ask us? We won't tell them anything that isn't so. These people don't even know their friends from their enemies. How can they be disappointed in us when they haven't told us what they want us to do?" So went the conversation when civil servants got together.

But the remarks of the businessmen arriving in Washington implied that they had no such concept of the role of a civil service, even a properly neutralized one. Only by good Republican appointees could Republican policy be made. Schedule C and political clearance at levels where it had been unknown since at least 1940 were instituted. Until these measures began to produce Republican appointees, and in some agencies for a considerable time thereafter, there was--to put it mildly--great instability of both policy and personnel.

Was all this necessary? Could much of the uncertainty and confusion, not to mention the frequently tragic sacrifices of careers, have been avoided if the Republicans had accepted the bureaucracy at face value? Or was the bureaucracy inflexibly committed to the doctrines of the past and claiming a larger role for itself than is permissible in the American political scheme? Here I enter an extremely controversial area and immediately hedge my position by asserting that the facts that would help us to answer these questions with any degree of certainty are really not available.

At one extreme, I think it is agreed that there was very little that could be described as bureaucratic rebellion or policy sabotage. The only instance even approaching it that comes readily to mind was the flare-up among the government scientists at Secretary Weeks' short-lived attack on the Bureau of Standards--an affair posing interesting questions about the ultimate responsibility of civil servants that we probably have no time to explore. For the most part, when the bureaucracy was told specifically what to do, it complied. There was undoubtedly some foot-dragging here and there, but one suspects that most of it was by the same bureaus whose congressional and pressure group allies also permitted them to evade the discipline of Democratic Presidents. Paradoxically, it was not these bureaucrats but the more President-oriented ones with government-wide loyalties who were in the greatest difficulty with the new administration. We have even had some fairly impressive cases of high-level Republican appointees who have recanted earlier testimony after a few months of experience and paid tribute to the loyalty, devotion, and ability of the civil servants, but of course it is possible to discount these as men who have been captured by the bureaucracy and lost their clear view of things. Sticking close to the facts, it is incontestable that



some elements of the bureaucratic machine were of invaluable aid to the new administration as it examined the situation and sought to make policy changes effective. The high survival rate among the administrative assistant secretaries attests to their usefulness; the legislative programming work of the Budget Bureau comes immediately to mind; and how could economy--perhaps the primary Republican objective of 1953--have been put into effect without the budget officers in the Bureau and throughout the government.

Of course all this may prove nothing except that the bureaucracy is so monstrous that it cannot be manipulated without inside help. (The case of the personnel officer who had to be kept because he was the only one who knew how to fire others!) What about the more subtle aspects of responsibility? Did the bureaucracy really display enough flexibility that it could work, and work enthusiastically, for its new leaders? When the upper civil servants talked policy did they present alternatives and choices that were realistic and useful to the new administration, or were they hopelessly in the grip of the policy premises of the past? Here I am afraid each of us must find answers in terms of his own prejudices and experiences, because the facts just aren't in. Undoubtedly some civil servants held unduly rigid views, or even cherished exaggerated notions of their own competence to judge what was legal, desirable, and politically feasible, thus making them liabilities to new political superiors. But my impression is that the vast majority of the upper civil servants were far more responsive and open-minded than their new bosses realized, and that the induced bureaucratic instability delayed rather than hastened the achievement of the general objectives of the new administration.

#### The Future and Its Requirements

We probably have to assume that future transfers of the Presidency will be under conditions at least as delicate as those of 1952. The government will be no smaller, and perhaps a good deal larger. Our troops may not be actively engaged, but the ICBM's will be operational. The danger is not that we will be unable to respond to an all-out attack; for this situation the procedures are well established and even the most humiliated outgoing President or confused incoming one would know what to do. The danger is rather from events like the recent coup in Iraq, which take us by surprise and require decisions based upon complex political and military considerations that cannot be calculated in advance.



So far as pre-inaugural preparations are concerned, massive staff operations of the Commodore variety will probably be the rule from now on, and Eisenhower's example in making his cabinet announcements within a few days after election is a powerful precedent. With campaigning increasingly demanding and strenuous, it is bad news for candidates but undoubtedly true that a President-elect who starts his preparations on the morning after election is already far behind on his job. Months of pre-election staff work, on both policy and personnel, are required. The principal appointees should be announced and if possible ready to go to work immediately after election. This includes not only the cabinet members but the assistant secretaries and other members of the secretarial entourage. And to the extent that the recruiting itself does not produce experienced, compatible departmental teams, there should be enough policy conferences to produce, by inauguration day, policy guidelines that can be announced to the staff. By launching these activities in time and under his own control, the candidate can minimize his subsequent vulnerability to ill-considered advice and assistance from persons with special axes to grind. All this of course sounds a bit utopian. My essential point is that candidates and their managers must anticipate the requirements of the post-election period and seek ways of reconciling them with the urgent necessities of the campaign itself.

President Truman's example in 1952 should encourage subsequent outgoing Presidents to similar overt and systematic efforts in the interest of orderly transition. The fact that CIA briefings were extended to the Democratic presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 1956 indicates that at least one innovation of 1952 has become standard. The "budget observer" activity of Joseph Dodge, which itself had the precedent of some unpublicized but authorized scouting by the Dewey camp in 1948, seems to have been highly useful and is likely to be repeated. The apparently greater success of the Dodge operation than of Lodge's more diffuse assignment in defense, foreign affairs, etc., suggests the desirability of assigning observers to each of the principal agencies. (Of course, if entire departmental teams are appointed and on the job in Washington well before inauguration, as suggested above, these observer arrangements would not be necessary.) In view of the emphasis

the Eisenhower administration has placed upon the development of briefing techniques, we can probably assume that the transfer of information to the next administration will be handled more efficiently than the various "black book" operations of 1952.

The Truman-Eisenhower experience demonstrated that it is possible for men who have said some pretty bitter things in the heat of a campaign to meet as a public demonstration of underlying American unity. My own judgment is that enough precedents have been established to exert a powerful influence on succeeding Presidents and Presidents-elect. The public will expect them to meet, and they are likely to do so even though they find it highly distasteful, simply to establish the record and avoid the explanations that would be necessary, and the implications of disunity that would be drawn, if they failed to meet. Whether such meetings can be made to produce anything in the way of joint action or specific agreement on policy is another matter; we have already noted some of the obstacles. The sort of support Eisenhower gave to Truman on the Korean prisoners issue was at least a small beginning. But the assertion that until inauguration day the President has all the responsibility and the President-elect has none is too simple. It may be true in the sense the President must be prepared to make important decisions, and make them without his successor's concurrence or support if necessary. But in a broader sense they cannot avoid responsibility as joint caretakers of the national estate during this awkward interval because that is the reality of power distribution. Assuming that the necessary information is available to him, a President-elect who refuses to make his position known on a critical matter simply because he doesn't want to get involved with the outgoing administration, or because he has no legal authority until inauguration day, is somewhat irresponsible. And the same thing can be said of an outgoing President who seeks his successor's support on an all-or-nothing basis and is unwilling to admit the President-elect to the process of shaping the issues and laying out alternatives.

It would be pleasant to believe that the bureaucratic crisis of 1953 resulted from the unusual conditions of that time, such as the long absence of the Republicans from power and the coincidence of the loyalty issue, and will not be repeated when the next Democratic administration takes over. Schedule C, an institutional residue from the 1953 experience, should provide a helpful element of flexibility. Even if the Democrats should continue, as the Republicans have done, to staff Schedule C partly with civil servants, the knowledge that they can make changes if they choose to do so should avoid some of the feeling of frustration that gripped the Republicans.

Their jobs may not be in Schedule C, but a great many upper civil servants are extremely conscious of their vulnerability in the event of a change of administrations. Whether this has resulted in making them more responsive to political leadership or merely more cautious remains to be seen. If the federal government is to respond quickly, efficiently, and

responsibly to new leadership, maximum utilization of the knowledge and skill of the bureaucracy is required. Unfortunately the American political culture probably is still not prepared to accord the civil service the status implied by this concept of its function. It is doubtful that belated tributes from Republican leaders will help the civil servants much with the Democrats.

Another indirect product of the 1953 experience was the Second Hoover Commission's proposal for the establishment of a special category of senior civil servants of outstanding ability and warranted party neutrality who would have their rank and pay virtually guaranteed in exchange for an obligation to submit gracefully to reassignment at the pleasure of the President. If something of this kind can be brought into existence by the next transition, it should be very helpful in absorbing the sort of shock that created so much damage in 1953. The administration's recently established Career Executives Program is a tentative step in the right direction. Since this proposal has already been discussed on another panel by two of my senior colleagues, I shall not have the temerity to analyze it further.

Thus the capacity of the American government to respond promptly and responsibly to electoral decisions depends upon a composite of many things. Among them are the historical situation, the efforts of the outgoing administration to insure continuity, the adequacy of the preparation of the incoming regime, the performance of the bureaucracy, and the success of the President in bringing his supporters in the executive branch and Congress to the point of actual decisions. To a considerable extent, each President plays the leadership role as developed by his predecessors; he inherits both the institutional machinery and the expectations that he will do so. But there remains much latitude for the application of varying doctrines of the Presidency and for personal leadership styles that play a large part in shaping the product. As political scientists we can outline roughly the consequences of various leadership patterns; as political men we can make our personal choices.

In keeping with the tradition of the profession, let me close by proposing further research. Of the many things it would be useful to observe, record, and analyze "next time," I will suggest only a few:

1. Intensive observation, from a strategic spot, of the activities of the President-elect and his entourage in the pre-inaugural period. How does the President-elect perceive his leadership problem and determine his priorities? What are the pressures, and in what respects is he vulnerable? What sorts of staff work are helpful?
2. Analysis of the crisis in the new majority party, as it makes the turn from opposition to governing. At least two facets could be investigated:
  - a. Factional realignment and the turnover in party leadership posts, state and national, as the victorious candidate and his associates tighten their control of the party machinery.



b. The process of recruiting political appointees. In the scramble for position, who comes out on top, and how? Implications for presidential control of the party and of the administration?

3. The process of policy change. Careful case studies in various agencies of the roles of political leaders, the bureaucracy, Congress, pressure groups, and other groups influencing policy after party turnovers. Only by observations of this sort can we find satisfactory answers to such important questions as whether the bureaucracy is responsive or resistant, and whether the instability temporarily enhances the influence of pressure groups and strategically placed congressmen.

The research opportunities are vast. However, not all is unknown. Intensive historical investigation has recently validated Mr. Truman's contention that the President-elect rides with the President to the inaugural ceremony. Other recent findings have resulted in the formulation of Henry's Law of Transitions: Democratic administrations drop the White House Easter-Egg roll; new Republican administrations always resume it.

## Footnotes

1/ Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 31.

2/ Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and Bros., 1939), p. 89.

3/ Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 512-13.

4/ Truman, op. cit., p. 514.

5/ Ibid., pp. 518-20; Donovan, op. cit., p. 15.

6/ Donovan, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

7/ New York Times (Nov. 22, 1952).

8/ Nancy H. Hooker (ed.), The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 77.

9/ Truman, op. cit., p. 521.

10/ Donovan, op. cit., pp. 142 ff.

11/ Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of Administration," American Political Science Review, March 1954, pp. 131-151.

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## THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

When the turn of fate brings to a man the honor of speaking on this occasion, he is likely to review the remarks of his predecessors. Their practice, I find, has been, in the main, to address themselves to one or the other of two kinds of themes. They discourse either upon a substantive problem within their own specialty or upon a matter of common concern to us as members of the same profession. As our specialties have become more numerous, the second alternative seems to have been followed with greater frequency. My decision to consider in my remarks the state of our discipline has, therefore, the support of precedent if not the merit of prudence.

The burden of my argument may be stated briefly and bluntly. It is that the demands upon our profession have grown more rapidly than has the content of our discipline. We are, in a sense, the victims of our own success. The achievements of our profession arouse expectations that our discipline enables us to meet only imperfectly. If we are to narrow the gap between our knowledge and our responsibilities, we must devote greater resources in manpower and ingenuity to the systematic analysis of the phenomena of politics.

### I

The weight of the demands on our discipline may be sensed from a quick review of the growth of the activities of our profession. As each of us concentrates his energies upon his own narrow interests, we do not, I believe, commonly appreciate the range and extent of our concerns as a profession. An incidental but incontestable inference from a broad view of our profession must also be that its accomplishments, whatever our misgivings about them may be, have been impressive.

The development that has affected the majority of us most directly has been the growth in our teaching tasks. In but a short period as time goes we have assumed a principal role in undergraduate instruction in our colleges and universities. Each year the senior classes include around 6,000 young men and women whose major studies have been in political science.<sup>1</sup> How many tens of thousands of non-majors are enrolled in courses in political science only the registrars, and perhaps the textbook publishers, know.

The peculiar place of civic studies in American society assigns to us responsibilities that are not easily fulfilled. We are looked to for the training of community leaders, for the instilling of a sense of civic duty, and for the transmission of an understanding of the world of politics.

Perhaps we can take some credit for the sprinkling of the leadership echelons of American society with persons of high civic literacy. And perhaps we may also be held accountable for some of the less imposing aspects of American community leadership. I can only remark in passing that we know far too little about just what are the effects of our efforts in this area and that a critical examination of our program and performance in undergraduate teaching is in order.

The variety of demands imposed upon us in our teaching role makes plain enough the magnitude of our task in keeping our discipline abreast of the necessities. Our teaching obligations place upon us requirements far more trying than those that confront a relatively simple discipline, such as, for example, economics or nuclear physics. We must be prepared to expound the inner realities of governmental systems from India to Russia, to Latin America, to Australia. We must have sage observations to make on the relations among all the nations of the earth. We must be able to cope with the niceties of municipal administration and the profundities of the political philosophers. Our coverage must extend from the grand problems of the organization of authority in the national state to the factors affecting the vote of union members in Teokuk in 1958.

Although we tend to regard ours as primarily a teaching profession, in recent decades more and more of us have become public servants. Probably not more than two-thirds of the Ph. D.'s in political science are employed by colleges and universities.<sup>2</sup> Over one-half of the M. A.'s in our field are employed by governmental agencies. A substantial proportion of our number is thus now engaged in public administration. Others apply the materials of our discipline in staff roles for congressional committees and state legislatures. All this is in marked contrast with the rarity of public employment of political scientists only a few decades ago and is a measure of the enlarged role of our profession.

We contribute a steady flow of recruits to the public service. In other ways, too, the applications of political science in public policy and public administration have multiplied. Members of our profession have moved in considerable number into the staffs of research organizations concerned with national and international affairs, bureaus of municipal research, taxpayers associations, and other like private agencies.

The demands upon those of our number in these applied phases of political science are quite as diverse as are those that vex the teaching branch of the profession. Yet the applied political scientist must be possessed of an outlook, of skills, and perhaps of substantive knowledge not relevant, or at least not essential, in teaching. There can be no doubt that we have opportunities to develop our discipline better to meet these needs. Nevertheless, over the long run our impact upon public affairs has been far more powerful than we commonly realize. Many well settled governmental practices were but a few decades ago regarded as impractical schemes emanating from the ivory tower.

## II

These comments touch only the broadest aspects of the responsibilities in teaching and in application that have been assumed by our profession as it has grown in stature. They involve problems of the gravest import; and they involve matters of endless variety and puzzling intricacy.

The nature of our fulfillment of all these responsibilities rests upon the nature of our discipline. Ultimately the quality of our teaching, our efficacy as public servants, and the wisdom of our work as consultants and advisors in the applications of political science depend upon the quality of the content of our discipline. A bit of artistry and devotion is helpful in teaching; courage and a sturdy stomach fortify a public servant; and a modicum of cunning contributes to the making of an effective applied political scientist. Yet all these characteristics, useful as they may be, do not enable us to rise far above the body of knowledge with which we are equipped.

Our most urgent problem consists in the enlargement, improvement, and refinement of that body of knowledge. In that respect perhaps ours may be only the common lot of all branches of learning. Yet the primacy of politics in the determination of the conditions of life gives warrant for a critical rating of our needs. Advances in our discipline can be quickly converted into advances in all aspects of our work--teaching, administration, application.

Those who would blueprint a strategy for the acceleration of the development of any field of knowledge should proceed most tentatively. Perhaps we can have to some degree programs of planned invention, but in the main the enlargement of human understanding is a mysterious process that probably includes a large component of chance. The insights of an original mind may color an entire discipline for decades and scores of lesser men may preoccupy themselves in verification, refinement, and imitation. Or bits of inquiry by painstaking and plodding workers may gradually piece themselves together and at some stage cumulate into a broad advance on a wide front. Or a chain of inquiry started by a Frenchman, continued by a Briton, and picked up by an American may eventuate in a striking finding entirely unanticipated at the beginning of the sequence. Or a new concept, perhaps borrowed from another discipline, will permeate a field of learning and throw into new and illuminating perspective old ideas and old bodies of data. Or a new technique of observation may open up entirely new lines of inquiry and permit new approaches to old questions.

Given the erraticism and the variety in the processes of growth of human knowledge, we are justified in viewing with reserve those who contend that with their approach they command the only road to the advancement of human understanding. Nevertheless, it is perhaps feasible to indicate some broad directions in which the application of effort would most probably strengthen our discipline.



At times the specialties that make up our discipline seem to be flying apart, yet over the past few decades a major tendency has been an intellectual unification of all its elements. This unification has been no grand codification of our lore. Rather, common concepts and common outlooks have to a degree been adopted by all parts of the discipline. One of our colleagues has called this the "politicization" of the discipline.<sup>3</sup> In outlook the unification has been behavioral.<sup>4</sup> These tendencies toward unification facilitate communication among workers in all branches of the discipline, stimulate new interpretations of old data, and increase the chances of getting ahead by bringing, in effect, more manpower to bear on the same problem. On occasion even now an expert in municipal administration can learn something from a specialist in international relations and vice versa. The further identification and analysis of the common elements of all aspects of our discipline hold, I believe, opportunity for building a base for broad and perhaps rapid advance.

As most of the branches of our discipline come to be characterized by a focus on political behavior, instead of the unique qualities of constitutions, charters, or practices, it becomes embarrassingly apparent that we need to exert ourselves to move from the description of the particular toward the formulation of modest general propositions. Our work still bears the marks of its origins in history and in law, disciplines dedicated in peculiar degree to the analysis of the particular. Our journals are still in large measure filled with treatments of particular events, institutions, practices. Often these are well done, even ingeniously done, yet they add absolutely nothing new by way of general idea. They stand alone as isolated accounts of peculiar events or situations. They remain unconnected with what has been learned before; from their nature they will remain unconnected with what is learned later.

Lest I be misunderstood, I should say that to recognize our need for more work leading to modest general propositions is not to urge the construction of grand hypotheses to encompass all political action. Those who yearn for the psychic satisfactions of such systems underestimate the incorrigibility of the data with which we deal. In addition, I should explicitly observe that we shall always have to be concerned in great degree with the particular. The demands upon us, both in teaching and in application, tend to be for diagnosis and analysis of the unique rather than for discovery and exposition of the general rule. Nevertheless, without a body of general knowledge, one must grapple with the unique situation with no weapon better than his bare hands.

We probably have a larger body of general propositions in our literature than we assume. But much of this knowledge is inchoate, poorly articulated, rarely adequately tested. An incidental consequence of this state of affairs is that in its training each generation of our profession must almost recapitulate the history of the discipline. And another consequence for the advance of the discipline is that the form of our knowledge requires that we dedicate not inconsiderable effort to the rediscovery of what was in reality already known before.

I am well aware that in these remarks I have made some tacit assumptions about the nature of the political process at variance with the position that we are destined to ignorance of the ways of man. Our analytical schemes must, to be sure, make provision for the accidental, the erratic, the unique. And we must be forever alert to the possibility that the verified general proposition of one era may not hold at a later time. Political systems have a plasticity; they also have an inertia. We have demonstrated well enough that political knowledge that retains a validity even for a generation or so has great utility as mankind endeavors to elevate itself by its bootstraps.

These comments should not be regarded as a reiteration of the ancient complaint that we have too much "mere description." Perhaps the advance of knowledge in all fields is associated with the contrivance of ways and means to achieve more perfect description. We have, in fact, ample reason for dissatisfaction with our techniques of observation and description as well as with the tenuous relationship of descriptive work to theoretical endeavors.

It seems to be requiring an inordinate amount of time for us to develop techniques of observation supplementary to the skills in legal and documentary analysis which for so long sufficed to meet our needs. When we began to venture out of the libraries and to study political action at first hand we went equipped with nothing more than whatever common sense and native ingenuity we possessed. Those qualities are admirable, and always in short supply, but they are not enough.

Our colleagues in other social sciences, notably in sociology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology have far surpassed us in the contrivance of techniques of observation. Many of those techniques readily adapt themselves to problems traditionally the concern of political scientists. That adaptability has been turned to advantage by our colleagues in other fields as their interests have led them into the study of political behavior and institutions. The consequence has been that a goodly proportion of the significant advances of recent years in several of our specialties have been the contribution of men not professionally political scientists.

The survey research technique provides an example of a handy means for coping with questions about which we have been limited to excogitation for lack of a workable method of observation. Yet few indeed are the political scientists who have a command of survey technique. The problems of its adaptation to the study of political questions have by no means been completely solved, but political scientists are slow to exploit its present possibilities.<sup>2</sup> Consider, for example, what might be done with this instrument in that field to which we have most ready access but about which we probably know least, namely, local government and politics.

On the whole we close our minds to problems of method and technique. This permits us to take a smug attitude toward the absurdities occasionally committed in the name of method. It also assures that we rarely come to



grips with the fundamental question of how we go about pushing back the limits of our knowledge. Method without substance may be sterile, but substance without method is only fortuitously substantial. Technique and method in themselves perhaps may not generate many new ideas, but they are most handy for verification or, as occurs with melancholy frequency, disproof. And new techniques and methods often make it possible to raise new kinds of substantive questions.

Perhaps most of these worries about the state of our discipline relate in one way or another to the place of political theory in our studies. In an earlier day the place of political theory could be readily comprehended. It amounted to the history of political thought, an eminently respectable branch of intellectual history. It found an autonomous place in political science and could be pursued without influence upon, and without being influenced by, other branches of political science. The development of our discipline had merely brought into loose academic alliance various specialties.

As the segments of political science have come to be, if not cemented together, at least infused by common terminology and common concepts, the question comes to be asked what relevance has political theory for other branches of political science. Most current work in political theory is, I suppose, in the tradition of historical analysis. Our theorists, or so it seems to me, nowadays manifest a sharpened sophistication in their analysis and exegesis of the classics of political thought. Yet among our theorists there seems also to be developing a view that a radical reorientation of their focus of attention may be in order if they are to contribute to the growth of the discipline. They are bestirring themselves, but I must confess to some bewilderment as I attempt to discern where they are leading us. In my mellowed moods I lean to the forecast that the confusing cross currents in contemporary theory will turn out to have served usefully as probes in the process of trial and error by which we feel our way along the path ahead. The topic could be dismissed with that hopeful observation, but I shall comment on the odd relation that prevails between theoretical and empirical work, a matter that bears in a major way upon the advance of our discipline.

That relation tends to be one of antagonism, if not hostility, but its characteristic most significant for the present discussion is the supposition that theoretical and empirical work are separable. Extremely rare is the piece of work by a theoretician which seeks to indicate lines of potential convergence between theoretical and empirical inquiry.<sup>6</sup> And it is almost solely among the older, and perhaps wiser, theorists that one finds occasional reflective consideration of the problems of knitting together theoretical and empirical work.<sup>7</sup> More commonly a separateness prevails. The extreme doctrine seems to hold that theorists should work in isolation both from empirical inquiry and from the empirical world of politics.



The only reason for mentioning such disputation is that it points to some real problems--and opportunities--for the advance of our discipline. I doubt whether in its present stage of development our discipline contains adequate foundation for a genuinely fruitful division of labor between theoretical and empirical workers. (I am, of course, not using the term theory in the sense of history of political thought.) For the specialist in theory to be creative he must be able to work from a foundation of more or less established propositions from which extrapolations may be made by logical procedures. Such hypothetical extensions of old knowledge may then be subjected to empirical test. And the sequence may then recur as the cumulation of knowledge proceeds.

The present chaotic state of our knowledge hardly suffices to permit an operative separation into specialized hands of these two kinds of intellectual processes. Both kinds of work need to be carried on, if not simultaneously in the same mind, in the closest collaboration. And that collaboration rarely occurs. Most exceptional is the piece of theoretical writing that has the slightest use for the empirical worker, and the occurrence of reports of empirical work usable by the theorist may be equally infrequent.

I must take note of signs that forces are at work to close the gap between theoretical and empirical work, a tendency which, if carried far enough, would make the two indistinguishable and greatly expedite the development of our discipline. Our empirical work would become less irrelevant theoretically and our theoretical work less naive empirically. Such changes require time, but the opportunities for young men and women who wish to help bring them about are extraordinary.

While an impatience with the rate of development of our discipline is justified, I should say that I do not share the attitude of self-flagellation adopted by those of our colleagues who are overwhelmed by the massiveness of our collective ignorance. Our profession has built up a body of knowledge that is substantial indeed. That accomplishment we tend to forget as we are awed by the unsolved questions that confront us. One can also confidently assert that the quality of our research has mightily improved. To those who doubt this judgment I can only recommend a careful perusal of a few volumes of the American Political Science Review as it appeared around 1920. That is a trying but encouraging exercise.

### III

The quality of our work may have improved, but there can be no doubt that the development of our discipline lags behind our requirements. A basic limiting factor is the amount of manpower that we allocate to the business of research and inquiry. Precisely what that quantity is one cannot say, but it is plain enough that we devote the most meager resources to the tasks of political inquiry.

One clue to the productivity of the profession is provided by a check on the publications of those receiving Ph. D.'s in political science and international relations in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937. Of this sample:

At least one fourth have not been heard from since they received their Ph. D.'s; their theses were not published; nor have they helped to fatten the periodicals.

One sixth appeared in the periodicals at least once or twice over a twenty-year period.

About a third have published a book (in some cases the thesis) and in some instances in addition an article or more during the first couple of decades of their career.

About a fifth have produced at least two books, although this count includes theses, textbooks, collections of readings, and other items that would scarcely be regarded as books by a knowledgeable dean as he considered a proposal for promotion.<sup>8</sup>

I hasten to say that the moral of all this is not that every Ph. D. should be a prolific contributor to the literature of our discipline. The specialization of labor among us dictates that some of us do one kind of work and others another. The meaning of the data rather is that we allocate the most inadequate resources to the labor of inquiry essential to the development of our discipline. Inspection of the detailed bibliographies underlying my proportions can only yield the impression that extremely few of us manage to make significant contributions to the content of our discipline. From my examination of my sample, I would judge, by what seem to me to be latitudinarian standards, that not over 10 per cent had made significant contributions. I should say that I have far more confidence in the 10 per cent estimate than I would in an identification of the individuals making up the 10 per cent. Over the long pull a single article may turn out to be a more enduring addition to our knowledge than a shelf of books.

If my ratio based on a sample from the mid-thirties continues to prevail, we may forecast that of the 250 or so Ph. D.'s added to the supply this year, not more than 25 will during their careers make significant contributions to the substance of our discipline. I have the impression that the work of the new crop is distinctly superior to that of my sample from the mid-thirties; I am far less certain that any larger proportion will make durable additions to our knowledge. In fact, a sharp increase is occurring in the proportion of Ph. D.'s turned out by those institutions whose graduates had in my sample an especially low record of scholarly production.

## IV

The conventions that govern discourses of this sort dictate that diagnosis should be followed by recommendations for action. Such prescriptions should be rooted in extended deliberation, and I have meditated upon the problem at some length. About the only proposition on which I have formed an obstinate conviction is that there is not much to be gained by appointing a committee to look into the state of the discipline. Yet, if you concur in the view of the pivotal importance of elevating the quality of the content of our discipline, two areas offer obvious opportunity for exertions by each of us individually.

The first of these is in the area of graduate instruction. The quality, nature, and objectives of graduate instruction differ widely among the 40 or so institutions offering Ph. D. degrees in political science. Yet it does not require an extensive survey of their varying practices to know that probably no single department offers truly adequate training in the problems of research in our field. Some departments have, to be sure, attempted to bring their instruction abreast of the new possibilities. Nevertheless, we have some distance to go if we are to have graduate instruction suitable to produce a larger number of political scientists adequately equipped to advance the discipline. This appraisal conflicts, of course, with the occasional plea that is heard for training leading to a teaching degree. What we now have is in fact by and large a teaching degree. A critical need of our discipline is for more, and far more rigorous, research training. The graduate department that first manages to orient itself in this direction and to staff itself for that purpose will exert a pervasive influence on American political science.

A second area in which the exercise of individual initiative can contribute to the long-run advance of our discipline is that of recruitment of young men and women into our profession. Such vocational guidance--or proselyting--must, however, be discriminating as well as diligent. We need in some way or another to draw more recruits who will turn out to be genuinely creative scholars. The enlistment of even a score more such persons per year would mightily reinforce the propulsive power behind the growing edge of our discipline.

I do not underestimate the difficulties either in the early identification of such talent or in its attraction to our trade. The competition for talent among academic disciplines and among all professions is sharp and will become sharper. All branches of the academic profession are handicapped in this competition in ways too well known to require exposition here. Yet I am confident that we can in good faith more strongly advise many of the best of our students to follow a career of scholarship.

To many young men and women the academic profession offers opportunities, both economic and intellectual, that cannot be matched by alternative careers. No other profession has so nearly removed the economic bars to entrance for persons of exceptional talent. Moreover, I doubt that other lines of



endeavor are so well organized to expedite the advancement of exceptional talent as is the world of higher education. Let an instructor in the most remote college demonstrate sufficient quality to make himself even lightly visible, and dossiers on him will begin to build up in the files of recruiting officers from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Our own branch of the academic profession seems to me to hold special promise for young men with high potentials in research. Such persons can quickly make their mark, given the rapidity of the development of our discipline.

In short, our profession has a special attractiveness for the talent we need most, namely, those persons who can ultimately become contributors to the development of our discipline. We need to bring that attractiveness persuasively to the attention of young persons with curiosities about the nature of politics, with fortunate mixtures of methodicalness and imagination, with an impetuous drive disciplined by the persistence to pursue a problem to its end, and with the hope of youth tinged by a precocious maturity of judgment. As we succeed in attracting a bit more than our share of such talent, the intellectual development of our discipline will take care of itself.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The Office of Education reported for 1955-56, 5,670 bachelor's degrees in political science; 554, in international relations.--Earned Degrees Conferred by Higher Educational Institutions, 1955-56 (Circular No. 499), p. 19.

<sup>2</sup>One recent survey fixes this percentage at 76.7 with the warning that the respondents included a disproportionately high number of teachers.--Personnel Resources in the Social Sciences and Humanities (Department of Labor Bulletin No. 1169), pp. 95, 129.

<sup>3</sup>Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (Paris: UNESCO, 1956).

<sup>4</sup>The following characterization of our discipline could not have been made a few decades ago: "Allowing for local variants, political science in the United States today may be said to focus on political behavior in the widest sense of the term. And this is true in varying degree of all contemporary political scientists, whatever their own specialized field may be . . ."--Peter H. Odegard, "A New Look at Leviathan" in Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study of Man, edited by Lynn White, Jr. (New York: Harper, 1955).

<sup>5</sup>I have touched upon some of the problems of adaptation of such techniques to the traditional problems of politics in "Strategy in Research on Public Affairs," Items, 10 (1956), pp. 29-32.

<sup>6</sup>For one of the exceptions, see Oliver Garceau, "Research in the Political Process," American Political Science Review, 45 (1951), pp. 69-85.

<sup>7</sup>For two such considerations, see Frederick M. Watkins, "Political Theory as a Datum of Political Science," and Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Philosophy and the Science of Politics," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, edited by Roland Young (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958).

<sup>8</sup>The bibliographical check was of those listed (except Orientals) in Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities for 1934-35, 1935-36, and 1936-37, under the categories political science and international law and relations.

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

I propose to confine myself to political parties as they operate as majorities and minorities within the framework of political regimes typical of Western Europe. Democratic regimes know only one permanent majority-minority relation: the one between the majority power, which is the popular sovereign, and the minority powers par excellence, that is to say, those which act through the constituted organs of the state, parliament and executive. Contrasted with the popular sovereign, the groups that operate the executive branch and those that dominate parliament are themselves in a minority position. The control of the permanent minorities, which is the executive, by the popular majority makes such a situation tolerable. The political party, agent of liaison between the constituted organs of the state and the popular sovereign, tones down some of the inevitable consequences of the permanent majority-minority relationship, that between those who rule and those who are ruled. It can do so effectively, because in contrast to the unchangeable and permanent majority-minority relations between the sovereign people and all the constituted organs, the concept of a majority party or a minority party implies reversibility of majority and minority positions. As the agent that connects the popular sovereign with the sphere of governmental action the political party undergoes a change in this very process; it will never lose sight for very long of its birthright, its claim to conquest of full power, or at least participation in effective exercise of power. In the modern party, the democratic system has found the elixir, which -- concededly at high cost -- dissolves enmity and obstruction and generates and engineers maximum consent and satisfaction. But this elixir is made of the eternal hope, sanctioned by constitutional law and enforced by the climate of opinion, that today's party minority will be the majority tomorrow and establish itself at the seat of government.

The degree to which such a system proves workable depends largely on the nature of the political parties which are operating under it. The most important type, dominant by now in many countries, is the democratic mass party. It rests on a nucleus of professional political personnel and



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on a party membership of great variety in size and intensity of loyalty feelings. At the same time it entertains amical relations with and finds support among a variety of interest groups. Both form and intensity of relations with the latter groups, whether they are religious, middle class or entrepreneurial organizations, who are among the traditional backers of Christian type catch-all people's parties, or trade unions, as in the case of labor or socialist mass parties, are governed by limiting considerations. The parties need to appeal to as large as possible numbers of voters and the interest groups' similar need to avoid irreversible commitments antagonizing too deeply other and possibly momentarily more weighty political forces. Hence the marked watering down of purely ideological commitments. The stress now lies on the complex interplay of a multitude of groups which, as the 1957 draft program of the SPÖ, the Austrian Socialist Party, has it, may combine in a great variety of ways.<sup>(1)</sup> The style and modus operandi of the parties thus adapt to the new social economic and intellectual landscape of our period.

Social status and position in the production process may still be the most important single determinants around which the public's party preference is built,<sup>(2)</sup> but democratic mass parties need to aggregate as many interests as possible in their fight for majority status. Both the consequent need for as broad a social basis as possible and some regard by both adherents and voters for proclaimed party goals and featured personalities, have their effect on party patterns, outlook and clientele. They look the less "chemically pure," the more they are geared toward immediate political action rather than toward common recitation of belief systems.<sup>(3)</sup> Modern industrial society has contributed to break down barriers among various elements of the new employed middle class, the skilled workers, the middle ranks of the white collar, and the civil service ranks. Similarities of situation and expectations outweigh existing traditional distinctions, even though we are far from the unified middle class society stressed by some authors.<sup>(4)</sup> "Celebration of individual character and effort" says an industrial sociologist, "has in some measure been superseded by a belief in individual adaptation, just as the struggle for survival and the pursuit of self-interest has been superseded by the image of cooperative teamwork."<sup>(5)</sup> Essential goals for which the individual had been fighting in earlier times now are wrapped up in his standardized "existence package"; this includes softening of hardships from loss of employment,

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sickness, and old age.

At the same time that the condition of the new middle class becomes materially more comfortable, secure, and perhaps correspondingly, more boring, the cleavage that separates this new middle class from the more successful elements of the older independent middle classes -- the artisans and peasants of medium-size holdings, both with enough capital equipment to profit from technological progress -- is diminishing. The technological revolution is changing the outlook of these tradition-bound and conservative groups at the same time that it reduces their size. Increasingly enmeshed in the fortunes of the national economy, they now raise claims, identical with those of the new middle class, for guaranteed real-income levels and participation in social-insurance schemes. To this extent the struggle between the independent old middle class and the employed new middle class is more a struggle for larger shares of similar social welfare provisions than a clash of incompatible programs. The impact of this changed social structure permeates all political parties, whatever their official label.

The lower degree of social polarization is to be seen in other groups as well as among the middle classes. At the same time the parties often feel greater community of interest in resisting the invasion of alien political systems. The consequences are more rational party structures, less bound by ideology. This fact eases inter-party relations and increases the parties' potential to develop -- below a thin veneer of ideology -- many features of an interest market.

A look at the composition of the parliamentary groups of major mass democratic parties might exemplify the system of party-interest group interrelation and show how the parties are integrating a great variety of groups with at times parallel, at times contradictory claims on the state and how they equip themselves for the job of both representing and in this process mediating between group interests. Most available tabulations of occupational background and status data for parliamentarians are not conclusive, for they focus mostly on the past, which is an element -- but only one element -- in the analysis of the legislator's specific role after he enters parliament. It would be more practical to break down parliamentary



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personnel into three categories, with allowances for changing roles or cumulation of different roles even through one legislative term. The three categories I visualize would be:

(1) A small group of leading party men, a group identical in part with what the French call ministrables and in part with the parties' principal office-holders who initiate and, after proper consultation with competent party bodies and parliamentary groups, negotiate the outline of agreements of major issues of foreign policy and non-specialized areas of domestic affairs. Then,

(2) the much larger supporting cast of political professionals who acting as transmitting agents, i.e., party executives, propaganda experts, organizers, party men in government administration, etc., in brief, the large army of party officials or appointees on the national or, more often, the regional or local level in charge of a two-day communication system that puts the people in contact with political decisions.

(3) The large body of direct representatives of specific interests. A legislator in this group may have arrived there in any one of many different ways. He may have been active in both interest group and party organization, functioning as a natural liaison man; he may have come up from party ranks, taken charge, as a local government executive of a specific sector of public enterprise; or, he may be a farmer, an industrialist, an artisan, or self-employed professional and have been propelled, on the strength of business reputation or professional standing into a leading position with his farm, trade, or professional association, acting on its behalf within the associated party and representing it in governmental councils or parliamentary bodies. Or else he may be a technician (economist, lawyer, chemist, engineer, public relations counsel, etc.) on the staff of an interest group holding a parliamentary seat as part of his staff assignment.

Quantitative proportions do not really matter. Group influences are weighed, not counted.<sup>6</sup> Generally, a key



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committee assignment for one liaison man in parliament is more important to an interest group than votes cast on the floor by a whole bunch of backbenchers. And if there should be danger that the parliamentary process produce results detrimental to the interest group, it will rely on its normal access to key men of the administrative machine, or, if need be, party and government bosses, to have the right proportions restored. Often direct access to administrative personnel assigned to legislative groundwork will promise more substantial returns than proper proportional representation among parliament members.<sup>(7)</sup>

As for relative numerical weight among the legislators of career politicians as against representatives of specific group interests, the proportions will vary from party to party and from country to country, influenced by tradition, party mechanics, degree and character of interest organization and the vagaries of the election law. Men of specific group interests will be less numerous among parliamentarians representing a traditional party of organized labor with its solid but relatively homogeneous group (i.e., primarily labor men) connections and proven advantages of recruiting legislative personnel from the ranks of salaried or honorific party office holders and union leaders, than among middle-class parties of the "people's" party type. Among them recruitment from the top strata of voluntary organizations, professional and community groups outside the area of career politics has been part of the cultural tradition. Participation of interest group representatives will be heavy in a country like Western Germany where the party system is stable with few, rather well disciplined parties, and organized interests through well nigh a century have developed a closely-knit network of political connections.<sup>(8)</sup> The proportion will be much smaller in France<sup>(9)</sup> where the great number of parties, the organizational weakness of most parties, and their ideological orientation allow both parties and individual members to be put more easily under interest pressure emanating from outside parliament.

No matter through what channels the interest representative got into parliament, he usually is concerned with arrangements desirable to his group as a whole rather than with promoting individual business propositions. It is worth noting here that, not yet down to zero, the share of lawyers, who used to fill the ranks of parliament in former times, has been well on the decrease.<sup>(10)</sup> The lawyer still

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may perform his traditional part as a mediator of group interests -- especially in middle-class parties -- but if he were out to use his office to perform services for individual clients, which he is used to doing professionally, he would be jeopardizing rather than helping his career in European politics. (11)

In a way, the declining importance of the practicing lawyer in parliamentary life points to the changing role of the party, whose influence has come to rest on the interpenetration of political machines and group interests. If corruption be taken to mean conduct designed to influence public agencies in a sense deemed undesirable by the community, this certainly would include, and stigmatize, any use of political office for the furtherance of individual as against group interests. To be sure, there remains quite a sizeable marginal area. Influence peddling as a gainful pursuit of the individual politician is becoming less frequent; what is more important are the efforts by zealous party officials to wangle public funds for depleted party treasuries. (12)

The point is illustrated by a recent political skirmish in Austria. Since the war Austria has been ruled by a coalition of the Austrian People's Party and the Socialists (on which I am going to comment later on), sharing office and spoils but continuing to compete with each other in electoral terms. Recently the Vienna district chairman of the Austrian People's Party had made a deal, sealed in a formal contract (13) with Transfines, a private import-export firm, wherein he undertook to furnish for cash his party's business contacts; the size of his fee -- with which to pay off the debts of the party office -- was to depend on the success of transactions made possible through his efforts. The attitude the party took when the story broke was a bit ambiguous. A party honor court and the party's headquarters expressed disapproval but the influence-peddling party dignitary was not disqualified from holding party office, and the slate of candidates he headed obtained a thumping 95 percent of the delegates' votes at the next district convention of the party organization; two office holders who had been directly responsible for the deal were given other assignments. Party authorities were aware, and so stated officially (14) of the general public's sour reaction to the deal. And yet no remedy was suggested for the lack of funds in the party treasury, whose revenue from membership dues lagged sadly behind spending requirements.



The line separating acceptable political representation of group interests from illicit pressuring for individual claims is hardening. The party performs a legitimate and approved-of function when it brings major interest groups into harmony with the political community at large, and when it filters the groups' claims, checking and weighing them against others.<sup>15</sup> Before chaperoning this or that interest grouping for a rendezvous with public powers the party-commissioned duennas may see to it that the grouping's claims be aligned with more general policy requirements attributable to the common weal.

If all the individuals were well integrated into either parties or party-connected interest groups and if general standards of values were commonly accepted, the government formula would become a purely technical matter, a kind of applied statistics securing satisfactory consideration of all the group claims, with majorities and minorities changing places according to their ability and perspicacity in foreseeing, correlating and servicing the wants of their respective clienteles. But this, of course, is a far cry from reality. The individual is not always well integrated into his social or professional group -- his membership may be nominal or he may be in permanent revolt against his group's leadership, or, he may be a member of a variety of groups with conflicting party affinities.

The same process that has created a new middle class and lessened the distance between the old and new elements has everywhere uprooted diverse other social strata, and has so far failed to assign them a satisfactory position within the new society. The main victims of this process of transformation have been older people whose income has not kept pace with inflation, small peasant holders, small artisans and retailers without the capital to modernize their shops, and those white-collar elements economically outflanked by many groups of manual workers and unable to acquire a new feeling of "belonging" to compensate for the meagerness of their occupational existence.

These people may either remain isolated or belong to marginal, often fly-by-night protest groups which do not find a place in the universe of the accredited major interest groups. But all the same, whether remaining isolated individuals or becoming members of protest groups these people are entitled to vote. It may well be that the



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ubiquitous process of privatization, people's preoccupation with their own concerns and their lack of interest or ability to connect their own fate with that of the community at large is somewhat further advanced among such non-group-integrated voters than among other members of the community. Still, a look at the election participation in many a European country bears evidence that most such citizens must exercise their voting privileges, even though they may not meaningfully connect this form of civic exercise with the affairs of the polity at large<sup>(16)</sup> -- activity becoming another form of passivity<sup>(17)</sup>. Yet, whatever the meaning of this vote, it counts; parties will make efforts to play up to it, even if the difficulties to relate to the isolated individual are much more formidable than the job of coordinating group interests.

The political parties' potentialities for integrating into the political community those numerous elements which are neither absorbed nor absorbable by party or interest group connections must therefore derive from the basic features of democratic government: every party shall have the chance to be associated with government operations as the responsible majority or a minority called upon to watch and criticize and in this process impress the population at large with its capacity to act as the spokesman for the community rather than as a skillful exponent of specific group agenda.

Measured by classic standard of parliamentary rule, Western Europe's government formulae developed in the post-war period do not invariably show the simple contours of the traditional British government/opposition, majority/minority relationship. Frequent failure of general elections to return a clear-cut majority--not always determined by mere technicalities of the election system--certainly contributes to the deviation from the classical model; but it is not the only contributing factor. At closer view, parliamentary systems of the British type appear predicated on a combination of indispensable conditions, which have not always been met in continental experience. These requirements may be described as follows:

- (1) Wide area of agreement on basic features of domestic policy, or, at least, a considerable degree of mutual tolerance for policy changes, implying an understanding of the limits of permissible changes, essence of the "modern-Elizabethan compromise";

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(2) Reliance on the majority's willingness to keep the opposition -- or its titular leader -- informed of major foreign policy plans and take dissenting opinion under advisement;

(3) Unquestioning acceptance of policies and orders emanating from the parliamentary government by the bureaucratic hierarchy and the military, acceptance precluding political plots of the personnel of government agencies against the exponents of parliamentary rule, whatever their political complexion;

(4) General recognition of basic rules of conduct, under which the majority may be trusted not to use its hold on the governmental machinery unfairly so as to stay in power forever, and the minority may be expected not to turn its opposition into obstruction and sabotage.

In a parliamentary system most drastically deviating from the British model, no reciprocal loyalty will be taken for granted nor will one party give the other credit for sticking to the rules; distribution of power positions as between majority and minority will be negotiated in minute detail by advance agreement, and the utmost care will be taken to anticipate all possible change and build safeguards to prevent disruption of the negotiated balance. In its purest form this technique may be observed in Austria, where all cabinets since 1945 have originated in the continuing association of the two major parties, the Austrian People's Party, with presently 46 percent and the Socialists with 43 percent, respectively, of the popular vote.

Located at opposite poles of the parliamentary government scale, the British and the Austrian systems display one common characteristic. Under both, maximum consideration is given to points of view and interests represented by the party with the smaller share in parliament seats with the result that government policy is incessantly modified and adjusted to minimize operational frictions. This does not make the operation smooth, and a great deal of energy and labor goes into adjustment. But the machinery operates without major upset. The foundation in the British case is the self-enforceable usage, ensured by the governing majority's self-interest, which makes it look beyond the



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legislative term and adapt policy planning to such changes of political climate as may be inferred from content and vigor of minority criticism. By contrast, in the Austrian case nothing is entrusted to usage or precedent; nothing is left to chance; nor is any reliance placed in the rival's presumed self-interest or sense of fair play. From age-old mutual distrust, memories of an unhappy association in the 1920's, participation on opposite sides in the civil war of 1934, and enforced cooperation under the 1945-1955 occupation regime, Austria's feuding parties have evolved a contractual system of combined management, which rigidly restricts their freedom of action; no piece of major legislation may be introduced, no major administrative decision or appointment made by one partner without consent of the other. (18)

Whatever the difference in techniques, the relationship between the leading party in the elections and its chief rival has specific implications, not too dissimilar for both Britain and Austria. In countries in which general elections produce parliamentary one-party majorities -- as in Britain -- the majority party forms the cabinet and has the initiative in determining the share to be conceded to the minority's concepts and demands. In Austria, where -- barring electoral changes of landslide dimensions unknown in the history of either the first or the second Republic -- neither party has a majority in parliament, the outcome of the election does not deliver the government machinery to either the Austrian People's Party or the Socialists. But in giving the one party a plurality edge over the other, it determines their respective shares in governmental power. In proportion to the percentages of votes cast for either, the governmental status quo is immediately readjusted.

In the Austrian system, the minority's hope to acquire majority status has not been extinguished, but it has lost importance. Miniscule changes in electoral preferences instantly turn into gains or losses of individual positions and patronage. For the expectation of sudden and incisive change as a result of minor shifts in voting percentages (which indicated an odd trust in the miraculous mechanics of numbers) has been substituted the certainty that government action will be based on a weighted index of votes. The very terms, majority and minority, acquire a different meaning under the circumstances; here they merely denote quantitative positions under a cooperative program wherein elements of restricted and controlled competition have been assigned specific places. 19



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The classic majority-minority formula and the semi-permanent joint management of government affairs by strong partners jointly controlling an overwhelming majority in parliament show the wide range of variations in government formulae characteristic of different periods in individual countries. There is no need to dwell on transitional and anomalous subspecies such as minority cabinets tolerated by shifting heterogeneous majorities, caretaker cabinets made up of non-party officials, all-party coalitions in national emergencies, etc., all essentially stopgap arrangements, which have no bearing on the problem under discussion. There is no need either, to scrutinize in detail, the Swiss pattern; not a parliamentary government in the exact meaning of the term Switzerland's multiparty Federal Council comes as close to the Austrian model as frequent intercessions of referenda will permit.

When these atypical combinations are eliminated, four major types of continental European government patterns become discernible. They are:

- (1) The more or less classical majority-minority system, which has been operating with longer or shorter interruptions in Norway, Sweden, and Ireland.
- (2) Domination of the cabinet by one preponderant party, controlling over 40 percent of the popular vote with the assistance of minor groups which provide the wanting parliamentary votes or important regional strongholds. This system has been in operation in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 to the middle of the fifties and occasionally in Sweden, Belgium, and Ireland.
- (3) Multi-party coalitions of groups of unequal and varying strength, as in Holland, Finland, or -- a marginal case -- Denmark.
- (4) A special type of types 2 and 3 dominated by the persistence and strength of an opposition of principle, or several opposition parties of that nature. In Italy (a special case of type 2) and in France during the Fourth Republic (a special case of type 3), there is close cooperation of parties committed to parliamentary rule and, though not necessarily participating in the cabinet, determined to keep out of the government rival groups of questionable constitutional loyalty. I add that different

forms have occurred in the same country at different periods. And the first three categories are based on purely formal parliamentary and coalition mechanics without regard to the content of party politics, while the fourth category derives from this cleavage in fundamental political attitudes.

In terms of majority-minority relationships the system which is based on unequivocal electoral majorities brings about special frustrations when it perpetuates through decades, as it has in Norway and Sweden, the rule of one party again and again returned to office by the voters. Is the situation likely to be reversed? Controversial issues which may favor the opposition certainly have not vanished from the earth; the recent Swedish pension dispute had originally raised such hopes among the opposition parties. When no such issues arise, there is not much minority parties can do outside of hoping for an all-party coalition or relying on the majority's sense of fair play and the general levelling off of party differences in areas not calling for radical political decisions.

A multi-party coalition resulting from considerable proliferation of independent political groups has been a somewhat cumbersome but workable government device, if the participants, as in Denmark, Finland and the Low Countries, consist of interest and issue-oriented groups, partners in a broad national consensus. It has not worked well in major countries, as, e.g., Weimar Germany and France of the Fourth Republic. In both cases its partners were hemmed in by a sizeable opposition of principle, sometimes on both ends of the political spectrum, with which the moderate groups had to compete in electoral terms while bureaucracy and army increasingly preempted the governmental functions. Moreover, interparty relations became the province of the political specialist, but were a hopeless jungle for the average citizen. As he had not the remotest idea of the parties' capacity for solving concrete problems, the alienation of the non-committed voter increased to the breaking point.

Whatever the formula, there is common recognition of the legitimacy of any constitutional party's driving for access to governmental power. Even when interparty relations rest on a maximum of mutual trust, which certainly is not the general rule, as the considerable cleavage in Germany shows in contradistinction to Scandinavian harmony, no party enjoys



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being kept out of office for a lengthy period of time. A party which takes part in a major capacity in the exercise of power benefits by widening the scope of effective action and elevating its traditional program and the men who handle it to the level of national importance. While outside the government performing brokerage services for its group clientele, the party is in the position of a broker with but little margin to offer to competing clients. Once in power, it has a chance to arbitrate. This not only enhances its prestige with the interest clientele, but also provides an opportunity for autonomous action beyond the rival pressures of interest groups. A party in power may even have enough vision to make a success of its farthest reaching program, and embark upon the road toward the promised land of independent self-initiated policy which gives the erstwhile interest agency the appearance of a spiritual force shaping national destiny. It will impress many an uncommitted voter with the image of the party as a projection of widely approved national interests and national symbols. Such a party and its chief become -- as indeed happened in contemporary Germany with Adenauer and his party -- a household word in daily use; it is not in need of laborious identification as it partakes of this pseudo-familiarity which in mass society has come to substitute for the irretrievable loss of personal contact.

At least in the cases of clear majority-minority relation, the minority's hope of a reversal of roles keeps its meaning even if in a somewhat reduced form. It not only signifies the acceptance of the reshuffling of old and the coming into operation of new interest combinations. It also represents a the traditions, hopes, vistas and projects of a number of loyal adherents and of a nucleus of political cadres. But whatever its degree of devotion and loyalty, the minority's chance to dispossess the present majority, or -- as the case may be -- the present senior partner of the majority, lies in the weakening and disintegration of the majority. Strategy directed toward this goal is as much an integral part of the patterns of minority behavior as the previously discussed forms of political cooperation with the majority. If the hoped for split in majority ranks results from deep cleavages rather than from personal rivalries and incompatibilities, it might substantially affect the political situation. Every party in and out of government will concentrate its efforts at all times on causing dissensions and splits in the ranks of powerful rival groups. These splits may coincide and



merge with directed strategy for taking away from the latter specific groups of voters. Thus, the Social Democratic Party in Germany in the last half decade has tried in vain to entice the Catholic manual workers away from the reigning Christian Democratic Party. The Socialist Party of Belgium has long hoped to wean Catholic, chiefly Flemish workers away from the Catholic Party. But its chances have recently been set back enormously because its school policy, seeking a long-run majority by a change in the balance of the Catholic school-public school population, offended Catholic workers along with other sections of the Catholic population. Dissension within the ranks of the majority party and its general discredit with the voters at large, rather than the switch of loyalties of a specific social group, is the goal when the minority throws some divisive issue into the debate to prevent the majority from carrying through a controversial program; witness the present German debate on atomic armament. Usually party planning in and out of government pursues preservation of cohesion in the ranks (sometimes extending beyond a single party's confines to a coalition) and disruption in the enemy camp. Success of such policies, which depends as much on extraneous factors as on the intelligence, inventiveness and zeal of the majority, means the disappearance of old and the emergence of new majorities. It is disintegration of majorities rather than simple electoral defeats which alters the parliamentary and governmental landscape; the electoral results confirm the underlying process.

A radical, decisive change has been introduced into the majority-minority mechanism with the emergence of strong political groups not committed to the operational rules of parliamentary government. I am thinking of revolutionary movements and organizations which aim at a social and political order different from the established one but will not forego the use of the latter's institutions for the advancement of their cause. One aspect of the new phenomenon which puts democratic government in a dilemma is the revolutionary groups' willingness to use both legal and illegal means to undermine the foundations of the democratic order. To the revolutionists the issue is spurious. Revolutionary movements at all times are inclined to think of themselves as the custodians of true, genuine, superior legality threatened or violated by established authority, whose wielders they accuse of ruthlessly manhandling law and justice to stay in power. To have to judge the validity of this claim in a concrete situation is just one among many equivocations which democratic

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governments are confronted with when revolutionary groups begin to attract great numbers of voters in free elections.

Everybody knows how often the problem has come up in recent decades. It is perhaps less well remembered that a similar problem used to vex constitutional governments in Europe long before the rise of modern totalitarian movements. What to do about a strong revolutionary minority had become a pertinent issue by the end of the 19th century with the rapidly swelling tide of organized labor socialism. Not integrated with the established political system, the growing socialist parties insisted on the freedom to operate within its framework. In an essential point, however, things were different in those days as compared to more recent experience with Communist activity. True, socialists prior to World War I took a dim view of assuming governmental responsibilities along with parties of capitalist complexion and kept outside the governmental process. Yet, most of them consistently rejected the use of revolutionary means for attaining majority status as they firmly believed that the ballot -- unless interfered with -- would get them where they wanted to go. A political movement partly disinclined to cooperate and partly prevented from cooperation in the governmental process by those in power, but unshakably convinced that in the long run the very system of legality and free elections would make for its triumph, is certainly something basically different from present-day Communist parties to whom it is purely a matter of tactical expediency whether and when to use or not to use illegal means. Relying on the automatism of social and economic development in industrially advanced countries to turn the overwhelming majority of the voters into supporters of the socialist cause, the socialist parties of the pre-1918 era considered exclusion from governmental power a merely transitory stage; eventually they would be voted in by universal suffrage, and power would be theirs to use within a strictly democratic framework.

For the European Communist leadership of our day, however, seizure of power is only tangentially related to the prospect of a majority at the polls. What they primarily count on is a radical shift in the international power setup that would create a situation "objectively" insuring the resumption of the Communist march to power in Western Europe. That is to say, whether or not they stop being semi-permanently in the opposition of principle hinges on a complex of factors of



which the domestic situation is only one aspect, even though for tactical reasons the Communist party may constantly re-iterate its willingness to share in a normal majority government. So far the Communists have not envisaged giving up the isolated status of opposition of principle, to the point of participating in a constitutional government in any other manner than as a first step toward doing away with the established political system in its entirety.

Absence of "objective" impulses for assuming an advance finds its reflection in the general condition inside Western Europe's Communist camp. Regardless of differences in organizational structure, ideology and objectives as between the Communist organizations and other parties, the postwar vogue of depoliticalization and privatization has not spared the Communist rank-and-file. We might take Louis Aragon's verses as a base of comparison for the metamorphosis taking place in human beings as part of an all-embracing political experience.

Mon parti m'a rendu mes yeux et ma memoire,  
Mon parti m'a donne le sens de l'epoque,  
Mon parti, mon parti, merci pour tes leçons,  
Et depuis ce temps la, tout me vient en chanson,  
Le colere, l'amour, la joie et la souffrance.

The political reality of the 50's bears little similarity to this image.

The party is hard put to call on sympathizers for political demonstrations, even of minor import; whenever the party machine is out to enlarge its range of influence in an indirect way, it has to be extremely careful to select limited economic objectives susceptible of mass appeal; and it never gets to a point where non-Communist groups could be stretched toward a more permanent partnership. The party's semi-permanent minority position is determined not only by its reduced outside appeal, but also, and more so, by the passivity of its voters, which sets narrow limits to political action. The "Communist apparatus" may be assured of the following's support at election time, and to a lesser degree for some other narrowly circumscribed campaigns but the mass of the followers, will not, at the present juncture, respond to a more drastic call for action. This may not disturb the party's leaders; they may even find the condition satisfactory since it practically eliminates the great risk of spontaneous mass



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action. Spontaneous explosions certainly would not be welcome at a time when Western Europe's Communism is reduced to a standby job of a supporting cast, called upon not unlike the chorus of Greek antiquity, to induce in the public a state of receptivity, but not meant to take part in the performance. This about sums up the dynamics and potentialities inherent in the Communist parties' status as a semipermanent minority.

The Communists' chances of using their position within the limits of the parliamentary process as a substitute for, or perhaps, in support of mass action will depend on whether or not the other parties will be prepared to accept them as legitimate participants in the majority-minority interplay. This the latter so far have refused to do, even though they have not withheld from Communist legislators privileges guaranteed by the constitution. In France, this refusal on the one hand contributed toward freezing the Communists in the isolated position of a semipermanent minority, an opposition of principle, on the other hand it created the necessary minimum of cohesion to keep together or periodically to renew otherwise quite heterogeneous French governmental majorities.

Such has been, between 1947 and 1958, the development in France, and with certain modifications (due to the status of the Nenni Socialists and the commanding position of the Christian Democratic Party) in Italy. Parliamentary quarantining of Communist representatives was achieved by means of procedural devices. One of these procedural devices of special savor was that of not counting favorable Communist votes as part of a majority needed for government formation -- although a recent premier found it advisable to count the pro-Communist Progressives while virtuously excluding the Communist Party votes. Such devices on the parliamentary and electoral level were supplemented -- particularly in Italy -- by administrative devices of varying legal validity and political effectiveness; such as non-implementation of constitutional rules for the formation of regional governments, discrimination in administrative appointments and assignments, etc.<sup>(20)</sup> On the whole, Communists are granted the freedom of the market place. There is agreement between them and the government to the effect that exercise in the market place may be refreshing so long as the exit is guarded by carabinieri; disagreement is minor -- it merely refers to whose carabinieri should watch whom.

It might be interesting to speculate on why the Nazis' threat to the Weimar Republic, which was as deadly, if not

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more so, failed to produce a realignment of political forces and techniques similar to the one observed in recent years in France and Italy. Postwar lessening of social antagonisms, the presence of the external threat of the USSR, and the German lesson on what political disarray in the face of a common enemy can do to democratic institutions, may have contributed toward keeping the political machine in operation in defiance of a powerful opposition of principle.

The semipermanent minority status of the opposition of principle has grown out of a specific historical situation. It took shape at a time in 1947-48 when the repercussions from the National-Socialist and Fascist systems were still vividly felt, barring not only the alternative of a right-wing totalitarian mass movement as response to Communism, but equally putting temporary obstacles of psychological, legal and international nature into the way of any form of authoritarian government. The formula of mass democracy operating with a constitutionally admitted but administratively restricted opposition of principle seemed to offer some operative device. However it does not make for the most beneficent functioning of the democratic system. In distorting the distribution of proportional weight, it blunts the edge of the system. It sins, to save the system itself, against the system's cardinal rule, that the claims of all major groups shall be respected, either by way of the group's inclusion in the government or by means of giving the most careful consideration to demands and interests of groups not so included, which assume the natural function of opposition.

It is possible that substitute channels will open up, contributing toward redressing the faulty balance. For competitive or prestige reasons groups other than the Communists may take it upon themselves to act as the vicarious representatives of social interests previously represented by the opposition of principle.

Generally speaking vicarious representation is a haphazard device. Reduction in the relative weight of the one group subjected to political quarantine, automatically increases that of other groups; this falsifies the standards by which public power arbitrates party claims. Distortion of power proportion affects not only issues of mixed social and political nature, in regard to which the urge to compete for votes may mitigate effects of the vitiated balance. The



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preweighted scale will prove much more lopsided in issues of greater political importance. There is, e.g., little doubt but that curtailment of the party pool from which French government majorities may be chosen has delayed workable agreement on disengagement in North Africa, thus creating emergencies which threaten the whole system.

This is neither the time nor the place for predictions as to whether and under what conditions in countries like Italy and France the opposition of principle will ever change into collaboration on the terms of the parliamentary system. It must, however, be said that the Communist parties and, more so, the labor unions under their control are under pressure to take care of the day-to-day needs of their clientele; they are exposed in their own ranks to growing insistence on modes of action more consistent with the pattern of traditional labor parties. Therefore, outside the field of well-publicized propaganda, some mutual accommodation might take place between parliamentary parties and the opposition of principle be it in parliamentary commissions exercising as they do in Italy some measure of legislative prerogatives or be it on the local level.<sup>(20)</sup> This mitigates, but does not extinguish the consequences of the fact that for the time being, self-isolation preferred by the opposition of principle and the quarantine imposed on it by adverse political forces work hand in glove. Permanent exclusion from the government lets the revolutionary party stay virginal and avoids subjecting its doctrine to the challenge of political reality. But it poorly disguises the fact that the Communist machines' frantic efforts to arrest disaffection and win new recruits, neither serve immediate revolutionary action nor secure favorable government response to their followers' demands. Beyond possibly salvaging the parties' prestige, such efforts merely husband potential strength against the unforeseeable day for redeployment behind the shield of a propitious "objective situation."

This brings up once more a consideration of farther-reaching importance. I have pointed out the transitory relationship between majority and minority parties; in a mass democracy, which must satisfy a number of conflicting and a great many parallel claims, only a slender dividing line separates the majority from the minority. But, this does not in any way imply that mass democracy is doomed blindly to align itself with the lowest denominator and abandon the inseparably interlaced principles of majority rule and minority protection.



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Europe's lopsided political compromise of recent experience essentially was forged by two factors, viz., the levelling impact of technological revolution, and the shock of first, the fascist, and later, in a more enduring form the communist annihilation of democratic political life. But there are broad areas where neither factor has been able to transfigure large sections of the people and where status and class differentiations not only continue as the determining experiences but also have merged with new loyalties transcending national boundaries. There the majority principle in its unadulterated form has remained and must be upheld as the ultimate provider of democratic legitimacy; its enforcement alone can keep revolutionary minorities within the boundary of the legal order.

It is true that under such circumstances the majority principle is as arid in operation as it is unassailable in the realm of theory. It makes it possible to carry out a necessary holding operation which, however, becomes the more ambiguous the more it is met, if not paralyzed, by a kind of holding operation in reverse emanating, as in France and Italy from an opposition of principle. Of all varieties of modern mass democracy the one operating under the handicap of a sizeable opposition of principle is therefore the least safely anchored. It is deprived of democracy's major advantages, the close and constant interweaving between its basis of legality, the formal working of the majority system and its basis of legitimacy, the broad consensus of the citizenry. This type of mass democracy forms therefore -- witness Germany in the 30's and present-day France -- the point of departure for political venture in quite different directions.

FOOTNOTES

1. G.E. Lavau, "Definition d'un parti politique" in Esprit, Janvier, 1958, p. 4277, the point is made in some detail in Jeanne Hersch, Ideologies et Realites, Paris, Plon, 1956.

2. Cf. Hirsch-Weber/Schütz, Wähler und Gewählte, Vahlen/Berlin, 1957. Table 52, p. 249 and conclusions page 403. According to the remarkable analysis of voters' preferences during the January 1956 national assembly election in the first sector of the Seine department 7 out of 10 participating workers voted Communist: Jean Stoetzel et Pierre Hassner, "Resultats d'un sondage das le premier secteur de la Seine" in Les Elections du 2 Janvier 1956 ed. Duverger, Goguel, Touchard, Colin/Paris, 1957, at page 272, 274.

3. Das Neue Programm der SPO, Vienna, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1957, p. 11

4. S. Landshut, "Die Auflösung der Klassengesellschaft" in Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, vol. 7 (1956), p. 451; the same point is made in H. Schelsky's speech, "Haben wir heute noch eine Klassengesellschaft?" reprinted in Das Parlament, February 29, 1956.

5. Reinhard Bendix, Workd and Authority in Industry, New York, John Wiley, 1956, p. 339.

6. Failure to differentiate between major politically relevant pressure groups and their party connections on the one hand, and a great variety of minor groups and "causes" on the other, mars, e.g., the study by G.D. Stewart: British Pressure Groups, Oxford Univ. Press, 1958.

7. This point is brought out very well in: Henry Ehrmann; Organized Business in France, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1957, p. 258.

8. See the forthcoming study of Arkadius L. Gurland on the "Pattern of Interest Representation in German Postwar Parliaments."

9. Ehrmann, op.cit., pp. 242-256.

FOOTNOTES (continued)

10. In the century between 1848 and 1949 the number of practicing lawyers went down from 11.5% sitting in the Paulskirche to 6.3% in the first Bonn Bundestag, calculated after Karl Demeter, "Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Parlamentes seit 1848 im Spiegelbild des Strukturwandels des Volkes" in Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 3, 1952, pp. 1-29, und Otto Kirchheimer, "The Composition of the German Bundestag" in Western Political Quarterly, vol. 3, 1950, pp. 590-601. In order to understand these figures correctly it might be worth mentioning that in the 1848 assembly there were also 31.6% judges, while the total number of professional civil servants excluding political office holders in the first Bonn Bundestag was 3.6%. The total number of *hommes de loi* comprising lawyers and a much smaller number of magistrates and notaries in the French second chamber went down from 26.5% in 1910 to 12.7% in 1956: cf. Mattei Dogan, "Les candidates et les élus" in Les Elections..., p. 456, and the same author's "L'origine sociale du personnel parlementaire français" in Partis Politiques et Classes Sociales en France, ed. Duverger, Colin/Paris, 1955, p. 309.

11. In March 1958 the lawyer chairman of the Bundestag committee for restitution resigned from the committee chairmanship when it became known that he held power of attorney from the lawyers of a sizeable bloc of restitution claimants residing in foreign countries.

12. This statement is not intended to convey a judgment as to the political effect of increasingly strict normative limitation on the pursuit of self-interest; it may well be argued that transformation of an individual into a conscious group representative and bearer of a group mission diminishes chances of accommodation; perfect integration of the individual into the group may be reached at the expense of wider integration of the individual into the community. The point has been widely discussed in American and German sociological literature: cf., e.g., Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 1956, p. 115, et seq.

13. Published verbatim in Socialist Arbeiter Zeitung, Vienna, January 12, 1958, p. 1.



FOOTNOTES (continued)

14. According to Die Presse, January 11, 1958, p. 3, the party's national chairman Weinberger, Deputy Major of Vienna stated, e.g., after some discussion of the party's financial plight as the affair's background that the Vienna chairman's conduct was neither "popular nor likeable."

15. One of the most "perfect" examples of a party integrating interest groups is the Belgian Catholic PSC (Parti Social Chretien). This is the successor to the Catholic Party which was officially a Standespartei, a federation of Catholic farmer, labor, and middle class organizations, plus the aristocratic and bourgeois Catholic political clubs. The PSC now is a "unitary" party, of individual membership, in form, but in practice it still functions by intra-party deals at national and local levels among its constituent social groups. A. Simon, Le Parti Catholique Belge, Brussels, 1958. R. H. Hojer, Le Regime Parlementaire Belge, 1918-1940, Uppsala & Stockholm, 1946.

16. From the already quoted opinion poll taken after the 1956 French elections in a cross-section of Paris voting districts (14) it may be seen, e.g., that about one-half of the respondents did not relate their voting decisions to a current political controversy, or the concrete program offered by whatever party they chose. While party preferences appear interchangeable, the stated inclination of the choice indicated a vague expectation that the party or candidate selected would do a better job than those discarded in removing the cause of unspecified dissatisfaction. From what is known about the state of mind of the German voter it may be concluded that the major difference is in the psychological background of equally vague and undifferentiated motives oriented toward a model of stability rather than change. Jean Stoetzel et Pierre Hassner, Resultats d'un sondage dans..., pp. 233-235.

17. An interesting parallel of the voters' situation with the situation of the individual in our society may be drawn from Gunther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Beck, Munchen, 1956, p. 218.

18. Replying to criticism on the floor by two minor parties represented in Austria's parliament, the Socialist's Arbeiterzeitung, December 8, 1957, p. 2, recently observed that the two government parties, in permanent opposition to one another, were under reciprocal control as coalition partners. "With and against one another, cooperation and opposition -- such is the Austrian government formula," the Socialist daily added.

FOOTNOTES (continued)

19. The various types of "all parties governments" including the extension of the concept to the government formula of the Austrian provinces have been brought together in Axel Vulpus, Die Allparteienregierung, Frankfurt, Berlin, 1957.

20. For a criticism of these practices, cf. Piero Calamandrei, La Costituzione e le leggi per attuarla in Dieci Anni Dopo, 1945-1955 Editori Laterza Bari 1955, pp. 214-316 and Marino Bon Valsassina "Profilo dell opposizione anticonstituzionale nello stato contemporaneo" in Rivista Trimestale di diritto pubblico, vol. 7, 1957, pp. 531-623, esp. p. 578 ff.

21. Valsassina, op. cit., p. 595.

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Tentative and Confidential

FATHERS AND SONS

THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL BELIEF

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

The lives we lead are at the same time private and social; secret and public. Inadmissible impulses must be fought and conquered, not once but daily; the burdens of shame and guilt we acquire early may be the baggage of a lifetime journey. Men are hopeful without knowing why; despairing when the sources of despair are long since perished. The secret life is the cistern from which the public life, the persona, draws nourishment and inspiration. If we wish to understand the public political man we must know the private man as well.

Here we have gone back to one of the great shapers of the inner core of a man, his relations with his father. We have inquired how the development of these relations may, many years later, affect an adult's social outlook. Loosely speaking, there are three ways in which a father lays the foundations for his son's

political belief. He may do this through indoctrination, both overt and covert as a model for imitation so that the son picks up the loyalties, beliefs, and values of the old man. (2) He does it by placing the child in a social context, giving him an ethnicity, class position, and place or regional environment. And (3) he does it by his personal relations with his son, the way he molds the personality which must sustain and develop a social orientation. It is a combination of these which produces the "Mendelian law" of politics, the inheritance of political loyalties and beliefs, but while imitation and common social stakes will tend to enforce this law, the socialization process may work to repeal it. It is the socialization process, the way in which fathers and sons get along with each other, that we will examine in this paper.

For the sake of perspective let us glance at a number of possible models of the way fathers through their rearing practices may affect their sons' social outlook. The German model of the stern father who emphasizes the masculine "hardness" and "fitness" in the son, and monopolizes the opportunity for conversation at the dinner table is one that has been explored at length in the literature. The Japanese father, partially deified like his ancestors, with attention to

protocol and detail in the home, is another. The Russian father image: the gruff, indulgent, somewhat indisciplined but spontaneous and warm individual is yet a third. And, so it is said, the American father, more of a brother than a father, suffering with his son under the same female yoke, uninspired but certainly not frightening -- here is an image to compare with others and, as with the others, exaggerated like a caricature but, like a caricature, representing an identifiable likeness.

Let us explore the relation of father-son association with the help of data on the lives and politics of fifteen men interviewed at considerable length in a recent period. These men represent a random sample drawn from the voting list of 220 names living in a moderate income housing development in an Eastern industrial city. Out of fifteen asked, fifteen agreed to be interviewed, even though these interviews ranged from 10 to fifteen hours each, administered in from four to seven installments. The characteristics of the sample are as follows:

They are all men, white, married, fathers, urban Eastern.  
Their incomes range from \$2,400 to \$6,300.  
(with one exception: his income was about \$10,00 in 1957.)



Ten had working class occupations such as painter, plumber, policeman, railroad fireman, machine operator. Five had white collar operations such as salesman, bookkeeper, supply clerk. Their ages ranged from 25 to 54 -- most of them in their thirties. Twelve are Catholic, two are Protestant, one is Jewish. All are native-born; their nationality backgrounds are: six Italian, five Irish, one Polish, one Swedish, one Russian (Jewish), and one Yankee. All were employed at the time of the interviews. Their education is as follows: Three stopped after grammar school; eight had some high school; two finished high school; one had some college; one went to graduate school.

The interviews were taped, with the permission of the interviewees, and transcribed for analysis. There was an agenda of topics and questions but the interviews were conducted on a relatively unstructured basis with probes and follow-up questions in a conversational style. The topics included (1) current social questions such as foreign policy, unions, taxes, desegregation, (2) political parties, (3) political leaders and leadership, (4) social groups and group memberships, (5) ideological orientation on "democracy," "freedom," "equality," "government," (6) personal values and philosophies of life, (7) personality dimensions -- partially explored through standard tests, and (8) life histories including attitudes towards parents, brothers and sisters, school, etc.

In their relations with their children, both parents lay the foundations of a trust in human nature -- or a suspicion of mankind. They develop attitudes toward the nature of authority: is it arbitrary? does it yield to reason, wheedling, or to obstinate rebellion? The parents give the child a sense of his own importance -- or a lack of importance. They develop in the child attitudes toward the rewards of effort; they instill the controlling mechanisms known as conscience; they create an often inarticulate premise that the world is a warm and friendly place, or alternatively that it is a competitive jungle and God help the man who falls behind. We mention these things not because they are novel but because it is important to have them in mind when dealing with the complex problems of political socialization.

#### The Unfought War of Independence

The influence of the son's rebellious attitudes towards his father has often been said to be important in explaining radical movements, particularly the so-called youth movements. The son's basic position is one of growing from complete dependence to one of independence. During the later stages of this growth he and his father each must make a rather drastic adjustment in this changing relationship called forth by the

son's maturation. Under certain circumstances the son may rebel against the family and particularly against the father. Is this the typical American pattern? Erickson (Childhood and Society, 280-3.) says No. Unlike German youth American youth does not rebel, although willing and able to do so, because the paternal discipline is not something to rebel against.

We explored the question of rebellion, particularly in its political aspects with our fifteen men and found that there was indeed very little evidence of the kind of thing Erickson had in mind. There apparently was only rarely a family-shattering clash of wills when the son thought himself old enough to behave as a man. The father-son opposition took relatively minor forms: there was the question of what hour to come in at night, the use of the family car, and the son's continuation in school. On the political expression of such rebellious feelings there were strong indications that this was just outside the range of the men's world of experience.

To a question on youthful rebellion or radicalism, Rapuano, an auto parts supply man with a rather undisciplined tendency to vent his aggression on social targets (communists and doctors), responds in bewilderment



and finally denies any such tendency. O'Hara, an oiler in a large factory and one of the more class-conscious of the men in the group, is confused and takes the question to mean rebellion against his brothers and sisters. Woodside, a policeman who rejected his father with venom responds to an inquiry about his own youthful rebellion or radicalism, as follows:

I do remember through the depression that my folks mentioned that it seems as though more could have been done -- that the parties should have made more means of work so that the poverty wouldn't be existing so much around you -- and, not only around you -- but with you yourself.

He turns the question of his own rebellion and radicalism into a family matter: the family was more or less disgruntled. Only one man, better educated than others, speaks of his own moderate radicalism in a way which could be interpreted as a search for independence from or opposition to his parents.

There are a number of reasons why this political expression of youthful defiance failed to come off. One is the low salience of politics for the parents. Few of the men could remember many political discussions in the home and some were uncertain whether their parents were Democrats or Republicans. If the old

man cared so little about politics, there was little reason to challenge him in this area. Another reason, is that when there is a need to assert independence there are ways of doing it which come closer to the paternal (and generally American) value scheme. One of these is to quit school. Four or five men sought independence and the economic foundations for a life no longer dependent on paternal pleasure by quitting school just before they were ready to graduate. This struck more directly at the interests of the parents determined to see their children "get ahead in the world." Of course this had its compensations to parents in need of money, but there seems to have been a genuine conflict of wills in this area. Going to work, or volunteering for service in the army, is in some ways, the American youth's equivalent of the European youth of conservative parentage joining a socialist or fascist party.

We have said that one reason for the apolitical quality of this revolt is the low salience of politics in the American home and the opportunity for rebellion in other ways. A third reason may be the relatively low salience of father in the American scheme -- if such a hyperbolic expression be permitted. We asked our clients "who made the important decisions in your

parents' household?" One of them said they were jointly made, two of them said their Fathers made the important decisions; and the remainder said that their Mother was boss. Ruggiero, a maintenance engineer and supply man from a remarkably happy home typifies the most frequent point of view when he responds as follows:

"Which of your parents would you say was the boss in your family?"

I'd say my mother. My father was easy-going in the house... We found that mother ran the house exactly the way she wanted to. She took care of the money, too. Paid all the bills. She still does.

Now it may be that from a child's perspective it usually appears that Mother is boss; but the near unanimity here is remarkable, and the accompanying comments generally do not show an overlord in the background. Even in this immigrant and second generation population Mom had taken over. Why, then, rebel against Father?

There is a fourth reason for the generally low rate of political rebellion. In the American home a child is given considerable latitude. "Permissiveness" is the current phrase to express this idea and although the phrase and idea are in bad odor among some social critics, it is clear that the prevailing standards of child care even twenty years ago allowed the child a degree of freedom in school, neighborhood, and home not



generally prevalent in Europe or Asia. To a remarkable extent, the boy is on his own. This is Erickson's point, but we can illustrate it in detail. Farrel, a man from a working class background who went on to do graduate work, reports on his own tendency to political radicalism in his youth:

I think there must also be the adolescent revolt aspect, which was never acute with me, I don't think. There was, as far as I was concerned, no necessity for it to be acute. I didn't feel hemmed in by my parents.

Rapuno talks of his "reckless" youth in which he ran free with the other boys and others talk of their parents' preoccupation giving them opportunity to live a free life of their own. Many of the boys earned money for their own as well as their families' use by selling papers, working in grocery stores, or cleaning up the school. Nor was this freedom attributable to parents' indifference. When Rapuno was struck by a school teacher, his mother (note that it is his mother, not father) went to school to beat the teacher with a stick. A free child assured of supportive parental assistance when in need, does not need to rebel. But for an accurate picture we must also report that a minority of four or five suffered under controls which seem strict by most American standards.

Four Men Whose Fathers Failed Them

Although it is true that the symptoms of rebellion are rather slight and the political expression of even this rebellion is miniscule, it does not follow that the American son, particularly the son of immigrants, identifies with his father, introjects the paternal ideal, as the psychoanalysts might say, and accepts the male role as it has been played on the home stage. Rather it seems to be true that at least four of the sample of fifteen have experienced seriously damaged relations with their fathers and even in the roseate glow of remembered childhood do not like the old man. Interpretation here must be circumspect, since people are supposed to love their parents and even commanded to honor them. But during the interviews interstitial comments, the selection of incidents to report, the graphic silences, as well as the overt expressions of like and dislike present a clear picture of wholesome or damaged father relations. In these four cases of damaged relations we find two patterns. One is identification without affection, represented by only one case. The other, the "rejection pattern" is illustrated by three cases. In this section we will briefly picture the father-son relationships. In the following sections we will explore their political

expression.

Identification without Affection. We have said that the American youth typically does not invest much emotional energy in a father rebellion on the European scale, but, of course, it sometimes happens. We have in mind the German pattern where the youth identifies with his father, struggles for his approval, gradually asserts himself against him as though assaulting a fortress, departs and returns to be like him, another paternal fortress against his own son. Sullivan, a railroad fireman and former semi-professional boxer follows this tradition. Now, at age 25, he stresses his respect for his father, but in his report there is little affection. On the subject of discipline he says:

He was pretty strict -- very strict. He'd been brought up strict and, in an old Irish family there, and of course, all the way through school it was very strict /the father went to a Catholic seminary/. So he was pretty strict with me, more so than with the two girls.

When asked about his father's good points he responds in the same terms as though everything else were blotted out:

Well...(long pause)...his good points were that he knew when to be strict and when to be lenient.

Except on the question of sports (where the father gave instruction, but nothing is said of a good time) there is



little joy in this relationship.

Yet there is identification here. The son is like the father having adopted his own strict manner. Sullivan left his wife and children because his wife would not take his orders on the management of the house; he sees now how right it is to have the children give instant obedience. His rebellion -- and he did rebel -- is over:

Oh, I knew everything when I was 19. Nobody could tell me nothing. Boy oh boy I found out, though. That's one thing my father would always try and...teach me things, and offer advice and so on. But no, I wouldn't listen. He told me especially about discipline and orders and so on. I never used to like to take orders. I don't think I was in the service a month when I wrote and told him, "Boy, you were right. You said someday I'm going to say that -- and boy, you are." The service was a good thing for me.

Sullivan is a "hard" man to deal with, not mean, but there is a steely quality about him which reflects his experience in and exaltation of the Marine Corps as well as his father's values. He is the most doubtful of all the men interviewed on the utility of electoral procedures (sense of political efficacy) and he ranks high on the F scale. He is tense over sex matters, and scores high on a test of social anxiety. He is a "dominant" personality, but a complicated one. And his politics are cynical: we are not approaching a better world; politicians are corrupt; elected officials

do not listen to you; "a bunch of kids lost their lives for nothing" in Korea. (Yet he liked Truman, because he was a fighter, as well as MacArthur.) And he has the courage to say that American Communists are protected in their rights by the Constitution.

Rejection of the Father. Unlike Sullivan, Woodside, Dempsey, and De Angelo reject their fathers outright. There is no effort to cover over their feelings, to take back the criticism, undo the damage, unsay the words. Something within them is quite clear and solid on this and they are not shaken by fear or guilt at the thought of such rejection. Here is De Angelo, a factory machine operative, whose father and mother separated when he was one or two and who subsequently acquired a step-father. Of his father who lives in the same town, he says, laconically, "I don't bother with him." Of his step-father, he says:

He was a good guy when he was sober, but he was bad when he was drunk. I never had too much respect for him...When he was drunk he wanted to argue, you know. But my mother was bigger than him -- didn't have too much trouble taking care of him. After a while my mother left him, you know, and we were on our own.

De Angelo narrowly missed the reform school when he was in high school from which the principal ordered him to leave, possibly through a misunderstanding. Some maternally inspired gyroscope within him then kept him

on an even keel through a maze of adversity until he is today the father of six boys, a steady breadwinner, and union shop steward in the plant.

Woodside, a policeman with a conscience, remembers his childhood with horror because of the irresponsible drunken behavior of his father -- and particularly his father's "outside interests" -- namely women. He says, quite simply:

At one time I felt I'd hate my father -- that if anything ever happened to him it would be a wonderful thing.

But today he plays checkers with the pathetic old man and helps him when he's in trouble. He hated him in the past for the beatings he gave his mother, the humiliation he brought on the household, and the physical suffering to the children:

It's pretty gruesome thing to tell anybody that a father could neglect his kids so much. Believe me, a good many days I've seen where I had just water, and I was lucky to have water -- for a meal for the whole day.

Here is an anxious man, but a gentle man, a good father, a loving husband -- out of nowhere. Well, not exactly nowhere -- his mother was a tender and conscientious woman who was, as he says, both mother and father to him and to his sisters and half brothers.

Dempsey is an older man who married a widow when he himself was 40, prior to that living with his mother



and, until they were married, with his brothers. His reactions to his father are a little more veiled and he identifies somewhat more with him. He thinks of him as "a hard working man, the same as I am now, and couldn't get much further than I probably will...although my hopes are probably a little bit higher." But through the veil we see more granite than flesh and blood:

"Did your father have a sense of humor?"

Well, that I couldn't say. As I say, we were never too chummy with him. He never was a fellow to be chummy with us children... He was one of them guys -- it had to be it, or there was no way out of it.

There apparently were few family outings, little fun, and strict curfews. What things did Dompsey admire about his father?

Only that he was a hard worker, and gave us a chance to do -- to choose what we wanted to -- at the time (reference to choice of religion in which they chose Mother's religion.) Outside of that he was a very hard man. (And a few minutes later he repeats)...he was a hard -- a very hard and stern man.

#### The Politics of the De-Fathered

(a) Low information and social interest. The failure of the father does leave a mark, and the mark does show up in political expression. Let us consider first the question of political information, partly because it indicates the degree of interest in the social world outside oneself. Our measure of political information

is made up of questions on local, national, and international institutions and events. The local events, in particular are not the kind of things one learns in school, since they include such matters as "who is the local boss of New Haven" and "how would you go about getting a traffic light put on your corner?" It is therefore significant that these four men rank as the four lowest of the fifteen in terms of political information.

There are several reasons for this. The loss of a secure parental model made it necessary for each to devote a relatively greater amount of time in framing his own life style and in the lifelong business of self-discovery. He had to make the mold as well as cast the statue. He is his own pygmalion. Even more important is the failure to develop that personal sense of security, of being a loved and wanted and respected person, which is a bulwark against the many forces producing psychic conflict. That this was in fact the case in several instances seems borne out by the evidence of severe anxiety in all four cases. Dempsey and De Angelo rank among the four highest in the "neurotic anxiety" scale. Sullivan ranks the third highest in a social anxiety scale and shows evidence of the most sex-tension in the group as indicated on a scale to measure these aspects of

life (and his marriage is breaking up.) De Angelo is fourth on this sex-tension scale. Woodside, while less troubled by sexual problems and not "neurotically" anxious ties for first place on a scale of social anxiety. He is, by his own account and other evidence a worrier; he is a searcher for "security" in all its aspects; he has somatic troubles.

Anxiety can lead into politics as well as away from politics. People can defend themselves against anxiety by knowing more than others -- or people may succumb to the demands of anxiety by knowing less. Generally in the American apolitical culture the anxious man will not employ politics as a defense against his conflicts. One of the little appreciated benefits of an apolitical culture is the low premium on politics for the anxious and neurotic.

(b) Authoritarianism. Three of the four men are high on authoritarianism: De Angelo has the highest score in the group, and Sullivan and Woodside tie for 4th place. Only Dempsey is moderate in this area. The genesis of authoritarianism and its close connection with relations with the father is too well known to be explored further here. Suffice it to say that in order to believe that people can live and work as cooperative equals or at least as trusting partners, one must



have experienced such a relationship. In their relations with their fathers, these men had no such experience.

(c) Speak no evil of the political leader. There is a third area of political outlook which seems to be shared by these four men with damaged father relations, a quality which sets them apart from the others in some degree. Although political lore would have it otherwise, it is generally true that people prefer to speak well of political leaders than to speak ill of them. But the normal citizen can criticize such leaders, designate those disliked, and weigh the good and bad points of each on occasion. The four men with damaged father relations found such criticism or even objectivity more difficult than the others.

Sullivan admires Monroe, Lincoln, Truman, and Eisenhower. He defends Truman against those who feel his attack on the music critic was out of order. He defends Ike for the vacations he takes. When asked about political leaders he dislikes he says:

Well, from what I learned in history, Grant seemed to be pretty useless... (pause) He didn't seem to do too much. (mentions he was a drunkard.) And (pause) I mean I don't dislike him, either, but -- I don't dislike any of them.

"How about living leaders, or recent leaders, which of these would you say you had the least respect for?"

(pause) Well (long pause) None that I could think of.

Dempsey likes Washington and Lincoln; after a probe he likes Wilson and Truman and voted for Truman. Asked about "any particular feelings about Dewey" he says "No, I wouldn't say that." Roosevelt was "a very good man." Eisenhower is also a "very good man, doing everything he possibly can." He can think of no mistakes he has made.

De Angelo says he doesn't particularly admire any political leaders but "I like them. I mean I didn't think anything bad about them, y'know." Probed about an earlier reference to Robert Taft, he says:

Well, I mean, I thought for being President, I thought he'd be a little better in know-how and savvy than Eisenhower, y'know. I ain't got nothing against Eisenhower -- he's good, he seems to be honest enough, but I don't ...I don't ...I don't think he should have run again because I think his health is -- his health was good enough.

He has trouble expressing his reservations about Eisenhower even on the question of his health. In addition to Taft, he liked Kefauver (better than Stevenson), and when asked specifically, he says he liked Churchill, but that Mussolini "did some good over there (but) got a little bit too strong for his own good and

wound up more or less where he belonged." This is about as far as De Angelo will go, except to say later on that Truman should not have gone around offering "to punch a bunch of people in the nose." Asked specifically about people he dislikes, distrusts or thinks are weak or wrong for the job, he says "Well, I don't know, not off hand," and explains this on the grounds of his age (he is 33) which he believes gives him only a limited basis on which to judge political leaders.

Woodside's views are a little different. He likes Eisenhower but is more willing to discuss his weaknesses (particularly his signing an order to have a deserter shot). He likes MacArthur as a "big man" and mentions Lincoln favorably. Asked about his dislikes or those he thinks did a poor job, he mentions other people's criticisms of Roosevelt but then rushes to his defense, except to say that he thinks Eisenhower is "a little bit more mannish" than Roosevelt. He finds Mrs. Roosevelt distasteful but likes Mrs. Eisenhower because "she stays in the background pretty near all the time and she looks like a quiet woman but could be jolly to be at home with." The only political leader he mentions unfavorably is Adlai Stevenson who strikes him as a man that could say 'yes' when he meant 'no'; "he was a man that would follow the decision of his -- so to speak --



his people that were backing him up, just to get the position." He wasn't decisive or strong in the sense that Eisenhower has these qualities.

These remarks, with the possible exception of Woodside's remarks on Stevenson, convey three themes: (1) Conventional leaders like Washington, Lincoln, and Monroe are admired. (2) The independent leader who doesn't let outsiders tell him what to do is admired: Truman would stand for no nonsense (Sullivan), Stevenson is too much influenced by his advisors (Woodside). And especially (3) Authority figures are not to be criticised.

In their hesitancy to criticize political leaders these men are different from the others. For comparison we may note that O'Hara, a factory maintenance oiler, is outspoken in his partisan dislike of Eisenhower and Dewey. Costa, a factory machine operative and inspector, is strong in his dislike of Joseph McCarthy (one of two who disliked him), and Johnson, a plumber for a large factory, takes a "personal dislike" to Dewey. With reference to Dewey, our theory is reinforced by the fact that of nine spontaneous references to Dewey, eight were unfavorable. Sullivan alone liked him, and Dempsey, when asked, denies "any particular feelings" about him.

Why do these four men with difficult relations with their fathers find it so hard to criticize political leaders in a whole-hearted way? They are not men notably deficient in their general ability to criticize or express hostility. Let us, in the first instance distinguish between Sullivan and the others. Sullivan is guilty about his negative feelings toward the original political authority in the family. He cannot bring himself to express his hostility without quickly taking it back and saying something positive about him. For him it is clear that the expression of hostility to authority figures is painful and he simply avoids this pain.

The other three, in fact do express outright hostility or unrelieved criticism of their fathers. Why not also of political authority? There are three reasons. The first is that there is a carryover of fear from the childhood situation which has not been obliterated by the adult emancipation. Men do not easily forget those childhood moments of terror when the old man comes home drunk, orders the mother around, or gets out the strap to deal with the child in anger unalloyed with love. The second is the combined worship and envy of strength which father hatred develops in a child, for it is the strength of the old man in the household that

penetrates the childish consciousness. And the third is the persistent belief that it is useless and dangerous to counter authority, to rebel against it. Although De Angelo was a rebel in high school and was thrown out for his pains, and Woodside stood up to his father with a log threatening the old man behind the wood shed, the reasons they are successes now is in part because they have lived down such anti-authority impulses as threatened to bring them to disaster once before. Their consciences are composed of anti-rebellion controls; this is why they can be good citizens; they have the rebel in them well under control.

But at the same time that these are true, notice the distinct gradation in capacity to be critical of authority. Sullivan has none because of his guilt feelings; Dempsey, who veils his hostile feelings more carefully than Woodside and De Angelo is only slightly less reluctant to criticize. De Angelo permits some doubts about Truman and Mussolini, but these are relatively few and muted. Woodside treats his favored figures more dispassionately, permits some criticism of a defeated candidate, Stevenson, and is quite openly critical of the wife of a man he regards as a great leader, Mrs. Roosevelt.



(d) Utopia and conservatism. The basis for a hopeful view of the world lies in the self; the world is ambiguous on this point. In the self, the notion that we can develop toward a more perfect society -- although perhaps never to attain it -- is supported by the sense that people are kindly by nature and considerate one to another. Moreover, when the idea of a better society is developed even only a little, the mind quickly turns to the nature of authority in such a society. Is there a kind of authority which is strong and directive, yet at the same time solicitous of the weak and supportive of them in their infirmities, in short, paternal?

We asked our subjects about the nature of their vision of a more perfect society with results which must await exploration in detail at a further time. At the end of the discussion we inquired whether there was evidence that we were getting closer to such a society or was such evidence lacking. Although we did not ask if the world was not, perhaps, working in the other direction, some volunteered this answer. Our fifteen men answered these questions according to the following pattern:

	Damaged Father-Son Relations	Others
We are moving closer to ideal society	10	8

We are not moving closer to ideal society	3	2
(volunteered) We are moving away from ideal society	1	1

The relationship is a clear one. Woodside first touches on the drift from a peacetime society to a wartime society. Then taking only the peacetime society "like we're in peace now, the society is about the same as it has been back along...I would say that throughout history it has been about the same." Asked if people are happier now than they were a hundred years ago, he is reminded of the phrase "There's nothing like the good old days," and he digresses to say that people adjust so quickly to mechanical progress that their state of satisfaction and dissatisfaction remains about constant over time.

Dempsey, as always, is more laconic. Asked the same question about the progress of the world toward a better society, he says, "No. I don't think so. I think we're going to stay on the same lines we are on right now."

Sullivan says: "Never. We'll never get any place close to it, I think." He first modifies his answer by saying that "prejudice" may decline but is skeptical on this because "you can't change human nature."

De Angelo takes the dimmest view of all:

I don't think we'll ever get any closer  
/to a more perfect society/. We're  
getting farther and farther away from it,  
I guess. All indications are we're  
moving away from it. There's not enough  
people trying to make the world perfect.

Asked why we are moving away from it, he cites what he regards as the drift away from religion and the rise of communism, perhaps the two most conventionally convenient pegs on which to hang a deeply rooted pessimism regarding the social order in which one lives.

Contrast these views to the views of a sample of five selected because of their close identification and warm relations with their fathers. One says flatly "I don't think we're far from it." Another says that since the population is increasing we will have troubles but he is hopeful because the proportion of good people to bad is increasing, too. A third says that every mistake we make teaches us something, hence the world is getting better. A fourth says that we're getting closer to a socialist society which he thinks is probably a good thing although socialism is not an "ideal" society. And only one holds that such progress is unlikely. He attributes this to the increase in government controls but he adds, characteristically, "Maybe concurrently with such controls you're getting more of the things that most people seem to want made available to them."



Fathers and Sons -- and History

The state is "man writ large"; the family is a microcosm of society. The history of a nation may, in considerable measure, reflect the changes in the way child and parent, son and father struggle to find a way to get along with one another. We do not have here the data or the time to explore these connections in detail, but their nature may be suggested by three examples.

In the German rathskeller, the Parisian cafe, and coffee houses of Rome and Genoa, the young men talk of politics. The university students of Cairo, New Delhi and Peking have been in the forefront of revolutionary movements. But the American youth talk of movie stars, sports and romance. There are few rebels here; there are almost none eager to make a revolution; there are only a handful who ever become swept up into a social movement in such a way that they cannot extricate themselves when they are adults. This is important not merely because it deprives the nation of the dubious benefits of a youth movement. It is important in the universities where the problems and orientation of the faculty is often a reflection of student problems and interests. The lack of student political rebellion (nationalism, socialism, fascism) colors the world of

the academy and the thinking of those who shape the ideas of the educated world. American social science reflects this in its concentration upon the pragmatic problems of organizing a society and its relative ignorance of ideologies suitable for rebellion.

The immigrant votes as frequently as the established native citizen, but the second generation citizen does not. The torn and shattered fabric of a family in transition imposes its ravelled character upon the relations of father and son. These damaged father-son relations were in some sense responsible then for the long delay before the voices of Emma Lazarus' "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" could be heard in the politics of the nation.

It is often said that there is a strain of idealism in American international politics which distinguishes it from the hard boiled realism of the Continent. Wilson's Fourteen Points, Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, Truman's Point Four plan of aid to underdeveloped nations illustrate the character of this idealism, an idealism nourished by the idea that we can do away with war and hope for a new world order. Behind these beliefs and supporting them in their many expressions lies that quality of hope and trust which are forged in boyhood, when the son is apprenticed for a while to a protective and loving father.

Men mold institutions not only by writing laws or by taking sword in hand, but also by taking the hands of their sons.

### Summary

With a humility drawn from an understanding of the great variety of experience that goes into the making of political man, we suggest the following hypotheses.

1. Compared to other Western cultures, the American culture discourages youthful rebellion against the father. It further discourages political expression of whatever rebellious impulses are generated. This is because:

- a) There is less need to rebel in a permissive culture.
- b) Rebellious impulses are less likely to be expressed against the father because of his relatively less dominant position in the household.
- c) Because of the low salience of politics for the father, rebellion against him is less likely to be channeled into politics or political ideology.
- d) Because of the high salience for the father of his ambition for the son (and because of the independence it gives) rebellion against the father is more likely to be expressed by quitting school and going to work (or by delinquency).

2. Damaged father-son relations tend to produce low political information and political cathexis. This is because, inter alia:

- a) Without an adult model the youth must exercise relatively greater attention to the process of self-discovery and greater energy in managing his own life problems.
- b) The failure of the father relationship creates anxiety which is often (though not always) pre-occupying to the exclusion of more distant social problems.



3. Damaged father-son relations tend to develop an authoritarian orientation.

4. Damaged father-son relations tend to inhibit critical attitudes toward political leaders because:

- a) The damaged relations develop an enduring fear of expressing hostility toward authority figures.
- b) They develop a reverence for power as the value that prevails over other values.
- c) They develop in children the belief that it may be useless to rebel or petition authority; hence one must relax and accept it.

5. Damaged father-son relations discourage a hopeful view of the future of the social order because:

- a) The damaged relations develop a less favorable view of human nature.
- b) They create a skepticism about the possibility of kindly and supportive political authority.
- c) They encourage a cynical view of the political process: it is seen in terms of corrupt men seeking their own ends.

6. The history of a nation reflects the quality of the relationship between that nation's fathers and sons. This is illustrated in university life, electoral behavior of the sons of immigrants, and in the idealistic character of its foreign policy.

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THE SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY

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Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September  
4-6, 1958.



# The Social Requisites of Democracy\*

by Seymour Martin Lipset

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Political theorists have concerned themselves with the social correlates of democracy as well as those of other political systems, at least as early as the Greek philosophers. Two approaches to the question have differentiated themselves throughout history. One, which continues today as the main approach of political philosophy, seeks to define the nature of the "good society" and the social conditions are necessary for its operation. The other, which is currently known as the behavioral or sociological approach, starts from the question of what are the social requisites and consequences of given institutional patterns. Both approaches clearly have their functions, one is concerned with the (or sometimes depths) for men to reach, while the other seeks to trace through empirical relationships <sup>in order</sup> to facilitate action or elaborate and test social science theory.<sup>1</sup> The value-oriented theorist necessarily must learn from the behavioral analyst what is possible, while the more empirically oriented social scientist tends to choose his research problems as a consequence of his own values.

This paper is a sociological or behavioral analysis, asking what are the conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society. It seeks to deal with the question by presenting a number of hypotheses concerning the requisites for democracy, and by briefly discussing the types of data that are available to test these hypotheses.

\* This is an early draft of a paper to be presented at the 1958 meetings of the American Political Science Association. In view of its preliminary and rough state, the author requests that no citations from it be made.

This paper is being written as one aspect of a comparative analysis of political behavior in western democracies which is supported by grants from the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. Assistance from Robert Alford and Amitai Etzioni is gratefully acknowledged.

A different classification stressing variations in methods rather than concerns may be found in David Easton, "Traditional and Behavioral Research in American Political Science," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2, (1957) pp. 110-115.

In order to discuss democracy, it is first necessary to define it. Any such definition is more or less arbitrary, and necessarily reflects one's values. I do not suggest that the one used here is inherently superior to others.

Democracy (in a complex society) is a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among contenders for political office who represent alternative policies. As should be obvious, this definition is in large measure abstracted from those of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber.<sup>1</sup>

This definition implies a number of specific conditions: a) a "political formula"; a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions - parties, a free press, and so forth - which are legitimated (accepted as proper by all); b) one set of political leaders in office; and c) one or more sets of leaders, out of office, who act as a legitimate opposition attempting to gain office.

The need for these conditions is clear. First, if a political system is not characterized by a value system allowing the peaceful "play" of power, the adherence by the "outs" to decisions made by "ins" and the recognition by "ins" of the rights of the "outs" - there can be no stable democracy. This has been the problem faced by many Latin-American states. Second, if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of effective authority to one group, a party or stable coalition, then unstable and irresponsible government rather than democracy will result. This state of affairs existed in pre-Fascist Italy, and for much, though not all of the

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp. 232-202, esp. 239; Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946,) p. 226.

history of the Third and Fourth French Republics, which were characterized by weak coalition governments, often formed among parties which had major interest and value conflicts with each other. Third, if the conditions facilitating the perpetuation of an effective opposition do not exist, then the authority of officials will be maximized, and popular influence on policy will be at a minimum. This is the situation in all one party states, and by general agreement, at least in the West, these are dictatorships.

Two principal complex characteristics of social systems will be considered as they bear on the problem of stable democracy: economic development and legitimacy. These will be presented as structural characteristics of a society which sustain a democratic political system. After a discussion of the economic development complex (comprising industrialization, wealth, urbanization, and education) and its consequences for democracy, we shall move to two aspects of the problem of legitimacy. The relations between legitimacy <sup>the</sup> and effectiveness of the system <sup>the latter</sup> (primarily a function of economic development) will be followed by a discussion of the sources of cleavage in a society and the ways in which various resolutions of historically key issues result, either in disruptive forms of cleavage, or in cross-cutting affiliations which reduce conflict to a manageable level. Finally, the bearing of these various factors upon the future of democracy will be assessed.

No detailed examination of the political history of individual countries will be undertaken in accordance with the generic definition, since the relative degree of democracy in different countries is not the real problem of this paper. Certain problems of method in the handling of relationships between complex characteristics of total societies do merit brief discussion, however.

aspects of

An extremely high correlation between social structure, such as income,



education, religion, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, is not to be anticipated even on theoretical grounds, because to the extent that the political sub-system of the society operates autonomously, a particular political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form. Or, a political form may develop because of a syndrome of fairly unique historical factors, even though major social characteristics favor another form. Germany is an example of a nation in which the structural changes: growing industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education, all favored the establishment of a democratic system, but in which a series of adverse historical events prevented democracy from securing legitimacy in the eyes of many important segments of society, and thus weakened German democracy's ability to withstand crisis.

The high correlations which appear in the data to be presented between democracy and other institutional characteristics of societies must not be overly stressed, since unique events may account for either the persistence or the failure of democracy in any particular society. Max Weber argued strongly that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another. To illustrate his point, he used the analogy of a dice game in which each time the dice came up with a certain number they were loaded in the direction of coming up with that number again.<sup>1</sup> To Weber, an event predisposing a country toward democracy sets a process in motion which increases the likelihood that at the next critical point in the country's history democracy will win out again. This process can only have meaning if we assume that once established, a democratic political system "gathers some momentum", and creates some social supports (institutions) to ensure

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<sup>1</sup> Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949,) pp. 182-185; see also S. M. Lipset, "A Sociologist Looks at History," Pacific Sociological Review, 1 (Spring 1958), pp. 13-17.

its continued existence. Thus a "premature" democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or autonomous private associations. This paper is primarily concerned with explicating the social conditions which serve to support a democratic political system, such as education or legitimacy; it will not deal in detail with the kinds of internal mechanisms which serve to maintain democratic systems such as the specific rules of the political game.<sup>1</sup>

Comparative generalizations dealing with complex social systems must necessarily deal rather summarily with particular historical features of any one society within the scope of the investigation. In order to test these generalizations bearing on the differences between countries which rank high or low in possession of the attributes associated with democracy, it is necessary to establish some empirical measures of the type of political system. Individual deviations from a particular aspect of democracy are not too important, as long as the definitions unambiguously cover the great majority of nations which are located as democratic or undemocratic. The precise dividing line between "more democratic" and "less democratic" is also not a basic problem, since presumably democracy is not a quality of a social system which either does or does not exist, but is rather a complex of characteristics which may be ranked in many different ways. For this reason it was decided to dichotomize the countries under consideration, rather than to attempt to rank them from highest to lowest. Ranking individual countries from the most to the least democratic is much more difficult than splitting the countries into two classes, "more" or "less" democratic, although even here countries such as Mexico pose problems.

<sup>1</sup> See Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent, Michigan Governmental Studies, no. 32 (Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956.); and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (University of Chicago, 1956, ( esp. pp. 90-123 for recent systematic efforts to specify some of the internal mechanisms of democracy. See David Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, World Politics, 9 (1957) pp. 385-400; for discussion of problems of internal analysis of political systems.

Efforts to classify all countries raised a number of problems. Most countries which lack an enduring tradition of political democracy lie in the traditionally underdeveloped sections of the world. It may be possible that Max Weber was right when he suggested that modern democracy in its clearest forms can only occur under the unique conditions of capitalist industrialization.<sup>1</sup> Some of the complications introduced by the sharp variations in political practices in different parts of the earth can be reduced by dealing with differences among countries within political culture areas. The two best areas for such internal comparison are Latin America as one, and Europe and the English speaking countries as the other. More limited comparisons may be made among the Asian states, and among the Arab countries.

The main criteria used in this paper to locate European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, and the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic "rules of the game."<sup>2</sup> The somewhat less stringent criterion employed for Latin America is whether a given country has had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post World War I period. Where in Europe we look for stable democracies, in South America we look <sup>for</sup> countries which have not had fairly constant dictatorial rule/ See Table 1 No detailed analysis of the political history of either Europe or Latin America has been made with an eye toward more specific criteria of differentiation; at this point in the examination of the requisites of democracy, election results are sufficient to locate the European countries, and the judgments of experts and impressionistic assessments based on fairly well-known facts of political history will suffice

<sup>1</sup> See Max Weber, "Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland," Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 22 (1906) pp. 346 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The latter requirement means that no totalitarian movement, either Fascist or Communist received 20 per cent of the vote during this time. Actually all the European nations falling on the democratic side of the continuum had totalitarian movements which secured less than seven per cent of the vote.



TABLE I

Classification of European, English-speaking and Latin American  
Nations by Degree of Stable Democracy

European and English-speaking Nations		Latin American Nations	
Stable Democracies	Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships	Democracies and Un- stable Dictatorships	Stable Dictatorships
Australia	Austria	Argentina	Bolivia
Belgium	Bulgaria	Brazil	Cuba
Canada	Czechoslovakia	Chile	Dominican Republic
		Columbia	
Denmark	Finland	Costa Rica	Ecuador
Ireland	France	Mexico	El Salvador
Luxemburg	Germany (West)	Uruguay	Guatemala
Netherlands	Greece		Haiti
New Zealand	Hungary		Honduras
Norway	Iceland		Nicaragua
Sweden	Italy		Panama
Switzerland	Poland		Paraguay
United Kingdom	Portugal		Peru
United States	Romania		Venezuela
	Spain		
	Yugoslavia		

for Latin America.<sup>1</sup>

## II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popular based dictatorship.) And these two political forms can be given modern labels: tyranny's modern face is Communism or Peronism, Oligarchy appears today in the form of traditionalist dictatorships such as we find in parts of Latin-America, Thailand, Spain or Portugal.

As a means of concretely testing this hypothesis, various indices of

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The historian Arthur P. Whitaker, for example, has summarized the judgments of experts on Latin-America to be that "the countries which have approximated most closely to the democratic ideal have been.... Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay." See "The Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Historian's Point of View," American Political Science Review, 44 (1950), pp. 101-116. To this group we have added Mexico. Mexico has allowed freedom of the press, of assembly, and of organization to opposition parties, although there is good evidence that it does not allow them the opportunity to win elections since ballots are counted by the incumbents. The existence of opposition groups, contested elections, and adjustments among the various factions of the governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional does introduce a considerable element of popular influence in the system.

The interesting effort of Russell Fitzgibbon to secure a "statistical evaluation of Latin-American democracy" based on the opinion of various experts is not useful for the purposes of this paper. The judges were not only asked to rank countries as democratic on the basis of purely political criteria, but also considered the "standard of living" and "educational level." These latter factors may be conditions for democracy, but they are not an aspect of democracy as such.

See Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin-American Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, 9 (1956), pp. 607-619.

economic development: wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education have been defined, and averages (means) have been computed for the countries the Anglo-Saxon world and which have been classified as more or less democratic in Europe and Latin America.

In each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries, as the data presented in Table II indicates. If we had combined Latin America and Europe in one table, the differences would have been greater.

The main indices of wealth used are per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle and per physician, and the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons. The differences are striking on every score, as Table II indicates in detail. In the more democratic European countries, there are 17 persons per motor vehicle compared to 143 for the less democratic countries. In the less dictatorial Latin American countries there are 99 persons per motor vehicle, versus 274 for the more dictatorial nations.<sup>1</sup> Income differences for the groups are also sharp, dropping from an average per capita income of 695 dollars for the more democratic countries of Europe to 308 for the less democratic ones; the corresponding difference for Latin America is from 171 dollars to 119. The ranges are equally consistent, with the lowest per capita income in each group falling in the "Less democratic," category, and the highest in the "more democratic" one.

Industrialization (indices of wealth are clearly related to these, of course) is measured by the percentage of employed males in agriculture, and the per capita commercially produced "energy" being used in the country (measured in terms of tons of coal per person per year). Both of these indices

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<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered that these figures are means, compiled from census figures for the various countries. The data vary widely in accuracy, and there is no way of measuring the validity of compound calculated figures such as those presented here. The consistent direction of all these differences, and their large magnitude, is the main indication of validity.



TABLE II\*

A COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN, ENGLISH-SPEAKING AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, DICHOTOMIZED INTO TWO GROUPS, "MORE DEMOCRATIC" AND "LESS DEMOCRATIC", BY INDICES OF WEALTH, INDUSTRIALIZATION, EDUCATION, AND URBANIZATION<sup>1</sup>

## A. INDICES OF WEALTH

<u>MEANS</u>	<u>Per Capita Capita<sub>2</sub> Income</u>	<u>Thousands of Persons Per Doctor<sub>3</sub></u>	<u>Persons Per Motor Vehicle<sub>4</sub></u>
European and English-speaking Stable Democracies	695	.86	17
European and English-speaking Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships	308	1.4	143
Latin American Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships	171	2.1	99
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	119	4.4	274

RANGES

European Stable Democracies	420-1,453	.7-1.2	3--62
European Dictatorships	128--482	.6--4	10--538
Latin American Democracies	112--346	.8--3.3	31--174
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	40--331	1.0--10.8	38--428

(CONT'D)

\*

Notes 1 to 13 on page 8d.

(A. INDICES OF WEALTH - CONT'D)  
TABLE II

8b.

<u>MEANS</u>	<u>Telephones Per 1,000 Persons<sup>5</sup></u>	<u>Radios Per 1,000 Persons<sup>6</sup></u>	<u>Newspaper Copies Per 1,000 Persons<sup>7</sup></u>
European and English-speaking Stable Democracies	205	350	341
European and English-speaking Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships.	58	160	167
Latin American Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships	25	85	102
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	10	43	43
<u>RANGES</u>			
European Stable Democracies	43--400	160--995	242--570
European Dictatorships	7--196	42--307	46--390
Latin American Democracies	12--58	38--148	51--233
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	1--24	4--154	4--111

B. INDICES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

<u>MEANS</u>	<u>Percentage of Males in Agriculture<sup>8</sup></u>	<u>Per Capita Energy Consumed<sup>9</sup></u>
European Stable Democracies	21	3.6
European Dictatorships	41	2.4
Latin American Democracies Stable	52	.6
Latin American Dictatorships	67	.25
<u>RANGES</u>		
European Stable Democracies	6--46	1.4--7.8
European Dictatorships	16--60	.27--3.2
Latin American Democracies	30--63	.30--0.9
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	46--87	.02--1.27

TABLE II

## C. INDICES OF EDUCATION

<u>MEANS</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Literate</u> <sup>10</sup>
Stable European Democracies	96 +
European Dictatorships	85
Latin American Democracies	74
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	46

<u>RANGES</u>	
European Stable Democracies	95 - 100
European Dictatorships	55 - 98
Latin American Democracies	48 - 87
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	11 - 76

## D. INDICES OF URBANIZATION

<u>MEANS</u>	<u>Per Cent in</u> <u>Cities over</u> <u>20,000</u> <sup>11</sup>	<u>Per Cent in</u> <u>Cities over</u> <u>100,000</u> <sup>12</sup>	<u>Per Cent in</u> <u>Metropolitan</u> <u>Areas</u> <sup>13</sup>
European Stable Democracies	43	28	38
European Dictatorships	24	16	23
Latin American Democracies	28	22	26
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	17	12	15

<u>RANGES</u>			
European Stable Democracies	28--54	17--51	22--56
European Dictatorships	12--44	6--33	7--49
Latin American Democracies	11--48	13--37	17--44
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	5--36	4--22	7--26



NOTES :

1. A large part of this table has been compiled from data furnished by International Urban Research, University of California, Berkeley, California.
2. United Nations, Statistical Office, National and Per Capita Income in Seventy Countries, 1949, Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 1, New York, 1950, pp. 14-15.
3. United Nations, A Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation, 1957, Table 11, pp. 46-8.
4. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1956, Table 139, pp. 333-338.
5. Ibid., Table 149, p. 387.
6. Ibid., Table 189, p. 641. The population bases for these figures are for different years than those reporting the numbers of telephones and radios, but for purposes of group comparisons, the differences are not important.
7. United Nations, A Preliminary Report. . . . op cit., Appendix B, pp. 86-89.
8. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1956, Table 12, pp. 350-370.
9. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1956, op.cit., Table 127, pp. 308-310. Figures refer to commercially produced energy, in equivalent numbers of metric tons of coal.
10. United Nations, A Preliminary Report. . . . op. cit., Appendix A, pp. 79-86. A number of countries are listed as more than 95 per cent literate.
11. International Urban Research, University of California, Berkeley, California.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

show equally consistent results. The average percentage of employed males working in agriculture and related occupations was 21 in the "more democratic" European countries, and 41 in the "less democratic", 52 in the "less dictatorial" Latin American countries, and 67 in the "more dictatorial". The differences in per capita energy employed in the country are equally large.

The degree of urbanization is also related to the existence of democracy.<sup>1</sup> Three different indices of urbanization are available from data compiled by International Urban Research, (Berkeley, California), the percentage of the population in places over 20,000 and over, the percentage in communities of 100,000 and over, and also the percentage residing in standard metropolitan areas. On all three of these indices of urbanization, the more democratic countries score higher than the less democratic, for both of the political culture areas under investigation.

Many have suggested that the better educated the population of a country, the better the chances for democracy, and data on literacy rates support this proposition. The "more democratic" countries of Europe are almost entirely literate: the lowest has a rate of 96 per cent, while the "less democratic" nations have an average rate of literacy of 85 per cent. In Latin America, the difference is between an average rate of 74 per cent for the "less dictatorial" countries and 46 per cent for the "more

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<sup>1</sup> Urbanization has often been linked to democracy by political theorists. Harold J. Laski asserted that "organized democracy is the product of urban life", and that it was natural therefore that it should have "made its first effective appearance" in the Greek city states, limited as was their definition of "citizen." See his article "Democracy" in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York, Macmillan, 1937,) Volume V, pp. 76-85. Max Weber held that the city, as a certain type of political community, is a peculiarly Western phenomenon, and traced the emergence of the notion of "citizenship" from social developments closely related to urbanization. For a partial statement of his point of view, see the chapter on "Citizenship", in General Economic History, (Glencoe, Free Press, 1950,) pp. 315-338.

dictatorial."<sup>1</sup>

The relationship between education and democracy is worth more extensive treatment since an entire philosophy of democratic government has seen in increased education the spread of the basic requirement of democracy.<sup>2</sup> As Bryce wrote with special reference to Latin America, "education, if it does not make men good citizens, makes it at least easier for them to become so."<sup>3</sup> Education presumably broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices.

The evidence bearing on the contribution of education to democracy is even more direct and strong on the level of individual behavior within countries, than it is on the level of cross-national correlations. Data gathered by public opinion research <sup>agencies</sup> which have questioned people in different countries with regard to their belief in various democratic norms of tolerance for opposition, to their attitudes toward ethnic or racial minorities, and with regard to their belief in multi-party as against one party systems have found that the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from others has been

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<sup>1</sup>The pattern indicated by a comparisons of the averages for each group of countries is sustained by the ranges (the high and low extremes) for each index. Most of the ranges overlap, that is, some countries which are in the low category with regard to politics are higher on any given index than some which are high on the scale of democracy. It is noteworthy that in both Europe and Latin America, the nations which are lowest on any of the indices presented in the table are also in the "less democratic" category. Conversely, all countries which rank at the top on any of the indices are in the "more democratic" class.

<sup>2</sup>See John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, Macmillan, 1916.)

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in Arthur P. Whitaker, op cit., p. 112; see also Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1950.)



education. The higher one's education, the more likely is one to believe<sup>1</sup> in democratic values and support democratic practices. All the relevant studies indicate that education is far more significant than income or occupation.

These findings should lead us to anticipate a far higher correlation between national levels of education and political practice than we in fact do find. Germany, and France have been among the best educated nations of Europe, but this fact by itself clearly did not stabilize their democracies. It may be, however, that education has served to inhibit other anti-democratic forces. Post-Nazi data from Germany indicates clearly, that higher education is linked to rejection of strong man and one party government.<sup>2</sup>

If we cannot say that a "high" level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world. Thus if we turn to Latin America, where widespread illiteracy still exists in many countries, we find that of all the nations in which more than half the population is illiterate, only one, Brazil, can be included in the "core Democratic" group.

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See C. H. Smith "Liberalism & Level of Infy", Journal of Educational Psychology, 39 (1948) 65-82; Trow, H.A. It Wins Radicalism & Political Intolerance, Ph.D. thesis, 1957, p. 17; Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity & Civil Liberties, (New York, Doubleday, 1955) pp. 138-9, and K. Kido & M. Suyi "Report on Social Stratification & Mobility in Tokyo" (III) the Structure of Social Consciousness" Japanese Sociological Review, January 1954, pp. 74-100.

<sup>2</sup>Dewey has suggested that the character of the educational system will influence its effect on democracy, and this may shed some light on the sources of instability in Germany. The purpose of German education, according to Dewey, writing in 1916, was "disciplinary training rather than of personal development." The main aim was to produce "absorption of the aims and meaning of existing institutions", and "thoroughgoing subordination" to them. This point raises issues which cannot be entered into here, but indicates the complex character of the relationship between democracy and closely related factors, such as education. See Dewey, Democracy and Education, op. cit., pp. 118-120.

There is some evidence<sup>from</sup> other economically impoverished culture areas that literacy is related to democracy. The one member of the Arab League which has maintained democratic institutions since World War II, Lebanon, is by far the best educated (over 80 per cent literacy) of the Arab countries. In the rest of Asia east of Arab world, only two states, the Philippines and Japan, have maintained democratic regimes without the presence of large anti-democratic parties since 1945. And these two countries, although lower than any European state in per capita income, are among the world's leaders in educational attainment. The Philippines actually ranks second to the United States in proportion of people attending high school and university, while Japan has a higher level of educational attainment than any European state.<sup>1</sup>

Although the various indices have been presented separately, it seems clear that the factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education, are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor.<sup>2</sup> And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of democracy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ceylon which shares the distinction with the Philippines and Japan of being the only democratic countries in South and Far East Asia in which the Communists are unimportant electorally also shares with them the distinction of being the only countries in this area in which a majority of the population is literate. It should be noted, however, that Ceylon does have a fairly large Trotskyist party, now the official opposition, and while educational level is high for Asia, it is much lower than either Japan or the Philippines.

<sup>2</sup> A factor analysis carried by Leo Schnore based on data from 75 countries demonstrates this. (to be published.)

<sup>3</sup> This statement is a "statistical" statement, which necessarily means that there will be many exceptions to the correlation. Thus we know that poorer people are more likely to vote for the Democratic or Labor parties in the U.S. and England. The fact that a large minority of the lower strata vote for the more conservative party in these countries does not challenge the proposition that stratification position is the main determinant of party choice. (Given the multi-variate causal process involved in the behavior of people or nations). Clearly social science will never be able to account for (predict) all behavior.

A number of processes underlie these correlations in addition to the already discussed effect of a high level of education and literacy in creating or sustaining belief in democratic norms. Perhaps most important is the relationship between modernization and the form of the "class struggle". On the level of the lower strata, economic development, which means increased income, greater economic security, and higher education, permit those in this status to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics. A belief in secular reformist gradualism can only be the ideology of a relatively well-to-do lower class.<sup>1</sup> Increased wealth and education also serve democracy by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremist ones. The operation of this process will be discussed in more detail in the second part of the paper, but essentially it functions through enlarging their involvement in an integrated national culture as distinct from an isolated lower class one, and hence increasing their exposure to middle class values. Marx suggested that the proletariat were a revolutionary force because they have nothing to lose but their chains and can win the whole world. But Tocqueville in analyzing the reasons why the lower strata in America supported the system paraphrased and transposed Marx before Marx ever made this analysis by pointing out that "only those who have nothing to lose ever revolt."<sup>2</sup>

Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy by changing the social conditions of the workers, but it also affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape

<sup>1</sup> See S. M. Lipset, "Socialism - East and West - Left and Right," Confluence, Summer 1958.

<sup>2</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Vintage edition, 1945,) p. 253.



of the stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower class base, to a diamond with a growing middle-class. A large middle-class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups.

National income is also related to the political values and style of the upper class. The poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale of human society, as vulgar, as innately inferior, as a lower caste. The sharp difference in the style of living between those at the top and those at the bottom makes this psychologically necessary. Consequently, the upper strata also tend to regard political rights for the lower strata, particularly the right to share in power, as essentially absurd and immoral. The upper strata not only resist democracy themselves, but their <sup>often arrogant political</sup> behavior serves to intensify extremist reactions on the part of the lower classes.

The general income level of a nation will also affect its receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms. The value that it does not matter greatly which side rules the country, that error can be tolerated even in the governing party can best develop where a) the government has little power to affect the crucial life chances of most powerful groups, or b) there is enough wealth in the country so that it actually does not make too much difference if some redistribution does take place. If loss of office is seen as meaning serious loss for major power groups, then they will seek to remain or secure office by any means available. The wealth level will also affect the extent to which given countries can develop "universalistic" norms along its civil servants and politicians (selection based on competence; performance without favoritism). The poorer the country, the greater the emphasis which is placed on nepotism,

support of kin and friends. The weakness of the universalistic norms reduces the opportunity to develop efficient bureaucracy, a condition for a modern democratic state.<sup>1</sup>

Less directly linked but seemingly still associated with greater wealth is the presence of intermediary organizations and institutions which can act as sources of counter-vailing power, and recruiters of participants in the political process in the manner discussed by Tocqueville and other exponents of what has come to<sup>be</sup> known as the theory of the "mass society."<sup>2</sup> They have argued that a society without a multitude of organizations relatively independent of the central state power has a high dictatorial as well as revolutionary potential. Such organizations serve a number of functions necessary to democracy: they are a source of countervailing power, inhibiting the state or a single major source of private power from dominating all political resources, they are a source of new opinions, they can be the means of communicating ideas, particularly opposition ideas, to a large section of the citizenry, they serve to train men in the skills of politics, and they help increase the level of interest and participation in politics. Although there are no reliable data which bear on the relationship between national patterns of voluntary organizations and national political systems, evidence from studies of individual behavior within a number of different countries demonstrate that, independently of other factors, men who belong to associations are more likely to hold democratic opinions on questions concerning tolerance and party systems, and are more likely to participate in the political process: to be active or to vote.

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of this problem in a new state, see David Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition, (Princeton University Press, 1955,) esp. chapters 7 and 8. Apter shows the importance of efficient bureaucracy, and the acceptance of bureaucratic values and behavior patterns for the existence of a democratic political order.

<sup>2</sup> See Emil Lederer, The State of the Masses, New York, Norton, 1940; Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1950; Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason New York, Oxford University Press, 1947; Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1940; Philip H. Frank, (cont'd next page)

Since we also know that within countries the more well-to-do and the better educated one is the more likely he is to belong to voluntary organizations, it seems likely that the propensity to form such groups is a function of level of income and opportunities for leisure within given nations.<sup>1</sup>

It is obvious that democracy and the conditions related to stable democracy discussed here are essentially located in the countries of north-west Europe and their English speaking offspring in America and Australia. It has been argued by Max Weber among others that the factors making for democracy in this area are a historically unique concatenation of elements, part of the complex which also produced capitalism in this area. The <sup>basic</sup> argument runs that capitalist economic development (facilitated and most developed in Protestant areas) created the burgher class whose existence was both a catalyst and a necessary condition for democracy. The emphasis within Protestantism on individual responsibility

(cont'd from page 15) The Organizational Weapon, New York, McGraw-Hill 1952; Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, New York, Norton, 1932.

<sup>1</sup> See Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, (Glencoe, Free Press, 1958). for an excellent description of the way in which abysmal poverty serves to reduce community organization in southern Italy. The data which do exist from polling surveys conducted in the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Sweden show that somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent of the adults in these countries belong to voluntary associations, without lower rates of membership for the less stable democracies, France and Germany, than among the more stable ones, the United States, Great Britain, and Sweden. These results seemingly challenge the general proposition, although no definite conclusion can be made, since most of the studies employed non-comparable categories. This point bears further research in many countries. For the data on these countries see the following studies.

For France, see Arnold Rose, Theory and Method in the Social Sciences, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1954) p. 74; and O. R. Gallagher, "Voluntary Associations in France," Social Forces, 36 (December 1957), pp. 154-156; for Germany see Erich Reigrotski, Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik, (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1956,) p. 154; for the United States see Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," American Sociological Review, 23 (June 1958), p. 287 and J.C. Scott Jr., "Membership and Participation in Voluntary Associations," American Sociological Review, 22 (1957), pp. 315-326; for Great Britain see Mass Observation, Puzzled People, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947,) p. 119 and Thomas Bottomore, "Social Stratification in Voluntary Organizations," in David Glass, ed., Social Mobility in Britain, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954,) p. 354.

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furthered the emergence of democratic values. The greater initial strength of the middle-classes in these countries resulted in an alignment between burghers and throne, an alignment which preserved the monarchy, and thus facilitated the legitimation of democracy among the conservative strata. Thus we have an interrelated cluster of economic development, Protestantism, monarchy, gradual political change, legitimacy and democracy. Men may argue as to whether any aspect of this cluster is primary, but this cluster of factors and forces hangs together.

In the next section of this paper, I turn to an examination of some of the requisites of democracy which are derived from specifically historical elements in this complex, particularly those which relate to the need of a democratic political system for legitimacy, and for mechanisms which reduce the intensity of political cleavage. These requisites are correlated with economic development, but are also distinct from it since they are elements in the political system itself.

### III. LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY

#### A. Legitimacy and Effectiveness

In the modern world, as the previous section has attempted to document, economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy; this is a mark of the efficiency of the total system in satisfying the expectations of the population.

But the stability of a given democratic system depends not only on the system's efficiency in modernization, but also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectation of most members

(Cont'd from Page 16) for Sweden see Gunnar Heckscher, "Pluralist Democracy: The Swedish Experience," Social Research, 15 (December 1948), pp. 417-461.

of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces. The effectiveness of a democratic political system, marked by an efficient bureaucracy and decision-making system, <sup>is able to</sup> which/resolve political problems, can be distinguished from the efficiency of the total system, although breakdown in the functioning of the society as a whole will, of course, affect the political sub-system. Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved. It is the task of these sections of the paper to show first, how the degree of legitimacy of a democratic system may affect its capacity to survive the crises of effectiveness, such as depressions or lost wars and second, to indicate the ways in which the different resolutions of basic historical cleavages which determine the legitimacy of various systems also strengthen or weaken democracy through their effect on contemporary party struggles.

While effectiveness is primarily an instrumental dimension, legitimacy is more affective and evaluative. Groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values. Important segments of the German army, civil service, and aristocratic classes rejected the Weimar Republic not because it was ineffective, but because its symbolism and basic values negated their own. Legitimacy, in and of itself, may be associated with many forms of political organization, including oppressive ones. Feudal societies, before the advent of industrialism, undoubtedly enjoyed the basic loyalty of most of their members. Crises of legitimacy are primarily a recent historical phenomenon, following the rise of sharp cleavages among groups which are

able, because of mass communication resources, to organize around different values than those previously considered to be the only legitimate ones for the total society.

A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change, and therefore its roots, as a factor affecting the stability of democratic systems, must be sought in the character of change in modern society. It may be hypothesized that crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure, if (b) access is not provided to the political system to all major groups early in the transitional period, or at least, as soon as they develop political demands, or, if (a) the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during the period of structural change. After a new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of major groups (on the grounds of "effectiveness") for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.

Tocqueville gives a graphic description of the first general type of loss of legitimacy, referring mainly to countries which have moved from aristocratic monarchies to democratic republics. "...epochs sometimes occur in the life of a nation when the old customs of a people are changed, public morality is destroyed, religious belief shaken, and the spell of tradition broken ...". The citizens then have "neither the instinctive patriotism of a monarchy nor the reflecting patriotism of a republic; ... they have stopped between the two in the midst of confusion and distress."<sup>1</sup>

If, however, the status of major conservative groups and symbols is not threatened during this transitional period even though they lose most of their power, democracy seems to be much more secure. Striking

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<sup>1</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York, Knopf, 1945, pp. 251-252. (Vintage Edition.)



evidence of the link between the preserved legitimacy of conservative institutions and democracy is the relationship between monarchy and democracy. Given the role of the American and French republican revolutions as the initiators of modern democratic political movements, the fact that ten out of 12 of the stable European and English-speaking democracies are monarchies is a rather ludicrous correlation. Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are kingdoms, while the only republics which meet the conditions of stable democratic procedures since democracy was instituted, and the absence of a major totalitarian movement in the past 25 years, are the United States (Plus Uruguay) and Switzerland. Nations which have moved from absolutism and oligarchy (linked to a state church) to a democratic welfare state, while retaining the forms of monarchy, more frequently seem able to make changes while sustaining a continuous thread of legitimacy for their political institutions.<sup>1</sup>

The preservation of the monarchy has apparently retained for the system the loyalty of the aristocratic, traditionalist, and clerical sectors of the population which resented increased democratization and equalitarianism. And, by more graciously accepting the lower strata, by not resisting to the point that revolution might be necessary, the conservative orders won or retained the loyalty of the new "citizens." Where monarchy was overthrown by revolution, and orderly succession was broken, those forces aligned with monarchy have sometimes continued to refuse legitimacy to republican successors down to the fifth generation or more.

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Lippman, referring to the seemingly greater capacity of the constitutional monarchies than the republics of Europe to "preserve order with freedom" suggests that this may be because "in a republic the governing power, being wholly secularized, loses much of its prestige; it is stripped, if one prefers, of all the illusions of intrinsic majesty." See his The Public Philosophy, (New York, Mentor Books, 1956,) p. 50.

The one constitutional monarchy which became a Fascist dictatorship, Italy, was, like the French Republic, illegitimate for major groups in the society. The House of Savoy alienated the Catholics by destroying the temporal power of the Popes, and was also not a legitimate successor in the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Catholics, in fact, were forbidden by the church to participate in Italian politics until close to World War I, and the church rescinded its original position only because of its fear of the Socialists. A similar attitude was taken by French Catholics to the Third Republic during the same period. Both Italian and French democracy have had to operate for much of their histories without loyal support from important groups in their society, both on the left and on the right.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, one main source of legitimacy lies in the continuity of primary conservative integrative institutions during a transitional period in which new social institutions are emerging. <sup>legitimacy is, as indicated above, the way in which</sup> The second general type of loss of ~~the~~ <sup>this problem, the</sup> different societies handle the "entry into politics" problem, <sup>determination</sup> when new social groups shall obtain access to the political process will affect the preservation of legitimacy for the political system, either on the side of the conservative or new groups. In the 19th century these new groups were primarily industrial workers; the "entry into politics" crisis of the 20th century typically involves colonial elites, and peasant peoples. Whenever new groups become politically active (e.g., when the workers first seek access to economic and political power through economic organization and the suffrage, when the bourgeoisie demanded access to and participation in government, when colonial elites demand control over their own system), comparatively easy access to the legitimate political institutions

tends to win the loyalty of the new groups to the system, and they in turn can permit the old dominating strata to maintain their own status integrity. In nations such as Germany, where access was denied for prolonged periods, first to the bourgeoisie and later to the workers, and where force was used to restrict access, the lower strata were alienated from the system, and were led to adopt extremist ideologies which, in turn, alienated the more established groups from an acceptance of the workers' political movement as a legitimate alternative.

Political systems which denied new strata access to power except through revolutionary means also inhibited the growth of legitimacy by introducing millennial hopes into the political arena. Groups which are forced to push their way into the body politic through forceful means tend to overexaggerate the possibilities which political participation afford. Their hopes are for far more than the inherent limitations of political stability permit. Consequently, democratic regimes born under such stress will not only face the difficulty of being regarded as illegitimate by those groups loyal to the ancien regime, but may be rejected by those whose millennial hopes were not fulfilled by the change. France seems to offer an example of such a phenomenon, where right-wing clericalists see the Republic as illegitimate and sections of the lower strata await millennial fulfillment. Many of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa face the problem of winning the loyalties of the masses to democratic states which can do little to fulfill the utopian objectives set by nationalist movements during the period of colonialism, and the transitional struggle to independence.

We have discussed several conditions bearing upon the maintenance, or the initial securing of legitimacy by a political system. Assuming reasonable effectiveness, if the status of major conservative groups is threatened, or if access to the political system is denied at crucial periods, the



legitimacy of the system will remain in question. Even in legitimate systems, a breakdown of effectiveness, repeatedly or for a long period, will endanger its stability.

A major test of legitimacy is the extent to which given nations have developed a common "secular political culture"; national rituals and holidays which serve to maintain the legitimacy of various democratic practices.<sup>1</sup> The United States has developed a common homogeneous secular political culture as reflected in the veneration and consensus surrounding the Founding Fathers, Jefferson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and their principles. These common elements to which all American politicians appeal are not present in all democratic societies. In some European countries, the Left and the Right have a different set of symbols, and different historical political heroes. France offers the clearest example of a nation which has not developed such a common heritage. Thus many of the battles and symbols between the left and the right from 1789 down through much of the 19th century is "still in progress, and the issue is still open; everyone of these dates [ of major political controversy ] still divides left and right, clerical and anti-clerical, progressive and reactionary, in all their historically determined constellations."<sup>2</sup>

As we have seen, nations may vary in the extent to which their political institutions are viewed as legitimate by different strata. And knowledge concerning the relative degree of legitimacy of a nation's political institutions is of key importance in any effort to analyze the stability of these institutions when faced with a crisis of effectiveness. The relationship between different degrees of legitimacy and effectiveness in specific

<sup>1</sup>See Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (1956) 391-409.

<sup>2</sup>Herbert Luthy, The State of France, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1955,) p. 29.

political systems may be more graphically presented in the form of a four-fold table, with examples of countries characterized by the various possible combinations.

		Effectiveness	
	↑		-
Legitimacy	↑	A	B
	-	C	D

Societies which fall in box A, those which are high on the scales of legitimacy and effectiveness will clearly have stable political systems. Nations like the United States, Sweden, and Britain satisfy the basic political needs of their citizens, have efficient bureaucracies and political decision-making systems, possess traditional legitimacy, through long-term continuity of the key symbols of sovereignty, the monarchy or constitution, and do not contain any important minorities whose basic values run counter to those of the system.<sup>1</sup> Ineffective and illegitimate regimes, those which would be found in Box D, must, of course, by definition be unstable and break down, unless they are dictatorships maintaining themselves by force such as the governments of Hungary and eastern Germany today. The political experiences of different countries in the early 1930's illustrate the effect of varying combinations of legitimacy and effectiveness. In the late 1920's, neither the German or the Austrian republics were held legitimate

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The race problem in the American South does constitute one basic challenge to the legitimacy of the system, and at one time did cause a breakdown of the national order. The conflict reduces the commitment of many white Southerners to the democratic game down to the present. Great Britain had a comparable problem as long as Catholic Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom. Effective government could not satisfy Ireland. Political practices by both sides in Northern Ireland, Ulster, also illustrate the problem of a regime which is not legitimate to a major segment of its population.

by large and powerful segments of their populations, but nevertheless remained reasonably effective.<sup>1</sup> In terms of the four-fold table, they fall in box C.

When the effectiveness of the governments of the various countries broke down in the 1930's, those societies which were high on the scale of legitimacy remained democratic, while countries which were low such as Germany, Austria, and Spain, lost their freedom, and France narrowly escaped a similar fate. Or to put the changes in terms of location in the four-fold table, countries which shifted from A to B remained democratic, while the political systems of those which shifted from C to D broke down. It remained for the military defeat in 1940 to conclusively prove the low position of French democracy on the scale of legitimacy. It was the sole defeated democracy which furnished large-scale support for a Quisling regime.<sup>2</sup>

Situations such as those discussed above in which either legitimacy or effectiveness is high while the other is low demonstrate the utility of this type of analysis. From a short-range point of view, a highly effective but illegitimate system, such as a well governed colony, is more unstable than regimes which are relatively low in effectiveness and high in legitimacy. The political stability of a nation such as Thailand stands out in sharp contrast to the situation in the neighboring former colonial

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<sup>1</sup>For an excellent analysis of the permanent crisis of the Austrian republic which flowed from the fact that it was viewed as an illegitimate regime by the Catholics and conservatives, see Charles Gulick, Austria From Hapsburg to Hitler, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948)

<sup>2</sup>The French legitimacy problem is well described by Katherine Munro. "The Right wing parties never quite forgot the possibility of a counter revolution while the Left wing parties revived the Revolution militant in their Marxism or Communism; each side suspected the other of using the Republic to achieve its own ends and of being legal only so far as it suited it. This suspicion threatened time and time again to make the Republic unworkable, since it led to obstruction in both the political and the economic sphere, and difficulties of government in turn undermined confidence in the regime and its rulers." (Quoted in Charles A. Micaud, "French Political Parties: Ideological Myths and Social Realities", in Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 103.



nations of SouthEast Asia. The link between the analysis of legitimacy and the earlier discussion of the contribution of economic development to democracy is evident in the processes through which regimes low in legitimacy may gain it, and conversely those which are related to the collapse of a legitimate system. Prolonged effectiveness which lasts over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system; in the modern world, such effectiveness largely means constant economic development. Thus those nations which adapted most successfully to the requirements of an industrial system had the fewest internal strains, and either preserved their traditional legitimacy, the monarchy, or developed new strong symbols of legitimacy.

The social and economic structure which Latin America inherited from the Iberian peninsula prevented it from following the lead of the former English colonies, and its republics never developed the symbols and aura of legitimacy. In large measure, the survival of the new political democracies of Asia is related to their ability to sustain a prolonged period of effectiveness, of being able to meet the defined instrumental needs of their population.

### B. Legitimacy and Cleavage

Prolonged effectiveness of the system as a whole may as in the cases of the United States and Switzerland eventually legitimate the democratic political system. Inherent, however, in all democratic systems is the constant threat that the conflicts among different groups which are the life-blood of the system may solidify to the point where societal disintegration is threatened. Hence conditions which serve to moderate the intensity of partisan battle in addition to effectiveness are among the key requisites for a democratic political system.

Since the existence of a moderate state of conflict which is potentially disintegrative is an inherent aspect of a legitimate democratic system, and is in fact another way of defining it, it should not be surprising that the principal factors determining such an optimum state are closely linked to those which produce legitimacy viewed in terms of continuities of symbols and statuses. Essentially the character and content of the major cleavages affecting the political stability of a society are largely determined by historical factors which have affected the way in which major issues dividing society have been solved or left unresolved over time.

In modern times, three major issues have emerged in western states. The first was the religious issue: the place of the church and/or various religions within the nation. The second has been the problem of the admission of the lower strata, particularly the workers, to "citizenship," the establishment of access to power through universal suffrage, and the legitimate right to bargain collectively in the economic sphere. The third has been the continual struggle over the distribution of the national income.

The question which has general significance here is this: were the

major issues dealt with one by one, with each one more or less solved before the next arose, or did the problems accumulate, so that historical issues and sources of cleavage mixed with newer ones? Resolving tensions one at a time contributes toward a stable political system; carrying over issues from one historical period to another makes for a political atmosphere characterized by bitterness and frustration rather than by tolerance and compromise. Men and parties come to differ with each other, not simply on ways of settling current problems, but rather by fundamental and opposed weltanschauungen. They come to see the political victory of their opponents as a major moral threat, and the total system, as a result, lacks effective value-integration.

The religious issue, the place of the church in the society, was fought through and solved in most of the Protestant nations in the 18th and 19th centuries, and ceased to be a matter for serious political controversy. In some states, such as the United States, the church was dis-established and it accepted this result. In others, such as Britain, Scandinavia, and Switzerland, religion remains state-supported, but the state churches, like constitutional monarchs, have ceased to be major sources of controversy. It remains for the Catholic countries of Europe to provide us with examples of situations in which the historic controversy between clerical and anti-clerical forces which began during the French Revolution has continued to divide men politically down to the present day. Thus in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and Austria, being Catholic has meant being allied with rightist or conservative groups in politics, while being anti-clerical, (or a member of a minority religion) has most often meant alliance with the left. In a number of these countries, when newer issues emerged, these became superimposed on the religious question, and for conservative Catholics,



the fight against Socialists was not simply an economic struggle, or a controversy over social institutions, but a deep rooted conflict between God and Satan, between good and evil.<sup>1</sup> For many secular intellectuals in contemporary Italy, opposition to the church legitimates alliance with the Communists. As long as religious ties reinforce secular political alignments, the chances for democratic give and take, and compromise are weak.

The "citizenship" or "political equality" issue has also been resolved in various ways. Thus the United States and Britain gave citizenship to the workers in the early or mid-nineteenth century. Sweden and a number of European nations resisted through the beginning of the twentieth century, and the struggle for citizenship became combined in these countries with socialism as a political movement, thereby producing a revolutionary socialism. Or to put this in other terms, where the workers were denied economic and

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1. The linkage between democratic instability and Catholicism may also be accounted for by elements inherent in Catholicism as a religious system. Democracy requires a universalistic political belief system in the sense that it legitimates different ideologies. And it might be assumed that religious value systems which are more universalistic in the sense of placing less stress on being the only true church will be more compatible with democracy than those which assume that they are the only truth. The latter belief which is held much more strongly by the Catholic than by most other Christian churches makes it difficult for the religious value system to help legitimate a political system which requires as part of its basic value system, the belief that "good" is served best through conflict among opposing beliefs.

Kingsley Davis has argued that a Catholic state church tends to be irreconcilable with democracy since "Catholicism attempts to control so many aspects of life, to encourage so much fixity of status and submission to authority, and to remain so independent of secular authority that it invariably clashes with the liberalism, individualism, freedom, mobility and sovereignty of the democratic nation."

See "Political Ambivalence in Latin America," Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 1 (1943), reprinted in Christensen, The Evolution of Latin-American Government, (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 240.

political citizenship rights, their struggle for redistribution of income and status was superimposed on a revolutionary ideology. Where the economic and status struggle developed outside of this context, the ideology with which it was linked tended to be that of gradualist reformism. In Wilhelmine Germany, for example, the workers were denied a free and equal suffrage in Prussia until the revolution of 1918. This denial of "citizenship" facilitated the retention of revolutionary Marxism in those parts of Germany where equal suffrage did not exist. In Southern Germany, where full citizenship rights were granted in the late 19th century, reformist, democratic, and non-revolutionary socialism was dominant. The perpetuation of revolutionary dogmas in much of the Social Democratic party served to give ultra-leftists a voice in a party leadership, enabled the Communists to win strength after the military defeat, and perhaps even more important historically, served to frighten large sections of the German middle classes. The latter feared that a socialist victory would really mean an end to all their privileges and status.

In France, the workers won the suffrage, but were refused basic economic rights until after World War II. Major sections of French employers denied legitimacy to the French trade-unions, and sought to weaken or destroy them following every trade-union victory. The instability of the French unions, their constant need to preserve worker militancy to survive, gave access to the workers to the more revolutionary and extremist political groups. Communist domination of the French labor movement can in large part be traced to the tactics of the French business classes.

The examples presented above do not explain why different countries varied in the way they handled basic national cleavages. They should suffice, however, to illustrate the worth of a hypothesis relating the conditions for

stable democratic government to the bases of diversity. Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create the basis for weltanschauung politics, the democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition such politics does not include the concept of tolerance.

Weltanschauung politics have also weakened the possibilities for a stable democracy since parties characterized by such total ideologies have often attempted to create what Sigmund Neumann has called an "integrated" environment, one in which as much as possible of the lives of their members is encapsulated within ideologically linked activities. These actions are based on the assumption that it is important to isolate their followers from contact with "falsehood" expressed by non-believers. Neumann has suggested the need for a basic analytic distinction between parties of representation, which strengthen democracy, and parties of integration which weaken it.<sup>1</sup> The former are typified by most parties in the English-speaking democracies and in Scandinavia, plus most centrist and conservative parties other than the religious ones. They view the party function as primarily one of securing votes around election time. The parties of integration, on the other hand, are concerned with making the world conform to their basic philosophy or weltanschauung. They do not see themselves as contestants in a give and take game of pressure politics, in which all parties accept the rules of the game. Rather they view the political or religious struggle as a contest between divine or historic truth on one side and fundamental error on the other.

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1. See Sigmund Neumann, Die Deutschen Parteien: Wesen und Wandel nach dem Kriege, (2nd edition, Berlin, 1932) for exposition of the distinction between parties of integration and parties of representation. Neumann has further distinguished between parties of "democratic integration" (the Catholic, and Social Democratic parties) and those of "total integration" (Fascists and Communist parties) in his more recent chapter, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in the volume which he edited: Modern Political Parties, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 403-405.



Given this conception of the world, it becomes necessary to prevent their followers from being exposed to the cross-pressures flowing from contact with falsehood, which will reduce their faith.

The two major non-totalitarian tendencies which have followed such procedures have been the Catholics and the Socialists. In general, in much of Europe before 1939, the Catholics and Socialists attempted to increase intra-religious or intra-class communications by creating a network of church and party-linked social and economic organizations within which their followers could live their entire lives. Austria offers perhaps the best example of a situation in which two groups, the Social Catholics and the Social Democrats divided over all three historic issues, and separated the country into two hostile camps, which carried out much of their social activities in party or church-linked organizations.<sup>1</sup>

The totalitarian organizations, Fascist and Communist, expanded the integrationist character of political life to the furthest limit possible. They out do all other groups in defining the world in struggle terms, and in seeing corrupting influences either of Judaism or capitalism, as requiring the encapsulation of the true believers.

Efforts by democratic parties of integration to isolate their social base from cross-pressures is clearly disruptive of the requirements for a stable democracy in which there is shifting from one election to another, and in which issues between parties are allowed to be resolved over time. Isolation may intensify loyalty to the party or church, but it may also serve to prevent a party from reaching new strata. The Austrian situation also illustrates

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1. See Charles Gulick, op. cit.

the frustration of the electoral process which results when most of the electorate is encapsulated within parties of integration. The necessary rules of democratic politics assume that conversion both ways, into and out of a party, are possible and accepted as proper. Parties which hope to gain a majority by democratic methods must ultimately give up their integrationist tendencies. The only justification for isolation from the rest of the culture is a strong commitment to the idea that the party possesses the only truth, that there are certain basic issues which must be resolved by the triumph of historic truth. As the working-class has gained complete citizenship in the political and economic spheres in different countries, the Socialist parties of Europe have dropped their integrationist emphasis. The only non-totalitarian parties which can and do maintain such policies are religious parties such as the Catholic parties, or the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary party of Holland. Clearly, the Catholic and Dutch Calvinist churches are not "democratic" in the sphere of religion. They insist there is but one truth, as the Communists and Fascists do in politics. Catholics may accept the assumptions of political democracy, but never those of religious tolerance. And where the conflict between religion and irreligion is viewed as salient by Catholics or other believers in a one true church, then a real dilemma exists for the democratic process. Many political issues which may be easily compromised in other countries get reinforced by the religious issue, and cannot be settled.

The intense forms of cleavage developed by the cumulation of unresolved issues which creates weltanschauung politics is sustained by the systematic encapsulation of different strata of the population in organized political or religious enclaves. Conversely, however, it should be noted that wherever

the social structure operates so as to naturally "isolate" individuals or groups with the same political disposition characteristics from contact with differing views, those so isolated tend to back political extremists.

It has been repeatedly noted, for example, that workers in so-called "isolated" industries, miners, sailors, fishermen, lumbermen, sheep-sheerers, and longshoremen tend to give overwhelming support to the more left-wing tendencies. Such districts tend to vote Communist or Socialist by large majorities, sometimes to the point of having what is essentially a "one party" system in the areas concerned. Isolation is created by the fact that the requirements of the job make workers in these industries live in communities which are predominately inhabited by others in the same occupation. And this very isolation seems to reduce the pressures on such workers to be tolerant of other points of view, to contain among themselves diverse strains of thought and makes them receptive to extremist versions of the doctrine generally held by other less isolated members of their class. One should expect that the least "cosmopolitan" (the most isolated) of every political predisposition, or stratum, will be the ones most likely to accept extremism. The political intolerance of farm based groups in times of crisis may be another illustration of this pattern, since farmers, like workers in isolated industries, tend to have a more homogeneous political environment than do those employed in most urban occupations.<sup>1</sup>

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1. This tendency obviously varies with relation to urban communities, type of rural stratification, and so forth. For a discussion of the role of vocational homogeneity and political communication among farmers, see S. S. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), chapter 10, "Social Structure and Political Activity." For evidence on the undemocratic propensities of rural populations see Samuel A. Stouffer, op. cit., p.



These conclusions are further confirmed by studies of individual voting behavior which indicate that individuals under cross pressures -- those who belong to groups predisposing in different directions, who have friends supporting different parties, who are regularly exposed to the propaganda of different tendencies -- are less likely to be strongly committed politically.<sup>1</sup>

Multiple and politically inconsistent affiliations, loyalties, stimuli serve to reduce the emotion and aggressiveness involved in political choice. For example, in contemporary Germany, a working-class Catholic, pulled in two directions, will most probably vote Christian-Democratic, but is much more tolerant of the Social-Democrats than the average middle-class Catholic.<sup>2</sup> Where a man belongs to a variety of groups such that all predispose toward the same political choice, he is in the situation of the isolated worker, and is much less likely to exhibit tolerance of opposition opinions, or view the possibility of their coming to power with equanimity.

The evidence available suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that social strata, groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting

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1. Perhaps the first general statement of the consequences of "cross-pressures" on individual and group behavior may be found in Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 126-195. It is an interesting example of discontinuity in social research that the concept of cross-pressures was used by Simmel, but had to be independently rediscovered in voting research. For a detailed application of the effect of multiple-group affiliations on the political process in general, see David Truman, The Governmental Process, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

2. See Juan Linz, The Social Basis of German Politics, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1958.

forces, such groups and individuals have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict.<sup>1</sup> As Robert Dahl and Talcott Parsons have pointed out, such groups and individuals also have an interest in protecting the rights of political minorities.<sup>2</sup>

A stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among the contending political forces. And political moderation is facilitated by the capacity of a system to resolve key dividing issues before new ones arise. To the extent that the cleavages of religion, citizenship, and "collective bargaining" have been allowed to cumulate and reinforce each other as stimulants of partisan hostility, the system is weakened. The more reinforced and correlated the sources of cleavage, the less the likelihood for political tolerance. Similarly, on the level of group and individual behavior, the greater the isolation from heterogeneous political stimuli, the more that

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1. See B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954,) for an exposition of the usefulness of "cross-pressure" as an explanatory concept. Also, see S. M. Lipset, J. Linz, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and A. Barton, "Psychology of Voting," in Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, (New York: Addison-Wesley 1954), for an attempt to specify the consequences of different group memberships for voting behavior, and a review of the literature.

2. As Dahl puts it, "if most individuals in the society identify with more than one group, then there is some positive probability that any majority contains individuals who identify for certain purposes with the threatened minority. Members of the threatened minority who strongly prefer their alternative will make their feelings known to those members of the tentative majority who also, at some psychological level, identify with the minority. Some of these sympathizers will shift their support away from the majority alternative and the majority will crumble." See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 104-5. Parsons suggests that "pushing the implications of political difference too far activates the solidarities between adherents of the two parties which exist on other, non-political bases so that majorities come to defend minorities of their own kind who differ from them politically." See Parsons' essay "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in the volume edited by E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck, American Voting Behavior, (Glencoe: The Free Press, forthcoming).

background factors "pile up" in one direction, the greater the chances that the group or individual will have an extremist perspective. These two relationships, one on the level of partisan issues, the other on the nature of party support, are linked together by the fact that parties reflecting accumulated unresolved issues will seek to isolate their followers from conflicting stimuli, to prevent exposure to "error," while isolated individuals and groups will strengthen the intolerant tendencies in the political party system. The conditions maximizing political cosmopolitanism on the level of the electorate are the growth of urbanization, education, communications media, and increased wealth. Most of the obvious isolated occupations, mining, lumbering, agriculture, belong to the category of "primary" occupations, occupations whose relative share of the labor force declines sharply with economic development.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, we see again how the factors involved in modernization or economic development are linked closely to those which are involved in the historic institutionalization of the values of legitimacy and tolerance. But it should always be noted that correlations are only statements concerning relative degrees of congruence, and that another condition for political action is that the correlation never be so clear-cut that men cannot feel that they can change the direction of affairs by their actions. And this fact of low correlation means also that it is important for analytic purposes to keep variables distinct even if they intercorrelate. For example, the analysis of cleavage presented here suggests specific propositions concerning the ways in which different electoral and constitutional arrangements may affect the chances for democracy. These generalizations are presented in the following section.

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1. Colin Clark; The Conditions of Economic Progress, (New York: Macmillan, 1940).



#### IV. SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY

From the hypothesis that cross-cutting bases of cleavage are better for the vitality of democracy, it follows that two-party systems are better than multi-party systems, that electoral systems involving the election of officials on a territorial basis are preferable to systems of proportional representation, and that federalism is superior to a unitary state. In evaluating these propositions, it is important to note again that they are made with the assumption of all other factors being held constant. Clearly, stable democracies are compatible with multi-party systems, with proportional representation, and with a unitary state. And in fact, I would argue that such variations in systems of government, while significant are much less important than those derived from basic differences in social structure of the sort discussed in the previous sections.

The argument for the two-party system rests on the assumption that in a complex society, such parties must necessarily be broad coalitions, that they cannot seek to serve the interests of one major group, and that in building electoral coalitions, they necessarily antagonize support among those most committed to them, and conversely must seek to win support among groups which are preponderantly allied to the opposition party. Thus, the British Conservative or American Republican Parties must not so act as to basically antagonize the workers of the country, since a large part of their vote must come from them. The Democratic and Labor Parties are faced with a similar problem vis a vis the middle strata. Parties which are never oriented toward gaining a majority seek to maximize their electoral support from a limited base. Thus a peasant-oriented party will accentuate peasant group interest consciousness, and a party appealing primarily to small

businessmen will do the same for its group. Elections instead of being occasions on which parties seek to find the broadest possible base of support, and so bring divergent groups to see their common interests, become events in which parties stress the cleavages separating their principal supporters from other groupings.

The proposition that proportional representation weakens rather than strengthens democracy rests on the analysis of the differences between multi-party and majority party situations. If it is true, as is suggested above, that multi-partyness serves to exasperate differences and reduce consensus, then any electoral system which increases the chance for more rather than fewer parties serves democracy badly.

Further as Georg Simmel pointed out the system of electing members of parliament to represent territorial constituencies, as contrasted with systems which encouraged direct group representation (such as proportional representation), was preferable since territorial representation helps to stabilize the political system by forcing interest groups to secure their ends only within an electoral framework that involves some concern with many interests and the need for compromise.<sup>1</sup>

Federalism serves to strengthen democracy by increasing the opportunity for multiple sources of cleavage. It adds regional interests and values to the others such as class, religion and ethnicity which cross-cut the social structure.

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1. Georg Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-194. Talcott Parsons has recently made a similar point indicating that one of the mechanisms for preventing a "progressively deepening rift in the electorate" is the "involvement of voting with the ramified solidarity structure of the society in such a way, that, though there is a correlation, there is no exact correspondence between political participation and other bases of differentiation." Parsons, *op. cit.*

A major exception to this generalization occurs when federalism divides the country according to lines of basic cleavage, e.g., between different ethnic, religious, or linguistic areas. In such cases as in India today, or in Canada, federalism may then serve to accentuate and reinforce cleavages. One wants cleavage within linguistic or religious groups, not between them. But where such divisions do not exist, then federalism seems to serve democracy well. Besides creating a further source of cross-cutting cleavage, it also serves various functions which Tocqueville noted it shared with strong voluntary associations. Among these, it is the source of resistance to centralization of power, a source of training of new political leaders and it gives the out party a stake in the system as a whole, since national out parties usually continue to control some units of the system.

It should be noted again that I do not suggest that these aspects of the political structure as such are key conditions for democratic systems. If the underlying social conditions are such as to facilitate democracy, as seems true for Sweden, then the combination of multi-partyness, proportional representation, and a unitary state, do not weaken it. At most they serve to permit irresponsible minorities to gain a foothold in parliament. On the other hand, where a low level of effectiveness and of legitimacy has operated to weaken the foundations of democracy as occurred in Weimar Germany, or in France, then constitutional factors encouraging multi-partyness serve to reduce the chances that the system will survive.

#### V. PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY

The characteristic pattern of the stable western democracies in the mid-twentieth century is that they are in a "post-politics" phase -- there is



relatively little difference between the democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state. In large measure this situation reflects the fact that in these countries the workers have won their fight for citizenship, and for political access; the right to take part in all decisions of the body politic on an equal level with others.<sup>1</sup>

The struggle for citizenship had two aspects, political (access to power through the suffrage) and economic (institutionalization of trade union rights to share in the decisions affecting work rewards and conditions). The representatives of the lower strata are now part of the governing classes, members of the club. Political controversy has declined in the wealthier stable democracies because the basic political issue of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the workers into the legitimate body politic, has been settled. The only key domestic issue today is collective bargaining over differences in the division of the total product within the framework of a Keynesian welfare state, and such issues do not require or precipitate extremism on either side.

In most of Latin and Eastern Europe, the struggle for working-class integration into the body politic was not settled before the Communists appeared on the scene to take over leadership of the workers. This fact drastically changed the political game, since inherently the Communists could

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1. T.H. Marshall has analyzed the gradual process of incorporation of the working class into the body politic in the 19th century, and has seen that process as the achievement of a "basic human equality, associated with full community membership, which is not inconsistent with a superstructure of economic inequality." See his brief but brilliant book Citizenship and Social Class, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 77. Even though universal citizenship opens the way for the challenging of remaining social inequalities, it also provides a basis for believing that the process of social change toward equality will remain within the boundaries of allowable conflict in a democratic system.

not be absorbed within the system in the way that the Socialists have been. Communist workers, their parties and trade unions, cannot possibly be accorded the right of access by a democratic society. The Communists' self-image and more particularly their ties to the Soviet Union lead them to accept a self-confirming hypothesis. Their self-definition prevents them from being allowed access and this in turn reinforces the sense of alienation from the system (of not being accepted by the other strata) which workers in nations with large Communist parties have. And the more conservative strata are reinforced in their belief that giving increased rights to the workers or their representatives threatens all that is good in life. Thus, the presence of Communists precludes an easy prediction that economic development will stabilize democracy in these European countries.

In the newly independent nations of Asia, the situation is somewhat different. In Europe at the beginning of modern politics, the workers were faced with the problem of winning citizenship: the right to take part in the political game, from the dominant aristocratic and business strata who dominated politics; in Asia the long term presence of colonial rulers has identified conservatism as an ideology and the more well-to-do classes with subservience to colonialism, while leftist ideologies, usually of a Marxist variety, have been dominant, being identified with nationalism. The trade unions and the workers' parties of Asia have been part of the political process from the beginning of the democratic system. Conceivably such a situation could mean a stable democracy, except for the fact that these lower strata rights pre-date the development of a stable economy with a large middle-class and an industrial society.

The whole system stands on its head. The left in the European stable

democracies grew gradually in a fight for more democracy, and gave expression to the discontents involved in early industrialization, while the right retained the support of traditionalist elements in the society, until eventually the system came into an easy balance between a modified left and right. In Asia, the left is in power during the period of population explosion and early industrialization, and must accept responsibility for all the consequent miseries. As in the poorer areas of Europe, the Communists exist to capitalize on all these discontents in completely irresponsible fashion, and currently are a major party, usually the second largest in most Asian states.

Given the existence of poverty-stricken masses, low levels of education, an elongated pyramid class structure, and the "premature" triumph of the democratic left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia is bleak. The nations which have the best prospects, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, the Philippines and Turkey, tend to resemble Europe in one or more major factors, high educational level (all except Turkey), substantial growing middle-class, and the retention of political legitimacy by non-leftist groups.

Latin America, underdeveloped economically like Asia, is, however, politically more like Europe in the early 19th century than like Asia today. Most Latin American countries became independent states before the rise of industrialism and Marxist ideologies, and contain strongholds of traditional conservatism. The countryside is often apolitical or traditional, and the leftist movements secure support primarily from the industrial proletariat. Latin American Communists, for example, have chosen the European Marxist path of organizing urban workers, rather than the "Yenan way" of Mao, seeking a peasant base.<sup>1</sup> If Latin America is left to develop on its own, and is able

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1. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957).



to increase its productivity and middle classes, there is a good chance that many Latin American countries will follow in the European direction. Recent developments, including the overthrow of a number of dictatorships, in large measure reflect the effects of an increased middle class, growing wealth, and increased education. There is, however, the great danger that these countries may yet follow in the French and Italian direction rather than that of northern Europe, that the Communists will seize the leadership of the workers, and that the middle class will be alienated from democracy.

The analysis of the social requisites for democracy contained in this paper has sought to identify some, though obviously far from all, of the structural conditions which are linked to this political system. It has been possible in a very limited fashion to attempt some tests of the hypotheses suggested. These very preliminary efforts to apply the method of science to comparative political systems can still only be considered as illustrative since we can say so little about actual variations in national social structures. Considerably more research must be done specifying the boundaries of various societies along many dimensions before reliable comparative analysis of the sort attempted here can be done. Although the task obviously presents tremendous difficulties, it is only through such methods that we can move beyond the conventional semi-literary methods of giving illustrative examples to support plausible interpretations.

The data available are, however, of a sufficiently consistent character to strongly urge the conclusion that a more systematic and up-to-date version of Aristotle's hypothesis concerning the relationship of political forms to social structure is valid. Unfortunately, as has been indicated above, this conclusion does not justify the optimistic liberal's hope that an

increase in wealth, in the size of the middle class, in education, and other related factors will necessarily mean the spread of democracy or the stabilizing of democracy. As Max Weber, in discussing the chances for democracy in Russia in the early twentieth century pointed out: "The spread of Western cultural and capitalist economy did not, ipso facto, guarantee that Russia would also acquire the liberties which had accompanied their emergence in European history. . . . European liberty had been born in unique, perhaps unrepeatable, circumstances at a time when the intellectual and material conditions for it were exceptionally propitious."<sup>1</sup>

These suggestions that the peculiar concatenation of factors which gave rise to western democracy in the nineteenth century may be unique are not meant to be unduly pessimistic. In conclusion, I would like to repeat some words written sometime ago ending a study dealing with the prospects for the spread of democracy in a much more difficult universe, the trade union movement, which are equally applicable to the problem discussed here.

Although the events and conditions which have given rise to and sustained democracy in the ITU (the International Typographical Union, the most democratic of all major American unions) are unique and are rarely found in trade unions or other voluntary large social organizations generally, it would be foolhardy to predict that democratic processes cannot develop elsewhere. The specific factors which underlie ITU democracy are not likely to be duplicated elsewhere; but the very great variety of factors present in the situation suggests that democratic processes may develop under quite different conditions and take quite different forms.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Richard Pipes, "Max Weber and Russia," World Politics, 7 (1955), p. 383.

2. S. M. Lipset, M. A. Trow and J. S. Coleman, Union Democracy, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 412.

Political democracy exists and has existed in a variety of circumstances, even if it is most commonly sustained by a limited cluster of conditions. To understand more fully the various conditions under which it has existed may make possible the development of democracy elsewhere. Democracy is not achieved by acts of will alone; but men's wills, through action, can shape institutions and events in directions that reduce or increase the chance for the development and survival of democracy. To aid men's actions in furthering democracy was in some measure Tocqueville's purpose in studying the operation of American democracy, and it remains perhaps the most important substantive intellectual task which students of politics can still set before themselves.



Party Systems in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth:  
Causes, Resemblances, and Variations.

by

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri,  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

1. Statement of the Problem

There are good reasons for the increasing attention which political scientists have recently given to the study of parties. In a democratic community the party system forms the focal point on which all political forces converge. Everything that is politically significant finds a place somewhere within the parties and in the relations between them. Conversely, everything that is done by the parties is relevant to politics. Thus, an extension of knowledge about the party system helps to unravel the politics by which a people is governed.

Why is it that the parties have come to occupy so crucial a role in the functioning of modern democracies? This question is inevitably implied in analyzing the subject of parties, but it is not always explicitly raised and answered. Since the argument of this paper does attempt an answer, it is fitting to start with a general picture of the place and functions of the party system on which the ensuing discussion will be based.

The parties owe their importance in a democracy to this fact: It is they that provide the bridge to connect the groupings of society with the institutions of the state. On the one side, society generates the clusters of interests which push their way into the political process. On the other side, there stand the constitutional regime, the men and machinery of government, the institutional structures which compose the state. The state exists within society, and society permeates the state. But an intermediary is needed to provide a link between them--an intermediary which, to perform its role, must belong partly to both. Such are the political parties. The party system functions as a conductor of energy and as a transformer. It receives the impulses that flow from society, transforms them into the current of politics, and then distributes it among the institutions of which the state is constructed. Conversely, it is the party system which fastens the impress of the state upon the plastic associations wherein men combine.

Whatever lies in the middle will naturally be susceptible to influence from the two sides between which it is placed. This, of course, explains the difficulties that arise whenever one attempts to interpret the causes of a party system. Precisely because the parties are located in between the state and its society and belong in some measure to both, it has been possible for researchers to argue with considerable plausibility for either factor as the prime determinant of party politics. Hence, two kinds of answer have been given to the question: "Why does this community have this kind of party system?"

Some have thought that the institutions of government are the primary source for the formation of parties and their duration. Others believe that the party system derives in the main from the character of the society around it. The location of the parties in the middle has invited this divergence. But it remains the province of scholarship to continue the search for the factors which seem to incline the issue on one side or the other.

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into these problems in the case of five countries. These are the United Kingdom and the four ex-colonies which were the first to attain full self-government within the Commonwealth-- Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. For comparative study of this topic, a more appropriate group than these five could scarcely be found. The party system which began to form in England after the Civil War of the seventeenth century was exported in the nineteenth to the overseas territories inhabited by emigrants of British stock. In Australia and New Zealand the indigenous populations were either too few in number or too retarded in culture to affect the imported system. But elsewhere, the British tradition had to coexist with what it could not conquer: In Canada with the descendants of France's ancien régime, and in South Africa with an offshoot of seventeenth-century Holland and a large majority of tribally-divided Africans. The United Kingdom, its influence fortified by ancient heritage and present might, provided the model from which the English-speaking colonists derived their political attitudes and governmental structures. Here then was a situation where an identical pattern of institutions and ideas was transplanted to geographical regions remote from the place of origin and scattered from one another. As it struck root and grew, the exported system retained some of its inherited features, but mingled these with the characteristics acquired in the new environment. Also, as the process of nation-building required amalgamation into larger units, the federal principle was borrowed from the United States and adapted to the circumstances of Canada and Australia. Thus, after the lapse of four or five generations, it was possible to observe in this group of countries both similarities and differences. It is these which provide the theme of this inquiry. The questions to be raised are these:

What have been the causes of the party systems in these five countries?  
What are the reasons for the resemblances between the systems?  
Where they differ, why have these variations occurred?

In order to answer those questions, this paper will attempt to describe the party systems which have emerged in the five countries under discussion, to assess the effect upon them of governmental institutions, to analyze how they were shaped by the social environment, and to sum up by suggesting how a comparative method may throw light on the nature and causes of the party system.



## 2. The Character of the Five Party Systems

Since a causal interpretation must be preceded by a description of the subject under analysis, let us first survey the salient features of the five systems under review. In general, these can be summarized as examples either of a two-party system or of a fairly close approximation thereto. A two-party system can be defined as one which meets the following conditions:

- (1) At any given election, the chance of coming to power is shared by two parties, and no more than two.
- (2) One of these is able to take office by itself, without requiring third-party support.
- (3) With the lapse of time, two parties alternate in office.

This list of criteria, besides what it affirms, contains certain implications. For example, it recognizes that, along with two major parties, the system may include some minor ones. Provided, however, that one of the major parties always has a clear majority and that no minor party succeeds in holding the balance, the system realistically considered still belongs to the two-party type. Also, allowance must be made for the time factor. As a people changes, so does its party system. Hence, if a particular party is based upon a certain interest and that interest declines, the party tends to decline with it; and another party, representing a rising interest, may take its place. During the transition, of course, a three-party system will develop. But the trend of a few elections will show whether this state of affairs is destined to be permanent or temporary. The occasional coexistence of three parties in a dynamic relationship does not seriously disturb the definition of a two-party system, if the latter be proven in time to be the norm to which the system always returns from its temporary deviations.

Judged by these criteria, the United Kingdom nowadays has a two-party system and has had it for a long time. Its origins, as well as some phases of its evolution, remain a subject of disagreement among historians, and it is also arguable whether the term "party" can properly be applied to some of the parliamentary clusters which were mobilized in the eighteenth century by the Crown or by influential factions. These are the difficulties which inevitably attend the problem of devising categories to fit the facts with accuracy. Yet, be that as it may, a fundamental truth of British politics holds good after all the attempts to explain it away. The seventeenth century struggle between Royalists and Parliamentarians was followed by the eighteenth century alignment of Tories against Whigs. This in turn evolved in the next century into a conflict of Conservatives and Liberals, which has been converted since 1931 into the battle between Conservatism and Labor. For three hundred years the main highway of British politics has channelled its traffic along two lanes. The highway has frequently been rerouted, reconstructed, and resurfaced, and it now bears a much heavier load of traffic. But it has successfully carried the British people through their evolution from oligarchy to democracy, from a largely agricultural economy to one that is heavily



industrialized, and from the acquisition of Empire to the acceptance of Commonwealth. Small wonder that the two-party system has undergone transition and change. The greater wonder is that the system has been tough enough always to reappear, reassert itself, and endure.

On a smaller scale, and in a society far younger and less complex than the British, the same story may be told of New Zealand, whose party system provides the closest parallel to that of the mother-country. This Dominion has now exercised responsible self-government for slightly more than a century. Its party system emerged through two formative decades (1856-76), in which the principal problems to be solved were those of immigration and public works, the Maori Wars, and central-provincial relations. The contest between groups then became polarized into a Conservative-Liberal fight. As the working-class came of age politically and universal suffrage was achieved,<sup>2</sup> the Liberal party broadened into Liberal-Labour. Later, this hyphen lengthened into a split, and contemporaneously with Britain (from 1905 to 1931) New Zealand wrestled with the unstable equilibrium of three parties. The depression of the early nineteen-thirties restored the two-party system by impelling a coalition between the Conservatives (then called Reform) and what was left of the Liberals. Since that time to the present, a normal alternation in office has continued between Labour and their opponents, who currently are named National. Minor parties have occasionally formed themselves during the last sixty or seventy years--usually in order to express and organize a special interest or some extreme viewpoint. But they have always evaporated quickly, like the morning dew.

Canada, being a more complicated country than New Zealand, has experienced more complications in maintaining a two-party system. Within a few decades after federation, political contests had already fallen into the classic pattern. Two principal parties had emerged, which took their names (Conservative, Liberal) from Britain, but in their inner dynamics rather resembled the Republicans and Democrats. Canada's size, along with the diversity of its groupings, and their regional concentration, has always facilitated the breakaway of special interests or areas. As a consequence, third and fourth parties have been organized fairly frequently. Often, these have been able to capture control of a province and there to maintain themselves in office throughout several elections, contemporary examples being Social Credit in Alberta and the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan. At the Dominion level, however, Conservatives and Liberals have been alternating in and out of office for three quarters of a century, and it has been a rare exception for a third party to hold the parliamentary balance.<sup>3</sup> Of recent decades, the most remarkable

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1. In order to avoid repeating here what I have already said in print, may I ask the reader to refer to my article "The Two-Party System in British Politics", American Political Science Review, vol. XLVII, No. 2, June 1953, pp. 337-58.

2. For men, by 1889; for women, by 1893.

3. This did happen, however, after the election of 1921 when a revolt of the western prairies produced an agrarian movement called the Progressives.

feature of Canadian national politics was the long supremacy of the Liberals, which was accompanied by a decline of the Conservatives and some fragmentary representation for the Social Credit and the C.C.F. Had this paper been written two years ago, it would have been possible to argue that Canada no longer exhibited a two-party system. At that time, the four parties could have been evaluated in musical notation thus: the Liberals, a full note; the Conservatives, a half note; with a quarter note each for C.C.F. and Social Credit. This would have counted up to two full notes. But, as every quantifier should know, an addition of fractions equalling two is not necessarily identical with a two-party system. Since the two federal elections of 1957 and 1958, however, the Liberal reign has terminated abruptly. What King passed on to Saint Laurent, the latter could not transmit to Pearson. The Conservatives, newly revived and energetically led, are again ascendant; and, nationally at least, Social Credit was crushed and the C.C.F. is crumpled. The swing of the pendulum--to mix the metaphor--was more like the swish of a scythe!

Australia became a Commonwealth thirty-three years later than Canada was created a Dominion. Hence, national party politics in Australia count less than six decades. But a definite pattern has already emerged in this period. The facts are easy enough to state, although their meaning is in dispute. The first decade of this century was occupied with putting the federal system into motion and with a coalescing of groups. The fight between protectionists and free traders tended for awhile to overshadow the other divisions and to twist the political interests into its particular mold. But once that issue had been resolved in favor of protection, the Australians developed the kind of party system with which they have now lived for five decades. On one side stands the Labour party. Its history has been a series of battles between a central discipline and the revolts against it. Arrayed against Labour are two parties. The chief of these, after frequent changes of name, has now resumed the Liberal label. The other is the Country party, which has maintained a separate existence ever since the early nineteen-twenties. How should the Australian system be classified? Plain though the answer seems, it is nevertheless in controversy. Some say that Australia has a three-party system, for the simple reason that the system does contain three parties! But others argue that this arithmetic has to be interpreted politically. The third member of the trio, the Country party, does not function in complete independence, nor does it fill the roll of a balancer. It operates instead in a permanent coalition with the Liberals. Never does it combine, either electorally or in office, with the Liberals. Hence, with a substance of truth one can assert that Australian politics are divided along the axis of Labour versus non-Labour. The latter side maintains two organizations, of which the weaker partner represents and increases the bargaining power of the rural elements. The Australian system, therefore, is a trio in form, a duet in function.

Younger yet than Australia is the misnamed "Union" of South Africa. This is a geographical area which is occupied by a state that lacks a nation, a government that is one-fifth of a democracy, a minority living in perpetual fear of the majority. In a plural society where those of European descent are outnumbered by four to one and where government is the exclusive preserve of



a minority which is itself acutely split, the party system functions amid a nightmarish network of restrictions and distortions. Since the minority has a monopoly of political participation, the parties "represent" only the dominant fifth of the population. Yet, all their calculations are powerfully influenced by the presence of the other four-fifths--who are disfranchised, discriminated against, and demoralised. Thus, in describing South Africa's party system one must allow for, but never forget, these basic limitations. Within their framework, a complex of tangled groupings has tended to sort itself out into a rough alternation between two parties. One party is formed by the majority of the Afrikaners, and they are opposed by the minority of Afrikaners combining with the majority of those whose tongue is English. This division between groups, which runs primarily along linguistic and cultural boundaries, is widened by a difference of attitude towards the submerged majority. On the problem of race relations the fanatical extremists oppose the more moderate gradualists. Then, too, within the minority of dominant Europeans there are minorities which form splinter movements of their own--a Labour party to oppose the owners of capital, a Dominion or Federal party to resist the supremacy of Afrikanerdom over the English, a Liberal party to plead (valiantly, but forlornly) the noble doctrine of human equality. Such groups have hitherto been unable to make much of a dent in the strength of the two big organizations--National and United.<sup>1</sup> At the present moment, since the three elections of 1948, 1953, and 1956 recorded rising percentages of the votes in their favor, the Nationalist fanatics unfortunately have everything their own way.

Such, then, is a short survey of the five systems. It supports the generalization that they conform principally to the two-party model. But the variations and deviations are quite as significant as the norm. What therefore remain to be explained are the reasons both for the norm and for the departures from it.

### 3. The Structure of Government and its Influence on the Parties

According to the institutional explanation, the primary factor which shapes the party system is the machinery of government. The stuff of politics is regarded as so much molten material, taking its form from the mold that the state imposes. Party warfare is conducted in order to capture control of the government; and consequently, on this reasoning, it is the nature of governmental institutions that imposes the organization and tactics to which the parties conform. Applying this logic, some scholars have considered two-party politics the result of such factors as the cabinet system, or the power of dissolution, or the electoral apportionment into single-member districts where a bare plurality wins. The present question, therefore, is this: In these

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1. In the mid-twenties, however, Labour had sufficient votes to enter into coalition with Hertzog against Smuts, on a policy of monopolising the best jobs for the white workers. Also, when Malan's Nationalists first came to office in 1948, they needed the parliamentary backing of the small Afrikaner party under Havenga which they later absorbed.



five countries how uniform, how different, are the institutions which could have a bearing on the character of the party system? And is there a discernible connection between these institutions and the parties?

At first glance, one is struck by the amount of overall similarity in the institutions by which the five countries are governed. But at the same time certain differences are apparent and it is the explanation of the reasons for them which calls for further analyzing. To begin with, there is complete uniformity in the use of the cabinet system. The fusion of parliamentary and executive leadership in the hands of the same persons is a distinctively British contribution to the art of constitution-making and is invariably followed throughout the Commonwealth. Rule by cabinet is the rule. To this there are no exceptions. Differences do exist, however, in the effects of the cabinet's power and in the techniques by which it is exercised. In certain of these countries, for example, the threat of dissolution has virtually atrophied and can no longer be considered essential--if indeed it ever was--either for maintaining discipline in the majority ranks or for perpetuating a two-party alignment. Seventy years elapsed in New Zealand (1881 to 1951) before a general election was called prior to the expiration of parliament's full term.<sup>1</sup> The reason for this is simply that New Zealand's elections have been triennial, and it was therefore unnecessary to shorten the life of a parliament. Notwithstanding this fact, both the two-party system and the discipline within the parties have continued in force.

In Australia, too, early dissolutions have become superfluous because the regular federal elections are held triennially, as in New Zealand. But in one important respect the Australian parliament differs from those of Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. It retains its original bicameral character, in fact as well as in form. Following the pattern of the United States, the six States are represented in the Senate as equal units, and the terms of Senators are staggered. Consequently, a conflict between the two Houses can occur, if Labour controls one House while the non-Labour coalition controls the other. Because of this situation, the Liberal Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, took advantage in 1951 of the constitutional provision that authorizes a double dissolution. But this did not take place because of any defect in the working of the party system as such. It was the result, rather, of an institutional contradiction. Cabinet government, to be effective, requires not checks and balances, but a concentration of political authority in one place. Hence, wherever it functions in full force, the cabinet has either crippled or crushed bicameralism; and the ability of one chamber to eliminate its rival has been reinforced by the logic of the two-party system which necessitates a majority for one party over its opposition. Thus the power of dissolution, to the extent that it survives nowadays in Australia, is a consequence of the party system and not a cause of it.

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1. Except for the occasions of World Wars I and II, and the depression of the early thirties, on which occasions Parliament extended its own duration.

The Australian case, however, contains other implications whose broad effects should be comparatively viewed. Australian bicameralism is the product of Australian federalism. One must therefore consider whether the institutional difference between a federal and a unitary constitution has any effect on the number of parties within the political system. Let us suppose that one were to rank the five countries on a scale according to their proximity to the poles of unitary or federal government. The order, without any doubt, would be as follows:



How does such a ranking correlate with the party systems of the same countries? In my judgement, fairly closely. The countries in which the two-party system is most firmly established are the very two whose institutions are most definitely centralized and unitary. On the other hand, the states which are federal or quasi-federal are precisely those in which the problem of the third, and even the fourth, party has continued to present itself. A person who favors the institutional argument will, therefore, be disposed to contend that federalism is an impediment to two-party monopoly. Just because an intermediate level of government exists, a party whose prospects for national power are slender may prevail in a state or province. Hence, it would seem to follow that federalism tends to encourage a multiplicity of parties. If so, this indicates how the governmental structure helps to shape the party system.

On that point, briefly to anticipate the view for which I shall argue later, it would certainly appear that the party system is correlated with the degree of centralization on the reverse in the machinery of state. But to assert that one factor causes the other is an unproven inference. Rather, it may be held that both factors--the type of party system and the pattern of institutions--are themselves the joint product of another, more fundamental determinant that is as yet undisclosed. Should this be true, the correlation between the parties and either a unitary or a federal government would resemble the relation between sibling and not that between parent and child.

There remains one further institutional arrangement to consider, namely the electoral system. It is through the machinery of elections that the voters choose between alternative policies and candidates. By means of elections the parties place their representatives in political office. Hence, it is self-evident that a connection exists between parties and elections, that their relationship is direct and immediate, and that the influence of one factor upon the other is causal in character. What is in doubt, however, is the crucial



issue: which is the cause, and which is the effect? Generally it has been assumed<sup>1</sup> that the electoral machinery is the cause which produces effects upon the party system. My own research, however, leads me to the opposite conclusion--that it is primarily the party system which molds the electoral system. The parties, as it appears to me, determine which type they will employ among the available varieties of apportionment and voting. What they select is the type which best suits their own interest, and that interest is, of course, to preserve and perpetuate themselves. Naturally, once the electoral system has been adopted and goes into operation, it produces a reciprocal effect upon the parties which brought it into being. Normally, this effect is to buttress and strengthen them. But, such being the nature of the political process, whenever the existing parties and electoral methods afford inadequate recognition to new interests and groupings which arise within society, the latter will succeed in making their own way. Thus, despite what is frequently considered the "inevitable" tendency of the single-member district system to militate against the weakest party of three, the British Labour Party was able to survive and grow, and then to supplant the Liberals. And precisely the same has happened in New Zealand as in Great Britain.

A comparison of the electoral systems that are in use in these five countries discloses some significant facts. In Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, the single-member district system prevails, the winner in the district being the candidate with a plurality. This method of apportionment, which evolved in the mother-country between 1832 and 1885, was exported to the maturing colonial territories during that period. Simultaneously the suffrage was extended to the whole adult male population, and the very parties which were responsible for the extension were opening their doors to new members. When two parties dominate the political scene, they are likely to favor the single-member district system just because its distortions, its lack of proportionalism, are an impediment to the growth of new parties. If, however, a third party does appear on the scene, one of two consequences follows. The third party may become potent enough to replace one of the existing major parties and thereby restore the two-party system. If it can do this, as in Great Britain, the electoral system then continues without change because there is no reason to alter it. Or, the third party may be permanently added to the other two, so that the party system itself changes. In this case, it is both convenient and sensible to modify the electoral system subsequently. Indeed, this is what occurred in Australia, the one country of this group which forms the exception that proves the rule. There, the Country party was organized after World War I to increase the political power of the farmers on the anti-Labour side. The electoral system was then changed to conform with the altered character of the party system. Since it was expected that farmers would give their support first to the Country party, and next to the other non-Labour party, the electoral method which was adopted was that of the single transferable vote--a device precisely suited to the politics of a tri-party

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1. For instance, by Professor Maurice Duverger in Les Partis Politiques.



system wherein two of the members were normally expected to coalesce against the third. Clearly in this case, the party system formed itself first and then modified the electoral machinery to conform to its political requirements.

This point--namely, that the party system is supreme over the electoral system, and not the reverse--may be further illustrated by some evidence from New Zealand. There, in the first two decades of this century, the Labour group split off from the Liberals and organized their own party. The Liberals, who were dominant from 1890 to 1905, began to read the writing on the wall as Labour mobilized and as the old Conservative opposition regrouped itself under the name of Reform. In order to forestall the rise of a Labour party, the Liberals, while they still held a parliamentary majority, introduced a second ballot to provide for a run-off election in constituencies where no candidate had obtained a majority. This second ballot was in operation for two elections only--those of 1908 and 1911. It did not achieve the aims of its proponents. Despite its mechanics, the Labour party did grow and the Reform party increased its strength until in 1912 it was able to form a government. Then Reform used its parliamentary majority to abolish the second ballot. In short, it was the politics of the party system which proved triumphant over the electoral system, and not the mechanics of the latter which determined the shaping of the former.

To summarize this part of the discussion, one observes that the institutions of government are remarkably similar in the five countries. The most noteworthy exceptions are the electoral system in Australia and the use of a federal structure in that country and Canada. A relation does exist between these institutional differences and the variations in the party systems. It remains now to be seen whether the differences and similarities both in the party systems and the institutions of government are related to some further factor yet more pervasive and more penetrating. For that, I turn to the composition of the societies in question, since it is of their politics that parties and state are the manifestations.

#### 4. The Composition of Society and the Politics of its Parties

To inquire into all aspects of a society which are politically relevant would go far beyond the scope of this paper. What can and must be done, however, is to look at one feature in the composition of society which has a direct and immediate bearing upon the character of the party system. Parties are groupings into which a people subdivides in order that policies may be debated and programs executed. That groupings into parties are political in nature is self-evident. What needs clarifying is the relation between the parties and the other groupings of which a society is interlaced. Not all of these are always and necessarily political. But virtually any social grouping may acquire this significance, and many of them will from time to time become politically charged. The particular aspect of a society's structure which I am exploring here is its heterogeneity or homogeneity. The assumption is simply that a party system is certain to be influenced by the groupings in society, and is likely to reproduce either their complexity or simplicity.

A people "fundamentally at one" to cite Lord Balfour's phrase,<sup>1</sup> would not be expected to sustain the same party politics as "a house divided against itself." Race, religion, language, occupation, class, property and income are among the principal constituents of a social order. So, when the racial, religious and linguistic groupings tend to coincide, political organization will generally be more cohesive than if these groupings crisscross with one another and if the same persons recombine differently in terms of economic status and occupation. To examine the validity of these assumptions, one must study the effect of the components of the social order upon the character of the party system.

The mother-country supplied to its colonies, as they matured, not only a framework of government but also a model for party politics. In point of time, Britain's two-party system stems from beginnings which long antedate the grant of responsible self-government to territories overseas. But that same party system did develop further because of Britain's own domestic evolution and was being more completely organized simultaneously with its transplantation to other continents. In a dual sense, therefore, the British model is both prior to and contemporary with, the systems that sprang up in the Dominions.

The story of the British party system is so long and complicated that the need for compression in a paper such as this involves the risks of oversimplification and apparent dogmatism. Nevertheless, there are certain salient features about which some reasonable generalizations can be offered. As long as the monarch possessed real power, any genuine alternation of parties was impossible. The Civil War of 1641-49 marked a division of society into two sides which could not compose their differences through the existing framework of government. The supremacy of Parliament was a necessary institutional accompaniment of a party system, since Parliament provided the forum where parties could engage in regular public debate. Gradually, the controversies of the Restoration period crystallized into a Whig-Tory dichotomy, imparting a modicum of coherence to the eighteenth-century gambits of aristocratic interest, influence, and intrigue. Such a dualism corresponded with the social divisions of that era. Granted that politics were a function of the upper classes, i.e. of the minority, opinions tended to polarise around two issues--one economic, the other religious. In a society that was largely agricultural and rural, but was acquiring colonies and increasing its external commerce, two interests were opposed. On one side were the majority of landowners. On the other, the minority of landowners were allied with the mercantile interest. In the religious sphere, the ecclesiastical settlement which had been imposed after the Restoration and reaffirmed after the flight of James II provided the boundary line for a second split. The dominant Church of England displayed its intolerance not only to Jews and Catholics, but also to Nonconformist

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1. From his introductory essay to The English Constitution by Walter Bagehot, "The World's Classics" edition (Oxford, 1928) p. xxiv.



Protestants. Hence, two parties existed in the religious field--those who were for the established Church, and those who were not. Most important of all, however, was the fact that the alignment of groups on the religious issue tended to correspond with the economic bifurcation. The country squires, for the most part, were rural-minded, royalist, Anglican, and Tory. Their opponents were more friendly to commerce, more tolerant of dissent, more loyal to Parliament, and Whig.

With the groundwork thus laid for a two-party system, nineteenth-century Britain was required to adjust its politics to an economic transformation and its social aftermath. The economic change was widespread industrialization; the social change, urbanism; the political result, democracy. The effect upon the parties of industrialization, although delayed for a generation by the Napoleonic Wars, was to help the descendants of the Whigs, then called Liberals. Demanding a revolution in economic policy, the Liberals supported the reform of governmental institutions as its precondition. Thus in 1832, they won for the urban middle class a measure of representation in Parliament and therewith a political ascendancy which lasted for four decades. Conversely the Conservatives, identified with the landed interest, were split and crushed. Later in the century, however, by a strange irony, the same forces which had once aided the Liberals turned to their disadvantage and redounded to the benefit of their opponents. When the welfare of the working class became the overriding issue, some of the Liberals were unwilling to incur the higher taxation and the extension of governmental functions which social services involved. Thus commenced the succession of breaks which culminated in the disintegration of the once-mighty Liberals. But while the need for further change destroyed the party which had elevated reform into a philosophy, the Conservatives discovered that changes, after their adoption, acquire a conservative tinge and that the landed aristocrat could tax a factory owner for the welfare of the factory worker. With the enfranchisement of the industrial and agricultural laborers in 1867 and 1884, the underprivileged were finally in a position to use liberty to obtain equality; and, since their strength lay in the solidarity of numbers, they organized their own party. Caught in between, the Liberals cracked into further splinters, which flew off--left and right--to coalesce with Conservatism or Labour, helping thereby to liberalise the former and constitutionalise the latter.

Contemporary Britain, for all its size and inner diversities, has a compactness and solidarity which underlie the two-party system. Its economy is overwhelmingly industrial and commercial; its way of life, predominantly urban; its religions, strongly Protestant; its race, homogeneous; and its political union, an English majority far out-numbering the Scots, Welsh, and Ulstermen. Under these circumstances, the party system reflects, on the whole, the surviving elements of horizontal stratification in the British economy and social order. The Labour Party has mobilized the bulk of the wage-earners along with a section of the middle-class and the intelligentsia. The upper-class and well-to-do, the farmers, the majority of the middle-class, and a

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1. Though, because of West Indian immigration, an incipient color question now exists on a small scale.



minority of the wage-earners vote Conservative. Finally, those who have an allergy to mammoth organization, and who echo individualistically "a plague on both your houses", will continue to inscribe a protest vote for the Liberals--especially at bye-elections, where the control of Parliament is seldom affected.

I interpret the British party system, then, as the outcome of an ancient social order which has now attained a fundamental harmony; which therefore divides easily into two sides whose opposition is conducted within mutually agreed limits; which has evolved along with, and has helped to cause, the framework of institutions that suit its purpose. It is this system which has provided an example for the English-speaking inhabitants of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. But the societies which have developed in these countries are not identical with the British, nor are their peoples derived solely from the British Isles. In terms of homogeneity and its opposite, it is fairly evident that New Zealand and Australia contain societies which are more homogeneous than that of Britain, whereas the Canadian and South African societies are much more heterogeneous. How, then, are these social variations related to the party systems?

The simplest in structure of all these societies is the one in New Zealand, the country whose party system is the closest akin to the British. The people of New Zealand are homogeneous to a rare degree. They have the population of Philadelphia spread over an area as big as Oregon. The Europeans, who outnumber the Maoris by ten to one, are drawn, to the extent of 98%, from the British Isles. Of these, the great majority were English or Scots and Protestant, and are descended from emigrants of the working class and lower-middle class. Although farming provides nine-tenths of the country's export wealth, farmers ceased long ago to be in a majority and have also lost the advantage of special apportionment under the electoral law. The demand for higher living standards, equally spread, has led to a moderate urban development. But, instead of one dominant metropolis, New Zealand has four main centers, spaced apart from north to south. For political purposes, the people divide along two axes: the city folk versus the farmers, and those who have less against those who have more. The farmers form a bloc which seldom<sup>1</sup> splits. But, being insufficient to win an election, they need to coalesce with some urban interests in order to produce a majority. The result is their alliance with importers, businessmen, and higher-income professional people. Thereby, the National Party is cemented together. On the other side, the Labour Party enjoys the full allegiance of the industrial workers. With these, it unites in the cities many of the lower-paid white-collar employees of government and of private firms. For the National Party the problem is to hold together its rural and urban wings; for Labour, its industrial and white-collar supporters. A loosening of either tie is usually enough to produce an electoral swing and thus to change the party in power.

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1. Occasionally, however, and in times of falling prices overseas, the dairy farmers may break from the sheep farmers, and, as in 1935, some will vote Labour.

What New Zealand politics would be like if its social structure were projected onto a larger screen can readily be seen in the case of its neighbor, the Commonwealth of Australia. In many of their basic characteristics the two countries are identical. But the sub-groups which exist in Australia are proportionately larger than their New Zealand counterparts. This fact has intensified their sense of separateness and aggravated their frictions, with consequences which are immediately observable in the party system. In terms of race, language and national origins, the Australians are remarkably homogeneous. In religion, however, because rather more Irish emigrated to Australia than to New Zealand, the number of Catholics amounts to 21% as against 11% in the smaller Dominion. This is politically relevant because the bulk of the Catholics (for the same reasons that formed them into Democrats in the U.S.A.) early joined the Labour Party, where their concentration makes them a powerful force. Also owing to their geographical distances from one another, the regional sentiments are more pronounced in Australia than New Zealand and explain why one country adopted, and the other abandoned, a federal constitution. The antagonisms between classes, and between city and country, are also more sharply felt in Australia. In practically every state over two-fifths of the population are to be found in the capital city; and in the rural areas the pastoral industry had to adapt to conditions of climate which required huge "runs" for the sheep to graze and led to cleavages between the owners and their laborers. Hence the Australian party system accurately reflects the same two lines of social division as in New Zealand--but with two important differences. The city-country conflict has fostered two parties on the anti-Labour side. The Country Party represents many of the farmers, while a minority of them join with the urban business interests in the Liberal Party. Labour has the backing of the industrial workers and many of those in the lower paid clerical jobs. Maintaining unity on the Labour side, however, has proven difficult. The party was split acutely in World War I on the issue of conscription, in the depression of the early nineteen-thirties over the choice between radical or orthodox finance, and since 1947 between its Catholic right-wing and a left wing which veered close to the Communists. When Labour are divided, the other side are sure to hold power. When Labour are unified, they can take advantage of the city-country feud and oust their opponents from office. Thus, the system described above as a duet in function and a trio in form corresponds appropriately to the patterns of the Australian society.

The country which comes next in order of social complexity is Canada. It has produced a distinctive brand of politics and a party system which supplies the nearest parallel to that of the United States. Canada consists of two cultures which have coexisted for nearly two centuries but have not fused. They are divided by language, religion, and political memories, and the capacity of the minority to survive is reinforced by its geographical concentration and its "peculiar institution", the Church. The art of governing Canada is exceedingly difficult. So far, only three men--Macdonald, Laurier, and King--have fully mastered its secret. For the politics of the Dominion require the maintenance of a delicate equilibrium among forces which are for the most part centrifugal. Externally, Canadians are drawn to influential poles both east and south. The English-speaking are pulled by trade and



sentiment to Britain; the French-speaking to France--but of the ancien régime, not of the contemporary Republic. Southward, the natural alignment of the North American continent has attracted Canadians to the United States for the mutual benefits of trade, defense, and propinquity. Internally, a country whose north is sparsely settled and whose people are stretched east-west in a narrow band from Newfoundland to Vancouver Island is divided into the five well-marked regions of the Maritimes, the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes, the Laurentian Shield, the Prairies, and the Pacific slope of the Rockies. The function of the federal government at the center is to hold the balance between the two cultures, among the domestic regions, and between the United States and Western Europe. Under these conditions, the party which keeps in power is the one which can discover a lowest common multiple of the contending interests. Thus, statesmanship in Canada becomes synonymous with compromise.

The two main parties of Canada are best described as federal unions within a federal union. The strategy of their opposition is dictated by two recurring factors: the unity of Quebec, and the tendency for people to vote one way provincially and another way nationally. For many decades Quebec was the "solid South" of Canada. Each of the major parties owed its long period of ascendancy to support from that province. But the retention of power at Ottawa has been consistent with continued opposition from the provincial capitals. What was so significant during the long Liberal hegemony was that effective party conflict virtually ceased at the federal level and also within most of the provinces, but was still conducted between the two levels. Only a few years ago, many provinces for all practical purposes had produced one-party regimes, since for many elections in a row there had been no political change. Equally significant was the fact that the Liberals, though lording it at Ottawa, did not control the majority of provincial governments. Thus, Duplessis' Union Nationale was ascendant in Quebec; the Conservatives ruled Ontario; the C.C.F. was dominant in Saskatchewan, as was Social Credit in Alberta. Yet some of the very districts which chose these parties provincially were voting for the Liberals nationally. What this must mean is that in Canada the effective line of political division is drawn between the nation and its component regions. Indeed, even when the party that controls the province is nominally the same as the one prevailing at Ottawa, conflict can still occur between province and Dominion--a striking example being the fight in the nineteen-thirties between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Premier Hepburn of Ontario.

It is these fundamental tendencies that are reflected in the history of Canadian politics. Because of the regional diversities in the Canadian economy and the geographical distribution of languages and religions, Canadians express their preferences on one set of issues locally, on another set nationally. Hence, as many as four or five parties may dominate the several provinces. At the center, however, that party prevails which cements a winning coalition by compromises and conciliation. Thus, following the same line of argument, one can see why the federal system, as such, is not the cause of the Canadian party-complex. Both the party system and federalism, in my judgement, are the



consequences of the same social factors. The federal structure is well-suited to the diversities of Canada's regions and cultures; and the parties, major and minor, which flow from these very diversities support and use that structure for their political ends.

Last to be considered is the most heterogeneous of the societies discussed in this study. Viewed cumulatively, South Africa exhibits all of the diversities of Canada--plus the tremendous complication of the size of the non-European majority. Also, in two respects the position of the English-speaking South Africans differs from that of English-speaking Canadians. In the former country they are the minority group within the European minority, whereas in Canada they still outnumber the fertile French. Also, in South Africa the memories of armed conflict between English-speaking and Afrikaners reach back to as recent a date as the beginning of this century; and the bitterness of military defeat has increased the determination of extreme Afrikanerdom for a political revenge.

Because non-Europeans are not permitted to participate in elections (save to the limited extent that the Coloured may vote in the Cape), the pivot for South African parties lies at the point where the Afrikaner group splits into fanatics and moderates. When there were enough of the moderates, their alliance with the English-speaking minority could produce victories for the United Party--the party of which Botha and Smuts were leaders. But the Afrikaner moderates are always threatened by their own extremists. In this way, Hertzog rebelled against Botha, as Malan did later against Hertzog. Since 1948 the program of apartheid has served as the rallying cry for the fanatics, who have thus far outmanoeuvred their opponents by appeals to prejudice, fear, and white supremacy.

South African society is subdivided both vertically and horizontally. The horizontal layers are racial, with the whites occupying the narrow apex at the top of the pyramid. Vertically, they are themselves split by language, religion, economic status, and the bitterness of the past. Since all lines of cleavage tend to coincide, each reinforces the other. In this way, there has arisen among the dominant whites a system of two major parties flanked by a number of splinters. But the nub of this party system is that it does not include and represent the majority. Instead, it serves merely to organize the fear for the majority which the minority entertain. Since South Africa comprises not one society, but several which have been superimposed in a hierarchy, the party system reflects the restrictions by which the country is crippled. Clearly, if the Liberal viewpoint were ever to prevail, one would expect to see many more parties in the arena.

Equally clearly one can observe that the institutions of government adopted in South Africa do not accord with the natural requirements of its plural society. The country was ill-fitted for a constitution which enshrines the British principle of parliamentary supremacy and establishes no legal checks to restrain the majority in the parliament. A federal structure, and certain internal checks and balances, would have been the appropriate means of

safeguarding minority rights--and also, in this case, the rights of the Bantu majority. But the parliamentary form and, with it, a structure that leans more to the unitary than the federal were preferred by Smuts because the minority's fear of the majority made them seek protection by concentrating the coercive powers of government at one focal point. South Africa, therefore, offers an example of both a party system and an institutional framework which result from the attempt of the few to preserve a position of privilege in a divided society.

### 5. Comparisons and Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn from the comparisons undertaken in this survey? In the process of transplanting the British way of governing, the amount that has been retained is perhaps more striking than the amount that was modified. Modifications there were bound to be since structures and processes do not emerge the same when their social accompaniments are altered. The British who emigrated to the Colonies were not an exact statistical cross-section of the original society, since the upper class element was far smaller and less influential. Moreover, in Canada and South Africa the British were condemned to coexist with other cultures which they had forcibly brought under their jurisdiction. In the homogeneous societies, party politics are founded, almost exclusively, on economic divisions. Hence it is in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, that a Labour Party has become strong, and not in South Africa or Canada. In the societies where language, religion, and race create their own affiliations, party politics are influenced as strongly by these groupings as by the economic. In the plural societies the attitudes of sub-groups towards the structure of government and the principles of politics will vary with their numerical strength. The party system of a people fundamentally at one can readily absorb the small electoral swings which turn a minority into a majority and result in a change of Ministry. But the exercise of majority power is quite differently viewed in such a country as Canada and South Africa. French-speaking Canadians are tenaciously jealous of minority rights and normally uphold the provincial position against the Dominion. Likewise in South Africa, and notably in Natal, the English-speaking minority has become sensitive to the need for safeguards--especially nowadays when Afrikaner extremism is rampant.

It is these cross-currents within society which inject the motive force into the party system and through it, determine how the institutions of the state will function. The same factors, moreover, supply a different content to such familiar labels and concepts as Liberal and Conservative. Conservatism in any system derives its ethos from the nature of that which it seeks to conserve. Thus an inhabitant of Quebec who wishes to keep his language, Church, and social order intact stands on the right-wing of Canadian politics, although in many national elections he has found it his interest to vote for a party which calls itself Liberal. Also on the right-wing, but defending a different status quo, are the financial interests of Toronto. In such a country as New Zealand, the center of political gravity has moved so

far over on the left that the conservatism of the National Party would be damned as outright communism by many a conservative in other lands. On the other hand, in South Africa the politics of fear have given such an impetus to racial reaction that the vaunted moderation of the United Party appears wishy-washy and ineffectual on any comparative scale of liberalism.

To sum up, then, it is these groupings in society and their psychological consequence in human attitudes which provide the substance for a party system. These also will mold the structure of government and modify its use. That structure can itself impinge upon the party system. But the dominant parties will always alter the structure, by law or custom, when their interests demand it. The merit of a comparative method is that it serves, better than any other, to illuminate these relationships which, if observed within a single system, are more likely to remain obscure.



## CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION IN A PENAL INSTITUTION

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton Jefferson Hotel, Sep. 4-6, 1958.

The issues of methodology have come to occupy an increasing proportion of professional time in political science, but that area of interest is distinguished from the conventional fields of the discipline by its lack of intrinsic objectives. Methodology, at best, is something of a staff function, serving the process of discovery in conventional fields. However, the absence of intrinsic goals for methodology leaves that subject especially liable to the winds of fad and fashion and without criteria of relevance for its propositions advanced. As a tentative, introductory criterion, it is suggested that the procedures of research must be responsive to the questions asked, the nature and conditions of inquiry, and the material limitations of the enterprise. General discussions of method, apart from the problems and conditions of inquiry, lend themselves to the inclusion of large elements of nonsense. In an effort to avoid that result, the present paper raises certain issues of method against the background of a completed study.

The outline of this paper will follow its three principal objectives. The first objective is to illustrate the use of the case approach in the examination of certain problems to which that approach seems particularly adapted. The second is to point out advantages of the approach under certain conditions of inquiry, and the final objective is to argue for a more intensive and critical use of the case approach in those circumstances to which it applies.

### A Case Study in Practice

The substantive study on which this paper will focus was drawn from the context of a much larger inquiry into the relationships of government and social process. The principal hypotheses of that larger research were that (1) the body of social habits and belief -- the culture of a community -- is largely determined by the manner in which the community is ruled, and that (2) substantial change in the nature of government will be reflected in cultural change and social disorganization.

The problem of that larger study -- the relationship of government to culture -- is precisely the type of circular problem which normally defies systematic examination, blunts the most refined tools of inquiry, and gives rise to large quantities of poetic nonsense. For governments are, in the main, the instruments created by society to achieve public ends. While the tool may shape the hand of the user or bend his back, it remains an artifact of the culture itself. A government both reflects and reacts upon the society of the governed.

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If we are to study only the consequences of a form of government for the society, the task of methodology is to arrest this circular relationship of variables and avoid the type of trap in which one sees, in the relationship of eggs to egg-cups, the evidence of some grand design.

The specific method of approach was to discover instances of government for examination where those governments were not responsive or responsible to the people ruled. It should be clear that the problem is in no way removed simply by reducing the scope of the study to the "laboratory" setting of campus or township government. Reductions are sometimes valuable though often subject to abuse. The real issue here was to find cases of government set apart from the values and behaviors of the subjects. Such cases are provided with dramatic clarity by prison government.

The appearance of those conditions in which the problem could be studied in the relatively closed interactional systems provided by prisons recommended the case method as a suitable research tool. Further advantages were provided by the fact that cases of prison government could be so selected as to provide for a high degree of comparability in physical environments, population characteristics, and the main dimensions of behavior. Holding such factors relatively constant by selection of cases, the larger study concentrated on two cases of prison government which indicated substantial differences on an authoritarian - liberal continuum. One institution which exemplified the liberal extreme (the setting for the specific study outlined below) was completing a decade of change from repressive, authoritarian patterns to its present practices of government.<sup>1</sup>

It is impossible to detail the 1,000 elements of procedure which, in sum, characterized each institution as authoritarian or liberal. The traditional ways of prison government have been studied as a model of autocracy, and the historical pattern has been to treat the subjects of that government as faceless and worthless numbers, without rights and goals of their own.<sup>2</sup> Hence, it was no problem to discover the penal regime which illustrated a repressive,

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1. Oahu Prison as of a decade ago and the Central Prison of North Carolina in 1953 provided examples of an extreme authoritarian government. The study drew upon two years of experience in Oahu Prison in 1945-47 and a systematic study of Central Prison's government and inmate society in 1953. The major part of the larger research and the study on which the specific illustration given below is based involved a year of field work in Oahu Prison during 1954-55, after its decade of transition was nearly complete.

2. Norman A. Polansky, "The Prison as an Autocracy," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXXIII (May-June, 1942), 16



authoritarian state and its related way of life. Discovery of a case which could be called liberal was more difficult but not impossible. The term "liberal" has not been reserved here for such conventional procedures as majority rule. Such procedures represent a means by which faith in the dignity and value of the person is institutionalized in government, but not the only means. In modern times, the practice of governments called "liberal" has been marked less by majority rule in any strict sense than by a concern for minority rights and, in the last analysis, the rights of man. Like the inmates studied here, modern man everywhere is subject to necessities over which he has no control, regulations in which he has little voice, and the requirements of the administrative state. Where liberal government survives, its faith in the ultimate dignity of the individual must be institutionalized in forms of government far different from the town meeting. Hence, the term "liberal" in this study was applied to ways of governing which express a concern for the will and welfare of the subject, belief in the ideal of a rule of law, and a regard for the worth of the person. Against that standard, it is possible to contrast civil or penal governments on an authoritarian - liberal scale.

In the larger study, it was possible to compare differences in beliefs and behaviors in the two prisons differently governed and to trace the consequences of governmental change in the single institution. The design of the research permitted the testing, in these societies in microcosm, of the type of propositions which Lewin, Lippitt, and White have advanced about social behavior in autocratic and democratic group atmospheres.<sup>3</sup>

It must not be assumed that the case method implies unsystematic and impressionistic techniques of data gathering simply because the well selected case may make such procedures relevant. Selection of the prison as the case for analysis made a large body of institutional records and statistics available as data. It also permitted the exploitation of a mass of excellent published scholarship on the prison community.<sup>4</sup> Among the varied techniques employed in the general study were those of par-

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3. Ronald Lippitt, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Autocratic and Democratic Group Atmospheres," The American Journal of Sociology, XLV (July, 1939), 26-49.

4. Any set of examples cited to illustrate that body of literature should include: Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community, (Boston, The Christopher Publishing House, 1940); Frederick E. Haynes, "The Sociological Study of the Prison Community," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, (Nov. - Dec., 1948), 436; Lloyd E. Ohlin, Sociology and the Field of Corrections (New York, The Russell Sage Foundation, 1956); Clarence Schrag, "Leadership Among Prison Inmates," American Sociological Review, XIX (Feb., 1954), 41; and Lloyd W. McCorkle and Richard Korn, "Resocialization Within Walls," The Annals, CCXCIII (May, 1954), 88; along with standard texts in criminology.



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ticipant observation, panel studies with groups of inmates, sociometric devices, analysis of votes for and within the inmate council, and a study of trends in reported disciplinary infractions by frequency and type over a ten year span. There is no inherent inconsistency involved in studying a problem within the framework of a case and using every relevant type of data or technique of data collection.

A summary of the larger study and its findings is available and need not detain us here.<sup>5</sup> Suffice to say that evidence supported the principal hypothesis. Characteristics of leadership, social structure and process, and expressed social values differed in the community governed in a liberal fashion from those aspects as observed under the authoritarian regime in this study -- and as reported elsewhere in research on the traditional prison community. It is not necessary to say that the differences were significant -- that term can be abdicated to the statisticians -- but the differences were visible to the naked eye.

Within the designed framework of the larger study, a specific problem appeared which constitutes the focus of this paper. It was one of those inevitable, annoying limitations which plague any research in depth but which are, perhaps, especially noticable and most difficult to ignore in the case approach. The problem was the failure of practice to correspond to principle -- the perpetuation of authoritarian behaviors in the setting identified as liberal and the conflicts which were thus produced.

In that institution selected for contrast with the frankly authoritarian regime, management had passed into the hands of a group of men dedicated to a liberal approach. They had launched a conscious challenge to the traditions of repressive penology, claiming that "men cannot be prepared to resume a place in free society while being governed in dictatorial ways." They rejected the elements of censorship, arbitrary force, secrecy and fear which had been the foundations of social control in the old regime. Instead the new management published a detailed manual of policy and procedure, established judicial disciplinary processes and an explicit code of conduct, accepted restraints on its own use of punishment, permitted free discussion and criticism, abandoned many requirements which had served to distinguish the status of the rulers from the ruled, individualized treatment, and sponsored an elected, representative inmate council. Dozens of detailed changes reflected an increased appreciation for the dignity, value and potential of the individual subject. The liberal element siezed control of the processes of decision and drafted both general policies and detailed regulations reflecting their views. The results of that labor produced a gold mine of data on social disorganization and brought on conditions approaching anarchy in the society of the prison.

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5. Richard McCleery, Policy Change in Prison Management (East Lansing: Michigan State University Governmental Research Bureau, 1958).

In time, the revolution was incorporated into practice, and an emerging social order, far different from its predecessor, appeared in the prison world. But, in spite of all that had changed on the levels of policy and regulation, a large part of the immediate behaviors of governing remained as they had been in the past. These authoritarian behaviors stood in sullen contradiction to the dominant policies of the administration and the requirements of the original research design. Interpretation of the overall research findings was constantly compromised by the bitter necessity of making allowances for the facts. Even though the evidence was clear that a change in the patterns of government altered behavior and belief in many respects, it was apparent that certain authoritarian behavior patterns of the governors and senior inmates showed a remarkable capacity to resist changes in the formal norms.

If this persistence of authoritarian behaviors in conflict with the ideals of a system were limited to penal institutions, it might be dismissed as unimportant. But inmates who venture into the outside world report the same phenomenon in government there. The record of history suggests that the potentiality of authoritarianism becoming dominant exists in all ages and all men. Carl Becker has weighed the substance of modern democracy against the ideal and found it wanting. His analysis might set the task for the study reported here.

It is in the nature of revolutions to the betrayed, since life and history have an inveterate habit of betraying the ideal aspirations of men. In this sense, the liberal-democratic revolution was bound to be betrayed -- men were sure to be neither so rational nor so well-intentioned as the ideology conceived them to be. But while a little betrayal is a normal thing, too much is something that calls for explanation.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, a specific task of this research was to identify those conditions and circumstances in which authoritarian behavior survived in the face of official disapproval.

It should be noted that the case study of an institutional community, like the laboratory study, is simplified by the limited number of alternatives for behavior which exist within the closed system. Institutional life is marked by repetitive behavior varying within rather close limits under relatively standard and constant conditions. Hence, it must not be assumed that intensive analysis of the case or a laboratory experiment can produce a complete roll of all the variables which operate in relation to a given event. Analysis can only concentrate on those factors present in the situation and associated with the behavior there. While the general approach to the problem was the case study, the specific procedures of data collection were observation and interview. An additional technique was that of injecting some action, interruption, suggestion or question into an ongoing process in order to

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6. Carl L. Becker, Modern Democracy (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1941), P. 33.



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gauge and compare reactions. For example, several persons with varied responsibilities might be asked what should be done in a certain case and why. The judgment of the investigator on how authoritarian a person was could be cross-checked by having other participants in the situation rate individuals. The judgment on how authoritarian the system was under various circumstances could be checked against such information as the number of disciplinary actions taken or the severity of penalties imposed for a type of infraction. However, the main resource of inquiry remained the observations and impressions of the student. It was the situation and not the techniques of recording data that was standardized.

Examples of the behaviors considered authoritarian in the prison setting are: habitual abuse toward subjects coupled with undue deference to superiors, the placing of conventional rules ahead of individual needs in a way indicating the relative value attached to each, and an inability to recognize differences in individuals. Such behaviors can be observed even in a college setting. More specific examples are the inability of some employees to conceive of alternatives to force as a means of gaining conformity, quick resort to punitive sanctions, the identification of subordination with "respect," the translation of every issue into a question of status or power, demands that employees be "backed up" right or wrong, resentment expressed toward inmate who were granted responsibility and a freedom of movement necessary to carry it out, refusal to accept a person's word in good faith or assume legitimate motives for his actions, hostility expressed against "lenient" judgments of the disciplinary committee or programs of individual treatment, an extreme defensiveness against questions, and the moral basis and evident sincerity with which all the above positions were maintained.

While the task of the study was to identify the situational variables related to this pattern of behavior, it should be noted that individual personality differences seemed to be almost as great as those produced by the situation. A tower guard with an excellent service record had to be dismissed when it was finally discovered that he never loaded his rifle and had religious scruples against shooting an escapee. The liberal group that revolutionized the management of the prison showed, on the whole, a vigorous ability to resist those pressures in the situation which worked toward authoritarian modes. The widest differences in authoritarian behavior were between that management group and the senior custodial employees. The possibility cannot be discounted that some of those differences were a function of the type of personality recruited to the different roles. However, when the widest allowances are made for differences in personality, large variations in behavior remain to be related to the situation.

While the frequency of authoritarian behavior on the part of the custodial force invites concentration on the circumstances of their work, in some situations the most dedicated rehabilitation officials displayed similar patterns of conduct. The impact of such conduct is most severe when it is least expected. The following summary of variables related



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to authoritarian behavior should not be taken to imply a rank order of their importance, nor can the impact of these factors in combination be reckoned as the sum of their influence separately. All that can be said is that the frequency and intensity of authoritarian behavior increases in the presence of such factors and decreases, not disappears, in their absence. Individual employees, transferred to new positions in the prison, altered their authoritarianism substantially in response to the presence of such factors in their new situation.

One related factor was personal insecurity. This relationship was recognized in the common sense of the prison culture. Inmates accepted abusive treatment from employees known to have family problems that would have provoked rebellion if extended by others. Employees censured by their superiors, sensitive to newspaper criticism of the institutional program, faced with the uncertain requirements of some new responsibility or a particular crisis of role definitions were inclined to demonstrate authoritarian responses. This was as true of treatment of officials as of the guards and was especially apt to mark the reaction of treatment officials to an inmate whose failure to respond to some opportunity presumably extended implied a criticism of the treatment program. The most frequent instances of authoritarian dominance on the part of the guard force do not seem to have occurred at the time when their punitive, custodial ideology permeated the prison. Such conduct reached its peak at a time when the liberal revolution in policy withdrew official sanction for authoritarianism and left the guards uncertain of their role and status in the institution. As changes left the guards feeling that the inmates were "getting out of line," custodial efforts to impose subordination were supported with a sense that both the social and the moral order of the prison world were disjointed.

One key to the relationship between insecurity and authoritarian behavior may lie in the observation that the imposition of punishment serves to release tension. The usually solemn disciplinary committee never appeared more light hearted and jovial than after some especially severe penalty had been handed down. The most domineering conduct was explained as "putting an inmate in his place" and seemed to reassure the ruler in the same measure that it intimidated the subject. The inmates who were most successful in exploiting the system to their own ends had developed obsequiousness to an art, while the officials who were least secure in their own role sought out scapegoats.

In the absence of official sanction from top management, authoritarian behavior was closely related to the amount of support provided by the immediate work group and intermediate officials. The senior guards maintained an elaborate rationale to justify departures from formal policy. The three guard watches performed identical functions but varied consistently in authoritarianism, creating different expectations for conduct on the part of the inmates. The three watch Captains rotated in a manner that gave them a different watch each month, and the inmates looked with alarm to the time when the most rigid of the Captains commanded the most authoritarian watch, bringing his sanction to the most domineering conduct. Since each watch performed their duties under identical circumstances the only factor left to account for this behavioral variation was the obvious disapproval

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of high officials and the insecure defensiveness provoked in response to it. Internal conflicts in the administration and the inconsistencies in the treatment of inmates added greatly to the social disorganization which accompanied administrative change.

In general, the amount of authoritarianism expressed by the guard force was greater than that evidenced by treatment officials. This comparison is complicated by the difference in behaviors required by their position, but analysis is aided by instances in which individuals moved from one type of position to another. However, an effort was made concentrate analysis on what might be called gratuitous authoritarianism rather than on behavior which might be implied by the duties of a given post. The Senior Captain said, "It is my job not to trust anyone." This was substantially correct, and it constitutes a limitation on analysis of his position. Old employees, whose habits had been fixed and rationalized under previous administrations, tended to be most authoritarian, but there were negative instances. The intellectual qualifications for the position of guard were less than those required of treatment officials, but within the guard force there seemed to be no relationship between intelligence and authoritarian conduct.

There was a direct relation between gratuitous authoritarianism and certain characteristics of the requirements of a position. The repeated performance of routine tasks seems to pass imperceptably into ritual behavior, and the ritual performance, in turn seems to assume a symbolic meaning. Any challenge of interruption to narrowly defined routines was met with bitter resentment and a sense of sacrilege. The rituals of security seemed to stand as a substitute for the effective practice of security, and a vast amount of custodial time was spent in the preparation of records to show that the men had been where they were supposed to be some time in the past. Persons who interrupted those processes stood little chance of gaining a fair hearing or reasonable treatment. The non-custodial employee who operated the record office with a perfection of routine was also notoriously abusive and domineering to inmates. Post duties of the guards were narrowly and negatively defined. The men whose duties were no more than to "prevent" and "prohibit" tended to expand those requirements into a philosophy of government and to develop a stereotyped conception of inmates which supported their exercise. Although the guard force was in close and constant contact with inmates, the narrow and routine definition of their duties seemed to prevent their seeing inmates as individuals and responding to them as humans. Other officials whose duties were less rigidly defined were less inclined to stereotype the inmate and more able to react to individual differences, even though they were farther removed from daily contact with the men.

The work of the guards in the cell block was that most governed by routine and regimentation. In that setting, perceptions were most apt to be stereotyped and behavior to be authoritarian. Guards on duty there, supported by the attitudes and definitions of their work group, were inclined to think of all inmates as dangerous, evil, and in need of repression. In fact, however, the inmates who were most dangerous and defined as in need of repression were confined in a special, incorrigible



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unit. On each watch a single guard was in full charge of the small group in that area. He was required to keep his wards under close and constant supervision, and all contacts with these men passed through him. In that situation, where authoritarianism would seem to be in order, guards tended to become "soft," take a personal interest in individuals, let discipline relax, and become known as "pop" to the inmates. The substantial distinction seems to be that the more comprehensive duties of that post required a view of the inmates as individual persons.

A similar distinction appeared in the behavior of guards and work supervisors, two groups with similar general qualifications. Where the work was routine, menial and undifferentiated, the authoritarian behavior of supervisors was much like that of the guards. Where the work was differentiated and complex, where supervision was more individual, the general patterns of attitude and behavior of the supervisor were more liberal. As another example, the pursuit of an escapee required the guards to concentrate on the man as an individual and take his personality into account in the work. The behavior of the guards was normally less punitive and abusive toward an escapee than toward an inmate guilty of some less serious offense in the prison yard. In a very general way, authoritarianism seemed to increase in proportion as an individual was removed from the main stream of communication.

Another related factor seems to be the principle of hierarchy in organizational structure. The custodial force was a uniformed, disciplined and militantly organized group in which distinctions in rank were expressed in visible symbols. Although there were considerable differences in authoritarianism within this group, that behavior was always more frequent in the custodial ranks than among work supervisors or other staff elements. It was the fierce objection of the custodial force which vetoed a staff proposal to allow "trustys" to have their uniforms tailored and pressed. Guards were especially sensitive to any change which threatened to blur the visible distinctions of their superiority over inmates. The amount of deference demanded of subordinates seemed to be in proportion to the amount which the guard was obliged to extend to his own superiors. Officials from the loosely structured treatment division never fully appreciated the extent to which their informal relationships with inmates outraged the guards and sometimes led to custodial repression of those inmates. To the guards, the class system of the prison institutionalized the superiority of righteousness over evil. The social and moral order were as one, and any tinkering with the traditional structure -- such as the establishment of an inmate council -- was a compromise with sin. Persons within the militantly graded hierarchy tended to translate every issue into terms of power and the implications for the status of individuals.

Each of the factors listed above -- personal insecurity, challenge or criticism, the presence of informal group support, routine performance of narrow or negatively defined duties, and an rigid hierarchy -- was related to the persistence of authoritarian behaviors in the face of a formal



policy revolution. The tradition of disciplined obedience indoctrinated in the guard force would have led that force to face mortal danger on command. It was of no use for asking them to give up the security of accustomed ways. It was of little use in the face of a conflict of basic ideologies and the fundamental ways of life built into their unthought ~~outlets~~ habits, and expectations.

The factors identified here are not unique to penal administration. With the possible exception of personal insecurity, they are factors characteristic of any bureaucracy to some degree. Whether these factors only perpetuate authoritarian behaviors or whether they can serve to create such behavior in the absence of a sympathetic tradition is a question which invites further research. It can only be noted here that -- like Aristototele's knife -- the guard force has retained its character through a considerable replacement of its individual members.

Certain conclusions may be drawn from this study beyond the identification of situational factors related to authoritarianism in the prison. The opinion of individual participants attributed the conflict in the prison to the malicious motives of others, who proved, on further examination, to be deeply sincere. The conflict was deeply rooted in the nature of the situation. The excellent and expanding body of literature on the authoritarian personality has, by virtue of both the interests and the methods employed, tended to focus attention on the variables of childhood experience and basic character structure.<sup>7</sup> That body of scholarship has been applied in political science in the form of a concern that the selection of officials recruit democratic personality types. The implication of this study and its method is that concern should focus on the environment of the official and the elements in the governmental situation which condition his behavior. It comes closer to the traditional concern of political science with the impact of institutional arrangements on the conduct of men. This study suggests that any man will tend to indulge in authoritarian behaviors when the factors in his situation combine to predispose that end. Our larger task is to discover those factors in the situation which may predispose all men to a choice of democratic means. The method illustrated here is proposed as especially pertinent to that task.

#### Advantages of the Case Approach

Although the development of refined criteria for the relevance of research procedures to given problems is the major task of methodology, criticism may begin with the rough criteria advanced earlier: procedures must be responsive to the questions asked, the nature and conditions of inquiry,

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7. T. W. Adorno and Others, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950)

and the material limitations of the enterprise. The existence of equally legitimate procedures in the general tool kit of method does not mean that there is not one best approach to a given problem.

The approach adopted here seemed suitable to the major problem posed, the problem of the influence of government on culture. It was not the only possible approach. An analysis of vital statistics and behavioral records of colonial or occupied nations might have supplied the condition of government independent of the society ruled. If the problem had committed the researcher to a study of family or child rearing practices, only the latter approach would have served. However, the data discovered by such an approach might have been related to a multitude of factors other than the form of government and beyond the possibility of matching by research design, even assuming that the procedures for collecting the data were comparable at the start. The fundamental justification of the case approach here lay in the ability of the researcher to select cases which fulfilled the principal condition of the problem (the independence of the governmental variable), permitted the control or matching of intervening variables, and allow the comparison or repetition of the study in similar instances.

Accepting the relevance of the case approach to this problem, criticism may center on the use of penal institutions as opposed to hospitals or schools. It is clear that not every society in microcosm satisfies the conditions of the problem, but a number of others might have served nearly as well. Although rational justifications can be advanced (the relative permanence of the subject population, the availability of records, the range of alternative behaviors subject to observation), candor requires an admission that the choice of setting was governed by the preferences and past research experience of the student as well as the material limits of the enterprise. Excellent work has since been reported from hospitals for chronic patients on similar problems.

A major advantage of the case approach and intensive observation for the central problem of this study was to drive home the conflict between definition and actuality, between the liberal constitution of government and the perpetuation of authoritarian behavior in governing. Careful scholarship should not need to depend on such aids, but real research often does. When the study was forced to focus on the special problem of authoritarian behavior, the accident which had directed the study to the prison setting produced an unearned increment of good fortune. The prison setting is exceptional in the extent to which it permits inclinations toward authoritarian behavior to be expressed. Even in the most liberal prison setting, the inmate has no more recourse against an official than the urban citizen against the township Justice of the Peace. There is a higher probability of authoritarian behavior occurring, and occurring under conditions allowing observation, in a prison than in any other setting which comes to mind. Foresight dictates the selection of cases in which

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the behavior to be studied is both present and visible to a maximum degree.

At a stage in the art when exact quantification and precision in measurement is all the rage, criticism is apt to focus on the apparent sloppiness of impressionistic observation and interviewing in depth. Nor can it be denied that a multivariant design for the quantitative analysis of factors related to authoritarianism would be a substantial achievement. Even if the present research had known the relevant variables in advance, it was not staffed with sufficient wit to accomplish that end. But a word is in order on the general question of precision in research and its role in the case study. There is a disposition to identify science with the number of figures to the right of a decimal point, and that disposition may be regarded as unfortunate. Precision in research may take alternate forms.

When the problem posed is one which requires the extraction of data from a raw and undifferentiated situation in experience, or a variety of such situations, then the place for precision is in the most exact refinement of the measuring instruments. Problems of the amount of radio-activity in teeth or the amount of rural-urban conflict in politics are of that type and subject to the standards of criticism relevant to that mode of inquiry. But, when the problem posed is one of seeking the conditions under which an event will or will not occur, the issue of precision is moved elsewhere. There may be precision in the logical process by which the hypothetical conditions of an event are deduced. There may be precision involved in the identification and selection of cases which incorporate the conditions assumed. There is precision in the sense of carefully washing a test tube before preparing a formula in order to avoid foreign bodies which confound an experiment.

Where the nature of the problem posed permits accurate formulation of a research design, where the conditions of inquiry permit a precise selection of cases, the collection of data may take the form of seeing an event or not seeing it. In general, the more precision can be incorporated in the beginning of inquiry, the less is required at the end. The case study and the techniques of intensive observation lend themselves to problems of that type. An incidental consequence of this formulation is to posit a place in research for those of us who have difficulty in counting change, and the formulation may be subject to a charge of self interest on that score.

### A Plea for the Critical Use of Case Studies

The present example of inquiry into authoritarianism, seen in contrast with other work on the subject, indicates the relation of discovery to the method employed. The results of all research depend on the kind of questions asked and the type of bucket used to dip facts from the bottomless



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of experience. A danger for political science lies in concentrating on the limited set of problems subject to solution with the bright, new quantitative tools at hand. The development of a science requires more than the arts of mathematics. The movement of other disciplines toward scientific status can be measured largely in terms of the analysis of behavior in relation to the conditions in which it occurs. This is the heart of the experimental method.

The trend toward precise measurement in political science has much merit but some hazard. It tends at times to be allied with a metaphysical element in the traditions of the discipline and to move away from the experimental approach. The use of quantitative techniques is often accompanied by a disposition to deal with masses of data which submerge the conditions of individual difference in some concept of an average. Such concerns come close to the ancient questions of innate internal dynamics of the organism or "free will." Philosophers may always quarrel about the essential nature of man and what the spirit will do in an environmental vacuum, but the behavior we experience is behavior in concrete situations. There is reason to believe that a political science will emerge, if ever, from the specification of behavioral patterns in terms of the conditions under which these occur. Any device, quantitative or impressionistic, that serves that end should be welcome.

This formulation places an unorthodox emphasis on the approach of the case study. It is the technique of inquiry which, if properly employed, can fulfill the logical requirements of experimental method and relate events to environmental circumstances. A concept of the case as a critical experiment forces attention to the theoretical context from which any methodological tool gains its significance. Unless one starts with the assumption that the plan of the universe is concealed in every atom, the first rule of this approach is to know what any case is a case of. The heart of the case approach is the selection of a setting that provides and controls those conditions under which theory expects a given event to occur.

If theory declares that leadership is a situational characteristic, that the leader emerges in relation to some problem facing the group, the natural setting for study is a group faced with some crisis or disaster radically altering its situation. If theory holds that leadership is a personal quality or individual characteristic, the setting for study is one where a group of people are stripped to their shorts, denied all distinguishing marks of position or possessions, and set to work under identical circumstances. Those are precisely the conditions under which a group of men are admitted to a prison, and the patterns of leadership which emerge there can be observed with experimental clarity. If theory asserts something about the capacity of rules and sanctions to alter

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A plea for the critical use of the case study is a plea for political theory. Mature research is that which takes its problems from theory and enriches theory, in turn, with its results. It calls for the logical deduction of the conditions in which events and behaviors may be predicted. That is the method of science and the method which an intensive analysis of well selected cases is designed to serve.



## THE PROMISE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE\*

By C. Wright Mills

Men nowadays often feel that they cannot solve the troubles they are up against so long as they remain within their private situations. In this, they are usually quite correct. Limited by the boundaries of their everyday worlds, most people never transcend the close-up horizons of their job and family and neighborhood; in other milieux they remain visitors or spectators. And the more aware they become, however vaguely, of ideals and threats, ambitions and promises, which do transcend these immediate locales, the more trapped they come to feel.

Underneath this sense of the trap, there are seemingly impersonal changes in the structure of society. Classes rise and classes fall. There is slump, there is war, there is boom. Political regimes turn over. Cities sprawl into the countryside. The rate of investment rises or declines. Military institutions expand--facts about such institutional transformations are also facts about the biographies and the careers, the everyday frustrations, successes, troubles, happiness of individual men and women. Neither biographical qualities nor historical sequences can be understood without understanding the other, yet the troubles men feel--especially in the politically continuous society of the United States--are not usually defined in terms of historic change and institutional contradictions; the well-being they experience is not usually imputed to the shaping of society and its impersonal developments. They cannot usually cope with their personal troubles in such ways as to confront the structural transformations that usually lie beneath them. They try to remain altogether private men. And surely this is no wonder. In what age of human history have been so fully exposed at so fast an historical rate to such pivotal events, such earth-quakes of change? Within the limits of a single generation, the social structure of one-sixth of mankind is transformed from all that is feudal and backward into all that is modern and advanced in a great power state. After two centuries of ascendancy, capitalism is shown up as only one way to industrialize a human society; and even formal democracy is restricted to a small portion of humanity. Political colonies are freed; less visible forms of imperialism are installed. Eastern Europe experiences revolution. Since only yesterday totalitarian societies arise--and are smashed to fragments; others arise and after long travail make new beginnings--ambiguous, tentative, frustrated. At long last, ancient China enters upon the steep ascent of industrialization, claws and bites its way into the terrors and wonders of the modern world. Freed of colonial shackles, but not of the legacies they have left, men struggle ambiguously, their future much in doubt. Everywhere in the underdeveloped world, demands and aspirations are so urgently raised that Asia, Africa, Latin America are shaken to their old roots by wars, limited and unlimited; by revolutions, partial and complete, progressive and reactionary. And so enlarged and concentrated have the means of international power become, so centralized the national control of these economic facilities, military machines, political apparatuses, that a new world of nations and states now lies before us divided, the dominant nation at each pole concentrating its most concerted and massive effort upon the preparation of World War III.

\* This essay is composed of abbreviated sections drawn from a forthcoming book on the social sciences, The Sociological Imagination, which Oxford University Press will publish in the spring of 1959.

Surely now we must speak in all sobriety of epochal transformations; surely now we are forced to realize that the very shaping of history itself out-paces our ability to orient ourselves in accordance with cherished values. And which values? Even when we do not panic, we know that we are more often than not without firm values; that older ways of feeling, assessing, thinking have collapsed, but that newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral stasis. Is it any wonder that men feel they cannot cope with all this, cannot understand its meanings for their own lives, cannot relate themselves to it morally and that they become as best they can private and blase, and in self-protection morally insensible?

It is not only information that we need, although in this age of fact, information often dominates our attention and overwhelms our capacity to assimilate it.

It is not only skills of analysis we need, although our efforts to acquire these often exhaust our limited moral energy.

What is needed, and what is felt to be needed, is a kind of sensibility that will help us to use information and skills in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within ourselves. It is just this kind of sensibility, just these kinds of perspectives, that artists and scholars, publics and journalists, scientists and editors are slowly coming to expect of what I am going to call the sociological imagination.

# I.

This quality of mind enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals--and in doing so, to take into account how individuals often become falsely conscious of their true position. In the welter of the individual's daily experience, the framework of modern society is sought; within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated. Only by such means can the personal uneasiness of individuals be focused as explicit troubles, and the indifference of publics be transformed into the confrontation of public issues. The sociological imagination very largely consists of the capacities and skills required for such work as this.

The first yield of that imagination--and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it--is the idea that the individual cannot understand his own experience or gauge his own life-fate without locating himself within the structure of his epoch and with referencet to the life-chances of all individuals in his kinds of milieux. In many ways it is a terrible lesson; in many ways it is a magnificent lesson. We do not know the limits of man's capacities for supreme effort or willing degradation, for agony or glee, for pleasurable brutality or the sweetness of reason. But in our time we have come to know that the limits of "human nature" are frighteningly broad. We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society. He lives out a biography, and he lives it out within some historical sequence. By the fact of his living

he contributes, however minutely, to the shaping of this society and to the shaping of its history. He is also made by society and by its historical push and shove--and at times used by them as well.

The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within some society. That is its task and its promise. To recognize this task and this promise, I believe, is the mark of the classic social analyst. It is a characterizing feature of Herbert Spencer, turgid, polysyllabic and embrasive; of E.A. Ross--graceful, mack-raking, upright; of August Comte and Emile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim. It is the quality of all that is intellectually excellent in Karl Marx; it is the clue to Thorstein Veblen's brilliance, to Joseph Schumpeter's many-sided insight; it is the basis of the psychological sweep of W.H.E. Lecky no less than of the profundity and clarity of Max Weber. And it is present as the signal of what is best in contemporary studies of man and society.

No social study that does not come back to the problems of biography and of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey, no matter how grubbing or how high-flown that journey may be. Whatever the specific problems of the classic social analysts; however limited or however broad the features of social reality they have examined, those who have been imaginatively aware of the promise of their work, have consistently asked three sorts of Questions:

(1) What is this particular society like? What is its structure as a whole? What are its components, and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of society? And within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature we are examining for its continuance and for its changes?

(2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity? How does any particular feature we are examining affect and how is it affected by the historical epoch in which it moves? And this epoch--what are its characterizing features? How does it differ from other epochs? What if any are its characteristic ways of history-making?

(3) What types of men and women prevail in this society and in this epoch? What varieties of people are coming to prevail, and what are the mechanics by which they are selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What is "human nature"--as it is revealed and shaped by the human conduct and character we observe in this society in this epoch?

Whether the point of interest is a great state or a literary mood, a family, a model prison, a religious creed--these are the kinds of questions classic social analysts have asked. Such questions are the major bearing points of all classic studies of man and society--and they are the questions inevitably raised by any mind possessing the sociological imagination. For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another: from the political to the psychological; from examination of a family to assessment of a national budget; from the theological to the military;



from considerations of an oil industry to study of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal epochal transformation to the most intimate features of the human self--and to see the relations between the two. It is the capacity to construct at the intersection of such perspectives adequate views of total societies and of their components; to understand the variety of individuals and their troubles in terms of the society as a whole and of its structural issues. Back of its use there is the urge to find the social and historical meaning of the individuals and of their roles in the society and in the epoch in which they have their quality and their being. That, in brief, is what I mean when I say that it is by the sociological imagination that men hope to grasp what is going on in history, in biography, and to understand what is happening in themselves as minute points of the intersection of biography and history within society. They acquire, in a word, a new way of thinking and experience a transvaluation of values. By their reflection and by the enlarged scope of their sensibility they realize the cultural meaning of the social sciences.

## II.

Perhaps the single most insightful and fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination works is the distinction between "The personal troubles of milieu" and "the public issues of social structure." These terms, in fact, are among the characterizing features of this imagination and as well of all classic work in social science.

Troubles occur within the character of the individual, and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is usually directly and personally aware. Accordingly, to the extent that troubles are primarily "interpersonal," their statement and their resolution properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu--the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity. A trouble is a private issue: values cherished by an individual are felt by him to be threatened.

Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life. They have to do with the organization of many such milieux into the institutions of an historical society as a whole. They are, in this sense, public problems; they are problems of structure; they have to do with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger context of social and historical life. An issue is a public trouble: some value cherished by publics is felt to be threatened. Often there is a debate about what that value really is and about what it is that really threatens it. This debate is often endless and unfocused because it is the very nature of an issue, unlike even widespread trouble, that it cannot very well be defined in terms of a set of immediate personal milieux, of the everyday environments of ordinary men. It is in fact most often a crisis in institutional arrangements, and often it involves what is called in Marxist literature "contra-

diction" or "antagonisms." These terms refer, I think, to a condition in which expected, or at least proclaimed, values are threatened by some structural development or, more classically, to the unintended coincidences of several structural trends. It is the task of the sociological imagination to grasp such structural trends and issues, and their meaning for the life and the troubles of a variety of individuals.

In these terms, consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000, one man only is unemployed, that is a personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when, in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. For the very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a matter of individuals.

Or consider war. The personal problem of war, when it occurs, is how to survive it or how to die in it with honor; how to make money out of it; how to climb into the higher safety of the military apparatus or how to contribute to the war's termination. In short, according to one's values, to find a set of milieux and within them to survive the war or to give effect to one's death in it. But the structural issues of war have to do with its causes, with what types of men it throws up into command, with the unorganized irresponsibility of a world of nation-states, with the effects upon economic and political and family and religious institutions and milieux. Whether we want war to stop, or whether we want it to continue, we must spell out the "we" into a party or a class or a movement or one's own dramatic self, conceived as an instrument that may influence such decisions as are involved.

In so far as the family as an institution turns women into darling little slaves and men into their chief providers and unweaned dependents, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable of purely private solution. In so far as the elements of an economy are so arranged that slumps occur, the problem of unemployment becomes incapable of personal solution. In so far as there exists an organized network of ethnic and racial prejudice, anchored in the economic ways of entire strata, the Jew and the Negro will find no satisfying solution to their troubles as persons. In so far as the overdeveloped megalopolis and the overdeveloped automobile are built-in features of the overdeveloped society, the problems of urban living will not be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth. In so far as war is inherent in the nation-state system and in the uneven industrialization of the world, the ordinary individual--with or without psychiatric aid--in his restricted milieux will be powerless to solve the troubles this system or lack of system imposes upon him.

What we experience in various and specific milieux is often caused by structural changes. To understand the changes of many personal milieux requires us to look beyond these merely personal environments. And the number and variety of such structural changes increase as the institutions within which we live become more embracing and more intricately connected with one another. To be aware of the idea of social structure and to use it with sensibility is to be capable of tracing such linkages and causal sequences within and among a great variety of milieux. To be able to do that is to possess one of the prime means of the sociological imagination. To use that imagination fully, we must continuously translate both the troubles of milieux and the issues of publics into problems of social science. To know the major issues for publics and the key troubles of private individuals in our time, we must ask what values are threatened, and what values are most supported, by the characterizing trends of our times. And in both cases, assuming these values, we must ask: what are the salient contradictions of structure that threaten them?

### III.

At any given moment, of course, "social science" consists of what duly recognized social scientists are doing, but all of them are by no means doing the same thing, in fact not even the same sort of thing. Social science is also what social scientists of the past have done, but different students choose to construct and to remember different histories of their disciplines. To ignore these facts by pretending to speak for an abstraction called "social science" is merely pompous self-deception. That is why, when I speak of "the promise of social science," I hope it is clear that I mean the promise as I see it. Before now, I have not written much "about" social science, first of all, because I have been rather busy practicing it, and well content to do so. Then too, I have had, and do have, a distaste for the posture of The Academic Statesman.

Just now, however, among social scientists there is a quite widespread uneasiness, both intellectual and moral, about the directions their chosen studies often seem to be taking. This uneasiness, as well as the unfortunate tendencies that contribute to it, are, I suppose, part of a general malaise of modern intellectual life. Yet perhaps the uneasiness is more acute among social scientists, if only because of the larger promise that has guided much earlier work and the urgent need for such work today, as that need is revealed, among other tokens, by the attempt to possess and to use the sociological imagination. By no means does everyone involved share this uneasiness; but the very fact that many do not is itself cause for further uneasiness among those who are alert to the promise and honest enough to admit the pretentious mediocrity of much current effort.

The promise which I see in these human disciplines, and in the kind of imagination they make available, is by no means taken up by all those who are now at work on studies of man and society. Social science as I am trying to define it, in short, is not the only way in which it is defined. Of late the conception I happen to hold has not been ascendant; in fact, it is now quite threatened by major



political, academic and ideological trends, especially, I think, in the United States. Social science does often become merely a set of bureaucratic techniques which inhibit social inquiry by methodological pretensions; it does often seem congested by obscurantist conceptions; it does often trivialize its work by concern with minor problems unconnected with publicly relevant issues. These inhibitions, obscurities, and trivialities cause uneasiness, yet no newly ascendant school or doctrine or style of research enjoys an altogether easy dominance. It may be meaningless or irrelevant to assert that there is a crisis in the social studies today (there is usually, let us be grateful, "a crisis" in all living studies); but certainly it must be said that they are in both a confused and a confusing condition.

Some social scientists stress the need for "research teams of technicians," others for the primacy of the individual scholar. Some expend great energy upon refinements of methods and techniques of investigation; others think the scholarly ways of the intellectual craftsman are being abandoned and ought now to be rehabilitated. Some go about their work in accordance with a rigid set of mechanical procedures; others seek to develop, to invite, and to use the sociological imagination. Some, being addicts of the high formalism of "theory", associate and disassociate concepts in what often seems a curiously Byzantine manner; others urge simplicity of statement and the elaboration of terms only when it is clear that they enlarge the scope of sensibility and further the reach of reasoning. Some narrowly study only small-scale milieux, in the hope of "building up" to conceptions of larger structures; others examine social structures in which they try "to locate" many smaller milieux. Some, neglecting comparative studies altogether, study only one small community in one society at a time; others in a fully comparative scale work directly on the national social structures of the world. Some confine their research to static or very short-run sequences of human affairs; others, concerned with issues which are only apparent in historical perspective, take as the subject of their inquiry nothing less than the course of human history. Some specialize their work according to academic departments; others, drawing upon all departments, specialize topically and upon problems, regardless of where they lie academically. Some confront the human variety. Some do not.

#### IV.

If we wish to carry out the promise of social science, we must first find out where we stand within the intellectual apparatus of our time, and where this apparatus stands within prevailing social structures. And we must, I think, distinguish three political roles in terms of which the social scientist, as a carrier of reasoning and imagination, may conceive of himself; we must make our own choice among these roles; and we must confront some of the difficulties presented to those who would enact it.

Much social science, perhaps especially sociology, contains the theme of the philosopher-king. From Auguste Comte to Karl Mannheim,

one finds the plea for greater power, for "the man of knowledge." They have wanted to understand society in order to increase the role of reason in human affairs. In more specific statement, the enthronement of reason means the enthronement of "the man of reason." This one idea of the role of reason in human affairs has done much to cause social scientists to keep very general indeed their active acceptance of reason as a social value. For they have wished to avoid the silliness of such an idea when it is considered alongside the facts of power. The idea also goes against the grain of populist versions of democracy, for it involves an aristocracy, even if an aristocracy of talent rather than of birth or wealth.

The quality of politics does of course depend upon the intellectual qualities of those who are engaged in it. Were "philosophers" kings, I should immediately desire to move to another country; but when kings are without any "philosophy," I believe them incapable of responsible rule. Fortunately, the rather foolish idea that the social scientist should become a philosopher king is only one version of the public role of the social scientist.

The second, and now the most usual role, is to become an advisor to the king. The bureaucratic uses of these disciplines are a major current embodiment of this role. Involved in it, the individual social scientist tends to become part of those many tendencies of modern society to make the individual a part of a functionally rational bureaucracy; it tends to make him sink into his specialized slot in such a way as not to be explicitly concerned with the total structure of modern society and its main drift. Then social science itself often becomes a functionally rational machine; the individual social scientist tends to lose his moral autonomy and his substantive rationality, and the role of reason in human affairs tends to become merely a refinement of techniques for administrative and manipulative uses.

But that is the role of advisor to kings in one of its worst forms; those who play this role need not, I believe, assume the bureaucratic style. It is at all times most delicate to fulfill in such a way as to retain moral and intellectual integrity, and hence, freely to work on the tasks of social science. So much, I believe, is evident. It is easy for consultants to imagine themselves to be "philosophers" and their clients "enlightened rulers," but even should they be "philosophers," those they serve may not even be enlightenable. That is one reason I am so impressed by the loyalty of some consultants to the unenlightened despots they serve. It is a loyalty that seems strained neither by despotic incompetence nor by dogmatic silliness.

I do not assert that the role of advisor cannot be performed well; in fact, I know that it can, and that there are men who are doing it. Were there more such men the political and intellectual tasks of those social scientists who elect the third role would become much less burdensome, for it overlaps with this one.

The third way in which the social scientist may attempt to realize the value of rationality and its role in human affairs is also well known, and sometimes even practiced. It is to remain independent and to do one's own work, which means to select one's own problems, but to direct

this work at kings as well as to "publics." Such a conception prompts us to imagine social science as a sort of public intelligence apparatus, concerned with public issues and private troubles and with the structural trends of our time underlying them both-- and to imagine individual social scientists as rational members of a self-controlled association, which we call the social sciences.

In taking up such a role, we are trying to act upon the value of rationality; in assuming that it may not be altogether effective, we are assuming a theory of history-making: we are assuming that "man" is free and that by his rational endeavors he can influence the course of history.

## V.

In assuming the third role, the social scientist does not see himself as some autonomous being standing "outside society." In common with most other people, he does feel that he stands outside the major history-making decisions of this post-modern epoch; at the same time he knows that he is among those who take many of the consequences of these decisions. That is one major reason why (1) to the extent that he is aware of what he is doing, he becomes an explicitly political man. No one is "outside society;" the question is where each stands within it. And that is also (2) why he does not assume the posture that is called "the tragic view of life"; the feeling that he is personally responsible for history because he too, as a human being, is somehow involved in all that is happening in history.

The social scientist, given his middling circumstances of class and power, by his activities in these milieux is often in no better position than the ordinary individual to solve structural problems, for their solution can never be merely intellectual or merely private. Their proper statement cannot be confined to the milieux open to the will of social scientists; neither can their solutions, which means, of course, that they are problems of social and political and economic power. But the social scientist is not only an "ordinary man." It is his very task intellectually to transcend the milieux in which he happens to live, and this he does when he considers the economic order of 19th century England or the status hierarchy of 20th century America, the military institutions of Imperial Rome, or the political structure of the Soviet Union.

In so far as the values of freedom and rationality concern him, one of his themes for study is the objective chances that given types of men have within given types of social structure to become free and rational as individuals. Another of his themes has to do with what chances, if any, men of different positions in differing types of society have, first, by their reason and experience, to transcend their everyday milieux, and second, by virtue of their power, to act with consequence for the structure of their society and their epoch. These are the problems of the role of reason in history.



It is, I think, the political task of the social scientist who accepts the ideals of freedom and reason, to address his work to each of three types of men classifiably in terms of power and knowledge. I. To those with power and with awareness of it, he imputes varying measures of responsibility for such structural consequences as he finds by his work to be decisively influenced by their decisions and their lack of decisions. II. To those whose actions have such consequences, but who do not seem to be aware of them, he directs whatever he has found out about those consequences. He attempts to educate, and then again, he imputes responsibility. III. To those who are regularly without such power and whose awareness is confined to their everyday milieu, he reveals by his work the meaning of structural trends and decisions for these milieus, the ways in which personal troubles are connected with public issues; in the course of these efforts, he states what he has found out concerning the actions of the more powerful. These are his major educational tasks, and they are his major public tasks when he speaks to any larger audience. Let us now examine some of the problems and tasks set by this third role.

## VI.

Regardless of the scope of his awareness, the social scientist is usually a professor, and this occupational fact very much determines what he is able to do. As a professor, he addresses students, and on occasion, by speeches and by writings, publics of larger scale and more strategic position. In discussing what his public role may be, let us stick close to these simple facts of power, or if you like, to the facts of his powerlessness.

In so far as he is concerned with liberal, that is to say, liberating, education, his public role has two goals:

What he ought to do for the individual is to turn personal troubles and concerns into social issues and problems open to reason. His aim is to help the individual become a self-educating man. For only then would he be reasonable and free.

What he ought to do for the society is to combat all those forces which are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass society, or put as a positive goal--his aim is to help build and to strengthen self-cultivating publics. For only then might society be reasonable and free.

I must explain just what this means in a slightly indirect way; reminding you that these are very large issues, I ask your patience.

We are concerned with skills and with values. Among "skills," however, some are more and some are less relevant to the task of liberation. I do not believe that skills and values can be so easily separated as in our search for neutral skills we often assume. It is a matter of degree, with skills at one extreme and values at the other. But in the middle range of this scale, there are what I shall call sensibilities, and it is these which should interest us most. To train someone to operate a lathe or to read and write is in large part a training of skill; to help someone decide what they really want out of their life, or to debate with them Stoic, Christian, and Humanist

ways of living, is a cultivation or an education of values. But to assist in the birth among a group of people of those cultural and political and technical sensibilities which would make them free members of rational publics, this is at once a training in skills and an education of values.

Alongside skill and value, we ought to put sensibility, which includes them both, and more besides: it includes a sort of therapy in the ancient sense of clarifying one's knowledge of self. It includes the cultivation of all those skills, or controversy with oneself, that we call thinking, and which, when engaged in with others, we call debate. As an educator you must begin with what interests the individual most deeply, even if it seems to you altogether trivial and cheap. You must proceed in such a way and with such materials as to enable him to gain increasingly rational insight into these concerns, and into others he will acquire in the process of this education. And you must try to develop men and women who can and who will by themselves continue what you have begun: the end-product of any liberating education is simply the self-educating, self-cultivating man and woman; in short, the free and rational individual.

A society in which such individuals are the ascendant type is one major meaning of the word democratic. Such a society may also be defined as one in which genuine publics prevail, rather than a society of masses. By this, I mean the following:

Whether or not they are aware of them, men in a mass society are gripped by personal troubles which they are not able to turn into social issues. They do not understand the interplay of these personal troubles of their milieu with problems of social structure. The knowledgeable man in a genuine public is able to do just that: he understands that what he thinks and feels to be personal troubles are very often also problems shared by others, and more importantly, not capable of solution by any one individual but only by modifications of the structure of the groups in which he lives and sometimes the structure of the entire society. Men in masses have troubles, and they are not usually aware of their true meaning and its source; men in publics confront public issues, and they usually come to be aware of their terms.

It is the public task of the social scientist, as of any liberally educating man, continually to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their human meaning for the variety of individuals. It is his public task to display in his work and, as an educator, in his life as well, this kind of sociological imagination. And it is his end to cultivate such habits of mind among the men and women who are publicly exposed to him. To secure these ends is to secure reason and individuality, and to make both the predominant values of a democratic society.

## VII.

You may now be saying to yourself: Well, here it comes; he is going to set up an ideal so high that in terms of it everything must seem low. That I might be thought to be doing so testifies to how unseriously the word democracy is now taken, and to how indifferent so many observers are to the drift away from any plain meaning it may be given. It is, of course, a complicated idea about which there is much legitimate disagreement. But surely it is not so complicated or ambiguous that it may no longer be used by people who wish to reason together.

What I mean by democracy as an ideal I have already suggested. In essence, democracy means (1) that those vitally affected by any decision men make have an effective voice in that decision. This, in turn, means (2) that all power to make such decisions be publicly legitimated and (3) that the makers of such decisions be held publicly accountable. None of these three can prevail, it seems to me, unless there are dominant within a society the kinds of publics and the kinds of individuals I have described. Certain further conditions will presently become evident.

The social structure of the United States is not an altogether democratic one. Let us take that as a point of minimum agreement. I do not know of any society which is altogether democratic; that remains an ideal. The United States today I should say is generally democratic in form and only in the rhetoric of expectation. In substance and in practice it is very often nondemocratic, and in many institutional areas it is quite clearly so. The corporate economy is run neither as a set of town meetings nor as a set of powers responsible to those whom their activities very grievously affect. The military machines and increasingly the political state are in the same condition. I do not wish to give the impression that I am optimistic about the chances that many social scientists can or will perform a democratic public role, nor--should many of them do so--about the chances that it would necessarily result in a rehabilitation of publics. I am merely outlining one role that seems to me to be open and, in fact, that is practiced by some social scientists. It happens also to be a role that is in line with both liberal and socialist views of the role of reason in human affairs, but I am not concerned here with that fact either.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In passing, I should like to remind you that in addition to its present bureaucratic context and use, the style of abstracted empiricism (and the methodological inhibition it sustains) is not well suited for the democratic political role I am describing. Those who practice this style as their sole activity, who conceive of it as the "real work of social science," and who live in its ethos, cannot perform a liberating educational role. For this role requires that individuals and publics be given confidence in their own capacities to reason, and by individual criticism, study, and practice, to enlarge its scope and improve its quality. It requires that they be encouraged, in George Orwell's phrase, to "get outside the whale," or in the wonderful American phrase: "to become their own men." To tell them that they can "really" know social reality only by depending upon a necessarily bureaucratic kind of research is to place a



The extent to which the United States is or is not democratic depends upon the exact period being discussed, and in particular upon the scale on which the preparation for war is proceeding. It is with reference to this general situation that we are discussing the political role of social science. And my point is that what that role may be, how it is enacted, and how publicly effective it is are relevant to the extent to which democracy prevails.

If we take up the third role of reason, the autonomous role, we are trying to act in a democratic manner in a society that is not altogether democratic. But we are acting as if we were in a fully democratic society, and by doing so, we are attempting to remove the "as if." We are trying to make the society more democratic. Such a role, I should contend, is the only role by which we may as social scientists attempt to do this. At least I do not know of any other way by which we might try to help build a democratic polity. And because of this, I should contend, the problem of the social sciences as a prior carrier of reason in human affairs is in fact the problem of democracy today.

#### VIII.

What are the chances of success? Given the political structure within which we must now act, I do not believe that it is very likely that social scientists will effectively play the role of reason's carrier. For men of knowledge to become such strategic actors, certain conditions must be present. Men make their own history, Marx said, but they do not make it under conditions of their own choice. Well, then, what are the conditions we require to play this role effectively?

There would have to be certain kinds of movements under way, and just now in the United States there are no movements of the

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taboo, in the name of Science, upon their efforts to become independent and substantive thinkers. It is to undermine the confidence of the individual, as a craftsman, in his own ability to know reality. It is, in effect, to encourage men to fix their social beliefs by reference to the authority of an alien apparatus, and it is, of course, in line with, and is reinforced by, the whole bureaucratization of reason in the Fourth Epoch. The industrialization of academic life and the fragmentation of the problems of social science cannot result in a liberating educational role for social scientists. For what these schools of thought take apart they tend to keep apart, in very tiny pieces about which they claim to be very certain. But all they could thus be certain of are abstracted fragments: it is precisely the job of liberal education and the political role of social science and its intellectual promise, to enable men to transcend such fragmented and abstracted milieux: to become aware of structural change and of their own place within it.

required kind. What is required are parties and movements and publics that are, first, open to ideas--within which ideas and alternatives of social life are truly debated--and, second, that have a chance really to influence those decisions which carry structural consequences. Only if such organizations existed, could we become realistically hopeful about the role of reason in human affairs that I have been trying to state. Such a situation, by the way, I should consider one major requirement for any fully democratic society.

In such a polity social scientists in their political roles would probably "speak for" and "against" a variety of movements and strata and interests, rather than merely addressing an often vague and, I fear, dwindling public. Their ideas, in short, would compete, and this competition (as a process as well as in its result at any given time) would be politically relevant. If we take the idea of democracy seriously, if we take the democratic role of reason in human affairs seriously, our engagement in such a competition will in no way distress us. For surely we cannot suppose that all definitions of social reality, much less all statements of political ways and means, much less all suggestions of goals-- would shape up into some undebatable unified doctrine.

In the absence of such parties and movements and publics, we live in a society that is democratic mainly in its legal forms and in its formal expectations. We ought not to minimize the enormous value and the considerable opportunity these circumstances make evident. We should learn their value from the fact of their absence in the Soviet world, and from the kind of struggle the intellectuals of that world are up against. We should also learn that whereas many intellectuals are physically crushed, many of us morally crush ourselves. That democracy in the United States is so largely formal does not mean that we can dodge the conclusion that if the free reason is to play any part in a democratic making of history, one of its chief carriers must surely be the social sciences. The absence of such parties and movements and publics does not mean that social scientists as educators ought not to try to make their educational institutions a framework within which such a liberating public of individuals does exist, at least in its inchoate beginnings, and one in which their discussions are encouraged and sustained. And it does not mean that in their more public role they should not try to cultivate such publics.

To do so is, of course, to risk "trouble"; and much more serious than that, to face a quite deadly indifference. For to do so requires that we deliberately present controversial theories and facts, and actively encourage controversy. For in the absence of political debate that is wide and open and informed, people can get into touch neither with the effective realities of their world nor with the realities of themselves. Nowadays especially, it seems to me, the role I have been describing requires no less than the presentation of conflicting definitions of reality itself. For what is usually termed "propaganda," especially of a nationalist sort, consists not only of opinions on a variety of topics and issues. It is the promulgation, as Paul Keckemeti has noted, of official definitions of reality. Our public life now often rests upon such official definitions, as well as upon myths and lies and crackpot notions. When many policies--debated and undebated--are based on inadequate and misleading definitions of reality, then those who are out to define reality more adequately are bound to be

upsetting influences. That is why publics of the sort I have described, as well as men of individuality, are, by their very existence in such a society, radical. Yet such is the role of mind, of study, of intellect, of reason, of ideas: to define reality adequately and in a publicly relevant way, the educational and the political role of social science in a democracy is to help cultivate and sustain publics and individuals that are able to develop, to live with, and to act upon adequate definitions of personal and social realities.

## IX.

The third role of reason which I have been outlining neither means nor requires that one hit the pavement, take the next plane to Hungary, run for Congress, buy a newspaper plant, go among the poor, set up a soap box. Such things are often admirable things to do, and I can readily imagine occasions when I should personally find it impossible not to do one or more of them. But for the social scientist to take them to be his normal activities is merely to abdicate his role, and to display by his action a disbelief in the promise of social science and in the role of reason in human affairs that it might carry. This role requires only that the social scientist get on with the work of social science and that he avoid furthering the bureaucratization of reason and of discourse.

Not every social scientist accepts all the views I happen to hold on these issues, and it is not my point that he ought to. My point is that it is one of his tasks to determine his own views of the nature of historical change and the place, if any, of free and rational men within it. Only then can he come to know his own intellectual and political role within the societies he is studying, and in doing so find out just what he does think of the value of freedom and of reason which are so deeply a part of the tradition and the promise of social science.

If individual men and small groups of men are not free to act with historical consequence, and at the same time rational enough to see those consequences; if the structure of modern societies, or of any one of them, is now such that history is indeed blind drift and cannot be made otherwise with the means at hand and the knowledge that may be acquired--then the only autonomous role of social science is to chronicle and to understand, the idea of the responsibility of the powerful is foolish, and the values of freedom and of reason are realizable only in the exceptional milieux of certain favored private lives.

But that is a lot of "ifs." Although there is ample room for disagreement over degrees of freedom and scales of consequences, I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to make necessary our abandonment of the values of freedom and reason as they lie within the legacy and as they might now orient the work of social science.

Attempts to avoid such troublesome issues as I have been discussing are nowadays widely defended by the little slogan that



social science is "not out to save the world." Sometimes this is the disclaimer of a modest scholar; sometimes it is the cynical contempt of a specialist for all issues of larger concern; sometimes it is the disillusionment of youthful expectations; often it is the posture of men who seek to borrow the prestige of The Scientist, imagined as a pure and disembodied intellect. But sometimes it is based upon a considered judgment of the facts of power.

Because of such facts, I do not believe that social science will "save the world" although I see nothing at all wrong with "trying to save the world"--a phrase which I take here to mean the avoidance of war and the rearrangement of human affairs in accordance with the ideals of human freedom and reason. Such knowledge as I have leads me to embrace rather pessimistic estimates of the chances. But even if that is where we now stand, still we must ask: if there are any ways out of the crises of our epoch by means of intellect, is it not up to the social scientist to state them? What we represent--although often you would never guess it--is man becomes aware of mankind, and it is of course on the level of human awareness that virtually all solutions to the great problems must now lie.

To appeal to the powerful, on the basis of any knowledge we now have, is utopian in the silly sense of that term. Our relations with them are more likely to be only such relations as they find useful, which is to say that we become technicians accepting their problems and aims, or ideologists of their prestige and authority. To be more than that, so far as our political role is concerned, we must first of all reconsider the nature of our collective endeavor as social scientists. And it is not at all utopian for one social scientist to appeal to his colleagues to undertake such a reconsideration.

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## THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INDONESIA

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

The superficial first impression one receives from the politics of a non-Western country such as Indonesia is that only a few hundred individuals are important. Their competitive scramble is rendered particularly sharp "because the competitors knew one another (and one another's limitations and virtues) so well". (1) Politics seems to take place in a vacuum, a rarefied atmosphere high above the "teeming millions" whose fate is being decided. This image of non-Western politics seems to fit the notion that in such countries the agrarian masses are still almost completely inarticulate, the middle class undeveloped and the political process limited to a very small elite at the top.

It thus becomes plausible to assume that interests, ideological or economic, play a much less important role than in the West and that politics are determined by personalities whose skill in jockeying for positions explains the shifting alignments and alliances formed by professional politicians while their charismatic appeal accounts for what following they have among the masses.

But is this image of non-Western politics not anachronistic? Are the people really unimportant in the politics of the new Asian democracies? Would that not imply a social structure which no longer exists? The very fact that a nationalist movement developed vigorously enough to achieve independence indicates that important changes have taken place. It means that the peasant masses who have lived for several generations in the setting of a market economy, are becoming less and less parochial as their contacts with the urban sector of society increase and the flow of communications from the outside world into the villages becomes more intense. It also means that the elite has grown in size and changed in character, that the traditional ruling class, with aristocratic-feudal characteristics, and an economic base rooted in control of the land or of public administration, has been gradually displaced by new elements.

This is indeed what happened in Indonesia. Mass movements appeared as early as 1912. The old elite was compromised by the exploitative alliance with the Netherlands against its own people. Its position remained unchallenged only until intellectual and economic activities created a new elite derived from commerce, the professions and organized labor. Apparently, "it would be possible to view the entire twentieth century social history of Indonesia as a gradual lowering of the prestige of the Princes and Regents". (2)

This process did not consist only in an erosion of the authority of traditional elites or a displacement of the allegiance of the masses to a new group of leaders in an otherwise unchanged social environment. The process was much more complex, involving the creation of new social strata as the result of the diversification

The research on which this preliminary report is based is currently conducted with financial support from the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California.



of the economy and of the impact of a variety of intellectual influences. As B. Schrieke observed in 1928, discussing the emergence of an intellectual class, of a rising labor movement and of a rising class of small-scale businessmen in the Netherlands Indies, that "the history of western Europe is beginning to repeat itself, though as elsewhere modelled according to the local pattern of society". (3)

If there is parallelism between developments in Western and non-Western countries, how are the differences to be explained? By assuming that we are observing simultaneously different stages of a process with similar broad and fundamental characteristics? Is the outcome then likely to be the establishment of comparable forms of constitutional democracies based on similar political processes, once the handicaps of the time-lag which the non-Western countries suffered have been overcome? Or are developments in the total setting of the mid-twentieth century creating circumstances which will prevent history from repeating itself?

It has become common place among scholars and policy-makers concerned with political and economic development in non-Western countries to assume that the demonstration effect of the rest of the world on non-Western countries is unavoidably complicating their problems and tasks. The new or resurgent countries' standards are set as far as government and politics are concerned by the most advanced countries of the West, which took a long time to achieve their present stage of development. But, understandably, the new countries are not and cannot be prepared to give themselves centuries or even decades to achieve similar results. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that with respect to economic development their expectations are increasingly influenced not by Western precedent, where political and economic development took place *pari passu*, but by the Communist countries in which democracy has been sacrificed for the sake of a rapid rate of economic growth achieved in the hot-house of totalitarian dictatorships.

An answer to the questions raised above would have to weigh several factors, namely the respective influence of authoritarian survivals from the period when the country was ruled by an alliance of colonial administrators and indigenous traditional elites, of tendencies toward regimentation inspired by the example of contemporary totalitarianism and of the role and characteristics of organized groups active in the political process of the new countries.

Traditional attitudes toward authority are not easily overcome. According to George McT. Kahin, "many more decisions are passed to the top in Indonesia than is true in probably any other major non-totalitarian country". (4) Where the tradition is authoritarian the attraction of a totalitarian answer to the apparently insoluble problem of economic development is likely to be enhanced. Are there any indications that countervailing democratic forces are at work? The political record of contemporary mankind makes it difficult to maintain that the people, the unorganized and largely inarticulate masses, will not allow the abduction of their newly-won freedoms. But it is equally difficult to maintain that a small elite can give any direction it wants to a country's political process. What we need to know, before trying informed guesses about the shape of things to come, is the nature and the role of the intermediate social strata placed between the elites and the masses as the supporting cast of politics, the organized groups active in public affairs. If these groups are numerous, vigorous, jealous of their special place in society yet willing to cooperate on the basis of reasonable compromises with other groups then, perhaps, one can say that independence is not likely to be a bridge from an authoritarian past into a totalitarian future.

The study of organized groups should provide important clues on future political developments. In a country in Indonesia's stage of development it is equally unlikely that politics be the exclusive play of an elite including less than one thousand people, or that a substantial proportion of the adult population of 85 millions is meaningfully involved in the political process. The strategic group is represented by those who by temperament, education and occupation develop an active concern with public affairs, persons who have achieved a certain degree of consciousness about interests and aspirations transcending the daily sphere of their lives, willing to play a certain role in society as members of organized groups.

Such groups represent social forces operating in a total field created by the collective problems to be solved, the habits inherited from the past, the orientations toward the future, themselves determined by interests and ideals, as well as by the specific circumstances resulting from the interaction of these groups guided or misguided by their leaders, supported or hindered by the much larger masses from which they emerge.

The following pages will attempt a sketch of the role of organized groups in contemporary Indonesia and to assess their likely influence on the direction of political developments in "the world's geographically least integrated major state", (5) a country which, due to the size of its population, natural resources, and strategic importance, is likely to be in the years ahead an area of major importance and a potential trouble-spot.

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Hard facts on organized groups in Indonesia are not easily available. After less than a decade of independent existence it is not surprising that few reference works have been published providing the basic information necessary for an inventory or even a survey. Complete coverage cannot be attempted at present but only, in unavoidably bold strokes, an attempt to trace a pattern in which gaps remain to be filled and errors to be corrected.

Functional boundaries between organized groups in Indonesia are fluid and often hard to determine. Specifically political organizations such as parties cannot be meaningfully separated from other social, cultural, economic, professional, ideological or territorial groupings which assume political functions. Indeed, the absence of functional specificity of organized groups may be one of the crucial characteristics of public life in contemporary Indonesia.

Where social functions are specifically determined and individual roles clearly defined one can hope to obtain a fairly sharp image of a country's political life. But where social functions are diffuse, or in a state of indeterminateness, and roles are blurred, the researcher must cast a broader net and yet expect a more meager catch. In simpler words, Indonesian politics are complex and confusing.

Reaching back in time, a student of organized Indonesian groups will find his task less forbidding than in other parts of the world. As everywhere in Southeast Asia he can limit his efforts to a period of about half a century.

There is general agreement that, with the possible exception of a few aristocratic self-improvement associations which were hardly more than social clubs, the first organized group with cultural-nationalist aims was the Eudi Utomo, an innovation in that it was "the first Indonesian organization on Western lines...based upon a free and conscious united effort by individuals". (6) Apparently, the first Indonesian voluntary associations were at least partly inspired by the organizational efforts of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. "Chinese example contributed to the national awakening of the indigenous population of the Indies", writes Lea Williams. "As early as 1904, an Indonesian noble, Raden Moehamad Oemar, who was a member of the Religious Council in Kendal, wrote the Tiong Hoa Hwa Koan, Batavia, to ask for information on its activities. In 1910 another member of the local nobility, Radja Sabarudin, at the time President of the proto-national Boedi Oetomo and a member of the native officialdom, asked to be allowed to attend a meeting of the Batavia Tiong Hoa Hwa Koan, in order to observe the organizational techniques of the Chinese." (7) Founded on May 20, 1908, in Djakarta, in a building to be reclaimed fifty years later from the slums and declared a national monument, the Eudi Utomo held its first convention in Jogjakarta on October 5, 1908. But the end of 1909 it had 40 branches and 10,000 members. (8) The program of Eudi Utomo was social and cultural, not political. Its interests were restricted to the islands of Java and Madura. Only at its April 1911 convention in Djakarta did the Eudi Utomo broaden its scope to include all Indonesian ethnic groups. In December 1935 the organization lost its separate identity becoming part of the Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra). (9)



While the Budi Utomo was the first secular Javanese nationalist organization, with a membership of largely aristocratic origin, the first mass organization was created by Moslem traders opposed to the monopolistic position of the Chinese especially in the field of textiles. Founded at the end of 1911 in Solo, Central Java, as the Sarekat Lagang Islam, (Islamic Traders' Union) the organization changed its name a year later, in September 1912, to Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) and broadened its scope. Its success with the peasant masses of Java was astounding. At the time of its third convention, in June 1916 in Bandung, West Java, it had 800,000 members and by 1919, 2 million.(10) Split by infiltrations from the rising Communist movement and repressed by the Dutch colonial administration Sarekat Islam declined rapidly in the following years. Van Nieuwenhuis states that "from the time of its creation in 1913 until 1920 the Sarekat Islam was certainly the outstanding example of Western style Indonesian organizational life", but that after its decline "no one nor even a combination of any of the Indonesian organizations can be termed representative of the bulk of the new elite". (11)

No mass movement comparable to the Sarekat Islam was permitted to develop by the Dutch colonial administration till March 1942 when the archipelago was occupied by Japan and the new era began.

This is not the place for an elaborate restatement of the history of political organizations in Indonesia before the achievement of sovereignty on December 27, 1949. Unlike the current decade, the earlier record has been covered in some detail by Indonesian, Dutch and American scholars.(12) It shows that political organizations were never able to enroll more than a few thousand or at best tens of thousand members. The Partai Nasional Indonesia founded in July 1927 by Sukarno and a few other young men who two decades later were among the most powerful political figures in Indonesia, had about 10,000 members in late 1930, few months before it was suppressed.(13) The size of the Communist Party at the time of the 1926-1927 rebellions in Java and Sumatra is indicated by the fact that the stern repressive measures taken by the Netherlands Indies government, which broke the power of the party for the rest of the colonial period, involved some 4,500 people.(14) Clearly, these were symbolically important political organizations but too weak and short-lived to acquire organizational strength and to create mass movements. Developments which gave their successors, the post-independence Nationalist and Communist parties, 8,434,653 and 6,176,914 votes respectively in the September 29, 1955, general elections, took place entirely within the hectic decade of revolutionary struggle preceding those elections. Their organizational roots in the pre-war period were of little importance.

Besides specifically political organizations, religious-cultural organizations, women and youth groups, regional associations and trade unions were formed in the years between the two world wars. None of them mobilized large numbers. The first federation of trade unions, Perestuan Penggerakan Kaum Buruh, at its congress of August 1, 1920, claimed 72,000 members organized in twenty two unions.(15) A small figure at a time when the organization of mass movements was still possible as proven by the Sarekat Islam's 2 million members at about the same time.

At the last census of the Netherlands Indies in 1930 the total population of the archipelago was 60,393,000. The number of Indonesians belonging to any kind of voluntary organization was at that time hardly more than a fraction of one per

cent of the total population and probably a very small fraction. Van Niel estimates that "the Indonesian organizations represented only a part and certainly not the greatest part of the group that one might call the elite of Indonesian society". (16)

Little is known about group dynamics in pre-war Indonesian organizations. Their formal structure followed Western models. They elected a chairman, one or several vice-chairmen, a secretary, a treasurer, the usual array of officers. But on their recruitment techniques and their decision-making process information is not easily available. While group activities were the result of Western influences, their dynamics might at closer inspection reveal essential traits which were characteristically Indonesian. Was the large following of the early Sarekat Islam motivated by rational interests or were the Javanese peasants attracted by the notion that the movement's spell-binding leader Hadji O. S. Tjokroaminoto was the long-awaited Savior, the Batu Adil (Just Prince) of Javanese legend? Were Indonesian organizations, structured in accordance with Western models, reaching decisions by majority vote or by Mufakat, (unanimous consent), the traditional Islamic-Indonesian decision-making technique? What seems clear is that few Indonesians acquired any experience with group activities in voluntary associations during the Dutch colonial period.

The Japanese occupation of the archipelago in March 1942 had a catalytic impact on Indonesian political life. It started with a decree forbidding "any discussion or organization...concerned with the political administration of the country", played off against each other Muslim leaders, nationalists, and members of the old bureaucratic elite, but ended by organizing mass movements with branches reaching, at least on Java, down to the villages. (17) While political organizations were regimented, the Indonesian elites had for the first time an opportunity to experiment with organizational techniques. The extent of this impact was considerable. Many Indonesians, including high school students, learned for the first time organizational techniques. As a result, immediately after the fall of the Japanese, organized groups of all sorts proliferated and have continued to do so ever since.

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As stated above, in Indonesia the dividing lines between specifically political and other organizations are fluid. No single classificatory principle appears adequate. In the early phase of the revolutionary period which followed the proclamation of independence of August 17, 1945, most groups whatever their rallying point were organized with the purpose of participating in the national struggle.

United by this overriding common purpose, organized groups were nevertheless sharply divided on matters concerning the military-political strategy to be followed and on the ideological basis of the newly created Indonesian state. The struggle for power within the broad context of the nationalist movement was often as violent as the common struggle against the Dutch, marked occasionally by kidnapping of opponents, assassinations and executions.

Indonesian public life is characterized by a curious contradiction. A study of Indonesian values cannot fail to reveal the central importance of harmony in the nation's value system. Harmony among people and between man and the surrounding cosmic forces. The origin of this value has been traced back to ancient South-east Asian culture.(18) Indonesians are also eager to emphasize the superiority of Musjawarah (consultation without formal voting) by which Mufakat (agreement by unanimous consent) is achieved, over Western methods of decision-making.

These cultural traits would lead one to expect a high propensity toward the establishment of large coalitions incorporating and reconciling a variety of possibly conflicting interest. In fact, the very opposite situation prevails. Indonesian society is fissiparous to an unusual degree, new groups being constantly formed, split and abandoned. It can hardly be said that in practice harmony has ever prevailed in the history of the nationalist movement and musjawarah, while occasionally attempted, has rarely resulted in mufakat. If the cultural ideal nevertheless exists, as it seems to, there must be a reason for the sharp contrast between theory and practice.

It is tempting but probably superficial to find an explanation simply in human ambitions and greed, which makes it necessary for those jockeying for positions or seeking benefits to create for themselves the supporting platform of an organization. Political ambitions, the quest for power, exert their influence in all societies. They are as omnipresent as the forces of gravitation in physical bodies. It is more likely that group dynamics in Indonesian society are determined by a number of specific factors. Among these I would be inclined to ascribe a major role to lack of experience with group activities resulting from the special conditions which prevailed before 1945 and to the difficulty for natural selection to operate in the few years since independence.

Colonial repression, manipulation and intrigue, in a society which suffered the impact of a variety of external cultural influences over a relatively short period, while lacking the educational opportunities to adjust to the new circumstances, have prevented the Indonesian elites and the social strata placed between them and the masses from acquiring and practicing the techniques necessary



for the articulation and aggregation of interests. Whereas in more settled societies the socio-political process has a certain degree of viscosity resulting from relatively long institutional experience with the expression and defense of specific interests, in the Indonesian situation certain positions are too volatile while others are too rigid to permit a relatively smooth flow. "Anything can happen." Perhaps it should be added that in this setting institutional limitations are less operative and therefore the struggle for power and jockeying for positions is less circumscribed by the rules of the game.

Following the repression of the Dutch colonial period and the regimentation imposed by the Japanese military authorities, the decompression that came with independence had almost explosive results. An effervescent process of group organization followed. Armed groups, political parties, labor unions, professional organizations, women and youth groups cropped up in an atmosphere of libertarian excitement verging on anarchy.

The newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia did not maintain the army trained by the Japanese since October 1943, the *Pembela Tanah Air* (PETA) which comprised over one hundred battalions. While the young men who had received their basic training under Japanese auspices became important elements in the Republican armed forces, the old organization was disbanded and a new one had to be created. What brought about a militia man and women to arms in the following years was only in part the recruitment effort of a central government. Voluntary armed organizations only loosely connected with the central government or the Army High Command were of great importance throughout the struggle. Those eager to fight for national independence rallied around natural leaders whose military and also political status was determined by the number of fighters they controlled.

Generals, colonels, and majors were born at the beginning of the Indonesian revolution depending on whether the respective commander disposed of troops of divisional, regimental or battalion strength. Only about one-fifth of these fighters became members of the National Army, to which most of them still belong. Four-fifth joined irregular formations. Some of these armed organizations were politically and ideologically affiliated to the various political parties which emerged during the same period.

These were of course many small guerilla units. Sixteen major "Republican Armed Organizations" were listed as active in May 1949, the last phase of the struggle for independence, in a 1950 publication of the Ministry of Information. These groups covered the whole political spectrum from the extreme right to the extreme left and some of the most fanatical elements were lost to the Republic of Indonesia and turned into rebel bands which are still a serious problem in parts of West Java and South Celebes.

After the achievement of independence the former guerilla fighters formed numerous veterans' organizations, some of them closely affiliated to political parties, such as the powerful, Communist-oriented *Perbpsi*. Some of these organizations acted as pressure groups in favor of legislation that would give official recognition and corresponding benefits to veterans. The Djuwanda cabinet, founded in April 1957 and still in office, included for the first time specifically a Minister for Veterans Affairs, himself a famous revolutionary guerilla leader, Chaerul Saleh. On September 9, 1957, Parliament adopted legislation to regularize the status of veterans. It was estimated that 800,000 persons, not including

members of the Armed Forces on active duty, would seek recognition as veterans.(19)

For several years after the fighting had stopped, the former guerillas were by and large neglected, although some governmental agencies were established after 1950 to organize the demobilization and reintegration into civilian society of the former fighters. Political circles seemed to be unaware of the reservoir of social and political dynamism (and one could add dynamite) represented by these elements.

In 1956 the Army began to show an active interest, sponsoring a Veterans' Legion. It was formally established in January 1957, with the hope that all organizations will merge into the new body which had official blessings. The politically oriented organizations showed little eagerness to lose their separate identity and freedom of action. On January 1, 1958, in a message to the Veterans' Legion on its first anniversary, President Sukarno stated: "I sincerely hope that the Legion will gain more success in the coming years in maintaining unity among the veterans in particular and the entire Indonesian people in general."

If the military phase of the revolution was fought on a pluralistic basis with only a fraction of the fighting population under the discipline of the national army, it will hardly come as a surprise that effort toward regimentation were equally unsuccessful in the political field proper. Initial plans for the formation of a single national party were abandoned within two weeks from the proclamation of independence. On November 3, 1945, a Government Declaration, signed in the absence of President Sukarno by Vice-president Hatta announced that "the Government welcomes the formation of political parties because, with the existence of parties, leadership can be given to the directions taken by the several currents of opinion present in society."

Parties were rapidly formed and received representation in a provisional, appointed central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP). Sukarno told George McT. Kahin in December 1948 that the number of seats received by each group was determined by party strength in terms of membership, integration and organization assessed on the basis of reports from local officials.(20) The electoral strength of parties became known, on a national scale, only ten years later after the elections for Parliament and constituent Assembly of 1955.

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An official publication of the Indonesian Ministry of Information issued in February 1950 listed as active in May 1949, 41 parties in Java, 4 in Sumatra, 27 in East Indonesia and 10 in Borneo, a total of 82 Indonesian parties, besides some 15 Dutch, Chinese and Arab political organizations still active at that time. Another publication of the Ministry of Information, issued in July 1951 gave information on 27 parties of which 5 were classified as based on religion, 14 as based on nationalism, 6 as based on marxism, and 2 as representing minority groups. A similar publication issued in August 1954 listed 23 parties of which 18 had parliamentary groups.

The available information is of relatively little help in estimating the depth to which these parties have penetrated Indonesian society. Even about the most important organizations information is obviously unreliable. To illustrate, in the 1950 publication it is stated that the leading Moslem party Masjumi had 20 million members. The following year the same source estimates its membership at 10 million distributed among 4,982 branches. (21) The 1954 publication gives no membership estimates. But in the spring of 1955, the writer was told by top Masjumi leaders that their membership was about 1 million. In their own estimation the Masjumi was organizationally weak for its size. "An elephant with beri-beri" in the words of one of the party's most distinguished figures.

However exaggerated, inflated estimates of Masjumi membership reflected the general consensus in the early years of the Indonesian Republic that the Masjumi was the country's most important political party. Initially established in September 1943 with the aid of the Japanese military authorities in Java, (22) reestablished in November 1945 following the Government Declaration mentioned above, the Masjumi included initially all important Islamic organizations. Much of the political history of independent Indonesia could be written in terms of the efforts of other political forces to weaken the Masjumi and to postpone elections until its chances to consolidate itself as the country's leading party had been reduced.

These fears were justified. If one adds to the Masjumi's 7,903,886 votes in the September 29, 1955 elections, the 6,955,000 votes of the Mahdatul Ulama which had seceded in 1952 to establish itself as a separate party and the 1,091,160 votes of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, which had seceded in 1947, a united Moslem bloc would have received at least 42.2 per cent of expressed votes and, under proportional representation, probably more than the 110 out of 257 seats in Parliament that the three leading Moslem parties received separately. But ideological differences and opportunist interests proved stronger.

By the end of 1955 the Masjumi had been overtaken by the Nationalist Party which polled 8,434,655 votes and two years later its position had probably deteriorated further, at least in Java, due to the role that three of its leaders, all three former prime-ministers, had played in the Padang rebellion of February 1958. Outside Java the Masjumi was in 1955 by far the strongest party, obtaining 29 seats in the Outer Islands whereas the other three major parties, Nationalist, Mahdatul Ulama and Communist together won only 24 seats. Whether the close association of some of the party's leaders with regional interests has hurt the Masjumi outside Java only the future can tell.



The adversities which have plagued the Masyumi seem now to befall also the Nationalist Party. As Indonesia begins to prepare for its second general elections, in September 1959, a new party, the Partai Indonesia (PARTIMBO) was created on August 5, 1958, in Djakarta, under the leadership of a number of prominent Nationalist Party members together with other radical nationalist elements. Experienced observers feel that the party may represent a serious threat to the Nationalist Party, especially if, as is currently rumored in Djakarta, it has the support of President Sukarno. In this most recent instance the fissiparous tendencies of Indonesia are again in evidence. The Nationalist Party can ill afford a secessionist movement. In the summer of 1957, elections for regional, district, and municipal councils gave substantial gains to the Communist Party, in many cases almost symmetrical to the losses suffered by the Nationalist Party as compared with 1955 returns. This trend by itself raised the specter of the Communist Party overtaking the Nationalist Party in 1959, especially as the former seems vastly more active and successful among the new, young, voters than the latter. Under the circumstances, a splinter nationalist party dividing its potential vote is likely to weaken the Nationalist Party in 1959, just as the secession of the Akhdatul Ulama prevented the Masyumi from maintaining a controlling position in 1955.

For the 1955 elections Indonesia was divided into 16 electoral districts of which one, Western New Guinea, which is still under Dutch colonial administration, had only symbolic significance. In the others the number of lists of candidates registered with the Central Electoral Committee varied from a minimum of 33 to a maximum of 51. The electoral law adopted in 1953 did not mention political parties but only "lists of candidates." Indonesian public law made no distinction for electoral purposes between political parties and other organizations. But the people's choice has given four parties a prominent place in the life of the country: the Nationalist Party received 22.3 per cent of the total of 37,735,299 valid votes, the Masyumi 20.9, the Akhdatul Ulama 13.4 and the Communist Party 16.4, while the next important Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia obtained only 2.9 per cent. Altogether only 16 parties and organizations obtained more than one seat in the new Parliament. But the number of organizations politically active in one form or another is many times larger. It is not easy to find an adequate classificatory principle by which to sort them out. Eschewing the effort to test in the Indonesian situation the definitions of parties formulated by political scientists seems appropriate when groups such as the Indonesian Police Force Association, the Bumiputera Pensioners Union, the Estate Workers Union (Sarbupri), the Humanist Society, the Indonesian State Railway Workers Union, the Pentecostal Church of North Sumatra and a number of ad-hoc voters' associations presented lists of candidates.

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An attempt to classify organizations active in Indonesian public life would have to take into account a number of lines of cleavage. Few organizations can be delimited entirely and completely by any one of these. The idea of Indonesian nationalism is hardly more than 30 years old. It was at the Youth Congress of October 20, 1928 that the pledge to "One People, One Country, One Language" was made. Among the nationalist elite the overriding purpose of Indonesian public life is to achieve unity. Increasingly this aim is shared by those educated, articulate, elements which form the link between the elite and the masses. (23) But in practice feeling of ethnic group (suku bangsa) identity are still very strong and have, it seems, been exacerbated by the events of 1957 and 1958 which led to armed conflict in Sumatra and Celebes. While ethnic groups are of course different from voluntary organizations the activation of feelings of ethnic distinctness, after only a few years of existence as citizens of the same nation, can give natural communities a psychology similar to that of activist organizations.

In the absence of a census since 1930, population estimates which are based on administrative sub-divisions are likely to be misleading. While rate of population growth has not necessarily been the same for all ethnic groups the power relations indicated by 1930 figures is still valid, keeping in mind that the total population was in 1930 about 60 million and is now probably 85 million. In 1930 the nine major ethnic groups were: (24)

<u>Name</u>	<u>1930 Population</u> <u>(in thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of</u> <u>Total Population</u>
1. Javanese (Central-East Java)	27,000	45.0 %
2. Sundanese (West Java)	8,500	14.2
3. Madurese (East Java & Madura)	4,500	7.5
4. Coastal Malays (Sumatra & Borneo)	4,500	7.5
5. Macassarese-Buginese (South Celebes)	2,500	4.2
6. Minangkabau (West Sumatra)	2,000	3.3
7. Balinese (Bali)	1,200	2.0
8. Batak (North Sumatra)	1,000	1.7
9. Atjehnese (North Sumatra)	750	1.3
TOTALS	51,950	86.7 %

The importance of ethnic origin, at least with respect to the creation of informal organizations, in practically all spheres of activity is so great that most knowledgeable observers claim that group dynamics in Indonesia cannot be understood without taking this factor into account. In the 1958 rebellions the most active groups were the Minangkabau and the Bataks of Sumatra and a smaller ethnic group in the Northern part of Celebes, the Menadonese.

Another line of cleavage, of special importance in Java but for which parallels can be found elsewhere, is determined by religious orientations. Although nominally 90 per cent of Indonesians are Moslem, conversion which started on a large scale not earlier than the end of the thirteenth century, has not created uniform religious orientations. Clifford Geertz, based on field-work in 1953-1954 in East-Central Java distinguishes three main traditions "abangan" representing a stress on the animistic aspects of the over-all Javanese syncretism and broadly related to the peasant element in the population; Santia, representing a stress on the Islamic aspects of the syncretism and generally related to the trading element (and to certain elements in the peasantry as well); and priajai

stressing the Hinduist aspects and related to the bureaucratic elements." (25).

There are strong indications that the electoral support of secular parties such as the Nationalists and the Communists comes from the abangan and priyai groups while the santani group supports of course the Moslem parties Ma'jumi and Nahdatul Ulama. It would seem that shifts in votes from the Nationalists to the Communists as took place on a rather large scale in the summer of 1957 happen only within the non-santani element of the population. Additional research is needed to verify this hypothesis. If true, it would permit fairly close estimates concerning the natural limits within which the growth of Communism is possible in Java today.

In other islands, where Islamic conversion or Christian conversion seem to have been more profound and elements comparable to the abangan and priyai groups are relatively small, this is clearly reflected in the strength of the Ma'jumi and other religious parties.

Another line of cleavage important in the body politic has gained wide acceptance and official recognition. Political parties are usually classified on an ideological basis, as religious, nationalist and marxist. With less deep roots in Indonesian culture, this division is not as sharp as the ethnic and religious ones. All parties are nationalist and, though not always marxist, invariably socialist in their orientation.

On the basis of the three principles enumerated above a detailed inventory of organized groups of various sorts would probably bring some clarity into the confusing medley of Indonesian organizations. Even more illuminating would be an analysis of the power structure within organizations which are not explicitly political, according to these criteria.

Age groups seem also to play a significant role. The present leadership of the country is still largely in the hands of the generation which became politically active in the nineteen-twenties. Recent developments suggests that, among other factors, the political process is also determined by a challenge from the generation which achieved political consciousness in the nineteen-forties and are now the younger leadership of parties, the top echelons of the army and a substantial proportion of the higher echelons in the bureaucracy. Underneath, a ground swell seems to be building up, coming from those now in their twenties whose adolescence spans only the period after the achievement of independence.

The organizations which would have to be studied taking all these factors of cohesion and dispersion into account are numerous. Among them the most important are trade unions, peasant organizations, professional associations, veterans organizations, women organizations, and youth organizations.

In terms of numerical strength and internal discipline the most important quasi-political organizations are the trade unions. The origin of the movement was closely related in the early part of the twentieth century with nationalism and the leaders were professional politicians rather than labor organizers. During the revolution armed workers' corps such as the Laskar Buruh Indonesia played an important role as the armed organization of the All-Indonesian Central Labor Organization (SOBSI) organized in November 1946 "along industrial lines but with craft unions having full equality." (26) The major groups included in SOBSI, which for a short time was for all practical purposes the sole federation



in Indonesia, were estate workers, oil workers, railroad workers, gas and electricity workers, seamen, miners, teamsters, longshoremen, pawnshop employees, printers and teachers. By 1956 there were nine national federations of labor in Indonesia, all politically oriented, many of them "creatures of the political parties." According to Hawkins "SOBSI has in recent years trained its own leadership separate from the leaders of the Communist party. Most other federations have not had enough leaders so that the same men have doubled as political and trade union leaders." According to the same author "some of the employers feel that the Communist unions are better organized and disciplined and, therefore, more responsible than other unions in Indonesia."

In August 1955 the Ministry of Labor had recorded 151 national unions and 1,350 local unions not nationally affiliated. Of these 39 national unions and 256 local unions belonged to the Communist-controlled SOBSI. Membership estimates varied from 1.5 million of which half belonged to SOBSI, to 4.5 million of which 2.6 million affiliated with SOBSI. (27)

SOBSI had two representatives in the Provisional Parliament which lasted till March 1956. In the general elections of 1955 it did not present lists of candidates but supported, of course, actively, the Communist Party. Its secretary general, Njono, is a member of Parliament elected on the Communist ticket. During the last cabinet crisis, in March 1957, SOBSI threatened to call a general strike if the Masjumi party was included in the new cabinet while the Communist Party was left out. Eventually the cabinet was formed without members of either party.

The most important farmers' organization, Barisan Tani Indonesia (B.T.I.), is also apparently Communist-controlled. Formed in November 1945, B.T.I. had two members in the Provisional Parliament, but had no lists of candidates in the 1955 elections. In September 1957 it claimed 3 million members, grouped in 103 branches. (28) The Minister of Agriculture in the Djunda cabinet is a member of B.T.I. By its nature, B.T.I. seems less well disciplined and organized than the SOBSI trade unions. Its striking power is obviously less great than that of organizations which have a hold on key sectors of the national economy. But it usually joins the Communist Party and SOBSI in supporting or opposing the government, thus providing at least symbolic support to causes espoused by the Communists.

Among women, youth and student organizations, too numerous to be inventoried here, some are affiliated to political parties and share in their ability or ineptitude in organizing and disciplining their members, others emphasize their independence from political parties and thus become centers of attraction for a significant number of joiners who do not want to be associated with political parties. Various federations are formed among such organizations.

Economic organizations such as the influential Central Indonesian Economic Council (DEIP) or the more recent Indonesian Industrial Council, professional associations of engineers, doctors, or lawyers are usually shunning party affiliations. Such organizations act frequently as true to pattern interest groups expressing their point of view on matters of special interest to their members. They also have a rather high propensity to pass motions on matters which are still felt to be part of Indonesia's national struggle, major domestic or international issues.

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In the absence of detailed case-studies, the consensus of informed observers seems to be that the flow of decisions and communications in voluntary organizations, as in the government, is from the top down with little feed-back in the opposite direction. But it can also be said that once issues are broadcast into society they are likely to gain a life of their own and continue a self-propelled course in society, beyond the control of the elite at the top. The initiative comes almost exclusively from the small group of leaders at the top. But they cannot count on popular response unless they have the support of the intermediate strata, that increasingly large segment of the total population with a mind of their own, the reference group and opinion leaders for the broad popular masses below.

Without the support of these intermediate social strata even a masterful orator and agitator such as President Sukarno can count on little or no popular response. Among many examples one can cite the failure of the All-Indonesian People's Congress initiated in August 1955, or of the New Life Movement suggested by President Sukarno in July 1957, both of which barely created a ripple on the surface of Indonesian public life.

When popular response appears to be strong, as in the early days of the 1945 Proclamation of Independence or to a lesser degree during 1957 when the Indonesian political system entered a phase of readjustment, what is at work, besides the intrinsic appeal of an issue is an organizational network. In 1945 it was the Japanese sponsored Djawa Hokokai, established as a mass organization with branches reaching into the villages and comprising women's and youth groups. (29) In 1957 the mobilization of popular support for President Sukarno's new concept of "guided democracy" in the first half of the year and for the anti-Dutch campaign at the end of the year seemed to be channeled through the organizational network of the Communist Party, its auxiliaries and front organizations.

The Communist Party, which by 1957 was "probably slightly larger in its following than the PNI, the Masjumi, or the NU and certainly larger in its active membership" (30) seems to be the only political organization since independence capable of creating a disciplined and dynamic mass party. The only other comparable efforts were the organizations created during the Japanese occupation. It is striking that both instances can be related to foreign assistance, in one case Japanese organizational techniques directly transmitted through the channels of the Japanese occupation army, in the other case the sum-total of organizational techniques of the international Communist movement transmitted through its own covert channels.

With these exceptions, Indonesian political organizations lack discipline, intensity of commitment and purpose. Most of them are brittle and possess only rudimentary skills in organizational techniques.

This does not mean that Indonesia is lacking in organized groups. The daily flow of news in the press records an amazing number of organized groups, often hard to identify due to the exuberant use of initials or emblems rather than of their full names. Motions and petitions are frequently circulated by such groups or by sometimes unexpected coalitions of groups. In the absence of detailed research it is hard to say to what extent such actions reflect opinions and wishes of substantial bodies and to what extent they are simply fabrications of a few individuals in need of an organizational platform.

Some valuable observations are provided by Donald Fagg who studied a small town of East-Central Java carefully in 1953-1954. He notes "the rather astounding number and variety of formal organizations, many of them with only nominal programs and activities, and the importance to the participants of being invited to committee-meetings and assisting in their formation... These committees are expressions of moral positions, the taking of symbolic action to fill the gap where actual action is difficult, dangerous, burdensome, or actually unintended, or where effective action is really possible only on some alternative front. They are an organizational statement of the need to take action, to pass resolutions and make statements, to set up potential machinery as yet largely unused... It is vitally important in the career of an organization then to gain recognition and acceptance as an organization 'in public standing', fulfilling those requirements which will enable it to assume a representative role in public ceremonies, participation by its delegates in the public deliberations. This recognition must come from other organizational types, within the leadership circles, must come first of all from inclusion on the official 'list of organizations' and of consequent invitation to official affairs... This participation is indeed the key to and proving ground of leadership potential, both for the constituent organizations and for their representative leaders." (31)

At the national level the incapacity to achieve broad organizational integration even for such widely shared purposes as the struggle for nationhood runs through the history of the nationalist movement from its beginning. While the inability to create mass movements under Dutch colonial rule can be directly related to repressive measures, the failure to integrate the efforts of such small organized groups as were able to establish themselves is less easily explainable. The facts are that the nationalist movement never achieved unity.

The first effort in that direction was the Radical Concentration which attempted to bring together, in November, 1918, nationalist, Islamic and Marxist organizations. It failed. A second attempt, in November 1922 did not even include the Islamic groups. A third effort was made in December 1927 at the initiative of Sukarno's Nationalist Party (PNI) and was called Understanding of Political Associations of the Indonesian Nation (P. P. P. K. I.) In December 1930 the Partai Serikat Islam left the P. P. P. K. I. The organization faded away in the following years.

Another attempt was made in May 1939 with the creation of the Indonesian Political Federation (GAPI) which convened a first Indonesian People's Congress in December 1939, and a second one in September 1941. Participants, besides the nationalist groups represented in GAPI, were Islamic groups federated in a body known as the MIAI and trade unions federated in the PVPN. A permanent body, the Indonesian People's Council (Madjelis Rakyat Indonesia), was established and a general convention planned for May 1942. But before the Japanese occupation of March 1942 changed the course of events, fissiparous tendencies manifested themselves again. The Moslem party P. S. I. I., descendent of the early mass movement Sarekat Islam, withdrew from the Indonesian People's Council on December 25, 1941. (32) The nationalist movement never achieved unity during the colonial period. The contrast with India is striking. The Indian National Congress was established in 1885, led the country to independence 62 years later and is still India's most important political organization 73 years after it was founded.



The Japanese created mass movements but played off against each other various segments of the Indonesian elite. Since independence, Indonesian political organizations have never been able to create a broad national front. Partial coalitions were primarily formed in opposition against other coalitions whose aims were challenged and positions coveted. Political alliances were frequently reversed as tactical considerations determined one party to join with others against the most important common political rival of the moment. Inter-party and also intra-party conflicts continued throughout the decisive years of the struggle for national independence. Even the common enemy was not a strong enough unifying factor.

As could be expected the first years of the Young Republic as a globally recognized sovereign state were marked by a continuation and even accentuation of group conflicts. On May 20, 1952, National Awakening Day, commemorating the creation of the Budi Utomo in 1908, an effort was made to have all parties and organizations join in a statement to "express preparedness to work for the reconstruction of the nation." Sixty-nine parties and organizations signed. The Communist Party which had been in the national dog-house since the Madiun rebellion of September 1948 got its first chance to join other political organizations, (33) the beginning of a clever campaign for the achievement of national respectability, which made it possible for the Communists to create a mass party in the following years. The Masjumi, the two Christian parties, and the Socialist Party refused their support and the pledge proved ephemeral.

In December 1954, President Sukarno made a "passionate appeal" (34) to all parties irrespective of their respective ideologies to form an All-Indonesian People's Congress to fight together for the return of Western New Guinea to Indonesia. Nowhere in Indonesia did I notice great interest in this proposal during the following months. The All-Indonesian People's Congress was nevertheless convened in August 1955 in an atmosphere of rapidly increasing tensions. A. M. Hanafi a man who seemed to enjoy the President's trust but was generally considered closely connected with Communism became Secretary General of the All-Indonesian People's Congress. Although the initiative had come from Sukarno the organization became so obviously and rapidly a Communist front that it was ridiculed by the Masjumi and the Socialist Party, and boycotted even by the Nationalist Party who called upon its members to withdraw. For the Communist Party the All-Indonesian People's Congress was a made-to-order instrument for the implementation of their national front tactics. At the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia in July 1956, D. N. Aidit, the Party's Secretary General stated in his report that the program of the All-Indonesian People's Congress "can become the platform for the everyday struggles of the Indonesian people" and that it has "the approval of a large section of the Islamic masses and the Nationalist masses and the entire Communist masses."

At the first session of the National Council of the All-Indonesian People's Congress, in August 1956, Sukarno undaunted by the opposition of the major political parties, "drew the conclusion that previous attempts to establish national front organizations, such as the G.A.P.I., the P.P.P.K.I. and the Radical Concentration had failed precisely because these bodies had exclusively comprised political parties. Thus it was that from its very inception, the All-Indonesian People's Congress had not been intended as an association of political parties, but of individuals, influential people regardless of whether they are Moslems, Nationalists or Communists." (35)

Then, on October 28, 1956, at a youth rally commemorating the historical Youth Congress of 1928, President Sukarno launched the bombshell which marked the current phase of Indonesian politics. "Let's bury the parties," he proposed. Between August and October he had visited the Soviet Union and Communist China, an experience which seems to have increased his determination and helped him to jell his thoughts. Weeks of frantic activity followed with the President's emissaries meeting in closed sessions with activist groups, especially veterans, all over the country to gauge the amount of support he could count on.

What seems to have been at first an intention to abolish the party system and make place for a single party or a mass movement was watered down and became the President's new "concept" announced in a major address on February 21, 1957. "The principles of western democracy," he said, "the parliamentary democracy of the western countries, incorporate the concept of an active opposition, and it is precisely the adoption of this concept that has given rise to the difficulties we have experienced over the last eleven years. By accepting this concept we have come to think in a manner which is alien to the Indonesian way of life." He suggested that what Indonesia needed was "guided democracy"; not an abolition of parties but a "mutual aid" (gotong royong) cabinet which would include representatives of the country's four major parties including the Communist Party, a proposal totally unacceptable to the Maajumi. He also proposed the establishment of a National Council (Dewan Nasional), through which "a firmly established bridge would be created between Parliament and the dynamic forces of society." While it proved impossible to form a gotong royong cabinet, a National Council was inaugurated on July 12, 1957, after a state of martial law had been proclaimed on March 14, 1957 and the extra-parliamentary cabinet of Djuanda Kartawidjaja had been formed on April 9, 1957.

The tensions generated by the events of the first half of 1957 were ultimately to explode in the proclamation of a counter-government (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) headed by prominent Maajumi leaders, in Padang, Central Sumatra, on February 15, 1958. This in turn led to armed conflict driving the rebels into the jungles of Sumatra and Celebes from where they still harass the national army. The fissiparous tendencies of Indonesian political organization had created a chain-reaction leading to an explosion.

The National Council, which includes representatives of what are now called in Indonesia 'functional groups', namely labor, youth, intellectuals, religious leaders, peasants, journalists, artists, women, business, and minorities, was described, a year after its establishment, by its Vice-Chairman, as a "reservoir of political energy, but a reservoir which is not built by political party self-seeking, fears or ambitions, but by representatives of genuine social forces organized in a genuinely national body." (36) But it can hardly be expected to reverse by itself the trend which has characterized group dynamics in Indonesian politics over the last half-century.

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Are there then no countervailing powers at work capable of competing effectively with the superior organizational technique of the Communist Party, its affiliates and fronts? It is tempting to say that there are natural limits to the expansion of a totalitarian movement in a society which seems to be like most of Southeast Asia "loosely structured". (37) An argument on these lines would emphasize the general fissiparous tendencies of Indonesian society, lines of ethnic and religious cleavage, a general opposition to regimentation apparent since the beginning of the nationalist movement and various reports of revulsion against "hard-sell" techniques of ideological indoctrination which came to the writer's attention while in Indonesia in 1957 and early this year. The counter-argument would stress the fact that all these factors may not prove major obstacles to a well-organized activist minority especially in a country which tolerated for several centuries colonial rule with only sporadic and ineffective resistance until historical circumstances permitted a successful struggle for independence.

If organizational technique can only be matched by its like then the social forces surveyed above are unlikely to prove equal to the Communist challenge. But a more effective countervailing power seems to be emerging recently: the Indonesian Army. The officers corps is the result of a process of natural selection which made some of the most able, enterprising and dedicated young men of the country rally followers and take up arms some twelve years ago. Most of them are barely approaching middle age, are vigorous and increasingly dynamic and have good reasons to consider themselves the real creators of the Republic.

The Army's attitude toward Communism is deeply influenced by its strong nationalism which would make it oppose any group influenced from abroad, and by the memory of the Madiun rebellion of September 1948 which engaged elite troops in bloody battles with Communist units in the face of an imminent Dutch offensive. But there are other reasons for the belief that the Army, though by no means vociferously anti-Communist, is not likely to stand by and let the Communists achieve control of the country in a power-vacuum. The conflict between the military and the Communist organizers is more visible at the local level than in national politics. There, the two groups have been competing for several years for the allegiance of the younger generation in towns and villages, (38) the pemuda, the young men and women increasingly restless as the massive educational efforts of the Republic heightens their expectations while population growth and economic stagnation deprive them of opportunities.

This clash of social forces between the military and the extreme left seems to be of greater significance than the personal attitudes of a handful of top-ranking commanders who might be displaced by an other-minded group, although there is general agreement that the top echelons of the Army are at present anti-Communist or at least non-Communist.

Developments in the last two years indicate that the Army, unlike the non-Communist political organizations, is increasingly aware of and familiar with the value of organizational techniques through which to reach and integrate the intermediate social strata.

In July 1957, following a meeting between the Army Chief of Staff Major General (now Lt. General) A. H. Nasution and representatives of four youth organizations affiliated to the four major political parties, the Nationalist Party, Masjumi, Nahdatul Ulama and Communist Party, a Cooperation Body Between Youth and Army (BKP-FM) was created. At the formal installation of this new organization,



in the presence of President Sukarno, a message from the Army Chief of Staff was read in which he appealed to other groups to follow the example of the youth groups. In the following months cooperation bodies between the army and women's organizations, labor, farmers and religious leaders were established.

At the first anniversary of the BKP-PM, on July 25, 1958, it was announced that Cooperation Bodies Between Youth and Army had been set up in all parts of the country except Atjeh (North Sumatra), West Sumatra and Celebes. Clearly, the Army was establishing control over the activities of the auxiliary organizations of political parties and other voluntary organizations, though not over the parties themselves.

A further development took place after the nationalist outbursts of December 1957 during which the Dutch were by and large eliminated from the economic life of Indonesia. In the first weeks activist groups assumed temporary control of the situation, apparently going beyond the intentions of the government. As a result the Central Action Committee for the Liberation of West Irian a private organization, of which the Minister of Information Sudibjo was chairman, was dissolved on December 21, 1957 and Prime Minister Djuanda Kartanidjaja announced that in the future the struggle will be directed by the National Security Council, a governmental body of which the Prime Minister himself was chairman.

Then, on January 11, 1958, the Army announced that all initiatives of veterans, workers, farmers and youth groups in connection with the struggle for West Irian would be channeled into a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian the formation of which had been decided by the Army Chief of Staff. It was emphasized that no other chain of command was permitted than that from the National Security Council through the Army Chief of Staff to the territorial commanders of the Army.

On January 17, 1958, the Army Chief of Staff issued a decree establishing the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian of which he became chairman. Territorial commanders were instructed to establish branches of the National Front in their areas. In various parts of the country the Army Chief of Staff presided himself in the following months over the installation of the local commanders as National Front chairmen.

On August 2, 1958, the Army announced that following a review by the National Council and by the cabinet of the position of the National Front it had been decided to strengthen the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian. It will be known thereafter by its abbreviated name Front Nasional and be built into a "guided mass movement" based on the Cooperation Bodies between the Army and Youth, Workers, Women, Farmers, Religious Leaders and Veterans. The Army Chief of Staff remained chairman of the Front Nasional. The statement added that by strengthening the National Front "any attempts to revive conflicts among various groups can be prevented". The new officers of the National Front were installed on August 15, 1958, at a ceremony at the Presidential Palace. The Army Chief of Staff announced that within six months branches of the National Front will be installed in all districts (kabupaten).

On August 9, 1958, another decree of the Army Chief of Staff instructed all governmental agencies to report about the political affiliation of all civil servants in category "I", the upper strata of the bureaucracy, a move likely to have considerable influence on the relations between the civilian administration of the country and political organizations.

The Army, which had for several years requested vigorous measures against corruption and had taken direct measures under martial law since early 1957, raised its voice again through its Chief of Staff on the eve of the Independence Day celebrations of August 17, 1958. Lt. General A. H. Nasution denounced those who are "parasites of independence, namely the economic soldiers of fortune, bureaucrats, corruptors, political horse-traders, owners of automobiles and beautiful houses and their like". This anti-corruption drive is bound to increase the popularity of the Army with the intermediate strata of Indonesian society who, unlike the small elite at the top, do not own cars or mansions.

The increasingly important role of the Army manifests itself in many other ways. Most of the properties taken over from the Dutch since December 1957 have been placed under military administrators. Under the state of war proclaimed in March 1957, the Army has a controlling role in the administration of civilian affairs at all levels. Even more significant is the increasingly active role of the officers corps in the social process at large, its involvement in civic activities of various sorts. In 1953-1954 Donald Fagg studying the social structure of a town in Central-East Java observed how on all occasions of national or local significance the Communists through the auxiliaries of the Party, the youth organization Pemuda Rakjat, SOBSI, STI and other groups, exploited all organizational opportunities to their advantage, occupying key positions on various committees, implementing directives from the center relayed through regional headquarters. (39)

In their untiring, well-planned, well-organized and well-financed activities they seemed few years ago unrivalled in the small towns and villages of Java. Other organizations, outclassed in terms of initiative, sense of direction and material means, were either put in the position of going along or had to leave the field to the Communists. But 1955-1956 opposition to initiatives such as the All-Indonesian People's Congress indicated that other organized groups were less and less willing to be manipulated by the Communists. But they were lacking the galvanizing energy necessary for effective counteraction.

As the Army is now extending the scope of its activities into society it seems more and more to become an accepted source of leadership in public life. While information on recent developments is still sketchy, it would seem that at present Army representatives are increasingly occupying the key positions on local committees concerned with civic activities. These developments, interpreted in the light of developments at the center, in Djakarta, suggest that the officers corps is engaged in counteracting quietly but apparently effectively Communist attempts to capture the dynamic forces of Indonesian nationalism.

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Hard facts are lacking to draw conclusions on whether these recent developments have the full support of President Sukarno and are therefore a new phase in his efforts over thirty years to achieve national unity, or whether they are an independent development initiated by the Army in its own right.

In his August 17, 1958, Independence Day address, President Sukarno pleaded again for his concept of "guided democracy." Although he went less far than in October 1956 when he talked about "burying the parties," he devoted an important part of his speech to the role of political organizations.

"Simplify the party system! The vastly multiplied number of parties have already become unpopular, and a laughing stock to the people. What is more, the people have become aware that political parties are often being used as a means, not to serve the interests of the people, but rather jealously to guard the personal interests of a handful of party-tycoons... I suggest forthrightly that we should change our General Election Laws and promulgate an effective Law on Political Parties. I plainly also propose that the Government Declaration of November 3, 1945, should be destroyed. That Declaration encourages the existence of political parties and introduced the world of parliamentary liberalism to our Revolution. This Revolution should be led by an undivided command, but due to the November 3, 1945, Declaration that command has been completely split up to the present time."

Significantly, despite his concern with a formula that would integrate the country's political forces, and his plea for an "undivided command", President Sukarno did not mention at all in his address Lt. General Nasution's National Front.

The broader implications of this detailed account of recent political developments in Indonesia should be clear by now. In the past as well as in recent years various efforts have been made to integrate political organizations into one national movement. These efforts have failed. It is the thesis of this paper that this was due to the fact that politics were treated largely as negotiation and manipulation among the few hundred or few thousand members of the country's top elite, with relative neglect of serious organizational efforts to reach the intermediate strata of society, the hundreds of thousands or millions of members of organized groups of various sorts. After 1952 the Communist Party engaged in a highly successful effort to change its own elitist structure into a real mass organization and to secure control of even broader social strata through front organizations and national front tactics. Recently the Army seems to have discovered the efficacy of this approach and in organizing the National Front is implicitly, quietly but probably deliberately, building up countervailing powers against Communist expansion. Whether the Army will succeed depends on what it will have to offer to the intermediate strata of Indonesian society. But its approach, based on an effort to control all organized groups seems, like that of the Communists, realistic.

In striking contrast with this approach, the Indonesian nationalist movement, of which President Sukarno has been for three decades a foremost exponent, has relied largely on an exhortatory technique, a moral and emotional appeal from the leaders to the masses. Perhaps this is the result of habits developed under Dutch colonialism when organizational efforts were constantly repressed. But the lack of success of the latter method in achieving national unity and political stability demonstrates the error of the concept that political decisions can be made, negotiated and manipulated by a small elite at the top and then transmitted to unorganized masses through rhetoric alone.

Berkeley, California, August 30, 1958



FOOTNOTES

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2. Robert Van Niel, Development of the Indonesian Elite in the Early Twentieth Century, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, February, 1954, p. 322.
3. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, The Hague, Bandung, W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1955, p. 199.
4. Kahin, op. cit., p. 529.
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6. Van Niel, op. cit., pp. 113-115.
7. Ica Everard Williams, The Rise of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Netherlands India, 1900-1916, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, April, 1956, pp. 215-216.
8. A. K. Pringgoldigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia, Djakarta, Pustraka Rakjat, 1950, p. 12.
9. L. M. Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia, Djakarta, Pustaka Rakjat, 1951, pp. 10-11.
10. Pringgoldigdo, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
11. Van Niel, op. cit., pp. 310, 312.
12. For an excellent account in English see George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1952, Chapter III.
13. Pringgoldigdo, op. cit., p. 76.
14. Ibid., p. 45.
15. Ibid., p. 98.
16. Van Niel, op. cit., p. 476.
17. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958, pp. 111, 153, 164.
18. George McT. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, p. 476.
19. Interview with Chaerul Saleh, Djakarta, January, 1958.
20. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, p. 500.

21. Republik Indonesia Serikat, Ministry of Information, Political Parties, Armed Groups, Labour Unions and Youth Organizations in Indonesia, Djakarta, 1950, (mimeo), p. 13. Republik Indonesia Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaian di Indonesia, Djakarta, 1951, p. 14.
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23. Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesian Images of Their National Self" to be published in the November 1958 issue of Public Opinion Quarterly.
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26. Everett D. Hawkins, Labor Relations in a Newly Independent Country - The Case of Indonesia, unpublished memorandum, South Hadley, Mass., Mount Holyoke College, 1957, p. 22.
27. Ibid, pp. 24-25, 38.
28. New Bulletin Persbino Indonesia, September 10, 1957.
29. Benda, op. cit., p. 153.
30. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, p. 556.
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32. Sitarus, op. cit., pp. 54-59.
33. Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958. Quoted from the working draft, p. 96.
34. B. H. M. Vlekke, Indonesia in 1956, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957, p. 12.
35. Communist Party of Indonesia, Review of Indonesia, September 15, 1956.
36. Roeslan Abdulgani, "Indonesia's National Council: The First Year," Far Eastern Survey, July 1958, p. 100.
37. John F. Embree, "Thailand--A Loosely Structured Social System", American Anthropologist, vol. III, No. 2 (1950).
38. Personal communication from Boyd R. Compton, Research Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs in Indonesia from 1952 to 1956.
39. Donald Fagg, op. cit., Part I (4), p. 102.

## THE STUDY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

The last generation has seen a fresh surge of scholarly interest in the venerable subject of military affairs. The result, especially in America, has been a growing number of articles, meetings, books, university courses, bibliographies, and research centers devoted to "national security," "national defense," or "military policy."

Although this outburst of activity is a natural consequence of the gravity of contemporary military problems, it has not been viewed with complete equanimity by those engaged in it, by their academic colleagues, or by public officials. Students of military affairs are not certain that there is a common denominator to their varied interests; they find it hard to discover a central focus or to perceive a set of internal relationships that give unity to the whole. More important, they are not certain what kinds of questions serious scholars can or should ask of the subject. Their colleagues are even more uneasy. They wonder to what extent the nature of present military affairs research justifies a claim to resources or a claim to autonomy. Political scientists, for example, are uncertain whether military problems should be treated as part of such established fields as international relations or public administration, or whether they should also be regarded as a separate area of inquiry. They wonder whether students of military matters are too occupied with essentially technical or operational details, or with problems of current but passing importance; in short, whether they are working below the proper level of a scholar. Finally, the public official suspects that some students of military affairs are trying to operate above their proper level that is, as policy advisers inclined to trespass on closely guarded areas and presumptuous in their readiness to offer guidance on grave issues about which they do not know very much.

In view of these honest doubts and serious questions, the student of military affairs has an obligation to examine the nature of his subject, its range and coherence as an area of inquiry, and the intellectual opportunities and problems that it poses. This paper is written in the belief that he must try



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to clarify his own thinking on such matters before he can hope to deal with the questions of others. Its principal argument is that the concept of military affairs can provide a useful framework within which to examine problems that are of real intellectual significance as well as of great practical importance. For the social scientist the study of armed forces in their full social and political context presents new frontiers of scholarship that encompass the full range of disciplines and methodologies. These frontiers, have only begun to be explored. They lie not only in the realm of current policy issues but perhaps even more in that traditional realm of inquiry, with no direct utilitarian purpose, that owes its appeal to our abiding curiosity about the eternal mystery of man in society.

The Focus of the Subject

Around the start of World War II a number of American scholars called for greater attention to military affairs and prepared outlines or bibliographies to suggest the scope of the study and to facilitate its pursuit.<sup>1</sup> Two such publications are of particular interest because they tend to approach military affairs from the standpoint of different fields of political science. One is a bibliography on civil-military relations prepared in 1940 at the request of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council.<sup>2</sup> The authors conceive their subject broadly. They give attention to comparative experience; they speak of "the whole social experience of a nation at war," and they cite the massive effort of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to analyze the economic and social history of World War I. But they place relatively little emphasis on the role of armed force in foreign affairs. Instead, they focus their attention on national government, particularly Public Administration, with the result that the bulk of the entries in the bibliography relate either to the management of particular mobilization programs (e.g. industry,

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1. See, for example, an editorial and articles by Alfred Vagts and Edward M. Earle in the Journal of the American Military Institute (Vol. IV, 1940). See also Dorothy C. Culver, Administration and Organization in Wartime in the United States (Public Administration Service, 1940). Edward M. Earle, "National Defense and Political Science," Political Science Quarterly (December 1940).

2. Pendleton Herring, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Bibliographical Notes on Administrative Problems of Civilian Mobilization (Public Administration Service, 1940).

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food, manpower) or to aspects of general overhead management (e.g. staffing, organizing, coordinating).

The second is a syllabus and bibliography on war and national policy prepared in 1942 by a group of scholars at Columbia and Princeton, assisted by the Social Science Research Council.<sup>3</sup> This work also conceives the subject broadly. It encompasses cultural, economic and technological influences on war, the formation of military policy, and the impact of war on government and society. But the principal emphasis is on force as an instrument of foreign policy. A foreword compares the growing interest in the subject with the start of international relations as a field of study in the 1920's. It also notes that war and national policy is "a much more inchoate subject" than the study of international relations.

An effort to bring together the emphasis on public administration of the first publication, and the emphasis on foreign policy of the second, is reflected in a more recent bibliography compiled under the supervision of the Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research Council.<sup>4</sup> From the standpoint of political science this merger of international relations and national government approaches is one of the distinctive aspects of present study of military affairs. It creates not only opportunities for fruitful cooperation but problems of where to place the emphasis. A second distinctive aspect, revealed in the three publications as a group, is its interdisciplinary nature. From the standpoint of the social sciences as a whole military affairs are seen to engage the interests of historians, social psychologists, economists, and sociologists, as well as political scientists.<sup>5</sup> This, too, creates problems

3. Grayson Kirk and Richard P. Stebbins, War and National Policy: A Syllabus (Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942).
4. Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research Council, Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952 (Columbia University Press, 1954). See also William T. R. Fox, "Civil-Military Relations Research," World Politics (January 1954), 278-288.
5. Examples of historical works cited are Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (W.W. Norton, 1937), Gordon B. Turner, A History of Military Affairs (Harcourt Brace, 1953), and official volumes on American forces and civilian agencies in World War II. Social psychology is represented by Samuel A. Stouffer et al., eds., The American Soldier, 4 vol's (Princeton University Press, 1949). Many works on the economics of national security are cited. An early example is J. M. Clark et al., Readings in the Economics of War (University of Chicago Press, 1918). Titles on war and social institutions reflect the interest of sociologists. An example is Hans Speier and Alfred Kahler, eds., War In Our Time (W.W. Norton, 1939).

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of emphasis as well as opportunities for cooperation. Indeed, it suggests the need for an explicit recognition of the fact that the subject of military affairs can be examined through foci of varying width and sharpness, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Three of the more important of these foci will be discussed.

An international relations focus emphasizes the relation between military power and foreign policy. The subject thus viewed includes study of the causes of war, the relation of the size and composition of armed forces to external objectives, ideas and institutions affecting their employment on behalf of such objectives, and the effect of their existence, manipulation, and use on other nations' foreign policies. Special interest is taken in gradations of armed force, alliances, the ability of the military establishment to perform external tasks, and its interaction with political, economic, and ideological aspects of diplomacy. Illustrations of this focus may be found in work done at Princeton by Edgar A. Furniss and at Chicago by the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy. The study utilizes many of the concepts of international relations and cuts heavily into that field, although it need not be viewed as coextensive with it. For example, an analysis of economic aid to Belgian victims of World War I may be undertaken without reference to military questions, i.e. solely to analyze American idealism in world affairs. On the other hand a study of whether economic aid helps Turkey meet military commitments to NATO may be regarded as an inquiry both in international relations and in military affairs.

The strength of this focus lies in its relative specificity and in the fact that it has been the external threat to national values that has created the current interest in military affairs and lent their study its particular sense of urgency.

A national security focus, while also concerned primarily with the use of force to meet external threats to the integrity of a political system, tends to expand the subject to include a broader range of domestic policy topics. For example, it invites study of military recruitment and supply, economic mobilization, and non-military measures undertaken to maintain home morale, control espionage, and protect the civilian population in the face of armed threats. This wider focus is illustrated by the interests of the Committee on National Security Policy Research of the Social Science Research Council and by courses on defense policy given at Harvard and other universities. The great variety of public functions encompassed leads to a heavier stress on the machinery of government, particularly on the planning and coordination of national policy.



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The national security focus is the dominant one among political scientists today. It has, however, some possible disadvantages. National security is a somewhat nebulous and subjective concept without a hard institutional core. Its definition may vary from one individual, country, and era to another. It has been said to be of the same order as "liberty" or "justice," that is, to lie in the realm of ultimate ends rather than areas of action, and in this sense to be too broad to delineate a subject of research.<sup>6</sup> In another sense the concept of national security is too narrow to include all the aspects of military affairs that are of interest to contemporary scholars. One problem is whether the concept should be stretched to include internal as well as external threats to the integrity of a political system, i.e. whether it should encompass phenomena of civil disturbance or revolution in countries like Egypt, Argentina, Spain, Iran, Iraq, or France, where the loyalty of the armed forces to the regime becomes a critical constitutional question. A more serious problem is that it cannot be stretched to cover the numerous civil functions that the military establishment may perform as an instrument of the general welfare rather than of the common defense. Such functions need not involve the manipulation of organized violence at all. The work of the Corps of Engineers is a classical example.

A military focus comes closest to embracing the full range of the subject as defined by the activity of contemporary scholars. A military focus, however, may take two forms, depending on whether the subject is conceived as a public policy field or somewhat more broadly as the study of military affairs. Faced with a choice between these two, the instinct of political scientists is to regard military studies as a policy area analogous to fiscal, foreign, labor, welfare, or resources policy. Such a perspective permits examination of all political purposes, domestic as well as foreign, for which military establishments are used. It directs attention to the public policies that regulate their use, to the processes by which those policies are formed and executed, and to the effects such policies have on human society. It permits study of how these matters are influenced not only by governmental institutions and current political, scientific, and economic trends, but also by historical traditions and contemporary social structure and culture. But it is interested in these environmental variables only to the extent that they affect public policy or the policy process, or to the extent that the environment is affected by the use of military establishments to advance political purposes.

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6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Challenge of Defense to Political Science, a paper delivered at the 1956 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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The military affairs focus, on the other hand, includes military policy and something more. It permits an examination of how certain environmental variables shape the nature of the military establishment as distinguished from the way it is used. For example, it would include a study of how the class structure of society affects discipline, career lines, or codes of conduct within the armed forces. It also directs attention to impacts of the military establishment that need not be the result of public policy. One example is the effect that an officer corps may have on routine domestic politics; another is the unplanned effect of war on economic structure or scientific progress. In other words the military establishment may be examined not only as an instrument of public policy but, from a more sociological point of view, as a mirror and moulder of the social order. From this viewpoint it is seen as an institution that reflects the community in which it is embedded and that serves as a causative element whose full impact on human life is deeper and broader than the public policy objectives of government.<sup>7</sup>

Both the military "affairs" and the military "policy" versions of this focus differ from the national security focus because they center the subject around an empirically verifiable institution - the military establishment. Each differs also because it extends the subject to institutional functions other than the management of organized violence. But the two can be distinguished from each other because the concept of military "affairs" encompasses more of the military establishments reciprocal relations with society. It thereby embraces a broader range of work in military history, war economics, defense policy, and the sociology of war and military life.

It does not follow, however, that research on every aspect of a military establishment is research in military affairs. This depends on the viewpoint or purposes of the scholar. A study of management practices in a military organization can be made to illustrate how such practices influence its effectiveness, or how management techniques are influenced by their military context. This is a study in military affairs. On the other hand a study of management practices which happened to be conducted in a military organization, but in which that fact is not relevant to the purposes or interests of the researcher, falls entirely within business or public administration. An inquiry into how planning errors caused inferior torpedoes to be delivered to Japanese submarines is a study in military affairs; but an examination of how torpedoes are handled aboard a ship is more likely to be a study in naval science. Likewise a chronicle of combat operations designed to illustrate or prescribe military

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7. The subject is often treated from this perspective in Pondleton Herring, The Impact of War (Farrar, 1941).

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techniques is a study in military science or in the history of military science. But an account of combat operations designed to illustrate their influence on theories of organization or strategy is a study in military affairs.

Even with such exclusions a military focus is wide enough to raise in its most acute form the problem of the coherence of military affairs as an area of inquiry. To better understand this problem it is desirable to look more closely at a few of the highly varied aspects of military affairs that are examined by disciplines with which political scientists are less familiar.

Military history, as just implied, can be divided into two overlapping and not easily distinguishable categories. Much of the earlier work in the field, with its specific concern for combat techniques, can be regarded as a part of military science. Some of the more recent military history treats armed conflict as a social phenomenon in the widest sense; as has been said, it studies "war without battles." But the typical concern of the historian of military affairs lies between these extremes. It is to analyze the origins of campaigns, the course and consequences of battle, and the evolution of military institutions, doctrines, and policies.

The interests of psychologists range from the motivation of R.O.T.C. students to the preservation or destruction of national morale. The sociologists examine promotion patterns, indoctrination techniques, ideologies, "guilds," and social controls within the armed forces. Some use the analytical tools of the sociology of professions; others employ the theory of bureaucratic organizations; still others adopt the large, loose framework of war and society.

Economists study the relation between rapid changes in the size of the armed forces and monetary fiscal, price, and wage policies. They examine the impact of military procurement on industry, the effect of military aid on economic development, and the economic implications of nuclear attack. They are also interested in the costing of defense programs and the application of economic theory to the problem of choosing among alternative defense programs within a nation and within an alliance.

Given these varied historical, psychological, sociological, and economic interests, military affairs can be constituted as a field of study only by abstracting certain phenomena from the disciplines within which they might otherwise be treated, combining them with political phenomena similarly abstracted, and establishing the whole as a special cross-section of the social sciences. There are precedents enough for this in the study of



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such subjects as small groups, race relations, or particular areas of the world. Military affairs may make a less tidy package than small groups, but not a more untidy one than American Civilization. In all such cases the reasons for creating a special cross-section are both practical and intellectual. One is that problems inherently worthy of attention are likely to be neglected if they are treated as parts of other subjects. A second is that scholars otherwise separated by such different analytical categories as power, scarcity, time, personality, or society, are enabled to discover that they share an interest in the same concrete object of investigation, e.g. ethnic problems, Southern Asia, or war. Their assumption is that this discovery will lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas because the particular aspect of the subject in which each scholar is interested is related in some manner to aspects in which the others are interested.

However, in all such cases the problem as well as the opportunity is plain. The problem is how to create a coherent field of inquiry. Coherence can be lent to a field by its method, its subject, its concepts, or its theory of the relations among its component parts. The study of military affairs, like political science itself, cannot acquire coherence from its methods; it borrows methods from all social sciences. On the other hand it has a common subject matter in the multiple functions relationships, and problems of the military establishment. Some of its concepts appear to be borrowed from the established social sciences - e.g. national interest, policy coordination, optimum allocation of resources, professionalism. Others appear to relate only to military affairs - e.g. arms race, economic potential for war, spectrum of force, mobilization base, civilian control. Integrating theory cannot really be said to exist. Perhaps it could be developed more easily if the focus of the subject were narrowed to military aspects of national security policy; for there seems to be a closer and more dynamic relation among such concepts as economic potential, arms race, and strategy, than between any of these and a concept like the bureaucratization of the armed forces. Yet even if one employs the wider focus of military affairs, it is possible that the basis upon which to build integrating theory exists. In principle all the phenomena of military affairs are related to the military establishment as variables affecting its nature, use, or impacts; and through the military establishment these variables are related to one another. This may be a thin reed upon which to lean, but it is better than nothing.

The only conclusion that appears warranted is that the study of military affairs in its incipient stage is neither a highly unified field nor a potpourri of unrelated topics. Over the years it is possible that elements of the subject will be diffused

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among and absorbed by the established branches of social science from which they were abstracted. It is also possible that a large number of distinctive concepts will be created, and a theory constructed, linking together all elements of the subject in a meaningful way. Resolution of this matter can only depend on the cumulative intellectual product of students of military affairs in the course of time. Meanwhile it is the responsibility of those students to make certain that the questions they are asking of their subject are as substantial and profitable as possible. It is therefore appropriate to turn to some of the opportunities and problems of military affairs research.

### Research Opportunities and Problems

An area of inquiry may be coherent and yet not wholly respectable. The doubts and misgivings about military studies relate to something more than the intrinsic unity of the field. In part they relate to the ideological outlook of people in the field. One common, if not always expressed, belief is that the military researcher, by a process of natural selection, must be a militarist. Or at least he must be a tough-minded neo-conservative who views the world order solely in terms of conflicting national interests ultimately to be pursued by force. This is a double misconception, first because many of the acknowledged neo-conservative students of military affairs have been among the most vocal critics of the great emphasis on force in American policy; second because the traditions of liberal idealism and pacificism continue to find support among men in the field. As a result the problem of civil defense continues to be related to the rule of law as well as to the requirements of security; and secrecy continues to be analyzed in terms of the public's right to know as well as in terms of its effectiveness as a weapon.

More serious doubts relate to the problems which the student of military affairs examines. Suspicion exists that these are largely technical or operational issues at a low level of generality, that they lie principally in the realm of current events; and consequently that they are almost entirely lacking in intellectual content. This suspicion is increased by exposure to academic courses in the subject when such courses consist of a series of unrelated topical briefings given by a series of visiting dignitaries to an odd array of officers present under orders, R.O.T.C. registrants, sensation-seekers, and law or business school "typos" - with hardly a serious graduate student of the social sciences in the group.

In part these suspicions may reflect nothing more than the natural conservatism of scholars in established fields when they are confronted with a new area of inquiry. Certainly there are

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some parallels between a study of the evolution and political significance of the "clear and present danger" doctrine and a study of the evolution and political significance of strategic bombing doctrine. And there is no inherent reason why it should be more respectable for a student of constitutional law to analyze the limitations placed on the political role of a Supreme Court by his professional inhibitions than for a student of military affairs to analyze the same phenomenon in Army generals. But it is less fruitful to attempt to prove that these suspicions are either justified or ill founded than to examine the different kinds of research opportunities in the field and the problems that they pose.

Although the resurgence of interest in military affairs is clearly a product of the present world crisis, it would be a serious error to conclude that all research efforts must be addressed directly to the solution of critical current problems. Certainly this purpose rarely animates those who stand in the great tradition of military history. For example, few if any of the massive volumes on World War II were inspired primarily by a concern for the current dilemmas of the government. Moreover, opportunity for such traditional scholarship is far greater than many social scientists realize. There is an urgent need for studies of the evolution of national military policy in the United States and other nations. There is an urgent need for more specialized studies of the evolution of strategic doctrine, recruitment policy, civil functions, logistical practises, etc. There is need for research on the history of theories about war - both for studies that relate the views of particular thinkers to other aspects of their intellectual systems, and for studies that relate such views to the social order or the social theory of the age in which they originated.

A closely related form of military affairs research utilizes historical data primarily for the purpose of formulating or testing generalizations about the relations among specific variables. Again the scholar may have no interest in the applicability of his findings to current problems. He may simply be curious about the effect of war on the mobility of social classes. Perhaps he wishes to test the hypothesis that the higher the proportion of a populace in the armed forces, the greater the tendency to egalitarianism both in the armed forces and in society. He may be curious about why some armies are more disciplined than others, or whether Naval officers tend to be less politically oriented than Army officers. He may be interested in the conditions under which the influence of military leaders waxes and wanes in society, or the conditions under which an officer corps is a citadel of reaction and the conditions under which it becomes a spearhead of social reform.



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Such studies are of the essence of traditional scholarship, particularly when they are pursued by a historical - comparative method that provides a check against spurious correlations. Yet scholars have barely begun to explore the possibilities for this kind of work.

There are other forms of military affairs research in which a scholar may desire to contribute to an understanding of grave and immediate problems, but in which he feels that he can be more effective if he attacks such problems indirectly rather than directly. This permits him to perform the traditional function of a man of learning without dissociating himself from the pressing questions of his time; and the possibility of such a middle course is itself one of the distinctively attractive aspects of the study of military affairs. Thus a student may be concerned over the organization of the Defense Department, but instead of analyzing or prescribing organizational policy, he may simply examine the extent to which military plans and operations appear to be influenced by the competitive position or institutional interests of the services under particular forms of organization. He may fear that NATO is about to fall apart and yet be content with a broad historical study of variables affecting the solidity of alliances. He may be convinced that war has become essentially a psychological contest and yet confine himself to a comparative analysis of the conditions under which military threats, demonstrations, or ultimata have proved effective.

Again, the scholar can confront current problems somewhat more squarely but still without attempting to appraise the manner in which they are dealt with by governments. Instead of analyzing policy or process, he can invent or refine concepts and distinctions that may be helpful in analysis. He can develop such categories as balanced organization, strategic monism, objective civilian control, declaratory versus operational policy, or expert versus representational roles. Instead of appraising the effectiveness of the budget process, he can speculate about the standards that such a process should meet. Instead of reviewing decisions on weaponry or organization, he can develop theoretical criteria on which such decisions ought to be based. Instead of examining official attitudes toward war or the aims of war, he can conduct a traditional philosophical inquiry into the problem of a just war, into the nature of the choice between national security and other values, or into the ethical implications of preventive war in a variety of morally ambiguous situations.

It is only when the scholar confronts the process by which current military policy is made, or attempts to appraise the merits of the product, that he begins to encounter some rather

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special difficulties in research. These need not necessarily dissuade him or impair the quality of his work, but he should be aware that they exist and that they tend to vary with the sensitivity of his subject and the level of generalization at which it is treated.

Even under the best of circumstances it is not easy to describe in its full richness the policy-making process within a government. Bureaucratic secrecy rears its head. The roles of individuals, their viewpoints, and especially their motives, are elusive. Memories are faulty and records inaccurate or incomplete. Official historians frequently find gaps or errors in accounts pieced together by private scholars; the operating official "who was there" may smile at the record painfully reconstructed by the official historian who was not present; and the operating official's psychoanalyst doubtless has his own interpretation of the Platonic truth. Nevertheless opportunity exists for detailed case studies of the process by which contemporary military policy is made. They are greatest in those areas of military affairs that have important domestic economic or political implications, and in which Congress takes a correspondingly great interest; the development of reserve forces policy is an example. A more serious problem arises in the application of case study methods to the process by which sensitive decisions are taken on strategy or weapons, for example, the decision to send missile units to Great Britain. It may be avoided if the researcher is content to deal on a level of generalization at which the details of plans and the precise reasoning behind them are irrelevant to his purpose. But if he seeks a reasonably complete account, he is obliged to inquire whether inaccessible classified data exist. If he believes they do exist, and that they might be important to the story, he has the problem of weighing the likelihood of an inaccurate or seriously incomplete account against the likelihood that his narrative could be at least more complete and meaningful than any picture of the process previously available to private persons. If he resolves this issue in favor of publication, he is obliged to avoid giving a false impression of certainty where he is not actually sure of the validity of his materials. Of course, scholars in other field face the same problems. Information is not unavailable only because it is unclassified. But the special aspect of detailed research on sensitive military policy is the stronger probability that the most important information is most likely to be unavailable.

A similar picture of opportunities and special difficulties confronts the researcher who seeks directly to examine the merits of current military policy. He can employ a great variety of criteria in his analysis. He can inquire into the

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likelihood that a policy will have the effect intended. He has asked whether it is likely to secure the necessary support, as in a study of disarmament. Or whether it conflicts with other social values, as in a study of conscription. Or whether one policy position (e.g. that NATO troops must be more than a trip-wire for SAC) is consistent with another (e.g. that a European war cannot be limited). Or which of two policies makes the more efficient use of scarce resources. In all such studies he can rest content with the analysis or proceed to prescribe a course of action.

If he does the latter he immediately faces the problem of deciding how specific or detailed such prescription should be. The scholar can close a lengthy analysis with a brief suggestion that the nation increase its capacity to fight limited wars. Or he can take successive steps down the ladder of generalization by applying this premise to the mobility of the Army to the problem of airlift, and to the merits of different types of transport planes. But the further down he goes, the greater the danger that his work will have a narrow range of application and a short life, the closer he will come to a form of operations research that rests on knowledge essentially technical in nature, the greater the likelihood that he will move from the field of military affairs to the field of military science, and the stronger the possibility that he will exchange the traditional function of the academician for the special province of the official expert or the contract researcher.

As in the case of detailed studies of the decision-making process, a second difficulty arises when the subject of research is classified. In attempting to deal with such highly sensitive topics as strategic plans, the scholar can only guess at the policy. He may try to infer it from general public statements, but such statements may have been made for another audience. In a democracy they may turn out to bear a closer relation than secret plans to the action subsequently taken, but there is no certainty that this will be the case. Consequently his analysis may be full of factual errors or false assumptions about the nature of the problem. Perhaps more aggravating, the researcher may be unaware that the problem itself no longer exists.

To some extent these difficulties can and have been overcome, short of espionage, by ingenuity in research methods. Another alternative is to take evasive action, that is simply to write a general "think-piece" on current military problems. Such writing is not the most characteristic activity of the scholar, but it can serve a public purpose. Official experts



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are perplexed by the novelty of their problems and harassed by the pressures of time and responsibility. They may also have tactical or psychological reasons for being unable to examine or to press fundamental alternatives. The scholar may be able to take well known data and arrange them in such a way as to limber up official minds or suggest new lines of thought. Even if he simply repeats an exercise through which some responsible planner has already gone, with precisely the same result, he may perform a service. Ideas familiar to planners are not necessarily familiar to the rest of the Pentagon, the rest of the government, or the general public. The private scholar can serve as a transmission belt and as a contributor to public debate. The latter opportunity is particularly important because military policy, more than most public policy, is made in the absence of an informed and critical public opinion.

Because a real opportunity exists for such policy analysis, because the stakes are great, and possibly because political scientists who loom so large in the field tend to define it as a public policy area, much present research in military affairs is devoted to the present rather than the past, to our own country rather than to others, and to "issues" rather than underlying relationships. But if the foregoing analysis is correct, it is precisely when the scholar attempts a direct evaluation of the manner in which governments deal with current military problems that he must walk most warily. On the other hand it should also be clear that there are ways to minimize the dangers of such appraisal; that ample opportunity exists for more traditional forms of research; and above all, that a theoretician may feel perfectly at home in the field. In short, an interest in the study of military affairs is perfectly consistent with the principle that the proper function of a scholar is scholarship.

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## VARIOUS MEANINGS OF "THEORY"

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958

So many discussions go astray because the same words are used in different senses by adherents of different points of view that it seems imperative to start practically every discussion by clarifying the meanings of terms. Yet this problem is easier posed than solved. We in academic life owe understandable allegiance to erudition and to elegance of expression, and all too often we take a definition to be adequate (in the sense of clarifying meaning) if it sounds well. More is required, of course. Clarification of meaning (whether couched in formal definitions or in illustrative examples) takes place only if the terms defined are actually geared to the experience of the people concerned. This is a serious problem, because the experiences of people, although they overlap, can be widely disparate. Particularly among us in academic life the disparity may be quite wide. For our experience is very largely the experience of thinking, and thinking is tempered by language in the broadest sense, that is, by the way ideas are organized. And various ways of organizing ideas are imposed on us by our disciplines. Discipline means constraint. Discipline is essential for any organized activity. And so in academic disciplines, "discipline" means constraint on the mode of thought. It prescribes the repertoire of concepts, the patterns of classification, the rules of evidence, and the etiquette of discourse.

Cross-disciplinary endeavor, therefore, depends on the ability of the participants to think in terms of more than one language--a feat more difficult than the ability to think, say both in English and French, because the languages of the disciplines vary not only in their vocabularies and grammars (as ordinary languages do) but also in deeper aspects, whose meaning I hope can be conveyed by the phrase, "principles of organizing thought."

Our concern here is the role of theory. I will first try to convey the experiences behind this term characteristic of the exact sciences (which I will define by their predominant thought patterns). Here I am on sure ground, because this is the field in which I myself have been "disciplined." Afterwards I will try to convey the experiences behind the term "theory" in other than exact sciences, particularly in the social sciences. Here I can only give my impressions. I am neither a political scientist nor a psychologist (to give two examples of "non-exact" sciences), and so I have not been properly disciplined to speak with authority on the way a term like "theory" is used there. My remarks are to be taken only as an account of how thinking of social scientists and others about theory appears to some one who thinks of theory in terms imposed by the discipline of exact science.



In the exact sciences, a theory is a collection of theorems. This concept of theory is also a partial definition of an exact science. It is the entire definition of any self-contained branch of mathematics. Some maintain, however, that mathematics is not a science, because it makes no assertions about the observable world. Whether one demands that a science must necessarily make assertions about the outside world is a matter of taste. I tend to accept this limitation on what is to be called a "science" and thus I agree to exclude mathematics from the sciences. What then is an exact science?

To begin with, it is a collection of theorems (to be presently defined); but the theorems have to be translatable into assertions about the tangible world and these assertions should be verifiable within certain limits of accuracy. The theorems are what makes a science exact; the accuracy of the assertions is what makes it successful.

Next we define a theorem. A theorem is a proposition which is a strict logical consequence of certain definitions and other propositions. The validity of a theorem, then usually depends on the validity of other theorems. This tracing of antecedents goes on until the rock bottom is reached--assertions which are not proved but simply assumed, and terms which are not defined but simply listed. In a mathematical system it is unnecessary (in fact, impossible) either to prove these basic assumptions (the postulates) or to define the basic terms. This is what Bertrand Russell meant when he said that in mathematics we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. In logic the situation is exactly the same. Indeed logic is often taken to be a branch of mathematics or vice versa.

According to our criterion for science, however, we demand that some of the terms used in a science be related extensionally to referents and at least some of the assertions be empirically verifiable. I say some, not necessarily all, and this is an important point to which I will return.

Practically all the exact sciences we know are mathematical or at least highly mathematicized. This is by no means an indication of some supernatural power inherent in mathematics but rather of the propensity of mathematicians for pre-empting new territories and of adjusting and extending mathematical methods so as to be able to deal with different content areas. The central fact is that a necessary adjunct of an exact science is a set of completely rigid rules of deduction. It is the rigidity of these rules, not the accuracy of the assertions or precision of measurements which makes an exact science. Now wherever there are such rules, a symbolism is invented as a purely mnemonic device. Wherever a symbolic notation occurs coupled with rules of deduction, i. e., of manipulating the symbols, the mathematician steps in and assumes jurisdiction over the territory, or else the practitioners of the newly invented system of symbol manipulation are called mathematicians. This is what accounts for the all-pervasiveness of "mathematics" in the exact sciences.

I will now describe in greater detail by an illustrative example what is meant by a theory in an exact science. Specifically I will take a problem from mechanics, the earliest and one of the most successful of the exact sciences.

Consider a pendulum, that is, a weight supported by a string. The problem is to "explain" its motion. Immediately the question arises what one means by "explain": Obviously any explanation will contain statements introduced by "because" in reply to questions starting with "why?" But what kind of questions are these? They are likely to be determined by what is observed about the pendulum. What is observed, in turn, will depend on what is singled out for observation. A question like "Why does the pendulum move around?" is so vague that it frustrates any attempt to answer it. Or, viewed in another way, it is trivially easy to answer, because it is so vague. One might say, for instance, that the pendulum moves around because there are forces acting on it.

The first task of an exact science is to make the questions precise. The question "Why does the pendulum move as it does?" is more to the point. But the phrase "as it does" now lays the questioner open to a counter-question: "What do you mean, 'as it does'?" This is a challenge to describe how in fact the pendulum does move, and this temporarily turns the attention away from an "explanation" toward description. To explain anything we must first circumscribe just what we are going to explain.

The first problem, then, is to describe the motion of the pendulum. This immediately introduces a motivation to simplify the situation. If the pendulum is constrained only by the string, its bobbing about will appear at first too chaotic to yield to a systematic description. Let us therefore constrain the pendulum to move in one plane the way clock pendulums move. Now it moves just "back and forth."

But "back and forth" is still too crude a description. How can we make it more precise? Here is where the fundamental orientation of mechanics (of motion) as an exact science begins to direct one's methods of observation. This orientation prescribes what shall be of prime interest in any investigation of motion. If a moving object can be specified at any given moment by its position, the description of motion consists of associating a sequence of positions with a sequence of moments of time. In the simplest case, the position can be uniquely specified by a single number, and, of course, time can also be so specified. The position of the pendulum bob, for example, can be specified by the angle of deflection (positive or negative) from the plumb line or else equally well by the horizontal displacement of the center of the bob from the position of rest. A complete description of the motion, then, will be given by a table specifying the deflection at each moment of time. Such a table is called a mathematical function.

It can be demonstrated by experiment that the mathematical function  $x = A \sin(\omega t)$  will very nearly, but not quite, describe the motion of the pendulum. Here  $x$  is the horizontal deflection of the bob,  $A$  is the maximum deflection,  $t$  is time, and  $\omega$  is a certain constant to be presently

discussed. The qualification "not quite" is of paramount importance, as we shall see. First, however, let us see what we mean when we say that a mathematical function describes a set of data.

Actually a set of data in which values of two variables are related can be represented by a set of points in the plane, as many points as there have been readings. In particular, suppose one took only three readings of the pendulum position and got three points on the graph whose axes are displacement vs. time. A mathematical function will "describe" these data if the curve corresponding to the function can be passed through these points. Now a circle or a parabola can always be passed through any three (non-collinear) points, and so can many other kinds of curves. All of them, then can be said to "describe" this limited set of data. Of course if more readings are taken, the additional points, may not lie on the same curve. However, given any number of points, a great many curves can be made to fit them, which is to say that a great many equations can describe the data, indeed exactly, not approximately. Why, then, is the particular function  $x = A \sin(\omega t)$  chosen, even though it does not describe the data exactly?

This function is chosen, because it does more than describe the data. It explains the data in the sense of "explanation" as it is used in an exact science. And the discrepancies between it and the data are accounted for by the inadequacies of the fundamental assumptions in terms of which the explanation is made.

The fundamental assumptions concern the general laws which supposedly govern the motion of a body subjected to forces. In the case of the pendulum, we can from the geometry of the situation analyze the forces acting on the bob, hence derive the mathematical form of the motion. The equation above gives the derived (idealized) motion of an idealized body in an idealized environment. The discrepancy between the idealized and the actual state of affairs is supposed to account for the discrepancies between the prescribed and the realized motion. Some of these idealizing assumptions are as follows.

1. The supporting string or rod is supposed to have no mass.
  2. No friction or air resistance acts on the pendulum.
  3. The bob is assumed to have mass but no extension.
  4. The (small) horizontal displacement is supposed to be proportional to the angle of displacement.
- Etc.

All of these assumptions are false. Yet the physicist continues to make them. Why? In return for sacrificing precision (precision must at any rate be sacrificed wherever measurements are involved), he gains simplicity and, what is more important, he gets at the fundamentals (almost in the Platonic sense of the word) of the situation. This allows him to subsume a great many phenomena under a single scheme. For example, the assumed laws of motion and idealized properties of the pendulum allow the physicist to derive from the same set of postulates the following additional relations.



1. The period of the pendulum will be independent of the mass of the pendulum.
2. Within limits, it will be independent of the amplitude of oscillation.
3. For large amplitudes, the period will become dependent on the amplitude, and the precise nature of this dependence can be predicted.
4. The period will be directly proportional to the square root of the length of the pendulum.
5. The period will be inversely proportional to the square root of acceleration of gravity.

The last relation explains the meaning of the constant  $m$  in the equation of the pendulum's motion. The constant involves the square root of the ratio of the acceleration of gravity to the length of the pendulum.

6. The horizontal velocity of the pendulum will be given by the function  $v = \omega A \cos(\omega t)$ .
7. The same scheme can be extended to the spherical pendulum. That is, one not constrained to a single plane. That is to say from the same set of assumptions one can get many additional results, for instance the precession of the plane of rotation of the spherical pendulum etc., etc. Indeed all the observed motions of the heavenly bodies are derived from exactly the same three or four assumptions about motion which are supposed to underlie the swinging of a simple pendulum.

The story of the pendulum illustrates the power of the mathematical model. A mathematical model is much more than a description of events in terms of the mathematical relations among the variables. It is rather a set of assumptions often referring to a highly idealized situation, from which assumptions the relations to be observed are derived, to be compared with observations. Agreement with observations corroborates the model. Most important for corroboration is prediction of other relationships, perhaps not hitherto observed. At any rate, the more are the relationships derived, and the fewer are the relationships assumed, the more powerful is the model. A trivial model does no more than lead to relationships which observations had suggested in the first place. Such a model penetrates no deeper than the observational level and is therefore purely descriptive, not explanatory. It simply restates in other terms what has been observed.

The method just outlined is applicable to many widely disparate exact sciences. But the content, of course, will be different in each case. In mechanics, for example, the fundamental assumptions have to do with the laws of motion. In mathematical genetics, another exact science in the sense defined, but not as successful as mechanics, the fundamental assumptions have to do with something quite different, namely the re-shuffling, segregation, and recombination in sexually reproducing organisms of entities supposed to be carriers of separate inherited traits. In this science, the laws governing these events are assumed to be not laws of mechanics or of electrodynamics or of thermodynamics but "laws of chance." For these too an exact mathematical theory exists. And on the basis of its given certain combinations of genotypes, certain patterns of mating, certain linkages among the genes upon the chromosomes, certain selection pressures exerted by the environment, etc., the distributions of the genotypes and of the phenotypes

in the succeeding generations can be computed. Here too discrepancies between prediction and observation are unavoidable, because of the idealizing assumptions which cannot be avoided. But the principle of investigation is the same as in theoretical mechanics. One derives a collection of theorems about how things should happen under idealized conditions. The discrepancies are attributed to the imperfections in the assumptions, and in the initial observations. The discrepancies provide the leverage for further refinements of the theory.

Economics may be viewed in the same light. The assumptions here have to do (in the classical picture) with the relations between price levels, supply, demand, maximization of profit (or expected profit) by the so called "economic man," etc. The mathematical scheme being given, predictions on the basis of initial observations can be made. In mathematical economics agreement between theory and observation is not often good, and many are led to dismiss mathematical methods in economics on this ground. In the light of what has been said, such an attitude is not justifiable. The predictive power of mathematical meteorology, especially in its early stages, was quite poor. Yet there was never any question that air currents, temperature gradients, and all the other conditions studied in meteorology are subject to the strict laws of physics. The low success of primitive meteorology is entirely attributable to the complexity of the phenomena compared with the drastically simplified assumptions which it was still possible to handle mathematically. Crude meteorology was merely a stage in the development of more refined and more successful meteorology. The original conceptual scheme was correct. Only the tools had to be sharpened.

Thus the bluntness of mathematical tools is not sufficient ground for rejecting them in principle. It is an entirely different matter if the question is raised whether the tools applied are the right kind of tools. As is conceded by all who understand the mathematical method, its power is enormous where it can be applied. The big question is where can it be applied? Clarification is needed here. For many, mathematics means classical mathematics, that is, the mathematics of eighteenth century physics, derived from the differential and integral calculus. As pointed out, the range of logical disciplines now called "mathematics" has enormously increased, both in techniques and in the variety of conceptualizations, so that any inadequacy of classical mathematics for dealing with problems of social science can by no means be taken as an indication of the inapplicability of mathematics in principle.

Nevertheless, let us first examine the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that classical mathematical methods may be utilized to advantage in theoretical social science.

First, there must be sharply defined, quantitative variables singled out for study. In mechanics of motion, we have seen that position and time were fundamental. Actually there are three fundamental kinds of quantities in mechanics, from which all others are derived: length, time, and mass. Nor is there any question (in classical mechanics) how these quantities are to be measured. In other branches of physics, there are other quantities, for example heat and temperature in thermodynamics, electric

charge current, and strength of electric and magnetic fields in electro-dynamics, etc. Where probability theory is used, the fundamental quantities are frequencies of occurrence of events or of "types," and so on. In pursuing the question to what extent a quantitative variable can be sharply defined, a most important problem looms: the problem of recognition.

Note that the problem is trivial in mechanics. To determine the position of an object, we must, of course, recognize the object in all positions, but this is ordinarily so easy as to present no problem. As we pass from physics to chemistry, the problem of recognition becomes more important. For example, before quantities or concentrations of substances can be measured, the substances must be recognized. To be sure, there are unambiguous rules for recognizing substances by their "properties," and to the extent that the "properties" are defined in terms of classical physical measurements, the problem of recognition is solved. But it makes itself known.

As we pass to biology, the problem of recognition becomes even more serious. It now takes special training, sometimes quite prolonged, to tell one type of organism from another, one tissue from another, to interpret what is seen through a microscope, etc. -

In the behavioral sciences, the problem of recognition becomes paramount. Since these sciences have only recently arisen from the humanities, their terms are derived largely from common sense and from intuitive notions at best and from deeply rooted pre-scientific notions and prejudices at worst. Outside of science, no need is felt to endow terms with operational meanings: one's intuitive meaning seems to suffice on the basis of the universal naive assumption that the other's perceptions are like one's own, or else something is wrong with the other's perceptions. Where there is no consensus on recognition, there can, of course, be no question of quantification or measurement, and so the first requirement of exact (or mathematical) science seems to be not fulfilled. Some workers in behavioral sciences feel that this difficulty precludes in principle the extension of mathematical methods to behavioral science.

The other condition usually assumed necessary for an exact science is the following. Given a set of unambiguously measurable variables, one must be able to choose some assumptions about how they are related which reasonably reflect "reality." It is conceded, of course, that only an idealization of reality can be reflected in any finite set of assumptions, but it is maintained that the idealization should at least come close to reality. In mechanics, this condition is fulfilled. True, there is no such thing as frictionless motion, a perfectly rigid body, extensionless mass, etc., but these idealizations are in many instances well enough "approached" by reality. Once a set of assumptions is chosen, the mathematics required to derive from them theorems and conclusions must be amenable to being handled by the human mind. Again, it is maintained by some that even if unambiguous variables could be singled out (as they are in economics) and even if reasonably accurate assumptions could be made, the resulting mathematical system would



be. to unwieldy. to be useful -- there are too many relevant variables, and they are too intricately interwoven to permit treatment by existing mathematical techniques.

When it is proposed to simplify the situation by holding all but a few variables constant, it is pointed out (quite correctly) that, first, in many fields of investigation this is practically impossible: one cannot experiment with national economies or with real political systems; second, even where experimentation is possible, controlled conditions introduce distortions of such magnitude as to make extrapolations from controlled to natural situations, i. e., from in vitro to in situ (to use the physiologist's terms) worthless.

Now I will develop what I want to say to this group along two lines. First I want to recognize to a certain extent the justice of the criticism of premature uses of mathematics in the social sciences and thereby the inevitability of an entirely different conception of "theory" and of the notion of a model, which have arisen in social science. But then I want to point out the limitations of this conception and its underlying assumption concerning the nature and function of mathematical methods and of mathematics itself.

There are social scientists who understand the nature and the importance of the operational definition. Whether motivated by a hope of an ultimate possibility of mathematization of their disciplines (they are more likely to criticize premature mathematization, not mathematization in principle), or because they have been caught up by the spirit of positivism, which has become dominant in modern systematic thought, they undertook the task of creating a sound and consistent terminology of social science (particularly in sociology.)

This task, however, would be trivial, if it were confined to a compilation of a glossary, no matter how "operational" the definitions in it. For definitions are arbitrary -- they are no more than agreements on how to use terms. Implicit in the work of Parsons and of Levy (to name two workers who recognize the importance of systematization) are not only attempts to map observable events on terms (which is what is done in operational definitions). Their main efforts are directed toward selecting events and combining them in such fashion so as to make the terms applied to these combinations fruitful in the development of a social theory which eventually is to become a collection of theorems -- statements in "if so ... then so" terms.

They ask for example, in effect, "What is a social action?" Given a certain philosophic orientation, questions like this can be appallingly misunderstood. Traditional philosophy is cluttered with questions of this type where the implicit assumption is that behind each word in use there must be a reality, and that the business of the philosopher is to discover it, so that making a "proper definition" is tantamount to establishing a truth. It has always been the curse of philosophy (until this curse was lifted by the logical positivists) to assume that entities called politics, society, power, welfare, tyranny, democracy, milieu, progress, etc., etc., actually exist, just as cats, icebergs, coffee pots, and grains of wheat exist,

and that each has an essence discoverable by proper application of reason and observation. (I add observation, because I am speaking not only of the Platonists but also of the Aristotelians.)

Now I certainly am not trying to say what is often said in vulgarized versions of the logical positivist position, namely that "concrete" objects certainly exist while "abstractions" don't. A "cat" is no less an abstraction than "progress" when you come to think of it. The problem is not one of existence but one of consensus. Not what is a cat, but what easily recognizable objects shall be called cats is the first question. Because agreement is comparatively easy to reach on this question, we can pass immediately to the study of the cats themselves, their "nature," if you wish. But where agreement is not easy, that is where one cannot immediately agree on an easily recognizable class of events which shall be subsumed under the term "democracy" or "status" or "power," it is futile to pass to the study of these supposed entities.

The systematizers understand in varying degrees the nature of this semantic problem, and they try to come to grips with it. They ask in effect, "What sort of thing shall we call a social action?" Consensus is not easy to reach, because the various definitions will presumably have different consequences. "Social action" once defined will presumably be a key term in some social science discipline. It will (hopefully) appear in the theorems of future theory. Therefore its particular definition serves to focus attention on the component events from which the definition is compounded. It may or may not be fruitful to focus attention on this or that combination of events. Hence the problem of definition becomes a "theoretical" problem, something which is often difficult for the natural scientist to recognize.

In the same spirit we can interpret the question "What is a political act?" "What is an economic act?" This search for primary, supposedly elemental acts is itself inspired by the role of the atom concept in chemistry (as Easton points out). It is not so much a question of whether these "elementary particles" exist: just naming them does not confer existence. It is rather a question of whether our observations can be so organized that the assumption that they exist gives us a heuristic and predictive advantage. Incidentally, this is the only sense in which the so called "elementary particles" of physics can be said to exist.

We have then, so far two distinct meanings or, if you will, flavors of theory. For the natural, especially the physical scientist, theory, as we have said, is a collection of derived theorems tested in the process of predicting events from observed conditions. The physical scientist is able to address himself to problems of this sort, because for him the problems of recognition, of definition, and of meaningful classification either do not exist or have been largely solved. For the social scientist, all too often, the latter kinds of problems are central. The social scientist's aim, therefore, must be lower than that of the physicist.

It is often difficult to concede that one's aims are lower. So there

are social scientists who will insist instead that their aims are "different." They are likely to say that they aim at "understanding" events, not at predicting them. For the physical scientist, however, "understanding" is synonymous with prediction. For this reason the physical scientist is likely to become impatient with the social scientist's distinction between the two. Moreover, the physical scientist often associates so called "understanding" (divorced from predictive ability) with ancient philosophical "explanations" which were unsurpassed in their vagueness or in tautological triviality. For this reason, too, the physical scientist often looks upon social science down his nose. And also for this reason, some investigators, usually those of physical science background in an attempt to be constructive (that is, willing to extend to social science the power and respectability of the physical sciences) try to take the bull by the horns and to construct mathematical models of social behavior or of historical process wherever quantifiable variables can be found, not bothering too much with the question of whether these variables are germane to the sort of thing social science is trying to do.

The success of these attempts is spotty but by no means negligible. But because it is spotty, and because the relevance of the results to the important questions of social science is uncertain and (let's face it) because many social scientists do not read mathematics and for this reason develop defensive attitudes toward its methods, there is a reaction in the social science camp. This reaction is largely, I think, the source of the disclaimer to the effect that social science is not interested in prediction but only in "understanding." When asked what the proponents of "understanding" mean by it, they are in difficulties. It is as difficult to convey the meaning of "understanding" (in its subjective sense, as it is used here) as it is to convey the meaning of "appreciation" or of "perception." Yet these words are full of "meaning" (of sorts). All of us "know" what they mean in the same sense that we "know" what vinegar smells like or how velvet feels. Pressing the issue of "meaning" of understanding is not fair in this situation. But it is fair to raise the question whether it is proper to give the name "science" to an activity which aims only at subjective understanding of this sort.

This is not a rhetorical question. I am not at all sure that the answer is categorically "no," although I suspect that I prefer "no" to "yes." Yet there is no denying that this intuitive organization of perception (akin to appreciation) is an important component in the psychology of science. Without it I doubt whether any but utilitarian motivation would exist for scientific activity, and I doubt whether science could get very far on utilitarian motives alone.

We have, then, a third meaning of "theory" in the attempts of social scientists (these attempts are no longer tolerated in physical science) to achieve and to impart intuitive understanding of social behavior, of the nature of institutions, of political systems, of cultures, and such matters. The language of such theory is largely metaphorical (although a great deal of factual material may be brought "in support.") To "support" a theory in



this context means at best to marshal factual material (historical and political events, case histories, etc.) in such a way that the reader who views this evidence "through the metaphors, concepts, and definitions of which the "theory" is constructed will have the experience of "understanding." There is no need to say that even such attempts at concretization are often lacking in the writings of social scientists.

You may gather that as I mention concepts of theory farther and farther from those which enjoy hegemony in the physical science, I am becoming more and more sceptical about the scientific worth of such concepts. To a certain extent this is true, but I do not wish to draw a sharp line anywhere. The "worth" of a theory is not calculable by a set of cut and dried criteria any more than a man's worth as a member of the community is calculable in terms of how much he produces. In particular metaphor and analogy, although they cannot be accepted as scientific "explanations" are sometimes important aids in the sense that they prepare the mind to make more precise investigations. It is in this sense that the so-called "models" of the non-exact sciences are to be appreciated. They are like the diagrams of geometry, neither necessary nor sufficient for the sort of proof that mathematical rigor demands, but often helpful for the eventual construction of such proofs.

There is also a branch of psychology which partakes in this sort of theorizing, namely, "depth psychology," to which the Freudian system also belongs. This branch of psychology is singularly poor in predictive capacity, either deterministic or statistical. Nor are there many attempts to operationalize its terms similar to the attempts of the systematizers in sociology. The aim is intuitive understanding of what makes up personality (another term which is only intuitively understood.) It is strange for me, whose habitat is mathematics, to say this, but I think that depth psychology, particularly the contribution of Freud, is the richest area of behavioral science. I only regret that the disparity between the soft-heads and the hard-heads is so great that it is difficult for them to lay out a common program in which intuitive insights can be translated into strict deductions and verifiable generalizations.

There is still a fourth sense in which theory is used, in particular "political theory," namely in the normative, value-laden sense. In this sense, political theory would be concerned, for example, with the question of what is the best form of government. I have been specifically warned to avoid this issue on the grounds that too much ink has already been shed over it. To some it seems that concern with what "ought to be" is farthest removed from science, which properly concerns itself with "what is." I will take serious issue with this position.

Whatever I know of the situation in political science is, of course, largely hearsay. In particular I take advantage of learning about ideas of men whose books I have not read from the very few books on political science which I have read. Thus whatever I know about the ideas of James B. Bryce I have read in a book by Easton. Easton tells me that Bryce felt that generalization must be firmly rooted in "fact." He also shows how

the idea is carried to extremes in some sections of American political science. This "hyperfactualism," as Easton calls it, is, of course quite understandable. The passage from undisciplined speculation, left over from the times when all science was rooted in philosophy, to militant empiricism has occurred in so many sciences as to suggest the operation of a law. In physical science hyperfactualism died on the vine. It might have proliferated if Francis Bacon's recommendations were ever carried out. But the greatest scientist who was Bacon's contemporary happened to be Galileo Galilei, and he chose a different path. If he had taken "facts" too seriously and too meticulously, he could never have enunciated the general law of falling bodies, because it would never account for the falling of leaves from trees, nor for the fall of rain drops, which between them account for probably 99% of the falling that ever occurs on this planet. Neither leaves nor rain drops follow Galileo's law even approximately. Therefore his law is factually false. But it is true nevertheless, in a deeper sense. Without such ideally true and factually false laws, mathematical physics would have never left the ground.

Galileo's was, in a way, a normative theory. It described not how bodies fell but how they ought to fall under idealized conditions. In this sense one can well see how a theory can be normative and yet truly scientific. The idea of a truly scientific normative theory of action is not to pontificate about morality but to prescribe correct courses of action on the basis of given desiderata, and in certain (usually idealized) conditions. Such a theory may not have any practical value, "because the idealized conditions may never obtain," but it may have immense heuristic value. In particular, it may through its underlying analysis of the fundamentals of the situation impart to the social scientist just the part of intuitive understanding of an area of investigation that he is seeking.

An example par excellence of this sort is game theory, a mathematical structure, which for the most part deals with situations which seem exceedingly remote from the subject matter of social science. However centuries of scientific experience should have taught us that remoteness of a theory from a particular content area is no indication of its relevance or irrelevance. The fever which derives its name from "bad air" was not really understood until the events in the life of a certain mosquito became known. The harnessing of natural forces owes a tremendous lot to the ancients' curiosity about the anomalous behavior of amber and to one man's logical analysis of an experiment, which had been designed for no other reason than to determine the earth's motion relative to "absolute space."

The relevance of game theory to social science, particularly to political science (although originally the most direct applications were thought to be to economics) resides in the circumstance that game theory distills the logical essence of the situation which Catlin has termed the political act, namely a desire to fulfill an act of will in a context where conflict with others' desires to fulfill their acts of will is to be expected.

Interpreted in a physical context, the metaphor "conflict of forces" calls for some sort of equilibrium theory. Such a theory can be and has been developed purely metaphorically. The concepts of "force," "pressure," "balance

of power," "leverage," "stability," "instability" are mostly terms borrowed from physics. Descriptions of conflict situations in these terms sound like descriptions of physical systems. But of course the analogy is a metaphorical one, not a logical one, i. e., the similarity is felt intuitively, not derived as a consequence of an isomorphism between two situations. Therefore metaphorical models of conflict, although they may be valuable for a variety of reasons cannot be expected to yield logically compelling theorems let alone theorems translatable into predictions.

There have been attempts to construct real mathematical models of conflict by utilizing the conceptual apparatus of classical mathematics. One such attempt, a very ambitious one was undertaken by the late Lewis F. Richardson, who cast international rivalries in terms of differential equations and interpreted the stabilities and instabilities of the resulting systems of equations as the stabilities or instabilities of certain international situations. Since Richardson's theory is mathematical, its conclusions are definitive and compelling. In this they have an advantage over the metaphorical theories of the same sort. Its success as a predictive theory is, as would be expected, extremely limited. One set of data was fitted very well by the assumptions of the model, namely the arms expenditures of the two coalitions during the armament race preceding World War I. But even this extremely good fit is not impressive, since there are too many free parameters in the model and the points to be fitted are too few. One could at this point recall our previous argument that a mathematical theory always begins by treating an idealized situation and this beginning serves as a point of departure for greater refinements.

The merits of game theory, however, are of quite another kind. It too deals with idealized situations, in particular it assumes "perfectly rational players." But it departs radically from earlier attempts to cast behavior into models of the mathematical physics type in one very important respect. The older models assumed the metaphysical basis of mechanics. That is they described systems whose "states" were determined by a causality operating on the "here and now," the way physical states are determined. The state of any physical system is a consequence of the immediately preceding state in accordance with the laws governing infinitesimal changes of state.

In contrast, game theory is primarily a decision theory. It too casts situations into sequences of states. But each successive state is determined by a decision made by a rational being who foresees all possible outcomes and chooses a course of action, which, in some way is likely to yield the best outcome under the circumstances. The phrase "under the circumstances" is crucial, for here game theory goes to the real heart of the matter. Each decision maker controls only a part of the situation. In making his decisions, he is aware that other decision makers whose "interests" may be opposed to his also make "rational decisions," and moreover take into account the decisions which he is likely to make. No physical theory treats of such situations.



Whereas the mathematical theories of behavior borrowed from the methods of physics (and often chemistry) depend for their success on the special assumptions concerning the interaction of variables and on the possibility of measuring certain key parameters, game theory is largely independent of special assumptions and measurements.

The independence from measurements is achieved by simply by-passing the problem. The only numerical variables are "utilities," i. e., degrees of preference by the several decision makers for the various possible outcomes, and these are simply regarded as given. Independence from special assumptions obtains, because game theory is entirely "normative." It assumes "complete rationality" of the decision makers.

To some workers in game theory, particularly those who are oriented to social science applications, the most interesting results are paradoxically those which show up the inadequacies of game theory, i. e., the indeterminacies of results based on the indeterminacy of the concept of "rationality" in all but the simplest of situations.

To illustrate, let us examine two game-like situations, in the first of which "rationality" can be satisfactorily defined but not in the second. Suppose two decision makers have two courses of action each. Each of the four pairs of choices leads to an outcome which is denoted by a pair of "pay-offs," that is utilities accruing to each player. The situation can be represented by a  $2 \times 2$  matrix. The first player chooses one of two rows; the second one of two columns. The entries in the matrix are the pay-offs to the first and second players respectively, as in Figure 1.

0, 0	3, -3
1, -1	2, -2

Fig. 1

Note that the pay-offs in this case all add up to zero, i. e., what the first player wins, the second loses. These games are called zero-sum.

This game has a "solution" which prescribes a "rational" choice to each player, namely for the first player to choose the second row, and for the second player the first column. This is so, because the first player can obviously guarantee for himself a win of 1, and the second player can prevent him from winning more than one, even if each choice is made without knowledge of the other's choice. Here a true "balance of power" exists, but note that this balance is not analogous to any physical balance of "opposing forces." It is a balance based on the logic of the situation, involving rational decisions.

The "solution" is much less definite in our next example, shown in Figure 2.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1, 1 & -2, 2 \\ 2, -2 & -1, -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Fig. 2

Here the pay-offs do not add to zero. Such a game is called non-zero sum. If we follow the first player's "rational" reasoning, we must concede that he should choose the second row because no matter which column the second player chooses, he is better off by choosing the second row. By symmetry, the second column is the second player's "best" choice. But this pair of "best" choices results in a loss to both players (-1, -1), where as their "worst" choices would have given both a win. Obviously "self interest" is not a self-evident concept.

Agreement between the players to choose first row, first column would be considered "rational" in this case. But admitting agreements of this sort leads to questions of coalition formation, an immensely fertile field in game theory and a very difficult one, because of the ambiguities which plague the concepts of "power," "self interest," "rationality," etc., terms taken for granted in much discussion of individual and social behavior, but which game theory has undertaken to define with mathematical precision and was led into formidable conceptual difficulties in consequence.

The central problem in game theory, thus appears to be logical analysis, specifically logical analysis of situations in which common sense often fails. Where such logical analysis can be pushed to a definitive conclusion, the theory of games can be considered a normative theory. For example the equilibrium solution of two person zero-sum game is essentially a prescription to two rational players how to choose their strategies.

But sometimes no such conclusion can be reached on the basis of existing concepts. The following extremely instructive example is taken not from game theory proper but from closely allied investigations. I shall cast it in terms likely to be of interest to political scientists.

Suppose three men, A, B, C, rank three courses of action, X, Y, Z, according to their preference 1, 2, 3. Let their rankings be displayed in the matrix shown in Figure 3.

	X	Y	Z
A	1	2	3
B	2	3	1
C	3	1	2

Fig. 3

What is a fair compromise? Suppose we apply the majority rule to paired comparisons. Noting that X is preferred to Y by A and B (a majority) and Y to Z by A and C (again a majority), we are tempted to assign to X, Y, and Z the ranks 1, 2, 3 respectively. However, this violates the majority rule in the case of X and Z, because Z is preferred to X by B and C (again a majority!)

Kenneth Arrow has shown that such impasses are certain to arise wherever more than 2 persons rank more than 2 alternatives, that moreover no decision rule except those which seem undesirable in a democracy, such as dictatorial or entirely arbitrary prescriptions can be assigned which do not contain inherent contradictions of the sort just noted.

The methods of such analyses, like the methods of game theory are those of exact science. The situations portrayed certainly remind us of political situations. They involve conflicts of interest, advantages of coalition, social decision rules, in other instances also arbitration schemes, calculation of power indices, etc. etc. Here, then, is an exact science, seemingly applicable to politics (or perhaps, economics). But what does "applicable" mean? If it is taken to mean as involving the possibility of translating the theorems into predictions about human behavior, I am afraid it is stretching the imagination to call game theory "applicable."

The conditions of translatability are not met. Situations are seldom so clear cut as to be describable in terms of a few "alternatives;" preferences are never so clear as to be measured in utiles; men are seldom rational. In this sense game theory fares no better than the classical mathematical models of behavior borrowed from physics and chemistry.

But in another sense, game theory and similarly oriented investigations are a genuine step forward. For they have burst through the framework of thought imposed by physical science on those who wished to apply mathematical methods to behavioral science. The flood gates have opened and a torrent of entirely new concepts has rushed by. I wish to note in passing that a flourishing terminology is more often a calamity in a rhetorically oriented discipline than an indication of its richness. Vagueness allows undisciplined proliferation and duplication, often providing a mask of erudition for lack of originality and insight. Not so in exact science. There concepts hold their own only if they provide points of anchorage for genuine theorems, not simply for rhetorical speculation.

But what good is it, the empiricist is bound to ask, which is his perfect right. No hide-bound answer can be given. Only if one believes that far-reaching and deep-digging logical analysis is essential in any discipline which aspires to the status of science, will one be satisfied with the answer that game theory is an example of such an analysis, that it is of relevance to political science because its fundamental concepts are idealizations of what political science is about, namely decisions made amid partly conflicting and partly coincident interests of rational, calculating beings. Theory of this sort represents one of two poles -- the other is meticulous empiricism, of the kind espoused by Bryce, by most historians, and by the



positivists of Jerome Frank's persuasion in legal thought. The arguments of the empiricists are well known. They are worthy arguments. The arguments in favor of pure theory are much harder to present because social scientists do not often come into contact with really powerful pure theories, the kind that grow on mathematical soil. One can only say that their worth has been amply demonstrated elsewhere. The physicist might spend thousands of years studying the behavior of ocean waves on a beach in most meticulous detail. In the end he would be no wiser than before with regard to what is essential in wave motion.

The really profound understanding of waves is quite independent of observing any real waves. For that matter the most important waves in our lives are not even observable directly-- I am referring to the waves which underlie our entire telecommunication system and also subatomic events.

It is these kinds of essences which pure theory seeks. It goes without saying that ultimately the findings of theory must somehow be translated into real predictions and observations. But to demand this too soon is not wise. It would be like demanding cash payment in every business transaction. Such "hard-headedness" although aimed at security would actually disrupt the system of credit on which any complex economy must depend to a great degree.

Theory, then, is like a system of credit. One has a right to demand that somewhere there are assets to back up the transactions. But as often as not, these assets may be in the future, and the very act of questioning their existence may set in motion a chain reaction which will preclude their existence.

This is what I meant by the statement that not every conclusion of an exact theory has to be translatable into observation. In the case of the recent constructions of exact theories of presumed relevance to social science, we will do well to extend to them the most liberal credit. After all, in our society the thinker's time comes cheap.

## AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL COMMUNISM

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

The Truman Doctrine of March, 1947 did not distinguish between various kinds of Communism. It was directed against the challenge posed by an international Communist movement controlled by Moscow and designed to further Soviet national interest. However, one year after its promulgation there commenced a correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which was to lead to the principal successful variant of "national communism"—Titoism. In fairness to the Yugoslav Communists it should be made clear that no Communist wishes to be branded an advocate of that contradictory phenomenon termed "national communism" (for lack of a better label). All Communists seek to have Moscow's blessings and to enjoy the benefits of the presumed solidarity of the international Communist movement. Strictly speaking, "national communism" is as meaningful and consistent a term as "particularist universalism."

Yet the existence of such a dialectical concept as "national communism" is useful if only to emphasize the crucial question of whether or not the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is worthy of enjoying a permanent primacy in the international Communist movement as well as ideological infallibility. Titoism developed as a unique phenomenon since no Communist "deviation" had ever acquired control over an entire country which it could then employ as a base in persisting in its unwillingness to repent and to do Moscow's bidding. It should never be forgotten that Tito did not defect but was excommunicated.

In effect, Titoism was created by Stalin who insisted that it was a deviation. The correspondence between Belgrade and Moscow which took place from March 20 to May 22, 1948, does point to a series of specific issues and practices which created tensions between the Russian and Yugoslav Communists. These included the Soviet practice of recruiting Yugoslav nationals for espionage, the behavior of Soviet experts stationed in Yugoslavia and the fact that Belgrade had to pay Soviet military officers four times what it paid its own, and the Yugoslav practice of keeping Soviet personnel in Yugoslavia under constant police surveillance.<sup>1</sup>

Moscow demanded unconditional recantation and obedience, and the issue was forced when the Yugoslavs refused to go to the Bucharest Cominform meeting in late June of 1948 to hear themselves anathematized. The shocked Yugoslav Communists leaned over backwards in their professions of loyalty to Moscow and its professed goals. Thus Tito and Kardelj wrote to Stalin and Molotov on May 17, 1948 that "we will resolutely construct socialism and remain loyal to the Soviet Union; remain loyal to the doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."<sup>2</sup> On June 20, 1948 the Yugoslav Central Committee declared to the Cominform that it "greet[s] the brotherly Communist Parties and declares that no disagreements will prevent the CPY from remaining true to its policy of solidarity and of the closest co-operation with the CC of the CPSU and other Communist Parties."<sup>3</sup> The awkwardness of Tito's position and his professions of loyalty even prompted him to attempt to rectify matters by intensifying the drive to collectivize agriculture. This occurred after his excommunication by the Cominform and following the Soviet letter of May 4, 1948 which charged him with having permitted the spread of "capitalism" in the villages.

The heretic attempted to demonstrate his orthodoxy, and by mid-1951 almost one quarter of Yugoslavia's arable land and 13 per cent of her peasant households were collectivized. By early 1953 collectivization had to be halted and with the permission of withdrawals the collectivized sector declined to 3 per cent of the arable land and 2 per cent of all peasant households. In the end it



was American aid that rescued this economy based on Leninist-Stalinist dogma.

The aid which Tito began to receive in 1950 was not the first of its kind. His rise to power in World War II was due in part to the supplies and recognition which the United States and Britain bestowed upon him and his Partisans and withheld from General Drazha Mihailovich and his Chetniks. In addition, Communist Yugoslavia received more than \$450 million in UNRRA aid. In return for this Western aid Tito became Moscow's most truculent satrap. He annexed Zone B of Venezia Giulia and demanded the city of Trieste which his troops occupied briefly and harshly in 1945 before being compelled to withdraw. An American offer to provide witnesses to testify for the defense in the trial of Mihailovich was rejected. The witnesses were American liaison officers and downed airmen who had been returned to safety by Mihailovich's forces. Instead, the prosecutor falsely accused the United States and Britain of having aided Mihailovich against the "National Liberation" movement. In August of 1946 Yugoslav fighter planes shot down two unarmed United States Army transport planes with a loss of five American lives. A strongly worded American protest and an ultimatum brought the quick release of the surviving downed Americans as well as a promise from Tito that there would be no further shooting down of foreign planes. Yugoslav troops also violated the Morgan Line in the Trieste area and fired upon Allied forces. Yugoslavia served as a faithful Soviet mouthpiece in the United Nations as the cold war went into high gear in the autumn of 1947. In October of 1947 Chile accused Yugoslav diplomats of fomenting coal strikes and severed diplomatic relations which had been established with Yugoslavia less than one year before. Belgrade, as capital of the newly established Cominform, was quick to participate in the new campaign launched against the non-Soviet world.

This, in brief, was the context from which the Titoist brand of "national communism" emerged and the heritage of American-Yugoslav relations which stood in the way of any American effort to capitalize upon Tito's excommunication.

The first American aid to Communist Yugoslavia came in the form of a \$20 million loan made by the Export-Import Bank on September 8, 1949. This loan was made at 3½ per cent interest and was to be repayable in 26 monthly installments beginning in July, 1951; it was designed to facilitate the Yugoslav output of non-ferrous metals. Earlier, on August 18, 1949, President Truman had authorized the sale of a steel finishing mill to Yugoslavia. Actually relations between Washington and Belgrade had taken a slight turn for the better at the time of the excommunication from the Cominform. On June 30, 1948, it was announced that the United States was releasing Yugoslav gold and credits which totaled about \$57 million and had been frozen since the war; this was facilitated by the decision of the Yugoslavs to pay \$17 million to satisfy American claims for compensation resulting from the nationalization of private properties, the shooting down of the two aircraft in 1946, and the receipt of Lend-Lease and relief supplies.

The year 1950 witnessed a turning point in the American program of aid to Yugoslavia. In March the United States lifted its ban on travel to Yugoslavia which had been in force since 1946 as a result of Belgrade's initial refusal to waive the Yugoslav citizenship of naturalized American citizens who had been born in Yugoslavia. In return for a lifting of the ban Belgrade agreed to grant exit visas to all United States citizens of Yugoslav origin. Drought and the Cominform economic blockade as well as the disorganization of agriculture brought on by the collectivization campaign resulted in severe food shortages. These were met by the United States in November and December of 1950. On November 24, 1950, President Truman allocated to Yugoslavia \$16 million from Mutual Defense Assistance Act funds on the grounds that the country's defense capabilities affected those of NATO (and of Greece and Italy in particular). When he requested \$38 million from the Congress later in November it was forthcoming within a few weeks; the Senate granted the funds by a 60 to 21 vote and the House of Representatives by a vote of 225 to 142.

Such clear-cut support for the Administration's policy of aiding Yugoslavia in 1950 provided the basis for

subsequent Western economic aid. In the following years such economic aid from the United States was usually valued at upwards of \$100 million and more per annum principally in the form of wheat and cotton surpluses as well as certain other raw materials. It should be pointed out that American aid to Yugoslavia was conducted in concert with aid offered by France and the United Kingdom. After 1954 the bulk of American aid was in food surpluses which generated counterpart funds in Yugoslav dinars. These dinar funds were used to benefit the Yugoslav economy by means of the construction of bridges, housing, highways, railroad stations, and hydro-electric power stations as well as flood control and Colorado beetle eradication projects. Thus outright unconditional American grants became a minor part of the total aid program within five years after its insuguration.<sup>4</sup> American economic aid to Yugoslavia has totalled more than three-quarters of a billion dollars.

Military aid to Yugoslavia, which commenced in late 1951, also resulted in the expenditure of more than \$750 million and led to a cooling in relations between Washington and Belgrade. The Military Assistance Agreement signed in Belgrade on November 14, 1951, was a brief and deliberately rather vague document. Yugoslavia pledged to use American military aid "exclusively in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations for the promotion of international peace and security" and for the strengthening of its own defenses. Belgrade also pledged not to transfer military aid to any other nation and to make available to the United States certain "raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources . . ." Communist Yugoslavia agreed to receive American military personnel "who will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished" and Washington pledged that "the number of such personnel will be kept as low as possible."<sup>5</sup>

It was the inspectorial activities of the United States Military Assistance Staff in Belgrade which caused friction to develop and prompted Yugoslavia's Communist rulers to



request that the program be terminated in December of 1957. The program was liquidated in the spring of 1958 but only after the United States had wholly re-equipped eight of the twenty-eight divisions of the Yugoslav Army and almost the entire Yugoslav Air Force. There remained the question of financing the future purchases of spare parts for this expensive military equipment and for the jet fighter planes. The Tito regime was apprehensive regarding the movements of United States military inspectors and did not wish to grant them the right to observe units which were not being equipped with United States aid. The apparent dilemma which the American aid presented not only to Tito but to the United States as well was expressed in a speech which Tito delivered in Belgrade on February 16, 1951:<sup>6</sup>

Today Yugoslavia cannot [sic] consider the dispatch of arms from the West. To receive arms would be held in the east as a confirmation of the allegations of eighteen months ago that we had ceded military bases in Yugoslavia to the Americans and others and that they were arming us. When the moment of attack against us becomes inevitable, matters will appear differently. We do not think the moment has yet come. This of course will harm our defensive preparations but it is of political and moral importance for us. We must show that we are not people who prepare for war, that we are not aggressors who always stand prepared. I said to a western diplomat, when we were talking of armaments, that I would rather that Yugoslavia waited for the attack with bare hands than as a satellite. . . . We cannot be anyone's satellites, for then, with a population of 16 million and with a party of over a million and a half, we would have no meaning. But as an independent people of 16 million with our great political assets, we represent a great force, greater than our 13 divisions, or whatever they may become. . . .

Within a few months Tito overcame these apparent compunctions and agreed to receive military aid which greatly strengthened his Communist regime.

The principal concern of this paper is an attempt at an evaluation of the merits and disadvantages of the American policy of extending aid to Communist Yugoslavia and an examination of the tenability of a policy in support of "national communism." Before attempting the formulation of a balance sheet some attention should be given to certain limitations upon American policy which are inherent in the problem. Titoism, the prototype of "national communist", was a windfall so far as United States policy was concerned. American purposive action could not have precipitated or facilitated the Tito-Stalin break in any way. Tito's excommunication was the result of a Soviet miscalculation and of the fact that Tito had an army and a police state at his disposal in order to prevent what the Kremlin termed "healthy [Stalinist] elements" in Yugoslavia from overthrowing him. Thus "national communism" results from the internal contradictions in Marxism-Leninism and from the inherent tensions which the Communist world generates.

American actions can conceivably give the "kiss of death" to any manifestation of "national communism" if they should be sufficiently indiscreet. United States aid to a Communist regime cannot even be a marriage of convenience but is more in the nature of an uneasy self-liquidating liaison of limited duration. In the case of American aid to Tito both parties claimed that the other needed it more than it needed the other. A serious limitation upon American capability in this area arises from the presence of Soviet troops in Poland and the apparent impossibility of effecting their withdrawal in the absence of any solution to the German problem. Any regime in Poland will be influenced by the fact that only the Soviet Union and its creature-government in East Germany recognize the present German-Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse line. This fact makes Warsaw dependent upon Moscow and also limits the latitude available to the United States in its policy toward a Communist regime pursuing Poland's national interests since

Washington cannot very well regard Polish views on the Oder-Neisse frontier as being of greater importance than the views held by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nor is the United States a free agent in the matter of a solution to the German problem, which presumably would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, since a solution in Germany depends largely upon Soviet willingness to facilitate a settlement.

Indeed, the case of Polish developments since October of 1956 points to the difficulty of defining "national communism" with any great degree of precision. However, the principal criterion is obviously an effort of some sort to reduce the country's dependence upon Moscow and to divest itself of Russian tutelage in order to pursue its "own road to socialism" based on unique local circumstances. Another criterion, a characteristic of only a fully developed "national communism", would be an effort to move out of the Soviet camp into the neutralist "bloc" to the accompaniment of a loud denunciation of all "blocs." This is a step which Tito was able to take since Soviet troops were not stationed on Yugoslav territory in 1948. Wladyslaw Gomulka could not take Poland out of the Warsaw Pact in 1956 or in 1957 since Soviet troops were in the country and, unlike Tito, he was not pushed across the ideological Rubicon by excommunication. Since this choice was not open to Gomulka he had to content himself with getting rid of Soviet Marshal Constantine Rokossovsky as Defense Minister and granting certain concessions to the population. These included a greater degree of religious toleration accorded to the Roman Catholic Church, the release of Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski from house arrest, a decollectivization of agriculture and a limited relaxation of the reins with which the party and its police have held the population in check.

These criteria of "national communism" certainly are applicable to the policies which the late Imre Nagy attempted to pursue in Hungary during the trying days of late October and early November of 1956. However, here again the presence of Soviet troops was the determining factor



in the unfortunate and sanguinary outcome. Moscow would not countenance Nagy's effort, resulting from popular demand, to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and have Hungary placed under the protection of the United Nations with a neutral status similar to that of Austria. Nor would Moscow permit the adoption of what was a democratic socialist platform and the restoration of a genuine coalition government.<sup>7</sup> Indeed the Hungarian Rebellion of 1956 served to indicate that an enraged populace will not be placated by the promise of "national communism."

The Hungarian Rebellion demonstrated the utter impotence of American foreign policy in a situation which was characterized by a high degree of spontaneity and opportunity as well as by great risk. The Truman Doctrine suddenly became inoperable and no Eisenhower Doctrine was promulgated on behalf of Imre Nagy's beleaguered government. The United States limited itself to moral support and medical assistance to Hungary for good reason since any effective American aid could have been brought to bear on the situation only in violation of Austria's neutral status, and the fact that Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops and borders on the Soviet Union also gave American decision-makers pause.

The events of the autumn of 1956 first heartened and then shocked and disappointed American public opinion. Embittered and perplexed, Americans could only ponder the limited alternatives apparently available to Communism's subject peoples outside of the Soviet Union. The notion of "liberation"—which was always more of a slogan than a real policy of the United States—now had to be viewed in terms of the likelihood of Communism's developing into something less than the image of its professed goals.<sup>8</sup> There was a certain grim satisfaction to be derived from the fact that the upheavals of 1956 in Poland and in Hungary resulted in large part from the policies pursued by Stalin's heirs in the Soviet Union and by their henchmen in Eastern Europe. The visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin in May and June of 1955 for the purpose of effecting a "reconciliation" with Tito constituted a turning point in

the development of the pressures which ultimately exploded in 1956. The de-Stalinization campaign which reached its climax at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February of 1956 was followed by the Poznan riots in June and the ferment which resulted in the memorable and tragic events of the autumn of that year. Thus it was primarily Communist policies and not external influences which determined the course of the developments during and after 1956.

At the same time it seems evident that the example set by Communist Yugoslavia—however involuntary it was in its inception—served to create tensions within the Soviet Union's East European empire and to provide a measure of hope that Moscow's grip could somehow be relaxed. Secretary of State Dulles described the significance of the "pilgrimage of the Soviet leaders to Belgrade" in the following terms: "Independence is rewarded, and heresy is condoned. This is bound to have a profound effect throughout the Soviet zone."<sup>9</sup> Subsequent events were to demonstrate the validity of this observation, but they also pointed to the fact that the fate of "national communism" and of the Soviet empire would be determined primarily by internal developments occurring within the Communist world.

The failure of Soviet Communism to resolve national peculiarities and reconcile all differences of national interest between Communist regimes should not imply that the United States need only wait for the internal disintegration of Communism. Yet the United States is limited in what it can do to encourage Communist regimes in certain countries to strike a less dependent posture vis-a-vis Moscow. Any American policy designed to aid "national communism"—even if that Communism loudly proclaims its adherence to "internationalism"—is bound to involve a serious dilemma as well as the assumption of certain calculated risks. These can best be perceived in an evaluation of the most fully developed policy in this area—that pursued by the United States in its relations with Communist Yugoslavia.

Many weighty arguments can be employed to challenge

the advisability of the kind of aid program which the United States developed for Communist Yugoslavia. To begin with many Americans had doubts about aiding a regime which had been so blatantly Muscovite in its adherence to Communism prior to its excommunication. There was also the bitter memory of the cruel treatment which the Tito regime had meted out to the advocates of a democratic Yugoslavia and to Drazha Mihailovich and his followers. The tragic fate of Cardinal Stepinac also served to remind Americans of the kind of regime with which they were dealing.

In evaluating the aid program to Communist Yugoslavia in terms of concrete gains and losses many have found it politically distasteful and unsound as well as morally repugnant to be granting aid to any Communist regime. While some satisfaction could be derived from the spectacle of Belgrade and Moscow each claiming that its brand of Communism was the purest and that the other had "betrayed" Leninism, the real issue was whether or not Tito's policies were actually detracting from Soviet capabilities and making the achievement of Soviet policy aims less likely.

Even those who have argued that aid to Communist Yugoslavia has been nothing more than a calculated risk have had to admit that Tito's policies have been designed to cultivate the so-called "neutralist" states. To the extent that the Soviet Union has not subjugated the "uncommitted bloc" and Yugoslavia remains a member of it this might be regarded as a gain of sorts for the United States. While this provides little satisfaction even that is negated by the fact that the United States has been aiding a country which ungraciously criticizes American policies on the slightest pretext and has regarded the receipt of American aid as proof of its own superiority.

Belgrade has been as vociferous as Moscow in its criticism of military pacts and "blocs," NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact as well as the Eisenhower Doctrine have all been condemned on various occasions. Denunciations of "colonialists" and "imperialists" have been part of Tito's stock in trade. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia has coincided, and not accidentally, with that of Moscow in other respects as well. Belgrade was quick to recognize



Communist China in the autumn of 1949 and to accept Peking's claim to Formosa. Tito's regime accorded diplomatic recognition to the Soviet regime in East Germany in October of 1957. This step, which led to the severance of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Belgrade, was rationalized as being "in the spirit of seeking a working system of co-existence by the avoidance of blocs" and as a "contribution" to German unity. Communist Yugoslavia has also cast its vote for many Soviet proposals in the United Nations since 1948. Numerous statements made by Tito and other Yugoslav Communists, especially since 1955, have emphasized the common goals which Belgrade shares with Moscow.<sup>10</sup>

The lack of any genuine and lasting community of interests between the ideology of the Communist rulers of Yugoslavia and the values to which Americans adhere has caused many doubts to be expressed in American congressional circles. Yugoslavia has remained a police state governed under the regime of a single political party which tolerates no organized or individual opposition.<sup>11</sup> Its basic character has not been changed by much advertised administrative reforms and reorganizations. Now it has been argued by some that the authoritarian nature of the Tito regime should not in itself be regarded as precluding it from receiving United States aid so long as the American taxpayer does not rise up in arms. The case of American military and economic aid to Spain has been invoked by some in order to justify continued aid to Yugoslavia. While neither country is a democracy, certain very important distinctions serve to distinguish the Spanish aid program from that which has benefited Yugoslavia. Franco's Spain, unlike Tito's Yugoslavia, granted to the United States the right to construct air and naval bases. In addition, the Spanish regime, while placing certain restrictions on Protestant worship, shares many of the spiritual values of other Western societies, and what is most significant, it is unqualifiedly anti-Communist.

American qualms about entering into an alliance with Spain were quickly overcome as a result of the practical gains which accrued to American capabilities in the area of Western European and Mediterranean defenses. In the case

of our relations with Yugoslavia little of a tangible nature emerged with the exception of certain non-ferrous metal deliveries. The original aid program of 1950 was justified on the grounds that food relief was necessary since even a limited famine would presumably have enabled the Kremlin to subvert the Tito regime. President Truman reasoned that American aid would "help preserve the independence of a nation which is defying the savage threats of the Soviet imperialists and keeping Soviet power out of one of Europe's most strategic areas."<sup>12</sup> Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, justified the request for \$38 million in additional aid on the grounds that the Yugoslav-supported guerrilla warfare had been terminated in Greece and Soviet power no longer impinged upon the Adriatic (except in isolated Albania). These gains, it was argued, had to be preserved since Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow served as "a force for peace in Europe" and its army was viewed as "a factor in the world balance."<sup>13</sup>

The obviously diminishing value of an aid program to Yugoslavia after 1955 should not blind one to the context in which the original decision to extend aid was made. It should be recalled that it was taken precisely at a time when the outcome of the Korean conflict was in gravest doubt. Who could at that time say with any degree of certainty where the Korean War would lead us and what our defense needs would be? Economic aid was extended to Tito at a time when Western Europe was quite defenseless. It should also be recalled that the United States had troops in Trieste and in Austria at the time and the fate of Yugoslavia had some bearing upon the defensive capacities of these and of the Italian forces in the event of a Soviet attack.

One can speculate, if somewhat idly, what would have occurred had American aid been withheld from Tito's Yugoslavia. The food deficit could have led to some degree of starvation, and to the extent that American deliveries of surplus agricultural commodities served a humanitarian purpose they can hardly be criticized. Yet one can ask whether the Stalinists in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia would have seized power in the absence of United

States aid or whether Tito would have gone to Canossa. One can ask, particularly after American military aid began to arrive in Yugoslavia, whether Tito would have fought if the NATO powers had been attacked by the Soviet Union and if Yugoslavia had not been attacked. Of course, the principal threat of a military effort against Yugoslavia, to the extent that it was immediate and real in 1950, came from Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. It can be asked whether the Soviet Union, under the circumstances, could really have committed the forces of these countries in an attack upon Yugoslavia. The advent of the nuclear ballistics missile has caused the military significance of Yugoslavia to decline further even though the country had not been a major area of operations in either world war.<sup>14</sup> In retrospect one can probably answer the above questions in the negative and conclude that United States military aid to Yugoslavia was excessive.

The general program of economic aid to Tito's Yugoslavia has been defended on various grounds in spite of the fact that it has enabled the Tito regime to further entrench itself. It cannot be denied that for a number of years Tito and various spokesmen for his regime made many scathing denunciations of the Soviet Union and of Stalinism and that these statements possibly contributed, if only in a slight and indirect way, to the furtherance of the cause of human freedom. However, it should be noted that these attacks have been the Yugoslav response to condemnations let loose by Moscow and by the capitals of Eastern Europe—and more recently by Peking. Yugoslavia did provide an alternative of sorts designed to give other East European subject peoples some hope for a measure of independence from Moscow even though this was an alternative not particularly calculated to elate Americans. Belgrade also signed with Greece and Turkey a "treaty of friendship and cooperation" in Ankara on February 28, 1953. This was followed by the signing of the twenty-year Balkan Pact for military aid on August 9, 1954. Yet this military alliance was rendered inoperative not only by the Kremlin's decision to employ a somewhat different tactic in dealing with Belgrade but also by the deterioration in relations between Ankara and Athens resulting from the



situation in Cyprus. At the same time relations between Greece and Yugoslavia remained improved and were far different from what they had been immediately following World War II.

Tito's support of the Communist guerrilla movement in Greece prior to 1948 would have been terminated without United States economic aid being granted to Yugoslavia. However, it is undoubtedly true that American aid to Yugoslavia did cause Tito to become amenable to a settlement of the Trieste dispute with Italy although not before much venom was heaped upon the United States and Great Britain for their allegedly "pro-Italian" attitude.<sup>15</sup> It might be said that the United States acquired a certain moral advantage in that it extended aid to Tito without attaching any real political conditions—something which Titoist spokesmen have publicly acknowledged and praised. Yet the United States has not fully satisfied Marshal Tito's ego and his desire to play the role of a world statesman to which few leaders of states the size of Yugoslavia even aspire. While Secretary of State Dulles did speak over the Belgrade radio in November of 1955 in praise of Yugoslavia's unwillingness to be anyone's satellite, Washington would not invite Tito for the kind of five-day official state reception which he was accorded in London in March of 1953.

While some Americans have been more concerned with the question of whether or not economic and military aid implied moral approbation, others have been calculating the financial cost and wondering whether, on balance, the policy has been worth the expenditures involved. The United States has paid a high price in absolute terms for the Yugoslav aid program, although \$1.5 billion is not an extravagant sum in relationship to total defense and foreign aid outlays. What is disturbing is the fact that the Yugoslav economy has not attained viability in spite of this vast aid program. In February of 1958 the United States agreed to provide Yugoslavia with \$62.5 million in surplus agricultural commodities to meet an apparently chronic bread grain deficit in return for dinar payments three-quarters of which were to constitute long-term

credits and the other quarter to be used for American government expenditures in Yugoslavia. In November of 1954, following a visit by Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo, Washington had to grant easier terms on previous loans made to Belgrade. Tito informed Senator Allen J. Ellender on October 26, 1957 that he was not requesting additional grants from the United States but would be satisfied with loans, yet it should be added that these must obviously bear a relationship to Yugoslavia's existing indebtedness and to her future ability to repay new loans. Serious attention should be given to Tito's assurance, in the same conversation, that United States-Yugoslav relations would not be affected even if all American aid were eliminated.<sup>16</sup>

If the lack of viability in the Yugoslav economy has created serious doubts in connection with aid, the condition of the Polish economy should give rise to even graver doubts. American aid to Poland in June of 1957 and in February of 1958 consisted of loans and sales of agricultural surpluses (including cotton) and other commodities as well as some machinery. Two loans which total \$55 million were made at 4½ per cent interest and are repayable in dollars over a twenty year period commencing in 1962 and in 1963. Sales of agricultural surpluses at world market prices under the two agreements total \$91.9 million and are to be paid for in zlotys. The June 7, 1957 agreement provides that zloty counterpart funds are to be established and are also to be used for American government expenditures in Poland. The February 15, 1958 agreement contains a recapture provision which obligates Poland to buy back zlotys beginning in five years at the rate of \$2.81 million per annum. It can be seen that these are rather business-like agreements.

However, American economic aid to Poland is only a small part of that country's needs. The Polish Minister of Agriculture, Edward Ochab, informed Senator Allen J. Ellender on September 7, 1957 that Poland needed \$2.5 billion in credits in order to develop her economy.<sup>17</sup> It is obvious that the United States should not underwrite the development of a Communist regime's economy in any country. The question has even arisen as to why the

United States should relieve Communist governments of the responsibility of feeding their own restless subjects. So long as the source is adequately publicized, and food surpluses exist, the sale of such American surpluses for a soft currency such as the zloty can hardly be said to appreciably strengthen the local Communist regime. This is particularly the case in a country such as Poland in which the populace detests the Russians.

The argument that American economic aid will cause a Communist government, as distinct from its subjects, to become "independent" of Moscow raises the question of how much aid would be necessary and how much "independence" such Communist rulers would actually have. In the case of Poland the disposition of Soviet troops in that country as well as in East Germany places serious limitations upon the potential independence of the rulers in Warsaw. An even more fundamental difficulty is that no Communist regime wishes to be at loggerheads with Moscow any longer than necessary. Similarly, no Communist heretic can ever admit that he is a heretic. Communists who receive foreign aid must rationalize it by arguing that the donor thinks that he is acting in his own interests when he is actually being duped and is aiding the establishment of Communism. For this reason economic aid relations with the rare Communist regime which publicizes its frictions with Moscow should be kept on a firm commercial basis, although this should not preclude the charging of a lower rate of interest.

It is clear that there are very real limits to what economic aid can accomplish in the countries under consideration. More important are the opportunities which may develop for introducing non-Communist cultural influences to people who have been offered a very meager and boring fare in the past. In this connection the two grants of the Ford Foundation in 1957 and in 1958, which total \$1 million and provide for cultural and scholarly exchanges, merit particular attention and indicate that this is an area in which private and semi-private organizations can sometimes accomplish more than public bodies. The United States also possesses a great asset in that large sectors



of its population have maintained ties with relatives in their countries of origin. It is the influence exercised upon popular attitudes in Communist-ruled countries and the preservation of the desire for a climate of free inquiry and discussion which will be far more significant in the long run than any schemes to underwrite economic development as a prerequisite to "political independence" for Communist rulers.

The challenge posed by international Communism can only be met on a variety of levels and by use of diverse weapons and tactics. A mere quarantine cannot be a permanent solution. While we cannot in the short run rely exclusively upon the development of divisions within the Communist camp, it would be equally foolish to relegate all Communists to some outer darkness in spite of disagreements which may arise among them. Communism has bred a number of heresies and deviations in the past, and the fact that Communists now wield political power in a number of countries adds greatly to the significance of this phenomenon. Indeed, one of the hopes of the democratic world in the long run may lie in the potential of international Communism to splinter in the way that all dogmatic belief systems have tended to become divided. Communists may be expected to differ to some degree over what actually constitutes the "true religion" and what is the correct road to "salvation."

It may be that Communism, like the Protestant Reformation, will not only divide into several "sects" and "denominations" which still share certain common beliefs but may also in the end generate a powerful "Counter-Reformation" in the democratic world. It is this latter element which is the really essential one if Communism is to be dealt with effectively. United States policy and the activities of individual Americans can, within limits, contribute to the effective appreciation of the contradictions which do exist within the Communist world. Recognizing and acting upon some of these contradictions can be an important part, although not the sole or even principal aspect, of American foreign policy. A great power such as the

United States cannot base its foreign policy upon self-imposed isolation from the Communist world, Nor can it hope to escape all dilemmas and assume no calculated risks. Anything less would render it unworthy of its past achievements and of its peaceful intent.

<sup>1</sup>See The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948) for the texts of the exchange between Moscow and Belgrade.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>4</sup>See the report by Senator Allen J. Ellender, A Review of United States Foreign Policy and Operations, 85th Congress, 2d session, Senate Document No. 78 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 174ff. Counterpart dinar funds were also used to pay certain expenses of United States missions in Yugoslavia and for certain off-shore defense procurements. Also see the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs' Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on Policy toward the Satellite Nations, 85th Congress, 1st session, House Report No. 531 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 23.

<sup>5</sup>For the text of this agreement see Documents on International Affairs, 1951, ed. by Denise Folliot (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 387-390.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 379f.

<sup>7</sup>For a statement of Nagy's earlier views on the need to relax police controls and to reward the workingman for his labors see Imre Nagy on Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).

<sup>8</sup>For brief but sound accounts of United States policy toward Eastern Europe during and after World War II see the papers by Philip E. Mosely and Robert F. Byrnes in The Fate of East Central Europe; Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy, ed. by Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), chapters 3 and 4.

<sup>9</sup>In a statement made on May 25, 1955 to the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 32, no. 832, June 6, 1955, p. 913.



<sup>10</sup>For a not entirely temperate criticism of United States aid to Yugoslavia based upon some very sound documentation but also employing certain disputable conclusions see Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957).

<sup>11</sup>For a very realistic account of the Tito regime based upon first-hand observation as well as upon documentary sources see Alex N. Dragnich, Tito's Promised Land, Yugoslavia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954).

<sup>12</sup>Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 597, December 11, 1950, p. 938.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>See Robert Strausz-Hupé, "The United States and Yugoslavia: A Reappraisal," The Yale Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 December, 1955.

<sup>15</sup>Dragnich, op. cit., p. 318 refers to the sacking of the United States and British information centers in Belgrade and Zagreb by organized Titoist bands in October of 1953.

<sup>16</sup>Senator Allen J. Ellender, A Review of United States Foreign Policy and Operations, p. 179.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

**BEST COPY AVAILABLE FOR PHOTOGRAPHING**

Paper to be delivered at the 54th Annual Meeting of The American Political  
Science Association, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri,  
September 5, 9:30 A.M., Room 6

THE FUNCTIONS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE STUDY OF POLITICS

Panel 36

Chairman: William C. Gibbons, The American Political Science Association

Papers: James A. Robinson, Northwestern University, "A Theory of Participant  
Observation"  
William C. Mitchell, Harvard University, "Role Problems of the  
Participant Observer"  
Alan Fiellin, Dartmouth College, "The Study of Legislative Behavior  
Through Participant Observation"



## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

By  
William C. Gibbons  
American Political Science Association

Said a seven-year old to her father: "I stood up on my toes yesterday." "You stood up," her father corrected. "How do you know?" asked the girl. "Were you there?"

Woodrow Wilson is said to have written Congressional Government without so much as setting foot on Capitol Hill. We may be thankful that there was no Congressional Fellowship Program. But since Wilson's day things have changed. Among many political scientists it has become the rage to be "there." The modern student of politics, from undergraduate to professor, is lured from his cloistered realms by a host of worldly ventures. Ventures may come and ventures may go, but their prime purpose remains the same: "practical experience."

Experience has long been esteemed in Western folklore about learning. "Experience is a good teacher." "There's nothing like experience." "Only so much do I know, as I have lived," was Emerson's way of saying it in his address on The American Scholar. "Practical experience" is a latter-day tautology, which must have been coined by some man of letters to distinguish between his experience - I shall not call it impractical - as an intellectual, and the more "practical" experience of men of affairs.

Experience is one of those common-sense words no one with common sense ever bothers to define. Everybody knows what it means. I shall likewise assume that everyone here knows what it means. But knowing what is meant by the word is not the same as knowing what constitutes experience, how experience is acquired, and what the functions of experience are in the study of politics.

I said a "host of worldly ventures." This is no exaggeration. Despite the poverty of knowledge about their operation or their results, "learning by doing" programs in political science have been proliferating at an amazing rate in recent years. Before World War II a handful of colleges and universities had conceived the startling notion that students of political science should be exposed to political reality; and it was a startling notion for that day. Some enterprising souls had even organized in 1934 an Institute of Public Affairs, which several years later began offering up to fifty Washington internships to talented college graduates. The colleges largely contented themselves with brief visitations to Washington for discussions with public officials. The National Institute's program sought to stimulate interest in careers in public affairs, especially in government service. Secondarily it hoped to provide "practical experience" for persons pursuing professional academic careers in the social sciences. Among its interns were five men who are currently prominent members of the political science profession - James MacGregor Burns, Robert A. Dahl, Edgar Furniss, Jr., Alexander Heard, and Arthur Maass, all of whom have subsequently demonstrated an active interest in public affairs, both inside and outside the red brick walls of their respective campuses.

Since World War II, which probably provided more "practical experience" in government for more political scientists than any program in the history of the profession, there has been a surge of interest in programs for the acquisition of experience. The National Institute lasted until 1949, when some of its functions were assumed by the government under what is now called the Management Intern Program. Individual college programs have steadily increased in number and scope. In addition, several important new programs have been created, most of them within the last five years, and some only recently. I refer to the Congressional Fellowship Program, the activities of the Citizenship Clearing House, the program of the Falk Foundation, the internship program in the California legislature, and the new program in "practical politics" of the Eagleton Foundation.

The Congressional Fellowship Program is, of course, operated by the American Political Science Association with money from the Stern Family Fund and the Ford Foundation. Established in 1953, it brings to Washington fifteen political scientists and political journalists between the ages of 25 and 32 for nine months of work in congressional offices, coupled with a rather heavy schedule of outside conferences and research.

The Citizenship Clearing House, created for the promotion of closer relationships between the study of politics and the practice of politics, as well as wider participation by college-trained people in political affairs, is conducting, with the assistance of the Ford Foundation, a broad educational program in a number of states. This ranges from campus conferences and field research, to various types of trips and internships, both in government - national, state, and local, and in political parties. The Citizenship Clearing House has also established the National Committee Fellowships, which enable two senior political scientists, one from each party, to work for one year in their respective national committee headquarters in Washington.

The Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh, which was the original backer of the Citizenship Clearing House, has also supported directly a substantial program of "education for politics" at a number of colleges and universities. This has included both undergraduate education, of which Ohio Wesleyan University with its Institute of Practical Politics is one example, and graduate education, in which Michigan State and Yale have recently been joined by Vanderbilt and the University of North Carolina. Besides field research and instruction, some of the participating institutions have used Falk funds for various types of political internships and fellowships, in addition to placing students with political parties or candidates during campaigns.

Five universities in California have recently joined with the State Assembly of California to create a political internship in the State legislature, formally called the California State Legislative Internship Program. Modeled after the Congressional Fellowship Program, this is the first internship program in a State legislature, and the first legislative internship program financially assisted by the legislature itself. Under the California plan, up to fifteen graduate students in political science, journalism, or law are selected for ten months of work with committees of the State Assembly in Sacramento. The State Senate is not yet participating. Committee work is supplemented by interviews with persons involved in the operation of the

State government, as well as by weekly seminars with the director of the program. You may be interested in a description of the program by the Speaker of the California Assembly, Mr. L. H. Lincoln, which appears in the January, 1958, issue of State Government.

Numerous other programs are conducted by colleges and universities, non-governmental organizations, and foundations. The Eagleton Foundation of Douglass College, Rutgers University, which has launched an extensive operation in "practical politics," sponsors a small political internship program in cooperation with Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey. Each year, a rising senior at the University is awarded a scholarship for three months of work on the staff of the Senator. A number of other Members of Congress have begun cooperating with institutions in their States in sponsoring political internships. Representatives Fred Schwengel of Iowa and Henry Reuss of Wisconsin have been particularly active. Senator Richard Neuberger sponsors his own internship program, which brings a young graduate of an Oregon college or university to his staff for a year's service.

The striking and distressing fact, as one surveys this impressive array, is that every program for providing political experience for political scientists, including the Congressional Fellowship Program, has been established on exceptionally fragile intellectual foundations. I invite you to examine the evidence. Read the annual reports. Study the schedules and the statements of goals. In all the literature, in all the promotional materials, I have not found a single justification which amounts to anything more than an assertion that contact with reality is desirable, that good citizenship is important, and that the change to see, to observe, and to participate will somehow strengthen citizenship, teaching, reporting, research, and writing, not to mention the Governor's office in the State of Michigan.

There is a tendency, prevalent in the United States, to regard contact with reality as a good in itself, which needs no rationalization or justification. This is particularly true, in the public mind, in the case of college and university faculty. The popular conception is that faculty members are isolated from the real world. They therefore tend not to understand the real world; not understanding, they tend to recreate an unreal world for their students. One has the feeling that most if not all of the programs promoting greater contact between political scientists and the realities of politics make the same mistake in reverse. They tend to be grounded on the uncritical assumption that the popular critics are right. They tend to assume that political scientists are isolated from the realities of politics, and that it is important to develop ways of piercing this isolation with opportunities for practical experience. They tend to fall into the same intellectual trap - an observation, an assumption, the asserted desirability of corrective action, and the flying intellectual leap, eyes closed, into the arms of a program.

No one would deny that the work of political scientists must bear a certain relationship to reality. There may be disagreement about what the relationship should be. There is certainly contention over the extent to which political scientists should attempt to affect events in the real world, and the extent to which the real world can or should be made the subject of scientific inquiry. The proposition that the study of politics requires an understanding of concrete political phenomena, however, is incontrovertible.



Nor would anyone deny that within the profession there is a "felt-need," to use a monstrous term, for establishing a closer and more productive connection between the study of politics and the practice of politics. The growth curve of "learning by doing" programs continues to rise. There is talk of internships at the next national political conventions. Before long we may even have to create needs to justify projects.

The problem, and it is a problem, does not lie in number or type of programs, or even in contact with reality. The problem lies in the development of an assumptive or conceptual framework within which programs for the acquisition of experience can be given adequate intellectual justification, productive design, and tenable purposes. One might suppose that the recent spate of programs might have generated an accompanying attempt to develop such a framework. The fact that it has not, I suggest, is evidence existing programs are so theoretically and conceptually deficient that they do not even produce a discussion of deficiencies.

The literature itself is disappointingly empty. A few contributions have been made by sociologists and anthropologists; none by political scientists.

It is not my task to examine the literature, or to conceptualize the subject. This will be done by Robinson, Mitchell and Fiellin. It may help, however, for me to sketch the limits of the subject, to suggest how it will be discussed, and to activate it with a tentative definition of terms.

The subject itself sprang from the deliberations of a small study group composed of these three men and myself, which I organized this year within the Congressional Fellowship Program. In the beginning we anticipated conducting a small research project on some aspect of Congress. It was eventually decided, however, that an examination of participant observation was more urgent and appropriate. The decision reflected the doubts, reservations, and questions of all four of us about the functions of the Congressional Fellowship Program, and programs like it, in the study of politics. Recognizing that there are many modes, found in many different forms in the various programs, we decided to confine ourselves to the type of program - the mode - represented by the Congressional Fellowship Program. This is the "participant observation" mode, in which political scientists of the graduate level or beyond engage simultaneously in a combination of political staff work and observation, sometimes coupled with actual research. The fact that they are participant observers is known, unlike the participant observation described by Florence Kluckhohn (7). The length of the period of their participant observation varies, but tends to be three months or longer. They actually perform political staff functions during their participant observation; they are not simply stationed in a place of political business, nor are they mere onlookers. They may interview, but interviewing is not their principal occupation.

Alas, the time has come for a definition. What is "participant observation"? Florence Kluckhohn defines it as "...conscious and systematic sharing, in so far as circumstances permit, in the life-activities, and, on occasion, in the interests and affects of a group of persons." Its purpose, she says, "... is to obtain data about behavior through direct contact and in terms of specific situations in which the distortion that results from the investigator's being an outside agent is reduced to a

minimum." (7) Another source defines participant observation as "... a process in which the observer's presence in a social situation is maintained for the purpose of scientific investigation. The observer is in a face-to-face relationship with the observed, and, by participating with them in their natural life setting, he gathers data." (15) A third source asserts that the "intent" of participant observation "...is to prevent imposing alien meaning upon the actions of the subjects." (16)

At the risk of coming in fourth, I shall try to combine and synthesize these various definitional statements. I shall define participant observation as a mode of learning combining identification with actors and their world through participation in their activities, and the observation of the actors and their activities. I shall define the purpose of participant observation as the development of understanding, as well as the collection of data, about the realities of social phenomena, in order to enhance the scientific study of society and social institutions.

Mr. Robinson will now discuss the first part of the subject. His paper, entitled "A Theory of Participant Observation," will be followed by William Mitchell's paper on "Role Problems of the Participant Observer," and Alan Fieillin's paper on "Study of Legislative Behavior Through Participant Observation." I am grateful to these gentlemen for their labors. I am also grateful to Mark Twain for reminding us - all of us - that "There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact."

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## A THEORY OF PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION

By  
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The assumption that practical political experience is useful in training political scientists is evident in the wide variety of participant-observation programs which recently have been established by colleges, foundations, and professional associations. My impression is that participant-observation is justified by its sponsors as a technique for imparting a "feel" for the hard facts of political life. One hears experience recommended for acquiring a "sense of the intangibles," for "soaking up" the "real world," for "appreciating" or "understanding" "practice" as opposed to "theory." The society page of a Washington Sunday newspaper quoted a Vassar College summer intern who believed she was acquiring a "feel" for international politics from her work at the Pentagon.

Is it possible to be more explicit about the meaning of experience for the study of politics? What are "feel," "insight," and "understanding?" To what purposes of social science does actual political work contribute? What are its limitations and special problems? In spite of the increasing favor of participant-observation programs, I have not found a single article in a political science journal, nor an article by a political scientist in any other source, which is addressed to these questions.

### The Concept of "Feel"

The term "feel" is common enough in conversations about the functions of experience in studying politics. I shall not presume to say what others mean by this term but instead try to define it as I use it. "Having a feel for a situation" may be described as the state of being comfortable in the situation, of believing that one has the essential facts of the event, of knowing what to expect next, of taking things for granted, of predicting without being taken by surprise. The basic intellectual operation involved in acquiring the "feel" is that of drawing an analogy between one's experience and the new set of circumstances in which he finds himself. He notes that A and B, which existed when he participated in a similar event, are also present in the latest situation. One then infers that C is likely to occur again. "Feel" is, thus, an analogy from earlier experience, and the sensitivity of one's "feel," the clarity and originality of his insight, depends in part on the quality of prior political experience (12).

The regular political participant feels comfortable when he has learned most of the attributes of his new role, with its jargon, skills, and expected behaviors. His early experience coincides with later experience on the job. In other words, when one has become socialized to a new role, he has acquired "feel." The observer who wants to acquire a "feel" for politics must undergo some of the same socialization process as the politician. I will not say that participant-observation is unique in providing the observer with experience similar to that of the politician, for I dare say that many of the best political reporters also have a very acute "feel" for politics. But in a real sense political reporters are part of the political process and have, therefore, shared experience with politicians.

Most of this discussion applies to the two roles which most political scientists as teacher-scholars perform -- that of teaching in the classroom and that of pursuing and publishing advanced and original research. The teacher with a "feel" for politics which he applies in his lectures engages in an intellectual operation basically similar to that in which he engages when he writes up his advanced study.

Likewise most of the advantages and disadvantages of participant-observation apply equally to the teaching and research roles. While I recognize that the two roles differ in certain respects, I also think there are many similarities, and without pursuing the distinction, I hope that teacher-scholars will recognize that the problems involved in participant-observation are not avoided because one is more teacher and less writer or more writer and less teacher. The problems are shared by both roles, and it is to be hoped that both roles will see that the value of participant-observation increases as its disadvantages as well as its advantages are explicitly recognized.

#### Uses of Experience

Participant-observation is useful for several purposes of the social scientist who studies politics. First, it suggests subjects not yet covered by the literature or it may lead to reconsideration of some topics which the observer learns are inadequately treated in the literature. Such projects are more likely to be problems in the process of policy formation than in the substance of policy. One begins field work with some knowledge of the professional writings on the political process in general and on the concrete structure in which he is working. As experience surprises him and reveals behavior which textbooks did not prepare him to expect, one sees new problems for study. These new projects may be translated into a set of hypotheses which the participant-observer might crudely test during the remainder of his field experience. After he has discarded the role of participant he may want to employ more rigorous techniques such as systematic interviewing or content analysis. While first-hand experience can generate new ideas for study, it is not necessarily the most appropriate way to raise tentative hypotheses to the status of verified propositions of wide generality (5).

For example, while working in the office of a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee I was surprised at the paucity of communications between the member's office and the Department of State. This suggested the hypothesis that Representatives rely on the Committee for most of their communications with the Department. I continued to count my Congressman's contacts with the Department, but confirmation of the hypothesis will require systematic interviewing of other members of the Committee.

Experience may generate hypotheses at two broad levels. At one level hypotheses grow out of general observation of the wide varieties of roles and activities in the social system in which one participates. In other words, the participant-observer is in a position to study roles and activities performed by regular participants in the political process. At the other level the participant-observer studies the role he himself fills. Introspection about his assumed role may help to formulate hypotheses for further thought and investigation by other methods of study. This kind of introspection is related to the familiar technique known as *Verstehen* or sympathetic reconstruction (1). To the extent to which the social scientist actively fills a role the less he needs to rely on projected imagination and the more he can draw out of his own propositions for additional investigation.

Participant-observation is also helpful for the interpretation of data gathered by other means. Such help derives from possessing a "feel" for political and social life. When the "feel" is applied to quantitative data or observations acquired from general reading, it may provide additional explanations. It helps to interpret data in terms of experience, in terms of familiarity with the milieu from which they were drawn. Several social scientists who study non-political phenomena report that participant-observation serves this useful purpose (5, 7). One of the best statements of this proposition is by two sociologists.

What the survey method gains in representative coverage of a population is probably of no greater methodological significance than the increased

depth of understanding and interpretation possible with participant observation techniques. This is evident when we contrast the position of a survey analyst and a participant observer when both face the problem of interpreting the meaning of a question. The desk chair analyst can give at best an intelligent guess based upon sketchy pretest and tabular data. The observer, in contrast, can call upon the wealth of experience with the linguistic habits, the attitudes, values and beliefs of the group and provide a much richer, and probably sounder interpretation (17).

Participant-observation also increases the opportunities for observation (3, 7). Many political situations are closed to the investigator qua investigator. It is conceivable that a congressional committee, a bureau, or a political party might admit an observer solely for the purpose of his learning about the subject. Indeed, it has been done, notably in bureaucracies. But there are many obvious obstacles, not the least of which is the necessity to explain one's presence to a large number of participants. If one is himself a participant, however minor his role, the entree is much easier established. My own experience illustrates this. I wanted to attend some conference committees in order to watch House and Senate conferees resolve conflicts between their different versions of the same bill. It would be well-nigh impossible to induce any chairman to admit an observer to these committees whose proceedings are almost as sacrosanct as the deliberations of a jury. But after several weeks on the staff of a congressional committee, I was invited to two conferences, although I was not a participant. It was easier for my sponsor to explain that "he is an intern with the Committee," or "he is temporarily on the Committee staff," than it would have been to say, "he is studying conference committees." The same rule governs admission to the floor of the Senate chamber, where I was permitted to be during debate on a resolution with which I had helped. One's dual role as participant and observer, thus, provides access to data otherwise difficult or impossible to secure.

What are the kinds of data which participant-observation can uniquely provide? Florence Kluckhohn (7), in one of the two or three leading articles on participant-observation, specifies three kinds of data which the technique is suitable for acquiring. First, it yields information about the current situation as it occurs rather than the situation as reconstructed by interviews or questionnaires. Second, it may be easier to oversee or overhear "guarded data." Virtually all social systems have subjects about which direct questions may only elicit evasions or even misrepresentations. Assuming that temporary participation is easier justified to most regular participants than mere observation, the participant-observer may be able to put himself in the position of learning "guarded data." Third, Kluckhohn notes the importance of having ready access to "gossip," if, for example, one is interested in the informal norms of behavior within a group. Private or off-the-record criticism of deviant behavior will cue one to the patterns of expected behavior.

On this last point, I think one might find that reporters or other observers who cover a concrete political structure regularly are able to pick up as much revealing gossip as a participant-observer. I suggest that some of the fascination in William S. White's Citadel derives from his having been close enough to the Senate to acquire from Senators informal estimates of their colleagues. From these comments he has inferred the membership of the "inner circle," although he is less explicit about standards for membership in that select few. Were he attuned to this question, his role as observer might serve as usefully as that of participant.

#### Limitations on the Method

While participant-observation has its virtues for certain purposes, it also has its disadvantages. These limitations, when relevant, must be weighed against the advantages and compared with other methods in order to determine which techniques are most appropriate for studying the particular problem.



An inherent limitation is that in gaining access, as a participant-observer, to some data one forecloses access to other data. Social anthropologists find this in highly stratified social systems (7), and sociologists working in communities have the same experience (9). In my recent experience as participant-observer with a Senate committee I encountered situations from which I was excluded from direct observation because of my association with the Committee. For example, working on the Senate side excluded participation in the House, and association with the Congress forbade seeing an issue from the point of view of the Executive. So it is with divisions within parties, between parties, between committee staff and Senators, between committee staff and Senators' staffs, and between sub-groups within the committee staff. I regard my experience as valuable for certain purposes, but it is nevertheless important to remind oneself now and again that he has not been privy to everything, that in adopting one research strategy he rejected others. In working closely with one staff person and one Senator on a resolution, I acquired rich detail about the situation as they defined it, but I do not have anything resembling such depth of information about other actors involved with the same issue. Therefore, I must rely on interviews and the public record if I am to reconstruct much of the history of the resolution.

A seemingly minor but in fact powerful limit to one's observation is his participation. For example, in writing letters, speeches, and reports for congressmen one occasionally finds himself so busy that he lacks time to analyze his role and thus may miss the opportunity to make explicit for himself some important propositions about "the language of politics." There are enough such examples to warn that over-participation may endanger observation (8). The participant-observer will do well to set aside a regular period for reflection about what he has witnessed in his most recent moments of active participation.

Another limitation concerns reliability. Other scholars must accept the word of one participant-observer about facts which cannot be rechecked (3). For example, in evaluating a case study, which I am preparing, on the passage of a resolution on which I worked during my participation in the Senate, other scholars will have to trust my account of those parts of the proceedings for which there are no public records. Others might do similar case studies concentrating on the same hypotheses, but they cannot repeat this single case from my point of view.

On the question of the validity of participant-observation data, there are two empirical studies which compare participant-observation results with results of other techniques. Vidich and Shapiro (17, 11) compared participant-observation and survey data in measuring the prestige of 547 members of a community with a population of 1,500, and they found a strong correspondence between the two sets of results. Donald T. Campbell (2) found that three informants' ranks of morale on ten submarine crews correlated .9 with a morale questionnaire administered to the enlisted personnel of the ten crews. Campbell conducted this experiment to learn whether informants who can communicate with social scientists may be of use as a method of general utility in social science. If informants with some understanding of social science questions can make reports which compare favorably with other methods, perhaps participant-observers may also be relied on for trustworthy accounts.

Kluckhohn offers a point in favor of the reliability of participant-observation data (7). To the extent that more information may be gained from intimate knowledge of a large number of participants, the less the danger that one's information will be atypical. Obviously, for certain purposes sampling procedures will mitigate against unrepresentativeness, but for others, especially where the universe is small, participant-observation may be an appropriate method both for access and reliability.

The absence of more empirical studies of participant-observation is regrettable. A psychologist might enlighten our methodology by translating empirical theories of perception and cognition to the problems of observing through participation. It is

well-known that observers may affect the observed (18), and the investigator is admonished to consider whether the effects of his presence are typical of what would have occurred were he absent (15). We are not familiar enough with the literature of psychology to know to what extent this subject has been considered. At any rate, it has not been dealt with by political scientists and this may be a place for fruitful collaboration between discipline.

Still another problem which already will have occurred to some is that of revelation, either oral or written, of "guarded" data gained from one's privileged position. How is one to treat information collected from people, who in their contacts with the participant-observer, probably never expected their most private political acts to be publicized? A similar question doubtless confronts interviewers and reporters in whom a politician confides. In these cases it is more likely that the interviewee will specify what can be reported, either with or without attribution, and what is to be held in strict confidence. Both teacher and writer will want to consider the intention of the observed and the effect of the revelation on the observed. A delay in publication may be a compromise. In any event, the participant-observer might take into account the fact that a breach of good faith can make research more difficult for other participant-observers.

#### Summary

The purpose of this paper was to review the uses and limitations of participant-observation in the study of politics. It was suggested that "feel" is derived from experience as a temporary performer of a political role from which one analogizes to other sets of circumstances. Rigorous testing of most of the propositions about uses and limitations are lacking, but when our experience is compared with that of scholars in other disciplines who have temporarily combined the roles of participant and observer, several uses of the technique are apparent. Without presuming to exhaust either the advantages or disadvantages of the method, three favorable uses were enumerated. First, "feel" or experience helps to judge the quality of professional literature, observe gaps in it, and formulate hypotheses for further study by various methods. Second, it aids in the interpretation of data gathered by other means, and third, it is especially helpful for opening opportunities for observation. On the other hand, participation denies the observer access to data from other sources. There is the danger of over-participation. The technique may be less reliable for some purposes than one would like, although at least two empirical studies indicate that it compares favorably with other methods. Finally, delicate rules of propriety may limit or delay publication. A fuller theory of participant-observation would include analysis of role problems of the participant-observer and suggest applications of the method to concrete problems. These are the burdens of the other papers in this symposium.

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## ROLE PROBLEMS OF THE PARTICIPANT-OBSERVER

By  
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My major concern, in this paper, is with role strains or problems encountered by a participant-observer, as a person, in his efforts to secure knowledge through participation in the activities of a task-oriented group or organization. While I believe that what is said applies to a wide variety of organizations, it does not apply to all types of groups. The illustrations used are, therefore, limited to work in an organization, and, more specifically, to a Congressional office.

It must be thoroughly understood that I am primarily concerned with identifying problem-areas and am not attempting the far more difficult task of relating problems to various other relevant variables such as personality types, offices, and individual responses to role strains. I should, however, like to suggest that role strains or problems have a profound influence on what a participant-observer experiences and how he evaluates that experience.

Finally, the emphasis on strains ought not to be construed to mean that I wish to down-grade the subject-matter of these papers; I do not.<sup>1</sup> Rationality dictates that one face problems and not deny their existence, because they may be unpleasant to recognize.

### I.

Of primary importance in the type of activity we are considering is the perceptual set, or expectations a participant-observer brings to his work. Such perceptual sets include both cognitive and evaluative elements. A participant-observer will, e.g., have various images of the Congressional process, the politicians involved, and a set of expectations as to his own role in that process. With regard to the former, the new participant-observer may be poorly prepared to understand what is to take place. He will, therefore, be forced to inform himself on elementary matters at the expense of his time and energy. With respect to the persons involved in the legislative process, the participant-observer may be forced to overcome images of politicians acquired, at a distance from highly biased sources. We have all learned, e.g., that some of our heroes are not quite so heroic or useful when viewed in close-ups over an extended period of time. The first problem, then, confronting a participant-observer is to learn to unlearn. And, as we all know, unlearning is one of the most painful and bitterly resisted experiences a person must cope with.

Assume, however, that a person is willing to unlearn and learn; there is still a distinct possibility that his expectations will be excessive, or too "high", i.e., he may expect more than he will be allowed or permitted to experience either as an observer or participant. Specifically, he will, like many Congressional Fellows, participate to a lesser degree, in important matters, and with important people,

<sup>1</sup> Miss Joyce McLeod, a colleague in the 1957-58 Congressional Fellowship Program, has suggested that role strains may well serve the process of creativity. Persons who do not experience strains and especially failure, are not apt, according to Miss McLeod, to question that which goes on about them. The person who does experience such strains is apt, on the other hand, to ask himself to explain the difficulties. In so doing he becomes creative. I subscribe to this theory of learning with the qualification that the strains are not so severe as to discourage the person from really seeking an answer to his difficulty and that his creativity be diverted from the work to himself.

than he had anticipated or hoped. Instead, he may be asked to perform what he considers as trivial or demeaning tasks. Or, he may be ignored. Or, he may not receive the social deference he feels is his due as an intellectual.

This matter of excessive or unrealistic expectations that a participant-observer brings into a formalized program such as the Congressional Fellowship Program, is to me an exceedingly important one. I doubt whether the same problems are confronted by an informal participant-observer, in an informal group, of the type William Whyte studied. The fact that a student of politics is about to enter one of the great legislative assemblies of the world cannot help but influence his attitudes of grandeur, influence, and simply, a good time. Furthermore, the education political scientists receive tends to fortify these beliefs and aspirations. They assume, as many public administrators, on the job for the first time, that they are able to move the world, and will be asked to do so. Such, of course, is seldom the case. More often than not the administrator and the Congressional Fellow will be asked to write letters to constituents.

A failure to have any or all of one's expectations realized may easily lead to disillusionment and unhappiness. The major consequence of this unfortunate state is a distorted perception of the organization, its activities, and the system of which it is but a part. And, just as a disappointed writer frequently rationalizes his failures upon idiotic editors and an insensitive public, so the disappointed participant-observer may rationalize his "failures" on the stupidity and/or jealousy of the staff-members who have prevented him from being the right-hand man of the Senator or Congressman. Nor, is it impossible for a person to become disillusioned with the entire process of politics. Attention that might have been fruitfully devoted to learning is, then, diverted by personal anxieties.

Thus far, I have emphasized the expectations of participant-observers prior to their assumption of the roles. I should like, now, to shift our attentions to the organizational environment faced by a student, on the job, for the first few days.

Generally, the student enters a situation that can only be defined as ambiguous, one in which the organization and the participant-observer share a mutual ignorance. This ignorance is almost all-pervasive or complete. The goals and norms of each party to the relationship need to be established; in other words, a role must be defined with-in a going concern that does not have much time to speculate on how to integrate the new man called a "participant-observer." "What are you supposed to be doing?" is a common question asked of the Congressional Fellow. The impressions created during the early period are of crucial importance in determining the success of the participant-observer's mission. I might add, that much of the responsibility in defining the role rests with the Fellow. And, this requires skill of a high order.

Perhaps, the most important problem confronting the organization is one of utilizing this man, who says he wants to participate, but will only be around for about three or four months, who apparently has some knowledge and skills to offer, but no one quite knows what they are. It becomes necessary for the organizational authorities to integrate the man in a way in which his skills can be utilized. The preliminary period of mutual testing of one another can be rather trying for many people, especially the sensitive and insecure. Clues will be constantly sought out, by the participant-observer, as to his acceptance, or status. At best, the clues will be slow in coming, indirect and often highly ambiguous, open to diverse interpretations.

A typical source of anxiety, in this regard, results from or involves the assignment of work to the participant-observer. Congressional Fellows are likely to expect an assignment to significant work, with the appropriate authority and responsibility they have been led to expect. Fellows who are not entrusted with such work are in-

clined to question or to seek out reasons for not being so entrusted. It may be that organizational necessities prevent using the Fellow as he would prefer; but, it may also be that the staff feels no sense of responsibility for his education. Or, in some cases, not entirely unheard of, certain staff members feel insecure in their positions. They cannot be expected, therefore, to welcome potential competition. To the insecure, everyone is a competitor, whether the facts justify the assumption or not. In any case, he acts as though the assumption were a fact of life. Such anxieties may not only make life difficult for the participant-observer, but they may well prevent him from experiencing all that might otherwise be available.

The sources of another type of role strain lies in the informal relationships a participant-observative attempts to establish with organizational members. In American groups casual or informal ties are expected and easily entered; perhaps, too easily. It is essential that informality be attained, in the interests of informational goals, yet, it is also necessary that certain informalities be avoided. Involvement in the personal antagonisms of group members must be avoided, but, in fact, they do present themselves and cause problems that require solutions. To become a partisan in these affairs may assist one in his relationships with some members but ruin them with others. As a result, cooperation in securing data, and worthwhile experiences can be reduced.

If, however, a participant-observer enjoys good relationships with the group, he may still find himself confronted with problems of access to the significant levels of decision-making. In the first place, authorities may not understand the goals of the student with the consequence that he is denied participation and observation in many situations. Staff men and the Members of Congress, even when sympathetic to the goals of the Fellow, may not be able to devise interesting and useful experiences for the man, because they have their own estimations as to what he ought to know. Many of the images of the political scientist, held by the politicians, are erroneous ones and likely to mislead him. I might, e.g., like to be considered a "behaviorist," but more often than not have been treated as an historian and/or a person interested in politics. As a result, my attentions are directed towards the types of work that interest historians and policy-makers. There is, of course, no strict dichotomy of orientation or work, but there are differences and when they are not understood time and energy can be seriously misallocated. And, perhaps, more importantly, the motivations of the participant-observer can be seriously affected. Being assigned library work, e.g., is not conducive to learning much about the legislative process.

Closely related to the above considerations is the fact that not infrequently men of the so-called practical world regard their actions as the most natural type of thing and find it difficult to believe that anyone else should find it unusual. The posing of questions, especially of the type that political scientists are inclined to ask, may seem to them as the unusual phenomena. Such politicians may not only find it difficult to communicate with the political scientist, but become impatient with his "naivety." On the whole this has not been a prevalent problem in the Congressional Fellowship Program, but that is due, I believe, primarily, to the fact that Fellows have gone into the offices somewhat atypical of the Congress. The tendency has been to select the intellectually respectable Members. A consequence is that we tend to over-estimate the intellectual capacities of the Congressman. I should also say that I suspect we view the activities of these Members as rather normal ones, when it is at least questionable whether they are or not.

## II

While a participant-observer is likely to work most closely with staff people they are seldom the major focus of his interests. It is the Congressman or the Senator whose actions are deemed crucial and for which the Program was set up to observe. It is in this area, of contact with the Members of Congress, that the greatest problems are encountered. Access to the "great men" is closely guarded for their time is lim-



ited and their status such that intimacy is rather difficult to attain.

The somewhat discontinuous contact that a Fellow has with his Senator or Congressman can lead to some rather interesting results. In the first instance, it leads to a partial picture of his activities. It is amazing how much a Member of Congress can do in one day yet how few persons can be familiar with those activities, except in the most superficial way. Participant-observers, eager as most of them are to learn, tend to overgeneralize about Congressional behavior as a result of having been in on some single action. Infrequent contact with the great men produces much in the way of fascination, speculation, and ego-gratification, but it does little for understanding.

Even the most limited form of participation in the activities of persons and groups that have a high social status, such as a Senatorial office, is capable of producing an unusual degree of personal identification on the part of the participant-observer with the Senator. While the reasons for the phenomenon are probably interesting to discover we shall have to ignore them in the interests of determining some of the consequences, of what might be termed "over-identification." The identification takes place on both ideological and personal levels. The original selection of an office by the Congressional Fellow is generally done on the basis of ideological commitments. Relatively few Fellows have ever entered offices of Members whom they either disliked or who were members of the opposition party. Once in an office, the personal identification begins to exert its influence over the Fellow's perception of the Congressional situation. The identifier loses his motivation and even capacity to analyze. Indeed, if he participates extensively in the work of the office, and, in particular, with the Senator or Congressman, a partisan orientation becomes a necessity. On a psychological basis, the Fellow will as a result of the recognition he has received tend to identify even more strongly. In such cases he may even feel responsible for the actions of his superior. I might add, that this phenomenon has actually taken place in those who have little or no influence with the Member of Congress. Charismatic orientations are hardly limited to Congressional Fellows; regular staff members, including the lowest ranking, frequently manifest the characteristics of followers smitten by the so-called charismatic leader. Every word the great man utters is regarded as either brilliant, or profound; every little sign of recognition he may bestow upon the lowly staff man is treasured. Criticism, or even relatively objective questioning of his motives and actions is regarded as a sign of disloyalty and by a few as sacrilegious. Of course, I am drawing an extreme case to make a point, the point being the substitution of personal identification for analysis.

The last set of role strains to be considered are role conflicts, i.e., conflicts among the various norms that presumably guide performances as participant and as observer. In a sense, much of the paper has touched upon these conflicts, yet, it is, I believe, useful to consider them from the point of view of role theory as a distant set of problems.

Role conflicts are a product of conflicting normative orientations expected of a person in the performance of some activity. In brief, the norms which define the participant are different from the norms defining the role of the observer.

A participant is expected, among other things, to perform services at the behest of his employer, to be loyal to him and his interests, and to honor the subsidiary norms specifying the manner in which the more general norms of work and fidelity are honored. An observer, on the other hand, regards participation as a means to the acquisition of knowledge. The observer's loyalty is to the abstraction of truth and not to an employer. Personal fidelity is regarded as an obstacle to the furtherance of scientific information. In terms of everyday activity the conflict becomes manifest; a participant-observer has to decide upon the allocation of his time and energy. Shall he give them to his employer or to the advancement of his field of knowledge?

Shall he, more specifically, attend a floor debate or perform some task that needs to be done in the office? Shall he, as an observer, ask questions that may be embarrassing to his employer, or shall he, as a participant, suppress the questions in the interests of harmony and political success? These are but a few of the normative dilemmas confronting a participant-observer. In the terms of sociology they are role conflicts.

Before concluding the paper I want to say just a few words about the resolution of role conflicts. Logically, a person can either honor one role or the other, compromise them through various combinations of norms, or he can attempt to escape the dilemmas by ignoring both roles. I doubt that any participant-observer has ever relied exclusively on any single one of these means. Varying personality types, however, tend to be consistent in their emphasis on a single means of coping with role conflicts. Some of us are inveterate escapist, others compromisers, and still others will sacrifice one role in order to maximize another. We do this in spite of varying social conditions. I mention these matters, because they have an important bearing upon the cognitive processes of the student. The way in which a person copes with role conflicts will determine, to considerable extent, the kinds and amount of experiences he is likely to have, and the reflections he is likely to make on these experiences. It is for this reason, among others, of course, that participant-observers come out of their experiences with quite different results.

### III

My remarks on role strains engendered by participant-observation may be summarized as follows:

A participant-observer entering an organization such as a Congressional office enters a situation that is for the most part a highly structured one, yet one which he knows very little about. His own role as well as those of the regular members, in their relationships with the participant-observer, has to be defined and this takes time, skill and attention. The process is essentially one of social problems that have to be faced and resolved if the program of participation and observation is to prove valuable. In the typical set of circumstances the chief responsibility for adjustment appears to rest with the participant-observer.

Among the problems confronting a participant-observer are conflicts of roles, over-identification with the organization or a Member, discontinuous contact the objects of one's attention, informal relationships with colleagues, misunderstandings as to goals, perceptual sets, and unrealistic expectations. Each of these problems and their solutions have consequences for the learning process and the product of that process. Generally, they all lead to partial perceptions. Perhaps, as Mannheim maintained, we ought not to be so pessimistic about partial perspectives; we ought really to make virtues of them, remembering, of course, that there are other perspectives deserving equal respect in the quest for knowledge.

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## STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR THROUGH PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

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The purpose of this paper is to raise and briefly discuss some of the issues involved in maximizing the opportunities for furthering the goals of political science through participant observation, with special reference to Congress and the legislative process. The discussion in this paper will be focused principally on research goals. Despite the proliferation of political participation programs, the possibilities for research and thereby the enriching of the literature have been neglected. This is unfortunate, because it seems likely that professionally trained participants could provide data and hypotheses in areas where little is now available.

That participation does have advantages for the study of politics is evidenced by the standing in the literature of books and articles based in part on participation by the authors. The writings of Bartram Gross and Roland Young about Congress are examples. And the personal accounts of politicians, such as James Farley and Ed Flynn are examples in the field of political parties. Why and what does the participation of these authors in the political process contribute to their writings? What are the potential advantages of participant observation not shared by other techniques of investigation?

There are two levels of political analysis to which participation may contribute. In the first instance, it may be used to acquire a general understanding of the institution involved. This is what has been called "acquiring the feel." On the basis of this, the researcher is able to discern areas of behavior meaningful in terms of the life of the institution and select promising researchable hypotheses. He gains some idea of projects which would be significant and the availability of the necessary data. But, there is a second step involved in analysis to which participation can make an important contribution. If we are to communicate this "feel" we have acquired, and presumably this is the goal of formal participant observation programs such as the Congressional Fellowship Program, we must conceptualize the "feel." In these conceptualizations we have hypotheses explaining the behavior which we are observing. The "feel" which is made explicit in these explanations of political behavior can be communicated either orally in the classroom or through publication. The participant can also go beyond this and observe more or less systematically in order to collect data to test his hypotheses. Participation provides advantages and opportunities at this stage of research as well and it is the feeling of the author that these are sufficiently significant not to be ignored. Through the exploitation of these advantages, real contributions may be made to the literature of political science.

### The Legislative Staff Role

Principally two factors affect the range and depth of data available to a participant observer; his position in the system and his personal relationships with the other participants (6). Since the participation of the political scientist in legislatures is usually in the position of staff assistant to a member or committee, I shall briefly discuss the advantages and problems of the legislative staff role for political analysis. Though certainly beset with the problems Mitchell has pointed out, particularly that of meeting the production norm, I will maintain that on balance, the staff role is particularly strategic for learning about legislative politics. If onerous, the production norm must be looked on as a necessary investment, as it is rare for busy legislators to allow a political scientist to hang around the office with full access to any and all data. Furthermore, assumption of a task oriented role may have

important advantages for various kinds of research projects. These advantages result from the kinds of tasks legislative assistants perform, such as: briefing the member on issues and bills with regard to which he must make a decision; preparing floor and public speeches, testimony before committees, and press releases; answering mail; meeting constituents; drafting legislation and committee reports; and listening and talking to lobbyists as the member's representative.

All of these activities provide opportunities for acquiring the "feel" of the situation and collecting data. "Acquiring the feel of the situation" can be given a rather specific meaning with regard to the performance of these tasks. It means being aware of and conceptualizing the problems and goals of the member, and the relevant factors involved in each of these public "outputs." The task of the participant requires formulating a conception of each situation and then, since he has the task to perform, he must apply and thereby test this conception. Of course, as a neophyte he may ask questions about the goals and relevant factors and in the process of learning the job, further his research goals. Thus, the performance of tasks enables the investigator to formulate and test his conceptions of the relevant factors and data in the range of decisions which constitute the legislative process. Specific data to answer the following questions can be gathered. In reaching this particular type of decision what kind of information does the member consider relevant? What does he conceive to be the problems involved, i.e., what are the relevant considerations to be balanced? How are each of these considerations weighted? What is the goal to be achieved? In performing a part of the task for the member, one must apply and test his answers to these questions.

The legislative staff role also enjoys, of course, the general advantages of participation for the collection and analysis of data. The staff role can provide access to "behind the scenes" data not otherwise obtainable. Since a major goal of politicians is to promote certain public images of themselves and of the political process, participation may be an indispensable means to the observation of some kinds of non-public behavior. And, a position in the member's office may give the investigator entree to other situations normally closed to political scientists, e.g., the floor of the chamber, executive committee sessions, conference committees, and staff meetings.

In addition to the task orientation of the investigator in a staff role, his relationship to the data is unique in other respects. He observes behavior in actual situations. The subjects need not recall, anticipate or imagine their behavior as is true in interviewing. When questioning is necessary, it can be done at the time the behavior is occurring and the inquiries as those of a fellow staff member will be regarded as legitimate, with the responses therefore unguarded. Furthermore, politicians take their behavior for granted and may be unable to articulate their experiences in formal interview situations. The sensitive observer on the scene, when the behavior occurs, may be able to see things which the politician would not be able to tell him.

As Mitchell pointed out, preconceptions may distort the observations of a participant. However, it seems probable that one's preconceptions are more likely to be shaken by confronting actual situations than by interviewing and reading.

Being "at home" in the physical and social system one is observing (e.g., Capitol Hill) has numerous advantages, including the facilitation of supplementary interviewing and observation.

Thus far, I have mentioned only the potential benefits of the staff role. But there are problems and limitations as well and these must be known and dealt with if one is to reap the rewards. Mitchell's discussion of the role problems of the participant observer is apropos here. Of particular danger to the participant in politics with research goals is the problem of overidentification, what the anthropologists refer to as "going native" (13). In cases where the political values and goals of the

system coincide with strongly held political beliefs of the investigator, their seductive power may be overwhelming. In these cases, if the investigator is not wary, his time and energy will be completely channeled into the struggle for achieving political goals, his scientific perspective distorted or lost, and for all practical purposes he will cease to be a political scientist. One of the chief values of formal group programs, such as the Congressional Fellowship, is the continual association with other political scientists. This association can be of considerable assistance in maintaining one's professional perspective, assuming of course that one's associates have not "gone native."

Furthermore, observational opportunities are severely circumscribed for the investigator in a task oriented role. I have already mentioned the limitation imposed by the work norm. In addition, the investigator must remember that he is seeing the system only from the viewpoint of his particular staff role. For example, though he may identify with the member, he is not a member and therefore can only approximate and imagine a member's viewpoint. And participating in one staff role will increase the observation of certain legislative behavior but it will restrict the opportunities to observe other behavior (7).

There are additional problems which may confront the investigator if his participation is through a formal program such as that of the Congressional Fellows. In this case, one is an unpaid, additional staff member whose tenure is known to be temporary and whose principal objective is to learn and observe. For these reasons one may not be able to assume a completely "legitimate" role and may not have full responsibility as an assistant to the member. Therefore, the participant observer may not be able to achieve complete access and confidence. But, the evidence on this point is not clear. The pressure of work in legislative offices and the individual's willingness to meet the work norm are helpful in overcoming this potential handicap. Members and staff may spend time with and teach the unpaid participant who is trying to learn. And, two experienced participant observers believe that being partially an outsider who will soon leave, and being known as an observer, are advantages rather than handicaps (17, 18).

#### Some General Rules

The extent to which a participant observer realizes his goals depends upon the extent to which he successfully handles the problems inherent in the technique of participant observation and those resulting from the specific circumstances in his individual case. Only general rules to guide the participant observer can be formulated owing to the variability between individual goals and personalities, given situations, and roles and tasks available to the investigator.

It is my own feeling that the experience will be much more rewarding if the prospective participant observer prepares himself. The following are some general rules which may help in charting the course.

(1) He should be aware of the general problems and opportunities of the technique through a reading of the key items of the literature in sociology and anthropology.

(2) The available roles should be analyzed and a role chosen on the basis of (a) specific research goals (if any), (b) the opportunities and limitations of each role, and (c) the biases inherent in each (7).

(3) It is probably advisable in the early stages to concentrate on participation and to play down the role of observer. This enables the investigator to learn the necessary skills so as to be useful and to achieve a status within the system. In this way he can establish rapport and confidence, and acquire the "feel" so that the role and system can be analyzed for potential research opportunities.



(4) Flexibility should be retained throughout the experience. There must be a reciprocal influence between the objectives of the investigator and the situation as he experiences it. This means that he must be prepared to adjust his preconceptions of relevant data (conceptual framework) and his data objectives as well. The details of the opportunities and limitations of each role cannot be known with certainty in advance.

(5) It is during this initial period that the investigator can gradually work out a suitable balance between his two roles so that (a) he will be accepted as a member of the system and become integrated sufficiently to view the system from the inside, but (b) he will at the same time maintain his scientific perspective and have sufficient time to observe and record. Achieving this balance is possible but not easy. One must overcome the temptation to resolve the conflict of roles by withdrawing from one or the other.

(6) The political scientist is one who by training is prone to judge the political system. As a general rule this is something to be avoided. One's fellow workers may strongly identify with the system and be alienated by what they will take to be personal attacks. The better course is to be one who is interested in understanding the system and who appreciates and is eager to learn the legislative skills of the practitioners.

In short, one must be sensitive to and observe the norms of the system if he is to establish the necessary friendly relationships with his associates. The academic observer whom politicians probably expect to be something of a snob and reformer may have an initial barrier to remove. If he fails, then confidence cannot be established and he will not enjoy free and open interaction with those from whom he can learn.

These rules are not hard and fast. There may be occasions when any or all should be broken. They are based on my own experience, conversations with other participant observers, and advice given in the literature. In the final test, it will be the individual's own social skills, coupled with an awareness of the problems, that will enable him to maximize his opportunities.

#### Suggested Types of Research

In terms of all the considerations mentioned previously, I shall now briefly discuss a few possible areas of investigation for participants in the legislative process. These are significant areas of legislative behavior about which little has been written and for the study of which the participant observer is uniquely qualified. In general, the investigator participating as a staff member in the legislative process can most profitably work with narrowly defined research projects concerned with the more or less non-public, informal behavior which occurs in and around legislatures. These are projects for which being on the spot and at least partially "behind the scenes" is helpful or necessary. The following is intended to be suggestive of the type of project suitable.

(1) The staff role provides an opportunity to study the largely unknown area of legislative staff organization and function. The importance of staff has long been recognized in the literature on Congress but the data as yet are rather meager. The staff participant, as a member of the system, has a unique opportunity to study this aspect of legislative behavior. How are offices organized? What specializations are involved and what are the relationships between staff and with the member? What is their role and influence in the decisions of members? Beginnings can certainly be made in the study of these questions and participants in the office are uniquely placed to observe and record the necessary data.

(2) In the study of legislatures, there is a growing awareness of the importance of rules of behavior, what the sociologist calls norms. This approach to Congress is

apparent in the work of Ralph Huitt, Donald Matthews, and Roland Young. Participant observers have a unique opportunity to increase our knowledge in this area. Their daily associations are with people who face dilemmas as to what is the proper way to behave in a variety of situations and they themselves face these normative problems. Both the investigator and his associates daily act in terms of these norms and may either spontaneously, or with prodding, bring them to the level of consciousness. The gossip which circulates among employees may be an excellent source of information about norms. One or more participant observers sensitive to this approach and the language and behavior which evidences these moral compulsions, over a period of time, could collect and perhaps classify some of these imperatives.

(3) The field of inter- and intra-legislative communications is one deserving of more and systematic research in which participants are in a position to contribute. What are the sources of a legislator's information? What kinds of information do these sources provide, how is it used, and with what effect?

(4) There is also the unexplored area of output by the member to his constituents, the House of which he is a member, specific individuals, party leadership, executive agencies and lobbies. What are the processes in communicating to each? What is the content and goal of the communication? Do these differ, depending upon the target? Are different images presented to the House, the constituency, significant interest groups, etc.?

(5) Another fruitful area of investigation which can best be observed from the inside is the range of decisions legislators make. Political scientists, probably necessarily have concentrated their efforts on the roll call vote decisions of legislators. This concentration has tended to lead to a narrow view of legislators' decisions. Many other choices face a member upon which he must decide. Members may make significant decisions on the following kinds of questions: What committee assignment? To speak or not? To specialize or not? To introduce a bill or not? To testify, attack, propagandize, go along, co-sponsor, or not? Systematic studies of these decisions and the relevant considerations for each would tell us much about the intricacies of legislatures and the problems of legislators.

(6) In special cases, it may be possible to study the entire range of variables in a legislative decision. Probably a committee staff assignment would be more strategic for this type of research.

These are only examples of possible types of research. Since the time and energy of the participant observer are limited, so must the research design. Therefore, the results will not be grandiose and will surely be tentative. But projects in these areas would be a start in studying significant kinds of legislative behavior about which we now know little or nothing.

So that this outline will not be interpreted as including all the kinds of questions about legislatures that political scientists ask, let me point out that it does not include: studies of the formal rules; roll call vote analyses; grandiose questions about the functions of legislatures or the reforming of their mode of operation; policy issues. Participant observation does not provide a unique opportunity to study formal, recorded rules and behavior and only through retrospection will it assist one in grandiose conceptualizations regarding the functions of legislatures and the most proper and efficient mode of performing those functions. These are principally armchair and library operations which do not fully take advantage of the intimate relationship to legislative behavior which the participant observer may enjoy.

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## 1957-58 CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

### A Suggested Model for the Study of Congress

#### THE PROBLEM

The Congressional Fellowship Program provides not only the opportunity for actual participation in limited phases of the work of Congress; it also affords a chance to observe Congress as an institution or social group, and to seek to understand and consider various questions of congressional structure, procedure, functions, and "behavior". This is a rare opportunity. It is also an opportunity which demands forethought and direction, in order that the experience of each Fellow may consist of more than a series of discrete events without any general meaning.

Except under the most unusual circumstances, there is only particular meaning to be derived from actual participation in the work of an individual office or committee in the House or Senate. This is not to say that such participation is not important; it is. Its real importance lies outside the actual experience itself, however, in the way in which the discrete events experienced in a single office are related to each other, to events which take place in other offices, and finally, to the operation of Congress as a whole within the American system of government. For it is only when such discrete events are connected, related, synthesized, and integrated into general concepts about the "process" that the fullest meaning can be extracted from each act of participation.

It is hoped that the model set forth below may provide a focus for individual and group conceptualization and reflection which will help the group to gain more from the program than it could in the absence of a system, no matter how crude. It is crude, tentative, clumsy. It is rudimentary. But at least it is a model, however deficient, for the study of a phenomenon whose size and complexity defy a random empirical approach, and whose richness and depth require more than traditional description.

There will, of course, be no attempt to force the model upon members of the group who choose not to use it as a guide to their search for value during the program. If the model performs only a gross organizational, purposive, and orientational function, it will have served its immediate end. If it can subsequently serve as the nucleus of a more advanced model for the study of Congress, it will exceed present

expectations. Its final rationale rests in the recent comment of the political cartoonist, Lichty: "This session of Congress is a challenge! . . . Never before have we had the opportunity of talking about so many things about which we know so little . . ."

#### THE PROPOSAL

In order to enhance the experience of each Fellow, it is proposed that Members of the group organize their thoughts and questions around a set of concepts and questions which will embrace the operations and procedures (or operational code) of Congress, the "power structure" of Congress, and the behavior of its members. These will be very tentatively stated, with the explicit assumption that it shall be one of the purposes of the group to revise, amplify and improve them in the course of seeking to use them. It shall also be assumed that while these concepts and hypotheses shall be explicitly employed by the group during the course of the year, they will be implicitly employed in situations - such as conferences with Members of Congress - where their explicit use would be self-defeating.

Three principal areas of inquiry will be emphasized: the organization of functions and allocation of authority, communication and information, and motivation. Organization of functions and allocation of authority will comprise the formal organization of the House and Senate, and the formal procedures and rules by which each body conducts its corporate activity. It will also comprise the more informal customs, conventions, or "norms", expressed through unwritten rules and modes of conduct, (including motivational stimuli generated by the system) which regulate behavior within the formal framework of the system. It will include, in addition, questions of the "power structure" of each body, particularly the nature and components of power, the ways in which power (and authority) is organized, and the manner in which it operates. Communication and information will embrace the information which is communicated to the Member, by whom it is communicated, and in what ways, from outside the system, from inside, and from the inside to the outside. A link will be forged between communication and information, on the one hand, and motivation on the other, by asking what kinds of stimuli result from what kinds of communication, and how these affect the behavior of the Member. Motivation will include most of the major stimuli (with the exception of the motivational stimuli produced by the system itself, which will be considered under the informal organization of functions) which combine to produce action: the attitudes, habits and ways of thought stemming from social antecedents and personality structure; pressures emanating from the character of the constituency; and the political dependencies of the office holder.

Politics has been defined variously as "Who Gets What, When, and How," the "authoritative allocation of values," the "resolution of conflict," the "art of the possible." The question "What is politics," while not included in the statement of the proposal or the set of organizing questions, is clearly the cornerstone of any inquiry into

that part of the American political system known as Congress. In suggesting possible lines of organization and intellectual orientation for the study of Congress, it is not intended that the group should neglect or skirt that question. Indeed, it is assumed that the group will continue to seek to illumine the various aspects of the question, and to devise tentative answers to it, and that it will undertake a more systematic study of Congress with these interests in mind.

In suggesting a design for the selective study of Congress and political behavior in Congress, it is also recognized that there are difficulties in separating or distinguishing the various parts and aspects of the congressional "process." Just as Gestalt or "field" theory in the study of personality has emphasized the unified, holistic nature of human behavior, so in studying political behavior within the context of Congress, or the congressional process, it is important to keep in mind the holistic, continuous interaction which characterizes the operation of Congress within the American political system. While it may be necessary to differentiate components of behavior, it is essential that these be viewed in the context of the processional and systemic functioning of Congress which results from the inter-relationships and interaction of the various "parts."



## THE DESIGN

### I. Organization of Function and Allocation of Authority

#### Organization of Functions - Formal

##### Some Propositions:

1. The Senate and the House of Representatives operate under procedures and rules which have been devised over time in such a way as to maximize tolerance for stress, facilitate accommodation and compromise, protect minorities, reduce interpersonal strife, and regulate legislative activity. Rules and procedures of the House of Representatives, because of the larger size of the House, allow less freedom of debate, and provide no opportunity for minorities to block action, while rules and procedures of the Senate permit unlimited debate which can be used by minorities as a device for blocking majority action.
2. In addition to their functional role, the formal rules and procedures of the House and Senate often have important substantive consequences.
3. Members who possess superior knowledge and skill in the use of the formal rules and procedures of the House and Senate are more effective in legislative activity than Members with less knowledge and skill.
4. Southerners are more knowledgeable and skillful in the formal (as well as informal) rules and procedures of the House and Senate than non-Southerners.
5. All rules and procedures, even those seldom used, have latent functions. Rules and procedures exist to guard against the unlikely and unforeseen, as well as to facilitate and regulate day-to-day affairs. Rules constitute an internal system of checks and balances for the prevention of usurpation or arbitrary action.

##### Some questions:

1. What rules, infrequently used, have important latent functions? What are these functions?
2. How can the rules and procedures of the House and Senate be used to facilitate accommodation and action?
3. How can the rules and procedures of the House and Senate be used to prevent action?
4. In what respects, if any, are the rules of the House and Senate dysfunctional? (Constriction of debate in the House, filibusters or the threat of filibusters in the Senate).

5. How do the rules and procedures of the House and Senate reduce interpersonal strife? (Addressing the chair, avoidance of name). In what ways do they operate to depersonalize conflict? (Decorum of debate, euphuistic language).

6. What types of behavior do the rules forbid?

#### Organization of Functions - Informal

##### Some propositions:

1. Each House of Congress is a social group, with informal rules of behavior (customs, conventions, or norms) prescribing behavior within the group.
2. In some respects the norms of behavior in both the House and Senate differ from norms of behavior in other social groups, but many of the generalizations about norms of behavior in other social groups apply also to the social groups within Congress.
3. There are within the two formal social groups (one Senate, the other House) two formal subgroups, consisting of the two parties, each with its own norms of behavior. The norms of behavior in both parties are quite similar.
4. There are within the two formal social groups (one Senate, the other House) many "informal" subgroups composed of persons of common interests and political beliefs.
5. Loyalty to the norms and policies of an informal subgroup sometimes leads to disloyalty, or at least dissent, to norms and policies of the formal subgroup comprising members of a party.
6. In order to "get along", it is important to "go along".
7. Members who "go along" are rewarded by those with the power to reward. Members who do not go along are likewise punished.
8. Members of Congress can be divided roughly into two broad personality types: compromisers or technicians, and polarizers or verbalizers.
9. Both the House and the Senate have an "inner club", from which leadership for both bodies is drawn, consisting of the compromisers of each body. Direction and control in each body is exercised largely by those who comprise the inner club in each.
10. Reciprocity is the universal principle around which most political behavior in Congress is organized,

Some questions:

1. What are the norms (customs, conventions) which prevail in the House and the Senate. Are there differences between the two?
2. What are some of the informal subgroups in the House and Senate, and what norms are peculiar to these? How does loyalty to these conflict with loyalty to the norms of the formal (party) subgroup?
3. How does a Member "go along"?
4. What rewards are there for going along? What punishments for not going along?
5. How are new Members socialized?
6. What conflicts are there, if any, between the norms of behavior within Congress, and the types of behavior induced by the demands of reelection, or a campaign for higher office?
7. What is the "inner club" of the Senate and the House? Who composes each, and why?
8. What functions do the compromisers and the polarizers perform?
9. How does reciprocity operate?
10. What are the qualities of a "good" Congressman or Senator?

Allocation of Authority

Some propositions:

1. Authority is shared by the House and Senate, with both playing similar functional roles in the system. Constitutional provisions about foreign relations and appropriations, however, tend to give the Senate more authority in the one, and the House more authority in the other.
2. Other factors, such as the higher prestige and publicity enjoyed by Members of the Senate, the fact that the Senate is the second stage in a two-stage process, the longer terms of office of Senators, and the greater individual power of a Senator, tend to enhance the power of the Senate in the resolution of differences in decisions of the two bodies.
3. The allocation of authority in the House and the ingredients of political power in American culture, operates to give greatest power to the Speaker, the Chairman of the Rules Committee, the Majority Leader, the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.



4. In the Senate, the allocation of authority, and the ingredients of political power in American culture, gives greatest power to the Majority Leader, the Chairman of the Finance Committee, and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.

5. Within committees, authority devolves upon those who have greatest seniority. Authority within committees, and of chairmen of committees within each body as a whole, is therefore possessed by those from "safe" districts, rather than those with the highest qualifications for these positions (sometimes, of course, the two are identical).

6. Over-representation of rural areas in the House of Representatives, which is closely related to the existence of "safe" districts, tends to give authority to those whose personal philosophy and constituency interests are not in harmony with active intervention of the government in the problems of modern society. More highly populated areas, which control the outcome of presidential elections, thus tend to be under-represented in the actions of Congress.

7. The pluralistic character of the American party system, coupled with our federal form of government (rather than unitary), tends to elevate compromisers and technicians to positions of authority and power within the House and Senate.

Some questions:

1. What is authority in Congress?
2. What is power in Congress?
3. Do Senators have more power than Congressmen in conference committee meetings, even though they possess the same authority? If so, why?
4. Who is powerful in the House, and why?
5. Who is powerful in the Senate, and why?
6. What is the power structure of the House and Senate?
7. When is power not synonymous with authority, and why?
8. What is the difference between authority and influence, and what are the differences, if any, between power and influence?
9. What makes a Member of Congress influential?
10. Why are the chairmen of the Committees on Ways and Means, Rules, and Appropriations in the House, and Appropriations and Finance in the Senate, powerful?

11. What authority does the Majority Leader in the Senate have? What power does he have?
12. What authority and power does the Speaker have?
13. What authority does the Majority Leader of the House have, and what power?
14. What power and authority do the chairmen of committees have, both within their committees, and in the House or Senate?
15. How do those who possess power exercise it? Are there uniformities in the use of power by those who possess it?
16. What are the factors which lead to the elevation of certain Members of Congress to leadership positions within the House and Senate?

## II. Communication and Information

### Into the System

Some propositions:

1. Mail is an important determinant of political action.
2. One thoughtful letter has more influence on the behavior of a Member of Congress than a large quantity of "inspired" mail.
3. Mail from individuals has more influence than mail from groups.
4. The effects of any communication, and the ease of access for oral communication, are functions of the political influence of the communicator on the Member.
5. Members tend to seek out for advice and information persons with whom they have a personal and intellectual identity, rather than persons on whom they are politically dependent.
6. Persons with communications skills, particularly those holding positions with the various communications media, tend to predominate among those called upon outside Congress by Members seeking advice and information.

Some questions:

1. What types of mail are received?
2. What mail does the Member see?
3. How are various types of mail handled?

4. How do Members evaluate public opinion based on letters?
5. What influence do letters have on behavior? (In motivating behavior, in justifying behavior).
6. In what other ways do people outside Congress communicate with Members?
7. Who has access, why, and how?
8. How is access prevented, and how are potential communicators screened?
9. Which persons and groups are most frequent communicators? Why?
10. Which people and groups does the Member himself seek out for advice and information? Why?

Within the system:

Some propositions:

1. Power status determines both the mode and the effects of communication.
2. Public communication (on the floor) decreases, and private communication increases as the Member acquires more power.
3. There is an inverse correlation between the amount a Member says on the floor and the amount of legislative influence he possesses.
4. Communication within the system occurs chiefly along ideological lines.

Some questions:

1. Does power carry a "language of its own" which reduces the need for verbal communication?
2. How does the leadership communicate with the members, and vice versa?
3. What kinds of communication are there between the two parties?
4. How does communication take place within the leadership? (The Speaker's Board of Education).
5. Who is listened to, and why?
6. Who is not listened to, and why?



7. Whom do various members consult for information and advice?
8. What role do outside groups (press and lobbies) play in communication within the system?
9. What are the formal channels of communication within the system?
10. What are the informal channels?

From the system:

Some propositions:

1. Communication from the system, with the exception of written or oral communication by the Members themselves, is regulated by commercial necessities of the communications media.
2. Commercial necessities impose upon the communications process a form of perception and selection which results in the communication of the more bizarre, spectacular, and conflict-laden types of behavior.

Some questions:

1. What is newsworthy, and therefore communicated?
2. Does the perception and selection by the communications system of newsworthy behavior tend to encourage such behavior?
3. What other ways can the communications system influence behavior within Congress?
4. Are Members from marginal districts, who tend to attach more value to publicity because of its relationship to their reelection, induced by the communications system to behave in ways which will maximize such publicity?
5. To what extent are the forms of behavior which are newsworthy, and will produce publicity, at variance with the norms of behavior which operate within Congress, and to which Members are expected to conform?
6. Is it possible that the operational code of the communications system, to the extent that it induces bizarre, spectacular, and conflict-laden types of behavior, distorts rather than enhances the social functions of Congress?
7. Is it also possible that as the competition increases for public attention, publicity-oriented behavior will increase within Congress?

8. Is the very process of communicating Congress to the public in some ways changing the role of Congress in the American system? (Does the reporting of investigations, for example, tend to reinforce the investigatory functions of Congress?)

### III. Motivation

Some propositions:

1. There are certain common properties in the motivational structure of Members of Congress, among which are a desire for attention and recognition, which produces a compulsive quest for positions of power and authority where such recognition can be gained; a desire to participate in the making of "important" decisions; a desire to engage in the excitement of social and political combat; a desire to dominate in social and personal relationships, a desire to "do," and to act.
2. Motivational factors are a function of personality structure, which in turn is an expression of social background, including sibling relationships, home environment, social environment, educational, psycho-physical characteristics, marriage relationships.
3. Those persons are recruited for congressional candidacy whose personality structure makes them susceptible to the appeals of political office.
4. Members of Congress survive and prosper in their political life in direct proportion to the political motive-power produced by their motivations.
5. The interaction of personal motivation, constituency (or State) interests, and the motivational stimuli generated within the community (or communities) in Congress of which the Member is a part (the House or the Senate, and the various communities within each), largely determines the political behavior of the Member.

Some questions:

1. How and why did the Member get into politics?
2. How and why did the Member run for Congress?
3. What were the home and social environments of the Member, and how does he consider these helped to generate his interest in politics? How do they affect his political behavior?

4. What is the nature of the Member's constituency (or State), and how does he think this affects his political behavior?

5. What does the Member's wife think of his being in politics? Did she approve of his running for office?

6. What person or persons have been most influential in the Member's political career? Why?

7. What figure in American politics does the Member consider the most ideal. Why?

8. Has the Member ever considered running for higher office? Why?

9. What personality characteristics, including motivation, does the Member believe are conducive to success in politics?



4. What is the nature of the Member's constituency (or State), and how does he think this affects his political behavior?

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## THE STUDY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AS AN ASPECT OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting  
of the American Political Science Association,  
St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel,  
September 4-6, 1958

An essay in a recent book entitled Approaches to the Study of Politics states very well the thesis of this paper: "A paradox in political science is the lack . . . of any systematic attention to the analysis of the decision-making behavior of judges."<sup>1</sup> Richard Snyder proposes that any particular kind of social system which functions in an organizational unit, and specifically including the Supreme Court, "can be analyzed fruitfully in terms of three significant variables: spheres of competence; communication and information; and motivation."<sup>2</sup> It is not my purpose to argue either for or against the particular frame of reference for decision-making analysis advocated by Snyder. I do believe, however, that he has correctly identified the approach which is most likely to command the focus of interest and activity of the coming generation of political scientists, including those whose substantive concern is with the analysis of political problems in the area of our discipline traditionally known as public law. I hope that I am right in my prognosis, because I suspect that if I am wrong, the moribund state of catalepsy that characterizes public law study today will have passed into riger mortis before the end of another generation.<sup>3</sup>

It is easy, of course, to view with alarm; and it may be that iconoclasts and the heralds of a new enlightenment are guilty of the same "slothful ignorance" with which Mr. Justice Black once charged workers who sought only to preserve the peace, quiet, and comfort of their own homes.<sup>4</sup> I do not propose, however, to throw baby out with the bath; I ask only whether it may not be time to change the water.

Sixty-five years ago public law was the core of the then emerging profession of political science.<sup>5</sup> The public law of that day, however, was concerned with far more than the study of courts and the law that judges make, as exemplified in the scholarship of Frank Goodnow, who wrote books on Politics and Administration<sup>6</sup> as well as constitutional and administrative law.<sup>7</sup> In essence, the scope of public law has grown increasingly narrow while that of the rest of political science has broadened. A measure of the change that has taken place is found in the title still embraced by the department which Goodnow joined three years after it was founded;<sup>8</sup> a Department of Government and Public Law is an anachronism only in terms of the much more restricted meaning associated with public law today.

I certainly do not advocate a return to the static studies of gross morphology characteristic of the public law of Goodnow's day. But we seem to have lost, somehow, his perspective that included courts and judges among the primary objects of political analysis. Why has public law slipped out of the mainstream of conceptual and methodological developments in political science?<sup>9</sup> Why is public law generally viewed as reposing somewhere out in left field,

an exotic (and not terribly interesting) speciality to be left to persons whose scholarly proclivities center upon the reading of oversize books filled with the opinions of the United States Supreme Court? The Supreme Court itself appears to have been the vanguard of the public law proletariat in suggesting, in Warren's opinion in Brown v. Topeka,<sup>10</sup> an important and significant relationship between law and social psychology; panels discussing this subject convened a few years after rather than in anticipation of the decision in the School Segregation Cases. The Opinion of the Court cited no political scientists in Brown v. Topeka, although it is true that some political scientists such as Ralph Bunche did contribute to the Myrdal study. In the most recent decision declaring an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, Warren's opinion, announcing the judgment of the Court, goes to the unusual extreme of citing no less than four different political scientists;<sup>11</sup> but the subject of this case was citizenship, and if the Court could not cite us specialists--on this subject, one would be forced to the unhappy conclusion that our professional work has practically nothing to contribute to the decision-making of the Supreme Court.

I have been an habitue of the public law panels at our annual conventions for only a decade, and I leave to those with longer memories the question whether my remarks about the past ten years apply with equal force to an earlier and longer period of professional interaction. With a single exception, to which I shall return presently, the public law panels have discussed such questions as these: Was the Supreme Court right or wrong in having decided the Steel Seizure Case<sup>12</sup> as it did? What is the doctrinal interrelationship between the legal concepts of conspiracy and clear and present danger? Does historical trend analysis confirm or refute the Dooley dictum (that "th' supreme coort follows th' illiction returns")?<sup>13</sup> What is the relationship between certain doctrinal trends and a suppositious account of public opinion during a given period? Does judicial stress accompany constitutional strain? What is happening to the Constitution today?

Now, I wish to make it perfectly clear that I have no quarrel with any of these papers in particular, or with the theses which they presented. My concern is with their aggregate impact upon our professional activities as teachers, and as students, of public law. We have passed our time talking over a variety of normative questions which reflect either the public policy exigencies of the moment or the unique interests of individual scholars. The conglomeration, as a package, evinces a monumental lack of concern for any quest for uniformities in the behavior of judges, or for uniformities in the behavior of judges and other public officials with analogous functions such as members of legislative investigating committees or regulatory commissions, or for an investigation of a possible relationship between public law and the social sciences. In particular, there has been no consideration of questions of methodology and research technique; the implicit assumption appears to have been that anyone who learns how to brief a case and use Shepard's Citator qualifies as a journeyman in our trade.

My complaint is simple: how can we ever hope to create a political science of public law if we continue to engage exclusively in such activities? Our models for both teaching and research have been borrowed almost exclusively



from three other professions: law, history, and philosophy. Practically all of us who teach public law soon learn to imitate law school professors, or at least our image of law school professors: we read and brief cases, and attempt to teach our undergraduate students how to exercise these skills, and we use the evidence derived from such study to teach the meaning of the Constitution as revealed in the opinions written by the Supreme Court. Our objective, apparently, is to describe and to trace the development of various doctrines which the Court has pronounced, and--of course--modified, from time to time. We never run out of ammunition, because the Court is dedicated to the task of turning out a fresh batch each year, which must be assimilated, collated, and added (agglutinatively) to our lore.

In order to make some of the older cases comprehensible to our undergraduates, to say nothing of ourselves, some of us undertake historical studies to illuminate the context out of which, for example, the Dartmouth College Case emerged. Some of these historical studies take the form of constitutional histories per se, such as the work of Carl Swisher or Charles Grove Haines. Others, like Edward S. Corwin, specialize in writing what is, at the time of publication, current history. And still others among us prefer to write personal histories of individual justices, and produce judicial biographies.

The intellectual exercise of manipulating, and of analyzing the Court's manipulation of judicial doctrines, leads us ineluctably to the study of political philosophy. We are thus enabled to lead our students in discussions of the policy issues raised by the Court's opinions, measured against a frame of reference consisting of the main currents of and leading spokesmen for American (or global) political thought. An example of the latter genre would be Professor Walter Berns' exposure of the moral debasement upon which rest the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the First Amendment.<sup>14</sup>

The last thing that I should wish to do would be to create the impression that I would eschew the legal, the historical, or the philosophical approaches to the study of public law. To the contrary, I think that each of these traditional approaches has a distinctive and an important contribution to make to our comprehension of the political behavior of the Supreme Court. Indeed, they have been making a contribution for the past half-century. I would be less than candid, however, if I were not to acknowledge my feeling that a few of us, at least, are essentially dilettantes, doing only moderately well things that law school professors, historians, and legal and political philosophers do much better. Certainly, the law schools so perceive our teaching of constitutional law, since they generally advise pre-law students to avoid political science courses in constitutional law as an anathema second only to an undergraduate course in business law.

Is there an alternative, or at least a supplement, to the somewhat unsatisfactory state of affairs that I have described? I believe that there is, and I propose to devote the remainder of this paper to a specification of several examples of the kinds of research in judicial decision-making and judicial behavior that promise to be fruitful. I mentioned earlier an exception to my description of the Association's public law panels of the past decade. The paper to which I refer is one delivered two years ago by Professor Joseph Tanenhaus, on "The Uses and Limitations of Social Science Methods in

Analyzing Judicial Behavior." I hasten to acknowledge my own personal debt to Tanenhaus, for having first called to my attention, in that paper, the possible application of cumulative scaling to the analysis of decisions of the Court and the motivations of the justices. Professor Tanenhaus was most modest, as I recall, in tentatively and most dispassionately suggesting that his audience might find something of value in the preliminary report that he was making of several experiments that he was then conducting in the use of quantitative techniques for the analysis of judicial behavior. His distinguished colleagues on the panel, however, led the audience in disparaging the long-range significance of the work that he was doing. Although I may not have profited from this aspect of his experience, I have adopted the tactic, in anticipation of a similar fate, that one about to be fed to the lions might as well make a bold confession of his faith. What does he have to lose?

In a Brookings Lecture delivered a couple of years ago, David B. Truman has defined the phrase "behavioral sciences" as "those bodies of knowledge, in whatever academic department they may be found, that provide or aspire to provide 'verified principles' of human behavior through the use of methods of inquiry similar to those of the natural sciences."<sup>15</sup> Truman noted that the research techniques that have characterized developments in the behavioral sciences during the period since 1930 include:

- 1) the sample survey;
- 2) experimentation in group dynamics (and, in particular, sociometric analysis of interaction and influence structure in small groups);
- 3) communications content analysis; and
- 4) the theory of games.<sup>16</sup>

I shall omit consideration of the sample survey, which is discussed, together with several examples of its application to the study of judicial behavior, in the Tanenhaus paper; but I shall present several examples of the other three behavioral research techniques listed by Truman, with the objective of illustrating the kinds of questions about judicial behavior that can be investigated with the aid of these tools. Before turning, however, to the behavioral research techniques, I should like to direct attention to a neglected aspect of judicial decision-making, the analysis of which requires no sophisticated methods of measurement, but simply counting. I touch upon this subject with some trepidation, since I am aware that critics may pounce upon my advocacy of the virtues of counting as proof that crude quantification is nearest and dearest to the hearts of barefoot empiricists.

#### I. The Analysis of Summary Decision-Making.

I think that we have paid far too little attention to the summary decision-making processes of courts, of which I shall use the United States Supreme Court as an example. Perhaps one reason for our neglect of 90% of the Court's decisions is our distaste for quantification--with the exception, of

course, of the consumption of lawyer-like quantification such as citator systems--although the only feasible method for handling up to 2000 decisions a year is quantitative. Our attempt to understand "the Court's work" on the basis of the hundred or so cases in which decision is accompanied by formal opinions is as inadequate as would be the description of icebergs relying only upon the portion above water visible to the naked eye. As Jack Peltason has pointed out, we do not limit our investigations of the legislative process to a perusal of the Congressional Record.<sup>17</sup>

Unfortunately, we cannot rely upon the official reports of the Court's summary decision-making. The data reported in the Annual Reports of the Attorney General focus upon the successes of the Solicitor General as the principal litigant before the Court; and the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts do not report data that would be needed to answer most of the important questions that might be asked about the political behavior of the Court. For example, we might well be curious about the extent to which a Court, which has been so insistent that the summary decision-making of administrators,<sup>18</sup> the President,<sup>19</sup> and the Congress<sup>20</sup> comport with the Rule of Law, practices what it preaches. To be specific, the Judges' Bill of 1926 purports to make the Court's certiorari jurisdiction discretionary, while the limited appeals jurisdiction is supposed to be obligatory. For almost two decades, articles in the law reviews have been pointing out that the Court was in the process of making appeals jurisdiction almost as discretionary, in practice, as certiorari jurisdiction; especially did this appear to be so in the dismissal of appeals from state courts for "want of a substantial federal question." Let us just suppose, for the sake of argument, that a political scientist, who noticed that all of the textbooks in American government and constitutional law copied the statute on this point, wanted to investigate this matter. He would soon discover that the Director reports the data on denials of certiorari, but that the analogous information about summary dismissal of appeals reposes--if anywhere--in a category coyly labelled "Appeals and reviews by certiorari disposed of on the merits."<sup>21</sup> He would next discover that this category is a catch-all which includes appeals disposed of after argument as formal cases; appeals decided on the merits, both with and without argument, as per curiam cases; appeals dismissed (i.e., denied review) with or (usually) without argument, by per curiam orders; and certiorari cases disposed of, both with or without argument, as formal or per curiam cases. He could not even discover the number of dismissed appeals without making an independent count directly from the case reports.

A related question that has come to the attention of political scientists, due in no small measure, no doubt, to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's repeated essays on the subject, is whether the denial of certiorari has substantive significance. A recent law note has suggested,<sup>22</sup> and an analysis of four recent terms of the Court confirms, that the question is broader than Frankfurter has revealed. In effect, there appears to be an equation such that the summary denial of certiorari (in either federal or state cases) is functionally equivalent to the summary dismissal of appeals from state courts which is equivalent to the summary affirmance of appeals from federal district courts. Moreover, there appears to be a second equation, such that the formal reversal



of appeals from federal district courts is equivalent to the summary reversal of appeals from state courts. I shall not attempt to prove these equations at this time, but I do suggest that, if true, they relate to significant uniformities in the behavior of the Supreme Court as the administrative head of a federal system of adjudication.

## II. Bloc Analysis.

We are all familiar with the Professor Pritchett's studies of dissenting votes and bloc affiliation on the Supreme Court. I shall not use the derisive term "boxscores" which appears to be particularly popular among those political scientists whose research experience with quantitative methods begins and ends with the aphorism that "Thinkers don't count, and counters don't think." Although Pritchett's work is methodologically quite simple, he has done far more than merely to count heads. Apart from the generally recognized fact that his quantitative studies have aided him in making highly perceptive and sophisticated interpretations of the Court, he has taken a long stride in the direction of a group dynamics approach to Supreme Court decision-making.

The surprising thing is that, among a profession who call themselves "scientists", there appears to have been no one who has attempted to replicate Pritchett's experiments. None appear to have attempted to criticize or to suggest improvements in his methods, or to apply his methods to study other periods of the Supreme Court than he has investigated, or to study other courts than the Supreme Court.

I shall confine my remarks about bloc analysis to three points. In the first place, Pritchett has used two basic kinds of tables: those which analyze paired agreement in dissent; and those which present paired agreement in both assent and dissent in non-unanimous decisions, expressed as a percentage of total paired participation. I should like to suggest that it is also possible to construct dissent tables which focus upon marginal decisions only, and to construct tables of paired agreement in assent in non-unanimous decisions. Tables of marginal dissents reveal significant patterns of voting behavior that would otherwise be missed; during the 1953-1956 Terms, for instance, Clark divided his dissenting votes about equally between the left and the right wings of the Court, but he was definitely affiliated with the left block of Black-Douglas-Warren in marginal dissents. Assent tables aid, in the interpretation of dissent tables and tables of over-all interagreement, in the determination of the locus of decisive power of the Court, Libertarians may deride Clark, for instance, for the uninspired quality of his judicial writing--to say nothing of the content of his views--but bloc analysis of recent terms shows him to have been the most powerful justice on the Court, in terms of participation in winning majority coalitions, and by no means a conservative in relation to his colleagues. Bloc analysis also confirms the journalistic observation<sup>23</sup> that Clark votes as an acolyte to the Chief Justice, on the far right of the Court under Vinson and slightly left of center under and immediately to the right of Warren.

In the second place, bloc identification does not need to be intuitive, but can be placed upon an objective basis by the use of standard indices to denote the presence and composition of blocs. In conjunction with my own experiments in the use of bloc analysis, I have developed three such indices,

which I offer tentatively pending the time when someone else comes up with something better. For the analysis of dissent tables, I suggest an Index of Cohesion, which is the ratio of the mean of the included dissenting pairs, in a postulated bloc, to the mean of the total dissents (for the period of time under investigation) of the included justices. It is, in other words, a decimal fraction which results from dividing the average of the dissenting participation of the included justices into the average of agreement among the included pairs. This index assumes that a justice can affect the overall cohesion of a dissenting bloc significantly only to the extent that both his rate of interagreement with other members of the bloc, and his volume of dissent, are high. On the basis of limited empirical application, I consider an Index of Cohesion of .50 or greater to be high; .40-.49 to be moderate; and less than .40 to be low.

For the analysis of assent tables, one might consider an Index of Adhesion, defined as the ratio of the mean of the included pairs to the total number of split decisions under investigation. This index measures the extent to which the justices combine to form a dominant majority bloc. Because of non-participation, the assent matrix which this index measures is not necessarily the converse of the dissent matrix for a given period. Apart from the difference in the matrices to which they apply, the Index of Adhesion differs from the Index of Cohesion in two respects: (1) the denominator of the IA is a constant for any measurement of a given matrix, while the denominator of the IC is a variable; and (2) the denominator of the IA is always much larger than the denominator of the IC, since no justice dissents 100% of the time. (The highest level of dissent on the Supreme Court during the past decade appears to be Douglas' 51% during the 1952 Term.) I consider an Index of Adhesion of .60 or more to be high; .50 to .59 to be moderate; and less than .50 to be low. An Index of Adhesion of less than .50 for a pair or bloc would signify that the justices concerned had participated together in the majority in less than half of the split decisions of the Court for the period under examination.

For the tables of over-all interagreement, which are expressed in percentages, the average of the ratios of the included pairs can be used as an Index of Interagreement, with .70 or better considered high, .60-.69 moderate, and less than .60 low.

Although bloc analysis appears to have been applied only to the United States Supreme Court, I think that some very interesting applications can be made to state courts. In order to test this notion, I have made a bloc analysis of four recent terms of the Michigan Supreme Court. The 1954-1957 Terms were chosen, because it was during this interval that Governor Williams, near the end of a decade in office, finally succeeded in packing the Court with a majority of like-minded Democrats. Bloc analysis of recent periods of the United States Supreme Court shows no relationship between partisan affiliation and bloc composition and voting behavior. We find Democrat Black and Republican Warren on the left wing, and Democrat Frankfurter and Republican Harlan on the right wing, as in recent terms, for instance. The most interesting finding of bloc analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court was the perfect correlation between political party affiliation and bloc

composition and voting behavior during the 1956 and 1957 Terms, after the Williams' justices accrued in sufficient numbers to begin to take over control of the court. This finding, in turn, raises interesting questions about the relative impact upon judicial behavior of appointment for life and election for fixed terms.

### III. Scalogram Analysis

Scalogram analysis, or cumulative scaling, offers what is probably the research technique easiest to use as well as the most widely applicable of those surveyed in this paper. The method for constructing scales of judicial cases can be stated in terms of fixed, objective procedures, although the statement of the procedures and the considerations upon which they are based is too lengthy for development here.<sup>24</sup> In essence, scale analysis measures the existence of a single dominant variable in a set of attitudinal data. Let us consider that a group of cases decided on the merits by the Court have asked questions of the justices to which they should respond consistently if they understand the questions to relate to a single basic issue. Scalogram analysis provides a technique for arranging both the cases and the respondent justices in uniquely determined rank orders. Moreover, it can tell us both how consistent and how intense the underlying attitudes of the respective individual justices, and of the Court as a collective group, have been.

It happens that the fifteen right to counsel cases decided by the Supreme Court from the 1940 Term through the end of the 1947 Term<sup>25</sup> form that empirical rarity, a perfect scale, so I shall use it as an example. The cases can be arranged in such an order that (it is assumed) the cases at the top of the scale are most deprivational to the defendants, and those at the bottom of the scale least so. In this example, the question that the justices are asked to answer is: "How sympathetic are you to claims of the right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment?" In the alternative, we can conceptualize the cases as raising a set of questions of this order: "Do you approve when a criminal defendant in a state court is denied counsel to the extent of X?" "Do you approve when he is denied counsel to the extent of X + Y?" "to the extent of X + Y + Z?"--and so on. In this particular example, the cases ranged from several, at the top of the scale, in which the Court voted unanimously in favor of the defendants' claims, to the case at the bottom of the scale which found even Black and Douglas joining in an unanimous decision against the defendant. Murphy and Rutledge have the highest scale scores, and neither of them ever voted against a right to counsel claim. Frankfurter voted, with perfect consistency, in favor of defendants in the first six cases of the scale, and against defendants in the remaining nine cases. We can readily rank, on the basis of their voting participation, all of the justices who were members of the Court during the period under investigation. But we can do more than rank the justices in terms of their respective attitudes towards constitutional claims of the right to counsel; we can also predict how they should have voted in the cases in which they did not participate.

In fact, scalogram theory postulates that, knowing the scale of cases and the scale scores of the justices, we should be able to predict all votes



in all cases comprising the scale. To the extent that some justices voted inconsistently in some cases, the degree of such inconsistency can be measured by a Coefficient of Reproducibility, which is the decimal fraction resulting from the subtraction, from unity, of the number of inconsistent votes divided by the total number of votes. It is conventional, based upon experience in analyzing other types of data, to consider a CR of .90 or better to be evidence of unidimensionality in a scale. I have followed the convention, although I recognize that ultimately, whether scales with CR's of .90 are acceptable for the analysis of Supreme Court decision-making is a question that must await considerably more experimentation than appears to have taken place to date. The CR for the right to counsel cases of our example was, of course, 1.00.

I cannot be sure whether it is fool's or beginner's luck, but every hypothesis that I have tested thus far has resulted in an acceptable scale. The subject matter of these scales include: (a) Federal Employers Liability Act evidentiary cases since 1942; (b) aliens' claims since 1950; (c) all of the non-unanimous decisions of the 1936 Term--the term of the "Court-packing" controversy, of course; (d) the right to counsel cases since 1940; and (e) the search and seizure cases, both federal and state, since 1937. On the other hand, it is easy to define inappropriate hypotheses which lead to unacceptable scales, as the report of the experiments of a sociologist demonstrates.<sup>26</sup>

The matrix of the scalogram can readily include supplementary information which is of considerable value in the interpretation of the data. In addition to the votes of the justices, the scalogram can show who wrote, and who joined in the majority opinion; which justices concurred and/or wrote concurring opinions; and which justices dissented and/or wrote dissenting opinions.

Scalograms of judicial cases focus attention upon the justices whose voting has been least, as well as those who have been most, consistent; and cases which are the occasion for several inconsistent votes are pinpointed. Such clues may suggest, in the instance of inconsistent justices, the possible presence of a secondary variable and, as regards inconsistent cases, the additional possibility that a case has been misclassified.

I should like to offer just one more example of the kinds of hypotheses that can be tested by scalogram analysis. We are all familiar with what I shall call the Court's official theory or doctrine in the right to counsel cases: that the Constitution unequivocally requires representation by counsel in state criminal trials only for capital offenses. If I may be permitted this single irreverence: this particular doctrine is nonsense. Scalogram analysis demonstrates conclusively that the Court has been just as consistent, and just as favorable, neither more nor less so, in non-capital as in capital cases. The Court has decided 66 2/3% of the right to counsel cases involving non-capital offenses, and 62 1/2% of the capital offense cases, in favor of defendants, and the coefficients of reproducibility for the two subscales are both very high, .976 and .986. Which among the Court's many other doctrines may be confirmed, and which may be exploded by scalogram analysis, one cannot predict on a priori grounds; but I am confident that cumulative

scaling offers a most powerful analytic tool for the study of the Supreme Court.<sup>27</sup>

#### IV. Content Analysis.

Content analysis can be used as the basis for more precise description of value as well as fact assertions in judicial opinions; but since no study of content analysis of judicial values has as yet been published, I shall limit my remarks to fact analysis. Eighteen months ago, Fred Kort published an article in the American Political Science Review in which he described a method for content analyzing facts in a set of Supreme Court opinions, together with a mathematical formula for processing the derived numerical data.<sup>28</sup> He reported the results of an experiment in which he divided the right to counsel cases into two chronological groups, and in which he predicted successfully how the Court would decide the later group of cases on the basis of his analysis of the earlier group. The June 1958 issue of the Review carried a critique by a mathematician of the theoretical assumptions on which Kort's method was assumed by the critic to rest, plus Kort's rebuttal. Although I happen to entertain independent reservations about Kort's method, apart from those points raised in the recent articles to which I have referred, I do not propose to raise such issues at this time. I think that the significant thing is that Kort's venture represents a serious and thought-provoking attempt to apply content analysis and mathematical procedures to the study of judicial decision-making, and I do not see how the profession can avoid learning something from his efforts.

I should like to limit my present remarks to two aspects of Kort's method. The first is this: I have applied his method to the analysis of the search and seizure cases of the past two decades. I considered those decided during the first decade to be what Kort terms the "source group", and I divided the decisions since 1947 into a federal test group and a state test group. I found that it was possible to predict from the source group (which consisted, of course, exclusively of federal cases) to the federal test group, but not to the state test group. Now, perhaps I should confess that I lumped together cases involving statutory interpretation (wire-tapping cases) and those raising constitutional issues under the Fourth (or Fourteenth) Amendments. I did this under the assumption that if, as Kort presumes, the decisions of the justices were determined by the cumulative impact of facts deprivational to defendants, it would be proper to disregard such doctrinal nuances as the legal aftermath of the Olmstead case.<sup>29</sup> By the same token, however, it is not unreasonable to assume that the "facts" should speak with equal authority whether the defendant is being tried in a state or a federal court, which leaves me with the question: if his method is theoretically sound, why should the prediction fail so completely for the state test group?<sup>30</sup> I believe that my question leads directly to the fact-value (questions of fact versus questions of law) dichotomy of jurisprudential theory, which should provide some comfort for those who are wedded to the philosophical approach.

The other aspect of Kort's method upon which I should like to comment relates to the relationship between Kort's results and those obtained by scalogram analysis. Perhaps it should be explained, for the benefit of

those who may not be familiar with the details of Kort's article, that he assigns weights to both source and test group cases. Indeed, the purpose of the content analysis and the mathematical operations specified by Kort is to arrive at a set of what he calls "final values", or numerical weights, for the cases. His basic prediction is that all pro cases (i.e., those decided in favor of defendants) will have higher weights than any of the con cases (i.e., those decided against defendants); and that all cases in the test group with scores equal to or higher than that of the lowest pro case in the source group will be decided pro; conversely, all cases in the test group with scores equal to or less than that of the highest con case in the source group will be decided con. He thus arrives at a numerical scale for all of the cases under investigation.

It is possible, of course, to arrange the right to counsel cases that Kort analyzed, and the search and seizure cases that I analyzed, in a scale according to Kort's system of weights; and to compare the resulting scales of the justices' votes with the scales obtained by direct scalogram analysis. This can be done for the entire group of right to counsel (or search and seizure) cases, and also for sub-groups such as the source and test groups. We find that the Coefficients of Reproducibility for the Kort-scales are lower than those of the direct scalograms, but several of the Kort-scales have CR's that are acceptable, and the others are in the .80's. Moreover, I believe that slight modifications in Kort's method would result in an even closer numerical approximation of cumulative scales. These findings suggest two conclusions: (1) Kort's method worked successfully on the right to counsel cases and on the federal search and seizure cases because each of these sets of cases happens to be in a scalar relationship; and (2) Kort appears to have discovered a mathematical technique for approximating cumulative scales.<sup>31</sup> At least, his work is sufficiently interesting to warrant further experimentation in which his method is applied to other data.

#### V. Game Analysis.

The judicial process is tailor-made for investigation by the theory of games. Whatever may be their obligations as officers of courts, attorneys frequently play the role of competing gamesmen, and the model of the two-person zero-sum game certainly can be applied to many trials. The two examples that I should like to describe briefly, however, involve the application of game theory to the analysis of the behavior of Supreme Court justices. I hope that I will be forgiven if I forego any attempt to explain game theory and its basic concepts, and simply describe the two games.<sup>32</sup>

The first of these I shall call the Hughberts Games. During the 1936 Term, the Court was divided between a three-justice liberal bloc and a four-justice conservative bloc, with Hughberts (Hughes and Roberts) in the middle. If we assume that, in the face of Roosevelt's attack upon the Court, the Chief Justice--with the support of Roberts--wished to maximize both his own authority within the Court and the degree of unanimity in the Court's decisions, while at the same time directing the Court to as liberal a course of decision as possible in order to forestall the possibility of the more drastic reforms proposed by the President, game theory can tell us how Hughberts



should vote if he--I shall consider Hughes and Roberts to be a single player from now on--were to behave rationally in order to realize these objectives. A game must have a payoff which can be expressed in numerical terms, however, and for this purpose I have used the Shapley-Shubik empirical power index<sup>3</sup> in order to be able to compare the Court's actual voting behavior with the imputed utilities (i.e., the payoff) postulated by the game model. Simply stated, the Shapley-Shubik index measures the extent to which each justice shared in the power of decision, which is defined as the probability of his having been pivotal in the winning coalition.

The left bloc and the right bloc are each defined as players in the game, which is three-person and zero-sum. Hughes has a pure strategy, which in essence requires that he form a coalition with the Left when possible, that he form a coalition with the Right when splintering or non-participation makes it impossible for him to form a winning coalition with the Left, and that he always join the coalition of the Left and the Right when the other players do not choose to adopt conflicting strategies. In fact, the voting behavior of Hughes and Roberts conforms very closely to the prescriptions of the game model. In terms of the empirical payoff, the two-justice bloc (Hughes and Roberts), the three-justice left bloc, and the four justice right bloc are all approximately equal in power; it is easy to demonstrate that in a three-person simple majoritarian game, equality of power is imputed among the players. It is by no means a self-evident proposition, however, that among nine justices each casting a single and equal vote, two justices can be just as powerful as four justices.

I shall call the other example the Certiorari Game. Do Supreme Court justices combine into a bloc with the deliberate objective of forcing upon the rest of the Court the consideration of an issue which the bloc wants decided in a particular way? The data for the game consist of the decisions of the Supreme Court, both jurisdictional and on the merits, in Federal Employers Liability Act evidentiary cases since 1942. The basic assumption is that a certiorari bloc was functioning throughout this period, although the number of justices affiliating with the bloc varied at different times and an antagonist player (Frankfurter) in opposition to the certiorari bloc entered the game (as such) only during the latter stages of the play. In order to simplify the discussion, let us confine our attention to the first period of the game, comprising the 1942-1948 Terms.

At that time, the certiorari bloc consisted of Murphy, Rutledge, Black, and Douglas. If we assume that the objective of the bloc was to maximize the number of decisions favorable to workmen's claims, game theory can prescribe how the bloc should behave rationally in order to accomplish this objective. Four justices are adequate to grant certiorari, but not (normally) to decide cases on the merits. It is assumed that, during this period, the remaining five justices had no fixed predisposition either towards or against the claimants. The only question in these cases is whether the trial court correctly evaluated the evidence; the cases turn, in other words, on questions of fact rather than law. Typically, they fall into two categories: (a) the trial court directs a judgment for the defendant railroad, on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient for the case to get to a jury; or the court

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directs a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict for the plaintiff; or (b) the trial judge enters a judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of a jury verdict. In either event, the decision of the trial court has been affirmed or reversed by a court of appeals, and either the plaintiff workman or the defendant railroad has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. It is assumed that, since these cases turn only on the evaluation of evidence, there is an equal chance that any of the five uncommitted justices will vote either for or against a claimant if the court of appeals has disagreed with the trial court. Therefore, since the certiorari bloc needs to pick up only one additional favorable vote on the merits, the chances of its doing so should be  $31/32$ , since the only permutation of the five uncommitted members on which the bloc could lose would be for all five of the other justices to vote against the claimant. The certiorari bloc has a pure strategy: never to vote in favor of petitions filed by railroads, always to vote to grant certiorari in cases in which review is sought by workers and in which an appellate court has reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and always to vote for the petitioner on the merits. If the certiorari bloc follows its pure strategy, the Court should decide 97% of the cases in favor of the claimants. If the bloc departs from its pure strategy, it can expect to win a smaller proportion of victories on the merits, because it has played irrationally.

As a matter of fact, the payoff to the certiorari bloc during this period was 92% (12 pro decisions and 1 con) in cases in which the bloc adhered to its pure strategy; of the 11 cases in which the bloc departed from its pure strategy by voting to grant certiorari for petitioners who had been two-time losers in the courts below, 8 were pro and 3 were con, for a payoff of only 73%. In later periods of the game, the bloc adhered much more closely to its pure strategy, and consequently enjoyed greater success. During the present period, the bloc consists of five justices, so the expected payoff is 100%. As a matter of fact, the bloc lost one of the fourteen cases decided on the merits during the 1956 and 1957 Terms (the latter through April only), because the bloc, perhaps a little power drunk, became careless and granted certiorari in one case that was so frivolous that even the bloc members joined in the unanimous decision against the claimant.<sup>34</sup>

The various examples that I have described so briefly are all developed at much greater length in a book which is presently in process of publication, under the auspices of the Governmental Research Bureau of Michigan State University.<sup>35</sup> I hope that I may have succeeded in suggesting some of the kinds of hypotheses that may be worth looking into if we are willing to consider adding other strings to our bow, rather than limiting ourselves to the traditional workways in public law. In addition to the many political scientists who will, doubtless, continue to practice the legal, historical, and philosophical approaches to the study of public law, there is a great deal of work awaiting the attention of such persons as may have, or may develop, an interest in the quantitative approach to the study of judicial behavior.

FOOTNOTES.

1. Richard C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1958), p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 24. (Emphasis in the original.)
3. Cf. Foster H. Sherwood, "The Role of Public Law in Political Science," in ibid., p. 87: "public law /has/ all but disappeared as a recognized object of study for political science."
4. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). Cf. Jackson, dissenting in Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943).
5. Anna Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1639-1900 (New York: Appleton-Century, 1939), p. 240: "Not until the end of the century was there any sign of waning of constitutional analysis as a dominant aspect of political and historical construction."
6. (New York: Macmillan, 1900), p. 1: "The tendency of most writers on governmental subjects has been to confine their study to the more striking facts which become apparent as a result of considering alone the formal governmental organization. Thus, most writers on the American government begin and end their work with the Constitution. Some, it is true, endeavor to treat of the history of the Constitution as well as its present form, but few have attempted to get back of the formal governmental organization and examine the real political life of the people. The cause of this method of treating our political institutions is unquestionably to be found in the fact that most of the writers who have left their impress on American political science have been lawyers, and therefore not accustomed to look beyond the provisions of positive law."
7. The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States (New York: Putnam's, 1905). For a biographical sketch, see Charles G. Haines and Marshall E. Dimock (eds.), Essays on the Law and Practice of Governmental Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935), pp. v-xiv.
8. Haddow, op. cit., pp. 180 ftn. 28, 251-252.
9. Sherwood recently has argued that public law, properly conceived as a body of relevant political data, "is within political science, and not at its borders." Loc. cit., p. 89.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).



13. Peter Finley Dunne, "The Supreme Court's Decisions" in Mr. Dooley's Opinions (New York: Russell, 1901), p. 26.
14. Walter Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1957).
15. "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," in Research Frontiers in Politics and Government: Brookings Lectures, 1955 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 203.
16. Ibid., pp. 204-208, 214.
17. Jack Peltason, Federal Courts in the Political Process (New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 1-2. Cf. Sherwood, op. cit., p. 88.
18. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
19. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
21. Emphasis added. See, e.g., the 1957 Annual Report.
22. Note, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 712-713 (February, 1956).
23. Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII, No. 26, p. 14 (June 25, 1956).
24. For a detailed explanation of the technique of scalogram analysis of the Supreme Court, as well as a more extended development of the other methods and examples discussed in this paper, see my forthcoming book, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior, to be published under the auspices of the Governmental Research Bureau of Michigan State University.
25. This particular period was chosen because it corresponds to that of the "Source Group" cases in the article by Fred Kort to be discussed below. See fn. 28, infra.
26. Jessie Barnard, "Dimensions and Axes of Supreme Court Decisions," Social Forces, Vol. 34, pp. 19-27 (October, 1955).
27. For a recent report of an application of cumulative scaling to the analysis of legislative voting, see Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," Journal of Politics, Vol. 20, pp. 308-338 (May, 1958).
28. Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the 'Right to Counsel' Cases," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, pp. 1-12 (March, 1957).

29. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
30. According to the prediction, all six of the state search and seizure cases should have been decided in favor of the defendants; in fact, only one of the six was a pro decision.
31. Cf. Robert N. Ford's discussion of "simple scaling" in M. W. Riley, J. W. Riley, and J. Toby, Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), pp. 297-298. Ford shows that when the simple sum of correct responses is substituted for scale scores (in a study involving a small number of questions and a large number of respondents), the resulting ranks for 96% of the respondents did not deviate by more than one rank from scale ranks derived from scale scores.
32. For an extended discussion of the theory, written by mathematicians for a social science audience, see R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957).
33. L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, pp. 791-792 (September, 1954).
34. Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 518 (1957).
35. See ftn. 24, supra.

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## THE LINKAGE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri,  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

### I

Presumably no Social Scientist is ever fully satisfied with the progress of his discipline. Yet few specialists seem more self-conscious about the state of their studies, more keenly searching for newer and better foci, concepts, data, and methods than those in the area of international relations. It seems painfully obvious to most of them that there is both need and opportunity for much further development of their field.

In this connection it is less than crucial whether one thinks of the study of international relations as a fully independent discipline, as an evolving separate discipline, as a sub-division of one of the older established disciplines, or as an exercise in synthesis. It is far more important to recognize that the student of international relations investigates a set of specific problems in a certain way, and that no other specialist investigates quite the same problems in quite the same manner. It is relevant to note, however, that the study of international relations has developed in directions which have made it less and less identical with any other single discipline. For example, while all students of international relations would admit that knowledge of diplomatic history is indispensable for their purposes, most of them would undoubtedly agree that the study of international relations differs from the study of diplomatic history. Likewise, while most students of international relations fully realize how much they owe, and how greatly they depend on the field of Political Science, an increasing number of them seem to feel that a purely political analysis of international relations (even of international political relations) is insufficient.

One of the main reasons for this alienation from the traditional field of Political Science is that international political relationships take place in an environment which differs substantially from that of domestic political relationships, which has been the area of inquiry for the Political Scientist. While such a statement would, in another context, merit closer examination, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that it is a generally accepted view among specialists in international relations. The only disagreement about this point centers not on the existence of differences in the environment, but on their significance.

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<sup>1</sup> Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York, 1955), Chapter 4; Frederick S. Dunn, "The Scope of International Relations," World Politics, Vol. I (1948), pp.142-143; Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments," Review of Politics, Vol. XIV (1952), p.433; Geoffrey L. Goodwin, ed., The University Teaching of International Relations (Oxford, 1951), pp.11,14.

Thus, some students of international relations seem to feel that the similarities between domestic and international politics are more important than the distinctions, while others would question this position and maintain that the distinctions are so basic that transfer of ideas from the study of domestic to that of international politics is a hazardous undertaking.

The trend among specialists in the study of international relations is increasingly toward frank acceptance of their field as an interdisciplinary one; so much so, indeed, that more than one of them must have had melancholy occasion to agree with the definition of the student of international relations as "a person who regrets that he does not better understand psychology, economics, diplomatic history, law, jurisprudence, sociology, geography, perhaps languages, comparative constitutional organization, and so on down a long list."<sup>2</sup>

In consequence of this trend, the study of international relations has in recent years been characterized by increasing eclecticism with respect to data - traditionally taken from history, politics, economics, and geography, but more recently also from sociology, psychology, and anthropology. But such eclecticism raises as many problems as it solves, and the old troublesome questions continue to plague the specialist: what should he select? Where should he search?

The answer to these questions obviously hinges upon what one conceives to be the focal element, or elements, in the study of international relations. A focus provides clues to the questions of sources and content of data, concepts, and methods. The way in which a problem is posed shapes all further effort toward its solution, and thus affects the solution itself. The main purpose of the present paper is to discuss the formulation of an appropriate focus for the student of international relations. For sake of simplicity and internal consistency, the question will be narrowed to the study of international political relations (international politics); the term "international relations", when henceforth used, will be deemed to include the term international politics.

One of the basic problems confronting the student of international political relations is the nature of the linkage between his own subject matter and that of certain other specialists. The related other fields of study are Comparative Government (which is more commonly pursued as the study of various foreign governments, with or without a comparative emphasis); and within this field, the study of foreign policies of various states.

We start with the assumption that the study of foreign policy is closely linked to the study of international political relations, but is not identical with it. This assumption, which will be discussed in detail below, is open to challenge, to be sure. Thus, Feliks Gross in Foreign Policy Analysis maintains that the two fields are identical, and that it is only in the non-political sphere that a separation of subject matter occurs.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Russell H. Fifield writes that

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<sup>2</sup> A. Zimmern, ed., University Teaching of International Relations (Oxford, 1931) (New York, 1934), p. 236.

<sup>3</sup> Feliks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York, 1954), pp. 4, 24, 49.

"International politics is really a study of the primary factors that enter into the politics of nations as reflected in current international developments." <sup>4</sup> The present paper proceeds from a different assumption, and while it presupposes a close linkage between the two fields of study, it attempts to distinguish between them - for sake of clarity, and in the hope that careful distinctions will contribute to the more orderly progress of studies in both fields.

If one wished to put the matter in extreme terms, it might be argued that the study of foreign policy, as a branch of the study of government, is in some respects quite similar to the study of governmental policies in such fields as, say, labor or education. The major distinction, of course, is that foreign policy is concerned with problems outside state boundaries and thus beyond a state's jurisdiction, while labor or educational problems are for the most part purely internal concerns, capable of being solved through domestic action. Nevertheless, all three activities do have certain elements in common. They are carried on in given ways by designated agencies of a national government, and are subject to constitutional, organizational, political, and other influences emanating from within the national society itself. The distinction between them lies in the strength of the influences emanating from sources outside the national society. (Note, however, that one of the potent influences affecting current American policy in the field of education also originates outside American society).

Surely no student of labor or educational policies would pretend that if he studied such policies of a number of countries, either separately or comparatively, he would be a specialist in "international labor problems" or "international education." Another case, that of "international economics" is particularly instructive, since a field of study thus identified exists. Yet, specialists in it would certainly insist that they are concerned with more than the study of the economic policies, even the foreign trade policies, of various countries, and that much of their work deals with the analysis of an international system which is linked to, but not identical with, the various national economic systems and policies.

If these analogies are valid, there seems to be no ground for the a priori assumption that international political relations can be studied by merely investigating the foreign policies of various states. It would seem more appropriate to assume a close connection, rather than an identity, of subject matter. The nature of that connection presents problems which have not yet been explicitly faced by students of international politics.

## II

There are a number of ways in which the ambiguity which characterizes this connection can be demonstrated. The one which was chosen for purposes of exposition here concentrates on the way in which various authors deal with the subject of international political relations: their definitions of the field, and the implications flowing from these definitions in terms of selection, coverage, organization, and treatment of materials.

Of books, especially texts, in international relations and politics there seems to be no end. The present writer has elsewhere attempted to characterize,

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<sup>4</sup> Russell H. Fifield, "The Introductory Course in International Relations," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLII (1948), p.1190.



categorize, and criticize some of these products of the more vocal and daring members of the profession.<sup>5</sup> For present purposes, the analysis of these books will center upon the way in which the subject is defined and treated.

Quincy Wright has pointed out that the term "international relations" refers both to a condition and to the study of that condition,<sup>6</sup> but most authors merely define the condition itself; and one has to infer their concept of its proper mode of study from their actual treatment of the subject. Some authors, indeed, take the easy way out by not defining their subject at all - a solution with which anyone who has come to grips with the problem will have lively sympathy. Others define it in ways which are less than ingenious or challenging, and which multiply rather than reduce problems. Thus, to say that "international relations are the relations between sovereign states" or that "international politics consists of the political relationships of states" leaves a good deal to be desired in terms of clarity of thought and of real indication of the boundaries and the content of the phenomena to be studied.

Nevertheless, one does find similarities in most definitions, as well as in most treatments of the subject. In all definitions, the locale of the phenomena under investigation is stressed, i.e. one deals with activities which at some point cross boundary lines. Three additional ingredients which are explicitly or implicitly present in most definitions relate to the fact that the subject is conceived as individuals or groups (actors) - acting - in pursuit of goals.

Some brief comment about such definitions in general seems in order at this point. The difficulty with definitions of international relations or politics is not the term "international" or even the term "politics". As to the first, students of the subject generally realize that they do not really mean "international" at all, and use the term only as a convenient shorthand way of expressing something infinitely more complex, and as an elegant way of saying something which, if it were spelled out, would be most awkward. "Inter-powerful-individuals-or-groups-separated-by-boundary-lines" would certainly not be an attractive formulation, although it would be a good deal more precise than "international". One suggestion has been to substitute the term "cross-national" to reduce some of the ambiguities built into the term "international", especially in the area of research efforts which consist of investigating identical or similar phenomena (including, conceivably, foreign policies) in a number of countries.<sup>7</sup>

The term "politics" - in spite of much, and often highly complex, discussion of its meaning - is usually dealt with rather simply in the context of definitions by specifying that the activities under consideration are relationships in which, at some stage, governments or other groups exercising power and control are involved.

The really troublesome term is "relations". What does it mean? It is suggested that, minimally, it implies contacts, connections, or associations; and that it implies action-and-reaction (as a single concept) and the linkage

<sup>5</sup> Fred A. Sondermann, "The Study of International Relations: 1956 Version," World Politics, Vol. X (1957), pp.102-111.

<sup>6</sup>Wright, op.cit., p.9.

<sup>7</sup>H.C.J. Duijker and Stein Rokkan, "Organizational Aspects of Cross-National Social Research," The Journal of Social Issues, Vol. X (1954), pp.8-9.

between the two component parts. If this is the case, then one must conclude that an "action" on the part of one group (government), even if directed toward another, is not of itself a "relationship" - although, and here is the difficulty, it is probably linked to a relationship in the sense that it was prompted by other actions and will in turn engender reactions on the part of others. But it is the burden of the present argument that, to qualify as a "relationship", such action must be considered within an "action-and-reaction" context.

One may point to other difficulties in terminology: is a state (government, group, etc.) which makes a foreign policy decision henceforth involved in foreign or in international relations? The present writer accepts Quincy Wright's suggestion that "the adjective 'foreign' implies the point of view of one nation and thus is not suitable for use in a discipline, or study, designed to be of universal validity and understanding."<sup>8</sup> Thus we may postulate that a country's projection of policies beyond its borders is a "foreign relationship" (when considered from the point of view of the country itself), and an "international relationship" (when considered from the point of view of the larger system which, in Wright's terms, constitutes the subject matter of international relations.)

More important than problems of terminology and definitions is the question of what is actually done in the works here under consideration. With due regard to the difficulties inherent in generalization, the following statements apply to most of the textbook literature in the field.<sup>9</sup>

- 1) The texts, in line with the definitions, are almost exclusively "actor-oriented". Actors may be defined in various ways: as states, groups within states, including governments; or even as role-playing individuals who behave in given ways. This actor-orientation is the outstanding aspect of the study of international relations at the present time. It is based on the assumption that "all international relations can be described in terms of decision-making by identifiable individuals or groups of individuals."<sup>10</sup>
- 2) Without exception the texts emphasize actor-capacities. These are defined, described, and when possible measured. For the most part, this is done in isolation, i.e. separately for each actor or set of actors; or by category, i.e. tangible and intangible power factors.
- 3) The texts attempt, with more or less success, to describe actor-motivation, either in general terms (national interest, self-preservation, security), or in the more specific terms of short, medium, or long-range policy objectives. Again, this is done separately for each actor or group of

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<sup>8</sup>Wright, op.cit., p.7.

<sup>9</sup>The emphasis on textbook literature seems justified in light of three considerations: 1) good texts incorporate and synthesize most recent research findings within a context which regards the subject as a whole; 2) texts are undoubtedly reflective of most current teaching; and 3) thus, in turn, they will affect future trends in research, writing, and teaching. See John S. Diekhoff, The Domain of the Faculty in our expanding Colleges (New York, 1956), p.36: "... nothing does more to determine the organization of a course and the instructor's conduct of particular classes than the text or texts on which they are based."

<sup>10</sup>Dunn, op.cit., p.145.

actors. Attempts to categorize actors (e.g. status quo vs. revisionist) fit into schemes at this point.

- 4) The texts describe methods used by the actors to achieve their objectives. Although these can be described in general terms (Alliances, Propaganda, Economic Warfare, etc.), and some authors attempt to establish typologies of action and interaction,<sup>11</sup> the discussions in most texts refer to specific types of instances in which such methods are used.
- 5) The texts also cover, frequently in great detail, various attempts at problem-solving on the international scene, with special emphasis on International Organization and International Law. (This is the only item in the list which has a clearly international focus).
- 6) Ten of fifteen major texts currently in use contain entire sections dealing specifically with the foreign policies of selected states, or with diplomatic history in general. These sections vary in length, at times coming close to occupying fully one-half of a text, and averaging approx. 30% of the books which include this feature. It seems proper to add that in most of the books these descriptions of foreign policies of specific states are not linked to the more general discussions of international relations, but seem to exist of and by themselves. It might further be noted that foreign policies are not frequently treated in a "relationship" context. A treatment of foreign policies which would seem perfectly valid in an international relations text would be to take certain key relationships (e.g. U.S.-Britain, France-Germany, Japan-China, Soviet Union-U.S. etc.), and, in describing these over time, attempt to arrive at generalizations which are linked to a theoretic exposition in the rest of the work. But this approach is avoided by most authors, who prefer to deal with the foreign policies of selected states within a context which does not encourage generalization.
- 7) More than half of the authors of books here under consideration found it necessary to include discussions of the structure and operation of the foreign policy machinery of specific states. The amount of space devoted to this subject, to be sure, is less than that given to discussions of foreign policies. It usually covers only one chapter, although in one work it occupies 20% of the total text. But again it is, to say the least, puzzling why some authors consider it essential to include such discussion while others - equally competent - feel that it is quite possible to understand international relations without going into this subject.

The foregoing remarks emphasize the "actor-orientedness" of present studies in international relations. Thus, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 - in whole or in part - really concentrate on the participants in international relations and their behavior patterns. The analysis includes 1) definition of who the participants are; 2) how their capacities for action may be evaluated; 3) what motivates them; 4) what methods they employ; 6) what their past history of foreign policy has been; and 7) through what types of domestic institutions they pursue their foreign policies. Only Item 5), the discussion of international institutions, contains the characteristics of an international focus.

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<sup>11</sup> Examples of such attempts are contained in Charles P. Schlicher, Introduction to International Relations (New York, 1954); and Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York, 1957).



The emphasis on the participants rather than on the process is not surprising. The field of international relations is an offshoot from the fields of diplomatic history and political science, both of which concentrate on the description and explanation of the behavior and institutions of given units. The fact that the study of international relations in the United States received its greatest impetus at a time when crucial problems arose in American foreign policy further explains the fact that attention was centered on specific participants in international relations - most notably, of course, the United States itself.<sup>12</sup> Preoccupation with "current events," which characterized the study of international relations for a long time, further increased this emphasis.

A number of influential studies which appeared in the post-World War II period noted, solidified, and encouraged this tendency. Thus, Professor Harold Sprout advanced his ideas on the scope and structure of the field of international relations under six headings, which included an examination of objectives of foreign policy, motivation of statesmen, tools and techniques of statecraft, and state capabilities. Only two items in this list seemed to concern themselves primarily with the examination of "relationships" proper: regulatory mechanisms, and, more importantly, "International relationships: What relationships arise from the simultaneous and often antagonistic efforts of states to attain their foreign policy objectives?"<sup>13</sup> Thus it almost seems that "international relations" is one of six branches of the study of international relations.

Professor Grayson Kirk, who defined the subject of international politics as "those forces which mold the foreign policies of national states, the manner in which they are exercised, and the influences which limit their effectiveness", grouped the objectives of the student of international relations under five main headings: "1) analysis of the various forces which influence the foreign policies of the principal states of the world; 2) critical examination of the methods which states use to carry on their business with each other, and the instrumentalities which they have established for that purpose; 3) assessment of contemporary economic, political and legal relations among states, and the trends which they reveal; 4) study of the means by which conflicts among states may be adjusted; and 5) consideration of the legal and moral principles which should govern intercourse among nations." Kirk's analysis of texts and course outlines, as well as his discussions with teachers, persuaded him that international relations were taught in the late 1940's with primary emphasis on five subjects: 1) the nature and operation of the state system; 2) factors affecting the power of states; 3) the international position and foreign policies of various selected states; 4) recent diplomatic history; and 5) building a more stable world order.<sup>14</sup>

Along similar lines, Professor Furniss indicated that the subject of international politics was presented to the student under four main headings: 1) the factors underlying state power; 2) the aims and objectives of states; 3) the tools and techniques of statecraft; and 4) the mechanisms for regulating inter-state relations.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> : Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "Theory and Practice in the Teaching of International Relations in the United States" in Goodwin, op.cit., p.98.

<sup>13</sup> Harold Sprout, "In Defense of Diplomacy," World Politics, Vol. I (1949), pp.404-413.

<sup>14</sup> Grayson L. Kirk, The Study of International Relations (New York, 1947), pp. 8-9, 10, 27-29.

<sup>15</sup> Furniss, in Goodwin, op.cit., p.100.

Professor Wriggins, in a paper read at the American Political Science Association's meeting four years ago, conceived of the study of international relations in terms of six principal components or "bundles of variables": Actors who act in a setting (made up of domestic and external elements), pursuing goals by the selection and use of certain means. Perception of setting, attachment to goals, and choice of means are largely the outcome of theories or ideas and affective responses to these phenomena. Out of the interactions of these elements in a system of states emerge certain typical patterns of inter-state relationships.<sup>16</sup> This scheme is very similar to the way in which the present writer's own course - and thinking - has been organized. Over the years, however, the thought has occurred with increasing frequency that such a scheme means that one actually spends a very small portion of one's time on "international relations" as such; or, to put it another way, that it becomes increasingly difficult to think about international relations without actually thinking about something else instead.

Finally, in another recent analysis of trends in the study of international relations, Kenneth Thompson pointed out that international studies have become progressively more concerned with the investigation of foreign policies of separate nation-states. "Instead of beginning with the international structure and society, the new line of inquiry has emphasized the urgency of examining national goals and objectives as a logical point of departure." Thus the student of international politics really concentrates on the examination of motives and capacities of nations and statesmen.<sup>17</sup>

This emphasis has its advantages, which will be discussed in a later portion of this paper. Some prominent scholars in the field believe that there should be much more concentration on the study of national societies and policies. Thus, Richard C. Snyder, in a major review of much recent literature in the field, expressed satisfaction at the increasing acceptance of policy-making as an analytic focus. But he regrets that such additional aspects of the subject as "the impact of total social organization and behavior patterns. . . . a society's communication network. . . . values and value clusters. . . held in common by a majority of the society's members. . . . the immediate organizational setting of policy-making" are still too frequently ignored or neglected.<sup>18</sup>

Along similar lines, Professor Frederick S. Dunn speaks of two possible foci in constructing theory in the international field: the choice lies between restricting oneself to theories of inter-state behavior and introducing theories of political behavior of individuals rather than of states. Of the two alternatives, he clearly prefers the latter: "It is possible to have an inter-state theory without looking to see what these states are made up of, what kinds of groups. This is a restricting field, however. It is possible to shift the focus somewhat and look beneath the surface of the state to see what operates there, that is to say, to describe the behaviour of states in terms of individuals who make decisions and who have interests, the groups which bring pressure to bear on the individuals who make the decisions, and the influences . . . that lead to the various choices that are made by decision-makers. At

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<sup>16</sup> Howard Wriggins, "A Conceptual Scheme for the Introductory Course in International Relations," Paper read at the American Political Science Association meeting at Chicago, September 1954.

<sup>17</sup> Thompson, op.cit., pp.440, 458.

<sup>18</sup> Richard C. Snyder, "Toward Greater Order in the Study of International Politics, World Politics, Vol. VII (1955), pp.464-465, 473, 474.



the present time in the United States this second focus is drawing a great deal of interest, especially among the younger scholars." <sup>19</sup>

### III

On the basis of the discussion so far, three comments seem appropriate: 1) there is real confusion about the limits and contents of the study of international relations and about the relations between this field and that of foreign policy; 2) in practice, much more attention has been given to the study of foreign policies than to that of international political relationships; and 3) in order to construct more fruitful hypotheses in the field of international relations, it seems highly desirable, indeed essential, to indicate clearly both the limits of the two fields and the linkages between them.

There are three possible reactions to the third of these comments. One may hold 1) that the two fields are coterminous; 2) that the study of international politics is a generalized version of the study of foreign policy; or 3) that the field of international politics consists of more than the study of foreign policy. These three alternatives will now be examined in turn.

The implication which follows from the point of view that the two fields are, for practical as well as theoretical purposes, coterminous is that it is a matter of choice which label one wishes to attach to one's efforts. It would seem only reasonable, however, to say that in view of the preponderance of attention which has been centered on the study of foreign policy, this should be the name given to one's endeavors. This, in turn, would mean a recognition of the fact that, at this point in our studies, there scarcely is such a field, or subject matter, or discipline (actual or potential, developed or evolving) as "international politics" or "international relations." <sup>20</sup>

This position would undoubtedly not appeal to very many members of the profession. The reason for its rejection, however, should not be that so many people have for so long labored in the vineyard of "international relations" or "international politics" that they have acquired a vested interest in its status as a separate field of inquiry. All of them may have been in error in assuming that there was something to labor with or about - - this has happened more than once in intellectual history.

The real reason for rejecting the proposition that the two fields are identical is that there do exist demonstrable environmental factors, processes, compulsions, and dynamics (the nature of which will be suggested below) in the field of international political relations which can neither logically nor conveniently be included in the study of foreign policy. The study of foreign policies of states is one of the important - quite possibly the most important - parts of the study of international political relations. But the latter is a broader field, which also includes inquiry into other problems.

The second alternative is that the study of international political relations is a generalized version of the study of foreign policy, and that the distinction between them is based on the level of generalization. This is apparently the point of view of those authors of texts who include a great deal

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<sup>19</sup> Frederick S. Dunn, comment in Goodwin, op.cit., p.72.

<sup>20</sup> This, to be sure, is overstating the point for the sake of emphasis. As will be pointed out later, research efforts which focus on relationships do exist, albeit not in very large numbers nor of broad enough scope.



of description and analysis of foreign policies of particular states; reflecting the preferences of many, perhaps most, teachers of international relations who believe that such discussions have a definite place in their courses.

The assumption on which this practice would logically seem to be based is that, while the study of the foreign policy of a single country may provide only clues as to the general situation in international relations, the study of the foreign policies of numerous countries (especially the states of major importance in the world) will provide an accurate picture of international relationships at given points in time. At a deeper level of assumption, this procedure of thinking, writing and teaching about international relations is based on the idea that any relationships, including those in the international field, can be studied only by focusing on the behavior of separate participants. This intellectual assumption corresponds to that of the psychologist, although its source for students of international relations probably lies in the study of history.

This is a serious, defensible assumption, and it deserves thorough examination. One way to arrive at generalizations is by induction: through the study of large numbers of isolated facts, which eventually are combined in propositions, hypotheses, theories, laws. From the practical point of view, furthermore, it is perfectly true that the moment one departs from generalized speculation, one must cite evidence; such evidence, in the form of examples, will almost invariably relate to actions of participants who behave(d) in given ways. Anyone who has taught a course in international relations, especially at the introductory undergraduate level, knows that he cannot remain for long at the level of generality, without constant use of referents in real life. Such referents, almost without exception, will come from, or relate to, the actual behavior (policies) of participants.

Even if the need for concreteness were not so great, there would be other good reasons for emphasizing the study of foreign policies. The outstanding ones are 1) that it is possible, i.e. it is a subject which can be investigated because much of the necessary evidence is available; and 2) pragmatically, it has contributed much to an understanding of international political relations. Thus, the attention given to this aspect of the subject is useful and productive. Studies in this area have contributed most of what we now know, and are bound to contribute more in the future.

The only caveat to be entered here relates to the assumption that the behavior of participants is the only fruitful point of departure for the study of international relations. The basic question, phrased somewhat awkwardly, is this: is the international environment at any given time what it is because the actors in it behave the way they do? Or do actors in international relations behave the way they do because of the nature of the environment in which they operate? The answer, obviously, is that both statements are possible; that there is no "either-or" dichotomy; but that, in practice, most students of international relations have assumed that the first proposition is more valid or in any event more useful. This is the only assumption which is called into question.

It is proposed that the subject of international relations can also be approached from the second point of view, and that such approach may also be productive and may, because of its different focus, provide insights which differ from those contributed by the foreign-policy orientation. Even if such insights were to correspond to those gained by other methods, they would still

serve a useful function by increasing the degree of assurance with which certain propositions can be advanced.

The possibility of such contributions leads to an examination of the third alternative, which holds that the field of international political relations consists of more than the study of foreign policies, and that different approaches than the ones hitherto emphasized may, in time, yield many important insights.<sup>21</sup>

Specifically, two alternative foci are suggested: 1) a study of interaction processes and situations as such, as distinguished from the study of inter-actors who behave in given ways; and 2) a study of the impact of the international environment on participants' behavior, as distinguished from a study of behavior as it affects the international environment. These alternatives do not entail the study of new phenomena, but rather suggest the investigation of the same phenomena which have always formed the core of international relations studies from a different point of departure and with a different focus of attention.

A few practical examples will serve to clarify this point: diplomatic negotiations between two governments are certainly "international political relations" and have always been studied by specialists in the field. Usually these studies have focused upon the processes by which decisions as to objectives and methods were shaped in the respective Foreign Offices of the participants in the negotiations. The ingredients of this decision-making process are many, including historical experience, social, political, and administrative structures of the participating societies, current perceptions of one's own and others' policy goals, and calculations of the power available to one's own and the other side. This is the normal method of analysis, which has revealed much that is useful for the student of international relations.

But it is submitted that different foci are also possible, and may reveal hitherto neglected aspects of a negotiating situation. One might, for example, emphasize certain inherent qualities and characteristics of the negotiating process itself, in terms of data from small group studies and group dynamics.<sup>22</sup> One might attempt to construct hypotheses about the relation between subject-matter and process (e.g. negotiations on disarmament, on frontier rectifications, on trade policies, etc.) These alternatives eschew the focus on participants, and center instead on process. Instead of approaching the analysis of a negotiating situation in terms of decisions of participants, they might throw new and revealing light on the "relationship" portion of the subject (and, through the process of deduction, might also contribute new insights into the decision-making process itself, indicating that the linkage between the study of foreign policy and that of international relations is reciprocal).

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<sup>21</sup>For a statement on the need for a different focus, see Charles A. McClelland, "The Tasks of International Studies", SFIS 58-6, February 1958, pp.10-11: ". . . an international perspective is something different from either a nation-centered or universal focus. . . the essential organization of international relations proceeds from a concentration on a particular level of human activity, 'above' the national plane and 'below' the universal. It is an awkward location. . . Something like an 'international synthesis'--a baseline such as that provided by the familiar national synthesis--is needed. . . . Although the subject certainly touches upon and draws from interpersonal, familial, group, organizational, and national phenomena, these materials must be reshaped in an organization which fits the special scope of international relations."

<sup>22</sup>The International Sociological Association, The Nature of Conflict; Studies on the sociological aspects of international tensions (UNESCO, Paris, 1957), pp.103-115, summarizing work by Kurt Lewin, Stuart Chase, Kenneth J. Arrow and others.



One may focus, not on foreign policy decisions, nor on the dynamics of inter-action processes, but rather on the environment within which all international political relationships take place. One might take as one's point of departure the general international situation - "atmosphere" to use a term which is regrettably imprecise, but yet conveys information about environmental factors which are relevant to an understanding of an inter-action situation. Quincy Wright refers to this factor as "the condition of the entire field of international relations at the time", and specifies the general level of tension and unrest in the world, the degree of economic, cultural, and political interdependence among states, the general standards of value and law, and the conditions of population and resources, production and consumption, ideology, and world politics.<sup>23</sup>

The fact that the world is organized into separate nation-states, each with its own myths, traditions, cohesive and divisive forces, goals, capacities, and preferred methods of achieving aims, creates an international system which has profound impact upon the behavior of participants in that system's processes- and which exists, in a sense, separately from the behavior which it influences. The fact that we are in a period of rapid technological advance, accompanied by cultural lag, when territorial separations of units are maintained in spite of the fact that they have become largely irrelevant<sup>24</sup> further creates tensions and uncertainties which profoundly affect all decisions in foreign policy. The concept of the "Security Dilemma" can be derived from the study of the foreign policies of various countries over a prolonged period of time; but it can also be derived from a study of the environment within which international relations in general take place.

It is easy to think of other examples where a shift in focus might have interesting results. One of the first that comes to mind is the concept which approaches a body of "theory" as closely as any concept in the field of international relations: the balance of power. To be sure, there can be no balance of power situation unless countries participating in a system pursue balance of power policies; and the concept of the balance of power can be developed and investigated by reference to the behavior of specific countries, under specific circumstances, at specified times.<sup>25</sup> All of this is a truism -

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<sup>23</sup>Quincy Wright, "Design for a Research Project on International Conflicts and the Factors Causing Their Aggravation or Amelioration," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. X (1957), pp.265,269-270. Some might disagree with the introduction of such concepts as "atmosphere", and argue against the tendency to let discussion slip "into the terminology of 'forces' which seem to leave the policy-makers in the role of robots." (Snyder, op.cit., p.475). The answer to this criticism is that the admittedly unsatisfactory terminology does refer to real problems, and merely points to the fact that policy-makers, dealing with questions over which they lack perfect control, are in a tough spot. A more serious problem is that one may begin to think animistically of "States" and attribute human behavior to corporate systems. But this is a danger which constantly besets the student of international politics; the only way to guard against it is to develop the required degree of sophistication to realize that one is speaking and thinking in short-hand terms.

<sup>24</sup>John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics, Vol. IX (1957), pp.473-493.

<sup>25</sup>Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955).



but, like many truisms, it obscures as much of reality as it reveals. One could also study the problem on the assumption that international relationships take place within the type of environment which leaves states with no real choice whether or not to pursue balance of power policies; indeed, perhaps deprives them even of real choice of the specific type of balancing policies that are available to them.<sup>26</sup>

The point should be clear by now that no claim is made that one approach is inherently superior to another. The more modest proposition which is advanced is that there is more than one approach, and that, to judge by the recent history, current emphases, and apparent future trends in the study of international relations, all but one of these approaches have been, are, and are in danger of being, neglected.

The assumptions of the prevailing approaches have been elaborated, but will bear repetition in this context. They are twofold: 1) that the subject matter of international political relations cannot be understood without a thorough examination of the policies of the participants in the process: states and their governments. Having said this, it follows logically that it is necessary to proceed further and investigate the complex web of factors and forces which affect governmental policies. Trends in the study of international relations can be described in terms of a progressive narrowing of the focus of attention. It has been assumed, in turn, that a) it was not possible to understand international relations without understanding foreign policies of states; b) it was not possible to understand those foreign policies without understanding both historical experiences and governmental structures of the foreign policy actors; c) it was not possible to understand governmental structures and processes without understanding the relevant social, political, economic, cultural factors of each society. Indeed, it may even be assumed that it is not possible to understand the policies of a society without knowing the identity of the important individuals who shape these policies, and that one must understand the subconscious compulsions of these individuals.<sup>27</sup>

All of these assumptions are defensible enough; indeed, they follow logically. But even so, as one progresses down the path toward greater (and narrower) specificity, one does reach points which - however valid and interesting they are in themselves - are rather far removed from the subject of international relations which provided the starting point for one's inquiries.

The second assumption is the reciprocal of the first: that when enough information has been assembled on the foreign policies of participants, their history, their governmental structures, the relevant social, political, economic, cultural factors, and possibly even the overt and covert behavior of the individuals who are responsible for their foreign policies, one will have the data with which to describe international political relationships and, hopefully,

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<sup>26</sup>One can think of a parallel in the political scientist's approach to the study of American Government. He can, and usually does, study this subject in terms of the actors, including the executive, legislative, and judicial establishments, parties, pressure groups, public opinion media, etc. He can also, however, study a society's politics in terms of the influence of the system itself upon the actors. In this area he might focus on the significance of the constitutional consensus upon the behavior of the participants, and the impact of such institutional devices as the Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances, Federalism, the 22nd Amendment, etc., which decisively influence the actors' behavior.

<sup>27</sup>See Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York, 1956). Also T.H. Pear, "The Psychological Study of Tensions and Conflict", The Intl. Sociological Association, op.cit., pp. 118-176.

construct meaningful theories on the relationships between the multiple factors which are relevant to our studies.

In supplementation of these assumptions, it is here proposed a) that there are other alternatives of pursuing the study of international political relations, which do not run the risk of losing sight of the central subject; and 2) that the nature of the linkage between the study of international political relations and foreign policy is more complex than the relatively simple first set of assumptions would indicate. The first of these propositions has already been discussed; the two suggested alternative points of departure are a) the interaction process, and b) study of the international environment as a system in itself. Further elaboration of these suggestions will follow in the final part of this paper.

It remains to discuss the specific linkage between the study of foreign policy and that of international politics. This task is difficult because, of course, no foreign policy and no international political relationship has a clear starting point in objective reality, and it is not easy to separate one from the other, even for analytic purposes. Any policy, any relationship, is encumbered by all preceding and, in turn, encumbers all succeeding policies and relationships. But although the task may be difficult, it should, in the interest of clarity, be attempted.

Let it be assumed that the simplest of international political relationships begins with decisions made on the part of two participants who consider only one another. These decisions are, minimally, influenced on either side by a) definitions of one's own desired objectives; b) awareness (image) of the objectives of the other participant; c) evaluation of one's own capacities; d) evaluation of the capacities of the other side; e) an estimate of probable costs vs. possible advantages in pursuing a given policy objective. Once this goal-capacity-cost-risk calculation is made, decisions as to methods and policy-moves will follow. On the basis of these decisions, foreign policies are formulated and projected outward in the form of implementation of such decisions.

At this point, the "implementors" (heads of state, diplomats, agents, etc.) meet and interact with the "implementors" of the decisions of the other state, which have been arrived at in similar fashion. Both sets of implementors inform each other, in terms deemed appropriate by each for the pursuit of respective objectives, size up the situation, and reflect and report on their impressions and experiences. As a result of such reflections and reports, both sides review, and probably revise, their objectives, the evaluation of their own and others' capacities, and consequently their initial cost-advantage estimates. In all probability, such review will result in the reformulation of decisions. The reformulated decisions, in turn, are projected outward, and the respective "implementors" interact once more. The process is repeated x number of times. It may, or it may not, yield results in the form of solutions of the particular issue at hand.

The only merit of this over-simplified scheme is to indicate the relationship between the processes of foreign policy and of international relations. Foreign policy is linked to international relations in terms of the factors considered in initial decisions, especially the definitions of objectives and relative capacities for their attainment; and in terms of repeated revisions of these calculations, through the mechanism of the "feed-back" of information from implementors to decision-makers.

But the processes, while linked, are also separable. What happens when each participant makes and revises policy-decisions as to objectives and methods



is appropriately the subject matter of the study of foreign policy. What happens when these decisions, in the form of verbal or written statements and of personal contacts among "implementors" come into touch with one another and affect each other is the subject matter of the study of international political relations. It is the burden of this argument that the second of these processes can be studied, not in isolation, but separately from the first; and that the awareness of this possible focus will make for a more rounded and sophisticated analysis of the subject matter of international political relations.

One of the difficulties on this point is that it is easy to see the locus of the study of foreign policy in time and space, but very difficult to define it for the study of international political relations. The student of foreign policy will find his data in the files of foreign offices, in the information about the political, social, and economic structures of national societies. His subject matter clearly is what has happened and is happening in terms of the actions of responsible officials, and in terms of the background of those actions. But what of the student of international relations? Whatever is relevant to the student of foreign policy, to be sure, is important to him also, but is there anything in addition? After all, unless the activities to be studied take place in an international organization, they are likely to occur in the same foreign offices as the activities which are studied by the student of foreign policy. In all probability, they will involve the same personnel. What, then, is left to do?

It is submitted that this problem is more apparent than real, and that distinctions in focus are both possible and appropriate. Whether a given activity lies in the field of foreign policy or of international politics depends not upon its time and place, but upon its participants and its content. When policies of two or more states are brought into contact; when they are discussed, debated, argued, compromised; when representatives of two or more states interact and (attempt to) affect one another's policies, then it is appropriate to speak of an international political relationship. The student of foreign policy can help describe this relationship in terms of the participants' initial and revised views, calculations, and decisions. The student of international relations can analyze the general international scene within which interactions of policies take place, and can examine the interactions themselves which, through the influence of historical experiences, affect initial decisions; and which, by feeding current experiences back into the policy-making apparatus, produce changes in objectives and methods.

We can, then, tentatively define the study of foreign policy, in a way which is similar to the definitions usually attached to international relations, as the study of activities of individuals and groups within states and involving the governmental machinery of such states, which are designed to have an impact on policies of other states, or individuals and groups within them. We can further say that the study of international political relations centers on the processes and effects of interactions between foreign policy decisions made by individuals and groups, and involving governmental institutions, in two or more states; and on the environment within which such interactions take place.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Compare this with Harold and Margaret Sprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1956), p.6: "International politics is defined as the system of actions, reactions, and interaction between and among the political entities known as . . . states. Foreign policy is defined as the scheme or pattern of ends and means explicit or implicit in a given state's actions vis-a-vis other states or the members thereof. Foreign policy is thus a sub-category of international politics."



One related point may easily be misunderstood and therefore deserves clarification: students of foreign policy and of international relations are not antagonistic competitors viewing each other suspiciously across (too much) terra incognita claimed by both. Rather, they are closely attuned to each other. Indeed, they may very well be the same person, in which case the only requirement must be that they should be aware which role they play at a given time. It is difficult to think of a student of foreign policy who is not concerned with the field of international political relations; it is altogether impossible to think of a specialist in international political relations who could neglect the information he receives from his colleagues in the field of foreign policy.

#### IV

Once the linkages and the differentiations between the field of foreign policy and that of international relations have been established, the process of proceeding with inquiries in the latter area presents certain problems. Not the least of these problems relates to the fact that when one has become accustomed to certain ways of looking at, organizing, and approaching a given subject, one becomes understandably reluctant to abandon such ways.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, in conclusion, it is suggested that certain concrete advantages may result from the pursuit of the suggestions contained in this paper.

One of these advantages is that either of the suggested foci - interaction or environmental analysis - will make a number of hitherto untapped resources from other disciplines available to the student of international politics. There is, to be sure, no absolute merit in cross- or inter-disciplinary work for its own sake; whether or not such endeavor is appropriate depends entirely upon the problem at hand. But if it is correct to assume that the study of international relations, political or otherwise, provides an opportunity par excellence for engaging in inter-disciplinary labor, then students cannot afford to neglect any important contributions which other disciplines can make to their studies.

Yet, many such potential contributions have indeed been neglected in the past, simply because the students of international relations have limited themselves by concentrating on certain types of inquiry and neglecting others. Disciplines such as Sociology, Psychology, and Anthropology have contributed to studies of elites, decision-making, national character, public opinion, attitudes, stereotypes, and propaganda; but not nearly as much in other areas as they well might have done. Some such possibilities will now be discussed by suggesting certain aids which other disciplines may be able to provide with respect to studies of tension and conflict, intergroup behavior, and conference procedures and problems.

If there is any single fact which is apparent to the student of international relations literature, it is that among the writers in the field, there is strong preoccupation with types and causes of interstate conflict. This

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<sup>29</sup> See comments by Professors Walter Sharp and Frederick S. Dunn in Goodwin, op.cit., pp.58-59: "There are a great many of us who, after having established courses over a number of years, just do not like to upset them, revise them, modify them or to develop a new course. . . . Even our friends, the other social scientists, who have developed a method and a vocabulary and a conceptual system, become complacent after a while and continue that method and that vocabulary and that conceptual system long after it has passed its useful period. . . . Complacency sometimes blocks intellectual progress."

subject has been investigated in a series of studies sponsored by UNESCO - the so-called "Tensions" project. Results of such studies are discussed and evaluated in an excellent recent work<sup>30</sup>, in which the distinctions between the psychological and the sociological approaches to conflict are summarized in a manner which is relevant to the present paper. It seems accurate to say that the first of these approaches - the psychological and social-psychological - will be of particular value to students of foreign policy, while the second, sociological, approach has more of significance to contribute to students of international relations proper. The tension concept in psychology is wholly an "actor-oriented" one, based on studies of behavior patterns of individuals. One of the assumptions of this approach is that inter-group tensions are the sum total of individual tensions of members of the groups involved.

Professor Bernard points out that, as applied to international conflict, the psychological interpretation of tension appears less useful than the sociological approach. The sociologist views conflict in terms of relationships between and among systems, rather than within or between individuals. He does not accept the view that the causes of tension and conflict are wholly subjective, but assumes that they may be based on objective reality, namely, the presence of incompatible or mutually exclusive goals, aims, or values which can not be simultaneously pursued.

To study such situations, various methods have been suggested, including that advocated by Walter Firey, who attempts to measure mathematically the conditions under which a system composed of accommodated groups may fall apart, or under which separated groups may be (re)integrated; Herbert Simon's theory of interaction; Lewis Coser's hypotheses on the positive functions of social conflict; the work done by Karl Deutsch in utilizing concepts of information and communication; and certain experimental studies of inter-group behavior, such as those by Muzafer Sherif, Kurt Lewin, and others.<sup>31</sup>

Students of international relations have not fully utilized such suggestions, although the work of Professors Deutsch and Van Wagenen indicates that they have not been oblivious to the opportunities offered by these approaches.<sup>32</sup> Likewise, Professor Quincy Wright has suggested a series of research projects on international conflicts. His proposed procedure is in considerable measure based on some of the suggestions advanced by other disciplines. His research proposals are "designed to throw light on the characteristic types of international conflict, on the situations from which they are likely to emerge, and on the procedures by which national and international agencies may exert effective influence or control to prevent them from generating hostilities and to settle them justly." In order to make such studies, he suggests a four-fold focus: 1) inquiry into the relations between conflicting states; 2) inquiry into the internal structure and policy of each of these states; 3) the process of

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<sup>30</sup> Jessie Bernard, "The sociological study of conflict," in *The International Sociological Association*, op.cit., pp.33-117.

<sup>31</sup> W. Firey, "Informal organization and the theory of schism," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XIII (1948), pp.15-24; H.A. Simon, "A formal theory of interaction in social groups," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XVII (1952), pp.202-211; Muzafer and C.W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension* (New York, 1953); K. Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948); Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, 1956); G.C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950).

<sup>32</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level; Problems*



adjustment, and procedures available and utilized for effecting it; and 4) the condition of the entire field of international relations at the time.<sup>33</sup> One may comment that such a scheme reflects the type of fruitful relationship between the study of international relations and that of foreign policy which has been envisaged in the present paper. Three of the four suggested foci (#1, 3 and 4) are properly within the purview of the student of international relations, while one (#2) is within the area in which the student of foreign policy has special competence.

All of this may become more obvious when one looks at a few of the suggestions emanating from Sociology with respect to intergroup behavior per se. One of the systems of analysis which Professor Snyder has suggested for the student of international relations is the "establishment of well-defined state interaction systems and processes, properties of which are specified and typified in terms of such factors, forces, and conditions as objectives, strategies, communications, rules of conduct, institutionalization of policy-making, duration, inter-dependence of units, reciprocal expectations, and so on."<sup>34</sup> While such a list may well give one pause, both its basic idea and some of the specific suggestions to implement that idea are of relevance in the present context.

In an article in The Journal of Social Issues, Herbert C. Kelman discusses interaction between nations in terms of an ever-changing succession of events, and suggests inquiry into the problem of the degree of probability with which it can be predicted that a particular interaction will result either in peaceful accomodation or violent conflict. He proposes that one of the most significant variables in the situation is the general level of inter-action that exists between the nations concerned - a term that refers to "the nature of the relationship as it extends over a period of time."<sup>35</sup>

According to Muzafer Sherif, a Social Psychologist who has done experimental work with intergroup behavior, the term "intergroup relations" refers to situations in which two or more groups and their respective members, collectively or individually, interact with each other. Sherif proposes a set of factors which determine the specific nature of intergroup behavior. He stresses not only intra-personal or intra-group factors (such as motives, attitudes, etc.), but also external - including situational and organizational - factors which help determine the properties of a given interaction. He points out that the relationship between in-group and inter-group behavior is not one-way, but that there are cases of inter-group relations which have demonstrably effected modifications in in-group relations.<sup>36</sup> The parallel to this, one may assume, would be situations in international relations which have effected modifications in behavior within states participating in the international relationship.

Finally one may cite a series of much-neglected studies by Gustav Ichheiser:

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of Definition and Measurement (Princeton, Foreign Policy Analysis Series #2, 1953); R. Van Wagenen, Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus (Princeton, Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1952).

<sup>33</sup>Wright, "Design", pp.263-264.

<sup>34</sup>Snyder, op. cit., p. 478.

<sup>35</sup>Herbert C. Kelman, "Societal, Attitudinal and Structural Factors in International Relations," The Journal of Social Issues, Vol. X I (1955), pp. 42-56.

<sup>36</sup>Sherif and Sherif, op. cit., Chapters 1, 11.



"Structure and Dynamics of Interpersonal Relations," "Misunderstandings in Human Relations," and "Misunderstandings in International Relations." Although these studies place proper stress on the psychological elements of situations of interaction (perception, motivation, attitudes, images, stereotypes), there is much here that might inform the student of international relationships as to the nature of the processes which characterize not only the behavior of participants, but also the ensuing interactions.<sup>37</sup>

A final set of suggestions, already referred to previously, relates to studies of overtly apparent types of international relations, such as meetings, conferences, etc. Here Gordon W. Allport has laid down certain suggestions for the study of conference procedure which depart from the study of the behavior of participants considered in isolation, and concentrate instead on questions of external and organizational requirements for effective deliberation and group decisions in various types of bodies.<sup>38</sup> The field of group dynamics, although - one gathers - a somewhat controversial recent offshoot from the field of Sociology, has many suggestions of value to contribute to the student of international relations.<sup>39</sup>

If one advantage of the proposed alternative foci of inquiry is that they encourage the introduction of additional materials from other disciplines, a second advantage lies in the reduction or elimination of a danger of which the student - and teacher - of international politics must constantly be aware: that one's presentation of the subject (to oneself and to others) will be affected by an ethnocentric bias. While one naturally makes every attempt not to let such bias enter into one's thinking, the very fact that discussion, thought, and presentation centers on the foreign policies of various States - one of which will almost always be one's own - presents considerable danger that the presentation will be affected by such bias, however unconscious one may be of the fact.<sup>40</sup>

An approach which centers on the study of relationships, or which at least distinguishes clearly between the study of relationships and the study of participants in such relationships, has additional value for the teacher. International relations is no simple subject to begin with; and teachers are doubtlessly agreed that it serves no useful purpose to present it in over-simplified form. Yet there are ways in which comprehension can be facilitated. One of the great problems of the study of international relations, as presently pursued and taught, is what Professor McClelland has called "shifting perspectives." We vacillate between two perspectives: one which focuses upon the "about 100 large, self-identifying, and boundary-maintaining systems. . . . labelled nations, or nation states," which operate and transact business in an international environment (this is what the term "actor-orientation" refers to); and 2) one which focuses upon the international environment, the international system proper. McClelland concludes that almost any international politics text (and, one may add, probably almost any course in the subject), "will furnish numerous examples of shifts of perspective,

<sup>37</sup> American Sociological Review, Vol. VIII (1943), pp.302-305; The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LV, No.2, Part 2 (1949) Chapter IV; American Sociological Review, Vol. XVI (1951), pp.311-316.

<sup>38</sup> Gordon W. Allport, "Guide Lines for Research in International Cooperation," in T.H.Pear, ed., Psychological Factors of Peace and War (New York, 1950).

<sup>39</sup> D. Cartwright and A. Zander, eds., Group Dynamics; Research and Theory (Evanston and White Plains, 1953).

<sup>40</sup> Wm. G. Carleton, "Wanted: Wiser Teachers of International Relations," The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. XXV (1954), p.2: "Our courses in international relations are not sufficiently above the battle, not sufficiently

and these are made generally without any notice or warning."<sup>41</sup> Clarity, then, as to the level on which we are speaking, as to the focus of our attention, will be one great advantage to be derived from the careful differentiation of the subject matter of international relations from that of other fields of inquiry, including the subject matter of foreign policy.

A final advantage is that the holistic approaches here suggested would provide an opportunity to see the entire field of international political relationships in a perspective which eliminates the danger that intervening objects (including massive sets of data) will obscure the view. Present trends in the field, which lead to concentration on ever narrower and more specific subjects of study, make it likely that the student will be swamped by masses of un-integrated facts, and that the larger picture becomes lost in the process; or, at least, becomes progressively harder to envisage as more and more information demands absorption into a general formula. The question might well be asked whether, in the present stage of the evolving study of international relations, we need more data with which to construct theories; or whether we need more and better hypotheses which will guide our search for new data.

The danger of being overwhelmed results from the fact of starting one's inquiries - as students of international relations still must - without a broad body of theory which guides their search for evidence. Since this is so, one alternative lies in a broadly eclectic approach of sweeping dimensions. But if one casts one's net widely enough, one finds that practically everything in the world can in some manner be related to the study of international relations. We referred at the outset to the unfortunate student of the subject who regrets that he doesn't know everything; the sequel is his equally unfortunate colleague who either starves in the midst of plenty or dies of intellectual indigestion.

Another alternative lies in narrowing one's attention upon specific aspects of the field. This has been the predominant choice of students of the subject. But here the danger is that, in the process, one gets further and further away from one's core interest.

If, however, one can concentrate one's attention without shifting from the subject of international relations to another area of inquiry, one may perhaps evade both horns of the dilemma and hope, eventually, to register real progress in one's endeavors.

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<sup>41</sup>Charles A. McClelland, "Approaches to Basic Teaching of International Relations, I, The Systems Idea in a Problems-Approach," SFIS 58-10, February 1958, p.8. Perhaps it is impossible to avoid shifts in focus; it is difficult to envisage an international relations course which does not include frequent references to state policy decisions. In that event, however, it would help if everyone involved were fully aware that a shift had taken place and what its nature and purpose was.

## REPUBLICAN GROWTH IN THE URBAN SOUTH

by

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The word has gotten around pretty widely that Dwight Eisenhower carried five states of the South in 1956, one more than he took in 1952. It is less generally known that in 1956 Eisenhower secured a plurality of the popular votes in the South. He received 48.9 per cent of the total popular vote compared to the Democrats' 47.8 per cent. In seven states his per cent of the total vote in 1956 exceeded that of 1952. The four states where the Republican percentage declined experienced no Democratic resurgence but rather the appearance of a States' Rights party.

The term "South" as used herein refers to the eleven states of the late Confederacy. The term "Republican" should be translated "voted for Ike." Later in this paper there will be some speculation about support for Republican presidential nominees not bearing the name Eisenhower and the possible growth of a strong Republican party at the state and county level. For the moment, however, let us turn our attention to that 49 per cent of Southerners who voted for Ike in 1956.

Those concerned with the development of an opposition party in the South should turn their attention to the cities. In both 1952 and 1956, a disproportionate share of the Eisenhower vote came from the cities. Moreover, Republican strength in cities is increasing; by contrast traditional mountain Republicanism has experienced no such expansion. Finally, since the South is becoming urbanized even more rapidly than the rest of the nation, those concerned with the future of southern politics ought to direct their attention to the rising cities more than to the declining countryside.

To demonstrate the importance of the city to the Eisenhower vote, one must first limit the definition of the term "city." Let us confine our attention to cities with a population of 50,000 or more according to the 1950 census. A comparison will be made of the political behavior of all counties containing one or more cities of 50,000 population with that of counties having no such city. For these purposes the counties having a city of 50,000 or more will be designated as "urban" counties, all others as "non-urban" counties. The vote of the entire county is taken because most election records are published by counties; getting the separate returns for a city within the county is often quite a task. Moreover, this use of the returns from the county housing a city of 50,000 is in harmony with the idea of the sociological city in contrast to the area within the arbitrarily defined city limits. Incidentally, in most cases these counties coincide with the metropolitan areas as defined by the census.



One computes the state's "urban" vote simply by adding together the total vote of each "urban" county. For example, Alabama has four such counties; the total vote of these four is the "urban" vote for Alabama. The "non-urban" vote for Alabama is the difference between the state's total vote and the urban vote. In other words, one subtracts from the state's total vote the urban total vote in order to secure the "non-urban" total. The "Republican urban vote" is secured by adding together all votes cast for Dwight Eisenhower in each of Alabama's four urban counties. The "non-urban Republican vote" is the difference between Eisenhower's total vote in Alabama and his urban total. The next step is to secure the per cent Republican of the urban vote -- that is, the Republican urban vote divided by the total urban vote. In Alabama it turns out that the Republican nominee secured 48.4 per cent of the total urban vote. A similar division of the Republican non-urban vote by the non-urban total vote reveals that the Republican nominee secured only 34.9 per cent of the non-urban votes. In urban Alabama Eisenhower secured better than 48 per cent of the vote, in non-urban Alabama not quite 35 per cent. The difference is a substantial one. Table 1 tells the story for the other ten states. In all eleven states the per cent Republican of the urban vote exceeds the per cent Republican of the non-urban vote. The difference varies considerably. In Georgia it is 22 percentage-points; in Tennessee it is 0.2 percentage points. If the states are ranged in order of the percentage-point difference from Georgia to Tennessee, the median is 7.2 percentage-points.<sup>1</sup>

The limitation of this line of reasoning is that it fails to demonstrate that over a period of time the Republican party has developed more rapidly in the larger cities than in other parts of each state. Note in Table 1 the relatively small difference in per cent Republican between the urban and non-urban areas of Tennessee, Virginia, and Arkansas. Much of the non-urban area of these states has been Republican for three-quarters of a century. What must now be shown is that the city dwellers have recently become nearly as Republican as the mountaineers.

This shift may be demonstrated by repeating the arithmetical processes explained above but applying them to the 1936 election returns. Thus, one computes for each of the eleven states the per

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1. Virginia offers some opportunity for a quibble about how to compute the "urban" segment of the vote. Virginia cities of a specified size are separated entirely from their counties for governmental purposes, and their election returns are reported separately. Since to use the votes of the cities would destroy the parallelism with the other states, the procedure was to add to the vote of each of these cities that of the county in which it is located plus the vote of any other independent city located in the same county. However, if one uses the city vote alone, the results secured are very similar.

TABLE 1  
REPUBLICAN LEANING OF THE URBAN SOUTH, 1956

State	Per Cent Republican of the Urban Vote	Per Cent Republican of the Non- urban Vote	Urban Percentage- point Lead Over Non-urban
Alabama	48.4	34.9	13.5
Arkansas	51.1	45.1	6.0
Florida	58.6	55.3	3.3
Georgia	49.8	27.8	22.0
Louisiana	57.2	50.7	6.5
Mississippi	34.6	23.6	11.0
North Carolina	56.7	47.0	9.7
South Carolina	33.4	22.5	10.9
Tennessee	49.3	49.1	0.2
Texas	58.8	51.6	7.2
Virginia	57.5	54.4	3.1

cent Republican of the urban vote and of the non-urban vote in 1936.<sup>2</sup> The next step is to compare the per cent Republican of the urban vote in 1936 with that of 1956, and then to make a similar comparison of the non-urban vote. We may use Alabama for an example. The per cent Republican of the urban vote in 1956 was 48.4 per cent; the figure for 1936 was only 8.8 per cent. Subtracting the 1936 figure from the 1956 figure shows that the urban percentage-point gain for Alabama Republicans, 1936-1956, was 39.6 percentage-points. Non-urban Alabama was more Republican back in 1936 than the cities -- 14.24 per cent. By 1956 it was 34.9 per cent Republican. Subtracting the 1936 figure from the 1956 figure, one discovers that non-urban Alabama experienced a Republican percentage-point gain of 20.7 percentage-points. The figures to be compared are the urban percentage-point gain and the non-urban percentage-point gain, 39.6 and 20.7 percentage-points respectively. If one subtracts the smaller figure from the larger, he gets 18.9. This is the number of percentage-points by which the urban percentage-point gain, 1936-1956, exceeds the non-urban percentage-point gain, 1936-1956. If somewhat cumbersome, this is at least a method of reducing to arithmetic the idea that urban Alabama has moved toward presidential Republicanism much more rapidly than non-urban Alabama in recent years. Material for the other ten states are set forth in Table 2.

2. One word of caution is appropriate here. The "urban" counties are still those that had within their borders a city of 50,000 in the year 1950. In a few instances, such as Gadsden, Alabama, the city had a 1936 population of less than 50,000.

TABLE 2  
GROWTH OF URBAN REPUBLICANISM, 1936-1956

State	Urban Percentage- point Gain for Repub- licans	Non-urban Percentage- point Gain for Repub- licans	Percentage- points by Which Urban Gains Exceed Non- urban Gains
Alabama	39.6	20.7	18.9
Arkansas	40.8	26.7	14.1
Florida	32.2	33.0	-0.8
Georgia	39.7	14.5	25.2
Louisiana	48.1	38.0	10.1
Mississippi	31.2	20.9	10.3
North Carolina	35.8	19.1	16.7
South Carolina	30.6	21.4	9.2
Tennessee	32.1	12.0	20.1
Texas	44.5	40.8	3.7
Virginia	36.3	23.7	12.6

If the eleven states are arranged in the order in which the urban percentage-point gain exceeds the non-urban percentage-point gain, we have Georgia at the top of the list with 25.2 percentage-point gain and Florida at the bottom with -0.8. Virginia, the median state, shows the cities outgaining the rest of the state by 12.6 percentage-points. A comparison of Tennessee in Tables 1 and 2 is instructive. In the 1956 presidential election, Tennessee's cities were only slightly more Republican than the non-urban sections of the state. Yet Table 2, which deals with Republican gains in urban areas over a twenty-year period, reveals that the Republican gains in the cities vastly out-strip the gains in other sections of the state. Florida, which is the only state with less rapid urban than non-urban Republican gain, can be explained by the tremendously rapid growth of the state due to migration. In the other ten states, what we are viewing essentially is the weakening of the allegiance of native Southerners to the Democratic party, and the willingness to abandon traditional political loyalty is much greater in the cities. In Florida the change is due not to conversion but to the influx of thousands of non-southern Republicans, many of whom settle in counties with no cities of 50,000.

One must not assume from the foregoing that all city dwellers are equally Republican although some people make this assumption. For instance, a Houston newspaper editor in a letter to the author explained that his paper had discontinued publishing election returns by precincts because "...the voting is pretty consistent all over the city." Actually the extreme range among Houston voting boxes



in terms of the percentage of the total vote for Eisenhower extended from a little under 22 per cent up to slightly over 92 per cent. If the range in other southern cities is not so extreme, there are none of which it can be accurately stated that the political preferences are "pretty consistent over the city." The relevant question to our inquiry is whether it is possible to identify some classes of urban dwellers more disposed than others to support a Republican presidential nominee. In theory, if an election precinct coincided with the boundaries of a Cherokee Indian reservation, one could examine the election returns and draw some inferences about the political preferences of the Cherokees. On a more practical level, one sometimes finds a coincidence in the boundaries of election districts and areas about which we have economic or other data. An example is the city of Mountain Brook, Alabama, the most exclusive suburb of Birmingham and the city with by far the highest median income of any city in the state. The city's boundaries coincide with those of precinct 59, which gave Stevenson 19.4 per cent of its vote, Eisenhower 77.0 per cent, and the remainder to independent electors. It may be worth noting that the comparable figures for the year 1952 were 20.1 per cent and 79.5 per cent. These Republican percentages were well above that of the whole county both years. This preference for Eisenhower among the most prosperous folk of suburban Birmingham naturally leads the investigator to the question whether this preference is unique to Birmingham or whether it is duplicated among upper-income groups in other southern cities.

Unhappily, this coincidence of boundaries of election districts with those of known demographic characteristics is not the general rule. All too frequently it is necessary to piece together jigsaw-puzzle fashion the demographic characteristics of election precincts. The ideal situation is to find a city for which some tireless investigator has already done the fantastic amount of tedious work necessary to describe accurately the demographic characteristics of the election units. Such a study is available for New Orleans under the title "The New Orleans Voter: A Handbook of Political Description."<sup>3</sup> This study identifies eight different types of neighborhoods in terms of the race and economic status of the inhabitants. For a neighborhood to be designated as a "Negro neighborhood" it has to have 66 per cent or more of non-white residents. The Negro neighborhoods are divided into three economic levels based largely on average rent and to a lesser extent on the value of homes owned by the occupants. White neighborhoods had to contain all white residents, and these neighborhoods were subdivided into five separate income brackets. The authors continue their description of their method as follows:

The boundary designations of the neighborhoods were then translated to a precinct map. . . . This required that

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3. Leonard Reissman, K. H. Silvert, and Cliff W. Wing, Jr., in Tulane Studies in Political Science (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1955), pp. 1-88.

neighborhoods be made coterminous with precinct boundaries. The procedure was to designate an entire precinct as one neighborhood type if the majority of blocks within the precinct were dominated by that type. Where neighborhood types could only account for a few blocks, or where several different types were found together, the precinct was left undesignated for a neighborhood.<sup>4</sup>

This procedure gives a neighborhood classification to 130 out of the city's 312 precincts.<sup>5</sup>

From here on the procedure is much simpler. One merely identifies the precincts in each category. For these purposes two of the five categories of white voters are omitted -- the lower-middle-class white and the lower-upper-class white. One merely identifies, for instance, all precincts classified as "lower-class Negro." Then one puts the returns for the three candidates (there was a small vote given to a group of independent States' Rights electors) into appropriate columns, totals the vote for each candidate in these precincts, and computes the percentage of support for each of the three parties among lower-class Negroes. The results for the six demographic classifications are set forth in Table 3.

TABLE 3  
1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN NEW ORLEANS BY CLASS AND RACE

Neighborhood Type	Per Cent of Total Vote		
	Democratic	Republican	States' Rights
Low-income Negro	46.20	51.65	2.15
Middle-income Negro	41.80	55.01	3.17
Upper-income Negro	36.65	59.59	3.76
Low-income white	51.39	44.08	4.53
Middle-income white	31.10	64.82	4.07
Upper-income white	22.21	74.69	3.09
City	39.5	56.5	4.0

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

5. Note the limitation inherent in the procedure of designating an entire precinct as one neighborhood type if the majority of blocks within the precinct are dominated by that type. Another limitation is that data about all neighborhoods comes from the 1950 Census. It is theoretically possible in the six years prior to the 1956 election for a neighborhood to have changed considerably in composition. This warning applies to comments about all cities that follow since these comments are equally based on the 1950 Census. However, revolutionary changes within six years of whole sections of a city are unlikely.

A glance at Table 3 explains why candidate Stevenson did not carry New Orleans. Of the six demographic categories he had a majority only among the lower-income whites. Note the very sharp rise in Republican percentage as one goes up the rungs of the class ladder among whites. A similar situation with much smaller gradations can be noted among Negroes. Only one precinct could be found that met the specifications for the upper-class Negro group, so this may be an unrepresentative sample. While it is highly important to note the greater enthusiasm for a Republican nominee at the higher economic levels among whites, one must not ignore the 44 per cent support for Eisenhower among lower-class whites. Such neighborhoods are defined: "Contains all white residents, 33 per cent or more renters, paying less than \$25.00 a month rent."<sup>6</sup> To be sure, these were 1950 rentals. In New Orleans, at least, it would be misleading to dismiss the 1956 Republican upsurge as a "silk-stockings vote." The upper classes are clearly the greatest supporters of the Republican party, but that party can certainly make a claim for broader support when it corrals the support of 44 per cent of the lower-income whites and a majority in every category of the Negro vote.

Another opportunity to live off the toil of others is presented in the case of Jacksonville, Florida. The demographic data here have been compiled by Dr. Charles D. Farris.<sup>7</sup> Dr. Farris identified a certain number of white precincts, no one of which had in excess of 1.6 per cent non-white residents. These he separated into three economic categories by rental levels, designating them as upper-, middle-, or lower-income precincts. From this entire group he selected a much smaller number of what he designated as "barometer precincts." These precincts he found by observation over a period of several elections to be highly representative of the voting behavior of all precincts in that income category. His compilations are based on the 1950 census. These three economic categories do not represent equal thirds of the population. Rather the barometer precincts for the high rental areas represent 16 per cent of the population, for the middle group 52 per cent, and the lower rental group 32 per cent. A check on the election returns of 1956 for these barometer precincts produced the results set forth in Table 4. The rise of Republican support with the rise of income, earlier noted for New Orleans, is present also in Jacksonville. However, the Republicans were weaker at all income levels than in New Orleans. They had less support among the upper-income group, they narrowly lost the middle-income group, and their 31.6 per cent in the low-income white group is substantially below the comparable group in New Orleans.

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6. Reissman, et al., op. cit., p. 81.

7. This material appears in his Effects of Negro Voting Upon the Politics of a Southern City: An Intensive Study, 1946-1948, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953.



TABLE 4  
 1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN JACKSONVILLE  
 BY INCOME LEVEL AMONG WHITE VOTERS

Income Level	Per cent Democratic	Per Cent Republican
High income	31.8	68.2
Medium income	52.5	47.5
Low income	68.4	31.6

In Jacksonville a breakdown of registrants by race in each precinct is available. By selecting overwhelmingly Negro precincts, one can screen out the white vote and be certain that he is talking about Negro political behavior only. The eleven precincts found in the table below account for approximately 74 per cent of the city's Negro registration. All eleven precincts in the table have a registration in excess of 98 per cent Negro. Unlike New Orleans no description of the economic status of any of these Negro precincts is attempted. The results of Table 5 indicate that one is not being particularly careless to speak of the Negro vote in Jacksonville as having split about 50-50. Nine of the eleven precincts appearing in the table are within five percentage points above or below 50 per cent. This even split is in sharp contrast to the votes of Jacksonville Negroes in 1952. Negro precincts were re-shuffled between the presidential elections so that no precinct-to-precinct comparison is possible. There were in 1952, however, a group of nine precincts in which the white registrants constituted less than one per cent of the total. The 1952 registration of 14,000-plus in these nine precincts is roughly comparable to the figure for the eleven precincts in 1956. In these nine precincts in 1952 Dwight Eisenhower polled only 10.6 per cent of the vote. Clearly the group of Jacksonville voters who shifted most dramatically were the Negroes. Other groups of the population gave relatively consistent support to Eisenhower in both elections. Duval County, which houses Jacksonville, gave Eisenhower 48.3 per cent of the total vote in 1952 and 50.1 per cent in 1956. Assuming a shift of 4,000 Negro votes toward the Republican party, it is not unreasonable to explain the county shift on this basis. The 1952 total vote of the county was 104,000, split 50,000 for the Republicans and 53,900 for the Democrats. The 1956 total was up to 106,000 with 53,000-plus for each party.

Only New Orleans and Jacksonville have such satisfactory demographic data for their precincts. There are a few cities where census data is reported by the same wards used for election purposes. This is true of Mobile, Jackson (Mississippi), Charleston, and with some qualifications, of Jacksonville. A shortcoming of this method is that when a city of 200,000 population is divided into sixteen wards the demographic data are divided into a few large and heterogeneous categories among which one can make only rather gross distinctions.

TABLE 5  
VOTES OF JACKSONVILLE NEGROES IN THE  
1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Precinct	Democratic	Republican	Per Cent of Vote Republican
2C	428	394	47.9
2D	412	454	52.4
2E	230	239	51.0
3A	859	1,026	54.4
3B	438	727	62.4
4C	400	297	42.6
4G	465	391	45.7
5A	624	604	49.2
5C	597	715	54.5
5D	424	356	45.6
5F	525	462	46.8
Total	5,402	5,665	51.2

In the interest of continuity of thought let us turn our attention back to Jacksonville. The city is divided into eighteen wards on the basis of which 1950 census data was reported. The precincts are usually subdivisions of the ward and cross ward boundary lines in only three instances. By piecing together precincts one can readily get vote totals for sixteen of the eighteen wards for which census data is available. One then computes the per cent Republican of each of these sixteen wards and ranks them in order of their per cent Republican. The range is from 65.9 per cent for the first place to 27.9 per cent for the sixteenth place. A satisfactory indicator of economic status is the value of owner-occupied dwellings. The census provides an average value in dollars for dwellings in each of Jacksonville's wards. These wards may be ranked in order of the average home value. Thus, ward 18 with an average home value of \$15,755 leads the list, the second-place ward has an average home value of a little under \$13,000, and so on down to a last place of \$4,190. The top five wards in terms of per cent Republican range from 65.9 per cent to 50.4 per cent. The same five wards that are highest in their per cent Republican are also the five highest in terms of home values. It might be added that this is a description of a substantially white electorate since the total population of the area is approximately two per cent Negro. In four of the five wards home ownership rather than renting is the prevailing situation so the use of home ownership is the appropriate index. If, however, the wards are ranked according to rent, four of the five highest

Republican wards appear among the top five of highest average rent.<sup>8</sup> All this confirms the findings about Jacksonville made by the method reported earlier.

The city of Mobile, Alabama, had nineteen wards at the time of the 1956 presidential election, and census data is reported on the basis of these same wards. Eisenhower carried the city with 53.6 per cent of the total vote. Since the least Republican of the nineteen wards gave him 40.8 per cent, it would be scarcely accurate to explain the Eisenhower victory in terms of support from any one element of the population. However, the range in Republican percentages by wards ran all the way from the low of 40.8 per cent up to a high of 73.5. If we examine the seven highest-ranking wards in terms of percentage Republican, we find that six of these were also in the top seven of the wards ranked in terms of average value of homes. Thus, if the nineteen wards are ranked in terms of the average value of owner-occupied homes, six of the seven top places are common to wards in the seven top places ranked in terms of per cent for Eisenhower. Homes in these seven wards, with one exception, are in the vast majority of cases owner-occupied rather than rented. In none of the seven wards is there non-white occupancy in more than 2.1 per cent of the dwellings. The lowest ranking of the seven wards supported Eisenhower with 55.0 per cent. Upper-income voting in Mobile in 1956 was very similar to that of 1952. Eisenhower's five best wards in 1952 reappeared as his five best wards in 1956. Although the size of the total vote was greater in 1956, Eisenhower's percentage was very close to that in 1952. Ward 7 has a registration slightly over 99 per cent Negro. This ward, containing roughly 40 per cent of the city's Negro registration, voted 47.7 per cent Republican. In 1952 this same ward gave Eisenhower approximately 14 per cent of a much smaller total vote.

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8. An explanation is in order about ward 10, one of the top Republican wards. The per cent Republican for ward 10 is a synthetic figure but a defensible one. The ward is made up of three precincts, two of these entirely within the ward and the third one partly outside it. The two precincts entirely within ward 10 gave 63.7 per cent of their vote to the Republican party. Now let us look at the returns for precinct 6-E, the precinct that is partly outside ward 10. Let us assume the highly improbable situation that all Democratic votes came from that part of the precinct inside ward 10, and that all Republican votes were in that part outside the ward. The 530 votes for Stevenson are then added to the Democratic total and the 637 Eisenhower votes of the precinct ignored on the assumption that they could have come from outside ward 10. Even with this wholly unreasonable distribution of the votes of precinct 6-E, ward 10 went 50.4 per cent for Eisenhower and ranks among the top five. Any more reasonable distribution of precinct 6-E's vote would, of course, have given a substantially higher Republican percentage for ward 10.



Jackson, Mississippi, has 50 voting wards which were also used as reporting areas for the census. Mississippi had four parties competing for the vote. The Republican party is still plagued with an ancient division between the lily-white and the black-and-tan factions. Each faction ran a set of electors although both sets were pledged to vote for Eisenhower. The fourth party was a States' Rights group, whose electors were uncommitted to any presidential candidate. The black-and-tans polled only 4.6 per cent of the vote, but the other three parties had an approximately equal three-way split of the remaining vote. The Democrats had a slight plurality with some 34 per cent, the lily-whites followed with 33 per cent, and the States' Righters with 28 per cent. The combined total of both factions of the Republican party amounted to 37.5 per cent of the total vote. It is worth emphasizing that the Democratic party secured only 34 per cent of the total vote. The impression is rather widespread that the Democratic party is the party of the South, particularly of the Deep South -- and how much deeper can one get into the South than Jackson, Mississippi? Yet, when confronted with these several alternatives, the good citizens of Jackson gave the Democratic party little more than one-third of the vote.

Class and race had an effect on choice among the four parties. Let us extract from Jackson's 50 wards certain wards that can clearly be defined as upper-income white, middle-income white, and Negro. The first step in the process is to rank all 50 wards first in terms of home values, then in terms of average rental. Then from among the top wards in rent and value one selects those with only a negligible number of Negro residents. Ten wards were designated "upper-income-white." Eight of the ten are in the top quartile of both home value and rental; the remaining two were in the top quartile of the kind of occupancy predominating in that ward and high in the second quartile of the other type of occupancy. There were only 26 Negro dwelling units in the entire area.<sup>9</sup> The ten wards designated as "middle-income-white" have less than 3 per cent of their dwelling units occupied by Negroes, and these wards fall in either the second or third quartile of both rent and value. The nine Negro wards have some 73 per cent of their dwelling units occupied by non-whites.<sup>10</sup> The results of all this cogitation and computation are set forth in Table 6.

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9. The term "dwelling unit" as used by the census implies the units that would normally be occupied by a single family. Thus, an apartment within a multiple-unit apartment house constitutes a "dwelling unit."

10. Although there is less Negro voting in Mississippi than in any other state in the South, there is no doubt that a substantial number of Negroes were qualified to vote in Hinds county in 1956. The Southern Regional Council's special report on the subject, which quotes the State Times, fixes the figure at 4,305. Hinds county, which houses Jackson, accounts for the lion's share of Negro registration in the state.

TABLE 6  
1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

	Democrats	Lily-white Republicans	Black-and-Tan Republicans	States' Righters
Upper-income whites	22.50	43.87	0.33	33.25
Middle-income whites	40.16	30.98	0.6	28.24
Negroes	34.89	24.34	21.1	19.66
City average	34.20	32.88	4.58	28.32

Among upper-income whites the Democratic party emerges as a poor third among the three parties. Almost twice as many prosperous Jacksonians preferred the Republican party to the Democratic party. Among middle-income people the Democratic party is the plurality rather than the majority party. It occupies a roughly 4-3-3 position with respect to the Republicans and States' Righters. However, as compared to the upper-income group, almost twice the percentage of middle-income people favor the Democratic party. As elsewhere, a clear split between Republicans and Democrats exists on an income basis. By contrast it is doubtful whether there is any relation between income and support of the States' Rights party. The Mississippi States' Righters were spiritual descendants of the 1948 Dixicrats. Their general philosophy was, "Both parties are too soft on the Negro question." The roughly five percentage-point difference between upper-income and middle-income classes in their support of the States' Rights party is considerably less than their disagreement along Democratic-Republican lines.

Few people will be surprised to note that the black-and-tan Republicans secured less than one per cent of the vote in the two white areas. The black-and-tans did considerably better in the Negro wards. On the theory that a vote for Eisenhower is a vote for Eisenhower, one can add together the lily-white and the black-and-tan percentages. This produces in the Negro wards a Republican total of 45.4 per cent. Jackson Negroes thus emerge as the city's most enthusiastic Republican group, a few percentage-points above the upper-income whites. Their support of the Democrats puts them about midway between the upper- and middle-income whites. There is no sure explanation for the almost 20 per cent of the vote going to the Independent or States' Rights electors. Probably the safest

guess is to recall that only 73 per cent of the dwelling units in this area were occupied by Negroes.<sup>11</sup>

Although the States' Righters made no more than a respectable showing in Jackson, they led in Charleston, South Carolina, rolling up a 46.7 per cent plurality. The Republicans secured an even one-third of the total vote, and the Democrats dragged along behind with an even 20 per cent. This is the one southern city examined in which there was not a strong relationship between the Republican party and the more prosperous wards. Wards 1 and 2 are the venerable city's silk-stockings wards. In both average values of dwellings and average rent they are far and away above any of the city's other ten wards. In these two wards some 70 per cent of the voters supported Independent electors. Only one voter in five liked Ike, and only one in twenty deigned to support the Democratic party.

The only other ward whose residents can be clearly designated is ward 9, seven-eighths of whose residents are Negroes. Since Charleston County with 6,000 colored registrants is a permissive area respecting Negro voting, we may assume that most votes in ward 9 were cast by Negroes. Back in 1952 ward 9 was 39 per cent Republican. In 1956 its 48 per cent Republican made it the top Republican ward in the city. While Negroes were the most enthusiastic Eisenhower supporters in Charleston, they were also the most enthusiastic Stevenson supporters. This same ward gave the Democrat his highest per cent of the twelve wards -- 44 per cent. Apparently Negro Charleston is about evenly split between the two national parties, whereas 70 per cent of the "best people" of white Charleston repudiated both national parties. The only characteristic common to both Negroes and upper-income whites is that both are moving away from the Democratic party, the Negroes haltingly, the whites precipitately.

Of the cities examined to date the prevailing pattern among upper-income whites has been consistent support of Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956. Certainly this has been true of Jacksonville, Mobile, and suburban Birmingham. Not so Charleston. In 1952 silk-stockings wards 1 and 2 gave Eisenhower 91 per cent of their vote; in 1956 the comparable figure was 21 per cent. Note that this extreme disenchantment was not paralleled in other cities. The voters of Mobile had an

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11. A varying approach is to throw out of consideration the four of the nine Negro wards with the lowest percentages of Negro occupancy. The remaining five then had nearly 80 per cent occupancy. A recomputation of party percentages on the basis of these five wards produces no startlingly different results. The Democrats secured 33.0 percentage, the lily-whites 25.0 per cent, the black-and-tans 25.8 per cent, and the States' Righters 16.2 per cent. Adding together the returns from the two branches of the Republican party produces a Republican total of 50.8 per cent, giving a clear majority for the Republicans in the Negro wards.



opportunity to vote for a similar slate of independent electors. Yet only 3 per cent of the voters in Mobile's two most prosperous wards availed themselves of this opportunity. Speculation about the reason for Charleston's atypical behavior might start by observing that the standard pattern for southern cities was very substantial growth in population between 1940 and 1950. Even Jackson, Mississippi, which makes no claim to being a major metropolis, grew from 62,000 in 1940 to nearly 100,000 in 1950. Charleston's population in 1940 was 71,000-plus; in 1950, 70,000-plus. Possibly this willingness to vote for Republican nominees is more pronounced among people who are making a good thing of it in thriving and rapidly growing cities.<sup>12</sup>

The perils of generalizing about "the South" can be brought out clearly by following an analysis of Charleston with one of Dallas, Texas. Dallas grew from a 1940 population of 294,000 to one of 434,000 in 1950. If the concept "southern" is associated with a large Negro population, let it be noted that the Negro population of Dallas is only slightly over 13 per cent, a smaller per cent Negro than Cleveland, Detroit, or Philadelphia. The personality and traditions of Charleston date back to a remote period of American history. As recently as 1880 Dallas had a population of 10,000. It is probably safe to say that the city of Dallas has been molded relatively more by recent history than the more venerable city in South Carolina. This may explain the difference in voting behavior of the two communities. Although the citizens of Dallas county had an opportunity to vote for States' Righter T. Coleman Andrews, only nine-tenths of one per cent of the voters availed themselves of this opportunity. Instead they gave Eisenhower 65.1 per cent of the vote (and elected a Republican congressman as well) and gave the Democratic nominee only 34 per cent. The enthusiasm of Dallasites for Eisenhower is indicated by the fact that of the county's 164 boxes, Eisenhower had a majority in 129.

Another contrast between Charleston and Dallas is in the difficulty of analyzing election returns. In Charleston both census data and election returns were reported from the same areas. In Dallas county there are 164 voting precincts, most of them within the city limits; however, census data is furnished by 94 census tracts which rarely coincide with precinct boundaries. Although there are several methods of attack on this type of problem (and it is encountered again in the cases of Richmond, Memphis, and Charlotte), there is no entirely satisfactory solution. The problem is to relate precincts to census areas, or rather to relate some precincts to some census areas.

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12. In this case one could explain Charleston's 1952 support for Eisenhower on the ground that his supporters interpreted his expressed concern for preserving state powers as meaning "states' rights" in the restricted southern sense--that is, state control over race relations. Of course, some loyal Charlestonian might attack this whole notion by observing that Charleston county experienced a 35 per cent growth between 1940 and 1950.

All of the larger census tracts give, in addition to information about rent and home value, the median income for families and single individuals. All tracts for which income is available may then be ranked from highest to lowest and quartiled. The next step is an operation in comparative map-making. One seeks to find precincts located wholly within a census tract. Or a permissible variation on this procedure is to locate a voting precinct located within two census tracts both of which are in the top quartile of income. A median annual income of \$4,102 or more puts a census tract in the top-income quartile. Thus, if a voting precinct is split among as many as three census tracts all of which are in the top-income quartile, we may still assume that it is located in an area that does not drop in income below the \$4,102 dividing line. By a similar process, precincts may be identified as being wholly within second, third, and fourth quartile income tracts. We must note that the number of precincts in each of these four categories is not equal. The only claim that can be made here is that there have been isolated some 58 precincts about which we have satisfactory data as to the economic status of their residents.<sup>13</sup>

The results are set forth in Table 7. The top-quartile precincts display the usual enthusiasm for the Republican party and the coolness toward the Democrats. Indicative of the fact that there is no direct correlation between income and Republican enthusiasm is the fact that the third quartile is somewhat more Republican than the second. The fourth quartile is coolest toward the Republicans and is the only one in which Stevenson secured a majority. When one uses this method of overlaying one jigsaw puzzle over another, it becomes extremely difficult to separate income and race. The fourth quartile contains a number of precincts with a majority of Negro residents and so must be thought of as a low-income, racially-mixed voting area. A closer estimate of Negro voting performance can be had by spotting three precincts located in tracts in which the population is 75 per cent or more Negro. The 2,700-odd votes of this area went approximately 61 per cent to Stevenson and 38 per cent to Eisenhower.

In Richmond, Eisenhower's percentage increased slightly between the two elections. In 1952 Richmond went roughly 60 per cent Republican, 40 per cent Democratic. In 1956 Eisenhower had nearly 62 per cent of the vote, the Democratic percentage had dropped to 24, and Richmond's own T. Coleman Andrews, running on a States' Rights ticket, secured 14 per cent. Thus, the Republicans scored a slight gain while the Democrats lost substantially.

Here again the method is to identify some precincts of known economic characteristics in the face of the obstacle that the boundaries of the city's 68 precincts and 61 census tracts do not coincide. The first step is to rank the 61 census tracts first by average home value, then in a second list by average rental. Both lists are quartiled. The next step is to locate all precincts lying entirely

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13. The main theoretical problem here deals with the representative character of these precincts. What is covered is 58 out of 164 precincts and roughly one-third of the county's total vote.

TABLE 7  
1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN DALLAS

Income Quar- tile in Which Precinct is Located	Number of Precincts	Income Levels	Per Cent		Independent
			Democratic	Republican	
1st	25	over \$4,102	19.8	79.1	1.1
2nd	14	3,227- 4,035	38.4	60.7	0.9
3rd	8	2,760- 3,185	33.4	65.4	1.2
4th	11	less than 2,486	50.2	48.4	1.4
Negro Pcts.	3		60.9	38.1	1.0
Dallas County	164		34.0	65.1	0.9

within census tracts that are in the top quartile of home value. An additional check is to require that these precincts lie within the top quartile of average rental. Thus, all precincts designated "upper-income precincts" are located in tracts in which the average value of owner-occupied houses exceeds \$11,000 and in which the average monthly rent of rented dwellings exceeds \$51 a month. These are overwhelmingly white precincts. These fifteen precincts are located in nine census tracts, seven of which have a Negro population of three per cent or less, two with nine and ten per cent. The four middle-income-white precincts lie entirely within second-quartile tracts of both home value and rent. Average home values range from \$7,000 to \$11,000, average rents from \$31 to \$49. Three of the precincts are located in tracts of one per cent Negro, the fourth in a tract six per cent colored. A truly all-white and low-income precinct is almost impossible to locate. Precinct 6 straddles a third and fourth quartile tract of home value and rent. One of these tracts is around 12 per cent Negro, the other 22 per cent. The four "Negro precincts" are located entirely within tracts that are two-thirds or more Negro. This procedure accounts for 24 of the city's 68 precincts and some 17,000 of approximately 44,000 votes cast.

Table 8 shows the usual bulge of strength for Eisenhower in the upper-income precincts. Whereas Ike secured nearly 70 per cent of the vote, only one voter in six supported Stevenson. The Republican enthusiasm declined to 49 per cent in the middle-income-white group and to 38 per cent in the low-income-white group. However, since the last group includes only one precinct and only 300 votes, any inferences drawn from it should be treated with great reservation. The percentage polled by States' Righter Coleman Andrews in the middle-income-white group is nearly twice that polled in the top-income-white group. This contrasts with Jackson and Charleston where third



TABLE 8  
1952 AND 1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RICHMOND

	Number of Precincts	1952 Per Cent Demo- cratic	1952 Per Cent Repub- lican	1956 Per Cent Demo- cratic	1956 Per Cent States' Rights	1956 Per Cent Repub- lican
Upper-income white	15	19.42	80.57	17.62	12.72	69.64
Middle-income white	4	38.19	61.8	27.26	23.66	49.07
Low-income white	1	64.3	35.67	48.0	13.66	38.33
Negro	4	82.2	17.8	26.4	2.15	71.42
City	68	39.6	60.3	24.3	13.9	61.8

party sentiment was strongest at the highest income levels. The Negro precincts with their 71 per cent for Eisenhower were considerably more Republican than Negro precincts in other southern cities. In 1952 the same four precincts had given Eisenhower only 18 per cent of their total vote. If the Negroes had changed, the same cannot be said of the behavior of the upper-income whites. The same precincts that were most enthusiastic for Eisenhower in 1952 were also his top supporters in 1956. States' Righter Andrews cut into this vote, but generally prosperous whites remained faithful to the Republican nominee. Specifically, in 1952 the fifteen top-income-whites gave the Republicans 80 per cent and the Democrats only 20. By 1956 the Republican support had dropped 10 percentage points, the Democratic two percentage points. The most prosperous citizens of Richmond registered some small degree of disenchantment with Eisenhower, but the effect of this disenchantment was not a return to the Democratic party; to which they gave a slightly lower percentage than in 1952.

The city of Charlotte, North Carolina, presents difficulties of analysis not easily surmounted. For census purposes the city is divided into only eleven wards. For a city of 135,000 there are not established very minute groupings in terms of income. However, a quick sample will indicate that the upper-income trend towards the Republican party is reproduced here. Wards 7 and 8 are the two high wards both in home value (average values \$18,000-plus and \$12,000-plus and in average rent. Negro population in both wards is slightly less than seven per cent. There are seven precincts that are wholly within these two top-income wards. After ranking the city's 33 precincts by per cent Republican, one can examine the Republican vote of the seven precincts within the two most prosperous wards. It turns out that six of these seven precincts are the first six of the 33 precincts ranked by per cent Republican. They range from 73.6 to 82 per cent Republican. The next two ranking precincts -- that is, rank numbers 7 and 8 -- are largely but not wholly within these two

wards. In addition, contiguous to some of these precincts but outside the city limits (hence, outside the realm of census data) are three precincts which, if included in the ranking system, would take places 5, 6, and 7. The speculation is that -- and it is only a speculation-- when you move from one of the city's best residential areas and continue out across the city limits you are more likely to find another exclusive residential area than a roaring slum.

Our final city, Memphis, is handled by a slightly different method. Here again the problem of method arises from the fact that Memphis has 130 voting precincts, and the city is divided into 88 census tracts. Boundaries of the two areas rarely coincide. As usual one computes the per cent Republican of the total vote for each of the 130 precincts, ranks them by per cent Republican, and marks off the quartiles. Then the census tracts are ranked, first, by average home value, and then by average rent. Quartiles are marked off on both rankings. There follows the chore of comparative map-making, that is, indicating the census tract or tracts within which a precinct is located. In Memphis the chances are that a precinct will be located in two or more different census tracts. One then turns to the 130 precincts, ranked from 78.6 Republican on down, and assigns to each precinct a quartile number in terms of home-value quartiles. Thus, no one will be startled to learn that the top seven precincts were located entirely within top-quartile, home-value census tracts. Some of these were located entirely within one census tract; one precinct was partly in two census tracts, each of which were top-quartile tracts for home value; and another precinct contained parts of four census tracts, each one in the top quartile of census tracts for home value. Naturally some parts of the Republican top-quartile precincts appear in the lower quartiles of home value. One now focuses his attention on the top 33 precincts in terms of per cent Republican, that is, the top quartile of 130 Memphis precincts ranked in terms of per cent Republican. One first adds up the total number of home-value quartiles in which these 33 precincts appear; this adds up to 55.<sup>14</sup> The next step is to note how many of these 55 home-value quartile appearances involve the first quartile, second quartile, etc. If Eisenhower support came exclusively from the wealthy, all 55 would theoretically be top quartile appearances. In a general way the results suggest the relationship between income and party preference that has appeared in other cities. Of 55 possible quartile appearances in Eisenhower's top quartile, 31 were in the top quartile of home values. In the Republican fourth quartile, top-quartile home-value tracts appeared only two out of a possible 60 times. Essentially the same story emerges when the computation is repeated in terms of average rental. A shortcoming of this method is that it measures economic status only. It takes no cognizance of race. In several other cities it has been apparent that Negroes, living in low-value and low-rent residential areas, voted much more heavily

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14. Clearly this does not mean 55 different census tracts. It refers rather to the number of possible quartile appearances.

Republican than whites in a similar economic status. This method probably understates the class division in voting among whites.

Unless these southern metropolises are somehow unrepresentative of the urban South, we may conclude that the upper-income groups in southern cities voted Republican in 1956 by margins that would be regarded as impressive in any part of the nation. And most prosperous folks had voted the same in 1952. The well-to-do of Charleston defected to a third party, but this was chiefly a curiosity. Where there were smaller degrees of defection, as in Jackson and Richmond, the Republican was still the most popular party among the prosperous; and in most of the biggest centers the third party did not even make a serious dent. Less adequate data indicate that the middle-income and low-income white groups were much more loyal to the Democratic party, the general pattern appearing to be the lower the income the greater the loyalty. The most arresting feature of Negro voting was the shift from an overwhelmingly Democratic vote in 1952 to an even split in 1956.

All that the foregoing indicates is how various classes of people voted in 1956. In no strictly scientific sense does it justify a prediction of future behavior. In fact, the prediction of voting behavior based solely on past performance can be misleading. For instance, any one basing a prediction solely on the southern Negro's overwhelming support of Stevenson in 1952 would not accurately have predicted his behavior in 1956. However, the very title of our panel, "Development of Opposition Parties in the South," almost forces one into the realm of speculation. "Development" implies a growth, a gradual unfolding, a continuing advance. The term does not describe the illumination of the photographer's flash bulb, which is brilliant but transitory. So our first question is whether we have a "development." Very practically, the question is: "After Ike, will we return to Democratic normalcy?" This is what the South did after Hoover's successes of 1928.

There certainly will be no development in the sense that the five southern states carried by Eisenhower in 1956 can be expected to reappear regularly in the Republican column. Nor does it follow that since the Republicans polled 53 per cent in Texas in 1952 and 55 per cent in 1956 they will get 57 per cent in 1960. Presidential Republicanism in the South will vary with the strength of the party in the nation. The years 1928, 1952, and 1956 were banner years for the Republicans in the nation and in the South; the years 1932 through 1948, both inclusive, were lean years for the party in the nation and in the South. In years when the Republicans lose New York and California, they will not carry Texas and Tennessee. The most sensitive test, in a year when the Republicans lose Texas and Tennessee, will be whether their per cent of the vote drops back to what it was in 1944, the last year of Democratic normalcy. Or another approach is to use the analogy of the Democratic party in various midwestern states where it holds few county and state offices. In the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa the Democratic party is normally the minority party. However, in years of great Democratic successes such as 1932 and 1936, these normally Republican states support the



Democratic nominee. It will be in this sense that the states of the South -- rather some states of the South -- will be brought into the presidential race.

The expression "presidential Republicanism" has been used in the foregoing comments to distinguish it from the situation of a Republican party putting up a full slate of candidates from U.S. senator down to a county commissioner. The development of an enduring presidential Republicanism is much more likely than the development of, say, a set of Republican nominees contesting the Democrats for county offices in each of Texas' 254 counties. To be sure, there is a relationship between presidential Republicanism and the grass-roots variety. However, the relation needs to be clarified. Presidential Republicanism tends to encourage Republican candidates for state and local offices. Witness in 1956 the Republican slates of candidates for state legislature in Memphis, Charlotte, and Houston. Note also Republican Congressmen elected from Dallas and Charlotte and the serious races made by Republican nominees for Congress in New Orleans, Birmingham, Atlanta, Memphis, Houston, and Richmond. It matters not that most aspirants were unsuccessful. The important fact is that the surge of Republican enthusiasm generated by Eisenhower's candidacy motivated serious Republican contests for these offices. With a popular champion at the head of the ticket, many lesser Republicans were encouraged to attempt to ride in on his coattails. The activating effect on the traditional minority party in a state of a highly popular presidential nominee has been discussed in V. O. Key's State Politics, and it applies to several non-southern states where the Democratic party is a traditional minority party.<sup>15</sup>

However, this coattail effect of presidential Republicanism develops its own counterforce. Many conservative Democratic officeholders who deplore "this socialistic nonsense" that goes on in Washington and who drag their feet during presidential campaigns can not be indifferent to serious state and local competition. The situation of the Byrd organization in Virginia is a case in point. It is one thing for the organization to back the Republican presidential nominee in the hope of securing a reliable, budget-balancing president. It is an entirely different matter to have a Virginia Republican party contest nine of the state's ten congressional seats, take two of them away from you, and give you a most disquieting scare in the other races. Here are a host of Democrats holding state and local offices who are not desirous of encouraging serious Republican competitors. Inasmuch as presidential Republicanism tends to encourage the state and local variety, there eventually will be reached a point beyond which it will no longer be prudent for state and local Democratic politicians to flirt with presidential Republicanism. The reasoning utilized with respect to Virginia applies with equal force to other southern states.

Moreover, it would be easy to exaggerate the number of southern voters who want Republican local officials. What would be

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15. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), Ch. 2.

accomplished by electing Republican sheriffs and county commissioners? It is only presidential one-party politics about which so many Southerners are unhappy. Fear of the more liberal orientation of the Democratic party nationally does not make it sensible for you to throw the Democrats out of the local courthouse. If they are understanding fellows with whom you have considerable influence, it would be madness to replace them.

The burden of this argument is that some degree of presidential Republicanism is here to stay in the urban South. This is not to say that Republican nominees will in the future do as well as Eisenhower did in 1956; rather it is to say that they will never do as poorly as Dewey did in 1944. A skeptic might recall that Hoover's 1928 successes in the South were followed by a Republican drop into near oblivion in 1932 and from this predict a return to Democratic "normalcy" in 1960 and beyond. "Normalcy" defined as a return to the Democratic percentages of 1940 and 1944 is a most improbable development. Possibly too much attention has been focused on Republican gains and not enough on Democratic losses. Although between 1952 and 1956 the Republicans scored percentage-point gains in seven states, the Democrats in the same period suffered a percentage-point loss in all eleven states. These losses range from 13-plus per cent in Louisiana to 1-plus per cent in Tennessee, the median being in the neighborhood of 3 per cent. Also indicative of discontent with the Democratic party is the fact that only Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina supported the Democratic presidential nominee consistently in the elections of 1948, 1952, and 1956. In each of these three elections either four or five states wandered off to support the nominee of a different party. In 1948 four states veered off to the Dixiecrats; in 1952 a different group of four turned to the Republicans; and in 1956 five states backed the Republicans.<sup>16</sup> The fact that some Southerners are riding off with the Republicans and others to a third party indicates indecision on where they want to go but demonstrates agreement on disenchantment with the Democratic party. Some Southerners are more unhappy about the racial policies of the Democratic party, others about its economic policies. To expect a return to earlier Democratic solidarity is to ignore many of the changes of the last quarter of a century. It is easy to demonstrate the movement away from the Democratic party; the only question that need concern us is whether this movement is toward the Republican party.

In fact, a more substantial attack on the idea of developing presidential Republicanism in the urban South would take the form of predicting the growth of a third party -- a return to the Dixiecrats. This is entirely possible. Both of the major parties have endorsed racial policies unacceptable to large numbers of persons in the South. These are politically displaced persons who may seek a political homeland in a revival of the States' Rights party of 1948. The fact that such a party would be unlikely to effect the nation's electoral vote has no relevance to the question of such a party being launched, for

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16. Louisiana played it both ways. In 1948 she supported the States' Righters, in 1956 the Republicans.



its role can not be explained by logic but rather by the emotional satisfactions derived by its followers. However, the center of strength of such a third party will not be the urban South so its appearance has only indirect bearing on the argument. The majority of persons who find the racial policies of both major parties anathema to them are the rural, blackbelt whites. They were the chief supporters of the States' Rights party of 1948 and will be the chief backers of such a party if one is launched in the future. Although States' Righter Coleman Andrews managed to eke out 14 per cent of the vote in his native Richmond, the third party of 1956 secured only a ridiculously small support in such major centers as Memphis, Dallas, Houston, New Orleans, and Mobile. Presumably the prosperous urban Southerner, who is the most enthusiastic supporter of Republican presidential nominees, is a person who, while opposing integration, is more concerned with such problems as taxes, organized labor, and the role of government in economic life.

In 1952 the Republicans polled their highest percentages from the prosperous white urbanites. In 1956 this group remained loyal to Eisenhower, and they were joined by about half of their Negro neighbors. This new source of Republican strength may have been under-emphasized. Negroes are moving to the big cities of the South as well as to Chicago and Detroit, and in the southern city they find fewest obstacles to voting. Certainly, much of the Negro's political future in the South will be in the cities. Several events since 1956 might dispose Negroes favorably toward a Republican president and embitter them toward southern Democratic governors. If anything, a continued swing toward the Republican party is indicated. Yet the great change in Negro voting preferences between 1952 and 1956 suggests that here is an unstable vote, one unsure of where its best interests lie. Predictions about its future are hazardous. By contrast, one can demonstrate a fairly consistent trend in the behavior of prosperous, urban whites. The urban receptivity to the Republican party must not be associated merely with the year 1956 or even 1952. As far back as 1948 Thomas Dewey was doing remarkably well in large southern centers. Dallas favored him with 37 per cent of its vote, Houston gave the same percentage, as did Charlotte. In Richmond it was 42 per cent. One has to go back to 1944 in Richmond to find a time when the Democratic nominee secured a majority of the vote. In Memphis and New Orleans in 1948 the figure was close to 24 per cent; in Jacksonville it was 28; in Atlanta, 23. This urban Republicanism increased dramatically in 1952 and continued at approximately the same level in 1956. These two latter elections brought out the peculiar affinity to the Republican party of upper-income urbanites.<sup>17</sup> Prosperous Southerners are now showing the same political preferences as their economic counterparts outside the South. Here one may see the abandonment of ancient loyalties forged a century ago and their replacement by voting based on calculations of class advantage. Unless the two parties abandon their recent policy orientation, one may predict the continuation of an impressive amount of presidential

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17. The author's "The 1952 Presidential Election in the South" in the August, 1955, Journal of Politics emphasizes the strength of the party in the upper-income areas of the cities.



Republicanism among this group. An examination of southern election returns in 1960 and 1964 can validate or disprove this thesis. Of course, no Republican nominee can be expected to have the Eisenhower appeal nor receive quite the same degree of support. However, if the Republicans elect a president, they will receive somewhat the same disproportionate degree of support from the cities and from the same areas within the cities. If the Republicans do not elect a president, they will lose support throughout the region, but the cities and the prosperous sections thereof will remain proportionately the areas of strongest support for the GOP, and this degree of support will not drop to anything resembling the 1944 level.

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LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION:  
COMPETING OR COMPLIMENTARY CONCEPTS?

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri,  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

Among students of administrative organizations at the "macro" level - that is, of organizations-in-the-round - the concept of leadership has not been a very central one in recent years. At the "micro" level of small group dynamics, leadership has continued to be a popular area for research, but to the rest of us the results frequently have seemed peripheral.

Does the virtual absence of leadership, in the research literature, mean that society has evolved types of organizations in which "headship" is sufficient and leadership no longer is required? More likely, I think, is the hypothesis that leadership does occur in administrative organizations, and that there are both theoretical and research deficiencies which account for the absence of leadership in our descriptions of administrative organizations.

On the research side there has been some tendency to apply the term "leadership" to all behavior of those in administrative positions, thus making administrative behavior and leadership synonymous and obscuring the issue. From the students of small groups there has also been a great variety of definitions attached to the term leadership in order to make possible the use of one or another research technique, and often with violence to the heart of the leadership concept.<sup>2</sup>

For understandable reasons researchers seldom observe administrative organizations through long periods of time. If leadership is an occasional phenomenon rather than a constant one in such organizations, it may not be observable during the time-samples we choose. Closely related to that possibility is the likelihood that leadership occurs most noticeably in the most complex organizations, and researchers by choice or necessity tend to work in simpler, more manageable systems. To the extent that this is true, we may have over-generalized about life and behavior in large organizations.

On the theoretical side, one deficiency which may have blinded us to leadership phenomena is the ancient distinction between policy and administration, which leaves organizational goals outside the province of administration and treats the organization as a passive tool. From this point of view,

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<sup>1</sup>For helpful discussions during the preparation of this paper, I am indebted to my colleagues, Peter B. Hammond, Buford H. Junker, and Arthur Tuden, at the University of Pittsburgh.

<sup>2</sup>For an excellent overview of the several small-group approaches to leadership, see Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," chapter 24 in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954.



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leadership is reserved for the policy-making body; and the most important questions to be asked about administrative organizations center around efficiency. Leadership by supervisors may be important, but the importance remains attached to the supervisory level. Thus leadership in organizations is recognized, but little thought is given to leadership of organizations.

Parallel results follow from the study of bureaucracy as defined by Max Weber. Here again each member of the organization routinely and mechanically carries out orders in a stable organization pursuing a fixed goal that is never questioned. From this point of view the most important questions have to do with the clarity with which roles are defined and the precision with which they are connected to one another.

One stream of theory, stemming from Barnard,<sup>3</sup> has called explicit attention to leadership. While it has stimulated considerable interest among theorists and writers of texts, surprisingly little use has been made of it in empirical research at the macro level.<sup>4</sup> This will be discussed more fully below.

The remarks which follow will argue that administrative organizations do require "leadership" as well as "headship," in varying proportions and at various times, and that therefore "administration" and "leadership" are overlapping rather than competing concepts.<sup>5</sup> I hope to show also that recent conceptual developments are equipping us with tools to search out and analyze leadership in administrative organizations, and that with these new tools it is possible to raise new and significant questions.

#### Working Definitions

Precise, formal definitions of leadership and headship are not necessary for purposes of this exposition, but we must have some bench marks for what is to follow. I suggest that there are four elements in each of these terms as we commonly think of them, that three elements are common to leadership and headship, but that the fourth provides the crucial basis for distinction. Elements common to both include:

1. Presence of a group whose members are in interaction with one another or are otherwise interdependent.
2. Group movement toward or away from something external to it, thus eliminating those groups which are formed only to provide collectively for the satisfaction of desires or needs of individual members.

<sup>3</sup>Chester I. Barnard, Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938.

<sup>4</sup>Philip Selznick's Leadership in Administration (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957) has challenged us to look anew at the concept of leadership if we wish to understand large organizations in action. His forceful presentation may well join Barnard's Functions of the Executive and Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior as a landmark.

<sup>5</sup>They cannot be treated as synonyms, however, since leadership obviously occurs in groups which are not administrative organizations.

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3. Choice by one member, or a portion of the membership, of goals for the group, thus eliminating those situations in which group members pursue a common goal because of spontaneous unanimity.

The fourth element - and the critical one - is motivational. In the case of leadership, the fourth element seems to be election by group members to pursue the designated goal. Thus it rests on such motivational factors as identification with the goal and loyalty to the organization. In the case of headship, the fourth element seems to be compliance by group members with activities required by the goal. This appears to rest on such motivational factors as obedience, discipline, or bargained agreement.

These concepts as defined above are not unlike Barnard's distinctions between the authority of power or position and the authority of leadership. Barnard starts with a concept of authority as deriving from the consent of those subject to it and existing only so long as they remain able and willing to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems. For the individual committed to membership there exists a "zone of acceptance;" the authority of position defines which messages and message-centers will be recognized as authoritative, so long as the messages remain within that zone. But the authority of leadership, as Barnard sees it, is the strategic factor in cooperation, essential in attaining the conviction, willingness, and commitment of members.<sup>6</sup>

#### EMERGING CONCEPTS

The ideas with which we undertake research have much to do with the richness of our observations. I believe we are emerging from an era of relative poverty, but that the change has come about so gradually that we have not yet realized the full significance and power of our treasury of concepts. In this section I would like to discuss three variables which earlier contained only polar extremes, or blacks and whites, but which have gradually been converted into continuous, or shaded, variables. I think they may combine to give us rather powerful new foci for research into complex organizations, their leadership, and their administration.

#### Organization as a Variable

For centuries it has been customary to think of organizations as differing. The academic community has adopted the definitions of practitioners and has developed separate educational programs around business firms, public agencies, hospitals, schools, etc.<sup>7</sup>

More recently Barnard, Simon, and others have challenged the old classifications by emphasizing the similarities of organizational fundamentals - the elements common to all of these types. The result has been general acceptance

<sup>6</sup>In Functions of the Executive, op. cit. pp. 173 ff.

<sup>7</sup>Differences among these are inescapable and, for the practitioner, meaningful. Categories useful for action may or may not be the most meaningful for research, however, and our reliance on the practitioner as the authority has slowed the search for other ways of viewing organizations. However useful the concepts of practitioners, they never represent the totality of experience.

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of the notion that organizations are different in some respects but similar in others. A still more recent reorientation is that organizations which are in fact different from one another nevertheless can be compared.

Thus we have arrived at the point where we are looking for variables present in all organizations but differing in amount or degree from one organization to another. This is a very different matter from classifying organizations as public or private, profit-seeking or service oriented.

Take, for example, the "zone of acceptance." Undoubtedly it varies from one organization to another because of different weights or combinations of factors which affect zones of acceptance. But what kinds of behavior are included and excluded, and how are the limits defined?

Bates and I have suggested elsewhere that the goals<sup>8</sup> of the organization dictate the technology<sup>9</sup> it can use, and this in turn has much to do with the width and content of the zone of acceptance. Briefly, here are some of the possibilities.

It appears that an important variable distinguishing various types of organizations is the extent to which the technology is lodged in human as contrasted with non-human resources. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to this as the ratio of mechanization to professionalization. When this ratio is high and the organization relies heavily on mechanical aspects of the technology, machine requirements serve as the basis for authority. Individual members know, when they join the organization or as soon as they have been trained, approximately what the machine will demand of them. Authority exercised over them by persons higher in the hierarchy tends to be restricted to insuring discipline to the machine requirement. Since the technology is a major factor governing members' behavior, and since the technology is relatively standardized, the zone of acceptance is seldom challenged, once the individual is committed to membership. In this kind of organization, therefore, consent regarding daily operations needs to be won only infrequently as, for example, when a new set of machines is installed and there is "resistance to technological change."

When the ratio of mechanization to professionalization is low, however, and the organization relies heavily on the skills and judgments of its members, the story is different. The bases for decision and action are no longer lodged in the external, impersonal machine, but rather are lodged as internalized norms in the person of the member. Discipline, compliance, and authority take on personal overtones in this kind of organization; zones of acceptance may be

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<sup>8</sup>James D. Thompson and Frederick L. Bates, "Technology, Organization and Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2 (December 1957), 325-343. By goals we mean the services or products an organization seeks to provide for other parts of the society. This is not to be confused with the motives of organization members. Whatever their motives, the organization must contribute something to merit support from outside. The determination of such goals goes a long way toward defining the technology which is appropriate.

<sup>9</sup>We are using the term technology in its broad sense as an integrated system of techniques, whether manual, mental, or machine.



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rather narrow; and consent may have to be won quite frequently.

Thus the kind of technology used by an organization has a bearing on the width and content of members' zones of acceptance, and hence on the organization's ability to rely on headship and compliance, or leadership and identification.

A closely related aspect of technology is the degree of heterogeneity of member skills required. Every complex organization distinguishes among classes, grades, or types of members, both hierarchically and functionally. These distinctions have the advantage of delimiting spheres of attention and concern and thereby increasing the development of specialized skills. But these distinctions also provide bases for comparison. Members of each category can examine their inducements/contributions ratios; compare with members of other categories, and draw conclusions about equity or fairness. The more categories, the more comparisons possible.<sup>10</sup>

Technical progress has for centuries been closely associated with the sub-division and specialization of activities. With rare exceptions, each technical advance has introduced new and finer bases for differentiation of behavior. This has been as true of advancement in the professional areas as in machine areas - as the history of the academic disciplines well illustrates. With these increasing sub-divisions there appears also increasing identification with sub-goals, and the familiar problems associated with "the good of the whole" rather than its separate parts.<sup>11</sup>

Variations in technology thus are associated with the amount of heterogeneity of activity in different organizations - or in the same organization through time. Differences in the number and nature of the groups to be administered undoubtedly have bearing on the kind of administration required, hence on the organization's needs for compliance and headship, or identification and leadership.

A third aspect of the technology is the nature of integration required. One technology may permit compartmentalization of effort so that each individual or group within the organization becomes relatively autonomous. Another technology may require sequential dependence, with each individual or group receiving the product of a preceding unit, adding an increment, and passing its results to another unit in chain fashion. Still a third technology may require

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<sup>10</sup>That members of organizations do suffer "relative deprivations" is well illustrated in the military case. The concept is introduced and amply illustrated in The American Soldier, Vol. I (Adjustment During Army Life) by S.A. Stouffer, E.A. Suchman, L.C. DeViney, S.A. Star, and R.M. Williams, Jr.

<sup>11</sup>The new field of operations research has also been caught up in this problem. It has tackled problems of sub-optimization with relative success, but has had trouble with overall optimizing. For a discussion of this problem see Charles J. Hitch, "Sub-optimization in Operations Problems," Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, Vol. I (May 1953), 87-99.

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the constant collaboration of differentiated specialists.<sup>12</sup>

An organization may be very heterogeneous without requiring much interaction among its several parts. This would be particularly true of the organization with a high ratio of mechanization to professionalization, or with multiple, discrete goals. There the flow of activity may be arranged so that the net result of each group is not dependent upon another. Even the organization with heavy dependence on professional activities may be able to segregate these activities, as the college divides its departments. The zones of acceptance may be different for each group, but the organization may deal more or less separately with each. Where the goal and the related technology call, however, for the integration of effort through the interaction of different professional specialists, the zones of acceptance are subject to frequent challenge. This would be true, for example, of the college which attempted to provide integrated, multi-disciplinary courses. Here an important aspect of administration is the existence of multiple groups vis a vis one another. The frequent failure of inter-disciplinary efforts to rise above a lowest common denominator and reach a creative level is evidence, I think, that headship without leadership is not enough for this kind of situation.

Thus by dictating the kinds of integration required of an organization's parts, technology again helps shape the kinds of problems faced by administrators. This undoubtedly has a bearing on the kinds of occasions and the frequencies with which headship and leadership must be exercised.

#### The Situation as a Variable

One of the conclusions emerging from small-group studies which has spilled over into the macro area is that the leadership situation has as much to do with leadership as do the traits of the individual in a position of leadership. The tendency of students of administration has been not only to accept that conclusion from small group research, but also to accept without critical scrutiny the secondary concepts used to define "the situation" in small group terms, i.e., in terms of a limited number of individuals united in direct interaction. Most small-group research is conducted under rather rigorous sets of restraints, and there seems no reason why the student of larger organizations must confine his attention to the limited number of items allowed to vary in the laboratory.

Here again I think there has been a reorientation of thinking which may lead in quite new directions. The change has been to shift attention from the situation of the leader vis a vis other members of the organization to focus on the situation of the organization vis a vis the larger world. This prepares us to look for concepts which describe "larger worlds" in meaningful ways and which will permit comparison of organizational environments in terms of "more or less," rather to contrast organizations as oriented to the market place or oriented toward a legislature.

Perhaps more than any other social science discipline, political

<sup>12</sup>These distinctions among types of integration were first called to my attention by Frederick L. Bates in informal memoranda in 1953. For recent empirical evidence that the distinctions can be important see William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2 (March 1958), 409-443.



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science is aware of the importance of organizational environment. This concern is reflected by the significance to the discipline of such structural concepts as pressure group, interest group, constituency, and clientele, and such process concepts as bargaining and cooptation.

These very real environmental forces undoubtedly affect the course an organization takes, as well as its rate of progress toward its goals. Administrators of governmental agencies are not alone in having to respond to outside forces. Business firms have customers and markets, competitors, suppliers, and regulatory agencies to think about. Churches must consider as well as alter the convictions of parishioners. Universities must think of students, parents, alumni, donors, and governmental units as well as the academic "market."<sup>13</sup>

If leadership includes choosing a direction and winning internal support for it, then modifications in direction brought about by environmental pressures must call for new exercise of leadership. To the extent that organization members have convictions about "proper" goals and "respectable" company, bargaining or cooptation may easily violate zones of acceptance.

This seems real enough, but I do not think we have developed adequate general concepts for dealing with environments from the organizational standpoint, and hence we have no systematic way of dealing with variations in administrative requirements caused by variations in environments. I will suggest three kinds of variables and their possible advantages.

One way of distinguishing among organizations, whether governmental, business, volunteer, or otherwise, is in terms of the heterogeneity of the environment. I am not speaking, necessarily, of the total community or society, but of those parts of the total social setting which are not indifferent to the organization. The more competing interests the organization faces, the more its administrators are circumscribed in presenting the organization to the world, and presumably the more difficult it is to maintain the willing participation of other members of the organization. Thus we might find leadership less frequently exercised in the organization with a comfortable, relatively homogeneous environment than in the organization facing many and constant pressures from a variety of sources. Or perhaps the leadership problem in the organization facing a heterogeneous, demanding environment centers on winning identification with shifting goals, while the leadership needed in the organization facing a comfortable environment is to forestall apathy by winning increased commitment to stable goals.

In any event the number and diversity of outside interests undoubtedly affect the problems administrators face in obtaining and maintaining members' compliance and commitment. Hence environmental heterogeneity has a bearing on demands for headship and for leadership.

A second important variable with which to sort organizations out is the amount of distinctiveness possessed by the organization in relation to its

<sup>13</sup>For a recent attempt to add some system to consideration of this topic, see James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review, Vol. 23 (February 1958), 23-31.



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environment. The organization with a unique and important role in the community or society - for example a hospital - is likely to enjoy appreciation and respect by the environment and thereby have members' identification and loyalty reinforced from outside. The organization which is an undistinguished unit among a large number of similar organizations probably must rely more on internal arrangements to provide motivational forces.

Distinctive organizations may be differentiated from their environments on at least two bases: technological skills or beliefs. Whereas the organization possessing neither of these distinctive characteristics may suffer from environmental indifference, the problems of distinctive organizations will vary depending on the basis of their distinctiveness. The belief-based sect, for example, must maintain homogeneity of beliefs by stressing their primacy over potentially disrupting differences based on age, sex, ethnic origin, economic status, etc. In this case the important environmental characteristic may not be appreciation or respect, but a sense of conflict or struggle between the organization and its environment.

Thus it appears that the amount and nature of contrast between the organization and its environment are important in determining the kinds of problems posed for administrators in maintaining and motivating membership, hence in determining the approximate occasions for headship or leadership.

In addition to (1) contrast or distinctiveness, and (2) environmental heterogeneity, there is the variable of organizational exposure to environment. Under some conditions, at least, constant exposure of members tends to erode their identification with the organization. Apparently this is especially true when organization members are constantly in interaction with the same groups outside the organization, and less true when members face a steady stream of clients or customers or suppliers on a one-visit basis. The frequency and regularity of interaction with interested non-members must have a bearing on members' identifications and hence on willingness to follow administrative leadership.

Similarly, the proportion of members exposed may vary from organization to organization and make a difference in the amount and kind of leadership behavior required. Where exposure pulls members' loyalties in different directions, the problem of maintaining membership and identification is not the same as in those organizations where the conflicting demands and interests are focused on a few administrators and largely resolved before being translated into programs and communicated to other members.

#### Deciding Man as a Variable

As Simon has pointed out<sup>14</sup> members of each hierarchical level in an organization are expected to make decisions within the bounds of premises established by members at higher levels. Much of our theoretical literature assumes that higher levels are the only sources of premises employed in organizational decisions and that within the confines of those premises, individuals and groups seek maximum output or payoff.

<sup>14</sup>Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957.

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This assumption frequently is attacked as assuming rationality on the part of irrational man. Simon more recently has given us another powerful tool in the concept of decision-making man as a satisfier rather than a maximizer.<sup>15</sup> This important reorientation immediately removes the basis for the ancient argument about man being either rational or irrational. But removing that trap, it permits us to raise questions about standards of satisfactoriness and their sources, and hence to consider those standards as continuous variables rather than dichotomous ones.

It would be a serious mistake to assume that the concept of man as a satisfier rather than maximizer applies only to individuals in lower levels of organizations. Administrators of whatever rank are human, too. Nevertheless it seems that leadership or headship at times requires raising or altering standards of satisfactoriness, thus acquiring different or more intense commitment of members. If the standards to which members refer in determining satisfactoriness vary, the following seem to be important determinants of those standards.

The degree to which empirical referents rather than social referents<sup>16</sup> are available probably is important in determining the clarity and the level of satisfactoriness to be employed by organization members in making decisions. Where premises or standards can be expressed in terms of quantity and measurable quality, groups probably tend to be uniform in accepting or rejecting such standards and in applying them. Where these premises or standards are expressed in terms of social judgments and values, consensus may be more difficult to achieve and more vulnerable to fluctuation.

It may well be that organizations lacking empirical referents directly related to their goals have particularly difficult administrative problems in this respect. In a society which glorifies measurement, there may be a tendency for organizational members to substitute quantifiable indices for more difficult judgments. The faculty member may judge or be judged in terms of number of papers published, student-hours taught, and grade averages, all of which can be quantified; and the administrative problem may then be to maintain primary attention on quality of teaching and research.<sup>17</sup>

The degree of empiricalness of standards available to the organization thus seems related to problems of compliance and motivation, and hence to the needs for headship and for leadership.

A second variable which appears to be important in determining levels of satisfactoriness is the extent to which standards of reference are external

<sup>15</sup>Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957. See especially chapters 14 and 15.

<sup>16</sup>For theoretical and empirical work on opinion validation by reference to "physical" or "social" reality, see Leon Festinger, et al, Theory and Experiment in Social Communication. Ann Arbor: Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, 1950.

<sup>17</sup>For an enlightening study of the interplay between standards and behavior, see Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.



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to the organization. There is likely to be a relationship between the ratio of mechanization to professionalization, on the one hand, and the extent to which internal standards are possible and available. The highly professionalized organization automatically acquires in its members certain sets of professional norms which define what is permissible or legitimate behavior and what is not. The judgments of professional colleagues scattered nation-wide may be as effective in determining standards in the professional organization as are official pronouncements of higher echelons.<sup>18</sup>

When standards are internal to the organization, or are inherent in its technology, satisfactoriness may tend to be judged in relation to past accomplishment or precedent, whereas when standards are external to the organization attention is less likely to be oriented to the past and more likely to be cast in terms of opportunity.

Whatever the facts of these relationships, it appears that the internal or external nature of standards have bearing on the kinds of motivation problems faced by the organization, and hence on questions of leadership and headship.

A third variable which affects levels of standards for organization members is time perspective. Conceivably two organizations with similar goals, technologies, and environmental settings could go in divergent ways - or unequal distances in the same direction - with variations in time perspectives prevailing in them. The rudderless opportunism of organizations lacking long-range objectives has been demonstrated repeatedly. If two or more alternatives are satisfactory for an immediate objective but have quite different implications for the extended future, the defining of time perspectives may be an important administrative problem.

Another aspect of time perspective is the frequency with which an organization achieves demonstrable accomplishment. The standby organization, or the group whose projects are few and long-term may be making significant progress without receiving evidence of progress. Problems of morale are likely to be more extensive in such an organization than in one which receives frequent proof that its efforts are paying off.

Thus it appears that members' perspectives of relevant time are important in determining the kinds of problems posed for the administrator, and hence have a bearing on leadership and headship.

In this section I have tried to suggest how three variables - technology, environment, and decision-standards - may differ from organization to organization with changing consequences for administration. The variables sketched above provide ways of distinguishing between organizations and their administrative problems which do not depend on the usual distinctions between business, government, military, etc.; they may be as useful for comparing hospitals, universities, and factories. For purposes of emphasis I have illustrated these variables with extreme cases, but I think it is possible to think of each variable as

<sup>18</sup>Reference group theory, and research based on it, are relevant in this connection. For a recent study in the setting of higher education, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2 (December 1957), 281-306, and Vol. 2 (March 1958), 444-480.



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having gradations, and perhaps it is even possible to think of measuring these variables well enough to rank various organizations in terms of them.

#### BLENDS OF HEADSHIP AND LEADERSHIP

The evidence seems clear that even in those informal groups which have no written by-laws, tables of organization, or officers, leadership is not exercised constantly. Clearly, in the administrative organization, prescribed and informal patterns carry much of the day-to-day activity. Operating within a framework of authority and expectations which have been generally accepted by members, administrative officers may make decisions about goals and programs which neither violate the willingness of members nor challenge their personal commitment to organizational goals. Within this same framework, administrative "controls" in the form of standards and of procedures for measuring performance against them may be manipulated effectively.

Leadership is not a complete substitute for headship. It is inconceivable that our complex organizations could operate if every modification in goals, every elaboration of technology, every response to environmental pressure had to be preceded by a membership vote. Administrative organizations are possible only because they can establish some regularity of expectations regarding what inducements and what contributions will be exchanged in the future. Within this general area of understanding, headship is possible and often necessary.

Presumably, however, there are critical periods in the life of every organization, when radical changes occur in the basic variables. It seems reasonable to believe that serious changes may call for leadership rather than headship. There may also be times in the life of an organization when gradual changes are occurring in such small increments as to go unnoticed, and when leadership rather than headship is necessary to shock and reorient organization members.

It thus seems likely that every organization faces some situations for which headship is essential, and other situations for which leadership is necessary. It is equally plausible that every organization faces situations for which leadership and headship are alternatives. The proportions will vary, I think, with the values of the types of variables described above, and hence will vary from time to time within a given organization.

The "cure" for an apathetic organization, for example, might be achieved through charisma on the part of an administrator, or by placing the organization in a more challenging or threatening environment, or by housecleaning and replacement of personnel, or by the deliberate creation of conflict or competition among parts of the organization.

In the highly professionalized, heterogeneous organization requiring considerable integration of effort, the several groups are likely to develop differing interpretations of goals and inconsistent expectations of one another with respect to goals. Perhaps headship may control the behavior of such groups within limits, or establish departments or divisions with specialized exposures; but leadership may provide a positive push to counteract differences without reducing or sacrificing the integration of the organization.

The organization with long-range goals and with both organizational

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and environmental heterogeneity may develop extreme caution regarding short-run alternatives. In such a situation headship may result in a choice of a course of action and the establishment of controls and measurement, but leadership may provide boldness and enthusiasm without these measures.

There is a wide range of combinations, conceivably, where differing proportions of headship and leadership are possible and likely. This line of reasoning leads to a number of questions of potential significance.

One: A good case can be made for the contention that administration in our society and era tends to emphasize headship over leadership. Schooled in "scientific management," obsessed with tests and measurements, preoccupied with the minimization of conflict through "human relations," and reinforced by a population which has accepted formal organization as necessary, administrative organizations in our society may seek out for administrative positions those who exhibit headship abilities and who tend to use those in preference to exercising leadership. If headship becomes a dominant orientation and is exercised not only in those cases where it is necessary but also whenever it can be elected over leadership as an alternative, is it not possible that leadership abilities will atrophy to the point where they are no longer available for those situations which require them?

Two: To argue that in some situations leadership and headship provide equally acceptable solutions is not necessarily to say that the total outcomes of the alternatives will be the same. Side-effects or unanticipated consequences may be different. If the specific difficulty can be solved by either approach but the "costs" in terms of other effects are different, may not automatic reliance on one approach add up over time to a major difference in outcomes?

Three: The organization which grows up under a strong leader frequently finds, on his passing, that it has neither leadership nor headship to fall back on. It flounders with its administration. The few studies of executive or administrative succession<sup>19</sup> suggest that the transfer of administration may be a significant point at which precedents are established. Are there relationships between the ways in which new administrators "take over" and their later opportunities to exercise leadership?

#### SUMMARY

I have argued that leadership as well as headship is required in administrative organizations, but that the proportions of headship and leadership will vary. I have also tried to illustrate some types of variables which will determine when leadership is required, and to suggest that there may be a range of situations when either leadership or headship may provide acceptable solutions. I hope this paper has indicated how significant reorientations in our concepts may lead us to significant questions and ultimately to greater understanding of leadership and its place in administration.

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<sup>19</sup>For example, Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954; and Chris Argyris, Executive Leadership. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953.

## A FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PARTY

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Prepared for delivery at the 54th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

Treatment of the congressional party in the literature of American politics presents certain anomalies. Acknowledged, at least by implication, as the product of a heterogeneous society that is governed by a federal system whose legislative branch at the national level continues to display a vigorous bicameralism, it is often "understood," if not judged, by what it is not, namely, the product of a homogeneous society that is governed by a unitary system of cabinet leadership in what amounts to a unicameral legislature. It is, in other words, often not understood for what it is but condemned for failing to be what it is not.

<sup>1/</sup>  
The research of which this paper is a partial summary was an attempt, primarily through the analysis of roll calls, to arrive at a conception of the congressional party in its own terms, of the roles of the leaders of the parties in both chambers, and of the place of both in the inclusive scheme of national government. The votes analyzed were those of the 81st Congress (1949-50). Although the data from these votes were supplemented extensively by interviews with participants in this and subsequent Congresses, the study was essentially a case analysis and involved most of the limitations inherent in that approach. The essential technique was a modified Rice-Beyle bloc analysis, by means of which frequencies of agreement between pairs of party members on selected series of roll calls in both sessions of both houses were used to identify the structure of voting in the two parties and to indicate features of the behavior of the formal party leaders.

### I

In the simplest and most general terms, the evidence of the study indicates that the congressional party has reality as a group, has a determinate behavioral structure; that within the limits of the legislative party's distinctive characteristics as a group, this structure in both houses is focused upon the roles of the principal elective leaders (chiefly the Floor Leaders); that these leaders and hence also the parties in the two houses achieve their full function when they are based on majorities in the Congress of the same persuasion as the President; that there is a functional interdependence between the majority leaders in Congress and a President of the same party; and that the congressional parties



and their leaders are of limited significance when the President is tied to a congressional minority, or when the majority on Capitol Hill is truncated (i.e., is not of the President's party), or when the congressional party is "out of power" at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

An integrated conception of the congressional party is suggested in particular by three lines of evidence appearing throughout the study. In the first place, the minority party in both House and Senate showed a more fluid and fragmented bloc structure than the majority, almost regardless of their relative cohesion and regardless of the frequency with which members' preferences were recorded. That is, the minority's structure tended to shift, not quite from issue to issue, but from one cluster of votes to another. In both chambers there were generally more Republican blocs than Democratic, wings and splinters of the central structure that could only reflect more varied lines of cleavage within the Republican party in this Congress. The minority's structural fluidity was also shown, especially in the Senate, by lower rates of agreement between the Republican Floor Leaders and the Whips (Wherry and Saltonstall in the Senate; Martin and Arends in the House). Possibly this was an indication of differences in party practice; to some extent, certainly in the Senate, it was a reflection of personal differences in attitude; but presumably this kind of disagreement was also less awkward, less embarrassing for the leadership of a party in the minority both in Congress and in the White House than it would have been for the majority. On the minority side the evidence also indicated much less accommodation between the Floor Leaders and the individual seniority leaders than was the case among the majority. This was also true of the relations between the ranking minority members of the committees and the men who might be regarded as alternative leaders on the Republican side, Senator Taft and Representative Halleck. Fluidity in the House minority structure was also suggested by the fact that there was a low correlation between the lists of men who most frequently agreed with the minority Floor Leader on the votes in the two sessions.

These and other indications of fluidity in the voting structure of the minority are important because they signify a relative lack of program, a comparatively unstable policy posture, which may be characteristic of the minority congressional party.

In the second place, in both parties, though again with differences between them, the relations between the principal elective leaders and the seniority leaders, as revealed in their voting, showed a tendency toward specialization which underscored the pivotal position of these elective leaders in the voting structure of the parties. That is, although the seniority leaders (chairmen and ranking minority members of the standing committees) in neither party operated as a collegial body, as individuals they and the Floor Leaders tended to agree on votes concerning measures reported by the seniority leaders' committees. Their relations as leaders apparently were specialized along particular substantive lines rather than generalized over the whole range of

<sup>2/</sup> matters voted upon in the chambers. Especially on the majority side, these data pointed toward a selective accommodation between the Floor Leader and the ranking member of a standing committee, not on all affairs of the chamber, but at those points of peculiar consequence to the performance of the legislative party, the legislation assigned to the seniority leader's committee.

Since the relations between Floor Leaders and seniority leaders were close to the heart of any approximation of a legislative party program, they inevitably reflected the more coherent voting structure of the majority and the looser corresponding pattern among the minority. In both Senate and House the Minority Leaders displayed much less disposition than the Majority Leaders toward accommodation with seniority leaders from opposing wings of the party's voting structure on roll calls growing out of the projects of their committees. Their rates of disagreement on these votes were consistently higher than those on the majority side. Though these contrasts of course reflected in part the personal characteristics of the Minority Leaders, especially in the case of Senator Wherry, they were so nearly duplicated by the behavior of likely alternative leaders, such as Senator Taft and Representative Halleck, that obviously more was involved than these individual peculiarities. The Minority Leader's role in this setting apparently did not require or did not permit the degree of accommodation evident on the majority side.

In the third place, despite sharp divisions within each of the legislative parties and differences in the leaders' behavior, between the parties there were clear divergences of central tendency on matters of substantive policy. Above divisions and coalitions there was a persistent cleavage between the parties that distinguished the policy preferences of most Republicans from those of most Democrats. These inter-party differences were revealed primarily in behavior on roll calls that were classified as Administration support votes.<sup>3/</sup> Table 1 summarizes these data for the first session of the Senate.

Table 1

Interparty Differences: Distribution of Republican and Democratic Senators\* According to Mean Administrative Support Scores, 81st Congress, 1st Session

Mean Administration Support Score	Democratic Senators	Republican Senators
High	46	7
Medium	9	11
Low	1	25

\* The total number of Senators classified in this table exceeds 96 because some men are included who served for only part of the session.

Data for the second session and for both sessions in the House show the same pattern. These distributions amply testify to the possibility of bipartisan or coalition voting on these roll calls, but they show even more strikingly that the centers of gravity of the two parties were not only distinguishable but consistently different.<sup>47</sup> It is worth noting, moreover, that the most anti-Administration Democratic Senator, Byrd of Virginia, had a mean score in both sessions equivalent to the modal Republican score. Correspondingly, the most pro-Administration Republican Senators, Morse of Oregon and Smith of New Jersey, had mean scores identical with those most commonly registered by the Democrats.

## II

One major implication of these three lines of evidence--the relative fluidity of the minority party's voting structure, the specialized relations between the principal elective leaders and the seniority leaders, and the indications of a persistent partisanship--is that the voting structure of both parties was focused upon one or a pair of positions: the Floor Leaders, joined at times, particularly on the Democratic side, by the Whips and, among the House Democrats, impliedly by the Speaker. Other men in both houses may, for limited periods and for restricted purposes, have exercised initiative in matters of policy and almost certainly were dominant from time to time, but no other identifiable role was as continuously pivotal. Challenges, as expected, seem to have come most typically from the seniority leaders, but when the Leader and the ranking committee member were opposed, a majority of the party and a majority of the party's contingent on the affected committee more often than not went along with the Floor Leader. Formal and informal leadership were not always identical, but if the congressional party had a focus at all, it was upon the Floor Leader.

But there were differences between the majority and minority parties in the degree to which these roles were central and pivotal. Their positions in the bloc structures and other aspects of their behavior indicated that both tended to be middlemen. On the minority side, however, the Floor Leaders more often voted in opposition to the seniority leaders and were less likely to carry with them a majority of their associates in the party or on the affected committee. In general, the minority Floor Leaders seem to have been less consistently a source of voting cues for their party associates, both of the rank and file and among the other elective leaders. The Minority Leaders' roles, in short, showed fewer consistent program characteristics.

The chief implication of these lines of evidence, however, lies in another direction. Why, given the pivotal character of the Leaders' roles on both sides of the aisle, should these differences between the parties have appeared so consistently? What was there about the majority party that made its structure more coherent and its leaders more central in the party's performance? No single, categorical answer to these questions is satisfactory, and none can be offered without concern for the fortuitous effects of setting, skill, and personality. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the inference that without the initiatives and the



known program preferences of a President from the same electoral party the distinctive features of the majority congressional party and its elective leaders would not have existed or would have appeared only in greatly modified form.

As noted earlier, analysis of the relations between the Majority Leader and the individual Democratic seniority leaders indicated a tendency, frequently apparent even when the committee chairman was associated with a dissident wing of the party, toward accommodation on votes concerning measures handled by a chairman's committee. This implies that such adjustment occurred along the lines of a program, one of special consequence to the performance of the majority legislative party.

Whence the program? If it was indeed the case that the initiatives and known preferences of the President produced the distinguishing characteristics of the majority congressional party, then those preferences must have formed the core of the selective, specialized agreements between the Majority Leaders and the committee chairmen. The data indicate that this was indeed the case in both House and Senate. Although the rate of Leader-chairman agreement was fairly high on all votes concerning measures reported by the several committees, it was higher on those that were classifiable as Administration support votes. The general pattern did not apply uniformly to all of the chairmen, of course, but, particularly in the Senate, if agreement occurred between the Majority Leader and a chairman from the dissenting wing of the party, such as George (Finance), Johnston of South Carolina (Post Office and Civil Service), or McCarran (Judiciary), it was most likely that the roll call involved would be one classified as an Administration support vote.

What of the minority? Did this same presidential "program" also draw together the principal elective leaders and the individual seniority leaders on the minority side? The data indicate that it did not. Especially in the Senate both Minority Leader Wherry and Senator Taft were more likely to agree with the Republican seniority leaders on other votes dealing with committee measures than on Administration support votes. In the House the pattern of agreements between Minority Leader Martin and the Republican seniority leaders was more like that on the Democratic side but at a lower level. The preferences of a majority President thus seem to have supplied no reliable basis for coherence among the leaders of the legislative minority.

### III

Generalized in the baldest terms, these data demonstrate that the "program" of the President had a centripetal effect upon the majority congressional parties that gave coherence to their leadership structures and meaning to the roles of the leaders, especially those in the principal "elective" positions. In other words, and somewhat more extreme ones, the Democratic majority parties in the Congress worked as groups because of and in response to the initiatives of a Democratic Administration.

This conclusion, given the complexity and the crudity of the underlying data, calls for some qualification. What, precisely, is the nature of the relations implied by the data? Do they mean more, for example, than the familiar characterization of the Presidency as involving the role of "Chief Legislator"? This term has no very explicit or precise meaning, but it usually denotes an aspect of the President's relations with the Congress as an inclusive institution and hence does not make the point that is here intended.<sup>5/</sup> The response of interest here is not that from the Congress as a whole but rather the response from the congressional party. Nor is the same sense conveyed by the notion of the President as "party leader," since this ascription normally implies no distinction between the electoral party and the congressional party or, more accurately, parties. Further, it is not very helpful to refer to the President as the "leader" of the House and Senate parties. These groups have their own leaders, whose roles, if the data of this study are to be credited, are real ones. The roles of the congressional party leaders, however, are not independent of the Presidency, and their occupants do not have resources of power equal to those of the President.

What is needed to describe the relations between the President and the leaders of his congressional majority that are pointed to in these data is perhaps a slightly modified conception of leadership in the context of the congressional party. In contemporary social science precise notions of leadership have grown primarily from the close observation of relatively small groups, in which the leader is defined operationally as one who characteristically initiates action for the other members of the group. These studies have tended to treat the small group in isolation rather than as a unit in a more inclusive system or organization. In consequence, they do not throw much light on more complex situations in which initiative does not have its origins within the membership of the group. Without attempting to draw a sketch that is more precise than the materials warrant, one may surmise that in the complexities of the relations between the Presidency and the congressional parties one is dealing with mutually dependent sets of relations, the congressional party leaders with their rank-and-file members and the President with his more inclusive audience going beyond the Congress and the executive branch to the nation and the world. The relations of the President with the leaders of his congressional party at the convergence of these sets are typically not symmetrical, since the power resources of the President exceed those of the congressional party leaders, but they are mutually dependent because the initiatives of the President are necessary for his performance of his role in his larger constituency and are also essential in the congressional leaders' performance of their roles within the legislative party.

An analogy that implies a clear hierarchy in this pattern is not entirely fortunate, but one may nevertheless think of the President as resembling, not the leader in the small group, but a plant manager who may lead a work-group through its foreman. The parallel is not close, but it suggests the essential point that the President's initiatives, though indispensable to the effective functioning of his legislative party, are not normally equivalent to the direct leadership of that group <sup>6/</sup>

The analogy is also helpful in its suggestion that the common enterprise of the electoral party, though possibly less completely absorbing than an industrial enterprise, encourages a convergence of view that otherwise would not occur.

The President, as these comments suggest, does something more than merely provide an agenda for the Congress or even for the legislative parties. If that were all he did, the apparent policy differences between the two parties and between their respective elective leaders would not be accounted for. The minority parties and their leaders would not have differed so consistently from the majority. The President's initiatives and preferences do set an agenda, to be sure. This has become one of the unwritten components of his role. But, especially if his is the majority party in the legislature, his preferences also provide leverage useful if not absolutely essential to the principal elective leaders of the legislative party in the performance of their roles.

The agenda of the President, composed of his public requests to the Congress, clearly is not identical with the program of the legislative party or even with the President's own program. Some occupants of the White House demand much of the Congress and some relatively little, but none, with the possible exception of Franklin Roosevelt in the first months of his first term, is granted all that he asks for. (No Congress, however compliant, could reasonably be expected even to act on, to say nothing of granting, the range of requests making up Harry Truman's agenda for the Eighty-first.) The principal elective leaders, on the basis of their own preferences and their estimates of what they in turn can expect from the committees and from their chambers, arrive at what the legislative schedule and the voting indicate as the program of the congressional party. But the emergence of this program of the legislative party is a function of the mutual dependence of the President and the principal leaders of his congressional party, in which the leverage provided by the President's preferences is crucial.

The importance for the principal elective leaders of their relations with the President, especially if the congressional party is in the majority, is fundamentally traceable to the peculiar characteristics of these groups. Space will not permit going into detail on this matter here. It will suffice to note that the legislative parties at the national level are marked by a paradoxical set of attributes: fractionation and, in some instances, structural fluidity, but also a tendency toward shared attitudes and expectations, even in substantive policy matters, and an apparent interdependence of role among the members, both of which testify to their persistence as groups. These attributes I have summarily described by designating the congressional parties as "mediate" groups, meaning that the relations constituting the groups are distinctively but not wholly determined by their members' affiliations with and dependence upon other groups. The latter would include primarily interest groups and constituency parties but would of course not be confined to these.

One of the implications of the mediate character of the congressional party is that the risks to which its members are subject are not fully integrated into the shared attitudes and goals of the group, as they would be in an "immediate" group such as a militant labor union, a



military combat group, or even a well-managed business firm. Its members' fortunes are not identical with those of the legislative party, but at the same time they are not completely independent of it. The degree of independence is probably less in the House than in the Senate, given the generally lower "visibility" of Representatives. In addition, the degree of independence is not a fixed quantity but is subject to fluctuation with various circumstances--the nature of emergent issues, the timing and imminence of the re-election contest, the vigor and popular standing of the President, and the like. These fluctuations usually are not highly predictable or subject to precise ranking. Hence the distribution of risks as between those produced by the performance and fortunes of the legislative party and those more closely related to "outside" groups is often decidedly unclear and ambiguous.

This ambiguity of risk for the party's members and the mediate character of the legislative party seem to be the keys to the roles of the principal elective leaders. Ambiguity may help to support the demands of the Floor Leader if he is able, unconsciously or by design, so to define the context in which the party's members make their choices that the apparent risks involved in opposing the leadership are emphasized. The ambiguity of risk also places a premium on being close to the centers of communication within the legislative party, for to be "in the know" concerning impending events in and outside the Congress is to be better prepared to minimize the risks they may imply. In consequence, the influence of one who, like the Floor Leader, occupies a position at the center of such communication can hardly fail to be enhanced.<sup>8</sup>

Given the mediate functions of the congressional party, the powers of its leaders, especially its principal elective leaders, cannot be expected, except in very small measure, to be formalized, codified, and at all times fully adequate for meeting the vicissitudes of their roles. Rather they are for the most part informal; personal, interstitial, and--somewhat like those of the President--often less extensive than the range of expectations they must meet. There appear to be differences in this respect between the House and Senate party leaders, but in both chambers the influence of the principal leaders depends heavily upon their recurrently improvising effective combinations among fragments of power of the most varied sorts. The leader of a mediate group, who almost by definition ranks little above his colleagues, must, if he chooses to perform his role with maximum effectiveness, avail himself of any outside resources and fragments of power that may be converted into influence within the legislative party.

Among these fragments the most important are to be found in the leverage provided by the initiatives of a President of the same party label, and this is the sense in which the conception of the relations between the President and the leaders of his congressional party in terms of interdependent sets of leader-follower relations becomes important. The imperatives of the Presidency and the peculiarities of leadership in a congressional party with the characteristics of a mediate group make collaborative relations between the President and the principal elective leaders of his legislative party functional for the participants on both sides.

The utility of this collaboration is suggested by the fact that the regular White House meetings of the President and the "Big Four" or "Big Six" of the congressional parties, meetings which in the past two decades have become a normal feature of governmental operation, provide the most regular contact between President and Congress and the only institutionalized point of meeting for the leaders of the parties in the Senate and House. Other communication between them takes place, of course, but apparently more casually and in a more restricted context. The White House meetings are not highly formalized, their results normally are not recorded, and there is in the public domain little information concerning precisely how they operate. From the standpoint of their value for the performance of the elective leader's role, however, the precise character of the meetings is probably less important than their regular occurrence and the comparative privacy surrounding them. Some reporting of the discussions is usually made in the meetings of the policy committees and other sessions of the legislative party leaders, but if all that occurred in them immediately transpired, their utility would be considerably reduced, both as a locus of genuine negotiation and as a source of leverage for the congressional party's leaders. The mere fact of the meetings, uniquely composed as they are and normally conducted without even the presence of staff, presumptively gives the congressional participants "inside" intelligence concerning both the President and the other chamber that, whether communicated subsequently or not, in the context of the mediate group can be a source of influence.<sup>2</sup>

These comments should not be interpreted as suggesting that the elective leaders of the congressional party do or can have a monopoly of information, especially concerning the President's intentions. Individual seniority leaders, perhaps especially in areas where the President's prerogatives and responsibilities are large, such as foreign policy, may enjoy a high degree of intimacy. But these are inevitably single areas, however important, and the data in this study on the relations between the seniority leaders and the principal elective leaders would support the inference that they probably do not extend very far over the interconnections among all parts of the legislative program.

The suspicion is strong that if these relations between President and committee chairmen do not supplement but steadily by-pass the elective leaders, they may reduce rather than augment the President's influence. Given the tremendous range of demands on his time and energies, to say nothing of the obstacles inherent in the congressional institution, the President probably cannot successfully attempt to become regularly the direct leader of the congressional party, working exclusively through the committee chairmen or directly with the rank and file. If this interpretation is correct, Franklin Roosevelt's reliance upon the leaders of the congressional party and his refusal to by-pass them by creating an alternative structure of communication with the Congress was wiser than some of his critics are willing to grant.<sup>10</sup> He could and did attempt to influence the legislative party's choice of elective leaders, but had he not relied upon them, once they were chosen and regardless of whether they were his favored candidates, his effectiveness almost certainly would have been reduced.



Those who stand at major junction points in an important communication network may acquire power from that fact alone. Even the appearance of being on the inside, however little it corresponds to reality, may have value for the leadership of a mediate group. Other things being equal, therefore, the elective leaders of the President's legislative party have a stake in their regular meetings at the White House and a corollary interest in the President's political standing. As leaders, they lose if he loses. Other things, of course may not be equal. Attachment to the role of elective leader may be less than that to other opportunities and aspirations. Personal and political animosities may be too strong to be submerged in even the semblance of a collaborative effort. Participants on either side may be insensitive to the subtleties of the relation. Or a President's missteps and misfortunes may make association with him an embarrassment rather than a reliance. Proximity to the White House is not the only fragment of power available to the leaders of the congressional party, and circumstances may reduce it to unimportance despite a generally strong tendency in the other direction.

The benefits of a fruitful collaboration, however, are not all on one side. They accrue also to the President's account. In the thundering crises that are the normal lot of Presidents in times when "normalcy" exists only in the past, the clock provides no hours for the cultivation of rank-and-file legislators which direct leadership of the Congress would require. But in addition the President is dependent upon the principal elective leaders of the congressional party in much the same way, if not to the same degree, as are their colleagues on the Hill. If the agenda he sets is to emerge in a product he favors, he must have the information and the means for day-to-day assessment, if not actual guidance, of congressional activity. The elective leaders wield no monopoly here, but, standing at strategic communication points, they are, for the President much as for their legislative associates, an important source of intelligence, entirely aside from their capabilities as facilitators or obstructors of his program. The President, save in exceptional circumstances, must rely on the leaders of the congressional party. If there are means by which he can do without them on a continuous, day-by-day basis, the record does not reveal what they are. Relations with the leaders of the congressional party can be supplemented, as they often have been, but no substitutes have appeared on which he can rely with equal confidence. To the degree that the mechanism of the congressional party is relied upon, however, it must be taken as it is, with the leaders it has produced. For a President to attempt to act directly as the leader of the congressional party almost certainly would be to destroy, for the time being, this valuable, if variable, governing instrument.

#### IV

To call the relations between the President and the leaders of his congressional party collaborative and mutually useful is to raise the problem of whether occupants of these legislative positions are to be viewed primarily as "his" or as the leaders of their respective houses and congressional parties. The formal answer, that their principal loyalties must be toward those whose suffrage they hold, their



colleagues in the congressional party, is not very helpful since it avoids the underlying realities. The question itself would lack point, in fact, if an answer were given categorically either way.

The fundamental complexity and subtlety of the roles of the leaders of the President's congressional party lie in the fact that they are, and probably must be, both the President's leaders and the congressional party's leaders. However, in order to be fully effective as leaders of the congressional parties, they must above all be effective spokesmen for the President; or at least, excepting the most unusual circumstances, they must appear to be his spokesmen. The data of this study indicate that open opposition to the President--as distinguished, perhaps, from covert failure to press his programs aggressively--was something to be avoided by the principal congressional leaders of his party.

The conclusion that support of the President is a pivotal element in the roles of the principal elective leaders of the President's congressional party is not accepted by some observers, especially as it applies to the Senate. William S. White, whose discerning observations on the upper chamber cannot be dismissed lightly, places chief emphasis on the requirement of loyalty to the views of legislative colleagues.<sup>11/</sup>

White correctly calls attention to the element of variability in the role of the Senate leader. The broad discretionary range implied in the expectations defining it is unquestionable. Nor can one quarrel with the proposition that a Leader not in sympathetic communion with his legislative colleagues will in most circumstances fail to perform his functions effectively.

One must also acknowledge a reality of structure and of attitude in the separation of Senate from House and especially of both from the President. The patterns of risk are not the same. They do converge, but convergence does not produce identity. Nevertheless, the imperatives of presidential politics seem to produce more than an echo in the congressional party, and the partisan responses at either end of Pennsylvania Avenue have a detectable mutual resemblance that makes the elective leaders spokesmen both of the congressional party and of a President bearing the same party label.

A tendency for congressional leaders to avoid emphasizing obligations to the President follows in considerable measure from the fact that the congressional party as a mediate group affords its leaders little opportunity for command, in the strict sense. Their influence in either house is only slightly the product of hierarchy, and because the limits on their influence are ambiguous, their power may in fact be more extensive than any of their followers would be willing to grant in a formal definition of authority. Actions propose definitions, and in a loosely integrated structure--perhaps in any structure--action that explicitly proposes to invoke the outer limits of implied power is likely to fail, and the resulting definition to fall short of what had previously received de facto acknowledgment. If the elective leaders only rarely can command, they also can publicly commit their followers to a given action only after elaborate preparation.

An instance that can be interpreted as illustrating the caution imposed on the leaders of the legislative party by the requirements of their roles was provided by the events surrounding the creation of a Democratic advisory committee following the election of 1956. The refusal of the seven principal Democratic elective leaders of the Congress to join this group has most often been interpreted in terms of "liberals" against "conservatives" and of challenges to the congressional leaders. An interpretation based on the conception of the leaders' roles developed in these pages would run somewhat differently. Even if the leaders of the congressional party were in sympathy with the substantive objectives of the movement, which is well within the limits of the possible, and even if the preliminary arrangements had been handled more adroitly, Messrs. Johnson and Rayburn and their associates would have been ill advised to enter the group. For if its decisions were made public, the leaders of the congressional party would be assuming a position of command which they may have by implication and after maneuver and negotiation but which they can rarely announce in open forum. Even after conferences with the President the leaders of his legislative party, though they may head a majority, normally avoid specific public commitments. Rather they report what the President wants and indicate an intent to get it for him if they can. Matters would not be much different if the decisions of such an advisory committee were not made public. In their negotiations within the Capitol the principal elective leaders would not seem to be speaking in the comfortably ambiguous name of an unspecified "party" majority composed of colleagues similarly situated and with equivalent political risks, nor would they be speaking for a President with at least contingent claims upon their support. Rather they would appear to be acting for an "outside" agency without status or legitimacy.

Given the mediate character of the legislative party and its attendant factionalism, commitment of the party by the elective leaders normally must follow internal negotiation, not precede it, and, if negotiation fails, the leaders will be better off in most cases if they are not too frequently and openly identified with the losing side. In his dealings with the Congress, a President may be able without net loss to make public demands that are repeatedly denied by the legislature, if he makes compensating gains within the electorate. The leaders of the congressional party are not situated in the same way. Repeated failure of their public initiatives, even if enunciated in the name of the President, is more likely to destroy them entirely. They can, as Senator Johnson did in declining membership on the advisory committee, invite the views of an "outside" group, but if these views commit the leaders, the implied initiatives are likely to produce a restricted rather than a broadened definition of their power.

The two role requirements, that the principal elective leaders of the congressional party support a President of their own party and that they function as the spokesmen for their colleagues in the Congress, are not always cleanly compatible. At the same time it seems clear that they are generally interdependent, in the sense that representing the President provides a focus and part of the leverage for leadership of the congressional party, and sympathetic reflection of the problems of legislative colleagues is an essential in advancing the President's

program. One or the other element may be more conspicuous from time to time. Apparently, moreover, the congressional base is generally nearer the surface; it is more openly expressed. But the element of support for the Administration is normally present, if only implicitly and though often reflected in ambivalent terms.

The ambivalence associated with the implicitly acknowledged interdependence of these two features of the role, especially in the case of the Floor Leader, can be illustrated in several ways. It is evident, for example, in estimates of the special hazards attributed to the position. A number of Senators and Representatives, asked whether they felt a Floor Leader ran any special risks, almost unanimously replied in the affirmative, the typical explanation being that as Leader he was obliged to act and to vote as he would not if he were an ordinary member of Congress. The usual illustrations were the cases of Majority Leader Lucas and Majority Whip Myers, both of whom failed of re-election in 1950, and the case of Majority Leader McFarland, who was defeated in the election of 1952. There may well be doubt whether holding these positions and being identified with the Administration in fact contributed significantly to the defeat of these men. The important point is that in the Congress there was a strong belief that this was the case.

A particularly good illustration of the conflicts, ambiguities, and ambivalences in the role of the Senate Majority Leader is the case of Senator Knowland in the Eighty-third Congress and especially in 1954. On a series of occasions beginning in February Knowland opposed or criticized several features of the Administration's foreign policy. These actions provoked a good deal of comment, and the press carried reports of resentment in the White House, of suggestions that Knowland resign as Leader, and even of rumors that he would resign. White has reported that Knowland actually strengthened his position in the Senate by these actions.<sup>12</sup> Though there is no reason to question this observation, it is worth noting that at one point Knowland himself stated that he would resign his post if the Administration ever granted diplomatic recognition to the Communist government of China. By this statement, as Arthur Krock noted in the New York Times, the Republican Senate Floor Leader conceded implicitly "that there are limits to the usefulness of a party leader in Congress who opposes a major policy of a President of that party."<sup>13</sup>

More revealing than this implied acknowledgment of the dual character of the Leader's role was the dramatically explicit gesture Knowland made at the time of the voting on the so-called Bricker amendment in February. The Senate had adopted the George amendment, which was not acceptable to the White House. Just as the final roll call was about to be taken, Knowland exchanged desks with Saltonstall, the Majority Whip, and announced his intention to support the measure. Explaining his action, Knowland said, in part: "I have left the desk of the majority leader because I feel that I have an obligation, while speaking in my individual capacity, to make that very clear."<sup>14</sup> Knowland here demonstrated the point that, subject to some variations in the conceptions of individual incumbents, the role required him to be also the President's leader if he was to be the Senate party's leader.



These are requirements of the Leader's role, but the precise definition of those requirements lies within the discretion of the man performing it at the time. His background, his skills, his energy level, and his own policy preferences will determine his conception of the role and, in general, his effectiveness in performing it. He may easily be satisfied with exploiting the potentialities of the role at a minimal level, especially if the President's own skills in this realm are not an inducement to vigorous activity.

It is also possible that practice, resting on convention alone rather than on a full appreciation of possibilities, encourages performance at levels well below the full potential.<sup>15</sup> The evidence is hardly conclusive, but it suggests the possibility that the roles of the elective leaders may one day, as a result of the skill and imagination of a single incumbent, break with existing practice and move to a new level of effectiveness. Such a level, once achieved, would likely remain the norm, even for less talented successors, as long as the underlying conditions remained unchanged.

Whatever the extent of the gap between performance and potentiality, it is important to emphasize that these inferences concerning the role of the principal elective leaders, especially in their relations with the White House, do not and almost certainly could not span the whole range of the legislative agenda. Inevitably they refer to major items and to leading proposals. Most of what is routine, uncontested, or only narrowly controversial--probably the bulk of congressional business--and some of what is highly explosive is left to the committees, their chairmen, the executive departments and agencies, and the relevant interest groups, except as one of the elective leaders may have a personal stake in them. Within these circles, of course, commitments and prerogatives become established, and, as in almost any complex organization, intervention from unaccustomed quarters in matters that have suddenly been projected from the obscurity of custom into the center of controversy may provoke resistance that places restrictions on any leadership, even if it has the prestige of presidential endorsement.

## V

The interpretations offered in the preceding pages have dealt with the majority congressional party whose presidential candidate occupied the White House. What can be said of the minority? What further, can be conjectured about a "truncated" majority, one without partisan ties to the President? And what about the legislative party that is in the minority on Capitol Hill but is "in power" in the White House? The data on the Eighty-first Congress, of course, bear on only the first of these questions, but, assuming the validity of the broad scheme of explanation offered in this paper, it should be possible to suggest answers to the others.

The conspicuous characteristics of the minority in the Eighty-first Congress--structural fluidity, a relatively low rate of agreement among the elective leaders, and minimal evidence of accommodation between the Floor Leaders and the seniority leaders--may have been primarily a consequence of the personalities and skills of the Minority

Leaders. It seems unlikely, however, that these fortuitous factors were the only ones involved. The minority congressional party, out of power in the White House, seems to have encountered special obstructions to coherent and programmed voting behavior. Since the minority were limited in their influence upon the agenda, program--as distinguished from isolated efforts on a small number of issues--was of little or no relevance for them. The suspicion is strong that the minority congressional party and its principal leaders reflected, but not precisely in reverse, the importance of the White House for the effective working of the legislative group. Given the presidential program, they did not mirror in opposition the pattern of the majority. Presidential initiatives distinguished minority from majority, but not in exact opposition presumably because the Minority Leaders lacked the leverage supplied by partisan association with the President, though they shared with their colleagues of the majority the agenda provided by the White House.

The nature of the Presidency itself probably contributes to the awkward position of the minority leaders. For the President of the United States is not, and is expected not to be, merely a partisan figure. Some Presidents more and some less, but all to a degree, speak for and to the nation as a whole. When they do, they increase the relative strength of their own congressional leaders and threaten that of the opposition leaders, who normally lack not only most of the means of developing an alternative program but also the leverage of an alternative "outside" source of legitimacy. In a substantive area, notably foreign affairs, in which the propriety of presidential initiative is generally conceded, in and out of Congress, this predicament of the minority is particularly evident.<sup>16</sup> Lacking the leverage of the White House, the minority leaders are unable, and perhaps also disinclined, to develop a substitute focus within the minority party.

These tendencies of the Republican minority probably were accentuated by the circumstances of the Eighty-first Congress. Had these been different, this particular minority's behavior might not have shown the assumed general tendencies so conspicuously. The degree could have been affected by the situation, but the direction seems to have been inescapable.

When its candidate has successfully gained the White House, however, it seems likely that the tendencies of the minority party would be considerably altered. Provided that it has not been temporarily discredited and that the occupant does not entirely neglect the opportunity to influence the legislative program, the Presidency should be a source of leverage to the minority's leaders even though their position does not permit exercising control over the precise schedule of the Congress or influence upon the timing of reports from committees and the form in which bills are reported. Depending on the skill of the leadership in both legislative parties, as well as on that in the White House, the responses of the minority in these circumstances would be expected to resemble those of a party in the majority at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

By the same token, a truncated legislative majority, nominally dominant in the Congress but facing a President of the other party, should display much the same sort of unprogrammed, fluid appearance identified here in the case of the congressional minority also without partisan ties to the White House. President Truman's charge during the 1948 campaign that the Eightieth Congress was a "do-nothing" body was, of course, exaggerated, but it was not wholly unwarranted. If, moreover, the line of analysis suggested here is valid, any Congress in which the majority is truncated is likely to present this ineffective appearance. The four Congresses between 1930 and 1958 that were in this position were, of course, confronted with quite different political problems, but they seem to have shared the dual characteristic of being unable to make use of the President's initiatives and being unable, or at least disinclined, to develop a coherent alternative program. Ineffectiveness rather than unified opposition seems likely to characterize a truncated majority.

In the case of the Eightieth Congress, the limited response to the President's initiatives is perhaps less revealing than the fact that efforts were made within the congressional majority to develop and enact an alternative program. In particular, Senator Taft, as Chairman of the Senate Majority Policy Committee, sponsored and secured Senate passage of a comprehensive housing bill and one extending Federal aid to education. Neither, however, was passed by the House. The implications are clear. As one perceptive observer has noted, "the cumulative impact" of President Truman's political "offensive" would have been "very considerably diluted had not the House leadership frustrated Senator Taft's own program for Congressional achievement."<sup>17</sup> A truncated majority lacked an effective focus, an "outside" point of leverage sufficient to produce a coherent, programmed performance in both houses.

The Democratic majority that took over in January, 1955, was in a particularly ambiguous position, since the mid-term elections of 1954 by no means indicated a diminution in President Eisenhower's prestige. It had in the House the familiar leadership of Rayburn and McCormack and in the Senate Lyndon Johnson, one of the new virtuosos of legislative maneuver. Almost at once, however, and particularly in the House, an absence of policy guidance was noted by members of the majority whose service dated back six years or more but who were not yet high in the formal hierarchy of the party. Several of them were inclined in interviews to attribute this to the leaders' having grown accustomed to a Democrat in the White House, but to an outsider the parallel to other truncated majorities is more impressive.

White's interpretation of Johnson's performance in the Senate is that, partly unconsciously and partly by design, the Majority Leader was re-establishing and even extending the Senate's "historic claim" to an "independent political life."<sup>18</sup> There is no reason to quarrel with this explanation. The reality of the Senate as a group and as an object of loyalty is clear. But, granting this point, one may yet inquire whether it was the only or even the major factor, especially as the House majority presented much the same appearance. Although Johnson probably was not guilty of an excess of zeal for the national



party record, the range of alternatives available to him was narrow. A new Majority Leader, relatively junior in Senate service, working with a divided party and the narrowest of majorities, yet ambitious to make a record, would not have been very impressive in a policy of relentless attack upon a popular Administration. But, given the nature of the Senate party and particularly, perhaps, the Democratic party, any Leader of a truncated majority who was more disposed toward positive action than toward obstruction or inaction would have been pushed toward a moderate position because he lacked the outside leverage that would permit his doing otherwise. Even a popular President of the other party could not, except in the most extreme sort of crisis, adequately provide such leverage. The main stream of politics in the United States is presidential politics, from Washington to the whistle stops. A legislative leader may not play this game very consciously or with great effectiveness, but he can rarely ignore it to the extent of calling for unity in the congressional party on the grounds of loyalty to a President who belongs to the other side.<sup>19</sup>

Johnson's "resources," therefore, were concentrated on Capitol Hill. There, even had he not had political and personal ties to the Southern wing of the party, he could hardly have avoided being drawn toward the Southerners in any effort to develop the semblance of a program likely to be acceptable to most Senate Democrats. The weakness of even this sort of effort at avoiding a "do-nothing" appearance was evident, however, when in November, 1955, shortly before the opening of the second session of the Eighty-fourth Congress, Johnson announced a 13-point "program." Although he apparently felt sufficiently sure of his position in the Senate to make such an announcement, his reach was limited to the north wing of the Capitol. In the House Speaker Rayburn indicated that he had not been consulted about the "program" proclaimed by his Senate colleague.<sup>20</sup> The actors were different, and the setting was not identical, but the situation repeated the Taft debacle of 1948. These events, moreover, were of a piece with the miscarriage of the Democratic National Committee's proposal a year later for the creation of an advisory committee. It had its roots in the dilemma of the truncated majority in the Eighty-fourth Congress, and its immediate fate had essentially the same source.

## VI

The interpretations offered in these pages go well beyond the data of the Eighty-first Congress, and it may be that the argument is valid at most for that Congress and would not hold for subsequent sessions of the national legislature. There are, however, reasons lying outside the events of 1949 and 1950 for assuming that the pattern sketched here is not unique. These can be reduced to the proposition that in general outline the pattern is consistent with the most fundamental trend of the American political system in the twentieth century, the emergence of the Presidency as the pivot of the whole enterprise.

The relevant point is that, given this trend toward what Woodrow Wilson at the turn of the century perceived as the re-emergence of the Presidency, it is reasonable to assume that there have been consequent changes in the functioning of the Congress, in the congressional party, and in its leadership roles. As controversies such as that over the

so-called Bricker amendment demonstrate, the trend with respect to the Presidency is not completely understood or, if understood, not fully accepted. Moreover, a number of men who had long been participants in congressional affairs indicated in interviews that they saw no major changes in the leaders' roles over the past three or four decades. Though their judgments must command respect, their views are not astonishing. If the more obvious changes in the Presidency are recent and their acceptance even more so, small wonder that subtler and more grudging alterations in the legislature should not be fully recognized. Presidential initiatives that a few years ago would have stirred up a tempest of protest like that created by a Jacksonian veto today not only are taken for granted but are expected. Specification and advocacy of a legislative program, once the distinguishing mark of "strong" Presidents, has become an institutionalized activity. In consequence, the kind of interdependencies that have been emphasized in these pages have had a wide acceptance in practice.

Changes in the Presidency and the associated increased scope and complexity of issues of national policy have contributed importance to the congressional leaders' roles as centers of communication and have both complicated and augmented their positions by emphasizing the expectation that those of the President's party will be his spokesmen. As long as the relations between legislative party leaders and the President carry mutual advantages, these expectations are likely to persist undiminished. The longer they continue, the more likely they are to become accepted, institutionalized fact.<sup>21</sup>

The consistency between these trends and the data on the Eighty-first Congress does not give these data validity beyond the period that they cover. It does, however, lend strength to the presumption that the patterns that they describe were not unique. Granting this point, they still indicate central tendencies rather than completely conforming behavior. Nor do they mean that Americans will awake some morning to find that they have inherited a system of party government on the British model. They reveal important tendencies, indigenous to American constitutional and political practice, tendencies subject to a continuous evolution the limits of which have surely not been reached.

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1. The investigation was initiated under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The author also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and a Ford Research Professorship from Columbia University.

2. This specialization helps to explain the ambiguity surrounding the term "the leadership." A former representative says: "The 'Leadership' is a term constantly used in conversations among House members. It can mean the Speaker alone or the Speaker and the majority leader or these two gentlemen plus their unofficial advisers among the older members." (Voorhis, Confessions of a Congressman, New York, 1947, p. 254.)

3. Roll calls were designated as Administration support votes when the record showed a clear indication of a Presidential preference in connection with the particular vote. Members of both parties were scored on these votes according to whether they voted for, were paired or announced for, voted against, were paired or announced against the President's preference, or were unrecorded. By assigning weights to each of these positions a composite score for each session could be computed for each man.

4. For comparable data on the first two session of Congress under the Eisenhower Administration, see V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 4th edition, New York, 1958, pp. 729 ff.

5. See, for example, E. S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 3rd edition, New York, 1948, chap. 7, and Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency, New York, 1956, p. 14 and passim.

6. The Woodrow Wilson of 1907 made a number of the distinctions indicated here, though the points were not elaborated and, in a sense, could not be until after his Administration. See Constitutional Government in the United States, New York, 1908, pp. 72 ff. and 107 ff.

7. In justification of this excursion into the coining of labels, note that neither the sociologists nor the social psychologists concerned with "group dynamics" have developed a satisfactory typology of groups and that, in particular, they have paid relatively little attention to identifying variations in the characteristics of groups dependent on differences in their settings and their functional relations with other groups in the society. For a suggestive list of group properties, see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, revised edition, Glencoe, 1957, pp. 308-26.

8. Note the relevance here of belonging to what William S. White calls "the Inner Club" in the Senate (Citadel, New York, 1957, chap. 7). See also the comments in Voorhis, op. cit., pp. 31-2.

9. Informants report a more formalized arrangement under the Eisenhower Administration, with attendance at the meetings by Sherman Adams and other members of the President's staff, and apparently with minutes taken at least concerning the agreements reached. The effect of this formalization, especially the presence of presidential staff, may be to reduce the utility of the meetings for both sets of participants. One suspects that such alterations would not be acceptable to some Democratic leaders, such as Speaker Sam Rayburn should he find himself again working with a Democratic President.

10. See James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, New York, 1956, pp. 348-50 and passim.

11. White, Citadel, pp. 96-8.

12. White, Citadel, p. 98.



13. New York Times, May 3, 1955. Krock added that the chief difference between Knowland and his critics was that they thought these limits had already been passed.

14. Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 100:2 (February 26, 1954), 2371.

15. See comments on this point in David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (December, 1956), pp. 1044-5. Cf. H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, New Haven, 1955, pp. 92 and passim.

16. See George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, Baltimore, 1951, pp. 134-6, 172, and passim.

17. Richard E. Neustadt, "Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative Balance Sheet," Public Policy, Vol. 5, Cambridge, 1954, p. 364, n. 20.

18. White, Citadel, pp. 101 ff.

19. Rarely can an opposition leader say, as did the Republican Floor Leader during the House "debate" on emergency banking legislation in March, 1933: "The house is burning down, and the President of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire." (Quoted in Pendleton Herring, Presidential Leadership, New York, 1940, pp. 57-8.)

20. New York Times, November 22 and 23, 1955. In the Eighty-fifth Congress, the deepening foreign policy crisis after October, 1957, and the onset of economic recession seems to have provided enough leverage to the Democratic Leaders, enough centripetal pressure, to permit the development of a fairly coherent program, but the characteristic earmarks of the truncated majority were still evident.

21. One should perhaps note the possibility, however, that a prolonged hiatus might delay this development. Between 1946 and 1958 three of the six Congresses were of the truncated-majority type. Two of these, the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-fifth, may have reflected no more than the skewing effect of a presidential personality not conspicuously identified with partisanship. But their consequences for the governing process might be the same.

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REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE SOUTH TODAY:

REVOLUTION IN THE ROTTEN BOROUGHES

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New Orleans, Louisiana  
1958



A memorable feature of the 1952 Republican national convention was the triumph after an intense struggle of "new" Republican leadership in several states over the "old guard" leaders. The changeover was basic, according to some commentators, and through the shift in leadership Southern Republican parties were being transformed from a political parties concerned only with patronage distributed from a deliberately restricted membership base to real political parties operating in the Southern political process from an ever widening membership base. The character of the revolution as verbalized by the new leaders themselves was stated typically as follows:

Contested delegations are characteristic of Southern political parties . . . but . . . this contest is different. (This) story is not the same old story of a factional dispute between petty rival groups animated by personal ambitions, oblivious of issues fighting for control of a party existing only on paper, circumscribed by the small range of their limited objectives . . . the real meaning . . . of the contest lies in its effect on the development of a decent, active Republican party leading to a two-party system in the South. A decision in favor of the old Republican leadership of the state will kill any hopes for the development of a decent, active Republican party . . . leading to a two-party system.<sup>1</sup>

In the wake of such impassioned pleas new Republican delegations (later translated into state leaderships) were legitimized by the Convention from Louisiana, Texas and Georgia. Even Mississippi began to catch up with the Southern Republican leadership cycle when Perry Howard, the archetype of old-style Black and Tan leadership, was denied the patronage and prestige consonant with his position and the way was prepared for new leadership in his state. Conferences were held on the problem of a two-party South, Lee Potter appointed head of the Southern division of the party and Mead Alcorn, himself, later made consulting field trips into the heart of the Southland. The prospects for a two-party

South never sounded brighter.

However, at the very height of the excitement over the new leadership in Louisiana a Creole cynic dissented from the popular estimate of the importance of this type of change, slightly twisting an old proverb: plus cela change, plus c'est la meme chose specialmente les Republicans du Sud - the more things change, the more they remain the same - particularly Southern Republicans. This neat bit of cynicism epitomized a widely observed fact about the nature of Southern Republican parties: that the frequent changes of leadership though usually accompanied by ritualistic and pious obeisances in favor of a two-party South, in fact, accomplished practically no activity toward real political participation except what Key had called their palace politics, in what Alex Heard has aptly termed their rotten boroughs.

When the Lily Whites wrested control of most state organizations from the Black and Tans some thirty or so years ago, they came in as new leadership, talking of building a real political party out of the restrictive patronage machines frankly maintained by the Black and Tans. Yet, in turn, the Lily Whites continued the Southern Republican parties as mere patronage machines becoming if anything more restrictive than their predecessors since new Negroes were effectively discouraged from participation in the party. The Democratic character of the electoral process went unsullied by local Republican candidates and the state organizations were maintained at skeletal strength of an emaciated state central committee and one or two county or parish party organizations. But business continued as usual with patronage dispensed as available, and influence cultivated through lines running into the national party.

Every four years the Southern Republican parties flowered suddenly into importance through the deliverance of pocket votes from the rotten boroughs to the preferred candidates.<sup>2</sup>

What is the nature of the latest new Republican leadership in the South? Has there been a revolution in the rotten boroughs? It is the purpose of this paper to report the results of just such an inquiry, a case study of the new Republican leadership in the state of Louisiana and an analysis of its activities in state and local politics over the past five years.<sup>3</sup> Since Southern Republican parties have followed a similar pattern of development, it is arguable that the Louisiana case will provide insight into the development of Republican parties elsewhere in the South. The basic idea is that partisan developments are one variable in a total interactive situation which includes social and economic variables and that where partisan activity is relatively passive, as in Southern Republican situations, social and economic changes common to several Southern states tend to lead toward similar partisan developments in these states.

A further important assumption of this paper is the now familiar notion that politics is best viewed as process, with leadership as an important part of a multivariant situation. It follows that one important way of looking at politics is in terms of relationships among component variables, leader-led relationships, leadership-activity relationships and leadership-organizational relationships, to name a few of the possibilities involving leadership as a factor. Thus Republican leadership in Louisiana will be studied in context with organizational and electoral activities, three prime components of the Republican political process or, one is tempted to say, the seeming lack of Republican political process in Louisiana.



In detail this paper is concerned with the recruitment of Republican leaders in Louisiana, their partisan motivations, and their image of and view of the political role of the party. The problem of the activities of the Republican party in Louisiana suggests a concern with the organizational activities of the party and the character and extent of its participation in the electoral process. Finally, on the basis of the foregoing data, the nature and role of the new Republican leadership will be considered.

#### Organization of the Party

In 1952, just before the new leadership was triumphant in Louisiana, the Republican party was organized to the extent of one parish committee out of a potential 64 and a state central committee consisting of 40 members out of a possible 101. In 1957, after five years under the new leadership, there were 22 parish committees extant and a central committee with full membership. Two new units of organization not present under the old leadership were inaugurated after 1952 and these were the municipal Republican committees and the eight congressional district committees. Only the Shreveport municipal organization is active of the four municipal committees but its activity is spectacular when compared to most municipal committees - Republican or Democratic. Not only does it run a continuing city office but regular meetings are held, campaigns conducted to increase party registration, and a complete set of records are kept. As the Democrats fully realize the Republicans are by far the best organized group in Shreveport.

Before 1952 the Republican party was run largely from New Orleans since it was there that most of the federal patronage emanated from the Customs House. Naturally, the only parish committee maintained was

that from Orleans parish. The present Republican party has a wider membership base, is more differentiated by geographical functions and is much more widely distributed in organizations throughout the state than the old. These formal organizational attributes are important because they represent a definite change of organizational policy from the pre-1952 policy. A compact centralized party can be effectively manipulated and controlled while, in a permissive political situation, dispersed and differentiated organization makes arbitrary control more difficult of accomplishment.

There is some evidence, moreover, that the wider organizational base represents a real division of function as well as an organizational form. For instance, the state central committee meets several times a year, considering matters of national and local strategy, deciding whether candidates should be run in important state elections and sitting as a forum for visiting party advisors from national headquarters. Thus in 1956, after Earl Long had been nominated by the Democrats in the spring gubernatorial primary, a committee met to consider running a candidate against Huey's brother in the coming general election. The committee consisted of 16 representatives from all congressional districts including the district leaders and is known in party circles as the executive committee of the state central committee. Although the decision was made after considerable debate not to run a gubernatorial candidate, it is significant that (1) the problem of candidates was debated and voted upon openly and (2) that the decision was made by a group representative of diverse local Republican power. A second illustration of diverse local decision-making may be examined in the party's response to the President's Little Rock action. The composition of party reaction included an official

statement issued by the secretary of the state central committee, official resolutions passed by the parish committees of Caddo parish, Jefferson parish and Orleans parish and a telegram sent by the leader of the fifth congressional district.

It is arguable that the Little Rock situation provides an opportunity to diagnose several important characteristics of the organization of the Louisiana Republican party. The strength of partisan attachment is a case in point. In contrast to the case of Mississippi where the state leader, E. C. Spencer resigned from the party, not one of the 30 leaders included in the leadership definition of this study took steps to sever party ties. Quite a few Republicans from the northern part of Louisiana were unhappy about Eisenhower's actions but in the parishes with the most active organizations, the opposition was politicized by taking the form of opposition to a party policy from "Southern Republicans." In Caddo parish the official resolution criticized the action as "hasty" and "without sufficient cause," reiterated the identification of Shreveport Republicans as Southern Republicans and proceeded to charge that the Democrats "shared equally in the blame."<sup>4</sup> The Jefferson parish committee, located nearer the French-Catholic section of the state and containing many suburban developments, praised the President's action and took pride in the Republican position, thus becoming the first Republican organization in the South to endorse Eisenhower's action at Little Rock.<sup>5</sup> Regardless of the approval or disapproval expressed, it is significant that party officials and organizations felt involved enough with the party to dispute and take a position in official party fashion and sufficiently identified with the Republican party not to bolt and sever party ties despite basic disagreement on an issue highly emotional to



Southerners. Considering the general thinness of all party organization throughout the United States, the holding power of Louisiana Republican leadership and organizations throughout the Little Rock crisis is impressive, since one might reasonably have expected that such centrifugal emotions would be generated that the party would literally fly to pieces.

This kind of organizational reaction, indicative of the location of the most partisanly involved sections of the party, suggests also the location of the power apparatus of the party. The intuition that Caddo, Jefferson and Orleans parishes reacted to the Little Rock crisis from a position of competency and control is confirmed by the fact that over 70 per cent of the new leadership comes from those three parishes. The essentially urban character of the organizational leadership of the party in Louisiana is indicated by the fact that each of the three parishes contains an urban area of over 75,000 population. Only these three parishes, out of the 22 reported as having parish organizations, held regular meetings more than once a year, during the five years past. Another three parishes which report holding meetings "sometimes" more than once a year all contain cities of over 50,000. These six urban parishes, each in a different congressional district, contribute the dominating leadership of the districts and thus control of the important levels of organization, a level utilized in the selection of the executive committee of the state central committee and in the selection of delegates to the national convention.

#### Political Activities

An important test of the revolutionary character of the new Republican leadership must lie in the nature and extent of its participation in state politics and by such participation the viability of

organizations and the politicization of leaders can also be judged. Primarily, this activity includes participation in the state and local electoral process and does not include, by definition, the internal maneuverings within the Republican party, the nature of the politicization of old-style leaders and organizations in Louisiana. The test of electoral participation is a hard one, too, since serious contention for office involves campaign financing, the organization of the campaign and plotting of campaign strategy as well as the routine ordeal of making the campaign. Neophyte Republican campaigners have been amazed at the problems attendant upon placing election commissioners, obtaining poll watchers and seeing to it that the right people get to the right places at the right times - especially the voters.

Requiring as it does particular effort and involvement from a party of minority status, Republican electoral activity is yet the kind of activity required to change the "democratic primary tantamount to election" value common to much of the South, and create a public image of a party that Southerners may join without feeling that they have been disfranchised and thus cheated of electoral participation. When a sample of New Orleans Republicans who had voted for Eisenhower, but not affiliated with the Republican party, were asked why they did not affiliate with the Republican party and thus become "republicans" the most common answer given for non-affiliation was that the respondent would thus be "disfranchised" and not able to participate in state politics.<sup>6</sup> The image of the Louisiana Republican party embodied in such responses was a true one and had been built up from years of Republican inactivity. An interesting hypothesis is that increased amounts of Republican activity will build an image of a Republican party as active and participating in the electoral process and

that presidential Republicans will affiliate more easily with such a party.

To be sure, talk of a two-party South, even organized committees for its promotion, has usually been cheap and plentiful among Southern Republicans. In a sense every Republican in the South, even those in the past most frankly committed to a restricted personally controlled party, joined the sect-church of the two-party South, avidly professing belief in the miracle of the two-party South, celebrating its image in all spoken and written references. Perhaps the apogee of the distance between professed belief and real action on this subject was reached when John E. Jackson, leader of the Louisiana Lily Whites before 1952 and notorious practitioner of the art of partisan restriction and inactivity in state politics, was appointed chairman of a Republican national Committee to Build a Two-Party South.

In the five years before the new leadership assumed power, from 1947-1952, there was four Republican candidates run in the general elections of Louisiana, exclusive of presidential electors who can hardly be considered real candidates for state office. Table I indicates what in the five years since 1952 there have been 53 candidates run under the Republican party label. While the percentage increase of over 1300 per cent in the number of candidates is enormous, the contrast between the kinds of offices sought during each period is also important. The four candidates before 1952 were all congressional or gubernatorial candidates while since 1952 Republican candidates have sought mainly local offices, with the emphasis on candidacies for police juror, school board and alderman. Over 85 per cent of the candidacies have been for the local parish or city categories mentioned.



Since only twelve per cent of all Republican candidacies were for state offices, a category including all state executives, state legislators and all Louisiana congressmen, it seems there has been a failure of the Republicans to develop a conception of political contention involving state-wide competition. Moreover, a majority of all candidacies have been from the three parishes (Caddo, Jefferson and Quachita) already diagnosed as three of the probable loci of party organizational and leadership power. The failure of a party organization to develop organized on state lines and with state-wide conceptions of the role of the party, has meant that few state candidates have come forward. Instead, the candidates come from the parishes with active organizations and leaderships, limiting, it seems, their political aspirations to offices in such localities. One-third of the candidacies have come from parishes in which enthusiastic leaders, usually with relatively weak organizations, run a slate of school board candidates here, two or three aldermen in another election there but with no policy of continuing candidates.

It is instructive to relate political activity to certain leadership characteristics. Table I indicates that political activity bears a relationship to the mood of the leadership, to the reaction to the Little Rock crisis and to the perceived needs of the Republican party. Leaders in areas in which there has been little electoral activity view the future role of the party in pessimistic and negative mood. Thus, in the passive areas, leaders say that campaign contributions are not to be had, candidates impossible to recruit and an organization difficult to articulate. The Little Rock crisis was said by the passive ones to have fatally damaged the Louisiana Republican party, in some cases irreparably.

Although active leaders thought that the Little Rock action hurt

the party, the predominant opinion was that the damage was short run and in the opinion of the leadership of two congressional districts, was necessary and wise. In the New Orleans area where there is a viable organization held together primarily by tradition and patronage, and to a lesser extent by activity enthusiasm, the leadership as the parish statement indicated was badly divided on the wisdom of the president's action. The active leaders whose moods are more sanguine over the prospect of Louisiana's Republican development, speak of the trial of raising campaign funds, of the difficulty in recruiting candidates and in holding organizations together, but do not regard these tasks as impossible. In fact the leadership of two congressional districts, young, relatively active in electoral affairs and sanguine about the prospects for the party in the state, expressed disappointment that the party has not been more active in offering candidates for office and speak bitterly, in some cases, of the lack of interest of many leaders in state political affairs.

Finally, we may contrast the active and passive leaderships, (active and passive in respect to electoral activities in their districts) as to the perception of remedies for the party, what will help the development of the party in Louisiana. Passive leaders of negative mood tend to put reliance on mechanistic and legalistic devices, speaking of the open primary and the device of cross-filing as methods most needed in the development of the party. Guarded as they are by jealous Democratic legislators, the closed primary type of law is not likely to be repealed nor corss-filing enacted, and one wonders, given the state of organization and activity in passive areas, whether or not the enactment of open primaries and cross-filing would really stimulate Republican growth there very much. Active Republican leaders, as one might expect, are more apt

to respond that the development of Republicanism is dependent upon the growth of active partisanship, a more active leadership, upon more candidacies for public office, and public relations campaigns to increase Republican registration. It is interesting that the more passive leaders see the improvement of the party as dependent upon factors outside the province of party leadership almost one feels upon a Democratic deus ex machina, while the activists are willing to talk of improvements measures that depend upon the activity of party leaders.

### Social Characteristics

#### Race, sex and age

The historical position of the Negro in the Southern Republican party is a good reason for considering, first, the race of the new leadership. Of the 30 members of the new leadership none were Negro and in the process of defining the identification of the group there was never really any serious question of including a Negro. Where once Negroes constituted a majority of the members of the party and the Negro, Walter Cohen, was National committeeman and Collector of the Port of New Orleans, the new leadership preserved the Lily White character of the party. A frequent answer given by the new leaders when asked about the possibility of campaigning among Negro voters and recruiting Negroes into the Republican party was "I could not afford to because of my social position." The tentative turn of some Negro voters to the Republican party in 1956 and 1957 brought forth no new Republican Negro leaders.

Six of the new leadership were women and while this does not define any feminine trends in the party, the presence of women leaders in the several major population areas would seem to indicate a more representative



TABLR 1

Organization and Activity Attitudes by Congressional Districts

District	No. of Candidates 1952-57	State of Organization	Mood of Leaders	Perceived effect of Little Rock on Party	Perceived needs of Louisiana Party
1.	4	Full roster meets regularly	Active Sanguine (part) Negative (part)	Sharply Divided	Open primary Cross-filing
2.	12	Full roster meets regularly	Active Sanguine Critical	Effect not Harmful	More candidates and Partisan Activity
3.	11	Partial roster meets sometimes	Active(part) Sanguine Critical	Short run harm, long run benefit	More interested leaders, parti- san activity
4.	11	Full roster meets sometimes	Active Sanguine Determined	Apprehensive of Harm	Time to work, build up party Avoid Little Rock
5.	10	Partial roster meets sometimes	Active(part) Sanguine(part) Negative(part)	Irreparable Harm	Avoid Little Rock Time change Public Opinion
6.	1	Partial roster Rarely meets	Passive Negative Critical	Sharply Divided	No opinion
7-8.	4	Partial roster rarely meets	Passive Negative	Irreparable Harm	Avoid Little Rock

group of leaders. The old group of Republicans maintained women in the party primarily as potential material for the position of national committeewomen.

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the new group is its youth, the mean age being 43 as contrasted with the mean age of 63 for the control group of the old guard. The control group of the old guard refers to those members of the new leadership who were also leaders before 1952. One could propose the youth of the new group as a kind of evidence that they represent "new blood" in the party rather than a faction of the old leadership. This does not mean, of course, that the new leaders could not turn into an elite of the old type.

In the past the Republican party in the South has served as a mobility vehicle for ambitious persons through its dispensations of patronage and influence, yet retained certain low-status connotations. In this respect mobility refers not only to a rise through patronage appointments but also to the kind of influence likely to help an aspiring young lawyer or business man that might be obtained through any influential connection in party channels. Thus a young lawyer who entered the party to help his law practice would be classified as undertaking leadership activities for reasons of mobility just as would the leader who actively sought a government job through his leader role. Table II indicates that the number of those acknowledging mobility motivations is small (10%) and even the proportion of those imputed to have had mobility in mind (27%)<sup>7</sup> is still not significant. The point of this analysis is not to state that a party leader should not be interested in patronage but to measure the proximity of the new group to the patronage machine type of party.

TABLE II

Social Characteristics of New Leadership of Louisiana Republican Party

Trait	Distribution
Mean Age	43 years
Male	80%
White	100%
Business and professional Occupations	93%
High Social Status	43%
Admitted Mobility Motivation	10%
Imputed mobility Motivation	20%
Members of cliques (number of cliques is 7)	67%



Status scales are useful in analyzing the new leadership and its relationship to the community.<sup>5</sup> Table II indicates that almost all the new group were in business and the professions at the time of joining the party. The large number of leaders classified as having high social status is very interesting. The findings provide interesting collateral for study of Republican voters made in New Orleans, 1954, in which the respondents were asked whether or not they thought people "looked down on Republicans" and the findings were that Republicanism suffers very little from low-status images in the mind of Republican voters in New Orleans.<sup>8</sup>

The large number of high-status leaders in the Republican party today would seem to indicate that party leadership is accepted as a high-class type of activity by not a few top social leaders of Louisiana. Also the high average status of the group would seem to deemphasize the function of the party as a mobility vehicle since so many leaders have already arrived in terms of social status. As a matter of fact some leaders claim that the party today engages too much in "Junior League" politics and must recruit more party-patronage types. Of course the party still fulfills a minor patronage role even among the top leadership and it may be that among minor party functionaries the role of patronage is even greater. The presence of some socially prominent matrons in the party has had the interesting effect of stimulating membership for social reasons. It is said in party circles that some Louisiana ladies have joined the party to gain access to the salons of socially prominent leaders where otherwise they would have no entrance.

#### Clique Orientation

In large part the new leadership is the product of leader development and even of party registrations since 1952 and only about one

in ten were active in the old guard. It is interesting therefore that both the present national committeeman and the secretary of the state central committee were both members of the old group. While the present national committeeman did come over to the side of the new group in the struggle for control the secretary of the state central committee, Bryant James did not and fought aggressively against the change. Although there seem to be no measures taken to exclude members of the old clique, expression of distrust of the old leader clique and tales of dissension between the two crop up frequently during interviews with Republican leaders. However, the maintenance of Bryant James in his position as secretary of the state central committee is evidence of the influence still exercised by an old pro in the game of Republican politics even though he is not regarded as having been converted to the doctrine of the new leadership.

Excluding the old leader clique we find that over half the new Republican leaders are members of clique groups, the association having formed, by definition, before entrance into the party. The cliques range in type all the way from associations formed as brother FBI agents to boyhood chum groups to in-law relationships. As a result, the present leadership group presents the picture of a highly personalistic organization in which recruitment depends not so much upon patronage or perceived opportunities as upon some primary personal nexus interpreted in a political fashion.

As one of the leaders of an active parish group explained in referring to his leader circle: "We were a nucleus of friends, grew up together, were chums all along and became Republican together." Another leader in explaining how he happened to join the party explained that he

was sitting on the porch of a resort hotel reading about the fight for new leadership being led by his old friend John Minor Wisdom when he turned to his wife and said "By golly, I'll drop old John a note and I'll tell him that I'll help him out." Although this phase of the relationship was not studied by the investigator it was suggested during some of the interviews that the process of clique building continues within the party, involving particularly important business relationships among bankers, lawyers, business men and contractors. It was doubtless this possibility that a young lawyer had in mind when he stated candidly "I work in the Republican party to help my law practice."

#### Summary Observations

This paper has been concerned with the new Republican leadership of Louisiana, its social characteristics, its organizational activities and electoral activities. Taking the three factors together the idea was to study the three as a kind of casual funnel interacting with each other and with other factors to form the "Republicanism" of Louisiana. That so much emphasis was laid on leadership does not mean that other factors are not recognized as important in the rise of the Republican party - urbanism for example and the activation of a Southern business community.

It is the contention of this paper that at the present stage, the nature of the leadership in the Republican party is highly important in determining the pattern of party development in the South. The party is engaged, at the present time, in negotiating the gap between no political activity and a pattern of initial minor party opposition. The data here strongly suggests that the role of leadership is crucial in determining what kind of party exists in the various parts of the



state whether a local party begins to fulfill some kind of minor party function or remains in the condition of a rotten borough. A brief contrast of two parishes will clarify the point.

As noted before, Caddo parish, with its city of Shreveport, is the most highly developed area of Republican party strength in the state and the development of its party functions can clearly be traced to the organization and activity of its leadership group. Not only do the Republican leaders themselves maintain that Shreveport has a two-party system, meaning a consistent pattern of minor party opposition, but, what is much more significant, so do the Democrats. The Monthly Newsletter of the Trades-Labor Council, in noting the activities of the Republican party in Shreveport, warned its readers as follows: "In past years, in a one party situation, a Democrat in Louisiana winning a clear majority in the Democratic primary was tantamount to election in state and local elections. This is no longer true. This was proven very graphically in Caddo Parish recently by the election of a prominent local Republican to the Caddo parish police jury."

Two important partisan results accrued from the activity in Shreveport. First, the image of virtual disfranchisement in state and local elections on registering as a Republican was weakened - it is notable that a pre-Little Rock registration drive by the Shreveport party succeeded in quadrupling the party's registration in that parish. Secondly, Republican candidates were available in elections just in case the Democratic majority should be weakened. Two years ago a Democratic nominee for police juror in Shreveport came out in favor of the morality of integration, and in the resulting uproar, his Republican opponent was elected in the general election. Obviously, if the Republican police

juror had not been a candidate he could not have been elected. When the electorate turns against a majority party, it is important for the minority candidate to be there - on the ballot. Lake Charles, in contrast, a city about the same size as Shreveport, has run no candidates nor conducted any registration campaigns. According to one source, the district leader, residing in the city, has to be prodded into calling even one routine yearly meeting. Essentially, although there is plenty of activity for the presidential nominee during those campaigns, the area remains a kind of rotten borough, representing practically no party activity in return for its partisan franchise.

In these and other Republican situations in Louisiana the evidence is strongly toward the influence of personalistic factors of leadership in determining the kind of party existent. Where the leadership is active and sanguine the party enters into near minor party competition. Apathetic leadership means that the areas involved have little or no partisan activity.

#### A Revolution in the Rotten boroughs?

Certainly the changes in the Louisiana Republican party have been important under the new leadership. It is the thesis of this paper, as supported by the evidence, that the new leaderships in the Southern Republican party are changing the pattern of partisan activity from no activity to near minor party opposition. And this will be revolution enough for the South.

Notes

- 1 Original Brief on Behalf of Louisiana Delegates Representing New Republican Leadership in Louisiana, to The Republican National Convention and to The Republican National Committee, pp. 5-6.
- 2 For brief history of the development of the Louisiana Republican party see L. Vaughan Howard's account in Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. I.
- 3 This study was made possible by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. The group of 30 leaders defined as the new leadership was selected as follows: A basic list was prepared with the aid of two consultants who were also, themselves, leaders in the Republican party, and this list was checked against lists of candidates, party office holders and program committees for party official functions. By a process of collation from these sources the final list of thirty was secured. Interviews were conducted with each of the leaders during the period between September 1957 and March 1958 and were open-ended in form although structured to the extent that common data were asked of each respondent. Data on party activities were gathered in the field, while conducting the interviews and from the Office of the Secretary of State of Louisiana.
- 4 Resolution passed by the Caddo Parish Republican Executive Committee, September 28, 1958.
- 5 Resolution passed by the Jefferson Parish Executive Committee (no date).
- 6 Kenneth Vines, Republicanism in New Orleans, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. II, pp. 93-134.
- 7 The imputation of mobility motivation was obtained by asking three Republican party leaders to select those they believed were active in the party from motives of mobility. Selection by two of the leaders qualified the leader for the category. Since it was thought that leaders might not readily admit motives relating to mobility and patronage, this imputation device was thought to add an extra dimension of information.
- 8 Republicanism in New Orleans, op. cit.
- 9 Scores on the status index were derived from a composite score including the following criteria: society pages in newspapers, type of occupation, type of residence and residential neighborhood and the opinions of persons qualified to pass judgment on social status in Louisiana and its various localities.



This paper concludes with the observation that the development of the Republican parties is in process. The process of development may be thought of as a series of thresholds, with each threshold as a critical stage marking how far the South or how far individual states are advanced toward a two-party system. Suggested stages for the development of the Republican party in this system are as follows:

(1) Black and Tan leadership to (2) Lily White patronage-oriented leadership to (3) critical competition in presidential elections to (4) partisan-oriented leadership to (5) candidate offerings in state and local elections to (6) critical competition in state and local elections.

Louisiana has entered the fifth stage of development and Texas is well into the fifth and may be passing into the sixth as measured by the most recent state election where the Republican party offered over 40 candidates for election. The evidence indicates, furthermore, that once a stage is reached in the development of the Republican party that there seems to be no slippage backwards. I would conclude that this is the significance of new Republican leadership in the South: that a critical stage of development has been reached in many of the Southern Republican parties toward a two-party South.

Political Limits of Fiscal and Monetary Policy

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958  
Annual meeting of the American  
Political Science Association,  
St. Louis, Missouri  
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel  
September 4-6, 1958

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Nine months elapsed between the pleasant incurring of the obligation to present this paper and its painful delivery. In mid-summer I became frighteningly aware that, though I felt neither a heaviness of data nor a quickening of ideas, public announcement had been made of my presumed Condition and that, moreover, the fruit of my labors would be exposed at birth to close and pitiless scrutiny. Believe me, I suffered pangs of regret at the weakness of flesh which had got me into this situation. What combination of ignorance and arrogance had led me to agree to do a paper on "Political Limits of Fiscal and Monetary Policy"?

Happily, I was able to develop a rationale which sustained me through the last miserable days. The turning point came when one day, twisting in my study chair and trying to find a comfortable way to sit, I thought of a relevant question. This question was not the familiar, anguished "Why did I do it?" but rather "Why was I asked?" Conceivably, only because I was There, but certainly not because of any special attractiveness - I was now willing to concede. Could it be, I asked myself, that I was invited to do this paper, not because of special qualifications for the task, but precisely because I had no special qualifications? Certainly the Committee knew that I am an expert neither in economics or politics. So obviously they invited me for this reason! What they wanted was an inexperienced, uncommitted look at a tangled area; and they could even hope for a paper with a certain naive charm. Of naiveté there is indeed a plenty, but I'm afraid it lacks charm.

## I

An appropriate place to begin is to ask, What is the subject for discussion? This has given me so much trouble that most of my "research" has consisted in trying to find the answer. In fact, most of what I shall have to say could be put under this heading, and the title could appropriately be "A Prolegomena to a Discussion of Political Limitations of Fiscal and Economic Policy". This situation would embarrass me if I did not have such respectable company. As one of my sources notes, there is so little genuine creativeness that one can often get a reputation as a bold thinker merely by making A Plea for Bold Thinking.

The appropriate point of departure in trying to define the subject of inquiry is the "charge" to me from my constituent authority. In a letter to me several items were set forth in way of explanation and orientation: (1) That this is a crucial area of public policy which we (political scientists) are neglecting, (2) that this area of public policy ranks with foreign policy, defense, resources and others with which we do concern ourselves as a discipline or profession, (3) that academic concern for this area of policy cannot be left safely either to the economists or to the "managerialists", because both of these groups are concerned with only a segment of the problem, (4) and that since politics (partisan, pressure, and bureaucratic, all three) cannot be left aside by those who do make policy and implement it and take its consequences, fiscal and monetary policy ought to be kept in the forefront of the concerns of political science. Further, opinion was expressed that we need have no more hesitation in dealing with economics than the economists have in dealing with politics - or the politician in dealing with both economics and politics, and that our professional shyness was probably as much an ignoble retreat from the miserableness of the world as a noble search for the Pure Truths of science.

More specifically, interest was expressed in seeing explored the limitations as a practical matter on fiscal and monetary policy as two sets of policy instruments. What can be done with them, expected of them, hoped or feared from them, given what we know about the political frame of reference? Still more specifically and by way of example, what are the difficulties in trying to recoup defense increases from farm subsidies? What are the costs in legislative program terms (foreign policy and other) of an assault on depletion allowances? What are the limitations of the expenditure side of the budget as a counter to inflation, given the "politically" as well as legally uncontrollable components?

While this much and more was set forth in way of guidance, still the Committee was permissive. I could, for example, narrow the discussion to fiscal policy alone, or I might choose to emphasize the "professional problem", treating substance only as illustrative.

Now it might seem that, both with considerable guidance and with considerable freedom, I should have no trouble addressing myself to a particular subject. But my difficulties have nevertheless been very great.<sup>1</sup> In general, they might be described as being caught between a sea of platitudes and commonplaces, and a mountain range of Big Subjects - some presumably climbed and mapped (but not by me) and some simply yet to be explored satisfactorily by anyone. Nobody in this fraternity needs to have explained to him that if for "economic" reasons an attack should be mounted on depletion allowances, there would be "political" resistance and this could easily be expressed against a particular type or objective of foreign policy. Given a certain existential situation, the "cost" of a certain reduction in depletion allowances could be specified closely in terms of votes on particular bills and predicted with a high degree of probability. Now obviously this is an important matter, involving our welfare or even our survival, but it isn't clear to me - perhaps because this is not my area of professional specialization - where we go from here in a general paper as against a monograph or case study.

On the other hand, my subject has an alarming tendency to broaden out. How could one discuss fiscal and monetary policy in their political context without involving the large theme of public economic policies generally, and the larger theme of government and economic life? How could one discuss fiscal and monetary policies without relation to the validity of economic theories thereon, or this without relation to the status and problems of economics as a discipline? And how could I discuss the problems of economics as a discipline without engaging myself to discuss perennial problems of the social scientist generally: the relationship of Science to Policy, the roles of Fact and Value, and so forth. How could I discuss the non-economic aspects of economic policy-making without discussing matters that run to the roots of the American political and constitutional system; or to the foundations of American values or ideology? How could one avoid a discussion of the relative "efficiencies" of democracy and non-democratic forms of government, since one quickly runs into an implication that the "limits" on economic policy are those of a particular form of government, one subject to popular ignorance and group selfishness? How could I hope to avoid problems which deeply concern and

<sup>1</sup>My research assistant was given the topic with only a general request to do some reading and to give me the benefit of his reflections. His report to me began "The assigned subject is hopelessly large, complex, confused and interrelated". I concur.



divide us as "political scientists" - problems of our self-image and aspirations? And again, as by way of economics, of the question of what social science is all about, anyhow. On the other hand, how could one hope to say anything fresh on such big issues in such a short space?

In any event, I propose to show how such matters can hardly be avoided, even if one addresses himself straightforwardly to the topic. I shall conclude with some personal, perhaps dogmatic, observations, and with what I hope are some pertinent questions.

## II

An historical perspective is perhaps useful in viewing the political side of fiscal and monetary policies. All of us are familiar with the main stream of American economic and political history. We are familiar with the relationships between politics and economic interests in the period of Revolution and constitution-making. We are familiar with the interrelations of politics and economics in the nineteenth century struggles over land, slavery, tariff, railroad regulation, the gold standard, and so forth.

While the picture becomes less clear - and in fact often so complex and obscure that, like a contemporary canvas, one hesitates to call it a "picture" - the closer one gets to 1958, still it is useful both to search for the threads of continuity and the reasonable analogies. Allowing the possibility that I am the victim of a professionally oversimplified view of things, it seems to me that a thread of continuity can be found running from the political and economic phenomena associated with Jefferson, through Jacksonianism and the rise of the Democratic party, through the fortunes and misfortunes of Cleveland, Bryan, Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. In the time of the latter, through the events and ideas we associated with the name of Keynes, fiscal policy as an instrument for controlling economic life becomes associated predominantly with the Democratic party and predominantly with a complex of ideas and interests which the conventions of our trade identify as "liberal".

Conversely, there is a thread of continuity running from the coalition of interests responsible for the Constitution, the rise of the Federalists and the policies of Hamilton, through the Whigs and the rise and triumph of the Republican party, through the fortunes of the McKinley, Coolidge and Hoover. In the time of the latter - and here history walks with us in the flesh - monetary policy as an instrument for controlling economic life, already associated with the Republican party and with a complex of interests and ideas which the conventions of our trade identify as "conservative", becomes even more firmly so identified. Monetary policy is identified with banks, bankers, and the Federal Reserve System (I pass over quickly the date of its birth). There are important associations with classical "equilibrium" economic theory, and with "free enterprise", both as an ideology and as a coalition of political interests. On the other hand, fiscal policy is identified with a "revolution" in economic theory and with a "revolutionary" change in our political approach to the national economy, with the rise of organized labor as a political force, even still perhaps with eggheadism.

Both fiscal policy and monetary policy, as viewpoints and interests, have their institutional strongholds. The FED is of course the center for monetary policy, whereas the centers of support for fiscal policy are deployed in CEA, the Executive Office, and Treasury. In all these there is struggle at close range, however, and in the Congress



one must almost proceed person by person in identifying "institutional" support.

I have been painting with very broad strokes indeed, but I must continue to use a broad brush and bright colors even when trying to qualify and supplement.

Let me speak now of Keynesianism and recent history. The paraphrase "We are all Keynesians now" is not quite correct, but it is a basic datum that most of us are now more or less Keynesian. That there has been a "Keynesian revolution" means that the center of our political strife over economic policy has moved into a new area, involving many new theories, issues, policies, and agencies, though sometimes masking a continuity - as suggested above - of many historic interests. But that the Keynesian revolution has not been complete, either in terms of making converts to the creed or in terms of the compass of the creed, means that we have only added another layer of complexity in our politico-economic life. That is to say, most of the great historic conflicts of economic policy, notably perhaps tariff and monopoly policy, continue, and others, notably "protectivism" for agriculture and labor and continuing foreign aid, have been added in the past generation. In economic terms alone the complexities are staggering: fiscal policy is complex, monetary policy is complex, they may compliment each other or conflict; and each and both exist and operate not in an economic vacuum but in an economic milieu of complex and more or less conflicting theories, economic rigidities and limitations, and economic unknowns.

But to return to Keynes, permit me a personal note. One of my favorite varieties of professional reading is writings by economists about economists, and the treatment of Keynes by his fellow economists has been very interesting. To my knowledge, none has asserted that the General Theory was really written by Lord Bacon, but I have seen it stoutly argued that Keynes said nothing - important and valid at least - that had not been said before him. On the other hand, there is respectable professional opinion that he is to date the outstanding economist of the twentieth century.

Fortunately for our purpose it is not necessary to settle this argument. If Keynes did not create Keynesianism, at least he popularized it, and beyond all doubt the impact of Keynesianism upon both economic theory and economic practice has been tremendous. Of course the Man (or the Doctrine) and the Time coincided. Had the Thirties been a period of prosperity rather than the time of the Great Depression, he would not have been read - for that matter, the General Theory would not have been written. The simultaneous and largely independent development of a national income accounting apparatus gave a framework for the operation of theory; the New Dealers found, at a critical time, a highly intellectualized defense of a course of action which on pragmatic grounds they had found desirable; tens of millions of distressed and disadvantaged people were prepared to believe a theory which put the blame for their situation on an institutional rather than in private failure; and the professional, economic opposition was in deep disrepute.

It is one of the important generalizations of political study in the Fifties that the Great Depression made a much deeper impression on American voting patterns and other

<sup>1</sup>Those interested in this subject will find the papers under the heading "Keynesian Economics after Twenty Years" in the May, 1957, American Economic Review of great interest and value.

political behavior than did the cataclysm of World War II. The Great Depression was of much longer duration, its impact was sweeping and almost wholly adverse, and its cause and cure were at the center of discussion and politics. World War II, whatever its tragedy for some, was an exciting and even profitable interlude for many, and the prelude to a period of unexampled prosperity for nearly all. But I need only remind you of the terrain well described by Lubell and others.

The Employment Act of 1946 of course had as its spur the memories of the Great Depression, was rationalized in Keynesian terms, and was written into law in fear of massive post-war unemployment. It was inevitably a compromise measure, and while some got less than they wished in the nature of substantive guarantees ("full" disappeared) or machinery for implementation, others got much more than they wanted. For apart from the fact that inevitably there were varying levels and types of understanding and acceptance of Keynesianism, there were some who remained convinced of its essential error or sinfulness.

It was, of course, a Democratic President and Congress that were formally responsible for the Employment Act, though Keynesianism by this time had become an accepted working viewpoint across party lines. To be sure, in the period from 1946 to the inauguration of Eisenhower, one might have supposed from reading the newspapers that, with a change of Administration, the Employment Act as well as a score of "New Deal" measures back through the Labor Relations Act of 1935 would be swept off the books. I remember my difficulties in the summer of 1953 trying to explain to English audiences why this had not happened and would not; though of course nobody sophisticated enough to belong to APSA was fooled.

To this extent indeed "we were all Keynesians now". To be sure, many Republicans were bitterly disappointed after January, 1953, some were sad but wiser; but many by this time were converts, if only for "political" motives. On the other hand, nobody has recorded that Senator Byrd pressed hard for the Act, and presumably he had company in the rank and file of Democratic registrants. Still and all, one would say that while the Republican party is committed to the Employment Act, the Democratic party is more deeply committed.

The Employment Act deserves a brief word as the chief platform from which fiscal and monetary are operated. It sets forth as an objective employment opportunities for "those able, willing, and seeking to work", and to this end the Federal government is to "utilize all its plans, functions, and resources". Further specified is the objective of "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power". It further states that these objectives shall be pursued within the ambit of the nation's "other needs and obligations and essential considerations of national policy"; and it is specifically stated that employment and production are to be pursued "in a manner calculated to promote free competitive enterprise". A Council of Economic Advisers was established in the Executive Office, and a Joint Economic Committee of Congress was established to receive and deliberate on Presidential reports and programs dealing with the nation's economic health.

Obviously, while I have called this Act the "platform" from which fiscal and monetary policy are chiefly operated, it is not a neat and sturdy platform. To the dismay of the economists, not only are the key phrases not "operational" without much defining



and refining, but there are plain contradictions, or at least possible conflicts, of objectives.<sup>1</sup> Nor is there an "administration" of the provisions of the Act in a direct sense, but rather only an elaborate system of collecting data, consulting, and giving advice, upon which the President and (or) Congress may or not act. In fact, the organs and agencies dealing rather directly with fiscal and monetary matters are various and only loosely coordinated; of which the separation of the FED from Presidential control and the separation of the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury are examples. Beyond these there is, of course, a long and heterogeneous list of departments, agencies and authorities whose involvement with the economy varies from significant to substantial, and whose operations bear upon the potentialities and limits of fiscal and monetary policy.

Already I have written two thousand words of what I hoped was a straightforward and brief outline of the problem of the political limits of fiscal and monetary policy without introducing the budget, which many would presume to be the Prince of Denmark in this Hamlet. A word both on the substance and the process.

As to the substance and not to put a needlessly fine point on it, it appears that the budget for fiscal year 1959-60 will be approximately 80 billion dollars, and that the gross national product for that year will be approximately four times as great. Of the 80 billion dollars, approximately half will be appropriated for military preparedness, and approximately two-thirds of the remaining half will be appropriated for debt service, veterans' benefits, and agricultural subsidies - items that are relatively "inflexible". To underscore the obvious, while the total budget figure is a sizable part of the gross product, and there are important and inevitable results of this expenditure economically and politically, there is not nearly as much flexibility, as much leverage both ways, as the expenditure total alone would suggest. Impact great, flexibility limited.

On the income side, the total of course will depend upon economic conditions (and these more or less on "political" conditions) a year and more hence. In general, it is predictable that more than half of revenue will be derived from individual income taxes, and about a fourth from corporation taxes, with various excise taxes yielding about a fifth.

On the basis of the politics of the past few months, I should say it is "politically" easier to raise or lower income taxes generally than to change rates substantially (i.e. progressively or retrogressively); but what should one conclude about the ease or difficulty of raising or lowering taxes generally? Changes in excise taxes are possible, even likely, in the near future. The plight of the railroads may spur the repeal of the tax on travel, for example. But what changes in excise taxes are likely to be made are not likely to have major economic consequences.

Considering that we came fairly close to a general reduction of income taxes this past spring, and that business tax rates as well as excise taxes seem to yield to

<sup>1</sup>Those interested in the Act and the economists' opinions of it should consult the symposium "The Employment Act in the Economic Thinking of Our Times" in the May, 1957, issue of the American Economic Review.



sufficient pressure of political (or economic) circumstances, there appears to be more flexibility on the income side of the budget than on the expenditure side. However I state this in a very small voice, and with appreciation of the imponderables and of the problems of definition.

To attempt to say something meaningful about the procedural side of budgeting in a few paragraphs takes more courage than I have, but foolhardiness will serve in the stead.

It may be close to the heart of the matter to say that the results of two generations of discussion and reform have given us a budgetary system which would be very adequate for the situation before 1929 - at least in the terms of the dominant economic thought of that day; that there is widespread dissatisfaction with present budgetary procedures and, though the dissatisfaction is not all of the same stripe, some of it is very impressive in the indictment it brings; and that despite the continuing introduction of new techniques, of which program or performance budgeting is the most widely advertized, there is general consensus among Those Who Know that our budgetary machinery is not adequate to the needs.

From one point of view, the problem is one of overload and inadequacy. Machinery designed to balance income and expenditure annually in a day in which the budget constituted less than five percent of the GNP is now, with only slight rebuilding, required to handle a volume of work that is much greater and a type of work for which it was not designed. The annual budget rule is an important aspect of the problem. Whatever its virtues and inevitability, it is clear that it is ill adapted to the enlarged role of government in the post-Keynesian era. And the problem is compounded by the tradition, the hope, and in some quarters even the earnest expectation of an annually balanced budget.

From another point of view, the problem is one of constitutional theory and institutional power. The Presidency and the Congress are pitted by the Constitution one against the other. Both are deeply and inevitably engaged with the budgetary process, for money is not only the life-blood of the economic system, but the food and drink of politics. As Charles Beard observed, politics is not economics, but without appreciation of the economic, politics is an utter mystery. Even when President and Congressional majority are of the same party - one is tempted to say especially when they are of the same party - there is inevitable discrepancy between Presidential program and Congressional programs. I suspect there has been intensification of conflict with growth of the states and increasing complexity of the issues.<sup>1</sup>

So far in this attempt to delineate briefly the political ramifications of fiscal and monetary policy I have not even mentioned the important factors of pressure group and inter-agency politics. But these phenomena are well known in general outline to political scientists, and no doubt I have by now adequately demonstrated how consideration of the subject has tended to take me between the devil of the commonplace and the

<sup>1</sup>On budget reform see: Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States (New York: 1955); Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: 1956); J.P. Harris, "Needed Reforms in the Federal Budget System", 12 Public Administration Review (Autumn, 1952), 242-250.

deep blue sea of the controversial and unknown. Perhaps, however, I have not made clear why or how the Big Subjects indicated in the introduction are inevitably involved. The next step, it seems to me, is to approach the subject by way of economics.

### III

Up to this point I have tried to take the substance of economic policies for granted, making an effort to look primarily at the political aspects of decision-making. That is to say, I have proceeded for the most part as though economics as a discipline and economists as a profession were united in a single policy, or an integrated set of policies, and that only the limitations of political science as a discipline and the boundaries and deficiencies of the political context, stood in the way of the realization of the policy. This is an assumption contrary to fact, and as far away from reality as the refined institutionless world of some economic abstractions. In this my first extended excursion into the literature of economics in several years, I have been deeply impressed with the similarities of economics to political science, in both the type and dimensions of the differences of opinion. (True, says one economist, economics is the most advanced of the social sciences - "in the wrong direction.") The problem, then, is not simply how to carry out the doctors' prescription, but in part one of what to do when the doctors disagree.

My title, in other words, is prejudicial, in suggesting political "limits" to economic policies. Presumably this was not intended, and in any event I cannot complain, because as you know, I was invited to state it as pleased my fancy. But perhaps now is as good a time as any to make the point that there are economic limits on fiscal and monetary policy, both in the sense of limitations in the discipline and limitations in the economic phenomena. And for that matter, there are economic limits on political policies. Indeed, the semantic-methodological problem is troublesome and perhaps crucial. What, for example, is the annual balanced-budget rule? Is it political? Economic? Legal? Historical? Psychological? Sociological? Anthropological? Normative? Factual? All of these and more. Which may be only a way of observing that we are a long way from a "unified field theory" in social science.<sup>1</sup>

But to return to the divisions of economics - these range from disputes over the definition of the discipline to differences of opinion over any particular item of public policy, such as the effects of a change of rediscount rates. Let us begin with the first type, the "high level" disagreements.

There appears to be little of the stale argument whether economics is properly designated a "science", but there is fundamental disagreement as to the nature of the science. The fact-value controversies are deep-thrusting if civilized in conduct, and

<sup>1</sup>As one of my sources observes, "A social theory cannot simply be stricken from the record"; and though Keynes may have overstated the case when he said we were ruled by "little else" than ideas, certainly one of the things which influences our "political" behavior is economic theories. These have popular acceptance and impact long after they have passed out of scholarly fashion. They "limit" economic policy. But are these limits then economic or political?



the Big Names appear - to an outsider - divided fairly evenly. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that some of the outstanding scholars are staunch advocates of the position that economics is or should be and can be value-free; and that the economist as economist - and perhaps even as non-economist - has no business to advise on or decide economic policies.

On the other hand there are those who argue strongly to the contrary, asserting that most economists have based their work upon policy preferences and have striven hard to realize them; and that even those most vehemently for a value-free science or most aseptic in theoretical construction are inevitably engaged with the world of values, and only deceive themselves and confuse others by refusing to deal directly and openly with the value problem.

Closely related is the problem of "rigor versus relevance". There are those who argue that economics is concerned with policy and that "it must be based on ethical or political presuppositions from the noneconomic world"<sup>1</sup>; that good methodology - even good sense - dictates a scheme of analysis which comprehends all the significant variables which bear upon some problem; and that those who insist on rigor and consistency and elegance at all costs are engaged in a form of "play". On the other hand some argue that the dictates of science are inexorable, and that while the road to a true science may be difficult indeed there is nothing to do but follow it if the objective is to be reached; and that this means starting with a few variables and proceeding cautiously and rigorously step by step, with close and careful attention to the relationship of theory to the empirical world.

Such controversy is familiar to the political scientist, and I review it, not for its novelty, but to indicate that my subject has deep roots indeed; that not only is there not agreement on particular fiscal and monetary policies, but even disagreement about whether it makes sense to say economists can agree or disagree about such policies.

Other conceptual and methodological problems close to the core of the discipline may be mentioned because they are relevant, though space does not permit their development. One is the charge - generally conceded as valid - that economic theory is a theory of statics only. Another is the related matter of predictability, some economists assert that the economist cannot predict - indeed cannot try to predict - the future of economic affairs "without stepping outside his discipline." Another is that the range of variables included in economic study and theory is narrow and unrealistic, that for example, the economist is purblind in continuing to concentrate on the market as the guiding mechanism of the economy when the "real determinant" of allocation is "the organizational structure of that society"; or in failing to note, in a traditional concentration on land, labor and capital, that technology, "the state of the industrial arts" (or perhaps administration) is now the crucial factor in production.

In his recently published The Affluent Society, J.K. Galbraith provides an interesting historical perspective on economic doctrine, and some of his ideas can usefully be

<sup>1</sup>Arthur Smithies, "Economic Welfare and Policy", in Brookings Lectures, 1954 (Washington: 1955), 1-22, 1. On this matter of rigor versus relevance see especially, in this volume, the essay by Jacob Viner.



summarized in this review of the economic aspects of the subject. This book is a new and better "Folklore of American Capitalism", well-tempered and gracefully written, but sharp and penetrating, and calculated to make liberals as well as conservatives squirm in their chairs while reading it. It is the best book I know of on the subject for discussion, treating political as well as economic themes.

To Galbraith, contemporary economics is an "intellectual backwater". (This is not likely to endear him to his fellow economists. I predict that they will dismiss his book with the judgment that he is not saying anything which was not said before. Perhaps - but not as well.) Basic is the fact that poverty has been the human condition until very recently, and still is in most places today. Economics grew up as a discipline in this environment of poverty, and as a reaction to and cure for it. The result was that Production became the central concept and orienting value. This struggle has been won, especially in the United States, but few of us, economists or non-economists, know it. The result is production beyond an optimum with results which, like overeating bring a train of discomforts and dangers.

Liberal and conservative alike are victims of the distortion, and for various historical and intellectual reasons the liberals play the conservatives' game. The reasons why concern in part the Great Depression and the nature of Keynesian doctrine. The Great Depression made employment and security prime political goals of the liberals, and Keynesianism became the "official" doctrine by which these goals could be achieved. Employment and security became linked to aggregate demand and thus to productivity. Keynes, it has been noted, had much in common with Ricardo.

Keynesianism became the "conventional wisdom" of the liberals, who are thus bound to values and ideas no longer appropriate to the post-World War II period. One of the results is to make inflation endemic. If full employment and security (national as well as personal) are falsely conceived as dependent on a constantly rising GNP regardless of what is produced, and if all policies are judged by their effect on aggregate demand, then a continuing inflation is inevitable through the interaction of political and economic forces. Price stability, not increased production, he sees as the central, strictly economic problem. And in this he has much company, I observe, in the economics fraternity.

There is much, much else in The Affluent Society, and it is tempting to pursue some of the other themes, such as the obesity of the private sector of our national life and the malnourishment of the public sector. But I must quote from some other works to insure that this is scholarship, not plagiarism. Let me turn then to the essay by Arthur Smithies, "Economic Welfare and Policy", which treats related themes; specifically it treats of the difficulties of economics in trying to deal with policy questions.

Smithies sketches the approaches of economics, historically speaking (and to repeat, old doctrines seldom die, and when they do they only slowly, slowly fade away), to the "welfare problem". Four "schools" are distinguished, the Classical, the Pigouvian, the Paretian and the Keynesian. The Classical economists saw welfare in terms of increase of capital and growth of output, but put a "dismal" construction on the matter. Pigouvianism wedded Classical economics to Utilitarianism, and sought and claimed a calculus of general social good. The Paretian approach, based on "indifference-curve analysis" attempted to "derive welfare conclusions without recourse to the Marshallian assumptions

of measurability and interpersonal comparability of utilities".<sup>1</sup>

Pigouvianism deserves a word because it has been professionally "destroyed", but lives on in our political life through the beliefs and attitudes it helped to inculcate. "The basic assumptions of the theory were that utilities derived by individuals from the consumption of commodities were cardinally measurable, diminishing, and comparable among individuals, and that the utilities enjoyed by one individual did not depend on those enjoyed by another. On those assumptions in organization of economic resources that would yield maximum satisfaction for society could readily be prescribed."<sup>2</sup> In the discipline of economics this structure of beliefs has been thoroughly demolished; apparently there is no professional argument about the matter. Nevertheless, "society is prepared to act as if utilities can be compared among individuals", and "any economist today who proposed that public policy be based on the view that utilities are not comparable would scarcely get a political hearing".<sup>3</sup> To be sure, such beliefs (as reflected, for example, in the progressive income tax) are not by any means to be attributed solely to the teachings of welfare economics. But there is nice irony in a situation in which a people wants to be directed according to the faith, but the priests no longer believe in the faith. The welfare criteria afforded by Paretian and Keynesian economics, being aggregative and not distributive, are a very poor substitute for purposes of economists trying to guide national policy: that is to say they provide only a single criterion, or perhaps two: aggregate production plus growth), and even if this one is "right" (as Galbraith denies), they have no subsidiary criteria for "distributive justice". To which some of my economist friends would respond, I suppose, "So its an imperfect world? So what do you have to suggest?"

I will conclude this horseback survey of the economic aspects of my subject<sup>3a</sup> by quoting part of a news story, from the New York Times. The heading is "Anderson Weighs Tax Intangibles", and the dateline was the bottom of the current "recession", March 22, 1958:

<sup>1</sup>Loc. cit., 8. Random thought: that "political economy" comes into vogue as a term at the wrong time. That is to say, it is associated with nineteenth century, largely British writings, which were largely very un-political.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>3a</sup>Reading my manuscript, my research assistant was startled to find I had not discussed "the disagreements (in economics) which specifically concern fiscal and monetary policy." I yield to the point to show I have some awareness of them, but they cannot be more than mentioned in a paper conceived (perhaps incorrectly) as this one is. These controversies include the relative merits of fiscal and monetary policy (Galbraith calls the latter a "mystique!"); discretionary policy (usually fiscal) as opposed to the CED automatic rule (usually monetary). A third concerns the primacy of goals: full employment or price stability. A fourth concerns the economy's long-term trend: stagnation or inflation.

"As Mr. Anderson knows very well, all the king's economists and all the king's men cannot provide the type of solid information that he needs on which to base a decision.

No one can tell him how well a tax cut will work, whether it will be a major force in pulling the economy out of the recession. A tax cut has not been tried before in the same sort of psychological and economic circumstances now prevailing. So no one can be sure about the effect.

No one can tell him whether a tax cut, or any other major weapon, is needed. Because economic forecasting is such an unsure business, the President's economic advisers, who are as practiced in the art as anyone, do not know whether the economy will soon pull out of the slump by itself.

Nobody can tell him for certain if a tax cut, assuming it does work, will also give new impetus to the baffling inflation that has plagued the economy for the last two years. There are strong, diverse opinions on this point, but again no certainty.

Finally, no one can even tell him how big a budget deficit a tax cut would produce. The answer to that question depends on the answer to the first question - whether and how rapidly a tax cut would turn the economy toward growth again. Besides the economic haziness, the Texan also confronts some political imponderables.

What is best for the Republican party? To play it "safe" by taking a major step such as a tax cut in an effort to end the recession quickly? Or to act more cautiously in the fear that tax cuts, by reviving inflation, would alienate the conservative forces and betray the party's basic traditions?"

This story illustrates correctly, without exaggeration I believe, the economic "haziness". (In fact, the story contains several more paragraphs of economic unknowns.) But it also brings us back to the political haziness on our own side of the subject, and that is proper. For I do not hope or think that my review of the economic side of the problem was simply diversionary mud-slinging.

#### IV

I pass now to a series of observations and questions stimulated by my inquiry. I can find no single thread of continuity on which to string them, and I will not pretend that one thought flows from the other according to some logical or literary formula.



1. Frankly, I am alarmed at how far away we are from mastery of our economic life. I confess that I lived in a state of faith and ignorance. I simply thought that now we had the conceptual apparatus and the legal-administrative machinery to do what we wished - within broad limits. I thought - and told my classes - that a major depression need not and would not occur. Keynes, the Employment Act, political self-preservation, and all that. Probably I was right in this prediction; but after all I have now found that some economists assert that the post-war prosperity and growth were due to inherent qualities of the economic situation, and had no necessary relationship to what the government did or didn't do.<sup>1</sup>

One presumes while on an ocean voyage that an Intelligence is operating according to Rules to bring the ship to an agreed destination safely. I was naive. I now know that, from bridge to screw and rudder there are serious defects in the machinery, that the officers are in argument about care of the engine and the technology of navigation, and that there is only a limited consensus about which port to make for anyway. There is no point in trying to assess "blame" for this situation as between economics and politics, and on a close view it is not at all clear which is which or whether these terms are the best analytical tools for examining the problem. Certainly the two disciplines share many of the same qualities - some of which are "deficiencies" - and are at roughly the same level of development.

2. I conclude that, though we are a long way from the mastery of our economic life nationally speaking, that there are strong currents moving in this direction. The theoretical and institutional problems that stand in the way are serious and may prove to be insoluble at least without deep-reaching changes - in ideas, values and institutions; and these changes will not necessarily take place.

However: a revolution of sorts has already taken place. The political and economic history of the past three decades plus the creation and reception of Keynesianism have had deep effects, and they will continue to move us in the same direction. Keynesianism in a strict sense has now been largely outgrown (if this is the proper word) by the economists; but Keynesianism as a general force is moving us along toward a national, rational management of the economy, and so far as one can see the future, our position of international competition will accelerate the trend. No doubt "free enterprise" will continue to have a large part in the scheme of things, but increasingly it will be "planned for". My estimate of the situation is that public expectation and desire are now ahead of what political institutions and economic analysis can deliver.

Of course, general political and economic desires are not necessarily in accord with personal, immediate desires. A member of the UAW, for example, may desire both economic benefits from uncontrolled bargaining and a "rationalized" economy with price stability, and see nothing inconsistent between the two. This sort of situation is a part of the problem which we are examining, and a "problem".<sup>2</sup> (Whether it is a political

<sup>1</sup>A Herblock cartoon apropos raising the legal debt ceiling seems relevant: Two men sitting on a running elephant, one holding a steering wheel attached to nothing, but saying "It gives me a sense of being in control".

<sup>2</sup>I may say I found (1) considerable agreement among economists that price stability needs at this time to be given high, and perhaps highest priority in our economic goals, (2) considerable opinion - even among "liberal" economists - that collective bargaining in such industries as steel and automobiles does have an inflationary effect, and (3) even a surprising amount of opinion in favor of selective price control, focused upon such industries.

"limit" on economic policy isn't clear - to me.) Of course, this is but another version of an old tale, that as buyers and sellers we may prefer different rules of the game.

3. My reading and reflecting in connection with this project has moved me toward the "relevance" end of the rigor-versus-relevance scale of methodological conflict. This is my natural tendency, no doubt, but in recent years I have tried to be sympathetic, understanding, and helpful towards the "behavioralist" movement in political science.

This is a large subject indeed, and perhaps it should not be mentioned unless one is prepared to pursue it at length. But I will risk a few summary statements.

My present feeling is: What will it avail us to gain a "hard" science in the long run if in the short run we shall all be dead?<sup>1</sup> I know of almost nothing bearing even at second hand upon the subject for discussion being done by someone in political science "behaviorally" oriented, yet the subject bears intimately not only on "the American way of life" but upon survival. If good minds and trained research talent were unlimited or in over-supply, then there would be no problem. After all, I should like to be tolerant toward what I do not fully understand; and merely on the principle of insuring against risks, one would not want to block any avenue of possible progress. But I do raise the question whether there is not danger that too many of the better minds, particularly among the younger researchers, are being attracted to the study of what lends itself to treatment by fashionable "scientific" tools, even though it is far from pressing pressing problems - so pressing that if not solved satisfactorily there will be no "long run". I speak now not only of political science, but of economics, for as I understand the situation the refinements of contemporary economic theory have the less relevance to public policy the more rigorous, aesthetically satisfying, and "scientifically" respectable they become. Is it scientific to ignore the important variables in what one is supposed to be studying?<sup>2</sup>

4. In American political science there is a bi-polar clustering of attitudes and values with reference to the American political system. One of these is associated with such names as E.P. Herring and Arthur Holcombe, and finds one of its best expressions in the latter's Our More Perfect Union. This school of thought is "defensive" of the peculiarly American, historically-given political system. The other found "official" expression, so to speak, in the report of the Committee on Political Parties of the A.P.S.A. in 1950. In this view there needs to be more "responsible" parties: parties with more "meaningful" programs, more discipline and clearer leadership, more nearly posed against one another in the British fashion. No close or at least necessary connection exists between these two schools and attitudes of praise or criticism of the constitutional system; but there is at least a general tendency for the first school to be laudatory, the second to be more or less critical, especially of the principles of separation of powers and federalism, which are deemed to be in part a cause of what are regarded as weaknesses in the political system.

<sup>1</sup> The Keynesian influence is pervasive, as I said.

<sup>2</sup> I have hesitated to express this opinion for all sorts of reasons, and I ask myself - without being sure of the answer - whether my point of view is not merely an old fashioned crotchet but a reflection of an American cultural bias in favor of "practical" as against "theoretical" activity, a bias as dangerous in social as we are told it is in physical science.



Between these two schools of thought I tend - as a nephew of the Vicar of Bray - to shift back and forth, depending upon the argument to which I am exposed, the problem to which I am addressing myself. The result of my reading and reflection in the present connection has been to move me toward the second position: in favor of reform. In this connection, I recall that Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, in their Politics, Economics and Welfare, take this position strongly; and I suspect that, in general, the motivation or reasons are the same. Politics, Economics and Welfare is an avowed attempt to "recreate" political economy as a discipline or focus of interest. Much emphasis is placed on "rationality, economizing" and goal-seeking. Certainly a natural, if not inevitable result of a look at the institutions and procedures for this purpose in the Federal government is the conclusion that there needs to be much better co-ordination - more unity and coherence.

5. Should political scientists make public economic policy a field of professional writing<sup>1</sup> and (or) engage in the making of public economic policies as permanent officials?

As to the first of these, at least I see no good reason why not. I should say that there is general agreement among the economists that the "purity" of economics becomes diluted in the area of public policy, and that in order to do professional writing here one must become half a political scientist - or at least partially something other than an economist. This implies, of course, that when a political scientist does professional work in this area he becomes half an economist; and this is assumed in my assertion also.

If I understand the situation correctly, the more abstruse aspects of economics, those parts for which technical virtuosity are required, are in general farthest removed from problems of public economic policy; so that while solid professional work is indicated, a political scientist need not master all of economics before trying his hand at the subject matter. In reverse: an economist need not master all of the discipline of political science before entering the public policy field. Neither the history of the theory of sovereignty or the latest refinements on the cube law are likely to be germane.

As to whether the political scientist should, as a permanent official, engage in making economic policy, here the case seems even more clearly favorable. His right in this case is at least equal to that of the professional economist. Whether either should is a somewhat different matter.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>That they have not been doing so during the past generation seems clear from a content analysis of the journals of political science over selected years of the period 1925-1954. (My Political Science in the United States of America: A Trend Report (UNESCO: 1956), 41.

<sup>2</sup>I have occasionally asked myself: What, in "anthropological" perspective, is the significance of the fact that a Council of Economic Advisers exists? Does it result from and symbolize the predominance of the economic motif in American culture? Does it indicate that the economists have a professional prestige and acceptance not accorded other "social scientists"? Why not a Council of Political Advisers? Of course - the two are not comparable (I tell myself) because government is itself a political institution, and it has in fact many councils of political advisers. Why not, then, a Council of Sociological Advisers? Or a Council on Equality (say) composed of a variety of social scientists?



6. Should either the economist or the political scientist make decisions on economic policy? In part this is the old, hackneyed and yet never satisfactorily explored question of the Role of the Expert. In its broad implications there is no space even to outline briefly, but in this particular context a few observations can be made.

First, it is clear (to me) that public policy questions involving economics in any important way involve some of the expertise of both political scientist and economist, and that both may participate legitimately. It seems clear, further, that many economic policy questions would involve other fields of expertise (whether or not academically organized and recognized), and in these cases such expertise should be brought to bear on the decision. A housing program, for example, would involve planning, sociology, and other interests, as well as politics and economics. In fact, the "typical" problem has many more than two professional dimensions.

Can or should such various disciplines or interests be combined in one person? This, of course, is a central problem of political science and administrative science. The phrase "make decisions" in the introductory question covers a range of ambiguity and dispute. Involved, for example, is the distinction between "staff" and "line"; between fundamental and applied research (or between both and "social engineering"<sup>1</sup>); between the elected official and the non-elected official; between the permanent career bureaucrat and the non-permanent; between the regular bureaucrat and the consultant; and so forth.

7. It is obvious that still broader questions are involved. How much is deciding public economic policy a matter of expertise and how much is it a matter of the "will of the people"? How much of the problem is substantive - "right" policies - and how much procedural - institutions and procedures for determining the best "mix" of expertise and the "will of the people"?

8. Probably it would be useful to do what I have avoided doing: simply to make a topographical map of "Political Limitations on Fiscal and Monetary policy". That is to say, to take standard policy items one by one, noting action and reaction, coalitions and configurations. Probably, indeed, there is much useful work, intensive as well as extensive, that could be done. But I would deny that I have been engaged in an elaborate maneuver to avoid discussing my subject; for such work, though relevant and useful, does not reach to the heart of the matter. Fiscal and monetary policy cannot be considered, except "artificially", apart from economic policies generally. On the political side also the "limits" reach to the constitutional fundamentals. And on both sides the ultimate professional dilemmas and conundrums are involved.

9. In order to help you raise your score at professional prediction, I close with a lament for the absence of a "political economy" and a hope - almost certainly forlorn - that it will emerge. The Dahl and Lindblom book, so far as I know, has fallen upon stony soil. I found it myself a highly stimulating and rewarding work, and regard the comparatively little attention it has received as a pity. Still - this was predictable.

<sup>1</sup>See Philip Hauser, "Social Science and Social Engineering", 16 Philosophy of Science, (July, 1949), 209-218.

The dominant currents run against it still, even though in many of its attitudes and themes it fitted the methodological and philosophical fashions of the day.

I close on the theme of the absence of a political economy because I think - I hope - that the deficiencies of this paper are related to a general situation and are not wholly personal. The topic is squarely between politics and economics. For generations political science and economics have been pulling apart, trying to become autonomous disciplines. More than that - though related to that - some of the basic theoretical and philosophical trends of the day run against the enterprise. Nor is there any sign of a reversal.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography has been prepared by my research assistant Mr. David Olson. With the exception of the six items marked with an asterisk in Part II, the annotations are his. To Mr. Olson I extend both thanks and apologies. Thanks for excellent assistance, and apologies for making inadequate use of the abundance he has set before me.

#### I. Symposia

Six highly valuable symposia (at least) have been published since the end of the war on the issues discussed in this paper. The first four discuss the politics and economics of fiscal and monetary policy, and in so doing often refer to the specific subject of the last listed reference on the role of the social sciences in policy formation.

1. "The Employment Act in the Economic Thinking of Our Times: A Symposium," in Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, American Economic Review 47: 96-144, May 1957.
  - a. Edwin Nourse, "Ideal and Working Concepts of Full Employment".  
Nourse states that the function of the economist is to operationalize the fuzzy and hopelessly vague sociological and political concepts of full employment embodied in the 1946 Act. This spritely statement of the functions and capacities of the economist is 'must' reading.
  - b. Robert Gordon, "Stabilization Policy and the Study of Business Cycles"  
Gordon confesses that the professional economist can not be credited with the relative success of our post war economy. He criticizes economic analysis as being too static and/or too limited in the number of variables considered. He pleads for more extensive and imaginative research.
  - c. Peter Henle, "Labor's Contribution under the Employment Act"
  - d. George Terborgh, "Business Investment for Stability and Growth"  
Henle and Terborgh commend their respective sectors of the economy for meeting our economic goal of a stable but also expanding economy.
  - e. E. Sherman Adams, "Credit Policies and Economic Stability"  
Representing the American Bankers Association, the author defends the Federal Reserve System against "a disposition" of the Council of Economic Advisers "to intrude" into the credit policies of the FED.
  - f. Orris Herfindahl, "Tax Policy for Stability and Growth"  
Since 1946, we have evolved a consensus on tax policy from among three competing views (perpetual budget balance, the CED automatic rule, and the discretionary tax policy). We need to evolve further agreement upon the tax structure and a tax policy for major economic swings. CEA and the Congressional Joint Committee should continue as means of "education and conciliation" to evolve these needed agreements.
2. Buehler, Alfred G. (ed), "Government Finance in a Stable and Growing Economy", The Annals 266, November, 1949, 256 p.  
This symposium contains articles on the budget, the impact on the economy of taxation (the longest section), views on desirable tax policies, and a discussion of the public debt.



3. Milikan, Max (ed), Income Stabilization for a Developing Democracy, 1953  
Subtitled "a Study of the Politics and Economics of High Employment without Inflation", this symposium discussed the economics, the politics, and the administration of the Employment Act of 1946. This interdisciplinary product of Yale is inexhaustible in its information, but yet is readable by the non-specialist.
4. Morstein Marx, Fritz (ed), "Formulating the Federal Government's Economic Program: a Symposium", American Political Science Review 42: 272-336, April 1948
  - a. Paul Appleby, "The Influence of the Political Order"
  - b. Edwin Nourse and Bertram Gross, "The Role of the Council of Economic Advisers"
  - c. Harold Davey, "The Experience of Other Countries" (Great Britain, France, Scandinavia)
  - d. Clarence Cannon, "Congressional Responsibilities"
  - e. Merle Fainsod, "Consolidating Party Control"
  - f. Norton Long, "Popular Support of Economic Programs"

The popular image of the role of government, based on ideas of individual rights and natural harmony, leads to uncoordinated government economic policies. Strengthening of the Presidency is not sufficient without also strengthening the party system.
5. Morstein Marx, Fritz (ed), "Maintaining High-Level Production and Employment: a Symposium", American Political Science Review 39: 1119-79, December 1945
  - a. James E. Murray, "A Practical Approach"
  - b. Gerhard Colm, "Technical Requirements"
  - c. W. Hardy Wickwar, "British Plans"
  - d. E.E. Schattschneider, "Party Organization and Employment Policy"
  - e. John Corson, "Organizing Government Staff Services for Full Employment"
  - f. Ralph Flanders, "Private Enterprise and Full Employment"
6. "Applied Social Research in Policy-Formation", Philosophy of Science 16: 161-249, July 1949
  - a. Robert K. Merton, "The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy: a Research Memorandum". Although the author had in mind the disciplines in "human relations", thus excluding economics and political science, his check-list of variables is applicable to the current topic.
  - b. Read Bain, "Natural Science and Value-Policy"  
This mis-titled article is a curious argument for "value-policy" and "method-policy" research which will rescue us from the "guess, special interest, exploitation, ignorance, waste, and confusion exhibited by those whom we now erroneously call policy-makers".
  - c. Solomon Barkin, "Applied Social Science in the American Trade Union Movement"  
This article starkly reveals the meaning of the concept that the social scientist researches within the values and goals of the policy-maker. In this instance, his function is to support the union's argument on any given issue.
  - d. Dorwin Cartwright, "Basic and Applied Social Psychology"
  - e. Philip Hauser, "Social Science and Social Engineering"

Hauser distinguishes between research, either pure or applied, and "social engineering". Research, being conditional and value-free, is the province of the social scientist. Social engineering, being the making of decisions is beyond the professional capacity of the social scientist. The decision-maker must be politically accountable for his acts; no researcher should be in this position.

f. E.A. Shils, "Social Science and Social Policy"

Although science cannot offer "direct guidance" in the formulation of policy, scientists should be "seriously involved" in such problems. Author lists 5 roles of social scientists in policy-formation, and indicates two major limits to their usefulness. He concluded with the hope that a social science may ultimately produce a "coherent theory" which would offer more guidance in policy formation.

## II. Books and Reviews

1. \*Brookings Lectures, Economics and Public Policy, 1955.  
Lectures by Arthur Smithies, Joseph J. Spengler, Frank H. Knight, John Jewkes, Jacob Viner, and Lionel Robbins. Highly concentrated, extremely valuable. Both economic and methodological problems are treated.
2. \*Burkhead, Jesse, Government Budgeting, 1956  
An excellent recent book on the subject; in fact the only recent general treatment. Balances economic and governmental-administrative viewpoints.
3. Colm, Gerhard, (ed), Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal Policy, 1955  
The chapter on "Fiscal Policy and the Federal Budget" lists six ways in which fiscal policy clashes with other government objectives in budget-making.
4. \*Colm, Gerhard, "The Federal Budget and the National Economy", and "The Need for Further Budget Reform, a Joint NPA Statement", National Planning Association Pamphlet No. 90, 1954  
Colm's essay (with Marilyn Young) which is the major part of this booklet is a model of concise exposition. Highly recommended.
5. Dahl, Robert A. and Charles E. Lindbloom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, 1953  
An attempt to "incorporate certain aspects of politics and economics into a single consistent body of theory", i.e. an attempt at a new political economy. An excellent work on the broader implications of the subject.
6. \*Galbraith, J.K., The Affluent Society, 1958  
In Timese, Current & Choice. If not the best single book on the subject, at least the best introduction to the subject.
7. Groves, Harold M., Financing Government, 1958  
Chapters 25 and 26 of this basic text provide a rapid and comprehensive survey of fiscal and monetary policies, the strengths and weakness of each proposed policy, and of the economists' analytical tools.
8. Nourse, Edwin, Economics in the Public Service, 1953  
Nourse, who confessed to have assumed the role of the political scientist to write this book, gives the legislative history of the Employment Act and a detailed account of the operations of the Council of Economic Advisers during his chairmanship. In the last section of the book he evaluates the events which he has described.

(Review by Charles Hagan, American Political Science Review, May 1954. Hagan observes that if CEA were to perform Nourse's synthesizing function within the executive branch, the Council would have to administratively coordinate and even formulate the economic policies of many of the government agencies, and the Joint Committee would likewise have to coordinate the other subject-matter committees of Congress. These conditions do not exist.)

9. Paul, Randolph, Taxation in the United States, 1954  
Review by Alfred Buehler, American Political Science Review, June 1955. Paul notes that petty politics have determined our tax policies, rather than well considered views based upon a concept of fairness. He pleads for widespread citizen interest in the formulation of tax policy to both meet our socio-economic goals and to keep the United States strong to meet the challenge of the USSR.
10. Price, Don K., Government and Science, 1954  
Review by Ernst Griffith, American Political Science Review, March 1955. The book's thesis is that research and professional discussion, not politics and pressure groups, have principally determined national policy. The major question concerns the role of scientists in advising and setting policy. While some scientists should become higher administrators, policy-making transcends science because it involves values.
11. Redford, Emmette, Administration of National Economic Control, 1952  
Review by Charles Hagan, Public Administration Review, August 1955. While Redford wrestles with the problem of the role of the public administrator in furthering the public interest in a society composed of competing private interests, he does not show how the public interest is anything more than the private interests of that part of the population which controls the political branches of the government.
12. Robertson, Dennis, Economic Commentaries, 1956  
Review by Robert Gordon, American Economic Review, June 1957. This English economist pleads for the objective of price stability over that of full employment.
13. Roosa, Robert, Federal Reserve Operations in the Money and Government Security Markets, 1956  
Review by William Gordon, American Economic Review, June 1957. Roosa explained both the defensive and dynamic functions of the FED. Gordon observes that an imperfect ability to predict, even with the aid of 2 daily forecasts, leads to imperfect control by the FED in the money and security markets.
14. \*Smithies, Arthur, The Budgetary Process in the United States, 1955  
Written by a professional economist for CED, it is a good and useful book, but lacking in a sparkle which Smithies has when writing "for himself". Contains material not only on "process" but on economic implications; and proposals for reform of the budgetary process.  
Review by Frederick Lawton, Public Administration Review, Spring 1956.  
Smithies' proposal for strengthening the Appropriations Committees would be politically feasible only if those committees were instruments of disciplined and responsible parties. When the author considers policy, his proposals are based upon "practical politics and not on fiscal principles."



### III. Articles

Note: The symbols following some of the items below, e.g., I.1.a, refer to one of the symposia articles listed above. Those articles are included here for purposes of subject classification; although, of course, these and many of the other articles as well fit into more than one category.

#### A. Economic theory, analysis and policy prescription

1. Bach, G.L., "Monetary-Fiscal Policy Reconsidered", Journal of Political Economy, October 1949, 383-94.

The author considers six difficulties in formulating monetary and fiscal policy, in view of which he proposes a policy of built-in flexibility and a simple rule for price stabilization. His arguments and proposals are answered by Heller. (III.A.3)

2. Burkhead, Jesse, "The Balanced Budget", in Smithies and Butters, Readings in Fiscal Policy, 3-27.

The author shows that the classical case for budget balancing rests in part upon assumptions about the role of the state. While the classiscists emphasize control of the budget, Keynesians stress the effects of the budget.

3. Heller, Walter, "CED's Stabilizing Budget Policy After Ten Years", American Economic Review 47: 634-51, September 1957.

In this "agonizing reappraisal", the author lucidly explains the CED automatic rule and then discusses its weaknesses. He concludes that we need more discretionary control than automatic control, and a greater use of fiscal controls than monetary ones. This article should be read in conjunction with Herfindahl (I.1.f) and Bach (III.A.1)

4. Herfindahl, Orris, "Tax Policy for Stability and Growth" (I.1.f)

5. Keyserling, Leon, "Everybody's Problems: Prices, Wages, Profits", Harpers, March 1948.

Government is an arbiter, creating the atmosphere in which groups can argue. Government is also an active player through its taxing, debt management and banking functions.

6. Lewis, Vernon, "Towards a Theory of Budgeting", Public Administration Review, Winter 1952, 42-54.

The author suggests three parts to a theory of budgeting, and upon this theory proposes an "Alternative Budget System", whereby alternative budget proposals would be submitted by the agencies to Congress.

7. Morton, Walter, "Development and Implications of Federal Reserve Policy", Proceedings, American Economic Review, May 1957, 229-43.

Following a discussion of the impact of monetary policy upon interest rates, the author considers the question of the primacy of price-level stability as an economic goal. He considers that one's view will be a function of one's basic assumptions concerning the possibility of long-term equilibrium, with the classical and keynesian views being the extremes. The author considers the conflict between full employment and price stability to be unreal.

8. Nourse, Edwin, "Ideal and Working Concepts of Full Employment" (I.1.a)
9. Reiersen, Roy, "Is Inflation Avoidable?", Proceedings, American Economic Review, May 1957, 145-60.  
 Author notes that while the economic problem since the war has been inflation, our economic policy is designed to combat depression. He attacks policies which encourage consumption, and argues for a tax policy to encourage savings. He recognizes the political unpopularity of this proposal. The author further states that economic policy per se has not generated our inflation, but other policies are responsible, such as farm price supports, special credit for home building, etc.
10. Schlichter, Sumner, "Our Economy", New York Times Magazine, December 4, 1955.  
 Economic policies are becoming less subject to partisan conflicts between the parties. The cases of this development are both technical (such as the built-in stabilizers) and social (growth of the middle class encourages the parties to appeal to the center).

B. The role of the social scientist in policy formation

1. Barkin, Solomon, "Applied Social Science in the American Trade Union Movement", (I.6.c.)
2. Clark, John Maurice, "The Interpenetration of Politics and Economics", Chapter 10 of Economic Institutions and Human Welfare, 1957.  
 Pure economic theory, if it ignores the role of government, becomes merely normative theory, because men and government can decide their own economic actions. Economists are impaled on the dilemma of being "pure" and thus irrelevant in their analyses, or of considering political standards and becoming something other than economists.
3. Gordon, Robert, "Stabilization Policy and the Study of Business Cycles" (I.1.b)
4. Hauser, Philip, "Social Science and Social Engineering" (I.6.e.)
5. Merton, Robert, "The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy" (I.6.a.)
6. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., "Financial Research and the Problems of the Day", 37th Annual Report, May 1957  
 While the Bureau does not make policy recommendations, all of its efforts are directed toward providing the basis for reasonable discussion of policy alternatives. One reason why the Bureau excludes policy recommendations is that the views of its staff are as diversified as those of the general public.
7. Shils, E.A. "Social Science and Social Policy", (I.6.f.)
8. Snyder, Richard, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior", in Research Frontiers in Politics and Government (Brookings Lectures, 1954)  
 The game theorist does not supply values or goals to the decision-maker, but helps him to clarify his own goals. The theorist then manipulates mathematically the values and givens of the decision-maker in order to discover the optimum strategy for him to use.

C. Role of expert staff agencies in government

1. Adams, E. Sherman, "Credit Policies and Economic Stability" (I.l.e.)
2. Appleby, Paul, "The Role of the Budget Division", (PAR) Summer 1957, 156-58.  
The function of the Budget Division is to present "a sound budget point of view" and to the Executive and Legislature, permitting them to make policy and the value decisions. Policy making must consider many points of view in addition to that of the Budget Division.
3. Flanders, Ralph E., "Administering the Employment Act--The First Year", Pub. Adm. Rev., Autumn 1947, 221-27.  
Senator Flanders discusses the relationships and procedures among CEA, the Joint Committee, the Executive Office and other Congressional Committees.
4. Gross, Bertram, and John Lewis, "The President's Economic Staff during the Truman Administration", APSR, March 1954, 114-30.  
A political scientist and economist discuss the functions and operations of CEA. They emphasize, like Nourse, the Council's synthesizing role, and recommend the strengthening of that role.
5. Nourse, Edwin, "Public Administration and Economic Stabilization", Pub. Adm. Rev. Spring 1947, 85-92.  
Nourse interprets for public administrators the objectives of the Employment Act and the function of CEA in government.
6. Smith, Harold, "The Bureau of the Budget", Pub. Adm. Rev., Winter 1941, 106-15.  
This article is a straight-forward account of the activities of the Budget Bureau.

(Books in this category are 1) Nourse, Economics in the Public Service and 2) Roosa, Federal Reserve Operations)

D. Unified policy versus a "politics of dispersal"

1. Banfield, Edward, "Congress and the Budget: A Planner's Criticism", American Political Science Review, December 1949, 1217-28  
A planner pleads for a budget based upon a six-year Development Plan formulated by a Central Planning Agency. Congress' function would be to approve or reject whole titles. The budget should not be an instrument of Congressional administrative management, but should be a means whereby Congress can allocate funds among alternative purposes.
2. Burkhead, Jesse, "Federal Budgetary Developments: 1947-48," Pub. Adm. Rev., Autumn 1948, 267-74.  
An economist cites developments and gives his criticisms of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Economic Reports, and the budget document.
3. Edelman, Murray, "Governmental Organization and Public Policy", Pub. Adm. Rev., Autumn 1952, 276-83.  
Using WW II wage stabilization as his example, the author gives five tentative propositions concerning relationships between organized interests and government agencies. He concludes that the dichotomy between legislation and administration is a false one, and that "efficiency" is no criterion of Policy. Rather, the "best" policy must be related to group purpose. "The term 'public interest' has no meaning."
4. Harris, Joseph, "Needed Reform in the Federal Bueget System", Pub. Adm. Rev., Autumn, 1952, 242-50.



Harris presents a powerful indictment of what's wrong with our budget procedure, but is not too optimistic about proposals for reform. He calls for a national commission on which both Congress and the executive would be represented. The key to budget procedure improvement rests with the cooperation of these two branches of government.

5. Herring, Pendelton, "The Politics of Fiscal Policy", Yale Law Journal, March 1938, 724-45.

The organization of American government militates against unified fiscal policy. Compromise among competing interests is requisite to comprehensive planning and the invention of organizations to plan and coordinate.

6. Kilpatrick, Wylie, "Neglected Aspects of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations", American Political Science Review, June 1947, 452-63.

The author discusses the procedures and mechanisms of federal-state-local relations and finance.

7. Lawton, Frederick, "Legislative-Executive Relationships in Budgeting as Viewed by the Executive", Pub. Adm. Rev., Summer, 1953.
8. Long, Norton, "Popular Support of Economic Programs", APSR, April 1948 (I.4.f.)
9. Long, Norton, "Power and Administration", Pub. Adm. Rev., Autumn 1949, 257-64.

The lack of orderly budgeting is not due to an incapacity for rational analysis but stems from the necessities of political power. In the absence of parties providing clear-cut mandates, agencies must make policy decisions, and as they do so, they attempt to build and increase their own sources of political support. The Presidency is no less responsive to its sources of group support.

10. Shoup, Carl, "Some Distinguishing Characteristics of the British, French and United States Public Finance Systems", Proceedings, Amer. Econ. Rev., May 1957, 187-97.

The author compares the three countries by 1) tax structure, 2) factors influencing the tax structure, and 3) evasion and avoidance. Federalism and localism in Congress are identified as important influencing factors in the United States.

11. Staats, Elmer, "The Governmental Sector of the American Economy", APSR, March 1953.

Desired economic policies are often countered by other policy needs (e.g. national security) and the temptation to both reduce taxes and initiate new government programs.

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## Interest Groups in India

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Prepared for delivery at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 4-6, 1958.

This paper is part of a larger study on political demands and public policy in India. This particular paper briefly describes the major interest groups in India, the environment in which such groups operate and some of the problems which they face. Field research was carried on in 1957-1958 under the auspices of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council which, as is customary, has no responsibility for anything written here.

For social institutions have been criticized as much as the interest or pressure group. Social critics have been concerned with the overwhelming power of "special" interests as a threat to the dispersal of power necessary for a democratic order. Such interests are often attacked as being characteristically "irresponsible" while democracy requires responsibility if the system is to work effectively. How to prevent special interests from interfering with the creation of a public policy directed at some kind of "general" interest has been a major concern of political scientists and public statesmen.

In recent years scholars have come to appreciate the role played by the interest group in the proper functioning of a democratic order. Interest groups are increasingly being viewed as necessary democratic mechanisms by which the political demands of the public - or at least some sections of the public - are communicated to those who formulate public policy. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that public policy in a democracy is essentially nothing more than the sum total of the forces of influence by various interests - but we need not subscribe to such a position to recognize the important role interests do play in shaping policy. Students of non-western political systems have further argued that in the absence of such articulated interests in a society, the system is likely to be either autocratic or highly unstable. In most of the non-western world politics is less organized, i.e. fewer people take part in organized political groups than one finds in most western countries. And in the absence of well organized political groups making demands in an open political arena on a government organized to receive, aggregate, reconcile and convert these demands in public policy, our capacity to make predictions is low. Without well organized interests articulating the demands of large sections of the society, not only is it difficult for the outsider to make predictions, but governments themselves are frequently uncertain as to what the response to public policy will be. Furthermore, without that continuous flow of communication between government and citizenry that makes a government responsive at least to demands which have wide support, a government will be a democracy in name only.

Democrats in the industrialized west have been concerned with the large concentrations of power in the hands of various organized interests, which have sometimes made it difficult for governments to pursue rational policies for the more general good of the entire community. In contrast the problem for democrats in most non-western countries is how to encourage the growth of voluntary associations which would not only communicate public demands to those who make public policy but who in return would give support to democratic institutions.



To what extent have interest groups been organized in Asia, especially among the newly independent democracies? To what extent are such groups communicating public demands to government? To what extent is government responsive to demands? Are interest groups giving support to the democratic system or are they using their power to destroy it? The answers to these kinds of questions may give us more insight into the dynamics of the new countries and their capacity to function as democracies than an examination of their formal governmental structures or even of their rates of literacy, voting turnout, the existence of free elections, and civil liberties. For freedom exists in many of these countries, but it is a freedom guaranteed only temporarily by the fact that the ruling elites are, for the moment at least, committed to working within a democratic framework. If a few individuals can establish a democracy, then a few can destroy it? But if a large part of the population is so organized that its demands are satisfied by a political system to which it gives support then democratic institutions are safe. The American and British publics are so well organized to defend their institutions that a coup d'état would be unthinkable. In Indonesia and Burma it is not.

Before we turn to our study of interest groups in India let us first clarify our terminology. By interest or pressure group we mean any voluntary organized group, outside of the governmental structure, which attempts to influence the nomination or appointment of governmental personnel, the adoption of public policy, its administration, or its adjudication. By definition we have thus excluded from this particular study those groups which are part of the governmental machinery - such as the military, police and civil administration. These groups do in fact attempt to influence public policy, but being part of the governmental machinery they are of a different order than voluntary interest associations in the society. We thus emphasize the classic distinction between State and Society, or to put it in modern terms, between government and politics, or to be even more modern, between the authoritative political structures and functions and the non-authoritative political process. We are not arguing that such institutional groups are not attempting to shape public policy, administration and adjudication. To the contrary, in much of the non-western world institutional interest exert great power and are in fact often the dominant political groups. In the absence of voluntary organized interests in the society, such institutional interests within the governmental structure often play a dominant role.<sup>1</sup> It is a basic assumption of this study however that the growth

1. We are not arguing a "bureaucratic" theory which accounts for the role of institutional interests solely in terms of the absence of any organized voluntary interests; obviously there are other reasons too for the special role which the military and civil bureaucracy play in most non-western countries - their "bureaucratic" outlook, the additional strength given to them by the presence of real or make-believe external threats, their "bureaucratic" mode of operation, their discipline and organization which can be employed to hasten rapid growth, the ties of military personnel to other institutions, and so forth.

of voluntary interest associations, rather than institutional interests within government are important for the emergence of a democratic order.

Our definition of interests also excludes political parties which have as their aim the nomination and election of candidates to public office. Parties in the U.S. and Great Britain are aggregations of interests rather than expressions of single economic, religious, or community interests. However, in much of the world, including India, the sharp line between parties and interest groups which we make in the United States and Great Britain is a blurred one. In India, single interests may attempt to influence public policy and administration, but

may also put up their own candidates for public office. In so far as parties in India are expressions of a single interest we shall pay special attention to them; in any event, the relationship between interests and parties will be an important part of this study.

Special emphasis is placed in this study on the word "voluntary." The family, village, or caste into which a human being is born is not an interest group. Only to the extent that individuals within the family, village, or caste band together voluntarily to influence government can we say that an interest group exists. From time immemorial individuals acting on behalf of their families or clan have attempted to influence government and in a genuine sense one can argue that such groups are interest groups. Such influence exists in Great Britain as well as in India - obviously far more so in India than in Great Britain, but what characterizes a democratic order is the extent to which the influence of such interests has decreased while the organization and influence of voluntary associations has increased. Interest groups, therefore, in our use of the term includes those non-party voluntary bodies or associations which, along with whatever other purposes they may have - economic, religious, educational, or charitable, attempt to influence the legal order.

Before turning to the factors which have affected the development and role of interest groups in India, we must see to what extent there are organized interests. In thinking about the various types of interest groups which exist in a society, one can distinguish between those groups which make limited demands on the system, such as the modern British trade union, and those whose demands are more comprehensive, such as the trade unions of Britain at the turn of the century. "The society in which many groups have major demands" wrote one student of British pressure groups, "is a society of grave discontent, for the demands probably indicate that large sections of the community consider that their interests are not recognized by the state."<sup>1</sup> Such a distinction calls attention to the

1. J.D. Stewart, *British Pressure Groups*. London: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 4.

quantity of demands being made upon the system. In India today interest groups make far more major demands than interest groups do in the United States or Great Britain today or did even fifty years ago. The high level of demand in India places upon the political framework a strain of greater magnitude than that experienced by the United States and Great Britain in their earlier periods of democratic political development.

Still another way of categorizing types of interest groups is not in terms of the magnitude of the demands but rather the character of the group itself. One can distinguish between those groups organized along the lines of occupational economic interest - trade unions, peasant associations, business organizations - and those interests organized along the lines of community - linguistic, cultural, tribal, and caste. Most non-western political systems are characterized by a larger number of community interest groups than are most modern western political systems. The occupational type of association is typical of 20th century western countries; the community type was more typical of an earlier period when ties to religion and region led to many political conflicts. The breakup of old loyalties and the growth of new loyalties to a national state, the rise of new economic classes and the growth of industrial economies, these twin developments involving the rise of nation-states and the growth of industrialization took place separately in many western countries. In India, as in other non-western countries these two developments are occurring at the same time in the twentieth century and this is reflected in the kinds of groups which are emerging and the kinds of issues being fought in politics.



The distinction between occupational and community interest groups is sharper in theory than in practice. Occupational interests are often divided along the lines of community as well. Among business associations for example, the distinction between the interests of commercial and industrial groups is often of less importance than distinctions between Marwari, Parsi and Gujarati businessmen. Trade unions too are often divided by caste conflicts. So are peasant associations. The Communist-Congress conflict in Andhra state is essentially a conflict between the Kamma and Reddi castes. On the other hand, community conflicts often coincide with economic divisions. The Hindu-Muslim conflict was often a conflict between Hindu landlords and Muslim tenants; the Maharashtra-Gujarat conflict in Bombay is also a conflict between Maharashtrian workers and Gujarat managers and owners.

It would be inaccurate to speak of community associations as "traditional" in contrast to "modern" economic interests. In a sense both kinds of associations are "modern." India's traditional order had no voluntary associations of the kind which we are studying. Even tribal associations are a modern phenomena. India's tribes did not have autonomous political structures comparable to African tribes. Leadership of the tribal associations in India is in the hands not of any traditional leadership but rather of those who, by virtue of their education and ownership of land, have status. Linguistic groups too are modern, dating only since the 1920s. A sense of identification with a linguistic-cultural region possibly dates, at the very earliest, to the Moghul period when vernacular literatures developed on a large scale. Few of these regions were ever political units. The desire to be a distinct political unit as part of a federation of Indian states developed only in the 1920s when the Indian National Congress passed a resolution stating that an independent India would reorganize India's states along lines of language rather than political or administrative convenience. Agitation for such reorganization didn't actually begin until after independence. Here too leadership of linguistic groups is in the hands of a leadership whose status is based more on wealth, education and occupation than on caste.

In spite of the blurring of lines between these two types of interest groups - those organized along the lines of community and those organized along the lines of occupation and economic interest - the distinction none the less is a useful one for it calls attention to the kinds of issues fought out in Indian politics and the kinds of strains placed upon the political system.

Looking first at occupational interests in India, we can discern six major groups: business, labor, peasants, landlords, the middle classes, and finally, though not strictly speaking an occupation, students.

#### Business Associations

The Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) is the peak association of Indian business. It is a federation of 123 chambers of commerce and trade and industrial associations throughout the country. Some idea of the magnitude of these organizations in India can be obtained from the fact that the 123 chambers which make up the federation have a total of 32,702 members. Many of these chambers are themselves federations of associations and do not have individual members, so that this figure represents the lowest possible number of individual members. India has two major types of chambers - those organized along the lines of specific trades and industries and those associations which represent a number of diverse trades and industries united together within a region. The first type includes the various associations of sugar mill owners,



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jute mill owners, textile mill owners, tea planters, and so on. These associations promote the interests of specific trades and industries through coordinating activities, supplying information, conducting research into market problems and prices, promoting standards, and representing their interests before public bodies. Associations organized along regional lines generally include the various trade associations. The most important of the regional chambers are the Indian Merchants' Chamber in Bombay (with 2,716 members of which 123 are themselves associations), the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta (made up of 21 industrial and trade associations), and the Southern India Chamber of Commerce in Madras (with 41 association members).

The organization of businessmen along the lines of trade and industry and region follows the conventional pattern of organization in the west. What is peculiar to India is the organization of industrial and commercial interest along "community" lines as well. By community here we mean the organization of businessmen in accordance with the linguistic, caste or religious community to which they belong, or geographic region from which they originally came. To understand why such community organizations developed in India, one must keep in mind two facts. First, loyalty to kinsmen, village, caste and religious sect or community have been an important feature of Indian social organization. Territorial loyalties have only recently developed on a substantial scale. Second, the response to the western impact was largely in terms of these existing communities. Commercial comprador classes and later industrial classes grew out of communities which had historically, as communities, been involved in commerce. Many of these communities were active in western India and were associated with the caravan trade routes from the Arabian sea to the Gangetic valley. Marwaris - from Marwar (Jodhpur) state in Rajasthan, Jains - a heterodox offshoot from Hinduism whose refusal to take any form of life probably contributed to their entering commerce, Parsis - Zoroastrian refugees from Persia, and Cajaratis in general were the most active communities in commerce and industry. Elsewhere, traditional money lending castes (known as banias) and trading castes entered the new economy. The chettiers, a money lending caste in the south, for example, became a powerful commercial class not only in south India but in southeast Asia. Some of these communities scattered throughout India and wherever they were formed chambers of commerce to represent their interests. Bengal, for example, has five major chambers: the Bengal Chamber of Commerce (a European chamber), the Bengal National Chamber (consisting of Bengali businessmen), the Bharat Chamber of Commerce (a Marwari chamber), the Indian Chamber of Commerce (an all-India chamber with a heavy Marwari and Parsi membership) and the Oriental Chamber of Commerce (a Muslim chamber).

Precisely how chambers attempt to influence government policy and administration, what their relationship is to political parties, and how successful they are in exerting influence will have to be dealt with elsewhere but without going into detail or providing evidence, a few general points about the position of the chambers should be made here:

Firstly, Indian business has always operated in a politically hostile environment, first under a government concerned more with British than Indian business interests and now under an Indian government dedicated to creating a "socialistic pattern of society." Socially too, Indian businessmen have been looked upon with contempt by more educated, more westernized, rural gentry classes and castes of higher status.

Secondly, the political influence of Indian business, while not insubstantial, is not commensurate with its economic power and concentration. Whether one

uses the criteria of ownership or control, Indian industrial interests are highly concentrated.<sup>1</sup> Nine leading families in India hold nearly 600 directorships or 1. M.N. Mohla, Structure of Indian Industries, Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1955. Chapters IX-XII, pp. 245-313 carefully document the extent of concentration of ownership and control in Indian industries.

partnerships in Indian industries. The house of Balmia and Singhania together hold more than 200 directorships in industrial concerns. Ten eminent industrialists together hold 400 directorships. A small group of thirty-six Managing Agency Houses control and manage more than 600 industrial establishments in India. These agencies also have their own banks, investment houses and insurance companies which provide capital for their own expansion.

A simplistic theory which relates economic wealth and concentration to political power would fail to explain why the influence of Indian business has been so meager. Indian chambers have had some success at affecting government policy, but not major legislation. Insurance, airlines and the Imperial Bank have been nationalized. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 eliminates certain major industries from further private expansion. The Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 and the Company Law of 1955 provide for detailed government regulation and control of business. Import and export regulations require businessmen to obtain licenses from the government. Taxes have been increased and new tax laws have been passed, including taxes on wealth and expenditures. But while business chambers have not been able to prevent such laws from being passed, businessmen have learned to evade many of the taxes and controls and found ways of obtaining government licenses. Such evasions are a form of "influence" resorted to when the chambers fail to affect larger public policies.

Why Indian business influence is not commensurate with its economic position can be attributed to several factors. First, as we have noted, is the socially and ideologically hostile atmosphere in which the business community operates. Partly because the community accepts its low status, partly because it doesn't know what to do about it, and partly because it fears that any action it takes might result in more stringent measures by government, business in India does little by way of public relations.

Secondly, the business community has had no other alternative but to exert its influence on the Congress Party which, in theory at least, is committed to a socialistic framework. Of the major parties in India, Congress is perhaps the most "conservative" party and if business is unsatisfied with the returns it gets, it can hardly hope to do better with the Socialists or Communists. Indian business is thus in a position analogous to what British business might be in if England had only a Labour and a Communist Party. In such an environment Indian business takes the prudent position of supporting the least hostile party. What Andre Siegfried wrote of the Englishman can also be said of the Indian businessman. "...he acts like an old-time sailor; he manoeuvres in an unstable environment, and he accepts that instability as a fact which he cannot change and which it would be folly to resent."

#### Trade Unions

Figures on trade union membership in India are notoriously inaccurate. In this case, however, the absence of adequate statistics is less a mark of governmental inefficiency than it is an index of the amorphous and disorganized character of India's trade union movement. Dues paying is irregular and unions are reluctant to drop non-paying individuals from the membership rolls; trade union meetings are not common; unions rely almost exclusively upon an outside political



leadership; finances are vitrually non-existent. Labor commitment to the trade union movement is low and without such commitment it is difficult to build a politically and economically effective movement. Only during strikes and mass demonstrations do most unions show any life, and these are more often ineffective than not. In 1954, for example, to take one year at random, of 840 work stoppages, 14% were successful, 10% partially successful, 31% were completely unsuccessful, 30% were indefinite, and the remainder not reported. In some years the number of unsuccessful strikes have been as high as 81% (in 1926); the most successful year was 1940 when nearly 27% of the strikes were successful.

India has four national trade union federations, each one of which is associated with and controlled by one or more political parties. The Indian National Trade Union Congress, the largest of the four federations (with about 920,000 members) is associated with the Indian National Congress. The All India Trade Union Congress (373,000 members) is associated with the Communists. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (210,000) is a Socialist group, and the United Trade Union Congress (about 130,000) is controlled by several Marxist left parties, mostly in West Bengal.

In spite of union weakness, however, India has a large number of remarkably progressive labor acts. The first factory acts were passed before there were trade unions in India. The 1926 Trade Unions Act which legalized trade unions and provided for their registration with government was passed at a time when unions were too weak to influence government policy. Labor legislation was more often the result of pressure from Lancashire, the influence of the International Labour Organization, or the concern of government for the shocking conditions in which workers worked and lived. British interests and British sentiment probably had a greater effect on the passage of labor legislation than pressures by Indians.

Trade unions operate in a far more sympathetic environment than do business associations. The Indian government is dedicated to a program of economic development aimed at increasing living standards and greater social and economic equality. The number of trade unions and trade union membership has increased tremendously since India became independent. Trade union membership increased from 899,000 in 1945 to 1,853,000 in 1952. The number of registered unions leaped from 865 in 1945 to 3,744 in 1952. This growth was closely related to the increased activity of political parties in the trade union field. Just as the earlier trade unions in the 1920s received their impetus from the work of Gandhians and other nationalists, so did the post-war unions get help from political elements.

The growth and role of unions is also related to government policy. Since 1947 a spate of labor legislation has been passed. These laws are of two kinds. One group of laws center around labor welfare. These are laws providing for the protection of the health, welfare and safety of workers (Factories Act, 1948), laws relating to working conditions in mines (1952), plantations (1951), docks (1948), minimum wages (Minimum Wages Act, 1948), and various social security acts. These progressive welfare acts have to be seen in the context of a second group of acts relating to industrial relations. The major act was the Industrial Disputes Act passed in 1947. This complicated act provides for Works Committees, Conciliation Officers, Boards of Conciliation, Courts of Enquiry and Industrial Tribunals, all directed at settling industrial disputes without strikes or lockouts. The most important provisions of the act prohibit strikes and lockouts during conciliation, enquiry or tribunal proceedings, and make the award of a tribunal or conciliation officer binding on the parties and legally enforceable.



It is generally agreed that the legislation effectively retards the development of a system of collective bargaining. Without the threat of strike neither unions nor management are eager for collective bargaining. Weak unions in particular are eager that disputes be sent to government tribunals where at least part of their demands can be satisfied. Management too, which in many cases has not become reconciled to trade unions and to cross-the-table discussions which collective bargaining entails, often prefers government tribunals.

In evaluating the role of trade unions as an interest group in India, two facts are of prime importance. The first is that union leadership is a non-working class leadership; the second, is that unions are largely controlled and utilized by political parties for purposes which in the United States and Great Britain would not be considered in the interests of trade unions. Most unions in India have been organized by, and are controlled by non-working class political party militants. In the 1920s most union organization was undertaken by Congress nationalists who wanted working class support for the nationalist struggle, or by Communists who associated trade unions with the class struggle against capitalism. After independence, virtually all major political parties expanded their trade union work to win votes in India's first election based upon universal adult suffrage, or to build the organization necessary for revolution. Communist, Socialist, Trotskyite, Congress, even the Hindu communal parties are in the trade unions. It is not that trade unionists support political parties, as in Great Britain and in much of Western Europe, but that political parties work in trade unions. The trade unionist is not a socialist in India; it would be more accurate to say that the socialist is a trade unionist. Trade union leadership loyalties are thus more often to the party than to the union.

In thinking about the political role of trade unions, one must take note of two distinct developments. The first, we have already noted, is the use of unions by political parties for political purposes. The second is the use of trade unions by the ruling Congress Party and the government to minimize strikes and maximize labor's contribution to higher productivity. Trade unions are thus also used as a device for ensuring greater labor discipline. Labor legislation, as we have noted, aims to minimize strikes, and the Congress-dominated Indian National Trade Union Congress is particularly active in utilizing conciliation and arbitration proceedings to eliminate strikes.

The trade union struggle is thus between those who wish to use unions as instruments of government planning and those who wish to use unions as instruments of political parties. The third alternative of unions as autonomous bodies concerned with protecting their own interests, seeking to influence both government and political parties is widely supported in India in the abstract, but the interests of parties and of government seem to dominate. This is a consequence of the dependence of unions upon political parties for their leadership. For Indian trade unions have produced their own leadership. It is in this vacuum of trade union leadership that political parties have operated. Unions in any democratic system have considerable power; where power exists leadership will arise to utilize it -- and if the leadership does not arise from within, it will come from without. The absence of a leadership within trade unions whose first loyalty is to unions is an important if not crucial element in the role of trade unions in India. Why unions have not thrown up their own leadership is a question we shall turn to later for we shall see that this is a phenomena characteristic not only of trade unions, but of other mass organizations in India as well.

### Peasant Organizations

While most Indians are peasants, few peasants belong to formal peasant associations. Peasant revolts against landlords and government are probably as ancient as India herself. Government reports and other contemporary accounts give us a picture of substantial peasant discontent and uprisings during the 19th century. In the 1830s the Santals, a tribal group in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, launched an insurrection against landowners, money lenders and the government. A few years later tenants of European indigo planters refused to cultivate indigo. There are also reports of uprisings in north Bengal, in Maharashtra, the Malabar coast, and in Mysore. None of these uprisings, however, resulted in the creation of any peasant organizations which could on a continuous basis represent peasant interests to landlords and government.

Peasant associations did not begin in India until after World War I. Nationalist leaders, including Gandhi, Sardar Patel (India's first Home Minister), Rajendra Prasad (the President), built their popular reputations on organizing peasant movements against, not so much landlords, as against the government. The peasant movement, like the trade union movement we discussed earlier, was catalyzed into organization by nationalist leaders who looked upon the organization of mass movements as a necessary step toward building up pressure against the British rulers. In the 1930s, however, the character of peasant movements changed; against the Congress nationalist approach of building up a national movement in which Indians of all classes joined together against the British, leftists within Congress sought to organize the masses according to the principle of class struggle. Landlords, as well as the British, became the new targets. Without going into a lengthy history of the peasant movement in India here, suffice it to say that in the early 1930s peasant organizations were started in Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra. In 1936 the All India Kisan Sabha was formed and for many years thereafter, the AIKS was the paramount organization of Indian peasants. Several facts about the AIKS are of particular importance in understanding its role as a pressure group.

Firstly, while it did put pressure upon the government, it also exerted pressure upon the Indian National Congress, and in this endeavor it was very successful in shaping the agrarian program of Congress.

Secondly, the Kisan Sabha was not organized or controlled by the peasantry, but by younger Socialists, Communists and nationalist political workers. Kisan Sabha manifestos, for example, did not use the first person plural, but the second and third person. Kisan political workers were not only outsiders, but they considered themselves outsiders; they were with the peasants, but not of them.

Thirdly, while the Kisan Sabha built up a mass organization, its leaders have acknowledged that whatever strength they have had has been more with peasant proprietors than with poor tenants or agricultural laborers.

During the war when the Indian National Congress leadership was imprisoned for opposing the war effort, the Communists successfully gained complete control of the Kisan Sabha and have retained control to the present day. Some of the non-Communist Marxist left parties organized their own kisan movement after the war, and the Socialists did likewise, but the Congress Party, for reasons we shall soon turn to, left the field of peasant organization. Neither the Socialist nor Marxist left peasant organizations have become very large however. The Communist dominated AIKS claimed over a million members in 1954, the same in 1955, but only 736,000 in 1956. But how poorly organized the peasant movement is



can be seen from even a cursory examination of the state membership figures whose variability indicates a great deal about the durability of the organization.<sup>1</sup>

1. Bihar, for example, had 56,000 members in 1954, doubled to 100,000 in 1955, then dropped to 54,000 in 1956. Andhra's 110,000 members disappeared in 1955; so did Telangana's 114,000 members. "Andhra and Telangana did not enrol members as all the kisan workers were fully engaged in the general elections in Andhra during that period," says the Kisan Sabha report of that year. In 1956 Telangana still had no membership and Andhra had only 20,000.

The fact is that the kisan workers are political party workers as well and peasant organizational work is an adjunct of their party work; when party work receives priority, as during elections, peasant work suffers enormously.

The Congress Party did not create a separate peasant organization on the grounds that Congress itself is a peasant organization since the bulk of its members come from the rural areas. It not only has a large peasant membership, but it claims to speak on behalf of the peasantry. It is the Congress, say Congress workers, that has successfully carried through a program of agrarian reform in India, abolished zamindari (the landlord system), improved the tenure of tenants, and carried out a large program of agricultural development.

In recent years, however, the Congress leadership has been concerned with the fact that the Communists, Socialists and other parties in opposition have had some success in winning peasant participation in mass demonstrations and civil disobedience campaigns, and in winning peasant votes during elections. Congress leaders have felt that too often peasants have been diverted from a program of rural development to political agitation. In 1955, Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh, India's Agricultural Minister, took the initiative in organizing the Farmers Forum which aims to "promote, advance and protect the social, economic and cultural interests of the agricultural producers" and "to assist in formulating and promoting State and national agricultural policies and to collaborate and cooperate with similar organizations of agricultural producers in the State or in the country." The policy statement goes on to say that it must express its views toward government "but it will use persuasion as the main instrument, not coercion, strikes and struggles." Thus far, the Farmers Forum seems to be more an organization of state and local officials concerned with agricultural problems, some businessmen, bankers and some larger landlords. With a membership fee of Rs 10 and an annual subscription of Rs 5, it is not likely that many peasants will join.

From a brief examination of the peasant movement in India, there thus emerges a picture of a movement in which participation has been greatest during political struggles, but which has not been effectively organized and which in any event has been more successful with the more prosperous peasantry than with poor peasants, tenants and agricultural laborers; the peasant movement, like the trade union movement, has also been characterized by an outside, non-peasant leadership concerned with utilizing the peasant movement as a device against British rule, against the ruling Congress Party, or on behalf of the government's rural development program.

#### Landlord Associations

While peasant associations had the blessings of the nationalists, landlord associations in India had the blessings of the British. The first landlord associations were that of the British indigo planters in Bihar at the beginning of the 19th century and the British Indian Association which was established in 1838 as the Landholders' Society. The zamindar or landlord system of Bengal was



created by the famous Permanent Settlement of Lord Cornwallis at the close of the nineteenth century. The measure converted revenue collectors into landlords, ensured a more secure revenue for the East India Company and created a squirearchy to back British rule. Landlords in India were among the most loyal to the British.

Landlords not only operated in a far more sympathetic environment as far as government was concerned (in comparison with the peasantry), but landlords were psychologically more disposed toward organization than the peasantry. Virtually all rural studies indicated that landlords in India are of a higher caste than cultivators or agricultural laborers. By virtue of wealth, education, and caste the landlord was in a position of dominance in the countryside. He had no hesitation about dealing with authority for he himself, in his own way, was in a position of authority. In contrast, the peasant, especially the poorer peasantry has lived for centuries in an environment in which he has suffered from the vagaries of both man and nature. A subsistence agriculture which makes a man so dependant upon the whims of weather, an oppressive tenure system, and a religious outlook which encourages acceptance and resignation combined to discourage peasant organization, for organization to influence policy and administration involves an image of one's self which all too often the poorer peasant does not have.

Since independence, the influence of the landlord has decreased. The Congress Party announced its intention to abolish the landlord system in India and state after state has passed some kind of reform legislation. In some states legislation has been ineffective as a consequence of legal loopholes or unsatisfactory administration of the law. Landlords have been active first in delaying legislation, in pushing for high compensation, and in getting the inclusion of legal provisions which would keep substantial amounts of land in the hands of the landlord. Unlike the peasant organizations and leftist parties which have openly attacked landlords and advocated land reform, the landlord groups have had to operate in a more circumspect atmosphere. Some landlords have been elected to state assemblies (twelve of the West Bengal MLAs list their occupations as landlords and another forty call themselves "farmers"). They have had some effect in persuading top government officials that major land reform was detrimental to the country, particularly on the grounds that the abolition of intermediary landholders would mean loss of income to the already impoverished middle classes. If the central government and the Congress Party in the center - both of which are much more free from local landlord interests - had not put pressure on many state governments land reform would probably not have progressed as far as it has.

#### Middle Class and Student Associations

Two occupational groups of considerable importance are the white collar salaried middle classes and the students. In India as elsewhere, the white collar classes are extensions of the student community, perhaps more so in India where relatively few students enter agriculture or business.

In most agricultural and semi-agricultural countries students seem to play a particularly important role in politics - by articulating popular demands, by organizing demonstrations and campaigns to influence government policy and even to overthrow governments, and by providing recruits for political parties. In agricultural countries where agricultural communities are not well organized politically but where universal adult suffrage gives to the rural community considerable power, students are often an important link between urban politics and the peasantry. At the University of Patna in rural Bihar, for example, where

most students come from villages and small towns, the university authorities kept the university open in order to discourage anti-Congress students from returning to their village homes to arouse the anti-Congress vote. In Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, it is generally agreed that the students were a decisive force in arousing public opposition to the ruling Muslim League, and winning votes for a United Front which trounced the League in the 1954 elections. On the other hand, the students in Calcutta have been less of a political force. They take part in mass demonstrations, but side by side with trade unions, peasants and refugees; they participate in election campaigns, but so do other groups. By operating in a more organized political atmosphere the influence of student organizations is reduced. Then too, the fact that Calcutta students - unlike the students at Patna or Dacca - do not come from rural Bengal but come from middle class families who have settled in Calcutta for one or more generations, tends to minimize their political usefulness as a link with the countryside. And the fact that the countryside is somewhat organized, more by the Congress Party perhaps than by peasant organizations, also minimizes their role.

Much can be said about the role of the middle class in modern Indian politics, but very little can be said based upon empirical evidence. The middle class is supposed to be the most educated part of the Indian community, politically articulate and active, and the core of India's nationalist movement. Precisely who the middle class is, however, has rarely been defined. Until recently those who have been generally called the middle classes in India have occupied somewhat different positions in India's society than the middle classes described in C. Wright Mills' *White Collar*. The Indian middle classes have been very much land conscious; the land system in many parts of India not only provided for large landlords but also for hundreds of thousands of smaller "intermediary" rent collectors. Population growth, and an inheritance system which encouraged land fragmentation not only multiplied the number of intermediaries but reduced their individual incomes. These middle classes entered urban life, took up white collar and professional occupations, helped build much of modern India's culture, and also became the foundation of many of her political movements. The political leadership of the nationalist movement and of many interest groups came from a rural gentry, what in Bengal is known as the "bhadralog" or "gentlefolk." These "intermediaries" in the land system also became intermediaries in the modern political system. It should be noted, however, that this role is not a new one since the rural gentry have always played an important part in the politics of village and town life. What is new, however, is the role played by the rural gentry in the new mass organizations. Data on the occupational background of peasant leaders, for example, indicates that leadership comes from a rural gentry background; in many cases, the landowning fathers were also small town doctors, lawyers, teachers and petty administrators.<sup>1</sup>

1. Statistical evidence for this point will be provided in a subsequent study of interest group leadership in India.

Ironically, India's land reform program which was so ardently supported by leftist parties, reduced the financial resources of leftist parties. Indian parties have always had many dedicated wholetime party workers who gave up their families, remained bachelors, and devoted their entire lives to political causes. The Hindu tradition of renunciation lent itself to this kind of political dedication, but the land system also provided the financial wherewithal which made this possible. Younger politically conscious Indians could become full time workers because the land revenue received by the family, a share of which was theirs, freed them from financial dependence. In most cases, the amount of money



available was small, but dedicated political workers needed very little to live. With the abolition of zamindari and the imposition of ceilings on land holdings, the amount of money available to the leftist political worker has decreased. In fact, leftist parties in West Bengal now complain of the difficulties in attracting whole time workers, in spite of the growing electoral strength and popularity of the leftists.

The "new" middle classes, which C. Wright Mills describes as those white collar workers who are completely dependant upon others for their income, have been growing in India. Yet these groups have not been active in forming interest groups until very recently when white collar unions have been formed. Civic associations which in most western countries draw their personnel from the new middle class - are poorly developed in most of India and where they exist they are more often "welfare" bodies than civic associations encouraging greater participation in public life and pressuring government to improve public services. Even the welfare bodies - flood and famine relief committees, hospitals, etc. - receive support mostly from large donors, and sometimes from government.

The major political role of the middle classes in India has been largely as an intermediary between other classes - workers and peasants in particular - and government. Mass pressure groups have largely been in the hands of these middle classes by virtue of their education, their higher caste position, their position as a rural gentry, and their capacity to deal with authority. The middle classes have thus been able to represent social classes who have not been able to deal directly with governmental authority. This is a phenomena to which we shall return later.

#### Community Interests

We have thus far focused our attention on occupational interest groups in Indian politics - business and workers, peasants and landlords, white collar workers and students. These interest groups, as we have noted earlier, represent only one section of India's major interest groups. A second kind of interest is organized around community, and of these the most important are religious groups, tribal groups, caste groups, and linguistic and regional groups.

As we have noted earlier, community associations as political entities are as "modern" as trade unions and business associations. Linguistic, religious, tribal and caste associations in politics are quite new. In the 1930s linguistic groups developed within Congress calling for a reorganization of India's states along linguistic lines. After independence, when Congress and the government announced their decision to postpone states reorganization, there was a mushrooming of linguistic groups outside of Congress. In most cases, the demand for linguistic reorganization was made by political parties, with the Communists among those most active. Petitions, mass demonstrations and civil disobedience movements against the government became so great that in 1956 the government reorganized India's states - more or less along linguistic lines. The campaign for reorganization was clearly the most effective pressure group campaign in post-independence India. However, not all the demands of these various groups were accepted by the government so that pressures from several political parties or coalitions of parties still continue. The most important of these are the Sanyukta Maharashtra Samiti, a coalition of leftist parties in Bombay, which advocates the creation of a Marathi speaking state, the Sikh Akali Dal, a party of members of the Sikh religion in the Punjab who want their own language as one of the two major languages in the Punjab, the Jharkhand Party in Orissa and Bihar which advocates the creation of a "Jharkhand" or tribal state out of the areas of those two states in which some six millions tribals live, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, an anti-Brahman party in Madras which advocates the creation of a "Dravidistan" or South Indian nation independent of the rest of India, finally, the Naga Peoples Convention of Naga tribesmen in Assam which



has advocated the creation of an independent "Nagaland." As we can see, these groups cover a wide range of community interests - religion, caste, tribe and language.

Some community groups are organized around specific economic demands on behalf of the community rather than demands for political power for the community. Legislation giving special assistance to castes and tribes considered particularly "backward" has encouraged many such communities to organize themselves and put forward their claims. Among untouchables, the Scheduled Caste Federation and the Gandhian-organized Harijan Sewak Sangh are most active. The Anglo-Indians have their own national organization; Muslims and other minority religious groups also have their own associations. Tribal associations, particularly tribal welfare bodies are quite active. West Bengal alone has some fifteen tribal associations, mostly organized along district lines. A few of the more educated and wealthy tribals create and run these associations to obtain government aid, carry on some voluntary welfare activities and build political ballistics for running for office.

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On the basis of our cursory description of some of India's major interest groups, we can now explore some of the factors which have affected the development of interest groups in India and the role which they play in the political process. These factors include: attitudes toward authority, the legacy of the nationalist movement, and post-independence government policies aimed at creating national unity and planned economic development.

#### The System of Authority

The Hindu social system is traditionally based upon the principle of hierarchy with relatively little individual mobility. Traditionally, each caste has its proscribed functions and so Manu, a Hindu law-giver has written, "It is better to do one's own duty badly than another's well." This notion of living according to duty, known as *dharma*, provided the basis of legitimacy for the hierarchical system. The religious texts required the brahman "to study and teach, to sacrifice and to give and receive gifts; the kshatriya must protect the people, sacrifice, and study; the vaishya also sacrifices and studies, but his chief function is to breed cattle, to till the earth, to pursue trade and to lend money; the sudra's duty is only to serve the three higher classes." Those who were not

1. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*. London: Signet and Jackson, 1954, p. 128.

In positions of authority were required to be submissive to authority. The poor, low class sudra was "the servant of another, to be expelled at will, to be slain at will."<sup>2</sup>

2. From the *Likhitam Grantham*, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 128.

The emphasis placed upon subservience to authority in India and upon resignation to one's role, no matter how onerous, has obviously not prevented people from expressing their protest through political organizations. But these values have had at least three major political consequences. First, the lowest castes and those lowest on the economic ladder (positions which generally coincide) have been reluctant to organize. As we have noted earlier, agricultural laborers, tenants and poor peasant have been more reluctant to organize than the relatively more prosperous, generally higher caste peasantry. Among workers too, those

lowest in occupation and caste have been among the most difficult to organize.

Second, where workers and peasant do organize they are often reluctant to deal with authority directly and turn outside for their leadership. It has been argued that illiteracy, the use of English in labor tribunals, the need for familiarity with complicated labor legislation, the hostile character of many employers toward workers, and victimization are responsible for the worker's unwillingness to deal with authority and his dependence upon outsiders. But the fact that peasants too turn toward outsiders suggests that many of these factors are secondary to the role played by low caste attitudes toward authority. It would be a mistake, I believe, to attribute the role played by outsiders in mass organizations to the illiteracy (i.e. the absence of reading and writing skills) of workers and peasants, except insofar as literacy is a mark of the status necessary to deal with authority. It is not only skill which is required but status.

A third consequence of the system of authority is the special role played by the rural gentry as intermediaries between low caste, low status peasants and workers and those in authority. In a system in which the status gap between those on the bottom and those on the very top is so great, the middle class rural gentry have probably always performed this function of being a communication link. Indians have simply applied on the level of national mass organizations a system of authority and a communication network with which they are familiar within the village. But what has worked for centuries so effectively on one level does not work so satisfactorily on the new level of modern mass political organizations.

The expression of submissiveness of low caste, low status persons and their dependence upon intermediaries in their relationship with authority has to be seen too in the context of the authoritarian behavior of high caste, high status persons. Studies of managerial attitudes toward the working force in India show how management is often unwilling to meet with workers in any kind of equalitarian relationship, and enter instead into a relationship of autocracy or paternalism.<sup>1</sup> There are however, notable examples of firms which have attempted to

1. Charles Myers, *Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, chapter VI, "The Managerial Response."

establish good relations with workers and unions; there are instances too where district collectors and other local administrative personnel have established good working relations with the peasantry, but unfortunately these instances are still too few. The elimination or reduction of authoritarian attitudes on the part of those in positions of authority is likely to contribute toward reducing the attitude of submissiveness, without which the problem of "outsiders" is not likely to be solved.

#### The Nationalist Movement

The rise of interest groups in India has been very much influenced by the existence and character of a nationalist movement in a colonial setting. The earliest modern political groups in India were in fact interest groups. The Indian National Congress was the successor to a number of smaller middle class associations concerned with winning such concessions from the British as more jobs in the civil service and the right for Indian judges to exercise jurisdiction in cases involving Europeans. The Congress, after its formation, continued in this tradition. It was not until World War I, three decades after Congress was founded, that Indian nationalists began to turn the organization into a mass



movement. Under Gandhi's leadership in the early 1920s nationalists began to organize the working class and the peasantry. Trade unions, peasant associations, student organizations, and constructive work associations mushroomed. Some of the discontent of these groups was directed at Indian employers and landlords, but in these early days of the nationalist struggle, nationalist leaders directed their discontent against the British rulers. Several consequences for interest groups flowed from this attempt by nationalist leaders to build up a comprehensive movement which could put substantial pressure on the British. The first is that discontent was organized by outsiders. The growth of industry during the first world war, the rise of a working class, dislocation in the rural economy and the rise of peasant discontent provided the base for mass organization by nationalist leaders. It is important to note that nationalist leaders did not create protest - for among peasants in particular there had already been a number of uprisings during the 19th century - but that nationalist leaders organized this protest when, for reasons we have already suggested, peasants and workers were not producing their own durable leadership and organization.

A second consequence of the rise of a comprehensive nationalist movement was that new expectations were aroused among those who were organized, expectations that government, especially an Indian run government, could improve their lot. Nationalists not only organized demand but, as the years progressed, contributed to the actual growth in demand. This growth in demand, as we shall see, has raised enormous problems for the present Indian government.

Not only did the nationalist movement encourage the growth of occupational interests, but certain community interests were encouraged as well. Nationalists were of course concerned primarily with encouraging the growth of a national consciousness, but at the same time they were eager to mobilize any sentiments which would build the movement against colonial rule. When regional-cultural-linguistic sentiment arose, Congress took on its demands for a reorganization of states along linguistic lines. In fact, as a mark of its support for such sentiment Congress organized its Congress committees by linguistic area, rather than by province. Bombay province, for example, had separate committees for the Kannada, Gujarati and Marathi speaking regions, but no single committee for the entire province.

It should be noted, however, that in some measure the growth of community interest groups in India was a consequence of British policy. Constitutional provisions giving separate representation to Muslims, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians and untouchables encouraged these communities to build their own organizations. Government policy since independence has actually continued to encourage the creation of certain types of community interests. The constitution provides for separate electorates for "scheduled" or backward communities, including untouchables and "depressed" tribes. These provisions are temporary, but the constitution and subsequent laws do provide for special help to scheduled castes and tribes in the field of education and government employment. The creation of an enlarged tribal welfare department in West Bengal in 1947, for example, was soon followed by the creation of many tribal welfare bodies which aimed to take advantage of the government program.

#### Government Policy

This leads us to the third and final consideration of factors which have affected the development and role of interest groups in India. Interest groups in any society are profoundly affected by the tasks which government performs. The fact that the Indian government has a program of restructuring Indian life



to create a unified nation and developed economy affects the role of interest groups. Where interest groups are still so relatively weak and where government is comparatively strong, the policy of government toward these interest groups plays a particularly important role in their development and activities.

Occupational interest groups in particular continually make demands upon the political system. Workers want less rationalization in industry and higher wages. Peasants demand land reforms, more funds for rural development, lower rents, more credit, less irrigation taxes. Students call for larger appropriations for education, more technical schools, more jobs. Landlords want less land reform, or more compensation. Businessmen desire more protection, fewer regulations, lower taxes, more credit. To a far greater extent than in the United States and Great Britain interest groups in India make demands upon a political system which does not have the revenue to meet demands.

In virtually all developed political systems, including those of the West, demands exceed resources. No government can satisfy all the demands made upon it, if only because some of the demands are conflicting. But in India, as in some other newly independent countries, the gap between demands and resources is far greater than in most western countries. West Bengal is perhaps a classic example of this problem. This province was hit hard by the western impact and has suffered considerably from such things as overpopulation, a decline in rural industries, food shortages, and lack of employment; and the ravages of partition further diminished West Bengal's capacity to meet the demands made upon it. In contrast with these low resources ("low" in the sense of their immediate availability to government for meeting demands) are high demands. West Bengal has many political parties, a large trade union movement, peasant organizations, tribal associations, student groups, and refugee associations calling for greater government expenditures. As we have noted earlier, the nationalist movement encouraged the expression of demands and encouraged the creation of mass organizations; the consequence is a system in which demands have far exceeded government's capacity to satisfy demands.

American and British politics operate in settings in which two facts of importance are so commonplace that their existence is rarely mentioned. The first is that we live in societies in which people have looked upon government for only a small part of their wants. And the second is that government and the society from which government draws its revenue has had enough resources to more or less satisfy the major demands made upon it. There are always limitations on resources, but the fact is that the really pressing demands -- those of the unemployed, those of depressed farmers, those of the aged, are somehow dealt with. And if in recent years the first proposition is less true, the second proposition has become even more true. We demand more of our governments, but our government has the resources to do more. In West Bengal, as in much of India, in fact as in many of the newly independent areas, neither proposition is true. Both interest groups and government are thus faced with the problem of functioning in an economy of great scarcity.

India's government has a five year plan aimed at the rational use of the country's resources. Throughout this paper we have noted how government has looked upon occupational interest groups as possible threats to the rational use of resources. Strikes by trade unions threaten production; refusal of peasants to pay taxes limits government's revenue; riots by students and by unemployed endanger the maintenance of an atmosphere of public order without which development cannot proceed. Faced with the demands of such groups, the Government of

India has responded in several ways: control (creating government-dominated and Congress-dominated trade unions, peasant organizations and student organizations), legal restraints (such as establishing a system of compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes), coercion (banning strikes, enforcing the Preventive Detention Act which permits arrests without habeas corpus and utilizing Section 144 of the Criminal Code which allows government to ban meetings), persuasion (speeches of the Prime Minister and other government officials), and finally concession to some of the demands.

It would be a mistake to think that the Indian government is authoritarian because it often attempts to control interest groups, and sometimes even to coerce them. The Indian government is committed to maintaining and strengthening its democratic order, yet it is also committed to a program of economic development. To control and coerce groups may threaten the democratic order, but to concede often and to permit too great a range of activity to such groups may threaten the country's attempt to develop. Many westerners, appreciating the dilemma, have accepted the principle of restraining the activities of interest groups. Charles Myers, writing on industrial relations in India, agrees with the Indian government that the system of arbitration and limitations on strikes may be a necessary measure if industrial order is to be maintained; fear of what unions might do, especially when they are subject to outside control, has led many people to the conviction that India cannot afford the kind of industrial relations legislation found in the United States and Great Britain. There is a presumption here that commitment to some kind of "general interest" outlook is thus far not well entrenched in most interest groups.

This dilemma is also posed with regard to India's community interest groups, large numbers of groups organized in accordance with caste, linguistic, religious and tribal identifications. To the extent that such groups demand greater government aid, they raise the same problems as do occupational interest groups. But many of these groups have called for greater regional autonomy, and in some cases independence. The Indian government has feared, sometimes correctly, sometimes incorrectly, that such demands threaten India's national unity. Many Indian government officials have been concerned that community conflicts within and between states and between the states and the center would grow and would impair the country's unity and capacity to develop.

While government has been somewhat successful in restraining and controlling occupational interests, the government and the Congress Party have generally been less successful with community interests. Having their own leadership, community interests have proved to be less susceptible to outside, even Congress, control. Where the government tried to use the Congress Party as the spokesman for linguistic sentiment, as in Bombay and West Bengal, it found itself faced with enormous popular agitation and violence. The government apparently underestimated the strength of local sentiment and overestimated the capacity of Congress to control what sentiment existed. An unsuccessful attempt at controlling interests lowered the government's capacity to predict the consequences of its policies.

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In the previous pages we have examined the types of interest groups in Indian politics, the environment in which they operate and some of the problems which their existence poses for a government dedicated to economic development and national unity. In what follows we shall attempt to enumerate the role interest groups play that are essential to the successful functioning of a



democratic order; then we shall proceed to enumerate those features of interest groups which can and, on the basis of India's experience, do represent a threat to governmental programs of economic development and national unity.

Interest groups perform two major functions necessary for the maintenance of a democratic system. First, as institutions through which public demands can be presented to government, they are means for encouraging governmental responsibility. Elections are imperfect ways of articulating group interests. For one thing they are infrequent. For another they are conducted along geographical lines which override occupational interests. Interest groups are essentially ways in which the public, or sections of the public, contribute to the shaping of public policy in a democracy. A second function of interest groups is to provide government with information on the state of public feelings and the areas of discontent in the society, information which is essential to the pursuit of policies necessary to maintain not only democratic institutions, but a stable order. The presence of interest groups and their freedom to communicate with government provides government with information about the social consequences of its policies. If one thinks of government as a producer of goods (i.e., policies) then it must have information about demands (i.e., what the public calls for) and costs (what the public will accept). If government has inadequate knowledge as to demands and costs, because interest groups are either suppressed or controlled, then protest may take the form of mob violence and revolution.

Interest groups do of course have their danger. In India they offer two major threats, one to the government's program of economic development, the other to the government's attempt to create national unity.

As in Europe between the 16th and 19th centuries, the national state in India has had to bring together diverse loyalties; and as in the West of the 19th and early 20th centuries, new social classes have to be absorbed into the political process. Class war, with its forebodings of revolution, and community warfare with its forebodings of civil war are latent features of Indian political life. Totalitarianism and balkanization are the twin dangers.

Both by the techniques they employ and the demands they make, interest groups may threaten national unity or economic development. Many strikes and peasant agitations have been provoked by the discontent sentiment with which authorities have not adequately dealt. But many strikes and peasant agitations also take place because unions, peasant organizations or the parties which control them deliberately use agitations as a means to build up their organization, or to build up revolutionary sentiment against the government. This latter kind of activity unfortunately threatens the legitimacy of the former. Without some broad conception of a "general interest" which underpins the narrower interests of pressure groups, such organizations are likely to be disruptive not only of the efforts to achieve national unity and economic development, but of the democratic order itself. Interest groups are essential to the successful functioning of democracy, but unless they operate within the rules of democracy, that is, legally and with consideration for the larger interests of the society, they can in fact contribute toward the destruction of democracy.

Policy makers are thus faced with the problem of how to encourage interest groups which fulfill the following sets of conditions compatible with a society concerned with economic development, national unity, and the maintenance of democratic institutions and practices:



(1) that interest groups are not so manipulated by government or by parties that they fail to properly communicate to government the demands of their membership and supporters;

(2) that interest groups attempt to influence public policy through orderly procedures and minimize the use of those techniques which endanger the public order; and

(3) that in the pursuit of their interests, groups should be aware of the resource limitations of government and the need for minimizing those demands which impair either economic growth or national unity.

This minimal list is a tall order. The task of creating specific policies to encourage those interests which move in this direction, and discourage those interests which do not, will be a difficult one requiring the efforts of government planners, administrators, political leaders, interest groups leaders, management, foreign aid missions and foreign voluntary aid programs. But the returns for the growth of democracy may be great. Thus far much attention has been directed at the program of economic development, but little to the fact that development may only increase expectations and demands to such an extent that an enormous strain may be placed upon democratic institutions. If economic development is followed by the growth of organizations utilized by totalitarian groups to destroy democracy, or are controlled or suppressed by government, or if interest groups are irresponsible in the demands they make or the techniques they employ to influence government, then democracy is not likely to prosper. If it is a free society which Indians seek, then they and those who wish to support them must give attention to the task of building free institutions without which there can be no free society.

# THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY IN POWER, 1953-1958

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## INTRODUCTION

The operations of the Republican National Committee and its Democratic counterpart are not clearly understood, either by the average American voter or by students and practitioners of the nation's politics. One common assumption is that the Chairman of a National Committee, frequently referred to as National Chairman of the party, is almost by definition the key figure in the party and the prime force in its activities. Another view, equally incorrect, is that the national committees are mere figureheads, comparable to the electoral college, devoid of power and unable to make any significant impact on the political scene. Serious studies of American politics, while avoiding these most extreme views, have tended to devote very limited attention to the activities and significance of the national committees.

This inadequate understanding of the national committees' role seems to result in part from the fact that much of their activity must be carried on quietly if it is to be effective. Other contributing factors are the facts that comparatively little attention has been paid to the committees by political scientists and that the role of a national committee varies so widely from year to year that accurate observations of its activities during one period may be quite misleading when applied to another period.

This paper presents some observations concerning the activities of the Republican National Committee during the first six years of the Eisenhower administration, with particular attention to the first two years of the second term.

## COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE

The Republican National Committee is in theory the creature of the party's quadriennial national conventions. The committee operates without the constitution or by-laws which would normally provide the basic foundation for a continuing operation of this kind. Delegates to each convention select persons to serve as members of a National Committee which is to arrange for calling the next national convention. The convention delegates also charge this committee with the conduct of party business in the period before the next convention, and in practice there is a routine re-adoption of a body of rules which have been developed over the years as a framework for National Committee activity. The committee has over the years acquired a considerable number of different jobs, but in a sense its only absolutely essential activity is to serve as a kind of umbilical cord from one convention to the next.

Although the present National Committee is in practice far more than a link between conventions, its composition and formal powers are still determined by vote of the convention delegates. Under the rules adopted by the 1952 convention and continued in effect in 1956 the membership of the Committee includes a National Committeeman and National Committeewoman from each state and territory and a variable number of state chairmen.

The National Committeeman has traditionally been the principal representative of the national party organization in his area. In the time before the direct election of United States senators, women's suffrage, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, and the Hatch Act, the typical National Committeeman was a powerful political figure. In recent years, as each of the above developments has curtailed his freedom of action, his power has diminished. Despite these developments, in some states he is still the most powerful leader of the party.

The addition of state chairmen to the National Committee in 1952 was a potentially important alteration in the party's organizational structure, the full significance of which has not yet become clear. This action came in response to a campaign which had been seriously prosecuted for little more than a year and seems to have come as something of a surprise to most leaders of the party.

The new rule grants National Committee membership to the state chairman of each state which voted Republican in the previous presidential election, has a majority of Republicans in its congressional delegation, or has a Republican governor. The territory chairman of each territory having a Republican delegate to Congress is also granted membership.

When the rule became effective in July, 1952, the chairmen of 31 states and Hawaii qualified for membership. After the 1952 election 8 more states qualified. There were no changes as a result of the 1954 election. The results of the 1956 election meant that three new state chairmen qualified, but one state and Hawaii lost their eligibility. As of 1958 there are 41 state chairmen on the Committee.

Open agitation for the addition of state chairmen to the National Committee roster began with an April, 1951, resolution adopted by a group of state chairmen who were holding periodic meetings as the Midwest and Rocky Mountain State Chairmen's Association. Their original proposal would in effect have admitted state chairmen to membership as under the present rule, plus granting membership to a fourth person from each state meeting more than one of the three present tests for State Chairman membership. In September, 1951, this same group adopted a resolution which merely asked that a "suitable number" of state chairmen be added to the National Committee.



This proposal to grant National Committee membership to state chairmen was opposed by Committee members from the South because it would reduce that region's relative membership, by most women members because it would destroy the equal man-woman balance among members, and by most national committeemen from states which promised to gain representation under the proposal, because if the State Chairman were made a member of the National Committee the National Committeeman's status and influence would be jeopardized. It is not surprising that the Committee reaction to the request was unenthusiastic. In response to the request for membership, the incumbent members voted to authorize the Chairman to appoint a group of four state chairmen to serve as advisors to the Executive Committee. It was the general hope and, apparently, expectation that this would be the end of the matter, but the hope was not fulfilled.

Several state chairmen devoted a portion of their energies during 1952 to the campaign to win National Committee membership for their group. By the time of the convention they had developed substantial strength. The intensity of the Taft vs. Eisenhower contest meant that no major faction wanted to risk alienating convention votes by taking a clear stand on the proposal. Normal hostility to the National Committee as an "unapproachable" and "over-powerful" group provided a basis for the campaign. When the proposal was considered by the Rules Committee of the convention it was approved by a vote of 15 to 13. When the Rules Committee report came to a vote on the floor it was approved, 683 to 513.

Some effects of this change have already become apparent. Other members of the Committee have observed privately that it was an unfortunate move. The already large Committee has now, they say, become even more unwieldy. Since it was already too large to transact business effectively at its previous size of 106, this does not appear to be a major drawback. Other criticisms focus on the unsettling impact of having the Committee's size fluctuate with the election returns, and the disruptive tendency of having such a fast turnover of State Chairman members.

Whereas the National Committeeman and Committeewoman from each state are elected for a four year term at each convention and frequently serves not only one but several terms, the job of State Chairman is one in which the average tenure is comparatively short. In the six years from July 11, 1952, when they were admitted to membership, until July 11, 1958, the 43 states and territories which qualified under the rule have been represented by a total of 130 different chairmen, whose average tenure in office has been slightly less than two years. The National Committeeman's observation that state chairmen come and go as though they were caught in a revolving door is clearly an exaggeration, but there was obvious basis for another Committee member's comment that it bordered on the embarrassing for him to have to introduce a new State Chairman at what seemed like every other meeting.

Such basic impact as the addition of state chairmen to the National Committee may have will stem not from the fluctuations in Committee size or the short tenure of members but from the tendency to achieve closer integration between the national party organization and the state party organizations which are headed by the state chairmen. It is too soon to be sure how substantial this impact will be, but clearly it will be significant. Already the National Committeeman has lost his unique position as intermediary between his state party and Washington. Already some state chairmen have begun to devote considerable attention to national party affairs. Charges have been made that in at least one state a State Chairman has neglected his state responsibilities in order to devote time to National Committee affairs. This seems not only undocumentable but unlikely in view of the limited amount of work National Committee membership involves, but there may be tendencies in that direction. It will be interesting to see in the next few years whether this fusion of state and national organizations has a significant impact on the substance of the party.

Since 1953 the Republican National Committee has held from two to four meetings per year. The number of meetings does not seem to be affected by the fact that the party is in or out of power. Although the frequency of meetings since Eisenhower's election has been below the five per year which were held when the party was out of power in 1944, 1945, and 1950, it has exceeded the single meeting which records indicate was held in 1941, 1947 and several earlier years.

Attendance at meetings varies, but there are normally a considerable number of absentees except at the time of the conventions. Willingness of members to miss meetings probably results in large part from their recognition that very little work is done at these sessions. Partly as a result of its large size the National Committee is not well-adapted for serving as an operational body. The agenda of its meetings consists largely of reports from various administrative officials. Repeated attempts to establish the National Committee as a working group have failed and seem certain to do so in the future.

After each convention the new committee grants the Chairman the power to appoint an Executive Committee which is authorized to do virtually anything the full committee could do except elect a new Chairman and make arrangements for the next convention. The Executive Committee meets approximately as often as the full committee. Since 1953 it has had either two or three meetings each year, with these frequently held in the morning of a day when the full committee meets in the afternoon. A reading of the transcript of recent Executive Committee meetings indicates that their proceedings are only slightly more substantial than those of National Committee meetings.



Members of the National Committee normally perform their major function by providing liaison, largely informal, between Washington and their state. Insofar as the National Committee carries on operating programs it does so by means of its Chairman and its headquarters staff, rather than the actions of Committee members.

### The Chairman

The key figure in the operations of the National Committee is its Chairman. Legally he is selected by the members of the National Committee, but in practice a party's presidential nominee is permitted to select the Committee Chairman for the campaign and when a party is in power any vacancy which occurs in the chairmanship is normally filled with a person selected by the President. His choice is in effect ratified by vote of the National Committee. In the period since Eisenhower was nominated in 1952, his selections for National Committee Chairman have never been opposed in Committee voting.

When his party is in power a National Committee Chairman has a two-fold responsibility. In addition to serving as the administrative head of the Committee's operations, it is highly desirable for him to serve and be recognized as the President's principal staff assistant for partisan political activities.

There will invariably be a number of experienced political leaders in the Cabinet and on the White House staff, but none of these people is so well situated as the National Committee Chairman to advise the President as to the needs of the party and the impact which proposed actions will have on the party's situation.

A conscientious Cabinet officer inescapably views problems from the point of view of his administrative concerns. He may well be interested in the welfare of the party, but his advice will be colored by concern for problems of his department. Experienced politicians on the White House staff are able to give the President effective advice, but their direct concern is for the President as an individual and for his program. There are times when this does not coincide with the welfare of the party. Although the situation might occasionally vary as the result of particular circumstances, the National Committee Chairman is as a normal rule in the best position of anyone among the President's advisors to serve as his staff assistant for partisan political affairs. Each of the chairmen under Eisenhower has, within limits to be discussed below, been accepted in this capacity.

Eisenhower's National Committee chairmen have included Arthur Summerfield, who served during the 1952 campaign and resigned January 17, 1953, to become Postmaster General, Wesley Roberts, Leonard Hall, and Meade Alcorn. Throughout the period since Eisenhower



took occupancy the National Committee Chairman has had ready access to the White House. Practice as of 1958 has the Chairman conferring with one or more of the principal members of the White House staff an average of about once a day and with the President "as often as enough problems have accumulated to justify taking his time". The President is reportedly willing to meet with the National Committee Chairman on short notice even when his schedule is so full that most types of appointments are being deferred for considerable periods. When the Cabinet is scheduled to discuss a matter directly concerning the party, the Chairman is invited to attend the Cabinet meeting. Chairman Alcorn thus attended three Cabinet meetings during his first year of office.

Despite this apparently ungrudging acceptance of the National Committee Chairman as one of the President's first-level assistants, relations between the National Committee and the administration have not been ideal since 1953. It seems likely that the trouble stems in large part from the decision which required Arthur Summerfield to resign as Chairman before becoming Postmaster General.

During the many years when the Postmaster General served as National Committee Chairman there was an effective guarantee that the interests of the party would be taken into account in any relevant cabinet-level deliberations. Situations varied from time to time as different persons occupied the various offices, but the organizational arrangements meant that the spokesman for the party was automatically a member of the president's official first family.

The tradition of giving the job of Postmaster General to the National Committee Chairman had been interrupted by President Truman, apparently for reasons stemming from the personal relationships among the persons involved. When Eisenhower planned his first Cabinet various people urged him to put the National Committee Chairman in his Cabinet or a comparable position in his official family. Eisenhower refused, not on grounds of personality but on principle. He wanted his administrative officials to be working full time on their jobs and not devoting a large share of their energies to affairs of the party.

Five years' experience tends to indicate that this separation of party organization from governmental structure was unfortunate, at least for the party and probably for the administration. Although relationships between the White House and the National Committee have been close and cooperative since 1953, the liaison has had to be constantly protected and developed and has not flowed automatically from organizational structure. It seems clear that the party as such would have fared better if its organizational leader were a member of the administration's governmental team rather than an outsider.

The evidence indicates that much of the Republican Party's troubles in the past five years stems from the application of an inappropriate approach to organization. Just as responsibility for various operating areas such as agriculture and foreign relations has been delegated cleanly and decisively to the appropriate Cabinet member, so the administration's problems of partisan politics have been delegated to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee. The theory is that if capable officials are selected it would indicate lack of confidence in them to have their activities closely supervised or their decisions questioned by someone else whose assigned responsibilities are, by definition, elsewhere.

The National Committee Chairman has been given a free hand within his area of assigned responsibility. Only on a few minor matters has a suggestion of the Chairman on matters accepted as being primarily the concern of the National Committee been resisted by the President. The trouble is not that the National Committee is interfered with in its own operations but that the attempt to draw a clean line between governmental operations on the one hand and partisan politics on the other was ill-conceived in the first place and has engendered trouble throughout the Eisenhower administration.

With partisan affairs categorized as the responsibility of the National Committee, which is not represented directly in either the White House or the Cabinet, it could probably have been predicted that there would be attempts to operate a "non-political" administration. This is in fact what has happened, and the results for the party and probably for the administration have been unfortunate.

Whole-hearted and ungrudging acceptance of the party system as an essential element in the political and governmental system would appear to be important to the success of any administration in Washington. The failure to recognize this may well have contributed to creation of the present situation in which a President who was overwhelmingly elected to a second term must deal with a Congress controlled by the opposition party.

#### Headquarters Staff and Organization

The Chairman of the Republican National Committee and members of the Committee staff occupy offices which comprise most of the second floor of a modern office building one block from the White House. The number of Committee employees fluctuates constantly with the political calendar and the state of the party's finances but has not fallen below 80 in the past six years and was over 350 during the 1952 campaign.

Principal members of the National Committee staff in mid-1958 include the Assistant Director, Executive Director, Campaign Director, and Public Relations Director. Each of these persons has major individual responsibilities and together with the Chairman they



constitute a Staff Committee which meets several times per week to consider strategy and tactics. The position of Assistant Director was occupied until her appointment as Under Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare by Miss Bertha Adkins, who also served as Director of the Women's Division. Miss Adkins had been active in Maryland politics, had served as Executive Director of the Women's Division during the 1952 campaign, and was respected as an able administrator and astute politician. The 1958 Executive Director is A. B. Hermann, who held the same position prior to the 1952 convention, when the Committee was strongly pro-Taft. The fact that he is now back in his former job is dramatic evidence of the fact that a few persons are succeeding in making their careers as professional executives with American political parties. Hermann supervises staff activities during the frequent absences of the Chairman and also directs Nationalities Division.

The 1958 Campaign Director is Robert Humphreys, a former editor of a news magazine who came to Washington to work with the Republican Congressional Committee and served as Director of Public Relations for the National Committee during the 1952 campaign. The Director of Public Relations, William Strand, came to the Committee from the Commerce Department.

The pattern which seems to emerge from this survey of principal staff members of the Committee indicates that although there is comparatively rapid turnover in particular jobs, most appointments tend to go to persons who have worked previously in closely related positions. The appointment to the Chairmanship of Leonard Hall, who had served as Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee and Meade Alcorn, who was in charge of arrangements for the party's 1956 convention, fits this pattern.

Below the five persons who make up the Staff Committee are approximately fifteen other professional employees whose group bond includes attendance at a Staff Meeting, which in theory is held every Wednesday but in practice is held about twice each month. During early 1958 each staff meeting was preceded by a "briefing session" at which a sub-cabinet representative from some department described programs and proposals of potential significance to the party.

This second group of staff members includes a specialist on agriculture and another on labor relations, an experienced Negro politician, the director of the Southern Division, the patronage director, the Director and Associate Director of the Research Division, and the Assistant Treasurer, who is a career employee of the Committee. Staff meetings are also attended by representatives of three auxiliary organizations which have office space with the National Committee. These are the Chairman of the Republican National Finance Committee, the President of the National Federation of Women's Republican Clubs, and the Executive Secretary of the Young Republican National Federation.



The headquarters staff has grown to its present size over a period of years in response to demands made on the National Committee to perform an expanded variety of jobs. For many years internal organization and responsibilities appear to have been informally arranged, and although an organization chart has now been developed it provides only a general guide to relationships among staff members. Assignments tend in practice to be made, or assumed, on the basis of individuals' work load, experience, and energy. With every major change in personnel or shift to a new stage of the political calendar, assignments tend to be changed.

### Services Rendered

As the center of the Republican Party in theory and, to a degree, in practice, National Committee headquarters is called on to perform a variety of functions. Several of these will be discussed below.

The National Committee is the logical source of communications designed to maintain liaison among the nation's Republican organization and develop the best possible image of the party among the general public. To this end a substantial public relations program is carried on.

Magazines or newsletters are a standard element in the Committee's public relations program, and in early 1958 three periodicals were being produced. Straight from the Shoulder was distributed to about 400,000 people every month, except when limited finances forced a month to be missed. The Chairman's Fact Memo was distributed bi-weekly to about 11,000 organization members, including everyone down to the level of county chairman. Battle Line was distributed four times each week to about 400 people in Washington, including all Republicans in Congress. This last publication, which amounted to a daily column of political fact and partisan analysis was a 1958 innovation which aimed at having a front page attacking the Democrats and a back page setting forth some aspect of the Eisenhower administration's positive accomplishments. One result of the circulation of this newsletter with its up-to-date ammunition for debate was that Republican senators and congressmen were made more aware and appreciative of the National Committee's operations than many of them have been in previous years. With most political developments being treated fully in Battle Line, the material included in the other two publications tended to consist largely of abbreviated re-workings of Battle Line articles.

In addition to producing periodical publications the National Committee also publishes a number of miscellaneous items such as the Republican Speakers Handbook and is responsible for turning out a continuous stream of press releases and statements. These chart the position of the party leadership with reference to political developments and attempt to focus attention on potentially profitable issues.

Research facilities of the Committee's headquarters are available for use by Committee staff and, within limits of time and manpower, other members of the party. When the party is in power some cooperation on the collection and preparation of data can be secured from executive agencies. This permits curtailment of some forms of research which must be carried on when the party is out of power, but even when a department has done the basic research the National Committee normally must do the job of converting straightforward figures into directly usable partisan ammunition.

Under arrangements in effect for several years the Republican Congressional Committee does such research work as the compiling of opposition congressmen's voting records. The research personnel of the Republican National Committee are thus freed from a considerable amount of laborious work which occupies much of the time of their counterparts at the Democratic National Committee. This permits the Republican National Committee Research Division to spend a larger proportion of its time on more basic general research, but it also carries with it a disadvantage. With such clearly useful research as the Democrats' congressional voting record available from the Congressional Committee rather than the National Committee, the prestige and stature of the former body in comparison with that of the National Committee has tended to rise, particularly in the eyes of congressmen and others whose concern is particularly with the legislative branch.

One continuing service which is rendered by National Committee headquarters is the provision of speakers for party rallies and similar functions throughout the country. This program, which is in charge of the Speakers Bureau, fills a definite need but works imperfectly for two reasons. One problem is that many local organizations and leaders make their own arrangements for speakers without either working through the National Committee or notifying the Speakers Bureau after the arrangements have been made. This prevents the Speakers Bureau from making as efficient use of the party's speaking talent as would be possible if it were always known when an important speaker would be in a given part of the country and might be available for additional appearances without great difficulty.

A second problem confronting the Speakers' Bureau stems from the tendency of local organization leaders to set unreasonably high standards in their requests for speakers. If the committee in charge of a comparatively small meeting 2,000 miles from Washington is notified that in spite of its request for a speaker having come only a short time before the meeting the Speakers Bureau has secured the Undersecretary of Defense or a second-term Senator with a creditable record, the organizers of the meeting are far more likely to complain about their failure to get the Vice President or the Senate Majority Leader than to be impressed with the effectiveness of the Speakers Bureau.



The fact that the party has been in power means that the Speakers Bureau has been able to draw on the services of members of the Cabinet and "Little Cabinet" as well as the congressional leaders and miscellaneous party dignitaries who are always available. This availability of key officials of the executive departments is clearly helpful, but involves major problems. Many of these people are unenthusiastic about speaking under partisan auspices. This is particularly true at times like the present when the success of their department's legislative program requires support in a Congress controlled by the opposition. The unfortunate impact on a U.S.I.A. budget request of partisan services rendered by its Director, Arthur Larson, illustrates the point.

This recognition of the prudent limits of partisanship was illustrated at the time the Speakers Bureau was engaged in recruiting speakers for the many Lincoln Day dinners around the country in February, 1958. The Bureau maintains a file of the administration's principal personnel with notations as to their availability at various times and places. In response to a special appeal that potential speakers plan to keep several days clear for Lincoln Day appearances, a considerable number in such agencies as the State Department sent word that they would under no circumstances speak at a Lincoln Day program. The Director of the Speakers Bureau was forced to operate without their services.

#### Patronage

In years past, the allocation of Federal patronage has been an important function of the National Committee and an important source of its power. The situation of the last five years has fitted this pattern only in comparatively small part. It seems probable that the patronage issue has on balance done the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party nationally more harm than good in the time since the party was returned to office in 1953 after twenty years out of power. There appear to be several reasons why this is the case.

There are serious dangers inherent in the system of distributing government jobs as rewards for political service. There are almost invariably too few desirable jobs to satisfy all the applicants who consider themselves deserving. Some former president is reported to have said that every time he filled a job in his administration, he made "nine enemies and one ingrate." This is a continuing danger. Unless patronage is awarded carefully and skillfully, the unhappiness of the unrewarded will overbalance the gratitude of the favored few.

The number of patronage jobs available in the Federal government has declined drastically in recent decades and was much smaller in 1953 than it had been in 1933 when the Republicans had last had



access to patronage. This meant that Republican workers throughout the country were bitterly disappointed with the small number of jobs made available to them and have continued to complain about this ever since.

James Farley, as former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, once said that he believed it would be possible to build a satisfactory party organization without reliance on patronage. Many people agree with him and there are good grounds to believe this could be done, but unfortunately the question to which Farley was addressing himself was not the one with which the Republicans were confronted when they came to power.

Although Republican ranks included many of the selfless public-spirited citizens whom Farley thought could be recruited if there were no prospect of patronage, there was another major group of party workers. A large proportion of the Republican organization stalwarts were people who had labored long and hard during the dry years in the expectation that when the party eventually returned to power they would receive appropriate compensation in the form of a government job. After the long-awaited day came and they found how little patronage was being distributed to the loyal workers of the organization their unhappiness was heartfelt and vocal. The stream of complaints about how few government jobs are going to deserving Republicans has continued unabated for the past five years. Every party leader expects to encounter examples of it every time he appears at a party function anywhere in the country. The key to much of this trouble lies in the failure of party workers around the country to grasp fully the extent to which the merit system has replaced patronage as a road to employment by the Federal government.

When the ranks of party workers were filled with people who wanted patronage and there was patronage to dispense, the system worked smoothly, if not without some occasional sacrifice of the general interest. If the day eventually comes when everyone understands that patronage is a thing of the past and the organization is staffed with people who work out of a sense of civic responsibility or a desire to advance the cause of some principle in which they believe, that new system may be a major step forward. The present situation, however, is an unhappy one. As long as the party ranks are filled to a considerable degree with people who expect eventual reward in the form of patronage, while in fact patronage is largely a thing of the past, disillusionment, frustration and bitterness will inevitably be the result.

A final problem which has complicated the Republican National Committee's patronage operations since 1953 stems from the failure of the administration to focus all its patronage activities in a single channel. There are two main causes of this. Part of the trouble stems from the so-called "Commodore Agreement" between

Eisenhower and Taft in 1952 which gives each Republican senator the right to make contact with executive agencies and seek placement for his constituents. A further complication stems from the fact that since the beginning of the Eisenhower administration there has been a patronage office at the White House as well as one at the National Committee. Patronage activity by the National Committee has been made far more difficult than it would otherwise have been because of the existence of these arrangements which divide the responsibility for filling political appointments.

The patronage provision of the Commodore Agreement was part of the bargain worked out to establish peace between the regular Taft Republicans and the successful Eisenhower forces following the 1952 convention. Its impact in the five years it has been in effect has been considerable and, from the point of view of the National Committee, serious.

The patronage office in the White House has created even more difficulties than the Commodore Agreement and is felt by many leading party officials to have been as responsible as any single factor for the dissension and discontent which has plagued large portions of the Republican organization throughout the country almost from the start of the Eisenhower administration.

The roots of this problem go back to the period immediately after the 1952 election when the President-elect and his advisors were confronted with the necessity of filling all the major political offices of the government with new people. They were determined to appoint people with appropriate administrative experience and demonstrated ability. As a first step they employed a firm of management talent consultants to compile a list of all appointments which would have to be made when the new administration took office, with types of job experience which would be suitable preparation for these positions, and develop lists of persons qualified for each appointment.

There was a feeling that for effective staffing of its important positions the new administration should undertake active recruitment of qualified people rather than merely choosing from among people who applied, or drawing from people with whom appointing officials were personally familiar. This meant that the function of keeping track of impending vacancies in appointive positions, which is normally taken care of by a clerk or secretary in the office of a mayor or governor or president was expanded. In addition to watching for vacancies, the President's office was given responsibility for recruiting potential appointees.

It was not originally recognized that the recruiting job would be particularly difficult, but it became apparent that this would be a major problem as soon as the new administration began to go through the lists of qualified persons which had been developed by the firm.



of management talent consultants. By the time the first thirty-three people approached had declined appointment as head of one of the government's largest agencies, everyone concerned realized that filling positions near the top of the governmental hierarchy involved far more than deciding who would be the best man for the job.

Over the years since 1953, the White House patronage office has continued to function, theoretically in cooperation with the National Committee but actually with a good deal of independence from party machinery. Several times major appointments for people entirely unacceptable to party officials in their home state have been processed through most of the stages of the appointment process before the National Committee has been aware that the appointment was under consideration. Sometimes these prospective appointments have been stopped when party opposition was expressed, sometimes the party officials have granted reluctant approval, and on a few occasions the appointment has been made despite firm National Committee opposition.

A final aspect of the patronage problem has stemmed from Eisenhower's firm determination to delegate to his cabinet members and other major administrative officials authority commensurate with their responsibility. In practice this has meant that the head of an agency should have as free a hand as possible in selecting his assistants, and as a result there has been a great deal of what could be termed "personal patronage." Major appointments have gone to people who may have been loyal Republicans but in whose selection the National Committee was not involved.

In the face of these handicaps, the National Committee has done its best to operate an effective patronage program. Its Personnel Office, which is a euphemism for "patronage division," went into high gear as soon as the results of the 1952 election were announced and has remained active ever since. Its 1958 staff includes five secretaries and a Director. It attempts to promote the interests of the party as appointments are made and to assist as many patronage applicants as possible in getting government jobs.

As of June 30, 1958, the Personnel Office had in its files applications from approximately 4,500 active applicants for patronage. Each of these people has been certified as an acceptable member of the party by appropriate persons from the party organization in his home state. Many of these applications had been on file since 1953. New applications came in during the first half of 1958 at the rate of 300 per month. Despite its best efforts, the Personnel Office is able to find employment for only a fraction of these who apply, and in little more than a handful of these cases is it possible to find a job which fits the classic definition of patronage.



In mid-1958, there were 1,685 positions subject to regular presidential appointment and 1,218 Schedule C jobs, making a total of 2,902 positions out of the millions of jobs in the Federal government, on which the administration had a free hand in making appointments. In practice, most of these entail such great responsibilities that it would be unsafe to award them except on the basis of demonstrated ability and, in fact, approximately half of these positions are filled by career people. Only a few hundred positions in the entire Federal service can actually be filled as a direct reward for service to the party, in the classic fashion of patronage appointments. Most of these few choice spots were filled within a few months of the coming to office of the Republican administration, and since then they have been available only when an incumbent resigned or died.

In addition to these presidential appointments and positions in Schedule C, there are several thousand additional jobs which can be used for patronage purposes within rather substantial limitations. Postmasterships and jobs as rural mail carriers fall in this category. These positions which are theoretically under the merit system are still regarded as political appointments, but their use in this fashion involves serious problems. No action can be taken until the incumbent Democrat vacates the office, no one can be appointed unless he places among the first three on the examination, and even if a Republican worker eventually receives the appointment he tends to feel that it is something he has earned rather than a reward given to him by the party. Since responsibility for selecting appointees to these Post Office jobs has been assigned to Republican Congressmen in those states where there are any, the National Committee's role in these appointments is only minor.

In trying to assist the great majority of its applicants for jobs the National Committee's Personnel Office has no chance whatever of finding genuine patronage. For this reason it devotes a large share of its efforts to what can most accurately be described as an employment agency operation. The goal is to find out about job opportunities as soon as they develop, inform suitable job applicants of the vacancies, render assistance in such things as filling out a "form 57" correctly and effectively, and if possible impress upon hiring officials the desirability of applicants who have worked through the National Committee.

This program has led to the placement of a considerable number of people during the time it has been in operation. It may well be the best arrangement which could have been devised under the circumstances. It is a far cry, however, from the kind of straightforward patronage which was available in an earlier period and to which party workers throughout the party still feel they are entitled.

# Money

Raising of money for Republican activity at the national level is handled by the Republican National Finance Committee. This group is responsible for raising funds to support operations of the Republican National Committee, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, and the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee. Although it acts with little publicity, its function is obviously of vital importance.

The National Finance Committee was established in 1940, following the enactment of the Hatch Act, with its limitation on the amount any one committee can spend during a campaign. It serves to raise money on a coordinated basis for the support of activities of the three national operating committees, each of which had previously raised its own funds. The Finance Committee now consists of a Chairman who is appointed by the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, thirteen area vice chairmen, fifty-three state finance chairmen, some of whom are also area chairmen, and seventeen appointed members.

Each December a Budget Committee appointed by the National Finance Committee Chairman meets to consider budget requests submitted by the three national operating committees. Basic presentations are made by the committee chairmen. On occasion their division heads are called on to support particular requests.

After examining the three proposed committee budgets and considering the general prospects for fund-raising in the coming year, the Budget Committee formulates a composite budget for the three committees. The National Committee budget has always been larger than that of either of the other committees but the ratios vary from year to year.

## SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL FINANCE COMMITTEE BUDGETS, 1956 - 1958

Year	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>
Total Budget	\$7,000,000	\$1,975,000	\$3,650,000
% to Natl. Comm.	42.9%	62.7%	56.0%
% to Cong. Comm.	38.8%	27.6%	29.0%
% to Sen. Comm.	18.3%	9.7%	15.0%

After the joint budget has been developed, state quotas are assigned. Since 1945 the fund-raising job is apportioned among the states and territories on the basis of a formula which gives equal weight to each of the following six factors:

1. Electoral vote; 2. Republican vote in last presidential election; 3. Population; 4. Purchasing power; 5. Personal income tax collections; 6. Number of occupied dwelling units.

Each state and territory's percentage of the national total of each of these items is determined, and the average of these six figures is the percentage of the national budget which is assigned as a quota for each state or territory.

Although calculating quotas is somewhat complicated, it is incomparably more simple than collecting them. There are several serious hurdles which stand in the path of anyone trying to raise funds for the national operations of an American political party.

Corporations and unions are forbidden to contribute to political campaigns. The Hatch Act forbids individual gifts of more than \$5,000. The fact that gifts to other types of socially productive causes are tax deductible tends to deter non-deductible giving to parties. A major problem stems from the fact that funds are normally raised by finance committees in the various states and there is a perennial tendency to take care of every conceivable financial need in the state before sending to Washington whatever may be left.

A veteran Republican fund-raiser has described his job as "an operation of enticement and allurement." There are few effective threats which can readily be used against the non-giver. Some fund-raisers have said that in their activities they rely on the same combination of traditional party loyalty, interest in particular issues, and popularity of individual candidates that the Survey Research Center has found explains voter choice.

Despite the best efforts of the Finance Committee members, it is not unusual for a state to fail to meet its quota. The following table presents the figures for a four year period.

NUMBER OF STATES AND TERRITORIES CONTRIBUTING VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF QUOTAS TO REPUBLICAN NATIONAL FINANCE COMMITTEE, 1954 - 1957

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956.</u>	<u>1957</u>
Met or exceeded Quota	11	41	40	7
Raised 80 - 100%	16	0	0	2
50 - 80%	18	2	7	11
20 - 50%	15	5	4	11
0 - 20%	4	5	2	22



When too few funds are raised to support budgeted programs, reductions are made on the basis of discussions held among the principal personnel of the three operating committees and the Finance Committee. Whatever activities appear to be expendable, are abandoned or curtailed until the financial situation permits their resumption. It was under these circumstances that the National Committee went several months in 1958 without publishing its theoretically monthly publication, Straight from the Shoulder.

Although there would appear to have been obvious dangers involved in the establishment of this autonomous Finance Committee, there has apparently been no occasion in the eighteen years since its creation when its leaders made a serious attempt to use their control of the purse strings to control party policy. Donors of funds to political parties have for many years attempted to gain power or influence in exchange for their contributions and this situation has not changed. The creation of the Finance Committee, however, has not been used to increase their leverage in the fashion that might have been expected. Partly this is undoubtedly a result of the fact that the Chairman of the Finance Committee is an appointee of the National Committee Chairman. Partly it undoubtedly stems from the fact that the contributors of funds have other channels through which they can make their views felt.

It occasionally happens that the Republican organization in some state is displeased by some move which the national organization has made or proposes to make and threatens to withhold funds from the national organization unless its views are taken into account. Normally the national leadership can quiet the revolts through a sympathetic exchange of communications, but if the state's objections are reasonable and concern a matter directly affecting that particular state, the national leaders may acquiesce. One instance of this occurred when it was announced that a person defeated for re-election to a post in a state organization was to be appointed to office in a regional Republican organization. State organization leaders denounced this as indirect interference with their internal operations and threatened to suspend all contributions to the national organization. Their protest and threat were successful and the announced appointment was not made.

#### Campaign Activity

Just as the effectiveness of a political party is determined in the last analysis by its ability to win elections, so a political committee can be evaluated in terms of its contribution to election campaigns. In this field of campaign activity the national committee of an American party is in a peculiar position.

During campaigns it becomes obvious to what extent the American political party is in fact a federation of state parties rather than

a national organization. The activities of such groups as Citizens for Eisenhower and Americans for Democratic Action, which may either cooperate or compete with the regular party organization, constitute a major challenge. The question of how to deal with candidates for Congress other offices who freely criticize national party leadership is a perennial problem.

Although the responsibility of a national committee in a presidential campaign is direct and gargantuan, its role in campaigns waged by other candidates of the party is indirect and ambiguous. Over the years the Republican National Committee has attempted to adjust to the difficulties which stem from its unique situation and perform effectively the campaign functions to which it is suited. In these efforts the Committee has had varying degrees of success.

The National Committee, in cooperation with the Senatorial and Congressional committees, renders a substantial amount of assistance to the party's candidates during every campaign. These services include the preparation of fact books, speakers kits, and voting records. Tours for national-level speakers are arranged and limited amounts of money are distributed. These direct services in which the National Committee engages are similar in kind to those rendered by every state committee, but in addition the National Committee has an additional campaign responsibility which is unique.

The crucial campaign job for which the National Committee must take the initiative if anything substantial is to be done is the coordination of the party's campaign for the House, the Senate, and in alternate elections the White House. This task of planning over-all campaign strategy was done informally and with limited effectiveness for many years. Since 1952 there has been a systematic attempt to do this job as well as possible.

In 1952 the party's approach to the job of winning votes in November was developed and set forth in a booklet known as the Campaign Plan, of which three copies were prepared. This plan was originally prepared by Robert Humphreys, then Publicity Director of the National Committee and now the Committee's Campaign Director. It was considered in draft form by a Republican Strategy Committee consisting of the chairmen of the National, Senatorial and Congressional committees and three members of the National Committee staff. After it was considered by Eisenhower and Nixon and their advisors it was put in final form, and throughout the campaign it provided a framework within which decisions on particular questions of campaign tactics could be considered.

The existence of this Campaign Plan was kept secret throughout the 1952 campaign. Shortly after the election it was revealed that such a document had been prepared, and portions of it have since been shown to several persons outside the party hierarchy. It was disclosed after the 1956 election that a similar Campaign Plan had been used in that campaign. This system of outlining the principal



features of the party's strategy in each campaign appears to be a sensible approach to the National Committee's job of providing basic planning and coordination for the candidates' appeals. It is easy, however, to exaggerate its significance.

By this time a belief has developed in some quarters that these documents are the quintessence of the "hidden persuader's" black magic. This is not correct. Each Campaign Plan has been an essentially straightforward analysis, in orthodox terms, of the party's strengths and weaknesses and the campaign approaches which it has been agreed offer the best prospect of producing victory in the election. They set forth general time tables for different types of campaigning and list target areas in which campaigning is to be concentrated. They explain the general pattern for the allocation of funds, the way in which various communications media will be used, and times and places at which it is planned to have major speeches given. Nowhere in a Campaign Plan document is there evidence of the use of motivation analysis or other types of opinion research of a kind more esoteric than that which is regularly presented in the general press.

The authors of each Campaign Plan have been prevented from including in its call for action anything which deviates significantly from what the party's candidates would have decided to do on their own, for the same reason that the National Committee in its other activities must move cautiously. There are no effective sanctions available through which to secure compliance with a National Committee decision.

This illustrates what in a sense is the basic problem with which the National Committee is confronted. Its responsibility far exceeds its authority. Campaign coordination is only one of several important jobs which must be done by the National Committee if they are to be done at all and for which the Committee is inadequately equipped.

The National Committee has virtually no coercive powers. It can not fire anyone except members of its own staff. It can not readily punish at future elections office holders who do not cooperate with it. It has no effective way of securing compliance with its programs. The unfortunate truth is that now and for the foreseeable future the National Committee must operate without enough tools to do the jobs for which it, as the central office of the party, can logically be held responsible.



TEXT OF ADDRESS

BY

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September 6, 1958

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

PANEL DISCUSSION ON

MADISON AVENUE TECHNIQUES IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

I am pleased to be here today, but in all honesty I must admit that I realize that your invitation was not so much to me as to one of the persisting myths of our decade. The myth of the Madison Avenue ad man.

This myth wears a grey flannel suit. He speaks a special exotic language, and he is - in the political arena anyway - a magician. He is more potent than Merlin or Mandrake. His magical powers are boundless. Put in his hands, the most ignorant party hack - a man with the physical properties of a Nast cartoon, the speaking voice of a grog and the personality of a cabbage -- your gray fannel myth will simply wave his magic wand and presto - the hack has been transformed. The voters have been nypnotized. If the Madison Avenue man gives them the word, they will happily troop to the polls to vote for Joe Stalin.

As I said, I am grateful for your invitation. If nothing else, I hope it will allow me to destroy this flattering but almost wholly untrue bit of 20th century mythology.

The things the advertising man can do with his magical tools - billboards, newspaper ads, radio and TV are severely limited in a very practical way.

They are limited by what he is given to work with. There is, frankly, nothing he can do about a sow's car. No matter how many slogans he decorates it with, on TV or radio, it is still quite obviously a sow's ear. Albert Lasker, one of advertising's greats once made the sage observation that won't sell without advertising won't sell with it, either. There is another limitation, too. That is, the limit of susceptibility of the audience. In recent years, this has been vastly underrated because this same audience has shown an apparently bottomless capacity to absorb soap commercials. Let me make this clear to you. People buy ideas, not products. Soap is in one particular category. They feel differently about politicians, no matter what you may have heard. To begin with they are suspicious of politicians. What sometimes passes for apathy is probably closer to suspicion.

Very simply, you can't sell a politician like a bar of soap. People won't elect a detergent to public office. My subject is the uses of TV in politics and I don't want to give you the impression that I deprecate it.

Aside from the obvious fact that that would be bad for any business, it is perfectly true that TV is an important - and can be a decisive factor in a campaign. People vote less for an issue than an image. TV is the greatest image purveyor of all time. But let's be clear what we mean by image. We mean a total impression. That total impression is the result of many random, casual and not so casual impressions.

What TV can do is strengthen the impression. Clarify it if it is blurred. TV can concentrate, focus, emphasize, but it cannot create an image that is not at least embryonic already. It cannot make a

fat man appear thin, it cannot make an inarticulate man silver-tongued, it cannot create sincerity where sincerity does not exist. The last point may trouble some of you. You may even have, in your memory, an instance to rebut me. Nevertheless, I insist it is true. What a man is, how he really feels, come through on the 21 inch screen. The image you see may not be one you admire. But if the voters accept it you can feel pretty certain they are getting what they want, they aren't being fooled by what they see. They may be wrong but they are not misled. The president who perhaps more than any other represents in many people's minds an image, manufactured artificially, is Warren G. Harding. But I think it would be hard to argue that the people in voting for him did not get exactly the kind of man they wanted. The results may not have been all some people hoped. But, that's not the point. What is the point is that people voted for Mr. Harding because he was what he was, not because they thought he was something different.

Let me make one more general point. It is obvious that the best qualified candidate may not be the candidate with the slickest speaking manner or the handsomest face. A lot of people worry about that -- about a handsome front man being put up to get the TV vote.

In my opinion, it's one thing we don't have to worry about. In the first place, TV is only a tool. I doubt if the day will ever come when Madison Avenue picks the candidates.

To paraphrase Mr. Stalin's famous remark: "How many votes does Madison Avenue have?" The answer is that Madison Avenue has not patronage, no constituents, no delegates. As long as our political system retains some vestige of its present form the candidates will be selected by



the pros, who operate a considerable distance from Madison Avenue both geographically and psychologically.

In the second place the voters are, as I have said, a suspicious lot. Sincerity means a good deal more in my not inexperienced opinion than a handsome face or a pleasant voice.

Why, then, do the political parties need Madison Avenue? Very simply because television is a tool. It's a very technical tool, No intelligent man would undertake to fly an airplane without engaging a pilot. What Madison Avenue can legitimately and helpfully contribute can be put in too much overworked words: "KNOW HOW"

We can tell a candidate how to look his best and speak his best before the cameras. We can tell him what lens to look into, what kind of a shirt to wear. We can tell him what length of time he should speak to get the most concentrated audience attention. We can help him put together the kind of TV program on film that will help hold that audience.

We are the technicians. It is up to us to see that the tools work. It is not up to us - and should not be up to us - to decide what is done with the tools. Some outsiders have had the feeling that Madison Avenue is about to take over the policy-making function. As a bloodied veteran of many campaigns, let me assure you that the opposite is true. In a good many cases the extent of our influence is to convince the candidate, by the end of the campaign, to read his speeches from teleprompter instead of from notes in his hand.

There has, of course, been a revolution in political campaigning . . . No question about that. And it has been a TV revolution. It has taken the candidate down off the stump and brought him into the living room. The day of the silver-tongued orator is over. No man can orate to an audience of one sitting in front of his TV set with his shoes off drinking a cold beer and ready any moment to switch the dial to the ball game. But the real meaning of this revolution has been misunderstood. We had demagogues before - we will probably have them again. In the future, they will use TV and probably effectively. But whether they succeed or not will not depend on TV - but on the people.

It is quite true that with one speech a candidate can be seen and heard by at least a hundred times the number of people who might have been able to see and hear him in an entire campaign in pre-TV days. But, by the same token, if the audience was small in those days, it was at least captive. People had to listen. They don't on TV. They don't have to tune in. And, if they do tune in, nothing is simpler than tuning out again.

Furthermore, the candidate is competing against Lawrence Welk, Walt Disney and Playhouse 90. His chances of being heard above the roar of Western guns are not ideal.

This, in fact, is one sure safeguard against TV dominating politics -- the natural apathy of the voters. All things being equal they will choose a Quiz Show even though it may be more fixed than an old time ward election.

However, there is a huge potential TV audience for any candidate. He will be widely seen. He will make an impression. That impression

will count heavily in the voting booth. How does he go about making a winning impression? It may sound obvious to say this but Madison Avenue has been credited with such potent magic that I think it may also be necessary to explain. It will be a good idea if the candidate has an issue.

Given the right issue, the effect of TV can be devastating. It was revealed in the waning days of a campaign in which I was recently involved, that our opposition had written a very damaging letter. We had been campaigning against a corrupt administration and this letter drove home our point. Our candidates went on TV. He used no tricks - no gimmicks. He spoke straight to his audience. He told them the story very matter of factly.

What TV did was to give him a chance to bring his case to the voters in a way no other medium could. Perhaps you could say TV had a big hand in winning this election. But then, you would have to go on to say it was not TV but the issue that really turned the tide. TV was, as it must always be, only the means.

Can TV create a candidate? I would think not. Attempts have been and will be made to wrap a mediocrity in a polyethelene box, mark him the giant economy size and try to sell him to the electorate as a bargain. It hasn't worked. I don't think it ever will work.

In all the political campaigns that have been waged on TV in the past few years, there has been no indication that you can sell the American people a candidate in the same manner you can sell them a tube of striped tooth paste.



What this medium does put a premium on is communication, on making contact. The candidate comes into the viewer's home. He comes as a stranger and he must prove to be an interesting guest or out he goes with the twist of a dial.

Perhaps in the future this will cause more emphasis to be placed on a candidate's ability to communicate himself to people. I don't believe this is a bad thing. Politics, as much as TV, is a matter of the ability to persuade. A good politician, and I use the word in its proper, useful sense, in the sense of politics being what makes our democratic system work -- a good politician has to communicate, to persuade.

The greatest politician of our time, Franklin Roosevelt, would have loved TV. To any good politician it is a useful tool. It is a means of reaching the voters - to explain the need for a New Deal or the need for a police action in Korea. Occasionally, this emphasis on communication may cause us to overlook a worthy man who does not communicate well. But it is my conviction that such a man is not really suited to our political system in the first place.

Whether you like it or not, ours is a system that demands that its leaders be able to explain themselves continuously to the voters, to persuade the voters to go along with them.

TV didn't invent that. It didn't invent demagogues. We had Huey Long before we had TV. We also had Abraham Lincoln. And I think Mr. Lincoln would have been just fine on TV. And, don't forget it was TV that destroyed the great demagogue of our era - Joe McCarthy.

Basically what I am trying to say to you is this: TV is an instrument. It can be used well or badly. It can help a candidate for political office or it can damage him. But, it cannot create the candidate. At its best, it can show him clearly for what he is. It can help him explain clearly what he stands for. It can help him put the issues clearly before the voters. It can create an image in this sense only. But - it cannot make anyone into something he is not. It will fail if it tries. If the candidate is a fake you will know it. The TV eye is merciless. You cannot pretend something is there which is not there. But, if you have something to say, and you have someone to say it, TV can furnish you with an unequalled forum.

More people will see you. More people will hear what you have to say. This is the best service Madison Avenue can offer. In a sense, it is the only service. We are not magicians in grey flannel suits. Sometimes, we wish we were. But we are not. We are only effective when we have a candidate and effective issues. The hard sell may peddle soap but it cannot peddle people. It is easy to underestimate the voter. He is usually badly informed. . . but he is a lot smarter than we think he is.

This has always been the saving grace of our democracy. TV has not changed that. In a political campaign on TV it has been my experience that it is pretty hard to fool most of the people even part of the time.

